Hylomorphism

How is soul-body hylomorphism different from property dualism?
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From the SEP article on soul-body hylomorphism "The soul bears the same relation to the body
which the shape of a statue bears to its material basis,", as well as other definitions (e.g.
wikipedia), it seems to me that soul-body hylomorphism is the same thing as property dualism.
However it has been pointed out to me in other threads on Philosophy SE, that property dualism
covers a wide range of options and that I don't understand dualism properly.
My questions:
How is soul-body hylomorphism different from property dualism?
What are the different types of property dualism?
philosophy-of-mind aristotle mind-body
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edited Nov 23 '15 at 22:29
asked Apr 24 '15 at 16:59
Alexander S King
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I'll start by saying I don't understand the term "property dualism" as you're using it. So this only
addresses what is meant by hylomorphism -- which is properly speaking neither dualistic not
reductionistic.
You can roughly trace two basic traditions of philosophical thinking: one idealistic and one
empirical. Using this rough sketch, we have the following pairings:
Idealist: Plato | Descartes | Kant
Realist: Aristotle | Locke | Hegel
There's a lot more that could be added to the picture, but these are important pairs.
The thinkers in the above category tend to posit views that we can understand as somewhat
dualistic in nature. Plato famously calls the body a trap for the soul. Descartes' confidence in the
mind is much higher than the body. Kant's philosophy centers on giving us a faculty that makes
us free despite the determinism in the world.
The thinkers in the below category are more positive about the body (for now let's leave out
some of the complexities of saying this about Hegel. Thus, while for Plato, the body is the trap
for the soul, for Aristotle, the soul is the principle that organizes the body as the sort of thing it is
(here following Sir Anthony Kenny's definition provisionally).
It's important to realize that for Aristotle, every living thing has a soul (but no everything has an
immortal soul).The way he means soul is not a religious concept per se (though it was adapted to
be one by Muslim and Christian thinkers later).
To give a clear example, the form of a giraffe (i.e., it's soul) is what makes the difference between
having a giraffe in front of you and a pile of matter composed of the same elements that would
make a giraffe but are dead. (This is an image from Thomas Nagel). Again, "soul" here means
precisely this difference. It's not some further difference on top of all the processes that lead to
this matter being organized and sustained giraffe-wise.
To put it another way, if we kill the giraffe, nothing is organizing that matter giraffe-wise anymore
and over time it will break down whereas as long as the giraffe is alive, the whole giraffe is
organized and continuing as certain type of living thing.
As a theory in philosophy of mind, the idea of hylomorphism is that it's a mistake to view brain
as identical to mind, because mind is something that occurs not just when certain matter is
present but precisely as an organizational process that orients all of the activity of brain-wise
matter and neural networking in a mind-wise way. Thus, it's not any standard sort of reductive
materialism about mind, because it asserts mind is more than matter.
Conversely, hylomorphism thinks its a mistake to view mind (at least human mind or animal
minds) as possible apart from matter organized brain-wise. Thus, it's no dualism because it does
not think mind occurs without this organizational activity occurring over the right sort of matter,
i.e. brain.
For more, see William Jaworski's index of terms.
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answered Apr 25 '15 at 14:04
virmaior
17.9k32672
Let us continue this discussion in chat. Alexander S King Apr 26 '15 at 5:18
It hurts to see Hegel as a flagship of idealism on the realists side. The only realism one can
ascribe to him is, I think, that of (concrete!) conciousness. Philip Klcking Nov 24 '15 at 11:45
But Hegel is a realist! Reality, of course, for him is reality for consciousness but this is not at the
expense of the actuality of the object (please see the section in the Lesser Logic on the Object).
virmaior Nov 24 '15 at 11:52
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How is hylomorphism different from property dualism
Hylomorphism was Aristotles solution to Platos problem of how a form could act on matter; he
simply posited that they couldn't be separated in the way Plato suggested.
Hence the form of a man is his soul - it's animating principle; and the matter of a man is his
physical body.
In a sense hylomorphism is a kind of monism rather than dualism.
Properties are what distinguishes substances; they are either essential or accidental; an
accidental property of a ring may be that it is made of gold; an essential property is that it is a
circle or has a 'hole'.
There is a substance man who has two kinds of properties, mental properties and physical
properties (but he, himself aren't reduced to them).
So hylomorphism connects Platos theory of Forms to Aristotles theory of substances and their
properties.
Example: consider Jameel from Eritrea

He is a man (ousia/substance), and he has mental properties (thoughts, feelings, passions,
appetites) and physical properties (weight, colour of skin, the skin itself) and so on.
He considers himself a unity; simply as a man; when asked about the relationship between mind
and body - he is confused; as he doesn't conceive of them apart from each other. 'I am Jameel',
he says; 'I am a man'.
I would suggest its because of the success of Descartes project that the dualism of mind and
body figures so widely in popular philosophy.
edited Apr 25 '15 at 15:33
Mozibur Ullah
24.7k42393
You fail to mention the Y in a "How are X and Y related?" question. Does the "but he, himself
[isn't] reduced to them" make this different from property dualism in your estimation or does
the main thrust of the sentence containing that make them the same. jobermark Apr 25 '15 at
15:47
@jobermark: jameels response, though not couched in Aristotelian terms, should be thought as
aligned with it; he's claiming he's a whole being, as in a hylomorphism. Mozibur Ullah Apr 25
'15 at 18:18
OK, so to your mind, the dualism is because the types are disjoint, not just because multiple
realizations exist. So given a functionalism where every thought is a deduction and an emotion
and a biological process and a competition between memes and ... all at the same time from
artificially differentiated perspectives. This is a monism, and not a property n-fold-ism. I have
been assuming the other side. jobermark Apr 25 '15 at 19:50
@MoziburUllah so far you're confirming my initial thought that property dualism and soul-body
hylomorphism are the same. Consider that you said "He is a man (ousia/substance), and he has
mental properties (thoughts, feelings, passions, appetites) and physical properties (weight,
colour of skin, the skin itself) and so on." And the wikipedia definition of property dualism
(continued in next comment). Alexander S King Apr 26 '15 at 5:16
From wikipedia "Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind
which hold that, although the world is constituted of just one kind of substance the physical
kind there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties. In
other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and
emotions) inhere in some physical substances (namely brains)." Alexander S King Apr 26 '15 at
5:17
What is Ontological Commitment?
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What is Ontological Commitment?
I can infer some understanding from its usage in philosophical texts, but I would like to have a
definitive answer to be able to confidently use the notion on my own. Other (for me) helpful
formulations would be: What things bear ontological commitment?, When is one committed to
an ontological claim?
metaphysics terminology ontology
edited May 3 '13 at 21:49
iphigenie
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asked May 3 '13 at 20:18
Lukas
2,113825
Maybe you could share some insight into the texts where you came across the notion? Who uses
it, and what can you infer so far? iphigenie May 3 '13 at 21:47
The last text was: Truthmaking without Truthmakers by Joseph Melia. One opinion seems to be
that by quantification over things (properties for example) one is commited to them. But I feel
like I can count things that dont exist (round squares, a horse that is no horse, and a ball that is
red all over and blue all over). I dont feel commited to them by naming/counting them. Lukas
May 4 '13 at 11:07
This belongs in the question, not just in a comment. iphigenie May 4 '13 at 15:46
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In philosophy[,] a "theory is ontologically committed to an object only if that object occurs in all
the ontologies of that theory[.]"
Wikipedia
The ontological commitments of a theory are those things which occur in all the ontologies of
that theory. To explain further, the ontology of a theory consists of the objects the theory makes
use of. A dependence of a theory upon an object is indicated if the theory fails when the object
is omitted. However, the ontology of a theory is not necessarily unique. A theory is ontologically
committed to an object only if that object occurs in all the ontologies of that theory. A theory
also can be ontologically committed to a class of objects if that class is populated (not
necessarily by the same objects) in all its ontologies.
[I think, but cannot verify:] Robert Audi, ed. (1999). "Ontological commitment". The Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy (Paperback 2nd ed.). p. 631.
answered May 4 '13 at 8:46
user3164
That is a good answer :). Are theories the only thing that commit me to existential claims? What
about sentences or statements. If the man on the street utters "there are properties you and i
share", is he commited to properties? Lukas May 4 '13 at 11:03
@Lukas I would have to refer once again to the same Wikipedia entry, and I will: E.g., there. I
think that covers it. user3164 May 4 '13 at 12:17
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I wonder if your uncertainty is over what ontology is. One's ontology is one's theory of what
sorts of objects have reality. For instance, most everyone agrees that physical objects are real--
perhaps, in some ways, Buddhist, Plato, and Cartesian skeptics might be excepted from this
group. Therefore such people have an ontological commitment to the reality of physical objects.
Mathematical realists have an ontological commitment to the reality of numbers, so that they
exist in the way that (most people assume) physical objects do.
I doubt that one can effectively characterize the sorts of theses that would entail ontological
commitments. Obviously, theses about the ways in which we may make inferences based on
evidence can carry with it theological ontologies or their lack. On the other hand, it is debated
whether correspondence theory of truth applied to mathematical objects implies an ontological
commitment to numbers.
What are some good books about social consensus theory?
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I am interested in reading more about the social consensus theory. I looked up online, but found
nothing more than the Wikipedia article.
Is there a book, or any kind of reference for this topic?
reference-request social-contract
edited Dec 24 '15 at 22:29
Joseph Weissman
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asked Oct 7 '15 at 8:20
M.M
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You've tagged this as "social contract". Was that merely because it seemed convenient or do you
view social consensus theory as integrally linked to social contract theory? virmaior Oct 7 '15 at
8:59
because of the second. M.M Oct 7 '15 at 9:01
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A good start would be Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action. It is very complex and hard
to get into for a beginner and even advanced students without guidance, though. But I think
every contempory theory regarding social concensus has to deal with the theoretical framework
established and defended by Habermas.
For an introduction, see this Wikipedia entry
edited Oct 7 '15 at 19:45
answered Oct 7 '15 at 19:30

