23rd International Symposium on Transport Phenomena
Auckland, New Zealand
1922 November 2012
Analysis of loss of heat removal accident in the spent fuel pools of Ignalina
Nuclear Power Plant
A. Kaliatka1, E. Uspuras1
1
Laboratory of Nuclear Installations Safety,
Lithuanian Energy Institute,
Breslaujos str. 3, LT-44403 Kaunas, Lithuania
Abstract
Safe storage of spent fuel assemblies in the facilities for
intermediate storage (spent fuel pools) is very important. These
facilities are not covered with a leak-tight containment, thus the
consequences of overheating and melting of fuel in the spent fuel
pools can be very severe. On the other hand, due to low decay
heat of fuel assemblies, the processes in pools are very slow.
Therefore, the accident management measures play a very
important role in case of some accidents in spent fuel pools.
This paper presents the analysis of possible consequences of fuel
overheating due to the leakage of water from a spent fuel pool.
Also the accident mitigation measure, i.e. the injection of water
was evaluated. The analysis was performed for the Ignalina NPP
Unit 2 spent fuel pool, using system thermal-hydraulic code
RELAP5/MOD3 and the code for severe accident analysis
ASTEC. The phenomena taking place during such accident are
discussed.
Abbreviations
INES International Nuclear Event Scale
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
Acronym for Russian graphite-moderated boiling
RBMK
water reactor type
SFA Spent Fuel Assemblies
SFP Spent Fuel Pool
Introduction
The Tsunami that followed the earthquake at the Fukushima
Daiici nuclear plants in Japan [1] showed that a loss of coolant
can occur with the resultant effect on the spent fuel in the spent
fuel pools. The consequences of such an event can be very
serious creating a possibility of significant amount of radioactive
material release to the environment. The consequences of such an
accident can possibly be equivalent to the Chernobyl accident,
which has been rated at 7 on the International Nuclear Event
Scale (INES), because spent fuel pools are in general not housed
in a containment with the same integrity as the containment
around the reactor core and primary pressure boundary.
The possible consequences of water loss due to the leakage and
water injection to the spent fuel pool after fuel heat up are
evaluated in this paper. The evaluation of this accident was
performed for Ignalina NPP Unit 2 spent fuel pool (SFP), but it
can be applied for SFP of other reactor types. In order to apply it
to other reactor type SFP, real characteristics of SFP, such as
water volume, possible leakage rate and decay heat of fuel
assemblies groups in SFP, etc. should be evaluated.
At the Ignalina NPP (Lithuania) both Russian design channel-
type graphite-moderated boiling water reactors (RBMK-1500)
are shutdown for decommissioning (in 2004 and 2009). All
assemblies of spent fuel are stored in the spent fuel pools and in
dry storage facility on-site of the Ignalina NPP.
The RBMK fuel assembly consists of two fuel bundles 3,5 m
long, placed one above the other (the core height of RBMK-1500
reactor is 7 m) [2]. Each fuel bundle includes 18 fuel elements
placed in two circles around the carrying rod. The outer diameter
of the fuel assembly is 79 mm. For safe disposal of spent fuel
bundles into the spent fuel pools and later in the dry storage
facility, the leak-tight fuel assemblies should be cut separating
the fuel bundles and placed in the shipping casks.
The main goal of this paper is to discuss the processes in SFP
during the loss of water due to leakage in pools and to describe
the accident mitigation measure, i.e. the water injection to the
spent fuel pool after fuel heat up.
Design of spent fuel pools at Ignalina NPP
The reloaded from the RBMK-1500 reactor fuel assemblies with
two fuel bundles remain in the pool for at least a year, after
which they may be removed to be cut in a hot cell. During this
procedure the fuel bundles are separated and placed into the 102
shipping casks. The shipping casks with spent fuel assemblies are
stored in the storage pools until they are loaded into the
protective casks CASTOR or CONSTOR to be further
transported to the dry spent fuel storage facility. The fuel
assemblies with fuel rods, which lose whey leak-tightness, are
placed in a special individual sheaths (for single assembly two
fuel bundles) and stored together with other non-cut fuel
assemblies [3, 4].
Each reactor unit at Ignalina NPP is equipped with a system of
spent fuel pools (Figure 1). All process of operations related to
the handling of the spent fuel are performed in the central hall or
in the spent storage pools hall. The spent fuel assemblies,
prepared to be cut in the hot cell, are accumulated in a separate
pool (Room 234). After cutting, the Spent Fuel Assemblies
(SFAs) are stored in shipping casks in shallow compartments of
the storage pool (Rooms 336, 337/1, 337/2, 339/1, and 339/2).
The non-cut SFAs are stored in deep compartments of storage
pool (Rooms 236/1 and 236/2). The loading of the shipping casks
is performed in two pools (Rooms 338/1 and 338/2). Also, there
is a transport corridor (Room 235) for the transportation of SFAs
and shipping casks between the pools and the transport corridor
(Room 157) for transportation of fuel assemblies between the
spent fuel hall and reactor hall. The whole complex of storage
pools of the spent fuel storage and handling system comprises 12
pools (Figure 1). The detailed description of spent fuel pools in
Ignalina NPP is presented in [3, 5].
 201, 202 and 203 models the water mixing in the pools.
Reactor Storage
hall
The bottom part of SFP below the fuel assembly in RELAP5
pools hall 236/2 336 337/ 1 337/2 339 /2

