Russian military deception
camouage,[2] soon extended to battleeld masking us-
Secret troop movements: World War II Russian IS-2 heavy tank a strategy of deception: I will force the enemy to take
moving through forest
Russian military deception, sometimes known as War is said to have been studied and widely used by the
Maskirovka (), is a military doctrine devel- KGB.[6]
oped from the start of the twentieth century. The doctrine
covers a broad range of measures for military deception,
ranging from camouage to denial and deception.
Deceptive measures include concealment, imitation with
decoys and dummies, manoeuvres intended to deceive,
denial, and disinformation. The 1944 Soviet Military En-
cyclopedia refers to means of securing combat opera-
tions and the daily activities of forces; a complexity of
measures, directed to mislead the enemy regarding the
presence and disposition of forces...[1] Later versions of
the doctrine also include strategic, political, and diplo-
matic means including manipulation of the facts, situa-
tion and perceptions to aect the media and public/world
opinion, so as to achieve or facilitate tactical, strategic,
national and international goals.
Deception contributed to major Soviet victories includ-
ing the Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk, and
Operation Bagration (in Belarus): in these cases, surprise
was achieved despite very large concentrations of force,
both in attack and in defence. The doctrine has also been
put into practice in peacetime, with denial and deception
operations in events such as the Cuban missile crisis, the
Prague Spring, and the annexation of Crimea.
1 Development of the doctrine
The Russian doctrine of military deception has evolved
with time, and it encompasses a number of mean-
ings. The Russian term (maskirovka) lit- invasion of Finland, white winter camouage was worn
erally means masking. An early military meaning was
ing smoke and other methods of screening.[3] From
there it came to have the broader meaning of military
deception,[4] widening to include denial and deception.[5]
1.1 Historical antecedents
The practice of military deception predates Russia. The
Art of War, written in 5th century BC and attributed to
the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tsu, describes
our strength for weakness, and our weakness for strength,
and thus will turn his strength into weakness. The Art of
1.2 Before the Second World War
The Russian Army had a deception school, active in 1904,
disbanded in 1929.[7] Meanwhile, military deception was
developed as a military doctrine in the 1920s. The 1924
Soviet directive for higher commands stated that opera-
tional deception had to be, in the historian David Glantz's
words, based upon the principles of activity, naturalness,
diversity, and continuity and includes secrecy, imitation,
demonstrative actions, and disinformation.[4] The 1929
Field Regulations of the Red Army stated that surprise
has a stunning eect on the enemy. For this reason all
troop operations must be accomplished with the great-
est concealment and speed.[4] Concealment was to be at-
tained by confusing the enemy with movements, camou-
age and use of terrain, speed, use of night and fog, and
secrecy. Thus 'in Soviet military art during the 1920s
the theory of operational maskirovka was developed as
one of the most important means of achieving surprise in
operations.'"[4] The 1935 Instructions on Deep Battle and
then the 1936 Field Regulations place increasing stress on
battleeld deception. The Instructions dene the methods
of achieving surprise as air superiority; making forces
mobile and manoeuvrable; concealing concentration of
forces; keeping re preparations secret; misleading the
enemy; screening with smoke and technical deception;
and using the cover of darkness.[8] In the 1939 Russian
by Soviet troops.[9]
1
2 1
