The Past and Present Society

The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy by J. L. Talmon

Review by: C. B. Macpherson
Past & Present, No. 2 (Nov., 1952), pp. 55-57
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/650125 .
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Reviews
J. L. TALMON: TheOriginsofTotalitarian
Democracy. (London:
Secker& Warburg,1952. Pp. xii,366. 27/6).

Mr. Talmon offers us a new varietyofhistory:LiberalEmpiricist.

It will have some appeal, and is likelyto have followers. It is
developedin thisvolumewithskill,insightand passionateconviction,
yet it is not satisfying.Mr. Talmon observes, acutely, that
" totalitarian democracy" (by whichhe means dictatorship based
on the mass enthusiasmgeneratedby a perfectionist ideology)is
just as much a part of the westernpoliticaltraditionas is liberal
democracy; it is not,therefore,to be exorcisedmerelyby reaffirming
the westerntradition,or by rehearsing the superficial " democracy
vs. dictatorship " theme. What is needed,he believes,is to show
whereand how the humanist,rationalist, individualisttraditiongot
offthe trackof liberalism,so thatwe mayrepairand guardagainst
similarerrorsnow and in the future. The divisionof thetradition
into the two streams- liberaland totalitarian - he findsto have
takenplace in 18thcenturyFrance. He treatsthe problemalmost
entirelyat the level of ideas and ideology. The substanceof the
bookis thusa studyof the development ofthe " innerlogic" of one
streamof 18thcentury Frenchpoliticalideas,fromtheEncyclopedists
throughRobespierreand Saint-Just to Babeuf.
Althoughhe is concernedentirelywiththe totalitarian tradition,
his treatmentof it depends on his conceptof liberalismand his
consequentdistinctionbetweenthe two ideologies. The crucial
distinction, he urges,is that betweenempiricismand beliefin an
absolute natural order of society. The liberal traditionmakes
politicsa matteroftrialanderror;itseespoliticalsystems as pragmatic
devicesof humaningenuity and spontaneity; it recognizesa variety
of levels of personaland collectiveendeavour,outsidepolitics;and
it sees theessenceoffreedom in spontaneity and absenceofcoercion.
The totalitarian democrats,on the contrary, believein a sole and
exclusive truthin politics; postulatea pre-ordainedharmonious
schemeofthingsto whichmenareirresistably drivenandatwhichthey
are bound to arrive;recognizeno levelsof existenceapartfromthe
political;and see freedomas somethingto be realizedonlyin the
pursuitand attainmentof the collectivepurpose- a purposenot
imposedon men but consideredto be immanentin man's rational
natureandto constitute thefullestsatisfaction ofhistrueinterest.
This distinctionMr. Talmon believesto be as valid for2oth as
for I8th centurydemocraticmovements, and he insiststhatin both
centuriesthese qualitiesare the fundamental ones. Indeed, as he
tells us, he foundthisdistinction firstin the zoth century. " With
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 thegrowthoftheWelfareStateaimingat socialsecurity,"he writes,
" the distinctionbetweenthe absolutistand empiricalattitudeto
politicshas becomemorevitalthanthe old divisioninto capitalism
and social-security-achieving socialism" (p. 254). Whateverwe
maythinkofthisview,whichdoes notgo verydeep,we maywonder
whetherit was advisableto read back thisnew distinction intothe
18thcentury, but Mr. Talmonwas impelledto do so in orderto give
weight to his warningagainst any deviationfromstrictliberal
empiricism.
The author'sfirsttaskis to show how the totalitarian and liberal
ideologiescouldhaveflowedfromthesameassumptions. He argues
thatthe bourgeoisideologyshapedby suchphilosophes as Helvetius
and Holbach,whilebasicallyindividualist and rationalist,
contained,
in itsassumptionofa naturalorderwhichcouldand wouldbe realized
by enlightened(or perfected)man, the seeds of the subsequent
totalitariantendency. When this assumptionbecame an article
of popularfaith,it was onlya step to the assertionof a unanimous
generalwill awaitingexpressionby an enlightenedand virtuous
vanguard. Once the vanguardhad got into power,its attemptto
realizetherationaland justnaturalorderled necessarily to thedenial
oftherightofopposition, to thesuppression ofparties,and in theend
a dictatorshipbasedon a singlepartyofthefaithful, intentonimposing
a reignofvirtueand freedomon thewholepeople- thedictatorship
of Robespierre,Saint-Just and the Committeeof Public Safety.
