CONDILLAC (1715 80) SENSATIONALISM

Born in Grenoble, the son of a lawyer, tienne de Condillac was educated at the seminary of Saint-Sulpice and at the Sorbonne,
where he studied theology. He was ordained in 1740, but devoted his life to philosophy rather than to his sacerdotal duties. He
was in close touch with the leading figures of the French Enlightenment and was a friend of Rousseau. In 1758 he became tutor to
Ferdinand of Parma, returned to France in 1767, and was elected to the Acadmie Franaise the following year. He died in the
Abbey of Flux near Beaugency.

LANGUAGE
[1] In his Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge Condillac supposed that language came into being 'naturally' in the context
of man's emerging rationality. We receive sensations and thence ideas. We reflect on this and link them together by using signs or
symbols [a]. A "well-constructed language" is necessary for human thinking. However, in his later Treatise on Sensations [I, iv] he
argues that even people limited to one sense, for example, smell can come to the idea of number (up to a maximum of three) even
before they acquire language. He would seem therefore now to admit the possibility of a prelinguistic intelligence [b] though
language is needed if our mental life is to develop fully.

METHOD/ KNOWLEDGE
[2] [Treatise on Systems] Condillac rejects the metaphysical rationalists' 'spirit of systems' (esprit de systme), which employs
deduction of conclusions from the definitions or axioms such philosophers suppose to be necessary truths about the world; for
definitions, he says, are only about meanings of words. But he does not reject systematization (esprit systmatique), which
involves the breaking down of what is given to us in sense-experience and the orderly arranging of the various parts of a 'science'
so as to make explicit the relations holding between them. He thus accepts the methods of 'analysis' and 'synthesis' provided
they utilize sensory phenomena and not the principles, definitions, and axioms of mathematics [a].
[3] The starting-point for knowledge, indeed the whole of one's psychological or mental life is, according to Condillac, sensations
(and their association) [see Treatise on Sensations] [a]. And by means of a 'thought-experiment' he tries to show that all the
operations of our minds can be understood as deriving from any of the five senses. He supposes [I, i] man to be a marble statue
possessing only the sense of smell, say of a rose. By 'attending' to his sensations he will acquire both memory impressions of
variable strengths and liveliness and judgements (through the comparing of memories of smells of different flowers. The feeling
of need to return to a pleasant state will produce desire and thence awareness of will [I, iii]. Similar considerations apply to each
of the other four senses. By separating and reflecting on disparate sensations we can form abstract ideas [b]. Condillac regards the
sense of touch as important in that it both clarifies and fixes our visual impressions of space and first gives us the idea of
externality [I, vii, xi, xii; II, v]. We do not know that there are external things. However, in discovering externality we show that
our sensations are caused; and we assume thereby that there are existent objects outside us to which we attribute properties,
including extension, put together by the mind [c]. But we can have no certainty of this [IV, v]. As for the mind itself this can be
known only in or through its modifications or transformed sensations and memory impressions [I, vi] [d].

PSYCHOLOGY/ ETHICS
[4] From the concept of 'attention' (to one's sensations) Condillac develops the concept of 'uneasiness' (inquitude) as the basic
motivating principle underlying all mental experience [a] (sense-perception includes understanding, feeling, desiring, fearing,
willing, etc.) [see 'Reasoned Excerpt ']. By 'uneasiness' he means roughly a 'felt need' to bring about some change in one's
condition, be it intellectual, physiological, or emotional. His position can be described as 'voluntaristic'; he thinks of the soul as an
active and free spiritual unifying principle though nevertheless psychical phenomena are to be understood as deriving from
sensations [b]. Morality too arises from feelings (of pleasure and pain) and the will, but is ultimately underpinned by God [c].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Condillac's philosophy may be understood as having taken to their logical conclusion the assumptions and methods of Lockean/
Newtonian empiricism, both our knowledge of the world and the activities of the human mind being accounted for in terms of
sensations. Thus his philosophy was to provide a basis for a 'science of man' [a]. Several original features in his thought should
also be mentioned: (a) his emphasis on the primacy of the sense of touch in relation to the concept of externality; (b) his view of
the active, unitary, spiritual soul as exhibiting 'voluntarist' tendencies (the concept of 'uneasiness'); (c) his stressing of the
important role played by language in our thinking and in later work his suggestion that intelligence is prior to language though
requiring it for its development. Thus Condillac was not strictly a materialist. Nevertheless, to the extent that his theory of
knowledge is grounded in and confined to sensations he cuts himself off from the external world and is restricted to probabilism.
Moreover, his sensationalism is not easily reconcilable with the spiritualist aspect of his account of mind.

HOLBACH (1723 89) MATERIALISM

Paul-Henri, Baron von Holbach (or d'Holbach) he inherited the title from his uncle was born in Edesheim, Germany and
educated at Leiden University. In 1749 he moved to Paris where he established a famous intellectual salon with Diderot,
Rousseau, Condillac, and other philosophes (some meetings were also attended by Hume). He wrote on a wide range of subjects,
though usually anonymously on account of their supposedly subversive nature; and he was a major contributor to Diderot's and
d'Alembert's Encyclopedia, particularly on scientific topics.

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
[1] According to Holbach, Nature is but matter in motion, although he also argued that there were different kinds of matter and
that it is not inert; movement belongs to it essentially by virtue of its property of energy or force. A number of consequences
follow. The behaviour of individual things, including plants and animals, is to be understood in terms of their material structures
and mechanistic explanations. And by virtue of forces of attraction and repulsion they tend to be preserved in their being until
transformed into other things the inherent energy of their constituent atoms and aggregates being redistributed. (In the case of
man these forces are manifested as love and hate) [a]. Holbach accordingly argues that the behaviour of material things is
necessarily determined; freedom is illusory [b]. He rejects the idea of an immortal spiritual soul, arguing that mental life is to be
understood in terms of our sensations [c] grounded in our 'organic machine'. And there can be no God; all attempts at definition
lead to self-contradiction; the concept must therefore be meaningless [d].

ETHICS/ POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

[2] In line with his atheistic materialism, Holbach was a vigorous opponent of organized religion to which he attributed all
man's misery and corruption, and any lack of progress. His ethics is therefore not grounded in any religious 'natural law'. Rather,
despite his commitment to determinism, he advocates a rational ethic based on and a concern for human welfare with respect to
both individual self-interest and society as a whole. Ethics is the science of cooperation with others whereby human happiness can
be maximized [a]. However, while he asserted that the people had the right to overthrow governments (particularly if underpinned
by religion) which failed to secure their happiness [b], he did not favour revolution as the means to solve fundamental political
problems. He said (prophetically in the 1770s) that the result might be an even worse state of affairs. Instead he argued for the
establishment of a constitutional monarchy, and thus rejected both republicanism and despotism ('enlightened' or otherwise). As
might be expected, he also advocated the separation of church and state [c].
HAMANN (1730 88)

ANTI-RATIONALISM
Born in Knigsberg, the son of a surgeon-barber, Johann Georg Hamann studied at the University there after a patchy education at
a variety of schools. He subsequently worked in commerce and as a tutor. Because of his dark and oracular writings, which mark
him out as a severe critic of the Enlightenment and a precursor of Romanticism, he came to be called the 'Magus of the North'.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAN/ CULTURE