Early usage: Red Army soldiers in winter camouage[9] near
Moscow, December 1941. RIA Novosti image 284
1.3 1944 concept
The 1944 Soviet Military Encyclopedia denes military
deception as the means of securing combat operations
and the daily activities of forces; misleading the en-
emy about the presence and disposition of forces, ob-
jectives, combat readiness and plans. It asserts that
maskirovka contributes to achieving surprise, preserving
combat readiness and the survivability of objectives.[1]
1.4 1978 concept
The 1978 Soviet Military Encyclopedia denes deception
similarly, placing additional stress on strategic levels, and
explicitly including political, economic and diplomatic
measures besides the military ones. It largely repeats the
1944 Encyclopedias concept, but adds that[10]
Strategic maskirovka is carried out at na-
tional and theater levels to mislead the enemy
as to political and military capabilities, inten-
tions and timing of actions. In these spheres, as
war is but an extension of politics, it includes
political, economic and diplomatic measures as
well as military.[10]
1.5 Modern doctrine
Russian military deception can be distinguished from two
other Russian terms in the same area.[11][12][13] Khitrost
means a commanders personal gift of cunning and guile,
part of his military skill, whereas deception is practised
by the whole organization and does not carry the sense of
personal trickiness; nor need the Russian use of decep-
tion be thought of as evil.[14] Indeed, Michael Handel
reminds readers, in the preface to Glantzs book, of Sun
Tzu's claim in The Art of War that all warfare is based on
deception; Handel suggests that deception is a normal and
indeed necessary part of warfare.[15] The goal of military
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
Soviet military deception at dierent operational levels of war as
theorized by Charles Smith;[3] this is not a Russian categorization.
deception is however surprise, vnezapnost, so the two are
naturally studied together.[16]
However, the military analyst William Connor cautions
that in the Soviet sense, the doctrine covers much more
than camouage and deception. It had, he suggested, the
connotation of active control of the enemy. By the time
of Operation Bagration in 1944, Connor argues, the Rus-
sian doctrine of military deception already included all
these aspects.[17] The meaning evolved in Soviet practice
and doctrine to include strategic, political, and diplomatic
objectives, in other words operating at all levels.[2] This
diers from Western doctrines on deception, and from
information warfare doctrines, by its emphasis on prag-
matic aspects.[2] According to the analyst James Hansen,
deception is treated as an operational art to be polished
by professors of military science and ocers who spe-
cialize in this area.[18] In 2015, Julian Lindley-French
described strategic Maskirovka as a new level of ambi-
tion established by Moscow to unbalance the West both
politically and militarily.[19]
In military intelligence,[20] the Russian doctrine
roughly corresponds to Western notions of denial and
deception.[2][21][22][23] The United States Army's Glos-
sary of Soviet Military Terminology from 1955 denes
maskirovka as camouage; concealment; disguise.[9]
The International Dictionary of Intelligence from 1990
denes it as the Russian military intelligence (G.R.U.)
term for deception.[9] Robert Pringles Historical Dic-
tionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence denes it
as strategic deception.[24] Scott Gerwehrs The Art of
Darkness summarizes it as deception and operational
security.[25] The historian Tom Cubbage comments that
military deception was enormously successful for the
Soviets, and whatever the United States might think, for
the Soviet Union it was something to make use of both
3.2 Rzhev-Vyazma, 1942 3