Philip Klcking
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Nicholas Rescher (1993), Pluralism, against the demand for consensus.
is really non-trivial and, imho, worth reading.
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What does to naturalize reason mean?
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I am a newbie in philosophy.
I've just started reading "The philosophy book" that is a broad introduction about the main
philosophers.
I found interesting the article on Richard Rorty, so I started to read "Rorty and his critics".
At page 2 it says
Although I think Habermas is absolutely right that we need to socialize and linguistic the notion
of 'reason' by viewing it as communicative, I also think that we should go further: we need to
naturalize reason by dropping his claim that "a moment of unconditionality is built into factual
processes of mutual understanding".
I don't understand what "to naturalize reason" mean.
I found an article on "Naturalized Epistemology" at "Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy", but I

don't understand it is the same thing.
epistemology contemporary-philosophy rorty
edited Sep 18 '13 at 19:50
asked Sep 17 '13 at 12:44
Robbo
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Could you quote the whole passage? (It concerns his reply to Habermas, if I remember correctly)
DBK Sep 17 '13 at 17:35
Yes, you are right, it concerns his reply to Habermas. I've just added the whole passage. Robbo
Sep 18 '13 at 19:51
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In general, "naturalizing" X, for philosophers, meaning looking at how the processes of X occur in
nature, and developing a theory of it based on those observations rather than reasoning about it
in the abstract. Quine's endorsement of "naturalized epistemology" was therefore an effort to
refocus philosophical analyses of knowledge towards how knowledge is actually produced in the
world (i.e. in nature). This would move epistemology away from the study of what kinds of
reasons for believing a sentence offer adequate justification for it. It would move epistemology
towards the study of human psychology (and how individuals acquire knowledge) and natural
science (and thus how we collectively acquire knowledge).
Not being a Habermas expert, I don't know whether more is built into his phrase "moment of
unconditionality" but I strongly suspect that "naturalizing reason" here means looking at how
human beings in fact from evidence to conclusions, and indeed replacing logic with that. I
suspect that "dropping the moment of unconditionality" means removing the abstraction from
the analysis of reason, and shifting it towards reasoning as it actually occurs, embedded in real
conditions.
Now, in both cases, there are serious questions about whether a naturalized inquiry could ever
replace a traditional one, even as it seems right that there is a danger in analyzing processes
entirely from the armchair, without engaging with how they happen in in fact. But the process of
integrating those two approaches has indeed characterized a good deal of Anglophone
philosophy over the past couple decades. But, I think that's what Habermas's critic is saying
above.
Who are the most influential living philosophers? [closed]

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Who are the most important, widely-read or influential living philosophers still actively working
and contributing to the field today? Which thinkers are recognized for doing the most interesting
and urgent work?
This is clearly subjective borderline territory so please try to justify your claim. As per the
discussion it's probably not that important to limit yourself to one thinker per answer, but the
best answers already justify their decisions based on a reasonable assessment of the importance
of the new concepts the thinkers produced. It isn't necessary that the thinker be the most
prolific, but she or he should probably rank fairly high in terms of number of citations (Gettier,
for instance.) Thank you!
history-of-philosophy contemporary-philosophy
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Joseph Weissman
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too broad to be answered, and there's no "correct" answer that can ever be determined. I don't
even think this is a good community wiki: "most influential" is far too subjective and
argumentative, and in a bad way. Philosophy is broad, and there are many camps. Cody Gray
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In analytic philosophy, I would say Saul Kripke, without a doubt.
Although his output has by no means been prolific, everything he has written has had a huge
and lasting impact. He is quite a character too.
See especially, Naming and Necessity and Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
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answered Jun 10 '11 at 6:35

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Chuck
Naming and Necessity is a cracking read, there's no question. boehj Jun 10 '11 at 6:41
"Another of his most important contributions is his argument that there are necessary a
posteriori truths, such as 'Water is H2O.'" Only in philosophy would saying "Water is H2O" make
someone famous. :D dimo414 Jun 11 '11 at 1:51
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The Wikipedia article on Saul Kripke, referenced by @Chuck, actually links to a survey done of
600 philosophers asking Who is the most important philosopher of the past 200 years?
The top 10 are:
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Gottlob Frege
Bertrand Russell
John Stuart Mill
W.V.O. Quine
G.W.F. Hegel
Saul Kripke
Friedrich Nietzsche
Karl Marx
Soren Kierkegaard
I can't speak to the rigor of this survey, but perhaps it's a little more objective than just naming
people, at the very least.
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dimo414
All long dead, right? Joseph Weissman Jun 11 '11 at 2:53
Yes, though Quine died pretty recently (compared to the rest, at least) Jeff Jun 11 '11 at 3:46
Nice find. I don't know who did the voting but it's a massive vote of confidence for Kripke (and
deservedly so). boehj Jun 11 '11 at 5:47
Good point Joe, sorry about that, got too excited that something empirical existed. Either way,
I'd still claim it's better than arbitrary conjecture of whichever people feel like visiting this
question. dimo414 Jun 11 '11 at 6:45
If Marx is to be included at all (despite his dead-ness), then surely he must be at the top, no? The
peoples of these states have a good claim that they were influenced by his philosophy (however
bastardized). The folks in Nth Korea, Laos, Cuba, China and Vietnam could say they're still being
influenced heavily by his philosophy. boehj Jun 11 '11 at 8:02
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Noam Chomsky
Although known widely as a political dissident and an anarchist, Noam Chomsky's opinions are
widely read and he is definitely one among the most influential living philosophers.
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edited Jun 10 '11 at 8:02
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AIB
Most of Chomsky's influential works (and nearly all of his landmark contributions) were in the
realm of linguistics, rather than philosophy. His later work became popular in critical theory
circles because it played so nicely into the framework that had already been established,
providing real geopolitical examples of the theoretical conflict scenarios that had been rehashed
for years. But I don't really count "Hegemony and Survival" and its brethren as all that influential,
as they merely provided support for theories that had been kicked around by others for much
longer. Cody Gray Jun 10 '11 at 10:54
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These types of questions are very difficult to answer.
Again from the analytic school, again someone that didn't publish much at all. I'm going to say
Edmund Gettier.
Gettier's paper, published in 1963, entitled "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" spawned an
entire cottage industry of responses and re-ignited a great deal of interest in the field of
epistemology. Entire volumes have been written in response to his three-page paper.
One of the things that epistemology (or theory of knowledge) examines is, "What are the
necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge?" From the time of Plato it was thought that a
knower S knows that a proposition p if and only if the following obtain:
p is true;
S believes that p;
S is justified in believing that p.

Gettier demonstrated, by way of two counterexamples, that in order for something to qualify as
knowledge, there must be an added something, X, added to the above tripartite. Gettier showed
that the above tripartite is not sufficient for knowledge.
We have yet to find what that extra X is, despite countless person-years of inquiry since 1963 to
discover what it might be.
Here is a link to the full-text of this milestone paper [PDF: 111 KB].
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boehj
It's crazy to think that someone who published only one widely-read paper is among the more
influential philosophers. loevborg Jun 10 '11 at 10:13
Not sure if you think I'm crazy for suggesting him or not. If the former: An extensive wikipedia
article about the so-called Gettier problem, his own section in epistemology, mentioned
throughout the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, including 'A Priori', Dretske, Nozick,
Goldman have written papers about him. I studied a full semester of epistemology in post-grad
philosophy @ Uni of London about the problem. He's a major figure. boehj Jun 10 '11 at 10:49
"... Gettier is remembered for his 1963 argument, which called into question the theory of
knowledge that had been dominant among philosophers for thousands of years. In a few pages,
Gettier argued that there are situations in which one's belief may be justified and true, yet fail to
count as knowledge... Gettier contended that while justified belief in a true proposition is
necessary for that proposition to be known, it is not sufficient... a true proposition can be
believed by an individual [...] but still not fall within the "knowledge" category..." boehj Jun 10
'11 at 10:53
1
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. boehj Jun 10 '11 at 11:03
There are many more and a pile of books a couple of metres high just dealing with the problem
he discovered. He would be discussed in any epistemology post-grad program worldwide. Once
again, the comment section in a SE isn't the ideal spot to point out the mountains of evidence
that this fellow was one of the major figures of 20th/21st century philosophy. boehj Jun 10 '11
at 11:07
A condition for them to be "living" limits the list quite heavily, so here is my:
Saul Kripke (b. 1940) - logic
Noam Chomsky (b. 1928) - language
Manuel Castells (b. 1942) - society
John Searle (b. 1932) - mind
Jurgen Habermas (b. 1929) - language
Alvin Toffler (b. 1928) - futurology
Stephen Hawking (b. 1942) - space
Its quite easy to knock most of them out (even Kripke) of the list, for not being "true
philosophers", but it don't see a real point to do it. List is already short, an most of those guys
are very old, so it will get even shorter soon, anyway.
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c69
I'm going to have to disagree with Searle. The Chinese Room is flashy, but it's never held as much
truck with the community as people think it does. Fodor probably has a stronger claim to the
most influential philosopher of mind. I haven't spoken to any X-phi's on this, but I suspect that
the Churchlands and Dennett have had a great influence on them. Chomsky's impact on
philosophy is a lot more subtle then people realize. His theories about deep grammar and the
critical period get all the truck, but very few people remember that he pretty much destroyed
behavioralism with one book review. Nathan Oct 4 '11 at 12:13
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For Continental Philosophy we now have to say Zizek and Badiou.
Zizek and Badiou are still living, while a lot of the great names in Continental Philosophy have
died recently like Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault.
Zizek is influetal because of his interpretation of Lacan in terms of Hegel's relation to Kant and its
application to Cultural and Literary and Filmic phenomena.
Badiou is influential because of his book Being and Event and its follow up which reduces Being
to Set Theory. This is wrong of course but is very thought provoking.
Why these two? This is because they have caught the American imagination somehow and are
continuously coming here to talk at various universities. Thus there star status has been
enhanced by American interest in their philosophies.
Zizek because he is so outrageous, because he will comment on anything, and he speaks at

