{

GROUP R E S E A R C H S T U D Y *

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OP THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT f S PART

IN THE

INITIATION AND CONDUCT OF THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

SUBUTTED BT:
HAROLD E. MINER,
Major, F i e l d A r t i l l e r y *

THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL,

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

6 April, 1933

FOR: The Director Second Year Class, Tbo Cotjnand and

General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

SUBJECT: A C r i t i c a l Analysis of the B r i t i s h Government^

Bart in the I n i t i a t i o n and Conduct of the G a l l i p o l i

Campaign*

! PAPERS ACCOMPANYING:

A Bibliography for t h i s Study

II THE STUDY PRESENTED. - A c r i t i c a l analysis of what the

B r i t i s h Government, p r i n c i p a l l y the War O f f i c e , did to help or hinder

the i n i t i a t i o n and conduct of the army campaign on the G a l l i p o l i

Peninsula*

III. HISTORICAL FACTS RELATING TO THE SUBJECT.

Prior to the World War the problem of foroing the Dardanelles

had been discussed i n a more or l e s s perfunctory manner but no d e t a i l e d

plans had been made. In 1904, Sir John Fisher, F i r s t Sea Lord, made on

examination of the problem and reported that even with t h e oooperaticn of

the army the operation would be mighty hazardous, (l) In 1906, the

problem was again examined by both the Admiralty and the War Off i O e# As

a r e s u l t of t h i s study the General S t a f f stated t h a t they were not pre

pared t o recomrrend i t s being attempted; but the Naval I n t e l l i g e n c e Depart*

ment believed i t would be < one. (2) In 1908 p the operation was again

considered by the War O f f i c e . At t h i s time the General Staff thought

that t h e operation could be successfully oonducted using 20,000 men and

the fldfct i f secrecy ccwld be obtained* (3) In 1911, t h e question was

(1) As, I, 27; Rob* I, 77

(2) As, I, 28; Call, 4; Rob, I, 77-8.

(3) As, I, 29.

1
again reviewed by the General Staff and it reaffirmed the opinion of

1906, largely because it was not belieyed that surprise could be effected*

(4) Thoro was no further study prior to the outbreak of the Wr.r#

On 31st August, 1914, the Turkish problem was discusaed by Mr,

Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty and Field Marshall, Lord

Kitchener, Secretary of State tor War* The next day in the absence of

Kitchener in France, Churchill wrote to the Chief of the Imperial Goneral

Staff stating that he, Churchill, had arranged with Kitchener for two

officers from the Admiralty to consult with two officers from the War Office

in order to examine and work out a plan for the seizure by means of a

(rroek army, the Gallipoli Peninsula, with a view of admitting a British

ffceet into the Marmora* (5) Nothing seems to have resulted from this

effort on the part of Mr. Churchill except a reply from General Callwell,

Director of Military Operations, statiAg that in the opinion of the General

Staff the attaok proposed would be extremely difficult and woulo ot be

justifiable wita less than 60,000 men and heavy ordnance* It is interest*

ing to note that General Callwell was a member of the Staff that formu
lated the opinion of 1906* (6)

Being unable to get the War Office to take an active interest

in the Dardanelles project, on 4th September, Mr* Churchill had a oable

sent to Admiral Kerr, head of the British Naval Mission to Greece, giving

him permission to consult with the Greek government in regard to a plan

against Turkey* Admiral Kerr replied that the Greek General Staff had

stated that, subject to certain conditions in regard to seourity, the Greek

plan for taking the Dardanelles was now ready* (7)

On 31st October, open hostilities between Great Britan and Turkey

broke out and on 3d November the British fleet, under Admiral Carden,

bombarded the outer forts of the Dardanelles* (6)

Early in January the Admiralty esked for an received from Admiral

(4) As, I, 29.