in war and in peacetime.[26] An article in The Moscow

Times explained: But has a broader mili-
tary meaning: strategic, operational, physical and tactical
deception. Apparently in U.S. military terminology, this
is called either CC&D (camouage, concealment and
deception) or more recently D&D (denial and decep-
tion). It is the whole shebangfrom guys in ski masks
or uniforms with no insignia, to undercover activities, to
hidden weapons transfers, towell, starting a civil war
but pretending that you've done nothing of the sort.[22]
In his comprehensive study, Soviet Military Deception in
the Second World War, Glantz summarizes the Russian
doctrine as involving both active and passive deception
and surprise. For the Soviets, deception permeated all
levels of war. And since they thought of war as just an
extension of politics by other means, deception could and
should be used and constantly considered in politics be-
fore a war began, if it was to work eectively.[27]

2 Measures
In 1988 Charles Smith analyzed the Soviet doctrine, con-
sidering it as a set of processes designed to mislead, con-
fuse, and interfere with accurate data collection regard-
ing all areas of Soviet plans, objectives, and strengths or Georgy Zhukov was a leading exponent of Soviet military decep-
weaknesses.[3] tion.

In addition, Smith identies dierent dimensions of Rus-

sian military deception. He divides it into multiple types
optical, thermal, radar, radio, sound/silence; multiple
environments aquatic, space, atmosphere each involv-
ing active or passive measures; and organizational aspects
mobility, level, and organization. The levels are the con-
ventional military ones, strategic, operational, and tacti-
cal, while organization refers to the military branch con-
cerned. Finally, Smith identies principles plausibility,
continuity through peace and war, variety, and persistent
aggressive activity; and contributing factors, namely tech-
nological capability and political strategy.[3][28]
3 In practice
3.1 Beginnings
The Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 was cited by Smith as
an early example of the successful use of deception; a
regiment had hidden in the forest, and the battle is seen
as the beginning of the freeing of the Russian lands
from Tatar rule.[3] At least three elements, namely de-
ception, concealment, and disinformation with false de-
fensive works and false troop concentrations, were used
by Georgy Zhukov in the 1939 Battles of Khalkhin Gol
against Japan. In his memoirs Zhukov described them as
such, noting that they were worked out at army group or
operational-tactical level.[29]
3.2 Rzhev-Vyazma, 1942
The rst oensive to have its own deception operation
was in Zhukovs part of the attack on the Rzhev-Vyazma
salient to the west of Moscow in July and August, 1942.
The oensive was conducted by Ivan Konev's Kalinin
Front on the north, and Zhukovs Western Front with
31st Army and 20th Army on the south. Zhukov de-
cided to simulate a concentration of forces some 200 km
to the south near Yukhnov, in the sector of his 43rd,
49th and 50th Armies. He created two deception op-
eration stas in that sector, and allocated 4 deception
(maskirovka) companies, 3 rie companies, 122 vehicles,
9 tanks and other equipment including radios for the de-
ception. These forces built 833 dummy tanks, guns, vehi-
cles, eld kitchens and fuel tanks, and used their real and
dummy equipment to simulate the unloading of armies
from a railhead at Myatlevo, and the concentration of
armour and motorized infantry as if preparing to attack
Yukhnov. The radios communicated false trac between
the simulated armies and Front headquarters. The real
tanks and other vehicles made tracks like those of troop
columns. When the Luftwae attacked, the deception
units returned re and lit bottles of fuel to simulate res.
The deception had the immediate eect of increasing
Luftwae air strikes against the railhead and false con-
centration area, while the two railheads actually in use
were not attacked. And the Wehrmacht moved three
panzer divisions and one motorized infantry division of
4 3 IN PRACTICE
XL Panzer Corps to the Yukhnov area. Meanwhile, the
real troop concentration to the north was conducted at
night and in thick forests. Zhukovs attack began on 4