model is modelled by a branch element 100, the top part of

SFP is modelled by branches 301 and 302. To model the
24 m

157 157 235 338/ 1 338 /2 atmospheric pressure in SFP, the top part of the pools is
234
connected to a time dependent volume 400 with atmosphere air
625 627
conditions. The leakage of water through the rupture in the wall
339/1
513,
0101,
046,
236 /1 of SFP is modelled by a junction 011. In the severe accident
047
management guidelines of Ignalina NPP it was shown that the
6m water leakage in the case of SFP floor break is limited by the
18 m 42 m
capacity of drainage system and the maximal uncompensated
Figure 1. Layout of buildings in SFPs hall of Ignalina NPP Unit 2 leakage may not be higher that 21.1 kg/s [5]. The flow area and
[3, 5] flow energy coefficients of this junction are selected in such a
way that the maximal flow rate from the pools (when the water
level in pools is nominal) is 21.1 kg/s. The supply of water is
During the modelling of loss of water from SFP due to leakage modelled using a junction 021 ant volume 020 with the
accident, for the evaluation of worst possible consequences the steady state conditions. The temperature of water, which is
main assumptions were used: supplied to SFP, is assumed to be 50 oC.
The maximal amount of SFAs is placed in the spent fuel It was assumed that shipping casks with spent fuel bundles are
pools. Total mass of uranium in SFPs (in 7901 SFA) is equal placed in SFP in two layers one above the other, according to the
to 752,400 kg; real shipping casks loadings in the SFP [5, 7]. Therefore, in the
The maximal possible water leakage through rapture of model, Heat Structure 12221 is described in same way like
drainage pipe is assumed (21.11 kg/s) [3, 5]. non-cut SFAs (Heat Structures 12111, 12211 and 12121).
Elevations of the shipping casks loading in SFP are different
The analysis was performed for the two different power levels: from the non-cut SFAs, thus Heat Structure 12221 is placed
The maximal possible residual heat of SFAs during the higher, comparing to Heat Structures 12111, 12211 and
Ignalina NPP Unit 2 operation (4253 kW) was assumed. This 12121 (see Figure 2).
situation is similar to the case, which was at the accident in ATMOSPHERE
Fukushima Daiici NPP Unit 4. For the Ignalina NPP this 400 507

situation is related to the moment when the Unit 2 of the 26 .18 m

13022

10 m
Ignalina NPP was in operation (i.e. at the end of 2009). 301 302 505
Nodes
At present, more as three years after shutdown of Unit 2, the 16.18 m

1m
22 Water level 15.18 m
decay heat of spent nuclear fuel in SFP is decreased. 21 201 202
According Ignalina NPP data, the total decay heat in the SFP