(5) As, I, 45; Ch, I, 631; Buch, II, 3*

(6) As, I, 41; Ch, I, 632*

(7) As, I, 42; Ch, I, 632-3*

(8) As, I, 34; Ch, I, 541*

Garden a plan for the reduction of the Dardanelles This plan was en
tirely naval and contemplated the forcing of a passage by a series of piece
meal attacks* (9) During the disoussicns of this plan, Kitchener stated

that there were no troops available; but he thought Cardan's plan worth

trying* (10) On 28th January, the War Council made the final decision

for the navy to attack the Dardanelles without the assistance of the army;

but with the reservation that the attack would be withdrawn at any time

if it did not promise suocess* (11) However, the project was not ex
haustively examined by either the Army or Navy Staffs and intelligence

about the Turkish strength and preparations was vague# (12)

On 16th February the War Council seems to have had some misgivings

on the probable success of a purely Naval operation and it directed that

the 29th Division should be sent from England to the island of Lemnos, to
gether with some other troops f rom Egypt, and that the Navy should collect

small boats* These forces were to be made available, in case of necessity,

to support the naval attacks* (13) However, it was still diffioult to

get troops &way from Kitchener and the 29th Division was not actually em
barked until the middle of March. (14)

Meanwhile the British fleet, reinforced by some French units,

began to carry out the Card en plan for foroing the Dardanelles* On 19th

February, they bombarded the outer forts On 25th February the operations

were resumed and carried on as weather permitted, so that by the middle of

March the fleet, aided by small landing parties, had reduced the outer

forts and practically cleared the ohannel toward the Narrows of Vines* (15)

On the morninj? of 18th March, the whole fleet attacked the Narrows; but

waso forced to withdraw during the late afternoon after the loss of three

ships and serious damaging of three others* (Id)

(9) Ch, II, 93; As, I, 55; Call, 11 #

(10) As, I, 57; Ch, II, 103, 167,

(11) As, I, 61; Ch, II, 165,167.

(12) As, I, 68; Ch, II, 197; Call, 32; Buch, II, 29.

(13) As, I, 68; Ch, II, 180; Call, 29; Buoh, II, 28.

(14) Ch, II, 188; fluch, II, 28*

f Ch, II, 190-224; As, II, 77-82

(Iff) Ch, II, 225-233J As, II, 96-98

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 E^ the last week of February the War Council oame around to the

idea that the Dardanelles campaign, having been started oould not be aban
doned, f<nd Kitchener seems to have agreed with this idea* (17)

The part that the Army was to play in the Dardanelles oampaign

was still exceedingly hasy but Kitchener decided that he should have a

senior army officer on the spot, so on 12th March he send for Ian Hamil
ton and ordered him to Lemnos* (18)

Kitchener 1 s instructions to Hamilton were of the vaguest kind

and showed the government still hesitating between naval and conjoint op
erations* Hamilton was to avoid landing if possible; but if the fleet

failed and landings became imperative, hone should be made until full

force available had been assembled* Landing 6n the Asiatic tdhore* was

thoroughly deprecated* (f9>) The War Office General Staff was of little

assistance to Hamilton, it had no plans whatever for possible operations

and all the intelligence branch was able to furnish was one text book, one

book of traveler's tales and an old map* (20)

Hamilton left London on 13th March with a few general staff offi
cers* There were many vacancies on his general staff yet to be filled

and no special staff were in the party* In fact none of the special staff

arrived in Egypt until two weeks after Hamilton's arrival there* Hamil
ton had had no choice in the selection of his staff nor of his subordinates

generals* ( M )

Hamilton arrived at the Dardanelles in tirm to see the naval

action of 18th March* He found that some of his troops had already ar
rived at Mudroe on the island of Lemnoe* The transports had been loaded

with no thought given to the use of the troops as a landing force - there

were troops on on ship, their machine guns and ammunition on another;

guns in one ship, their l i t e r s in another, eto* Before any landings

on a hostile shore could be made it would be neoessary to unload all the

(1?) As, I, 76; Ch, II, 183.