occupy wall street, and because he still claims to be a Marxist, and that is now OK because there
is no more Cold War. Also because of his attacks on Derrida and Deleuze.
Badiou because he is like an Analytic Philosopher which is a novelty. Also because of his attacks
on Deleuze.
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3 revs
holoidal
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In the English-speaking world, John McDowell, who teaches at the University of Pittsburgh, is
well known. He has published on a wide range of topics, most influentially in Greek philosophy,
philosopphy of mind, Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks, ethics, epistemology and the
philosophy of mind. McDowell's book Mind and World, essentially the text of his 1990-1 Locke
Lectures, is about intentionality and the relevance of experience for our knowledge of the world.
It contains and combines many of the themes he is interested in. Many of his influential earlier
essays are collected in the twin volumes Mind, Value, and Reality and Mind, Knowledge, and
Reality. More recently, he has published another pair of article collections, The Engaged Intellect
and Having the World in View, which reflect among other things his renewed interest in the
philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars.
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loevborg
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My own suggestions:
Alain Badiou
Slavoj iek
Quentin Meillassoux
Jurgen Harbermas
Michel Serres
Francois Laruelle
John Searle
Daniel Dennett
what was Plato's view on noumenon?
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The relation between objects in the world is established by pure concepts existing a-priori:
1) These concepts belong to a world of absolute concepts away from the mind - Plato
2) These concepts exist a-priori in the mind - Kant
If this much is right, Kant says, The world can't be known as 'itself' ('things in themselves') using
these concepts but can only appropriate them. (<-pertains to phenomenology I suppose)
What I want to know is, did Plato ever speak about this impossibility of knowing things "as
themselves"?
Simply, The question is whether Plato had any views about the impossibility of knowing the
'noumenon'. I detailed it to know if I went wrong in arriving at the question.
metaphysics history-of-philosophy kant plato noumenon
Ricardo
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jackson
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The sentence,"these concepts belong to a world of absolute concepts away from the mind," uses
terms (concepts and absolute) that did not exist when Plato wrote. As such, your entire question
rests upon modern interpretation, and thus, answers to your question will say more about
certain interpretations of Plato than about his thought. Jon Apr 2 '13 at 17:31
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While there is some confusion at work in how the question is asked, I think there's a good
question in there somewhere. I first want to suggest the following opening version of the
question: What is similar in Plato and Kant's respective accounts of where the truth is found?
I take on a basic level their main point of agreement is that truth is not out there in the world.
Thus, for Kant, our apparatuses -- the categories of the understanding and the forms of
sensibility are more important things to look at than things to discover truth. For Plato, truth is
the Forms/Ideas. Again, these are not out there in the world. Instead, what we have in the world
are Demiurge's poorly made copies.
With this rough sketch in mind, we can then think about what is different in the two views. In the
Kantian view, the things themselves are there but we cannot access them as such. We turn them
into objects and perceptions as we use our minds on them. So the categories apply concepts and
the forms of sensibility render them in space/time as things we can perceive. N.b., I am using
Kant's language here so if it sounds crazy don't blame me! So the important bits that make
knowledge possible are in our heads.
In the Platonic account, what we have in our head are forms. What we see in the world are the
shoddy copies that are, per the Cave, like shadows. Depending on where we are reading in Plato,
the degree to which we remember the forms/know the forms differs. So in Apology and
Euthyphro, we are unable to really get to knowledge. We're stuck with our inadequacy. In Meno
and several later dialogues, we know the forms in our souls (use minds if you prefer) and just
need to jog our memories. In a weird way, that means for Plato we are already knowers of what
is most real.
This finally enables us to look at the question as you worded it:
did Plato ever speak about this impossibility of knowing things "as themselves"? ... whether
Plato had any views about the impossibility of knowing the 'noumenon'.
Part of your question is a misinterpretation of Kant. noumenon are not things in themselves, but
we can address each piece separately. The misunderstanding happens because of a confusion
about how knowledge works Kant. While we cannot know the things themselves, this is because
of how we know. [God, in fact, can know them.] because God does not filter things through
forms and categories.
The answer is that Plato does think we can know what Kant might call "noumenon" but that's
because the closest thing is the forms which is in soul. On the other hand, the things behind the
phenomenon are on Plato's view either the forms or just the shifting shadows of the world we
live in which is inadequate to contain forms.
What the two have in common then is a belief that the real goods are in the soul from before
birth / in the mind of a rational being as categories and that the world is shadow. The neo-
Kantians of the 19th Century were also Platonists after a sort, so you're not the first to note the
similarity.
answered Feb 12 '14 at 3:11
virmaior
17.9k32672
If the noumenon are 'not things in themselves'. Then what are the noumenon and what are 'the
things-in-themselves'? Is this what is usually translated from ding-an-sich? Mozibur Ullah Feb
12 '14 at 4:16
things-in-themselves = ding-an-sich (English vs. German). You are assuming there are noumenon
per se. A thing is the basis of an object and a sensoribilium in Kant's epistemology. The
noumenal is the realm of will. It's not clear that we can speak of anything existing in the
noumenal. It's clear that the thing exists but we don't have access to the things in themselves.
So it's open whether they are the same. Google Palmquist Kant if you want to read the literature
on this or ask it as a question. virmaior Feb 12 '14 at 4:29
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The concept of noumenon as Kant uses it was unknown to Plato. Even the highest and most pure
beings according Plato's epistemology (see the allegory of the line, Republic, book VI), the Ideas,
can be subject of knowledge in a particular science, which is dialectics. Kant, on the other hand,
admitted that reason has limits, and asserted that beyond noumenon knowledge is impossible.
Therefore, Kant's critic to reason has no place on Plato's philosophy.
What is a strong argument that shows social rules exist? [closed]
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Aside from an appeal to common sense, what are the strongest contemporary arguments for the
existence of social rules? By social rules, I mean social rules in the tradition of Durkheim, Weber,
Hart, etc. These philosophers, to varying degrees, argued that there exist certain social rules or
social regularities that "structure" society. Some have argued that these social rules are always
normative. Others have argued that they need not be (i.e., Searle). An example would be the
"social rule" to drive on the right side of the road. This social rule is also a legal rule and carries
sanctions. But, we need not draw such secondary distinctions for the purposes of this question.
reference-request political-philosophy philosophy-of-law

edited Dec 23 '15 at 22:38
Joseph Weissman
5,35663170
asked Dec 21 '15 at 16:31
EVolk
873
closed as unclear what you're asking by Joseph Weissman Jan 3 '16 at 19:17
Please clarify your specific problem or add additional details to highlight exactly what you need.
As it's currently written, its hard to tell exactly what you're asking. See the How to Ask page for
help clarifying this question.
If this question can be reworded to fit the rules in the help center, please edit the question.
It's not at all clear (at least to me) what such an argument could even look like. How would you
prove the existence of, say, the Rocky Mountains, without any appeal to empirical observation?
WillO Dec 21 '15 at 17:32
So, given the question is "What's the evidence that social rules exist?" -- maybe it would be
constructive to try to motivate this doubt about the existence of social rules a bit? What sorts of
arguments have you encountered that seem to imply social rules might not exist? Joseph
Weissman Dec 21 '15 at 18:25
The language needs help. If you can give me an example of something we can agree on and its
effects, you have evidence of its existence, whether or not it strictly fits any specific definition
proposed. Are you questioning the necessity of social rules. Are you asking whether these social
rules are an epiphenomenon of something more basic or a mere simplifying abstraction covering
other mechanisms? You need to ask something more specific. jobermark Dec 21 '15 at 18:37
That which is necessary is moral?
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"That which is necessary is legal" is a doctrine practiced by sane states, so I would like to believe.
What has been said about "That which is necessary is moral"?
ethics reference-request
edited Jul 23 '15 at 5:05
Keelan
5,11742245
asked Jul 22 '15 at 21:01
Red Rackham
783
Hi, welcome to Philosophy SE. Yes, more concrete questions are appreciated because they help
devise more focused and useful answers. Conifold Jul 22 '15 at 21:36
Depends on what you mean by 'necessary'. Morality has to do with choice. If choice is not
involved, than it isn't even in the domain of morality. kbelder Jul 23 '15 at 15:59
@kbelder I mean: If there is a general consensus among human beings that if a person X doing a
certain action Y is "necessary", will it follow that there is a general consensus among human
beings that person X doing certain action Y is "moral" ? Red Rackham Jul 31 '15 at 17:06
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There is an inherent back pressure that comes from a doctrine like this. "That which is necessary
is legal" presses back on the definition of "necessary." If there is a strong desire for an act to be
illegal, there will be a corresponding strong desire for that act to be deemed "not necessary."
If you apply this logic to "That which is necessary is moral," the backpressure gets extraordinarily
strong. Questions of "is it necessary to remain alive?" arise. Consider the Samurai: in many
situations the only moral course of action they had available was to commit ritualistic suicide.
They did not have the luxury of assuming that living was a necessity.
However, it does lead in an interesting direction to explore. This quote feels very similar to the
attitude that there is always a moral path to follow, no matter how far one has strayed. Doctrines
can be slippery at times.
answered Jul 23 '15 at 0:35