Cooling by outside air

20 203
of Unit 2 is 810 kW [6]. 19
18 12221
11.08 m

POOLWALL
17
Developing of spent fuel pools models
Heat structure

16
15
6. 8 m

14
Analysis of loss of heat removal accident in the SFPs of Ignalina 13
12
12111 12211 12121
6 .8 m
NPP was performed using system thermal hydraulic code 11
Heat structure

Heat structure

10
Heat structure

503
9
RELAP5 Mod3.3 [7] and the code for severe accident analysis
12032
8 4 .28 m
7
6. 8 m

ASTEC [8]. RELAP5 model of Ignalina NPP Unit 2 spent fuel 6

5
pool consists of 3 representative spent fuel pools (201, 202 4
3
and 203 in Figure 2), which model the real rooms of SFP: 2 0 .0 m
1 -1.6 m
Element 201 is used for the modelling of the most energy -1.6 m

rated room of SFP (room 236/2). 100 - 1.723 m

011 021
Element 202 is used for the modelling of all the other SFPs 020
010
(Room 234 and Room 236/1 loaded with non-cut SFAs;
Room 235, Room 336, Room 337/1, Room 337/2, Room a) nodalization of SFAs and pools
338/1, Room 338/2, Room 339/1 and Room 339/2, where the
spent fuel bundles are loaded into the shipping casks).
203
In pool 201 two groups of non-cut SFAs: Heat Structure
Cooling by outside air

12111 and Heat Structure 12211 are modelled (see

POOLWALL

202
12032

Figure 2).
503

201
In pool 202 one group of non-cut SFAs Heat Structure
12121 and one group Heat Structure 12221 for spent
fuel bundles in the shipping casks are modelled.
By pool 203 the gap between SFA and SFP walls is
modelled.
Due to one-dimensional code specifics, it was assumed that pools b) pools and walls scheme
201 and 202 are in the concentric geometry as it is shown in Figure 2. SFP and SFAs nodalization scheme in RELAP5 model
Figure 2 b). It means that 201 does not have radial heat losses
to the SFP walls. 201 is connected only to 202 and 202 is The ring POOLWALL heat structure 12032 models the walls
connected to 203 by special connections, presented in Figure 2 of SFP from ferroconcrete. The outer ring channel 503
a) by arrows. These cross connections between the channels models the outside air, which is around the SFP. Total cross
sectional area equals to 201 + 202 + 203 = 30 + 240 + 30 = The decay heat of different SFAs groups, used in RELAP5 and
300 m2. Total volume of water in the SFP is 300 m2 * (15.18 + ASTEC modules, were assumed taking into account the storage
1.723) = 5070 m3. In the model, it was assumed that the area of time in the SFPs (see Table 1).
concrete walls (heat structure 12032) around the pools with
spent fuel assemblies (pool 203) is 1091 m2 from the inner side Groups Groups of SFAs Assumed SFA Amount Group
and 1145 m2 form the outer side. The top part of SFP, which is in RELAP5 and storage decay of SFAs power,
above elements 201, 202 and 203 models the volume filled ASTEC models time in heat, in kW
by air and consists of two volumes 301 and 302. The cross SFP kW group
sectional area of 301 equals 270 m2. This volume is modelled SFAs in Heat Structure
as branch element, which connects 201 and 202. The 236/2 12111; 8 days 5.21 166 864.9
volume 302 is above 203 with cross sectional area 30 m2. room ROD1
This volume 302 is modelled as branch, which connects SFAs in Heat Structure
203 and 301 with atmosphere and assures the constant close 236/2 12211; 137 days 1.281 1182 1514.1
to atmospheric pressure inside building of SFPs (the building is room ROD2
not leaktight). The height of volumes 301 and 302 is SFAs in
assumed 10 m. To model the area of the wall and roof in SFP Heat Structure
236/1
compartment above water, which are connected to the 12121; 2 years 0.489 892 436.2
and 234
environment, the heat structure 13022 was used. The area of ROD3
rooms
concrete walls around the top part of SFP building (volume SFBs in Heat Structure
302) is assumed to be 614 m2 from the inner side and 645 m2 shipping 12221; 3 year 0.254 5661 1437.9
form the outer side. The thickness of concrete wall is assumed to casks ROD4
be 0.5 m. Total: 7901 4253
To model processes during the reflooding of overheated fuel Table 1. Parameters of groups of SFAs in the RELAP5 and
rods, the analysis was performed using ASTEC computer code, ASTEC models, according situation at 2009
designed for the analyses of severe accidents in NPPs. ASTEC
code is developed for the analysis of reactor accidents with core Analysis of water leak from spent fuel pool at maximal
degradation and includes modules for the simulation of core possible residual heat by employing RELAP5 code
degradation, melting and relocation, release and transport of
fission product and aerosol, and behaviour of debris bed. ASTEC For the modelling of water leak accident at maximal possible
code is a source term code with modular structure [8]. A model residual heat, the following assumptions were made:
developed using DIVA module of ASTEC V1.3R2 code is used
initial water level is 15.18 m from the very bottom of the fuel
in this paper. DIVA module simulates the in-vessel core
degradation: the behaviour of in-vessel structures, the formation assemblies (15.18 + 1.723 m from the bottom of SFP - see
Figure 2 a);
and the evolution of liquid and solid mixtures, thermal
hydraulics, and chemical reactions between materials. initial water temperature in SFPs is 50 C;
In the ASTEC code analysis, the simplified single pool model air ventilation system in the SFP is switched off;
was created using DIVA module (Figure 3). DIVA module heat removal by outside air is not taken into account;
allows to model fuel assemblies in detail. So in the model, the maximal rate of water leakage from SFP is 21.1 kg/s;
zirconium and stainless steel grids were taken into account. The
initial volume of water, water level, initial water temperature and at the time moment t = 304,000 s (84.4 h) the leakage from
water leakage rate from the SFP in the ASTEC model of SFPs the SFP is terminated;
were assumed the same as in the above-described RELAP5 the supply of water into SFP starts at 400,000 s (111.1 h)
model. The fuel rod models ROD1, ROD2, ROD3 and after the beginning of an accident. The flow rate of the
ROD4 represent the same groups of SFAs as heat structures emergency injected water 27.8 kg/s was selected taking into
12111, 12211, 12121 and 12211 in RELAP5 model. account the capacity of water make-up system in Ignalina
NPP [5].
TO ATMOSPHERE
In the modelling it was assumed that the leakage in the SFP starts
at the time moment t = 0 s (Figure 4). Due to the water leakage
16.277
from the pools, the water level, the hydrostatic pressure of water
1m