(18) H, I, 1; As, I, 87; Ch, II, 210*

(a&) Buoh, II, 28; H, I, 2-16; Call, 33; Ch, II, 211*

(2ft) H, I, 13; As, I, 90; Ch, II, 212*

(21) H, I, 16 5 19,70; Buch, II, 31; As, I, 88, 116*

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transports* resort the troops and equipment, and reload the transports

with troops and equipment disposed for landings* The harbor of Mudros

was entirely urauitod for any suoh work, there were no piers, very few

lighters, no storage facilities and little freah water Under these

circumstances Hamilton asked for an reoeived permission to movo his base

to Alexandria, Egypt (22)

It should be noted at this point that the plan of operation at

the Dardanelles changed materially after the naval operation of 18th

March* The original plan had been to force the Dardanelles by use of the

naval force alone* By the end of February this * plan was changed to one

where some sort of land force was to be made available in oase of necessity

to assist the fleet* About 21st of March, as a result of recommenda

tions of Admiral de Robeck, who had siuooeeded Admiral Carden, and concurred

in by the Admiralty, the plan was agiin changed to one where the army was

to play the chief role, and the navy the secondary role of assisting the

army* (2$)

At Alexandria, Hamilton found that the equipment of his troops

was exceedingly faulty* There was little or no landing gear, nor proper

means for transporation of supplies after troops were landed* T^ere was

a shortage of bombs, hand grenades, artillery ammunition, trench mortars

and artillery* There was a shortage of engineers id othor special troops

and many of the line units were under strength* No provisions had boon

made for replacement of either mon or ammunition* (24}'

Hamilton and his staff set about the difficult task of unloading

and reloading the transports, of training the troops aid of supplying the

many deficiencies in equipment* Some of the needed equipment was impro

vised in the shops in Egypt, some was furnished b$ the Navy from Malta,

and a little came out from England* (25)

!ty April the transports had been reloaded and the little army set
m m* m m m

(22) As, I, 95,108; Ch, II, 198,243,245,253; Buoh, II, 33; H, I, 27,43;
Call, 34.
(2) Ch, II, 247-8; 363; As, I, 98,99; Cull, 33; H, I, 230.
(24^; H, I, 24, 43,44,46,52; As, I, 110, 117,119,120; Call, 36,66,69;

H, II, 280.

(26) As, I, 120; H, I, 64,73.

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 out again for Leanos* There were the 29th Division, the Anxao Corps
of two divisions plus two brigades, the French Division, end the Royal
Naval Division, in all about 76,000 men. (26) There were s t i l l grave
deficiencies in equipment* The most serious of which were: (a) a shortage
of ammunition, especially of artillery ammunition, hand grenades and
trench bombs; (b) a shortage of artillery; the Royal Naval Division had
practically none and there were few howitzers and those mostly of an old
type; (c) a shortage of air planes - the army had none and the navy very
few, for the Anzae landing there were no airplanes available and only two
were available for the He lies landings; (d) a shortage of hospital ships
and medical equipment> transports and lighters had to bo used to supply
this defect* (27)
' The foregoing Covers the action of the government in the i n i t i a
tion of the campaign, i*e* f the time up to 25th April when the first land
ings were made* We shall now take up the actions of the government after
that date*
This will t e l l the story of a shortage of anmunition, especially
of shell and hand grenades, a shortage of guns, especially of howitzers
end trench mortars, and a shortage of replacements; a story of ammunition
*nd guns and men that arrived too late, and a story of a government whioh
s t i l l pursued a hazy and unintelligent war policy*
The Official History reports that from 26th to 30th April the
losses eanong the British troops at Helles, were 187 offioers and 4,266 men
and among the Ansaos were 208 officers and 4,738 men* To replace these
there sailed from England on 30th April, one offioer and 46 men for each
battalion of the 29th Division and from Egypt there were sent, ontthe
same date two brigades for the Anzaos and on the next day all available
officers for the 29th Division* (26)
Hn the f i r s t week in May an Indian Brigade, and the 42d Division
began arriving from Egypt* Kitchener had refused to permit Hamilton, to
(26) As, I, 139; Buch, II, 34*
(27) As, I, 120,139,145; Buoh, I I , 210; H, I, 110*
(28) As, I, 301,305,315*

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to include the Indian Brigade in his original force, and n w they arrived

too late to have any material effeot, whereas if they had been present

and available on the day of the initial landings or the day after, Hamilton

might have been able to put them at a oritioal point with telling effect* (29)