August, and the 20th and 31st Armies advanced 40 km
in two days. The Russians claimed that surprise had been
achieved; this is conrmed by the fact that German in-
telligence failed to notice Zhukovs concentration of 20th
and 31st Armies on Rzhev. Other small oensives on
the same front had poorly planned and executed decep-
tion measures, but these were largely unsuccessful. The
successful deception for the attack on Rzhev showed that
military deception could be eective, but that only cer-
tain Red Army commanders applied it correctly.[30]
3.3 Battle of Stalingrad, 19421943
Successful deception: Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus (left), with
his chief of sta Arthur Schmidt (centre) surrender the encircled
German 6th Army at the end of the Battle of Stalingrad.
Military deception based on secrecy was critical in hid-
ing Soviet preparations for the decisive Operation Uranus
encirclement[31] in the Battle of Stalingrad.[32][33] In the
historian Paul Adairs view, the successful November
1942 Soviet counter-attack at Stalingrad was the rst in-
stance of Stavkas newly discovered condence in large-
scale deception. Proof of the success of the Soviet de-
ception came, Adair notes, from the Chief of the Ger-
man General Sta, General Zeitzler, who claimed early
in November that the Russians no longer have any re-
serves worth mentioning and are not capable of launch-
ing a large-scale attack. This was two months before
the German Sixth Army capitulated.[34] Hitlers own self-
deception played into this, as he was unwilling to believe
that the Red Army had sucient reserves of armour and
men. Further, the many ineective Red Army attacks
to the north of Stalingrad had unintentionally given the
impression that it was unable to launch any substantial at-
tack, let alone a rapid army-scale pincer movement.[35]
Careful attention was paid to security, with greatly re-
duced radio trac. The Germans failed to detect the cre-
ation of ve new tank armies.[36] Troop movements were
successfully concealed by moving the armies up only at
night, and camouaging them by day on the open, tree-
less steppes.[36]
Strategic deception included increasing military activ-
ity far away, near Moscow. At the sites of the planned
attack, elaborate disinformation was fed to the enemy.
Defence lines were built to deceive German tactical
reconnaissance.[36] Civilians within 25 kilometres of the
front were evacuated, and trenches were dug around the
villages for Luftwae reconnaissance to see.[33] Con-
versely, along the uninvolved Voronezh Front, bridging
equipment and boats were prepared to suggest an oen-
sive there.[36] The ve real bridges that were built for the
attack were masked by the construction of seventeen false
bridges over the River Don.[36]
To the south of Stalingrad, for the southern arm of the
pincer movement, 160,000 men with 550 guns, 430 tanks
and 14,000 trucks were ferried across the much larger
River Volga, which was beginning to freeze over with
dangerous ice oes, entirely at night.[36] Overall, Stavka
succeeded in moving a million men, 1000 tanks, 14,000
guns and 1400 aircraft into position without alerting their
enemy.[37] Despite the correct appreciation by German
air reconnaissance of a major build-up of forces on the
River Don,[38] the commander of the 6th Army, Friedrich
Paulus took no action. He was caught completely by sur-
prise, failing either to prepare his armour as a mobile re-
serve with fuel and ammunition, or to move it on the day
of the attack.[39] The historian David Glantz considered
that the concealment of the scale of the oensive was the
Red Armys greatest achievement.[40]
3.4 Battle of Kursk, 1943
Deception was put into practice on a large scale in the
1943 Battle of Kursk, especially on the Red Armys
Steppe Front commanded by Ivan Konev.[42][43] This was
a deception for a defensive battle,[44] as Hitler was plan-
ning to attack the Kursk salient in a pincer movement.
The Soviet forces were moved into position at night and
carefully concealed, as were the extensively prepared
defences-in-depth, with multiple lines of defence, mine-
elds and thousands of anti-tank guns.[45] Soviet defences
were quickly built up using deception techniques to con-
ceal the ow of men and equipment.[44] This was accom-
3.5 Operation Bagration, 1944 5