Cort Ammon
9,995625
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You have to be a bit careful in philosophy when tossing around the word necessary.
Philosophers, like kleptomaniacs, take things literally. :)
However, in context, "That which is necessary is legal", or Quod est necessarium est licitum is
actually a tenet of what's called the necessity defense that is recognized as common law and is
in most states' statutory law. And what it means is:
Sometimes, in a particular situation, a technical breach of law is more advantageous to society

than the consequence of strict adherence to the law
Something we all commonly encounter on the news without really considering it too often. An
example - killing in self defense. In most examples of the necessity defense, an argument based
on common good, or significant, unavoidable harm is given as the basis for necessity.
So, your question essentially boils down to this (if I understand you correctly):
Do any theories of morality have a similar clause: At times, doing the most moral thing requires
acting immorally?
The answer is, yes, though there might be some wiggle room in terms of what's defined as
moral, immoral or amoral on a case-by-case basis. The necessity defense would fall under the
umbrella of utilitarianism in terms of ethical theory. An oversimplification of utilitarianism might
be stated as:
"One should do whatever maximizes the total or average welfare of society"
Or, using the example of self-defense, "that which is necessary, is legal/moral" could be restated
as:
"when one is facing imminent harm, it is in society's total or average best interest that one
defend one's self with equivalent force and in such circumstances killing may be considered a
moral or amoral act."
Hope this helps. -Wah
wahwahwah
1807
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Emile Durkheim, a prominent French sociologist and philosopher, disagrees with you, and the
original Roman saying:"Deviance serves major functions to society according to Durkheim; it
affirms our cultural values and norms and clarifies moral boundaries. It also promotes social
unity and encourages social change. A society without crime is an ideal place for many, (so they
may think.) However, a society without crime is society without any progress". So crime is
necessary, and illegal.
The same applies all the more to morality. As St.Augustine put it, "the canvas of creation
requires both the black and the white paint". The evil is immoral, but it may be necessary, to
provide "diversity" or free choice for example. See Is God either immoral or not omnipotent?
and How does free will defense of God's benevolence work?
edited Apr 13 at 12:42
Community
Conifold
21.3k1978
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If a proposition p is moral just in case it ought to be that p, then the principle that what is
necessary is moral is adopted in normal philosophical deontic logics in the sense that if q is a
thesis of the logic then also it ought to be that q is a thesis of that logic.
user24406
1647
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Whether morals are absolute or relative, as far as we know they are relevant only in a human
context. We don't expect nature to "act morally", nor have other sentient beings been found
from whom we could expect so.
But to be able to act morally, humans need to live, and living entails certain necessities. Thus the
relationship between morals and (vital) necessities should be described not as necessity
implying morality, but as "necessities being satisfied" being a requirement for concepts like
morality and ethics to even make sense.
user83498
"But to be able to act morally, humans need to live" - is that necessarily true? There are
instances of humans sacrificing themselves because they think that's the more moral choice.
James Kingsbery Jul 23 '15 at 14:18
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I always hate introducing folk-tradition stuff here, because I cannot attribute any of it. But this
seems relevant to the question in a broad sense. This basic notion seems to have been known to
Kant, since he uses one branch of it "ought implies can" in lectures.
There is a sequencing to the basic modalities, sometimes expressed in a little box containing the
modal and mode-like verbs
ist -> muss -+-> soll --> darf -+
| |
+-> will --> mag --+-> kann --> weiss
Or in English:
consistent -> must -+-> should -> may --+
| |
+-> will --> might -+-> can --> conceivable
It kind of gives an informal excuse for the odd relationships between the conjugations of these
specific eight verbs, and it captures some essential concepts of the relationships between
different kinds of modal statements.
In every case "box" --> "diamond"
consistency -> conceivability (= non-inconsistency)
must -> can (= not mustn't)
should -> may (= not shouldn't)
will -> might (= not won't)
And the force of the modal construction comes in three tiers:
Essential reality determines
Accidental reality which determines
Political or personal reality: obligation or inclination.
In branch of concern to Kant is "soll -> darf -> kann -> weiss". In particular, it is unfair to require
and misleading to permit what is impossible. And it is impossible to carry out what is not
conceivable. The former two have application primarily in law, and the latter with how one
handles children or those of diminished capacity.
edited Jul 30 '15 at 5:05
jobermark
16.5k740
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The relation between needs and public policy is not straightforward. Discussions about what
people "really" need are hard to settle, and even if people agree that X is needed, a lot of
questions concerning how to satisfy X and how important is to satisfy it, given that we also need
A, B and C, have to be answered. Also, in some situations, there might be a conflict between
satisfying need X and being just, brave or honest, and it's not clear that we should always put
needs on top of these other values.
Since your question is tagged as a reference request, I highly recommend David Wiggins' "Needs,
Need, Needing", available here, if you wanna delve into the topic of needs, "Claims of Need",
also by Wiggins, is an excellent paper, but is not available online.
Your question is too open ended to give a meaningful reply. In a sense, every major brand of
moral theory tries to tell you what is needed to make a better world, or to do the right thing, or
to be a flourishing human being; but the notion of need seems to acquire meaning only after we
decide which of these things are really worth getting.

rds
1164
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That which is neccessary is moral
This question can only arise in a situation where what appears to the right course of action is
against normative moral considerations.
It's an appeal, in a sense to legislate new moral norms.
Kants answer to this is his categorical imperative; which is that a possible course of action in a
situation is if this action can be considered as a general maxim of moral conduct; that is one
thinks of oneself as a potential legislator for the community.
It is as though one submitted the situation at hand to some impartial judge who then legislates
the possible lines of action for this and analogous situations binding on the whole community.
It's easy to see that this cannot go against what laws are already held.
It maybe this impartial judge might demonstrate that the situation allows of actions that do not
go against already established norms, but that this might require more work; or that it actually
opens up the possibility of a new positive norm that is to be welcomed rather than to be
deterred from; or most likely it requires a minor modification.

If religion is the opium of the masses, are the masses self-medicating or is someone drugging
them?
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I've always assumed that when Marx said "Religion is the opium of the masses", he meant that
religion is a tool used by the ruling classes of the time to dominate the lower classes. But when
reading the full original quote:
The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not make man.
Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won
through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting
outside the world. Man is the world of man state, society. This state and this society produce
religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world.
Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular
form, its spiritual point dhonneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement,
and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human
essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion
is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.
Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest
against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless
world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. -- Contribution to the
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 1843.
I am a little confused. On one hand, he states that "This state and this society produce religion",
which seems to confirm my original interpretation that religion is a tool of oppression used by
the upper class.
On the other hand, he later says "Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression
of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed
creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions.", which I read as
saying that religion is a reaction by the masses to the oppression brought on them by the ruling
class, not a tool of the the ruling class itself. To extend the drug analogy of the famous part of
the quote, the masses are self medicating on the religious opium, it is not being forced on them
by their overlords.
So which view is correct according to Marx: Is religion a self-administered reaction to

oppression? or is it a tool of domination administered by the ruling class?
marx marxism
Alexander S King
15.3k21677
It would seem that an oppressive relationship can exist even if the religion is not forced upon the
people, but still used as an opium for the lower classes provided by the upper classes Matt Apr
7 '16 at 18:35
I remember pointing out this quote to you back when you had your old avatar :-) Historical
materialism is fatalistic, state and society produce religion like sun produces sunlight, or like an
oppressed creature produces a sigh. "Overlords" are tools of fate same as the masses and their
drugs, they can not force anything not already forced by the means of production if they tried.
For Marx there is no social will or agency (prior to him at least), and hence no difference
between historical agents and tools, religion is not administered or self-administered, it just
happens to society. Conifold Apr 8 '16 at 0:09
@Conifold "For Marx there is no social will or agency (prior to him at least)" this will keep me
smiling for a while. Alexander S King Apr 8 '16 at 0:12
That's why we got "The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the
new is human society, or social humanity. The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in
various ways; the point is to change it" in Theses on Feuerbach. Marx came to change the
world. :-) Conifold Apr 8 '16 at 1:00
It is possible for Marx to actually be right, and even realistic. (About something, somewhere,
occasionally.) jobermark Apr 26 '16 at 18:49
3 Answers
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If you look at Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, or Feuerbach himself, it seems that Marx would say
something like religion's origin is anthropological in nature the same way that economics or any
other social phenomenon is - that is, it originated based on natural social phenomena (not
simply top-down). It is possible that Marx meant that while the origins are natural, it is exploited
by the "this state."
In any case, the metaphor of "it is the opium of the people" itself doesn't seem to imply a
direction either way, just that either (1) Marx thinks it provides a dulling effect or (2) it provides a
consolation that does not exist against suffering that does exist (much as a "heartless world's"
heart and a "soulless condition's" soul doesn't actually exist).
James Kingsbery
5,08511136
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Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great
classes directly facing each other Bourgeoisie and Proletariat
Ch 1 of communist manifesto
In what relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians as a whole... The Communists are
distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the
proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common
interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of
development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass
through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.
Ch 2
It seems:
communists do not represent every act of the proletariat.
Which means the proletariat does not always act in the interests of the movement.
Is religion a self-administered reaction to oppression? Or is it a tool of domination administered

by the ruling class?
The civil sphere is a bourgeois invention, and so we can assume that it can be antagonistic to the
proletariat. As such:
the proletariat has the civil freedom to choose to use this opiate; yet it seems that
if the proletariat does not act in the interests of the movement, any antagonism with the
bourgeoisie is a loss.
In which case, assuming religion is not set apart, your question looks like a false choice.
user6917
i gave it a shot, sorry ... user6917 Apr 7 '16 at 19:54
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So which view is correct according to Marx: Is religion a self-administered reaction to