15.277 Water level

column and flow rate through the junction, which models the
+24.6 m
rupture in SFP, decrease. As it is presented in Figure 5, at the
ROD 4 time moment t = 59,700 s (16.6 h), the uncovering of the fuel
11.177
bundles, placed into a higher level in the 102 shipping casks (in
the RELAP5 mode these fuel assemblies are modelled by heat
POOLWALL
6.8 m

ROD 1 ROD 2 ROD 3

6.9 structure 12221) begins. The uncovering of non-cut spent fuel
16.9 m

assemblies placed in the lower level (heat structures 12211,

4.377 12121) and fuel assemblies of the emergency unloading (heat
6 .8 m
6.8 m

6.8 m

Structure 12111) starts at t = 134,000 s (37.2 h). The water

level decreases down to the very bottom of SFA at t = 304,000 s
0.1 (84.4 h). After the start of water injection with flow rate 27.8 kg/s
0.0
+7.7 m
POOL LOWER
400,000 s (111.1 h), the water level in the SFP starts to increase
-1.623
(Figure 4). All fuel assemblies are re-covered by water after
approximately 33 hours from the beginning of water supply (at
Figure 3. SFP and SFAs nodalization scheme in ASTEC model time moment t = 519,000 s). All analysed time intervals can be
divided into five stages:
 1st stage water leakage up to the beginning of the The heat from the hot fuel rods by steam-air mixture is
uncovering of the bigger part of spent fuel assemblies in SFP transferred to the walls of SFP. The behaviour of SFP wall
(t = 0 59,700 s); within this stage the SFAs are still covered temperatures on the inner and outer surface of the wall is
by water; presented in Figure 7.
2nd stage dry-out of fuel bundles and start of fuel heat up (t SFP wall temperature (water side)
= 59,700 304,000 s); 500 SFP wall temperature (air side)