our well-camouaged tanks were waiting for him. As we

later learned from prisoners, we had managed to move
our tanks forward unnoticed.[48] Katukovs tanks were
concealed in defensive emplacements prepared before
the battle, with only their turrets above ground level.[48]
Glantz records that the German general Friedrich von
Mellenthin wrote[45]

The horrible counter-attacks, in which

huge masses of manpower and equipment took
part, were an unpleasant surprise for us... The
most clever camouage of the Russians should
be emphasized again. We did not .. detect even
Unexpected mineelds:[41] a Tiger tank damaged by a mine early one mineeld or anti-tank area until .. the rst
in the Battle of Kursk, under repair
tank was blown up by a mine or the rst Rus-
sian anti-tank guns opened re.[41]
panied by a whole suite of deception measures includ-
ing feint attacks, false troop and logistics concentrations,
radio deception, false airelds and false rumours.[46] In
3.5 Operation Bagration, 1944
mid-June 1943 German high command (OKH) had es-
timated 1500 Soviet tanks in the Kursk salient, against
the true gure of over 5100, and underestimated So-
viet troop strength by a million.[43] The historian Lloyd
Clark observes that while the Wehrmacht was feed-
ing on intelligence scraps, the Soviets were mastering
maskirovka".[43]

Abandoned vehicles of the German 9th Army encircled near

German intelligence Bobruisk, Belarus in Operation Bagration, 1944[49]
view of Belgorod front,
The 1944 Operation Bagration in Belarus applied the
on the south of the Kursk salient,
strategic aims and objectives on a grand scale,[50] to de-
2 August 1943
ceive the Germans about the scale and objectives of the
(GA: Guards Army; TA: Tank Army)
oensive.[51] The historian Paul Adair commented that
Once the Stavka had decided upon the strategic plan
for their 1944 summer oensive [Bagration], they began
to consider how the Germans could be deceived about
the aims and scale of the oensive... the key to the
maskirovka operation was to reinforce the German con-
viction that operations would continue along this [south-
ern] axis.[52] In particular, Stavka needed to be cer-
tain that the Germans believed the main Soviet attack
Actual Red Army would be in the south. The Soviet plan successfully kept
dispositions on Belgorod front, the German reserves doing nothing south of the Pripyat
showing concentrated forces ahead of 4th Panzer marshes until the battle to the north in Belorussia had al-
Army, ready been decided.[53] Stavka succeeded in concealing
2 August 1943 the size and position of very large movements of sup-
plies, as well as of forces including seven armies, eleven
aviation corps and over 200,000 troop replacements. As
The result was that the Germans attacked Russian forces for the strategic oensive itself, its location, strength and
far stronger than those they were expecting.[45][47] The timing were eectively concealed.[54] Stavka and the Red
commander of the Soviet 1st Tank Army, Mikhail Army applied the doctrine of military deception at three
Katukov, remarked that the enemy did not suspect that levels:[17]
6 3 IN PRACTICE
Strategic (theatre-wide):[55] Stavka hid the location,
strength, and timing of the attack, with dummy
troop concentrations on the anks displayed to the
enemy before the battle, other oensives timed to
work as diversions, and forces left where the enemy
expected an attack (3 tank armies in Ukraine), away
from the true location of the attack (Belarus)[17]
Operational: the Red Army hid the locations,
strengths and objectives of each force[56]
Tactical: each unit hid its concentrations of troops,
armour and guns[56]
The German Army Group Center (where the main at-
tack fell) underestimated Soviet infantry by 40%, mech-
anized forces by 300% and the number of tanks as 400 to
1800, instead of the 4000 to 5200 in fact arrayed against
them.[17] The German high command (OKH) and Adolf
Hitler grossly underestimated the threat to Army Group
Center, condently redeploying a third of its artillery,
half its tank destroyers and 88% of its tanks to the
Southern front where OKH expected the Soviet attack.
