Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Edited by B. L. Turner II, Clark University, Worcester, MA, and approved July 11, 2007 (received for review March 12, 2007)
The articles in this special feature challenge the presumption that scholars can make simple, predictive models of social ecological
systems (SESs) and deduce universal solutions, panaceas, to problems of overuse or destruction of resources. Moving beyond pana-
ceas to develop cumulative capacities to diagnose the problems and potentialities of linked SESs requires serious study of complex,
multivariable, nonlinear, cross-scale, and changing systems. Many variables have been identified by researchers as affecting the pat-
terns of interactions and outcomes observed in empirical studies of SESs. A step toward developing a diagnostic method is taken by
organizing these variables in a nested, multitier framework. The framework enables scholars to organize analyses of how attributes
of (i) a resource system (e.g., fishery, lake, grazing area), (ii) the resource units generated by that system (e.g., fish, water, fodder),
(iii) the users of that system, and (iv) the governance system jointly affect and are indirectly affected by interactions and resulting
outcomes achieved at a particular time and place. The framework also enables us to organize how these attributes may affect and
be affected by larger socioeconomic, political, and ecological settings in which they are embedded, as well as smaller ones. The
framework is intended to be a step toward building a strong interdisciplinary science of complex, multilevel systems that will enable
future diagnosticians to match governance arrangements to specific problems embedded in a social ecological context.
I
n the introduction to this special
feature, we call attention to per- problems tend to be systems fore a severe transformation adversely
verse and extensive uses of policy problems, where aspects of behaviour overcomes them (23, 24).
panaceas in misguided efforts to are complex and unpredictable and
where causes, while at times simple A Nested Framework for Analyzing
make social ecological systems (SESs),
also called human environment systems, (when finally understood), are always Interactions and Outcomes of
multiple. They are non-linear in na- Linked SESs
sustainable over time. It is not enough,
however, just to call attention to the ture, cross-scale in time and in space, Moving beyond panaceas to develop
inadequacy of the panaceas that are pre- and have an evolutionar y character. cumulative capacities to diagnose the
scribed as simple solutions to complex This is true for both natural and so- problems and potentialities of linked
SESs. Korten (1) long ago identified the cial systems. In fact, they are one sys- SESs requires serious study of the com-
danger of blueprint approaches to the tem, with critical feedbacks across plex, multivariable, nonlinear, cross-
governance of tough social ecological temporal and spatial scales. scale, and changing SESs described by
problems and urged that policy makers Holling et al. (20). We need to clarify
The conceptual structure of these the structure of an SES so we under-
adopt a learning process rather than problems is a rugged landscape with
imposing final solutions. Kortens advice stand the niche involved and how a par-
many peaks and valleys. Finding higher ticular solution may help to improve
is similar to that of Walters (2, 3) and peaks when the number of potential so-
the emphasis on adaptive management outcomes or make them worse. Also,
lutions is drastically reduced to a few solutions may not work the same way
in contemporar y analyses of complex optimal strategies is grossly inade-
adaptive systems (4 6). Unfortunately, over time. As structural variables
quate for reaching creative and produc- change, participants need to have ways
the preference for simple solutions to tive solutions to challenging problems
complex governance problems continues of learning and adapting to these
(21). One can become fixated on a low changes.
to be strong (7). conceptual hill by tr ying to optimize
To move beyond panaceas and build a Many variables affect the patterns
specific variables while overlooking bet- of interactions and outcomes obser ved
solid field of sustainability science (8, 9), ter solutions involving ignored variables.
one needs to build on the work of schol- in empirical studies. After undertaking
Instead, we need to recognize and un- a careful analysis of the research
ars who have undertaken careful, well derstand the complexity to develop
documented and theoretically sound examining the factors likely to affect
diagnostic methods to identify combina- self-organization and robustness of
studies of ecological systems, socioeco- tions of variables that affect the incen-
nomic systems, and linked SESs (10 17). common-property regimes, Agrawal
tives and actions of actors under diverse (25) identified 30 variables that had
We should stop striving for simple an-
misuse of ecological systems are rarely a resource system and the resource units Author contributions: E.O. contributed new reagents/
analytic tools, analyzed data, and wrote the article.
attributable to a single cause (19). generated by that system that jointly af-
fect the incentives of users within a set The author declares no conflict of interest.