[1] Hamann sees himself as a latter-day Socrates; he attacks sophistry in all its forms the deceptions of language and the
intellect [a]. Approving of empiricist scepticism he rejected 'scientific rationalism', universal explanations, 'dead' abstraction,
space and time as 'innate forms of intuition', categories, fragmentation, the destruction of 'wholeness'. This can be seen in his
criticisms of 'faculty psychology', which seeks to separate reason, understanding, sense experience from matter; of rationalism in
all its forms (in metaphysics, history, science, aesthetics); and of natural religion and deism. What he seems to be saying is that
the individual man is essentially a unity of reason, sensuality, and faith, in whom truth is grounded and expressed. Man may
engage in many activities but he is but one organism. Central to his position is his view of language. It is through language that
reason and knowledge are expressed, language belonging simultaneously to the sensuous and the intellectual. Hamann therefore
considers it to be the mediating and unifying principle [b]; and it is through the splitting apart of sensibility and understanding
from their common root in Nature that the distortions implicit in dualism (especially of the Kantian variety) have arisen. As to the
origin of language, Hamann says man has always possessed it. Indeed "the entire capacity to think rests on language"
[Metacritique]. It is not a 'natural' invention of reason but is in some sense communicated by God [c]. In earliest times the divine
was revealed in inspired music and poetry ("the mother-tongue of the human race" [Aesthetica in Nuce] ). History likewise has an
inner 'truth' which is revealed mystically by God rather than through the speculative and distorting systems of reason [d]. Indeed
Nature as a whole can be regarded as a 'language' or 'symbol' of the Divine [e]. And it is essential, Hamann says, that language
itself, as a divine revelation, should not be uprooted from its grounding in living human history, if it is not to seduce, deceive, and
confuse reason [logos] [f] language being "the central point of reason's misunderstanding of itself" [ibid.]. As he says:
I am inclined to think that our whole philosophy consists more of language than of reason, and the misunderstandings of countless
words, the posing as real of the most arbitrary abstractions, the antitheses of pseudo-gnosis, and even the commonest figures of
speech of the sensus communis, have produced a whole world of questions which have as little reason to be raised as to be
answered. We are still needing a grammar of reason. [letter to Jacobi, 1 December, 1784].
Understandably the unity Hamann seeks in both man, world, and indeed God is one of opposites in tension (the sensuous
and the intellectual, body and spirit, God and man, calm and energy in God, for example); and he himself acknowledges this
coincidentia oppositorum [g] as intrinsic and inevitable.

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Despite the seeming obscurity and contradictory nature of his utterances, Hamann is significant for his criticisms of all aspects of
Enlightenment thought and of Kant's philosophy in particular, and as a precursor of Romanticism and Existentialism. He
emphasizes the unitary nature of the human organism and recognises language as having a role to play in the unification process
and in the inner soul's expression of thought in the wider symbolic world of culture. He is also original in seeing language as a
source of reason's 'confusion with itself it being the job of philosophy to understand this. There is, however, a tension between
the sceptical and empirical content of his views and his excessive reliance on 'faith'. He is also open to the charge of 'emptiness' in
the positive aspects of his philosophy.

HERDER (1744 1803) ANTI-RATIONALISM

Johann Gottfried Herder was born in Mohrungen, East Prussia, the son of a schoolmaster. He was educated at Knigsberg
University (where he met Kant and Hamann), studying medicine for a time before changing to theology. He became a teacher in
Riga, and embarked on his writing career. In 1769 he travelled in France (meeting Goethe in Strasbourg). Having been ordained
in 1765, he was appointed court preacher in Bckeburg. By this time he had broken away from the Enlightenment and had
become one of the leaders of the Sturm und Drang ('Storm and Stress') movement. He moved to Weimar in 1776 (again to become
court preacher) and despite financial difficulties and a large family maintained his prolific output of books and essays on literature
and philosophy.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAN/ CULTURE

[1] Herder rejected 'faculty' psychology; for him reasoning, perceiving, feeling, desiring, and so on are all activities of a unitary
organism. [See Treatise on the Origin of Language and Cognition and Sensation.] He was also critical of a priori forms of
sensibility and understanding, and of any mind-body dualism [a], insisting that psychology could not be dissociated from
physiology. He supposed that the psycho-physical organism exhibits in its thoughts and actions a fundamental force or energy
(Kraft). This is also manifested in the phenomenal world in general, all things being interconnected. There is thus 'continuity'
within and between the parallel orders of the natural and the spiritual or 'ideal' [b]. He later argued [Metacritique] against Kant
that the judgements of mathematics are not synthetic but are 'identical' [c]; and he also criticized Kant's account of space and
time; they are not forms of intuition [d]. Just as he had rejected faculty psychology so he was critical of faculty theories of art
such as commonsense, conscience, taste [see Critical Forests, IV]. And while in his later work he seems to accept that there are
common features in all forms of art (in so far as art is both an expression of the whole man and reflected in Nature the ground
of aesthetic and religious feeling), he yet regarded beauty as relative to a particular culture or period of culture [e]. He thus argued
for a view of art that requires both a psychological and a historical approach [see, for example, Another Philosophy of History].
[2] As for the origin of language, Herder at various times accepted the view that language and thought were in some mysterious
way given to man by God. But he later returned to the naturalist view that it is to be accounted for in terms of the development of
human consciousness (and not as an 'invention') in the context of man as a social being; for without language thought (that is the
use of symbols) and therefore communication is impossible. Reasoning cannot be separated from language, and neither can
culture [Treatise on the Origin of Language] [a]. To reason is to think, for which language is indispensable. It is either inward
(silent speech) or overt expressed vocally. Herder also said there are different types of language. In particular he distinguished
between scientific (including philosophical) language and poetic language. The various types are, he thinks, exhibited in the
historical process [see especially Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Mankind]. And he points to four stages of development
[b]: 'childhood', 'youth', 'manhood', and 'old age' characterized respectively by the languages of passion (cries and gestures),
poetry and song (metaphor), poetry and prose, and philosophical pedanticism. The implication is that in the course of time there is
a decline in the creativity and vitality of language. Moreover, different languages, on account of their different 'physiognomies',
present us with different ways of looking at the world (Weltanschauungen). And there is no single a priori underlying structure;
formal logic only approximates to what languages may have in common [c].
Herder says that running parallel to the stages of language there are different stages in the history of human development. But he
rejects any suggestion of historical inevitability, progress, or rationalistic schemes into which events must be forced. In all
societies, though, man's moral 'purpose' is to achieve Humanitt, that is self-realization which involves the fulfilment of his
spiritual, mental, and physical potential. Education is the key [see Letters for the Advancement of Humanity] [d].
Herder also says that different cultures reflect different geography, climates, human needs, and so on; but each has its own value
and is united or integral by virtue of shared traditions expressed through its language in poetry and other cultural activities. No
culture should be regarded as 'superior' to another. To understand different cultures we must study and interpret them from within:
we must learn and empathize (einfhlen) with them [e].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Initially an Enlightenment thinker, Herder progressively moved away from both rationalism and the Kantian critical philosophy in
the direction of Romanticism as he came to emphasize the central role played by language in human history and indeed in
culture in general. Accepting Hamann's views on the inseparability of language and reason, he regarded man as a unitary, active
organism. However, by stressing that there are different types of language and corresponding cultures and rejecting absolute
standards Herder lays himself open to the charge of relativism. At the same time his key concept of 'Humanity' as something to be
realized carries with it the suggestion that it is an ideal of perfection towards which individual man can aspire. Whether or not
these tendencies can be reconciled, Herder's wide-ranging thought was to influence significantly the subsequent development of
the philosophy of culture and the emergence of hermeneutics.