Only 580 German armoured vehicles were in place for
the battle.[57] In the battle, Army Group Center was al-
most totally destroyed, losing its Fourth Army encircled
east of Minsk, its Third Panzer Army (LIII Corps en-
circled in Vitebsk), and its Ninth Army encircled east
of Bobruisk.[58][59] In military historian Bruce Pirnies
view, the Germans were more completely fooled prior
to Operation Bagration than they had been prior to Oper-
ation Uranus [at Stalingrad]".[60] Pirnie concluded, based
largely on Bagration and Uranus with a look at other Sec-
ond World War operations, that the Soviet military de-
ception in Bagration was unsophisticated, but clever and
eective.[61] The Soviets succeeded in distorting OKHs
intelligence picture, given that German intelligence had
to rely mainly on radio intercept, aerial photography and
agents left behind in the territory they had once held.
Stavka deceived OKH by playing to their three sources of
information; Stavka systematically denied the Germans
real intelligence on Red Army forces as they concen-
trated for the attack, and revealed other real and simu-
lated forces in other places. However Stavka may have
come to do this, it played well to the Germans mental
attitude.[61]
Hitlers own reckless optimism and determination to hold
on to captured territory at all costs encouraged him to be-
lieve the picture suggested by the Russians. Meanwhile,
his advisors believed the Soviet Union was running out of
men and materiel, with much less industrial production
than it in fact had. Thus they underestimated the forces
ranged against them, a belief encouraged by continued
deception operations. Pirnie points out that it did not have
to succeed in every aspect to be successful. In Belarus,
the German armies involved had a good idea of the lo-
cations and approximate timing of Operation Bagration,
but the higher levels, Army Group Center and OKH failed
to appreciate how strong the attacks would be, or the in-
tention to encircle the Army Group. The combination
of display and concealment, directed at the highest com-
mand levels, typied their most successful deception.[49]
3.6 Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
American reconnaissance photograph showing Soviet nuclear
missiles in Cuba, 14 October 1962
The Soviet intelligence service and the Red Army
used deceptive measures to conceal their intentions in
Operation Anadyr, which led to the Cuban Missile Cri-
sis, from the USA.[62] According to CIA analyst James
Hansen, the Soviet Army most likely used large-scale bat-
tleeld deception before the Cuban Missile Crisis more
frequently and with more consistent success than any
other army.[18] The soldiers involved in Anadyr were
provided with winter clothing and informed they would
be going to the east of the Soviet Union. On board ship,
intelligence ocers allowed the 40,000 soldiers involved
on deck only during the hours of darkness. The force,
including missiles, reached Cuba before US intelligence
became aware of it.[62] Anadyr was planned from the start
with elaborate denial and deception, ranging from the sol-
diers ski boots and eece-lined parkas to the name of the
operation, a river and town in the chilly far east.[18] Once
America had become aware of Soviet intentions, decep-
tion continued in the form of outright denial, as when,
on 17 October 1962, the embassy ocial Georgy Bol-
shakov gave President John F. Kennedy a personal mes-
sage from the Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev reas-
suring him that under no circumstances would surface-
to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba.[63] Hansens anal-
ysis ends with a recognition of the Soviet advantage in
deception in 1962.[18] In Hansens view, the fact that the
Killian Report[64] did not even mention adversarial de-
nial and deception was an indication that American intel-
ligence had not begun to study foreign D&D; it did not
do so for another 20 years. Hansen considered it likely
that with a properly-prepared deception-aware analytic
corps, America could have seen through Kruschevs plan