Holling et al. (ref. 20, p. 352) identified
the structure of the problems involved: of rules crafted by local, distal, or This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
nested governance systems to affect in- Abbreviations: GS, governance system; RS, resource system;
The answers are not simple because teractions and outcomes over time (see RU, resource user; SES, social ecological system; U, user.
we have just begun to develop the Fig. 1). Furthermore, we need to enable *E-mail: ostrom@indiana.edu
concepts, technology and methods resource users and their officials to ex- 2007 by The National Academy of Sciences of the USA
www.pnas.org cgi doi 10.1073 pnas.0702288104 PNAS September 25, 2007 vol. 104 no. 39 1518115187
affected by interactions and resulting out-
Social, Economic, and Political Settings (S) comes achieved at a particular time and
place. Using such a framework also en-
Resource Governance ables one to organize how these attributes
System System may affect and be affected by the larger
(RS) (GS) socioeconomic, political, and ecological
settings in which they are embedded, as
Interactions (I) Outcomes (O) well as smaller ones.
Each of the eight broad variables
shown in Fig. 1 can be unpacked and
Resource Units Users further unpacked into multiple concep-
(RU) (U) tual tiers. How far down or up a con-
RS1- Sector (e.g., water, forests, pasture, fish) GS1- Government organizations fered only delayed costs from overgraz-
RS2- Clarity of system boundaries GS2- Non-government organizations ing. Translating his metaphor into a
RS3- Size of resource system GS3- Network structure
theor y requires five assumptions: (i) the
RS4- Human-constructed facilities GS4- Property-rights systems
RS5- Productivity of system GS5- Operational rules
resource system is a pasture (RS1); (ii)
RS6- Equilibrium properties GS6- Collective-choice rules no governance system is present (no GS
RS7- Predictability of system dynamics GS7- Constitutional rules variables) related to the resource sys-
RS8- Storage characteristics GS8- Monitoring & sanctioning processes tem; (iii) the mobile individual resource
RS9- Location units (RU1, the animals grazing on the
Resource Units (RU) Users (U) pasture) can be identified and are the
RU1- Resource unit mobility U1- Number of users
RU2- Growth or replacement rate U2- Socioeconomic attributes of users property of their owners (implicitly as-
RU3- Interaction among resource units U3- History of use suming RU6) and, when fattened, can
RU4- Economic value U4- Location be sold for cash (RU4); (iv) a sufficient
RU5- Size U5- Leadership/entrepreneurship number of users (large U1), given the
RU6- Distinctive markings U6- Norms/social capital
size of the pasture (RS3), are using the
RU7- Spatial & temporal distribution U7- Knowledge of SES/mental models
U8- Dependence on resource
pasture to adversely affect its long-term
U9- Technology used productivity (RS5); and (v) the resource
RU1- Mobile animals on stationary grasses U1- Large number of users lobsters, and how fishers were organized
RU2- U2- within their harbors.
RU3- U3- Whereas the contemporar y roving
RU4- Fattened cattle can be sold for cash U4- bandits of international waters simply
RU5- U5- move on after they destroy a stock, in-
RU6- Distinctive markings U6-
RU7- U7- Maximization of short-term gains for self
cluding the green sea urchins that were
U8-
depleted from the Maine shore in the
U9- 1980s for export elsewhere, the lobster
Interactions (I) Outcomes (O) fishers of Maine have lived in shoreline
I1- Maximum harvesting levels by users O1- communities for many generations (U3),
I2- O2- Destruction of ecological system have deep roots in their communities
I3- O3- (U4) and local leadership (U5), have
I4-
developed norms of trustworthiness and
I5-
I6- reciprocity with those with whom they
Related Ecosystems (ECO) have close interactions (U6), and have
ECO1- ECO2- ECO3- gained effective knowledge about the
resource system and resource units they
are using (U7) to evolve an ever more
in field settings lacking governance sys- fishing vessels make decisions indepen- valuable local fisher y, with sales of
tems or opportunities for communica- dently to maximize their own short-term Maine lobsters totaling $186.1 million in
tion. Berkes et al. (55) examine the returns (U7). The only slight difference 2000 (ref. 64, p. 13).
impact of roving bandits: fishing f leets in assumptions is the third assumption The biological attributes of lobsters
that target valuable marine species in related to the basis for establishing own- (the RU) have enabled the state govern-
coastal waters, deplete local stocks, ership of the resource units (capture as ment of Maine and the lobster fishers to
and then move on to exploit stocks lo- contrasted to long-term possession). The develop har vesting rules and norms that
cated in other regions. Drawing on the predicted interactions and outcomes (I1, have contributed to the recuperation of
work of Olson (56), who developed the high har vesting levels, and O2, severe the stock (ref. 67, p. 1907; and Fig. 1).
concept of roving bandits, Berkes et al. overhar vesting or destruction of the Lobsters are slow-growing but highly
(ref. 55, p. 1557) characterize the prob- ecological system) do occur in the productive after reaching maturity at 7
lem: Roving banditr y is different coastal waters studied by Berkes et years, with an expected lifespan of up to
from most commons dilemmas in that al. (55). 100 years. Fishers sort through the catch
a new dynamic has arisen in the global- Solving the problem of roving ban- in their traps and can safely return to
ized world: New markets can develop dits for mobile ocean fisheries is more the sea lobsters that are below and
so rapidly that the speed of resource challenging than designing governance above a defined size as well as any ber-
exploitation often overwhelms the abil- arrangements well matched to the ried female lobsters, easily identified by
ity of local institutions to respond. smaller spatial scales of many local, the hundreds of eggs extruded on their
These settings are similar to those common-pool resources (refs. 17, 44, bellies.