After the first Battle of KritMa on 28 April the shortage of

ammunition watt aoute and Hamilton had cabled asking to have more ammunition

sent out on rush order via Marseilles* In reply the Master General of Ord
nanoe cabled that he was sending 21,0C0 rounds, mostly shrapnel, by the

next relief ship* Hamilton cabled again with the result that ammunition

was finally sent via Marseilles but it arrived top late for the 2d Battle

of Krithia, 6-8 toy* (SO) For this latter battle there was barely anough

ammunition for one half hour bombardment, and on the 18th May the shortage

was such that the firings were reduced to two rounds per gun per day, and

there were only a dozen granades per company* (31) On 20th May, four Jap
anese? trench mortars arrived; but amunibion for them was soon exhausted*

(32) On 12th June the artillery ammunition arriving was equipped with a

new type of fuse for which no fuse wrench had been furnished, wilfo the result

that the ammunition could not be used until wrenches could be improvised or

sent out from England* (33)

On 14th May the War Council met for discussion of the Dardanelles

situation, and considered three plans: (a) to abandon the operation, (b)

to sond out strong reinforcements, .(o) to keep existing formations up to

strength, send out one fresh division and endeavor to wear dovm the Turks

by slow and steady pressure* As a result offlicrsediscussions Kitchener

oabled Hamilton asking him for an estimate of the force necessary to oarry

through the operations under assumption that foroe asked for vrould be sent*

In reply Hamilton cabled, 17th May, that if a Russian Corps were

to land on the Bosporus or if Greece or Bulgaria would declare war on

Turkey, then Hamilton hoped to complete the task with two fresh divisions,

but if existing conditions remained unchanged he would need four fresh

(29) Ch, II, 339j As, 1^01,305; J, I, 43,69,164,166*

(30) As, I, 288,326,348; H, I, 203,217.

(31) H, I, 199,236,268; As, I, 333; Aa, II, 30*

(32) As, II, 19; H, II, 296*

(33) H, II, 217,284,287*

7
 divisions* However, a Coalition Ministry was about to be formed and

no further action was taken for three weeks, except that the 62d Division

was sent out the latter part of May* (34) With the new cabinet the

Dardanelles Committee came into being and on 7th June it met and took up

the discussion of the Dardanelles situation* At the meeting, as the

result of Kitchenerfis advice, tho Committee decided to send out three

more fresh divisions "with a view to an assault in the second weak in July",

and further to send out some navel units less vulnerable to submarines

attacks A few days later the government's policy veered still more to
ward tho Dardanelles and at the end of July, when the offer was too late

to be of value it offered every man and gun Hamilton could use* (35)

However, generous were the intentions and promises of the Committee,

their fulfilment fell far short of even bare necessities* The more

serious defects were the shortage of guns expecially howitzers, some of those

tentc were old relics of the fourth African War, a shortage of anrounition

especially shell, and most serious of all, the lack of intelligence used

in the selection of a corps commander for the new units* Hamilton had

asked for Generals Byng or Rawlinson but received General Stopford, a man

with little energy and with little or no war experience, who had been

brought back from the retired list* (36)

The raw units having arrived, Hamilton fought the disasterous

battle of Anrac- Suvla Bay, May 7-10 August* ^hisbattle practically

marks the end of the campaign* General fyng came out 23d August when

his splendid energy and ability was of no avail* (37)

On 6th September, Bulgarian Joined the Austrians and Germans and

soon thereafter the Allies embarked on the Salonika expedition* Hamilton

was recalled on 17th October and soon thereafter Gallipoli was abandoned* (38)

IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM*

The Dardanelles campaign started as a purely naval operation - a

sort of experiment to be withdrawn at any time if it did not promise success*

Th* aimy was gradually drawn into the campaign, at first merely to assist

mm m ^ m tm

(30 As* I, 363; As, II, 4,6,7; H, I, 231*2.

(36) As, II, 66-59, 61,66; H, I, 283; H, II, 34; Ch, II, 411; Buch, II, 214.

(3S) As, II, 74,76,136, 326-6; H, I, 286-6,303-8; H, II, 35-36; Ch, II, 467;

Buoh, II, 241*

(37) As, II, 367, 178, 327; H, II, 106; Ch, II, 476;

(38) H, II, 210,224; 271} As, II, 575, 386.