BENTHAM (1748 1832) PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM/

UTILITARIANISM
Jeremy Bentham, the son of a lawyer, was born in Houndsditch, London. He was educated at Westminster School, Queen's
College, Oxford, and Lincoln's Inn. Although he was called to the Bar in 1772 he did not practise law to any great extent,
preferring to study science and politics and to write. From 1785 he travelled widely in Europe. He left his body to be dissected
after his death; it remains on show in University College, London.

ETHICS/ POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

[1] According to Bentham people are motivated primarily by desire for their own individual pleasure and aversion to pain, both of
which terms he understands in their everyday senses. (He allows that they may differ in quality but denies that 'higher' pleasures
may be better than 'lower' ones.) He says further that they underlie what we call respectively right and wrong [a]: they determine
what we ought or ought not do. However, despite their intrinsic selfishness, men are capable of social affections such as
benevolence. This leads to his formulation of the principle of utility: the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in
question is the only right and proper, and universally desirable end of human action [Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation, ch. I, i] [b]. By 'utility' he means:
any property in an object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness, or... to prevent the
happening of mischief, pain, evil or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered. [I, iii.]
Bentham argues that there is no other ultimate moral standard; all theories of morals in the last analysis rest on or appeal to the
principle of utility. He therefore rejected moral sense, social contract, and natural law theories, and also the concept of natural
rights [c]. The question then arises how, in deciding whether or not to act in a particular way, an individual is able to know if his
behaviour will lead to pleasure or pain, or indeed determine how much of each will result. Bentham accordingly proposes his
'felicific calculus' of hedonism, and suggests seven factors for estimating the degree of pleasure or pain: intensity, duration;
certainty or uncertainty; propinquity (nearness) or remoteness; fecundity, purity, number of people affected [ch. IV]. By
'fecundity' he is thinking of the extent to which a pleasure-producing action tends to be followed by further pleasurable
sensations; while 'purity' refers to the freedom a sensation has from being followed by one of the opposite type. The number of
people affected by the pleasure or pain is clearly central, because Bentham's theory relates not just to the individual in isolation
but to the common good. Bentham accepts that individuals left to themselves will not always behave rationally in a way which
will both increase their happiness and add to the totality of happiness of the community. To avoid conflicts between the
individuals who compose "the fictitious body" (the community) a government must legislate to encourage people's positive social
affections (such as benevolence) and discourage their inherently selfish tendencies, with a view to harmonizing individual
interests to the benefit of the community as a whole [I, iv]. To the extent that public utility is thereby promoted by the following
of laws justice is achieved and manifested [d]. Such harmonization involves essentially the concept of negative freedom [e] the
removal of hindrances rather than the promoting of, say, self-development. In the same way Bentham sees the primary purpose of
punishment as deterrence rather than reform [f], provided it is consistent with the avoidance of excessive pain. In itself
punishment is a necessary evil [XIII]. As for the nature of government, since monarchist or aristocratic constitutions tend to be
self-interested, Bentham argues that the best government to maximize happiness is most likely to be one in which there is the
greatest participation by the people, that is, some form of democracy [g].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
While not the originator of the concept of utility, Bentham is important for his powerful synthesis and formulation of utilitarian
ethics. He is noteworthy also for his radical views about participatory democracy and for his attacks on non-elected institutions.
By comparison with later utilitarian thinkers Bentham's views are arguably crude or incompletely worked out. For example, he
has perhaps not sufficiently considered how his 'felicific' calculus can be applied. Do pleasures and pains admit of being
mathematically quantified? Is this a satisfactory basis for ethics? He seems also not to have appreciated the difficulties in
predicting consequences. Nor has he taken account of a possible role for intention as an element in moral judgement. Indeed his
hedonist account of individual human motivation might be supposed to be limited reflected perhaps in his view that positive
social affections need to be encouraged by government. His concept of community is somewhat abstract and mechanical. And his
emphasis on negative freedom suggests he has little recognition of any place to be accorded to, for example, self-development.
Nevertheless, for all the weaknesses and omissions in his philosophy, as a key figure in the utilitarian and liberal tradition he
cannot be disregarded.

MARX (1818 1883) DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Karl Marx was born in Trier, Germany. His parents were Jewish converts to Lutheranism. He studied law at Bonn University,
philosophy and history at Berlin, and philosophy at Jena, gaining his doctorate in 1841. As a known atheist he was unable to
pursue an academic career, so he entered journalism and soon became a newspaper editor. When the paper was closed down in
1843 he went to Paris, where he met Friedrich Engels who was to become his lifelong collaborator. He was successively expelled
from Paris, Brussels, Paris again, and then Cologne, but he finally settled in London in 1849. Throughout this time he studied
economics, became deeply involved with labour movements, and wrote extensively on political, economic, and social issues.
Although helped by Engels, he and his family experienced considerable hardship and illness.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAN AND NATURE/ POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