oppression? or is it a tool of domination administered by the ruling class?
Marx statement "that religion is the opiate of the masses" is a statement about religion itself.
Look into Emile Durkheim's 1921 book, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, for more
related information about religion and it's power to influencing the masses. Marx's conflict
theory incorporates a similar understanding, but also adds context based on the conflict of the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
With this additional context he argues that religion is a pacifier to the proletariat struggle. It
masks the struggle of man within the world of man, and instead proposes man's struggle be
focused on the salvation in the next life. Leading a religious person to believe their struggle is for
religious Glory, and not here on this earth. There is a willing compliance with those who commit
to religion.
This is of course an oversimplification of the many factor at play when we consider volition and
religious devotion. It should also be noted that this is a rather extreme view and does not
account for those of "true faith". Those who have devotion without the necessity of escaping
social oppression. It also does not acknowledge that religious contentment can be legitimate
contentment, a reversal of Marx's original proposition. We can reconcile this because Marx's
primary focus is on the collective social need to lift up the entire proletariat population, and end
the social exploitations found the world over.
You also asked if religion is administered by the bourgeoisie. The answer is no, in the sense that
they are not the actors solely responsible for the introduction of religion in society. However, as
with all exploitable social mechanisms (labor trade, goods trade, access to the means of
production, etc.), the bourgeoisie do make use of religion. Looking at the close relationship that
religion and civil leadership share throughout history. A relationship so typical that it had to be
directly abolished in the United States Constitution, a clear affirmation of the bourgeoisie's use
and abuse through the influence of religion. The bourgeoisie's use of religion is more to further
their power and fortify the division of the classes.
Bare in mind that the bourgeoisie's greatest tools are not the ones they create themselves, but
the ones that exist naturally and offer an opportunity to control. With the exceptions of social
services, the bourgeoisie do not create much. That is the foundational accusation condemning
classism in Marxist Conflict Theory.

Popper vs Kuhn, Science and Progression
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So I've looked over multiple research papers and books and still can't grasp the idea of what the
difference between Popper and Kuhn is based on their view of how science works and
progresses?
Based on what I've read and managed to come up with is that Popper says scientist always
question scientific methods and is made up of unfalsified theories. While Kuhn says science is
socialized into a paradigm and they never question the theory.
philosophy-of-science popper kuhn
Al-1994
211
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Regarding progress specifically, it might be useful to start with Peirce. Peirce proposed a
pragmatist conception of truth as the limit point of the process of empirical investigation and
critique the scientific community gradually approaches a consensus, and Peirce either defines
that consensus view as the truth (the standard reading) or suggests that processes of empirical
investigation and critique will ensure that the consensus view is true (some Peirce scholars
prefer this reading). In short, Peirce sees truth as the end-state of scientific progress.
Popper agrees with that last statement, but has a more specific mechanism in mind that the
vague "process of empirical investigation and critique." Popper proposes that scientific progress
is the elimination of false theories. This produces Peircean convergence, as proponents of false
theories gradually have their preferred theories eliminated and are rationally compelled to
accept the consensus view.
With Kuhn, it's important to keep clear whether we're talking about progress within normal
science (inside a given paradigm) or progress in the transition from one paradigm to its
successor. Within a paradigm, a field of normal science will have goals (applying the conceptual
framework to novel phenomena or interesting cases, refining functional forms or the values of
constants, confirming important predictions, etc.), and progress within the field can be
measured in terms of the achievement of those goals. Between two rival paradigms, partisans
will often argue that their paradigm can resolve anomalies for the other side; GTR resolves the
anomalous perihelion of Mercury and the lack of an ether wind, that kind of thing. So here you
can get a notion of progress in terms of the resolution of anomalies.
So Kuhn as these two notions of progress, within and between paradigms. The critical difference
from Popper is that both of Kuhn's notions of progress are local. As Peirce and Popper see it, you
should be able to tell a grand historical narrative in which the scientific community thousands
of individuals distributed over time and space gradually converges on the truth. On Kuhn's
view, the transition between paradigms doesn't preserve conceptual frameworks or notions of
which cases are interesting or which predictions are important. The important puzzles of
paradigm A aren't necessarily the important puzzles of paradigm B, and might be totally different
from the important puzzles of paradigm C. Similarly, "resolves the anomalies of" isn't a transitive
relation. B might resolve the anomalies of A, and so B might be regarded as progress over A.
Later, C might resolve the anomalies of B, and so C might be regarded as progress over B. But C
does not necessarily resolve the anomalies of A. (Think of the way non-locality has waxed and
waned as a major problem with physics.) So we can't necessarily say that C is progress over A.
On Kuhn's picture, there's local progress, but it doesn't necessarily add up to a grand historical
narrative of convergence on the truth. It looks much more like just one damn paradigm after
another.
Dan Hicks
5125
Kuhn does, however realize that science does, on an overall and complete scale, make progress.
By looking at history we can make sure that paradigms do progress over time by avoiding past
failure. Some parts of this 'grand arc' will no longer make any sense to us, as they should were
science a single process, but we will not simply go back and forth or around and around. He
actively resists attempts by others to make his notion of incommensurability suggest cycling or
absolute relativism. jobermark Oct 17 '16 at 15:24
This captures the idea that Alchemy feels like nonsense without suggesting we will ever have a
substance-describing paradigm that is equally weak. We are not headed back to an Aristotelian
level of science by sheer drift. jobermark Oct 17 '16 at 15:29
That sounds somewhat more like Ernan McMullin (cf this piece, 41ff) than Kuhn, at least on
standard readings. Here (or here) is a good example of how contemporary philosophers of
science read Kuhn on progress. Dan Hicks Oct 18 '16 at 21:40
They do so over the protestations of Kuhn himself. Modern folks can insist there is no
explanation for the notion of progress in Kuhn, and that he is sorely at odds with Popper, but he
does not agree. You can see this in his own pieces in Criticism and the Growth of Science or The
Essential Tension jobermark Oct 19 '16 at 3:11
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As Kuhn keeps insisting, there is not that much difference between what Kuhn and Popper
suggest for most science as we see it function. What Kuhn labels 'Normal science' includes most
of what Popper identifies as science at all. Where they differ, is upon what happens at major
theoretical shifting points. Take Darwinism as an example.
Popper sees what Kuhn is calling a paradigm as simply a large and audaciously risky single
question. For instance, you can think of Darwin's entire theory of evolution as a single
proposition on species creation. To meet Popper's demarcation criterion, then, you have to
imagine what would be necessary to make it falsifiable, given that what is and is not a species is
somewhat subjective. Since it originates well before DNA and the other parts of the fossil record
that we ultimately tested it against, that leaves Popper confused as to how it succeeds as a
theory.
For a significant period of Popper's own career, he did not believe that Darwinism met his
demarcation criterion, and declared that it must, instead, be considered a mere philosophy
attempting to contribute to science, instead of a scientific theory.
It was not falsifiable as proposed, but it became so, largely on the basis of theories that sprung
up after it. So when did it become 'real' science? Why would anyone proceed to study the
biology that was not yet 'really' scientific long enough to get it to the point it was testable? So, as
in this case, Popper's demarcation criterion sometimes has problems putting cause and effect in
the proper temporal order.
Kuhn's way of looking at those periods is to see that what is shaping development is more basic
than simply being a single high-risk hypothesis. Darwinism is an entire way of shaping how one
looks at biology. For those who found it compelling, Darwinism was not simply a theory, but a
new paradigm. Finding data that fit into it, or that tested it became a focus that directed study.
And they were not open to easily abandoning it. When it was mature, it displaced the preceding
attempts at paradigms and simply took over the discipline as a whole.
Until then, it was contending with other established systems in terms of which it was simply
wrong, starting from the assumption that species were individually created and held relationship
to one another in terms of an overall design, meant to fit nicely together into niche structures
for the best use of the environments available. If one simply took the data at hand and insisted
upon a traditional interpretation, every newly discovered species fit nicely into the existing
cladism, with no intermediary forms, so Darwin was immediately falsified.
If, instead, you cut the new theory any slack at all, it was hard to see where to stop, and at what
point it could be interpreted as having been adequately challenged, and not coddled out of
animosity to the reigning sense of predetermined order. There is no logical place to make that
cutoff. But the call got made. Darwinism passed the modified tests. So it seems that the tests
themselves got chosen on some basis other than sheer falsifiability and experimental challenge.
Kuhn looks at the history of a science in terms of the succession of paradigms, each focusing
development in a given way, instead of Popper's alternately smooth and rocky succession of
simple theories with different levels of risk and implication, that are not 'layered' in any way, but
any one of which faces all the others on equal terms.
It is very hard to really tell these two apart in practice, and Kuhn's theory is layered upon that of
his mentor, so they also do not really conflict obviously. Kuhn, in his successive publications,
keeps alternately emphasizing this ultimate lack of conflict, and pointing out how much more he
favors his own ideas, which, in the end, does not improve our clarity. But the notion of paradigm
does seem, to many, to fit the pattern of historical periods of peace and strife within a discipline,
as periods where paradigms had been chosen and times when they were in contention with one
another.
Kuhn's whole theory seems to have trouble identifying the edges between disciplines that would
allow one to identify the given paradigm. E.g. Is Durkheim's study of suicide a sociological,
psychological or an anthropological theory. Sociologists claim him, and the other two acceded,
but on what grounds? His test criteria are against sociological factors -- national wealth, social
class expectations, family structure etc. But the theory is ultimately about an individual, and not
a group action, so it is psychology. And the economic, tribal and class factors themselves make
sense only in the overall cultural history of Europe, not generalizing to the rest of the world, so it
is anthropology.
Given that, one may need to see the layering of paradigms on a number of scales at once, and
see Kuhn's own theory through a sort of fractal prism of super-, and sub-disciplines. One can
respond to this by falling back onto Popper's unlayered uniformity, or by seeing the layering of
networks of assumptions as a more basic characteristic that determines Popper's "level of risk"
according to the size of the part of the paradigm that would be reconfigured by finding a conflict.
I propose the latter approach as a general theory of knowledge evolution that applies not just to
science, but to social convention, logical foundations, and individual perception.
jobermark
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Strictly speaking, Popper wasn't concerned at all with how science progresses, only with the
demarcation problem, that is how to tell the difference between science and pseudo-science.
Kuhn on the other hand, was concerned with the history and progress of science, but ended up
discussing the demarcation problem as a result of his investigations into the history of science. In
fact that was one of his key insights: That it was impossible to separate the philosophical
demarcation problem from the history of science and scientific progress.
Philosophically, the main difference between the two lies in their assessment of the problem of
auxiliary hypotheses that faces falsificationism.
Consider the problem of falsifying Newtonian mechanics based on measurements of planets