long before Maj. Heysers revealing U-2 mission.[18] In
Hansens view, it would take four decades before Ameri-
can intelligence fully understood the extent of Soviet de-
ception before the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially the
way the Soviets hid the truth of its strategic missile de-
ployment behind a mass of lies, on a scale that most US
planners could not comprehend.[18]
3.7 Czechoslovakia, 1968
Main article: Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia
The Soviet Union made substantial use of deception while
preparing for their military occupation of Czechoslovakia
in 1968.[18] The historian Mark Lloyd called the eect on
the Prague Spring devastating.[65] When the Kremlin
had failed to reverse Alexander Dubcek's liberal reforms
with threats, it decided to use force, masked by deception.
The measures taken included transferring fuel and am-
munition out of Czechoslovakia on a supposed logistics
exercise; and conning most of their soldiers to barracks
across the northern Warsaw Pact area. The Czech au-
thorities thus did not suspect anything when two Aeroot
airliners made unscheduled landings at night, full of t
young men.[65] The men cleared customs and travelled
to the Soviet Embassy in the centre of Prague. There
they picked up weapons and returned to the airport, tak-
ing over the main buildings. They at once allowed fur-
ther aircraft to land uniformed Spetsnaz and airborne
troops, who took over key buildings across Prague before
dawn.[65] Reinforcements were then brought in by road,
in complete radio silence, leaving NATO Electronic War-
fare units confused and frustrated.[65]
3.8 Crimea and Ukraine, 2014
Soldiers with no insignia or badges of rank, Perevalne army base,
Crimea, 9 March 2014
Main articles: Annexation of Crimea by the Russian
Federation and War in Donbass
The 2014 annexation of Crimea was described in the
7
West as maskirovka. As the BBC writer, Lucy Ash put it:
Five weeks later, once the annexation had been rubber-
stamped by the Parliament in Moscow, Putin admitted
Russian troops had been deployed in Crimea after all.
But the lie had served its purpose. Maskirovka is used
to wrong-foot your enemies, to keep them guessing.[66]
The area was quietly occupied by so-called little green
men,[67] armed men in military trucks who came at night,
with no insignia, so that even pro-Russian activists did
not understand what was happening. They were later re-
vealed as Russian special forces, but at the time Vladimir
Putin denied this.[67][68] Time magazine reported in April
2014 that the troops in eastern Ukraine described them-
selves as Cossacks, whereas analysts in Ukraine and the
West considered at least some of them to be Russian
special forces. Their obscure origins made them seem
more menacing and harder to deal with.[69] The arti-
cle observed that the wearing of face masks (actually,
balaclavas) was typical of the Russian tradition of mil-
itary deception, making asking why they were worn, as
one masked separatist remarked, a stupid question.[69]
In April 2014, the Hungton Post asserted that Presi-
dent Putins game plan in Ukraine becomes clearer day
by day despite Russias excellent, even brilliant, use of its
traditional maskirovka".[70][71]
The subsequent war in the Donbass region of Ukraine has
also been described as a Russian maskirovka campaign.
As with Crimea, the conict began when armed 'rebel'
forces without military insignia began seizing government
infrastructure. Unlike the action in Crimea, there were no
Russian military bases to deploy soldiers from. Support
for Russia amongst the local population was not high, and
Donbass was larger and less isolated than the peninsula.
A variety of deceptions were practised.[72] Russia sent
humanitarian convoys to Donbass; the rst, of military
trucks painted white, attracted much media attention, and
was described as a wonderful example of maskirovka
by the US Air Force Major General Gen Davis.[66] Regu-
lar Russian troops have been captured by Ukraine numer-
ous times, making the deniability of their involvement in-
creasingly implausible.[73][74][75][76][77][78][79][80]
4 See also
Active measures
Fear, uncertainty and doubt
Operational art
Proxy war
Salami tactics
Soviet deep battle
5 References
8 5 REFERENCES