[1] [See The German Ideology, I A.] Marx objected to Hegel's subordination of the concrete, living individual to abstract
conceptualization [a]. However, he differed in his analysis of religion, which, in his early writings, he saw as alienating man. God
is regarded as a human creation and as a projection which then stands against as supposedly 'weak and sinful' man [b]. Marx
rejected also the identification by the 'right' Hegelians of Hegel's rational state with contemporary Prussia. Both the State and the
Christian religion are viewed by Marx and the 'left' Hegelians as imperfect and thus far irrational; there is an inherent tension
between the individual and the state and between man and his religious beliefs. The task of philosophy for Marx, therefore, is to
push Hegel's philosophy further so that such conflicts might be overcome and a perfect, rational world be achieved for man.
Thought is inseparable from action which means social revolution. As he says, "The philosophers have only interpreted the
world, in various ways; the point is to change it" [Theses on Feuerbach, XI]. Such a social revolution will enable man to
overcome the alienation from the products of his manual labour (brought about because ownership of them has been denied to
him) [c].
[2] [gen 2] Central to Marx's account is a view of history which is both materialist and dialectical [see especially The German
Ideology, I A, 2-4]. He is a materialist in the sense that he rejects the idealist view that Nature (and therefore the historical
process) is the unconscious external manifestation of Spirit or the Absolute. Nature, not the Idea or Logos, is the primary reality.
Likewise philosophy and values must be grounded in analysis of concrete historical situations; he rejects all a priori metaphysical
speculation (and, of course, implicitly such a notion that individuals possess an immortal spiritual 'soul'). The historical process of
Nature isdialectical and is reflected in the dialectical movement of human thought [a]. Marx stresses the interdependence of man
and Nature. It exists for him in so far as (a) he differentiates himself from it, and (b) it provides the means for satisfying man's
needs through his productive activity in work. This, however, presupposes that man is a social being. He relates therefore not only
to Nature but also to other men. Indeed, it is only in their social and political relationships or intercourse (Verkehr), grounded in
material activity, that individuals can be genuinely defined as 'free' and 'real' [b]. The nature of individuals, he says, depends on
the material conditions determining what they produce; what they are coincides with their production. Together, Nature, as the
means of production, and man's relations to others constitute a dynamic process of history. In both Nature and in human history
the processes of change are dialectical in the sense that underlying them are laws of movement which involve progressive
transformations of opposites, "negations of negations", and so on. A seed, for example, is 'negated' when it forms a shoot; the new
plant is itself 'negated' when it in turn produces seeds. Human (scientific) knowledge, reflecting these processes, does not,
however, attain to any final or absolute view [c]; it must always be open to revision or development.
Dialectical materialism can now be applied to man's economic, social, and cultural life in general [ibid., I B]. Marx distinguishes
between (a) the material forces of production, and (b) productive relations. By the former he means not only the material things
needed to make something but also both 'forces of nature' and groups of men themselves the proletariat, in so far as their
working together contributes to production. By productive relations he means the social relations that obtain between the
collaborators. Productive relations depend on productive forces; and the two combined make up the economic substructure. The
economic substructure 'conditions' the superstructure the "social, political and mental life-process in general", which comprise
laws, ethics, religion, and so on. Life, Marx says, is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [d] [German
Ideology, I A], that is, by the "social being" of humans. However, he seems to accept that there is a two-way process at work here,
in that human ideas, especially of religion and ideologies, can in turn have a role to play in channelling or modifying human
action; and can thereby affect the economic substructure. But the primacy of the latter is never denied. At a particular stage in
their development a society's productive forces come to 'contradict' existing productive relations. The conflict can be resolved
only through a qualitative change in the economic substructure (and hence in the cultural superstructure). We thus have what
Marx calls the class struggle or war. He identifies four such stages [ibid. I C and D].
(1) Primitive communism. A tribe as a whole owns and works the land. But with the introduction of private property there is class
division, especially between rich and poor.
(2) The ancient period. The rich acquire slaves through war. This leads to class conflict between the slaves and the freemen.
(3) The feudal (mediaeval) epoch came into being as a result of a decline in agriculture and industry, and the rise of German
militarism. Various conflicts now arise between barons and serfs, the directly producing class of property owners and the small
peasantry (in the countryside) or journeymen and casual labourers (in the towns).
(4) The capitalist society resulting from the overthrow of the guild system and the industrial revolution. By its very nature, the
system is exploitational, in that the worker the means of production does not own what he produces (regardless of wages or
working conditions). Class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat ensues. The latter must therefore become a
revolutionary class to overthrow the former so as to establish the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and lead to a genuinely
communist society in which all property and class divisions will have been abolished [e]. The revolutionary class is thus "the
greatest of all productive forces". [See also Communist Manifesto and Capital.]
At the philosophical level, Marx also suggests that it is through the dialectical process that man can 'realize' himself (objectified in
his labour rather than 'pure' thought). If self-alienation in the social-economic sphere is overcome, so too will religious alienation;
and man will overcome division within himself and achieve 'wholeness' his true self. Marx thus sees his system as providing a
basis for an ethic which is not grounded in eternal laws or ideal a priori categories [f].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Although most communist regimes had been 'deconstructed' by the end of the twentieth century, the Marxist ideology to which
they all in one form or another subscribed remains as an autonomous philosophical 'world-view', and deserves as much or as
little critical respect as other philosophical systems. And it should be judged by the usual philosophical standards, though the
fact that in practice it seems to have been so often unsuccessful might also suggest there is something wrong with the dialectic.
The general framework of Marx's philosophy is of course Hegelian. (It should also be noted that the application of the 'necessary'
dialectic to material nature was largely the work of Engels.) But there are several key differences: (1) Marx's interpretation of
consciousness as the superstructure grounded in an economic infrastructure; (2) his substitution of the 'dictatorship of the
proletariat' and the 'withering away of the state' for Hegel's realization by reason of the 'Idea'; (3) the subordination of thought to
action, the aim of philosophy being seen as to change the world rather than to interpret it. Not surprisingly, there are many
difficulties with his philosophy.
(1) As with most ideologies, Marxism has spawned a multitude of 'orthodoxies', heresies, and 'deviant' intepretations. (Marx
would probably have felt much the same about these as Jesus would have done about the proliferation of Christian sects.) For the
greater part of this century there has been a fundamental disagreement among Marxists as to how the Master's thesis should be
interpreted. So-called 'orthodox' thinkers and revolutionaries Lenin, Stalin, Mao, for example, have generally understood his
social and political philosophy in terms of a scientific materialism. This is probably a consequence of the influence of his
collaborator Engels. However, from the 1920s onwards, philosophers of the 'Frankfurt School' Adorno, Horkheimer, and
Marcuse, all following Georg Lukacs set out to rediscover the more 'humanist', 'material idealist', anti-positivist Hegelian
Marx, which would be both more flexible, more self-critical that the strict orthodoxy prevailing in the Soviet Union. Their efforts
were facilitated by the belated publication of Marx's German Ideology in 1932. (The 'revisionists' also include Sartre; and more
recently the aims of the Frankfurt founders have been revitalized by the work of Habermas.)
(2) Despite Marx's own claims, dialectical materialism is a 'metaphysical' thesis and as such open to the same objections as apply
to Hegel's philosophy (an esoteric concept of contradiction, difficulty in applying the dialectic to concrete experience, and so on).
Moreover, it is unverifiable and therefore (on the basis of Popper's thesis) not scientific.
(3) Consciousness is supposed to have arisen out of the dialectic process. But it has been argued that Marx's treatment of this is
inadequate (though it is doubtful whether present day biologically based theories have been any more successful in dealing with
the 'first person' or subjective element).
(4) As in other dialectical and positivist philosophies, there is a tension between the supposed 'inevitability' of the process and the
role of the 'free' individual in bringing about the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and the elimination of the class system. Marx
might say that human activity is the dialectic in action: but clearly the debate does not stop at this point.

DILTHEY (1833 1911) 'CRITICAL EMPIRICISM'/ HISTORICISM

Born at Biedrich near Wiesbaden in Germany, the son of Lutheran theologian, Wilhelm Dilthey was educated at the Wiesbaden
Gymnasium and at the Universities of Heidelberg (theology) and Berlin (history and philosophy), gaining his doctorate in 1864.
After teaching for a time in secondary schools he became a university professor successively at Basel, Kiel, Breslau, and finally
Berlin in 1882. He lectured and wrote prolifically both on philosophy and the history of ideas.