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the navy if neoessary, but finally, at least in fact, the role was ohanged

and the arny played the dominant part assisted by the navy*

The oampaign started without any thorough staff studies having

been made; there was ignorance of the Turkish forces, fortifications and

equipment; there was ignorance of the terrain* No war plans had been

prepared, no equipment table devised. The expeditionary force sailed with

the war office and the commander in chief both ignorant as to where and

when and why the forces should be employed

The troops were loaded on the transports with no regard to their

possible use as a landing force on a hostile shore* There was shortage

of landing gear, of artillery, of ammunition,'and many other items*

Some of the units were under strength, and there was a shortage of engineers

and other special troops* No provision had been made for replacement of

equipment, artillery ammunition or men*

After the troops had landea, the vague ideas of the War Office

as to the why of the expedition were ever noticeable* Except perhaps

for a few weeks in July and August the expeditionary force was treated like

an illegitimate child and fed from the scraps left over from France*

There was always a shortage of artillery, especially of howitzers and a

deal of that present was of an ancient pattern, relics of the South African

War* T^ere was always a shortage of ammunition, especially of grenade,

and shell* At times there were soaroely a dozen grenades per company

on hand, and the artillery was limited to two rounds per gun per day*

There was always a shortage of replacements - Kitchener had initially re

fused to grant the expeditionary force the usual ten per cent and this

defect was never remedied* The War Office was always slow in granting

Hamilton9s request for reinforcing divisidns aid they frequently arrived

too late to tako part in the oritioal operation for which they were re
quested* This dilly dally policy of the War Office was most tragically

illustrated when it refused Hamilton1* request for Generals fyng or Raw

linson to command at the Suvla Bay - Ansao operation of August, sending

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instead General Stopford, a nan of l i t t l e energy and l i t t l e or no war
experience, who had been brought back from t h e retired l i s t * A short t i n e
l a t e r General Byng came out; but too l a t e t o r e p a i r t h e damage*
V. CONCLUSIONS OFTOEAUTHOR.
There w i l l ever be controversy among military men a s to whether
or not the Dardanelles campaign was j u s t i f i a b l e ; as t o whether or not i t
had any reasonable chance of sucoess; but there can nover be any contro
versy over the f a c t that one of the major causes of f a i l u r e nay be placed
upon the neglect on the p a r t of the War Office to make adequate prepara
t i o n for the campaign*
Again there w i l l ever be controversy among military men as to
whether or not Hamilton's operations subsequent t o the landings were t a c
t i c a l l y correot; but there never oan be any controversy over the faot t h a t
one of t h e major causes of t h e i r f a i l u r e was the neglect on the part of
the War Office to furnish adequate replacdment, adequate reinforcements,
adequate a r t i l l e r y and adequate ammunition and other supplies'*

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 B I B L I C 0 R A P B I .

KEY: (As, I I , 16) s No* 1 Text (below), Volume I I , page 76*

1* Aspinall-Oglander, Br. General C.F., "Official History of the War,

Military Operations: Gallipoli," Volumes I and I I , William H a ine
mann Ltd*, London, 1929

2* Buohan, Job, HA History of the Great War,H Volumes I and I I ,

Houghton Mifflin, Co*, New York, 1922

3* Callwell* Major-Oenoral Sir C.E*, "The Dardanelles 11, Houghton Mifflin

Co*, 1919*

4 . Churohill, Winston, S*, "The World Crisis, 1915", Volumes I and II*
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1923*

5* Hamilton, Sir Ian: "Gallipoli Diary", Volumes I and I I , George H*

Doran Co*, New York, 1920
6* Robertson, Sir William, ttSoldiers and Statesmen, 1914-1916*, Volume I ,
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1926

REFERENE
1* As - Aspinall-Oglander: "official History of the War, Military
Operations: Qallipoli* 11
2* Bach - Buchan, John: "A History of the Great War*11
3* Call - Callwell, Major General Sir C.E*: "The Dardanelles*11
H
4* Ch - Churohill, Winston S*: The World C r i s i s , 1915".
6. H - Hamilton, Sir Ian: "Gallipoli Diary11 *

6* Rob - Robertson, Sir William: "Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914-1918"*

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