orbits. You measure the orbit of a planet, and if it corresponds to the predictions of Newton's
laws, then Newtonian mechanics is confirmed. However if the measurement doesn't confirm
with Newton's laws, you are faced with two possibilities:
Either Newtonian mechanics (your main hypothesis) is falsified, and we need a new theory of
motion.
Or, you were wrong about the number of planets in the solar system (this is the auxiliary
hypothesis), and an unknown additional planet is causing your calculations to be mistaken. If you
accept that there might be an additional planet, than you can still "save" Newtonian mechanics
from falsification.
Popper thought that this problem could be solved: It should be possible to tell the difference
between (a) reasonable auxiliary hypotheses which help confirm a theory, and (b) unreasonable
auxiliary hypotheses which are simply desperate attempts to save a theory which is false.
Others, however, believed that it was impossible to completely separate the auxiliary hypotheses
from the main hypothesis being tested (See Duhem-Quine thesis). In the above example, one
might respond that we are already using Newtonian mechanics to figure out the number of
planets in the solar system, so treating the number of planets as an independently testable
hypothesis is wrong, and it can't be examined separately from Newton's laws.
Kuhn was one of those who saw auxiliary hypotheses as inseparable from the main thesis, and
they were all bound together in paradigms (For example Newtonian mechanics is one paradigm,
Quantum Mechanics is another, etc...). He argued that these paradigms were driven as much by
sociological and historical reasons, as they were by falsification and purely empirical evidence.
Alexander S King
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The difference between Popper and Kuhn on scientific progress is large and important.
Kuhn follows a long and dishonest tradition in philosophy that uses the following method. Pick
examples of people acting like morons and then insinuate that this is a necessary feature of
reality without saying it explicitly. So Kuhn produces examples where people who like to call
themselves scientists act like complete dumbasses, e.g. - refusing to answer criticisms. He then
insinuates that everyone is a dumbass and so that scientific progress is impossible. Now, since he
never sez this explicitly, people deny that's what he meant and you can have endless discussions
about it without resolving anything. And even Kuhn may sometimes have denied that's what he
meant.This makes philosophers look clever to people who don't know any better. Those who do
know better have described the sorts of bullshit many philosophers get up to. For a discussion of
linguistic philosophers that applies to many other philosophers see Ernest Gellner's book "Words
and Things" chapter VI.
Popper pointed out explicitly that just looking at what scientists do is a complete non-starter for
any serious discussion of philosophy of science, see "Logic of Scientific Discovery" Chapter 1
Section 2. You can't identify somebody as a scientist just cuz he sez he's a scientist. Creationists
and evolutionary biologists both call themselves scientists and accuse the other group of not
being scientists. They can't both be right unless science vs non-science is an invalid distinction.
So then you have to explain some standard of scientific conduct or stop using the word as
anything other than an expression of approval. Popper explains what the standard is: scientific
practice involves seeking criticism of theories, including looking for experimental results that
contradict the theory in question.
More broadly, Popper pointed out that the main precondition for progress is to take the position
"I may be wrong, you may be right and by an effort we may get closer to the truth." Even people
with very different ideas may be able to make progress if they have a genuine critical discussion.
See the title essay in Popper's book "The Myth of the Framework". Scientists often don't live up
to this standard. There are reasons for this. One problem is that our culture has a lot of anti-
intellectual ideas some of which are peddled by philosophers. Other problems include the fact
that scientists suck up to government to get money.
For a detailed discussion of Kuhn, including his intellectual dishonesty in insinuating Popper is a
naive falsificationist, see the introduction to Popper's book 'Realism and the Aim of Science'.
Less accessible but also interesting are Popper's replies to Kuhn in "Criticism and the growth of
knowledge" edited by Lakatos and Musgrave and "The Philosophy of Karl Popper" 2 volumes
edited by Schilpp.
What are some good resources on the ring of Gyges and mass surveillance?
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Plato in the Republic recounts a story about a magical artifact, the Ring of Gyges, in Book II of the
Republic. It is a device to motivate an investigation into the collective aspect of morality. Would
anyone be ethical if they did not need to fear capture or punishment? Socrates ultimately argues
that:
the man who abused the power of the Ring of Gyges has in fact enslaved himself to his
appetites, while the man who chose not to use it remains rationally in control of himself and is
therefore happy
So although this story is oriented towards a man and the individual conscience, it seems also
possible (and possibly intended) to read this concern with accountability and corruption, and
perhaps the social construction of morals more generally, to states, political classes and so on.
Especially given how Plato is investigating an analogy in the Republic between the parts of soul
and partitioning of cities.
What sorts of resources might be available around the question of the ring, especially in terms of
contemporary social formations? Given the ubiquity of mass surveillance, it seems plausible that
Plato's discussion of the ring may be present in philosophical letters about the moral ambiguities
attached to certain new technologies (particularly as the Republic is seen as one of the founding
documents discussing the nature of the Western polity.)
One resource that has turned up so far that seems important is Plato's Invisible Cities: Discourse
and Power in the Republic by Ophir, which mentions the ring extensively (it grounds the
invisibility in the title); and possibly Foucault's panopticism. What other sorts of resources might
be pertinent to an investigation of surveillance and invisibility that might also relate to the ring?
ethics political-philosophy plato computer-ethics
edited Feb 19 '16 at 0:12
Joseph Weissman
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Mozibur Ullah
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There is a fascinating paper by Marc Shell The Ring of Gyges (The Economy of Literature/1978,
ch.1 p.11-62). Herodotus' and Plato's versions of Gyges are interwoven with emphasis on power,
vison and wealth.
Tales of Gyges associate him with founding a tyranny in Lydia and with a power of being able to
transform visibles into invisibles and invisibles into visibles. This power . .. is associated with new
economic and political forms that shattered the previous world and its culture.
David Graeber in his writings on value often refers to cultural-anthropological findings that
connect hidden wealth and visibile signs for it . Today Plato's version seems to be more popular
but Hebbel's drama Gyges and his Ring (1865) relies more on Herodotus, with modern
commentators noting the links as done by Albrecht Koschorke in his Phantasmagorias of Power:
Hebbel's Drama Gyges und sein Ring
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At one level, the Ring of Gyges can take on an overly broad meaning. Simply put, invisibility is a
form of power, presumably technological, and power corrupts. Analogies abound, from Dr. Faust
to military Stealth technologies. Not terribly interesting.
You could equate this power with the visual field of "mass surveillance," but this risks arbitrarily
stretching the meaning beyond Plato's purposes, and in effect adopting the Gyges legend for
your own literary effects. I would see the Ring Effect as something closer to the opposite of mass
surveillance.
The idea in Plato, as proposed by Glaucon, is the case made by Hobbes, Durkheim, or Parsons
that our lupine natures are only kept in check by the mutual surveillance embodied in society.
When the constraint is lifted, the will seeks power, wealth, and fleshpots. Justice resides in
nothing more than such external and mutual constraint.
Socrates can only add that this may indeed be the case, but the extrapolation only gives us
something like the City of Pigs. This is not true justice or freedom. We free ourselves from social
constraint only to enslave ourselves to our impulses and appetites. It is an argument, perhaps,
against our own "Land of the Free," a social equilibrium through mass market consumerism...
which leads, not surprisingly, back to necessity of mass policing and incarceration. Bad model,
Glaucon.
We might surmise that Plato favors the Panopticon, a form of "supervision" that Bentham
intended to guide the wayward back to Protestant self-reflection, a mechanical version of Kant's
categorical imperative. After enough surveillance by the benign prison guards or Guardians,
everybody learns to watch themselves. This was precisely the problem modernity faced once
Enlightenment doubt assailed the panoptic God of Christianity. What can replace Fear of the
Lord? Reason? The categorical imperative? The Panopticon? Second Empire spies and police
networks? London's CCTV "Ring of Steel"?
So the Ring of Gyges operates on Glaucon's assumption that, indeed, some constraining force is
needed to watch the people... and watch the watchers. H.G. Wells' "Invisible Man," Alberich's
ring and cloak of invisibility in Rheingold, Sauron's ring of power, and so forth... all release the
human will from the many-eyed gaze of society, bringing about their own downfall as well, as
Socrates argued.
Rather than mass surveillance, it is the Hacker who most resembles Gyges. A comic book Mad
Hacker who can slip unseen into the electronic infrastructure and take whatever she wants, her
lust for power increasing exponentially with every new supercomputer brought under control. A
Moore's Law of Corruption. The corruption is latent everywhere, evasion of the social gaze and
the eye of god enables it to flourish. I'm sorry not to direct you to specific texts, but you may do
just well as googling. And here's a nice tip. Do you know which sites are routinely blanked out on
the Google Earth panopticon? All Google server farms!
Is this argument, with roots in virtue ethics, valid?
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According to virtue ethics, one should always strive to do as a "virtuous person" would do in the
same situation.
If a patient wishes to continue treatment, even though the doctor deems the continued
treatment to be futile, it is ethically correct, according to virtue ethics, to respect the patient's
wishes, as it shows empathy and respect for the patient, which are traits of a virtuous person.
In our society, respect and empathy are connected to virtue, so if the doctor acts with virtuous
properties, the doctor acts as a virtuous person making the conclusion follow the premise, thus
making the argument valid.
Is this a valid argument?

ethics argumentation virtue-ethics
edited Jan 3 '16 at 22:09
Keelan
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asked Jan 3 '16 at 22:08
Paze
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accepted
Because the argument makes an explicit appeal to societal definitions of virtue, and does not
attempt to claim an ontically objective one, it does seem to be valid and sound under those
assumptions. It would me much harder to defend ontic objectivity in any ethical theory.
1) In our society, respect and empathy are virtuous.
2) A doctor respecting the wishes of a patient is empathetic.
3) Therefore, the doctor is acting virtuously.