Now it is one thingto show (as Mr. Talmon does convincingly)
that the idea of a naturalordercan easilybe takento totalitarian
conclusions, and quiteanotherto show(as he wouldhaveus believe)
thatcertainpoliticalmovements weredrivento totalitarianpositions
becausetheyembracedtheidea of a naturalorder. Whyattribute it
all to the idea of a naturalorder? Are not the exigenciesof
revolution(and foreignintervention) to accountfor the
sufficient
totalitariannatureof Jacobinism ? Mr. Talmon says theyare not,
but his own view is somewhatunhistorical.For instance,he
attributesthe Jacobins'proscriptionof partiesto their belief in
" a sole exclusivetruth" which" excludesthepossibility of political
partiesrepresenting honestdifferences ofopinion,"and he complains
that" Saint-Just is quite unableto see in the partiesan instrument
forexpressingand organizing the varioustrendsin publicopinion"
(pp. 115-6). But this is just what parties cannot be duringa
revolution;the revolutionitself,while it lasts, withoutany belief
in a sole exclusivetruth,is enoughto makea peaceablemulti-party
systemimpossible.
Some importance, indeed,maybe attachedto theJacobins'belief
in an absoluteexclusivetruthin politics;at leastit made thepathto
totalitarianismeasier. However,ifwe areto look,withMr. Talmon,
to doctrineratherthanevents,thereis anotheraspectoftheirdoctrine
that may well have been more important. Both Jacobinsand
Babouvistswere, as the authorhimselfshows, quite unhistorical
in theirnotionsof humannatureand thenaturalorder. They were
surprisedthat truthsso obvious as theirprincipleshad not been
thought of before. They had no concept of historicalclass
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conditioningof individual wills; they dealt in undifferentiated
humanity. They insisted,also, that the general will could be
expressedonlybymenas individuals, notbyparties,groupsorclasses.
We may ask whetherit was not just this naive, unhistorical, and
abstractqualityof their conceptthat made inevitablethe trans-
formation of a democraticmovement intoa totalitariandictatorship.
Mr. Talmon arguesthatanypopularmovementdrivenby faithin a
pre-ordainednaturalordermustassume a unanimityof real wills;
that, owing to the uniquenessof individuals,therenever can be
spontaneousunanimity; thatthereforethe leadersof the movement,
oncein power,cannotgetfreeassent,and so aredrivento dictatorship:
" wherefull unanimityis postulated,thereis no escape fromthe
impositionof a singlewill" (p. 207).
The concept of unanimityis not as simple as Mr. Talmon's
treatment requiresus to assume. Not onlya pre-ordainednatural
orderof societybut any democraticsocietyrequiresunanimityon
fundamentals, that is, on all matterswhich men thinkimportant
enoughto justifythe exertionof poweroverothers. If the area of
unanimity thatis demandedis, as withtheJacobinsand Babouvists,
muchgreaterthancouldin thecircumstances emergespontaneously,
democracynecessarilybecomes totalitarian dictatorship.But the
circumstances are crucial. Amongthem,the stageof development
of classesis of firstimportance in determining the area of unanimity
thatis practicable. It also has a lotto do withthekindofunanimity
that is postulatedas possible. A petit-bourgeois movementlike
Jacobinism,or a proletarianmovementstill based on the same
individualistassumptions(like Babouvism)is peculiarlyliable to
demanda completelygeneralunanimityat a time when it is least
possible. It mightbe arguedthatit was thepetit-bourgeois character
of theseideologies,ratherthan the assumptionof a naturalorder,
thatled so readilyto totalitarian dictatorship.
If thisis so, Mr. Talmon's assertionof thefundamental similarity
ofthe 18thand 2othcenturydevelopments willneedreconsideration.
Insofaras the " people's democracies" of our day have emergedin
preponderantly peasantsocietiestheremayindeedbe new elements
of similarity to the I8th centuryto be found. But theywill not be
foundby searchingforone commonfactorin therealmofideas; nor,
if found,can theybe expectedto be the decisiveelementsin the
formationof modern" totalitarian democracy." The weaknessof
liberalempiricist historyis thatit makesdoctrinethe devil, and so
does notattendsufficiently to thesocialrealitiesthat give substance
and directionto specificdemocraticmovements. Neitherunder-
standingnorjudgmentcan be adequateon theseterms.

C. B. MACPHERSON.
of Toronto.
University

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