METAPHYSICS / 'PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE'/ CULTURE

[1] Central to Dilthey's later philosophy [The Construction of the Historical World] is the concept of Life (Leben). By this he
means the totality of human experience thoughts, feelings, actions, institutions, sciences, religions, expressed through the
multitude of different societies as a dynamic historical process. Life is what we actually experience: experience (Erlebnis) is
'lived', arising as it does from the interaction of the whole individual (reason, feeling, volition, as manifestations of the functional
unity of his mental life) with his social and cultural environment [a]. (This is to be contrasted with Nature itself, as studied by the
natural sciences [see sec. 2], which, he says, is produced independently of the active mind.) In Life we experience a relationship
of unity with other persons, and with phenomenal manifestations of culture works of art, religious ceremonies, and so on,
though these may be ultimately analysable into sensations and impressions. The knowing subject is itself also part of Life and
cannot transcend it to know from some 'objective' or 'absolute' standpoint. Ideas and values are all produced by individuals
situated and interconnected in particular societies or cultures at particular times in history and are thus relative [b]. Life, he says,
does not come to us as a mass of disconnected elements. It is already connected, organized and interpreted as a result of
fundamental principles or categories. But these are not a priori categories; they arise out of empirical generalizations. Ultimately
"the mind understands only what it has created" [Construction of the Historical World]. The categories operate mainly at the
subconscious level, but we also use them intentionally and consciously so as to make our experiences more meaningful. The basic
categories, however, cannot be fully explicated. Thus he identifies the cognitive concepts of 'inner' and ' outer', which relate
respectively to mental contents and their expression in symbolic language, and through these we attempt to understand the world
of facts (the things and processes of independent Nature). Other categories are power, in terms of which we account for the effects
the environment, including other people, has on us (in the context of scientific explanation this category would be termed
causation); and value and purpose (which relate to feeling and desire) [c], through which we experience the present or look to the
future, with a view to achieving pleasure or happiness (wherein lies the good). He also identifies the categories of 'development'
and the 'ideal'. The primary category, however, is that of meaning (Bedeutung). The central question he poses is, 'How is
meaningful experience possible?' Dilthey first understood meaning as the means by which we experience, that is, 'relive'
(nacherleben) the past. But later it became the category of which all the others are different aspects, employed or manifested in
different concepts [d]. The application of the categories (comprising thinking, feeling, and desiring) gives rise to interpretations of
Life myths, religions, works of art; while values and purposes can be made explicit in moral principles and systems, political
constitutions, and so on. These various interpretations together form different world-views (Weltanschauungen) each of which
expresses Life albeit partially and from particular standpoints [e]. Dilthey classifies these into three types: (1) naturalism; (2)
the idealism of freedom; (3) objective idealism.
While Dilthey seems to be committed to some form of relativism and regards the 'world-views' as one-sided, he considers an
intuitable overall 'vision' of reality as the ideal. However, he recognises that a complete or final synthesis cannot be achieved [f].

METHODOLOGY/ KNOWLEDGE
[2] [See The Construction of the Historical World.] A philosophy of life, if it is to be as complete as possible, must rely not just on
general observation of events or on broad 'interpretations'. A firm theory of knowledge and a reliable methodology will also be
required. Dilthey distinguishes between the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and the 'cultural' or human sciences
(Geisteswissenschaften) (that is, the sciences of mental life). The natural sciences are objective, systematic, and involve
observation, classification, induction and deduction, models and hypotheses, testing procedures, and the formulation of general
laws, and are generally anti-metaphysical [a]. The human sciences may use some or all of these elements, but in addition and
essentially they are grounded in the lived experiences and freely willed activities of individuals and in the concept of
understanding (Verstehen), by which Dilthey means the grasping and penetration of some inner structure or mental content
idea, feeling, intention, which is expressed through empirical phenomena such as gestures, words, or works of art. (In his early
writings [especially Introduction to the Human Sciences] Dilthey had interpreted this mental content psychologically and indeed
had regarded a scientific or methodological 'descriptive' psychology as foundational for the human sciences, but one which would
examine causal relations and 'typologies' as well as mental phenomena. However, later he thought of the 'inner life' more
transcendentally as spiritual, in terms of 'life relations' [b] which constitute the conditions for the world to be understood as
meaningful.) If understanding is to be achieved, there are, he says, three conditions which have to be met. (1) We have to be
aware of the mental processes which underlie our interpretations of human activities as meaningful. This requires us also to have
some knowledge of psychology and literary studies of the individuals whose lives and works we are seeking to understand. (2)
We should study systematically the particular context (time, place, situation) in which the expression (discourse, text, and so on)
of the mental contents occurs. (3) We should have a comprehensive knowledge of the relevant social and cultural background.
Dilthey adds that investigation of, for example, works of art, texts, or political and legal constitutions may be more complicated
than the study of the thoughts and feelings of an individual; and that such systems are therefore best dealt with as 'entities' which,
although part of the whole culture, have some independent existence.

HERMENEUTICS
[3] Life is of course not static, and change takes place in a historical dimension. Dilthey's philosophy thus leads to a 'hermeneutic'
a "critique of historical understanding". Underlying his project are three basic principles. (1) Everything that man says or does
is part of this continuing process and should be explained in historical-cultural terms. This means that our understanding of
individuals, families, nations is not to be measured against some abstract absolute standard; such 'entities' have different
expressions in different historical periods. (2) To achieve understanding we must enter imaginatively into the points of view of
individuals living in these periods. And this requires us first to be able to experience and understand our own social-cultural
context. We can then empathize with them and relive their experiences. (3) However, we must also recognise that the historian
himself is limited by his own prejudices and concerns, and that these presuppositions have to enter into the 'meaning' or
interpretation of the past [a].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Arguably the major figure in nineteenth century development of the philosophy of culture and philosophical anthropology,
Dilthey extended the scope of hermeneutics beyond texts alone to take in all situations in which meaning as subjective intention
might be discovered by abstracting from and transcending as far as possible from one's own individual and cultural prejudices.
The key features of his thought are his concepts of Life and understanding, and the categories.
Subsequent debate has centred on the question whether it is possible to discard prejudices and presuppositions to achieve genuine
insight into 'meanings'. To the extent that Dilthey's view of life as a historical-cultural unity is one of a process of continual
approximation to a putative objective vision of reality and human self-knowledge, he may be supposed to have avoided the
excesses of relativism and historicism. Nevertheless some later critics have argued that to acquire some grasp of meanings we
should actually have made use of the techniques and methods of interpretation available in our own contemporary culture so as to
achieve the fullest possible (albeit necessarily incomplete) 'fusion' of our own 'horizons' (to use Gadamer's phrase) with that of the
object of our interpretation. In this respect Dilthey's hermeneutics has been criticized as being limited or one-sided, and too
optimistic as regards the success of any interpretative venture.

BRENTANO (1838 1917) PHENOMENOLOGY

Born in Marienburg, Germany, Franz Brentano studied Aristotelian philosophy at Berlin before being ordained as a Roman
Catholic priest in 1864. Two years later he was appointed lecturer and in 1872 professor of philosophy at the University of
Wrzburg only to give up his religious and academic posts the next year. He accepted the Chair at Vienna in 1874 but again
resigned four years afterwards so as to marry, though he returned as lecturer in 1895. Among his many distinguished pupils were
Freud, Meinong, and Husserl.