What minimally counts as neo-Kantian?
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The term neoKantian gets applied to a wide range of philosophers, from Helmholtz and Cassirer
to Kuhn and even, I have heard, Foucault.
I presume that most versions of neo-Kantianism today take on a more materialist form, stripping
away older idealist and transcendental terminology, while retaining the idea that there is a
collective "rational subject" or conceptual framework that "constructs" the world in some more
or less universal way. Though today such "universality" might be subject to evolution.
I would also suppose that some sort of knowledge-limiting thing-in-itself or ignorabimus is

retained. And, perhaps, a basic sympathy with the aims of logic and science. Possibly an abiding
ethical concern as well.
My question is: What would make a reasonable and minimal definition, or perhaps
"characterization," of neoKantianism today? Are there clear breaks and groupings? I don't mind
a bit of oversimplification. Also, in contemporary philosophy are there self-identified traditional
"Kantians," as distinct from neo-Kantians?
history-of-philosophy kant terminology
edited May 17 '16 at 0:34
Conifold
21.3k1978
Nelson Alexander
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There were never real Kantians, unless we count more or less faithful popularizations of Kant's
ideas like Herbart's, or sympathetic commentary like Strawson's. Helmholtz, Grassman, Poincare
and other scientists were mostly interested in Kant's theory of visual perception, psychologically
and physiologically reinterpreted. Perhaps the most minimal definition is given in Wikipedia
without citation: ""Neo-Kantian" can also be used as a general term to designate anyone who
adopts Kantian views in a partial or limited way". By this definition however Hegel and Quine are
neo-Kantians, as are most contemporary philosophers.
Historically however two major philosophical schools self-described as neo-Kantians, Marburg

(Cohen, Natorp, early Cassirer) and Southwest (Windelband, Rickert, Lask), and they shared with
Kant two main themes. First, epistemology subsumes ontology, our beliefs are not
representations of any mind-independent "objects". The very concept of such a representation is
meaningless since our mental faculties can not "represent" anything independent of themselves,
they only deal with appearances. Second, the object of knowledge is constituted by our mental
faculties based on some a priori structures. Where neo-Kantians diverged from Kant is in
rejecting a priori forms of perception, space and time, they were left therefore with
undifferentiated manifold of sensation and logical forms of judgement to do the constitution.
This has far reaching consequences because it destroys the unity of Kant's architectonic of pure
and practical reason, productive ability of imagination can no longer do the work for Kant's
noumenal metaphysics of practical reason and judgement. Marburgers gave priority to pure
reason, and focused on scientific knowledge, Southwesterners to practical reason, values and
transcendental psychology over logic. Both retained priority of rational discourse over religious,
artistic, etc. forms of expression, but in mild forms. Rickert, Lask and Natorp paved the way for
phenomenology (personally influencing Husserl and Heidegger), Cassirer in 1920s moved
beyond Marburg by incorporating Hegel's historical dialectic and elements of Lebensphilosophie,
and advocating plurality of expressive forms.
By historical measure Foucault and Kuhn are frankly a stretch. The closest thing to a
contemporary neo-Kantian would be Friedman, who seeks to enrich Marburg with insights from
Carnap, Quine and Kuhn, and takes Cassirer as inspiration. In particular, he relativizes a priori
forms and analytic/synthetic distinction to lasting but historically revisable notions that help
bridge the "incommensurability" of paradigms and mitigate cultural relativism.
In Parting of the Ways Friedman gives a sympathetic account of historical neo-Kantianism and its
precipitation of the analytic/continental divide despite Cassirer's best efforts.
Conifold
21.3k1978
Thanks, I had just ordered "Parting of the Ways," so will learn more. I was also interested in
Hilferding and the Austrian-Kantian Marxists. But you are right. I don't see how a "materialized"
Kantianism can retain the moral force and practical orientation of the original, and thus provides
no real ethical grounding for Marxism. Nelson Alexander Oct 24 '15 at 21:16
What is Kant's influence on philosophy of science and the demarcation problem?
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Kant's proof of the existence of synthetic apriori knowledge was a response to Hume's fork and
his views the problem of induction.
Given the relevance of these two concepts to the philosophy of science in general and to the
demarcation problem in particular, can it be said that Kant's synthetic apriori had any influence
on the philosophy of science?
Does it have any implications for the demarcation problem?
Given Kant's pervasiveness in philosophy in general, has he had any impact on philosophy of
science, not just due to the synthetic apriori result?
philosophy-of-science kant demarcation
asked Feb 7 '16 at 18:36