characterized by the five assumptions and 5759; see also the Digital Librar y However, as Wilson et al. (68) clearly
that Hardin (50) implicitly made, with of the Commons for extensive cita- demonstrate, local trap-fishers may
the exception of the first assumption tions, http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu). evolve highly exploitative har vest- ing
related to resource systems: (i) the re- Berkes et al. (55) point to the need for strategies, depending on the spe- cific
source systems (RS1) are coastal waters multilevel governance institutions oper- combination of attributes assumed in
rather than pastures. The other assump- ating from local to international levels the model. The eventual success of the
tions are ver y similar: (ii) no governance (see also refs. 47 and 60 63). They Maine lobster fisher y is thus attrib-
system is present (no GS variables) re- conclude that: utable to the congruence of multiple
lated to the resource systems; (iii) the factors. The state of Maine made it
mobile individual resource units (RU1, no single approach can solve prob- illegal to har vest egg-bearing female
the fish captured by a fishing boat) be- lems emerging from globalization and
come the private property of the boat sequential exploitation. But the vari-
Events inthe rest of the ecosystem have turned the lobster
owner and can be sold for cash (RU4); ous approaches used together can fishery into more of a monoculture that exposes it to the
(iv) a large number of fishing boats slow down the roving bandit effects, threat of an epidemic among the lobsters that could gen-
(large U1), given the finite size (RS3) of and can replace destructive incentives erate an unexpected collapse at some future date. These
problems cannot be addressed by the evolved lobster
the renewable fisher y (RS5), are roving with a resource rights framework that governance system alone (S. Carpenter, personal commu-
the coastal waters searching for schools mobilizes environmental steward- nication, August 1, 2006; and J. Wilson, personal commu-
of fish to har vest; and (v) the owners of ship, i.e., one that builds the self- nication, June 15, 2007).
15184 www.pnas.org cgi doi 10.1073 pnas.0702288104 Ostrom
harbor, when the fishing season opens
S or closes, size limits, V-notch rules, and
other local rules. In light of the ex-
RS GS change of information among localities,
harbor organizations have learned of
I O and adopted more effective rules that
have then been backed by the state of
U Maine.
RU
RU1- Resource unit mobility Conditions related to autonomy in
RU1-a Mobile resource units making rules were also present when
RU1-b Stationary resource units the green sea urchins were overex-
RU6- Distinctive markings ploited, but the fishers in this instance
RU6-a Natural markings were not local (U2), did not share
RU6-b Artificial markings norms related to har vest levels and
practices (U6), and rapidly exploited
the stocks (O2) to sell for export (S5)
ECO before local fishers or officials (U5)
Fig. 2. Illustrative examples of second- and third-tier variables for resource units.
took much note of the overhar vesting.
Lobster stocks have been sequentially
overhar vested in other locations where
lobsters in the 1870s. This formal law of their territor y over time. Wilson et al. resource user characteristics differ
was not effective, as many fishers sim- (68) demonstrate that territoriality is (have not lived in the same harbor for
ply scrubbed the eggs off berried fe- unlikely to evolve spontaneously in a generations, no strong local leaders, no
males and sold them easily (64). In an multiagent model unless fishers can local norms, and little autonomy to
effort to encourage the owners of lob- potentially engage in trap cutting (a make their own local rules) (72). A
ster pounds not to har vest berried fe- sanctioning mechanism) and retain major factor in converting roving ban-
males, the state established a fund to memories of both good and bad events. dits into effectively organized local
buy back bearing-age females from Self-organized monitoring and enforce- groups is finding ways to convert the
pound owners. The warden would ment have repeatedly played important time horizon of har vesters from short
punch a hole in the lobster tail and roles in explaining successful efforts at term to long term. Har vesters with a
anyone caught selling lobsters with collective action (5254, 71). long-term interest in the sustainability
punched holes could be prosecuted. In of a particular resource system are
1948, the law was changed to make it Distinctive Markings of Resource Units more likely to invest in rules and
illegal to sell a lobster marked with a and Property-Rights Systems norms related to timing, technology,
V-notch, which lasts two or possibly Although distinctive markings of a re- and quantity of har vesting and in gen-
three molts, rather than a simple hole. source unit (RU6) are not discussed in erating useful information about re-
Soon thereafter, lobster fishers began the theoretical literature, they are fre- source conditions and the strategies of
voluntarily to V-notch berried lobsters quently used as an important attribute all har vesters.