PHENOMENOLOGY/ KNOWLEDGE/ LANGUAGE

[1] [Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.] Brentano's descriptive psychology (he was later to call it descriptive
phenomenology) is essentially an examination of mental phenomena or acts. He distinguished three classes: (1) representations
(Vorstellungen), including ideas, images, thoughts, and sensations; (2) judgements; (3) emotions. Common to all these is
"intentional (and mental) inexistence", that is, intentionality, thereby making a distinction between the mental and the physical.
'Representations' ('ideas' in a broad sense) are thus not definitive of our mental life; they have "reference to a content" and
"direction upon [or pointing towards] an object". Intentionality is the characterizing feature of mental acts. In a mental act we are
aware both of its content and of our awareness of the act itself. However, he rejects the view that we can 'observe' our mental
processes by some kind of introspection. Rather, we 'perceive' our mental acts (as opposed to the empirical or scientific
'observing' of 'ideas', such as colours, shapes, sounds) each act being simultaneously an awareness of the representation and of
the act of awareness itself [a]. Leaving aside the common feature of intentionality, Brentano regards the three classes of mental
acts as quite distinct. Representations and judgements are not to be considered as themselves both falling under the concept of
thinking. Representations and judgements have the same 'content' (within which he distinguishes between the intentional object,
towards which the mental act is directed, and the 'immanent objectivity' of a mental phenomenon or act). But objects given to us
as bare representations are accepted without any consideration of their truth or falsity, whereas judgements involve our adopting
an 'intellectual stance'; we recognise, that is, accept, assent to the objects of a mental phenomenon [b]. These 'objects' are distinct
from judgements but are not to be regarded as any kind of propositional 'entity' or 'fact'. This means that Brentano's view of
judgement is that it is non-propositional and non-factual, and that the term is sufficient for the expression of its content. To judge
that there is, say, a black cat is just to acknowledge an object. To judge all cats are black is to reject non-black objects. In this
context Brentano rejected the correspondence theory of truth on the grounds that (1) in geometry, for example, nothing
'corresponds' to true judgements; (2) it cannot account for false judgements (we cannot invoke 'negative facts' for truths to
corrspond to); (3) it leads to an infinite regress. In general he was unwilling to commit himself to propositional 'entities' except as
a matter of convenience. Underlying his non-propositional view of judgement is Brentano's assertion that predicative judgements
(such, as S is P) are a sub-class of existential ones, for example, 'An S (which is P) exists' or 'Some Ss (which are Ps) exist' [c]. As
for the third class (emotions), towards these we take up an attitude of loving or hating according as to whether we feel pleased or
displeased with the phenomenon. But representations remain primary in that judgements and emotions presuppose them.
Brentano's account of judgement not only underpins his epistemology but also reflects his view that logic and the drawing of
inferences are grounded in empirical psychology [d].
[2] Brentano argues that language consists of three kinds of terms: (1) referential, (2) 'synsemantic' (both of which would seem to
refer to 'entities'; of some kind) and (3) syncategorematic (terms such as 'and', 'is'). The function of the first type is to identify
particulars [a]. These may be either concrete, that is, 'real', or abstract. Only concrete things are objects of our thought. However,
he says that abstract terms can always be reformulated so as to have concrete reference. Thus, 'Red is a colour' becomes 'A red
thing is as such a coloured thing'. He also presents a theory of the 'genuineness' of concepts which appeals to a criterion of
asymmetrical dependence. For example, the concept of a 'whole' is genuine, whereas 'part' and 'that which affects or produces' are
not. This is because a part can cease without changing itself, while a whole will change itself into a part.
The second type of terms includes words such as 'exist', 'true', 'good' [on the last see sec. 4]; and Brentano says that their job is to
express acceptance or rejection in acts of judgement based on 'evidence'. So if we say, for example, 'x exists', what we are doing is
expressing our acceptance of x; while to say 'It is true that p' (where 'p' might be 'x exists' or 'x is red') is to reject 'evident
rejectors' of x or y as red. 'Truth' (and 'falsity') for Brentano thus belong to the mental act of judging [b] and not to the object or
the immanent objectivity of judgements, or to propositions. By 'evident rejectors' (and 'acceptors') Brentano means those people
who in their acts of judgement appeal to evidence (as against 'blind' judgements). Evidence is indirect or direct, the former being
grounded ultimately in the latter. Direct evidence relates either to 'inner perception' (involving immediate data of the senses) or to
reason or insight (as in the case of judgements about mathematical propostions and logical propositions such as 'a whole cannot
exist without parts' or 'that which is of one colour is, as such, other than that which is of a different colour'). All evident
judgements are true. The evidence of mathematical and logical judgements would seem to lie in the analyticity of their
propositions. We also have direct evidence of our mental acts themselves: we know these as the 'second object'. As for judgements
about the external world ('outer perception'), although true they are not evident but 'blind'. However, Brentano allows that such
judgements, as well as those relating to memory, may be supposed to have a high degree of probability [c]. [See also The True and
the Evident.]
ONTOLOGY
[3] [Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.] Underpinning Brentano's 'descriptive' psychology is a sophisticated but complex
doctrine of categories, which, he says, are the various ways in which a subject 'dwells in' (innewohnt) the 'accidental totality'.
(The accidental is that which a substance, as concrete individual or particular thing, includes within itself at a particular time, and
according to Brentano the subject can exist without accidents but not conversely.) In so far as they relate to both 'inner' and 'outer'
perception Brentano's categories are a posteriori [a]. The final 'differentia' of substances, however, are not grasped in inner or
outer perception because we have no absolute intuition of time. Furthermore, the concept of unity of consciousness is not a
persuasive indicator of a non-spatial, simple 'soul-substance' (he called it 'null-dimensional'), which he regards as the subject of
consciousness, although he thinks it might be united with its body or 'physical nature' without contradiction. The problem is that
we do not know whether the 'ultimate subject' of what is given to us in inner perception is material or spiritual (seelische). Indeed
we can know nothing of any transcendent soul, although he claimed, in the context of his proofs for he existence of God [see sec.
5], that it was created by God out of nothing and is immortal [b].
Like other entities, the soul is understood by Brentano as being a concrete individual, that is, an entity from which further
differentia are excluded. However, because our attempts to 'access' it must be made through 'outer' perception a 'universal' element
is involved. He argues that there cannot be only universals, as this would lead to a contradiction between identity and difference
as applied to the same entity; and in any case sentences containing references to universals as 'abstract' entities and other 'irreal'
things can be reformulated in such a way that they refer to real, concrete things [Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, II] [c].

ETHICS
[4] [The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong.] Brentano's ethics derive from the third class of mental phenomena
emotions. These, like judgements, may be 'correct' or 'incorrect'. A good action or thing is then defined 'synsemantically' in terms
of the impossibility of loving it incorrectly; and conversely the bad in terms of the impossibility of hating it incorrectly. Thus, to
call an action good or bad is to reject (apodictically) incorrect lovers and incorrect haters respectively. For Brentano the
correctness is objective in so far as it is not possible for one individual to love correctly or incorrectly what is hated correctly/
incorrectly by somebody else. However, he repudiated absolutist ethics grounded in, for example, a formal categorical imperative.
For him, love and hate possess essentially the character of evaluative approval and are not to be regarded as akin to, say, desire.
And, indeed, Brentano rejected subjectivist and relativist ethics, and appeals to, for example, fear or authority. The aim of
morality is the choosing of the best of all possibly attainable ends [a] (such as, perhaps, knowledge and self-fulfilment). He also
allowed degrees of goodness, one end being better than another in the sense that it is 'correct' to prefer it. But ethical knowledge is
independent of metaphysics which alone can answer the question whether the world is meaningful. The possibility of choice
the attribution to individuals of free will and responsibility is not in doubt; he rejects both determinism and indeterminism [b]
(he accepts chance but denies that it can be absolute) [Essay on Knowledge].

RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
[5] [On the Existence of God.] Brentano attempted to prove the existence of God as a necessary being by appealing to the
principle of sufficient reason (which he supposed to be logically necessary) and starting from the contingency of the world. That
God is also good and intelligent can be proved from the evidence of design [a].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Brentano's theory of judgement and his account of knowledge which would seem to combine something of the 'subjective'
certainty of both Cartesianism and Humean empiricism with the more 'objective' moderate realist position characteristic of the
Aristotelian Thomist tradition are both of considerable interest. His importance, however, lies primarily in the influence he had
on the phenomenological movement (of which many have regarded him as having been the founder). But his central concept of
'intentional inexistence' has given rise to much critical discussion. Intentionality is supposed to be uniquely characteristic of
mental states, and can therefore be pointed to as presenting a difficulty for physicalist accounts for mental life not least because
(it is claimed by some scholars, but contentiously) that Brentano himself held that the language we use to refer to mental states
cannot be about real, that is, physical entities. Some philosophers have also argued that if intentionality is essentially a feature of
language then it is in fact the same as intensionality; and this leads to problems concerning the attribution of truth-values to
sentences when substitutions (of terms, predicates, other sentences) are made in intensional contexts. Many physicalists (who tend
to be extensionalists) have also maintained that it is possible to adopt an 'intentional stance' towards physical systems without
attributing mental states of consciousness to them.
There are further difficulties with Brentano's concept. (1) Some of our mental states (for example, sensations) would seem not to
be 'about' or 'directed' at anything. (2) Brentano regarded intentionality as a characteristic of mental phenomena. But this raises
the problem of the mental realm itself: how this is to be understood and whether this postulation can withstand the attacks of
physicalists. (3) He was also criticized by Husserl and Frege for his supposed 'psychologism' (a position which Husserl himself
had initially adopted). Some commentators, however, have argued that this disregards Brentano's empirical account of 'evidence'
and his rejection of 'introspectionist' psychology in favour of 'descriptive' psychology.
Note also that Brentano [in his The Psychology of Aristotle] supposed his central concept of intentionality the distinction
between the real existence of external objects and their 'intentional' existence to have been anticipated by Aristotle's account of
sensation as involving reception of form but not matter [On the Soul see Aristotle 16c]. Recent scholarship [see especially R.
Sorabji, Articles on Aristotle, Vol. 4, pp. 51-3; see also Lawson-Tancred's Introduction to de Anima, pp. 102-3] has tended to
regard Brentano as having misinterpreted Aristotle's account of perception and therefore being mistaken in his claim.

as subordinate to writing, that is, the reverse of the Platonic view. Rather, according to Derrida, implicit in both speech and
writing there is what he terms arch-criture ('arche-writing'). This cannot be defined in any objective sense. He means by it that
which does not allow itself to be reduced to presence; and that by means of which the difference is manifested through language
signifies a difference which lies neither in a subjective self-presence nor in a transcendental objective presence. Put differently (no
pun is intended here though Derrida would welcome it as such), it is itself a kind of transcendental condition for the
functioning of the differentiating system of signs in such a way that meaning is always deferred. We might think of it as the core
concept of his new non-logocentric linguistics which he calls 'grammatology'. This is not an objective scientific linguistics.
(Such objectivity would drag us back into oppositions and contradictions because objectivity implies 'presence', yet science
requires repetition and hence temporal differentiation and deferral, which would undermine the notion of presence). Rather,
grammatology which is in effect Derrida's own, and for him the only possible philosophy is manifested or realized in the
deconstruction process: this is its proper role.

Quite obviously a major casualty of his attacks is any theory of interpretation which supposes there to be a 'truth' in a text, work
of art, culture, and the like. For Derrida deconstruction must give rise to a multitude of textual interpretations, all of equal validity
or invalidity; for no criterion can be appealed to in terms of which they might be scaled other than perhaps unquantifiable
pleasure or aesthetic satisfaction. There are also implications for ethics and politics. There can be no absolute values if by such we
mean entities akin to metaphysical presences. Nor can "political codes and terminologies" be immune; and the consequences for
such a position would seem to be either anarchy or a laisser-faire conservative acceptance of the status-quo, on the grounds that
one can have no reason to choose between one ideological position and another. Derrida would seem to favour the former option,
and this is consistent with his repudiation of anything that might be construed as 'essential' to his work and his denial that he holds
any 'stance'.

CRITICAL SUMMARY

Like Heidegger, Derrida has been revered by some acolytes but derided (one might say 'derridad') by most philosophical
commentators. His central theses are: (1) that meaning lies not in 'real presences' Being, the real, essence, for example, but in
differential structures of speech; he rejects both 'self-presence' and 'transcendental objective presence'; (2) that meaning is
'deferred', words carrying meaning only in relation to other words (his term diffrance being coined to cover both 'difference' and
'deferral'); (3) the deconstruction of 'logocentrism' leading to the end of philosophy. Not surprisingly, these claims have stimulated
much debate and criticism.

(1) It has been objected that Derrida's antirealism is undercut by his own deconstruction of the thesis itself. Derrida says there is
no reference beyond or outside language. This implies that sense is subordinated to reference. At the same time his position seems
to be that reference is confined to the inter-relationship of signs. Many critics would argue further that Derrida's claim to have
abolished the 'subject-presence' is questionable, in that his whole philosophical standpoint seems egocentric, a liberated self being
implicitly preserved through rejection of the 'other'. And it is held that while there may be areas of dispute, and different
philosophical theories, there is a consensus about the real (as it appears to us), and that it is presupposed by writing and speech.
There must be something for different structures to be 'about', to refer to. It is within this 'social dimension' that the concepts of
both the self and the other function. Perhaps then Derrida does not really mean there is only language. A possible interpretation of
his writings is that he does indeed accept the everyday view that language is about 'things' but that his concern is constantly to
warn against the dangers of logocentrism which is, as he says, inescapable; it must constantly be 'revisited'. In the last analysis
his claim to have brought philosophy to an end seems highly improbable.

(2) It could be argued that Derrida's tacit rejection of objectivity or absolutism in ethics and politics is incompatible with his
espousal of radical causes ranging from anti-apartheid movements to feminism. However, it is possible to see such positions
which seem to be grounded in some general concepts of liberality and individual autonomy as being accommodated within a
deconstructionist framework which by its nature demands a total openness, infinite deferring, and rejection of doctrinal rigidities:
but this clearly is a matter for debate. The most important issue perhaps is still whether his whole enterprise is tenable

RORTY (1931 2007)

ANTIREALIST PRAGMATISM
Richard Rorty was born in New York and educated at the Universities of Chicago and Yale, from which he gained his Ph.D. in
1956. In 1961 he taught philosophy at Princeton University, was a Guggenheim Fellow 1973-4, and in 1982 was appointed
Professor of Humanities at the University of Virginia. In 1996-7 he was a Fellow at the Stanford Humanities Centre, and in 1998
became a member of the faculty there in the Department of Comparative Literature. He was elected to the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences in 1983.

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE/ HERMENEUTICS/ CULTURE

[1] [Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.] Much of Rorty's philosophy is directed against various 'traditional' assumptions: that
the mind 'mirrors' nature, and that it is possible to discover by means of 'pure', non-empirical methods real essences, 'foundations'
of epistemology, absolute values, meanings, a human nature, and the like; that our perceptions, images, ideas are accurate
representations of reality, and that true propositions in some way 'correspond' to that reality [a]. Previous philosophers, he says,
have been unable to justify their claims, or to provide criteria for distinguishing between genuine and false representations. He is
therefore critical of all kinds of a priori metaphysics, such as Platonism, rationalism, Kantian transcendentalism, though he
recognises that many philosophers belonging to these traditions have nevertheless attempted to jettison the metaphor of mirroring.
In his rejection of all kinds of realism he is also critical of linguistic/ analytic philosophy which he himself had initially
promoted.