Alexander S King
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accepted
There is an unbroken chain of tradition from Kant to all major currents in the philosophy of
science. As for demarcation, Kant's standard was far stricter than even Popper's. For example, he
called chemistry "systematic art or experimental doctrine but not a proper science", and
infamously opined that empirical psychology will never become a science because introspection
data is too garbled and ephemeral. Only that which could structure experience according to
synthetic a priori principles in a mathematical form (i.e. mathematical physics) deserved the
name of (natural) science. He somewhat softened his stance in late years, willing to find a place
for chemistry as a kind-of-science in light of Lavoisier's work however. I still suspect that not even
modern biology, let alone soft sciences, would pass Kant's muster.
The assimilation of Kant by scientists proceeded through Herbart, a talented popularizer who
succeeded him at Knigsberg, and to a lesser extent Fichte, who spelled out what Kant's
"transcendental method" was. Dissatisfied with speculations of German idealism Helmholtz
issued the "back to Kant" call in his 1855 lecture. The original interest was in Kant's theory of
sensibility in relation to the emerging physiology of senses, especially vision and touch (early
studies of vision motivated Kant's model of sensibility, productive imagination and
understanding), and the related subject of empirical geometry (Riemann names Gauss and
Herbart as the only influences in his famous lecture, see Which school of philosophy motivated
thinking about spaces of higher dimension?). The approach was to discard idealist elements in
Kant and relax his synthetic a priori to make room for more empirical input, e.g. a priori did not
strictly dictate Euclidean geometry, only some locally Euclidean one, to be determined
empirically. Poincare went further in accepting the creative role of mental faculties in science,
and postulated that empirical theories only reflect certain structures of experience (Kant would
say those brought under the categories of understanding), e.g. experience only specifies
geometry + physics but not each part separately, that is decided by convention. Conventional
aspects are determined by pragmatic reasons and may be discarded in new theories. Current
structural realists (Worrall, Tegmark) trace their lineage to Poincare.
Professional philosophers of science went back to Kant soon after Helmholtz. Marburg neo-
Kantians introduced two approaches that came to dominate the assimilation of Kant:
externalization and relativization. Kant tacitly identified scientific process with individual
cognition assuming that scientific discovery follows the mental a priori. Around 1870 Cohen, the
founder of Marburg school, proposed to get rid of this "psychologism", and explicitly identified
knowledge with scientific knowledge, and replaced Kant's things in themselves with an object of
knowledge as ideal limit approached through a succession of refinements. Cassirer played a key
role in transmitting the neo-Kantian creed to logical positivists. After Einstein's formulation of
relativity Reichenbach, an early logical positivist known for coining "context of justification" vs.
"context of discovery", explicitly suggested that a priori should be relativized to account for
scientific succession, they last longer than the theories they help generate, but even they are
updated from time to time. Finally, in Carnap, the logical positivist par excellence, we find Kant
fully externalized and relativized, one could even say formalized. Pure reason (single) becomes a
linguistic framework (one of many), synthetic a priori become its definitions, axioms and
application rules, the duality between sensibility and understanding, and hence appearances
and experience, becomes the duality between observation and theoretical languages, and the
noumena/phenomena distinction becomes the distinction between external and internal
questions, the former being pseudo-questions devoid of meaning within the framework. For all
their disagreements, Popper also accepted the key elements of this picture, formalization of
scientific theories and the observation/theory distinction. It was a neat picture, until Quine and
Kuhn ruined it.
The elimination of sensibility as independent faculty by Cassirer (in response to relativity and
other developments in physics) ultimately led to impossibility of maintaining the
observation/theory distinction. And along with taking relativization of a priori to the extreme (of
discarding them) it paved the way for Quine's holism. Kuhn's culturalization and historicization of
philosophy of science somewhat paralleled Hegel's revision of Kant's philosophy with inspiration
delivered through Marx. More specifically, through Soviet Marxist Hessen, the Hessen thesis
injected social context into Western historiography of science in 1930s. Interestingly enough,
Carnap saw affinities between his linguistic frameworks and Kuhn's paradigms, and even
published Scientific Revolutions in his book series. It took Kuhn some time but he saw the
reciprocal light as well. Moreover, both Quine and Kuhn walked back the more radical
formulations of holism and cultural relativism, and Friedman, a contemporary neo-Kantian,
showed how their more moderate versions can be accomodated in a scheme of historically
evolving paradigms structured by relativized a priori in Dynamics of Reason.
The pursuit of more radical versions led to the postmodernistic pandemonium of 1980s (on both
sides of the analytic/continental divide) ending in the grotesque grand finale of Sokal hoax. The
story is told in Zammito's Derangement of Epitemes. The resurgence of structural realism and
even naive realism (Weinberg) among natural scientists in recent decades is likely a backlash
against that anti-scientific postmodernistic exuberance.
Conifold
21.3k1978
Great. Marvelously comprehensive answer! Are there any related books you can recommend? In
addition to the post-Kantian influence on sciences, I am interested in the Kantian Marxism of the
Austro-Marxists and after, which seems to be a marxism better suited to contemporary
financialization themes. As a pure hobbyist with limited time, relatively concise works are better
for me. Nelson Alexander Feb 9 '16 at 15:12
@Nelson Alexander Zammito's book covers the 1950-2000 period, neo-Kantianism, transition to
logical positivism and the emergence of analytic/continental divide are nicely analyzed in
Friedman's Parting of the Ways, Cassirer's Problem of Knowledge is considered a classic on 19th
century. See also short paper Kant, Herbart and Riemann by Banks
philpapers.org/archive/BANKHA.pdf Conifold Feb 9 '16 at 18:56
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Keynes once quipped that public figures who think they are expressing their original thoughts
are usually echoing the words of some dead economist. The same might be said of the dead
Kant in respect to science. While his thought provides a comprehensive modern framework for
science, most practicing scientists have never read him and large swaths of the philosophy of
science ignore or reject what they take to be muddled Kantianism.
Bertrand Russell and E.G. Moore were especially hostile to Kant, convicting him of logical errors
and supposing that transcendental idealism rested on a mistaken faith in the inviolability of
Euclidean Geometry, which Kant presented as the very model of the "synthetic a priori." These
dubious charges stuck all the way through logical positivism and continue in the analytic
tradition. Certainly Popper's demarcation criteria seem to reject Kantian approaches, or at least
so Popper claimed.
Today, however, it seems that more philosophers of science may be open to Kant. Henry Allison
offers detailed refutations of the above calumnies, and Kuhn was explicitly influenced by Kant in
his anti-Popperian demarcation by "paradigms." He claimed that reading Kant while studying
physics utterly altered his naive realism, though those are not his words.
As to the bigger picture. Bacon first described the emerging rift between the rationalists, "the
spiders," who weave webs of theory (coherence theory, we might say) and the new empirical
naturalists, "the busy ants," who gather bits of data (correspondence theory, roughly). The rift
grew into Leibnizian mathematical rationalism and Humean skepticism. It was Kant's great
project to merge and mutually limit the two on a firm metaphysical basis, in part to secure the
basis of Newtonian physics.
His unique amalgam of coherence and correspondence theory is in many ways, and intentionally,
a kind of philosophical version of the hypothetic-deductive framework of science, an expansion
of knowledge by rational (conceptual) methods and experimental (intuitional) confirmation. And
indeed science does undertake continuous active synthesis based on a priori assumptions of
necessity and universality. Even the "experiment" is somewhat Kantian, in that it is hardly
passive reception of sense data... the experiential confirmation in "common sense" is quite
artificial and actively constructed.
Most working scientists tend to believe they are following analytical rules and discovering
"correspondences" with hard "reality." So they look askance at Kantian idealism, regarding it as
akin to Berkeleyan empirical idealism or some sort of structuralism. Such assurance was, of
course, shaken by statistical mechanics in thermodynamics and then quantum mechanics. But
such "shaking" may only register with a few...how many physicists, after all, have time to read
Kant? Yet when pressed on theoretical issues many physicists will admit they are constructing
models and cannot speak about the "ultimate reality," mere speculative metaphysics, unaware
that they are defaulting to a near Kantian position.
Meanwhile, cosmology today seems to be weaving "theoretical webs" well outside any Kantian
remit, moving far beyond experimental range and tumbling headlong into the Antinomies. In
CPR B511, for example, we see hints of Copenhagen in "you never come face to face with
anything unconditioned...." or "...neither a simple appearance [i.e., final particle] nor an infinite
composition [i.e., material universe] can ever come before you." One might say Kant attempted
to work out a physics that included the observer.
Of course, this is very general and it is easy to contrive this sort of cozy compatibility. I don't
know enough about Kant yet to know where he might be in serious conflict with scientific
practices, especially in theory of evolution... or perhaps in the evolution and "selection" of
theories, where Hegel's criticism of Kant begins. I hope other will offer more specific references
to Kant in current philosophy of science, since I'd like to know as well.
Nelson Alexander
7,1722934
"Meanwhile, cosmology today seems to be weaving "theoretical webs" well outside any Kantian
remit, moving far beyond experimental range and tumbling headlong into the Antinomies." --
This could be the topic of a separate discussion. I like the way you put it. Alexander S King Feb
9 '16 at 18:07
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First let me recall the view which is denoted Humes fork (see
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/):
Propositions concerning relations of ideas are intuitively or demonstratively certain. They are
known a prioridiscoverable independently of experience by the mere operation of thought,
so their truth doesn't depend on anything actually existing (EHU 4.1.1/25). That the interior
angles of a Euclidean triangle sum to 180 degrees is true whether or not there are any Euclidean
triangles to be found in nature. Denying that proposition is a contradiction, just as it is
contradictory to say that 87=57.
In sharp contrast, the truth of propositions concerning matters of fact depends on the way the
world is. Their contraries are always possible, their denials never imply contradictions, and they
can't be established by demonstration. Asserting that Miami is north of Boston is false, but not
contradictory. We can understand what someone who asserts this is saying, even if we are
puzzled about how he could have the facts so wrong. The distinction between relations of ideas
and matters of fact is often called Hume's Fork, [].
Kant does not refute the distinction made by this classification. Like Hume also Kant accepts
mathematical truths as example of Relations of ideas and many statements from physics as
propositions concerning matters of fact. But different from Hume Kant holds that some
synthetic - statements from physics can be known a priori, see Kants Metaphysical Foundations
of Natural Science.
Your question asks about Kants influence on the philosophy of science.
1) Quine in his seminal essay Two dogmas of empiricism (1951) confirms:
Kants cleavage between analytic and synthetic truths was foreshadowed in Humes distinction
between relations of ideas and matters of fact [].
Quine names the belief in this distinction the first dogma of empiricism and he refutes it. He
links the first dogma with a second dogma (reductionism) and states in paragraph 5:
My countersuggestion [] is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of
sense experience not indivudually but only as a corporate body.
As a consequence it makes no sense for Quine assessing single propositions and classifying them
as analytic or synthetic.
2) Broadly speaking, Popper returns to Humes view of induction and adds the concept of
falsification of scientific propositions. Hence Popper refutes the existence of Kants view on the
existence of synthetic a priori statements. As a consequence the distinction of analytic and
synthetic does not play an important role in Poppers demarcation of science and metaphysics I
agree with Mauros answer.
3) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-science/ testifies a certain influence of Kants thoughts

on contemporary philosopyh of science. The passage starts:
Kant's philosophy of science has received attention from several different audiences and for a
variety of reasons. It is of interest to contemporary philosophers of science primarily because of
the way in which Kant attempts to articulate a philosophical framework that places substantive
conditions on our scientific knowledge of the world while still respecting the autonomy and
diverse claims of particular sciences.

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How is soul-body hylomorphism different from property dualism?

How is soul-body hylomorphism different from property dualism?

What are the different types of property dualism?

philosophy-of-mind aristotle mind-body

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asked Apr 24 '15 at 16:59

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Idealist: Plato | Descartes | Kant

Realist: Aristotle | Locke | Hegel

For more, see William Jaworski's index of terms.

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answered Apr 25 '15 at 14:04

How is hylomorphism different from property dualism

In a sense hylomorphism is a kind of monism rather than dualism.

Example: consider Jameel from Eritrea

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edited Apr 25 '15 at 15:33

answered Apr 25 '15 at 7:50

What is Ontological Commitment?

What is Ontological Commitment?

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edited May 3 '13 at 21:49

asked May 3 '13 at 20:18

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answered May 4 '13 at 8:46

What are some good books about social consensus theory?

Is there a book, or any kind of reference for this topic?

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edited Dec 24 '15 at 22:29

because of the second. M.M Oct 7 '15 at 9:01

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For an introduction, see this Wikipedia entry

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edited Oct 7 '15 at 19:45

answered Oct 7 '15 at 19:30

Nicholas Rescher (1993), Pluralism, against the demand for consensus.

is really non-trivial and, imho, worth reading.

What does to naturalize reason mean?

I don't understand what "to naturalize reason" mean.

I found an article on "Naturalized Epistemology" at "Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy", but I

epistemology contemporary-philosophy rorty

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edited Sep 18 '13 at 19:50

asked Sep 17 '13 at 12:44

Who are the most influential living philosophers? [closed]

edited Jun 14 '11 at 1:39

closed as not constructive by Cody Gray Apr 25 '12 at 3:25

locked by Cody Gray Apr 25 '12 at 3:25

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In analytic philosophy, I would say Saul Kripke, without a doubt.

answered Jun 10 '11 at 6:35

The top 10 are:

John Stuart Mill

answered Jun 11 '11 at 2:42

All long dead, right? Joseph Weissman Jun 11 '11 at 2:53

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edited Jun 10 '11 at 8:02

These types of questions are very difficult to answer.

S is justified in believing that p.