caught in their traps as a way of mark- of resource units in constructing effec-
ing a bearing-age female and to refrain tive property-rights systems (GS4). Pas- Multiple Methods for Analyzing Complex
from selling a V-notched lobster marked toralists through the ages have claimed Nested Systems
by another fisher. Common understand- ownership of their animals by their nat- Hopefully, a recognition of the decom-
ing and use of the norm grew over time ural distinctive markings when the num- posability of the conceptual knowledge
and is now widely practiced (64). A reli- ber of animals involved is relatively system needed for analyzing linked SESs
able signal was created that could be small and individual units are easy to at multiple spatial scales will help re-
easily monitored, and the fishers had a identify (RU6-a). Diverse property- duce the tensions that exist among ad-
simple way of sanctioning noncompli- rights systems make use of artificial vocates of a single research method for
ance by destroying the traps of an markings of resource units (RU6-b) as studying SESs. Just as advocating a
offending fisher. The widespread use of ways of identifying private property or single-policy panacea is not appropriate
V-notching helps to solve a core prob- resource units that need protection. for crafting sustainable SESs, exclusive
lem identified in the theoretical litera- Branding became a method for giving a devotion to a particular research method
ture on collective action of establishing large number of cattle a distinctive threatens the capability of scientists to
reliable signals to enhance reciprocity in marking in the Wild West, where contribute to the development of the
collective efforts (69, 70). cattleowners associations developed rel- diversity of institutions needed to sus-
This reciprocity norm would not be atively large-scale governance systems tain the diversity of ecological settings
effective if in addition to the attributes involving an annual roundup and assign- over time. Researchers who undertake
of the resource users (U) described ment of specific brands to the owners of abstract analytical models keep their
above, lobsters (RU) could not be re- cattle. analyses to a simple set of variables,
turned to the sea to continue growth The territorial organization of lobster or they cannot find analytical solutions.
and reproduction for many years (RU2), fishers in Maine takes advantage of the We should not assume, however, that
if most lobsters initially caught in one second major aspect of decomposability: the assumptions of a particular model
harbor migrated to distant harbors the potential organization and gover- are characteristic of all SESs but rather
(RU1-a), or if the V-notch disappeared nance of SESs at small to ever-larger of an important type of system with
rapidly (RU6-b) (see Fig. 2). Also im- spatial scales (GS). Given the tradition broadly relevant but specific attributes
portant is that resource users are infor- of local governance in Maine, the fishers (35). What analytical differences result
mally affiliated with others: a harbor have had considerable autonomy to de- when one dips down a conceptual level
gang. Fishers living in each harbor velop and experiment with their own and changes one or more assumptions?
have self-defined the outer boundaries rules related to who fishes from which Hardins (50) original set of assumptions
resource users, or the governance system and resource units can be avoided. Just as Carlsson and Berkes (ref. 88, p. 65) outline a series of
to be able to determine the factors associ- there is no cure-all that works in all set- steps for conducting policy analysis of comanagement
ated with observed performance. tings, there is no ideal entry point for car- systems: This kind of research approach might employ
Colleagues at Indiana University sys- rying out rigorous, useful research on the steps of (1) defining the social-ecological system
under focus; (2) mapping the essential management
tematically screened many cases before linked SESs. The entry point depends on tasks and problems to be solved; (3) clarifying the par-
identifying a set of 47 irrigation systems the question of major interest to the re- ticipants in the problem-solving processes; (4) analyzing
(of 450 documents screened) (75) and 33 searcher, user, or policy maker. For some linkages in the system, in particular across levels of
organized groups of fishers (also after questions, the appropriate focal system is organization and across geographical space; (5) evalu-
ating capacity-building needs for enhancing the skills
screening several hundred documents) the broader social, economic, and political and capabilities of people and institutions at various
(76) with sufficient and reliable data to setting (S) in which one compares these levels; and (6) prescribing ways to improve policy mak-
enter in a common-pool resource data- broader settings over time and across ing and problem solving.
15186 www.pnas.org cgi doi 10.1073 pnas.0702288104 Ostrom
stein, Maja Schlueter, Michael Schoon, Carl on earlier drafts and Joanna Broderick for
Janssen, Prakash Kashwan, Bobbi Low, Lau-
Simon, Kerr y Smith, Paul Stern, Catherine her excellent editing. The research from
ren Morris MacLean, Ryan McAllister, Mi-
Tucker, Emil Uddhammar, Jimmy Walker, which this article is drawn was funded by the
chael McGinnis, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Keith
James Wilson, Tracy Yandle, and graduate National Science Foundation, the Ford Foun-
M. Moore, Thomas Moore, Harini Nagendra,
students in Y673 for ver y helpful comments dation, and the MacArthur Foundation.
Scott Page, Charles Perrings, Dan Ruben-
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