5.1 Citations [30] Glantz 1989, pp. 9093.

[1] Jones 2004, p. 166. [31] Pirnie 1985, p. 3.

[2] Hutchinson 2004, pp. 165174. [32] Pringle 2006, p. .

[3] Smith 1988. [33] Ziemke & Bauer 1987, pp. 443445.

[4] Glantz 1989, p. 6. [34] Adair 2004, p. 57.

[5] Absher, Kenneth Michael (1 January 2009). Mind-sets [35] Beevor 1999, p. 223.
and Missiles: A First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Strategic Studies Institute. p. 28. ISBN 978-1- [36] Beevor 1999, pp. 226227.
58487-400-3. Soviet military equipment and personnel [37] Showalter 2013, p. 1930.
were being sent to Cuba under an extensive denial and de-
ception plan (known as Maskirovka in Russian). Soviets [38] Beevor 1999, pp. 230.
traveled to Cuba posing as machine operators, irrigation
specialists, and agricultural specialists. [39] Beevor 1999, pp. 245.

[6] Albats 1994. [40] Glantz 1989, pp. 113.

[7] Thomas 2004, pp. 237256. [41] Glantz 1989, pp. 153, 153155.

[8] Glantz 1989, p. 7. [42] Frankson, Anders; Zetterling, Niklas (5 November 2013).
Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis. Taylor & Francis.
[9] Sare, William (9 July 1995). ON LANGUAGE; p. 107. ISBN 978-1-135-26817-6. which in turn cites
Surveilling Maskirovka. New York Times. Retrieved 6 Journal of Slavic Military Studies, no. 1, March 1994,
February 2015. Documents: Tank forces in Defense of the Kursk Bridge-
head and Operational Maskirovka According to Voronezh
[10] Shea, 2002
Front Experience, JulyAugust 1943, page 96.
[11] Bar-Joseph 2012, p. 25.
[43] Clark 2012, p. 222.
[12] Frank & Gillette 1992, p. 352.
[44] Clark 2012, p. 210.
[13] Vego 2009, p. 112.
[45] Glantz 1989, pp. 153.
[14] Glantz 1989, pp. xxxivxxxvi. [25]
[46] The authors state that they are summarizing from
[15] Glantz 1989, p. xxxiv. Glantz, 1989.

[16] Glantz 1989, pp. xxxviixxxviii. [47] Clark 2012, pp. 260, 262.

[17] Connor 1987, p. 22. [48] Clark 2012, p. 278.

[18] Hansen 2007. [49] Pirnie 1985, pp. 1415.
[19] Lindley-French 2015, pp. 110. [50] Connor 1987, pp. 2228.
[20] Ash, Lucy; Hickman, Katy (1 February 2015). Analysis: [51] Adair 2004, pp. 5861.
Maskirovka-Deception Russian Style (Video). BBC. Re-
trieved 6 February 2015. [52] Adair 2004, p. 58.

[21] Pringle 2006, p. 327. [53] Adair 2004, p. 59.

[22] Berdy, Michele A. (31 July 2014). Russias 'Maskirovka' [54] Connor 1987, p. 23.
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[23] Beaumont 1982. [56] Connor 1987.

[24] Pringle 2006, p. xvi. [57] Ziemke 1969, p. 11.

[25] Gerwehr et al. 2000. [58] Willmott 1984, p. 154.

[26] Cubbage & Handel 2012, p. 416. [59] Zaloga 1996, p. 7.

[27] Glantz 1989, p. 3. [60] Pirnie 1985, p. 11.

[28] Yenov & Chermoshentsev 1978, pp. 175177. [61] Pirnie 1985, p. 14.

[29] Glantz 1989, pp. 1213. [62] Pringle 2006, pp. 153155.
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Glantz, David (1990). The Role of Intelligence in So-
viet Military Strategy in World War II. Novato, CA:
Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-380-4.
Glantz, David (1991). Soviet Military Operational
Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London, England,
Portland, Oregon: F. Cass. ISBN 0-7146-4077-8.
Glantz, David (1991). From the Don to the Dnepr:
Soviet Oensive Operations, December 1942 Au-
gust 1943. London, England, Portland, Oregon: F.
Cass. ISBN 0-7146-3350-X.
Glantz, David (1992). The Military Strategy of the
Soviet Union: A History. London, England, Port-
land, Oregon: F. Cass. ISBN 0-7146-3435-2.
Janiczek, R. M. (May 2002). The New
Maskirovka: Countering US Rapid Decisive Oper-
ations in the 21st Century. US Marine Corps.
Keating, Kenneth C (1981). Maskirovka: The So-
viet System of Camouage (PDF). U.S. Army Rus-
sian Institute.
Krueger, Daniel W. (1987). MaskirovkaWhat Is
in It for Us? (PDF). Defense Technical Information
Center.
Latimer, Jon (2001). Deception in War. London:
John Murray. p. Chapter 10. ISBN 978-0-7195-
5605-0.
Melnikov, P. (April 1982). Wartime Experi-
ence in Camouage, Concealment, and Deception
(Maskirovka)". Voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal: 18
26. translated by Foreign Broadcast Information
Service in USSR Report: Military Aairs no. 1707,
20 September 1982, pp. 2233. JPRS no. 81805.
Shea, Timothy C. (2002). Post-Soviet Maskirovka,
Cold War Nostalgia, and Peacetime Engagement.
Military Review. United States Army Combined
Arms Center. 82 (3). (subscription required (help)).
7 External links
The dictionary denition of at Wik-
tionary
 11

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