Rorty's own positive approach is to make use of hermeneutic and pragmatic models with a view to developing new forms of
discourse. The test of such forms will no longer be whether they provide us with insight into truth, goodness, or beauty. Instead
we should consider whether a 'practice' has been accomplished successfully or whether a form achieves satisfactory self-
description. His concept of truth is thus pragmatic. [See Consequences of Pragmatism.] He argues that thought cannot be properly
examined if divorced from the cultural conditions in which it is embedded. Our knowledge and the language we use to articulate
our experience are inseparable from our concerns and purposes. Even the criteria we appeal to for judging our arguments can
change. There are, he says, only "temporary resting places constructed for utilitarian ends" ['Pragmatism and Philosophy' (in C of
P)]. What we must seek to achieve through our analysis of different forms of discourse and cultural practices are better ways of
talking and acting. Philosophy in studying the advantages and disadvantages of these ways is thus to be concerned with what he
calls 'edification' (cf. Bildung) and not with a systematic quest for 'truth' [see Mirror, ch. VIII] [b]. We must be concerned not to
seek any positive 'nature' but to remain content with what we can make of ourselves.

In his later work [Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity and Philosophical Papers, I] he extends this broad approach to a
consideration of the self, subjectivity, and ethics. We do indeed have a sense of the 'self', he says paradoxically, but this essentially
has been created by ourselves. As such we are what he terms 'liberal ironists'. He is, however, a passionate advocate of the liberty
of the individual even though the concept of selfhood is a pragmatic one. There being no appeal to absolute moral values,
Rorty invokes the notion of 'solidarity' which is grounded in man's common experience of suffering and argues that literature
may offer greater insight into the human condition than abstract philosophizing [c].

CRITICAL SUMMARY

Rorty presents a highly controversial thesis which, if correct, must radically change our perception of the nature and function of
philosophy. Rejecting philosophy as a 'mirror' of nature and as a search for 'truth', he sees it as becoming but one more kind of
'conversation' in our cultural life. He thus seems to be committed to some kind of cultural relativism: there are no absolute
standards, only 'better' ways of talking and acting. Realist philosophers argue that 'better' ways are just those which are more
successful in revealing truth and providing knowledge about the world, and which can be assessed by reference to the viability
and progress of, for example, the natural sciences and our ability to cope with the world. It has also been objected against Rorty
that the idea of criteria for linguistic usage as being culturally embedded is incoherent. Language has evolved as a means for us
humans to understand and live successfully within the actual world; and this is common to all cultures.

Inevitably, given the wide range of issues examined by Putnam, his writings have attracted criticisms from philosophers of
various traditions.
(1) Many would dispute the view that mental life can be emergent from or supervenient on physical structures and yet cannot be
naturalized. How this occurs is arguably not adequately accounted for. (As against this, it has to be said that no contemporary
theory of mind and there are many has received universal acceptance.)
(2) More controversial perhaps is his (and Kripke's) theory of the rigid designator and his referential semantics. While the
programme may be feasible as applied to 'natural kinds' such as chemical elements, which have well-defined structures and
properties, when it comes to designating more complex entities, for example, animals, human beings, the theory becomes more
questionable and difficult to sustain without almost casuistic ad hoc modifications. His anti-Fregean (or at least modified Fregean)
view of sense and reference is also controversial and continues to be debated vigorously.
(3) Truth for Putnam is an unrealized ideal. But this raises the question as to how far we can pass beyond conceptual restraints
while remaining within the system. Can coherence, reinforcement 'point' beyond? Is there a middle way between 'metaphysical
realism' and 'relativism' as Putnam supposes (we might call this 'weak realism' as opposed to 'strong' realism and antirealism)?
Further, can criteria be set out for "epistemologically ideal conditions" which are either not already grounded in our conceptual
scheme or are based on arbitrary and pragmatic considerations?

HABERMAS (b. 1929)

CRITICAL THEORY
Jrgen Habermas was born in Dsseldorf and studied philosophy at the universities of Gttingen and Bonn. After a short time as
an assistant to Theodor Adorno (a founder of the so-called Frankfurt school and Director of the Institute for Social Research there)
he became Professor of Philosophy at Heidelberg and then, in 1964, at Frankfurt as Professor of Philosophy and Sociology. In
1971 he was appointed joint director of the Max-Planck Institute for the Study of the Conditions of Life in the Scientific-
Technical World, before returning to Frankfurt in 1982.

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY/ KNOWLEDGE/ HERMENEUTICS

[1] Habermas may perhaps be regarded as the leading representative of the 'second generation' or new Frankfurt School. The
founders of this movement were concerned essentially to return to a more 'philosophical' or Hegelian Marx. Habermas sets out to
develop a new concept of rationality and incorporate it within a neo-Marxist framework undistorted by positivistic excesses.
Although generally sympathetic to the modern hermeneutic view that the possibilities of reason and interpretation are both
constrained by and dependent on the cultural and historical context within which we act and communicate, Habermas believes it
is possible to transcend such limits and still sees reason as having a central role to play. (He sees Gadamer as being too ready to
submit to the authority of tradition and also argues that his notion of interpretive horizons is methodologically limited.) Indeed, he
regards it as the primary function of philosophy to act as a "guardian of reason" not least because it is exhibited in and
underpins human autonomy and freedom and underlies critiques of all forms of authority and dogma. However, he rejects the
search for ultimate epistemological foundations or any attempt to build a 'first philosophy'. Instead he sets out to cooperate with
the 'reconstructive' human sciences, which are concerned to discover and make explicit the intuitive human capacities underlying
speech, judgement, and action. He also regards philosophy as having a role to play as mediator between the various spheres of
culture [a] the natural sciences, the arts, law, ethics, and so on, each of which has its own 'logic' or methodology. Philosophy
itself thus becomes a human science, making its own contribution to other cultural modes as a 'placeholder' (Statt-, Platzhalter) to
keep open questions that they have 'closed off'. But it also acts as an intermediary between and interpreter of the cultural modes
constituting the 'lifeworld'.
[2] In his early work [Knowledge and Human Interests] Habermas examines the various kinds of sciences with a view to
uncovering their presuppositions and epistemological bases. He sees each science as associated with its own type of human
knowledge interest. By 'interest' he is referring to what he sees as aspects of man's relationship to the natural and social
environment and the way that relationship has developed historically. (1) In the context of his critique of what he sees as the
limitations and 'objectivist' claims of positivism Habermas argues that in the empirical-analytic natural sciences, which utilize
general laws and predictions, the interest should be technical with a view to determining the limits of applicability of these
sciences and facilitating purposive rational action. It is only in such a context that the methodological procedures of the natural
sciences can be properly exercised. This rational action corresponds to Marx's concept of labour. Rationality is 'instrumental' in so
far as we are seeking the means to bring about control or domination of nature [a]. (2) The pursuit of the empirical sciences is
essentially a communal enterprise. A communicative dimension is therefore required and this, Habermas says, cannot be
reduced to instrumental action. We thus have a second knowledge-constitutive 'interest', which is practical and concerned with
communication the domain of the historical-communicative sciences [b]. Action is now not labour but interaction with other
people. This involves 'substantive rationality' a concern with the validity or correctness of the norms and values binding on the
group (as a result of consensus), which is to be distinguished from the more manipulative and instrumental rationality into which
the Enlightenment ideal of reason had degenerated. The historical-communicative sciences set out to analyse the agent's self-
understanding and the rules guiding communicative action through examination of texts and human behaviour. (3) Language as a
prerequisite for communicative action is subject to distortion. A third 'interest' must therefore be 'emancipation', with a view to
achieving a true and rational consensus by discovering the forces and hidden motivations, implicit in ideologies and power