3rd stage fuel heat up and overheating in the empty SFP (t = 400
304,000 400,000 s); pool filled by water

Temperature, C
o
th 300
4 stage start of water injection and reflooding of
overheated fuel (t = 400,000 519,000 s);
200
start of water supply
5th stage final filling of SFP by increasing the amount of
water up to the initial level (t = 519,000 550,000 s). 100

0
30
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
start of uncovering of fuel assemblies Time, s
Flow rate, kg/s

20 all SFA are flooded by water

10
start of water supply
0
0 100000
Figure 4. Water leak from SFP and feeding
As it is shown in Figure 6, within the 1st stage (t = 0 59,700 s)
the increase of fuel temperature is insignificant. After the start of
uncovering the fuel bundles, placed into the higher level in the
102 shipping casks (heat structure 12221), the temperature of
these fuel rods starts to increase (t = 59,700 134,000 s) during
the 2nd stage. The heat up of the remaining groups of fuel rods
starts at the time t > 134,000 s. The temperature increases much
faster in the heat structure 12111, which models the fuel
assemblies of the emergency unloading with the highest decay
heat.
20
Water level from pool bottom, m.
Figure 7. Behaviour of SFP wall temperatures
After the beginning of water injection in the 4th stage (t =
release 400,000 s), the slow process of fuel cooldown begins. The fuel
feeding rods, placed in the lower level, are cooled faster, the top part of
the fuel rods (heat structure 12221) is cooled the latest (Figure
6). The increase of water level within the 5th stage in SFP is
indicated by a fast decrease of the wall inner surface temperature
200000 300000 400000 500000
(Figure 7). The modelling shows that the significant part of the
Time, s
heat from the SFA is transferred to the concrete walls (Figure 8).
As it was mentioned, an assumption was made that in the
calculation the total area of concrete walls is 1091 + 2005 =
3096 m2 from the inner side and 1145 + 2068 = 3213 m2 form the
outer side of the walls; the thickness of concrete wall is assumed
to be 0.5 m. In the developed RELAP5 model the heat transfer
from the SFP wall to outside air is modelled using heat structures
12032, 13022 and air circuit elements 503, 505. The
heat transfer coefficient from outside surface of SFP walls to air
was assumed to be in the range 2.5 5.2 W/(m2-K). The maximal
calculated amount of heat, which can be removed from the walls
of SFP is approximately 1 MW (see Figure 8).
3.0 From water side
From air side

18 all SFA are flooded by water 2.0

start of uncovering of fuel assemblies
Heat transfer, MW

16
1.0
14
top of fuel assemblies in heat structure "12221"
12 0.0 start of water
10 supply
8 top of fuel assemblies in heat structures "12111", "12211", "12121" -1.0
6
4 start of water supply -2.0
2
0 -3.0
-2 0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
Time, s
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
Time, s
Figure 8. Heat transferred from the water-steam-air mixture to
Figure 5. Water level in SFP the concrete walls of SFP and from outside area of walls to the
1000
"12111" "12211" "12121" "12221" outside air
start of uncovering
of fuel assemblies As it is shown in Figure 6, in SFA with the highest decay heat the
800 "12111", "12211",
"12121"
maximal fuel temperature reaches 990 oC. At such high
Temperature, C

temperature, the steam-zirconium and zirconium-air reactions

o

600
start of
uncovering
should take place; however, they were not evaluated in this case.
400 of fuel The additional calculation was performed activating a special
assemblies option of RELAP5/MOD3.3, when water-metal reaction was
"12221"
200 evaluated. In this last case, the reaction of zirconium and steam is
start of water supply
treated using the correlation developed by Cathcart [7]. The
0
model assumes that there is an unlimited amount of steam
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
available for the metal-water reaction. More detailed description
Time, s
of such modelling is referred in paper [9]. The comparison of
Figure 6. Behaviour of fuel temperatures in SFP maximal fuel temperatures calculated without evaluation of
steamzirconium reaction and when this exothermic reaction was
taken into account is presented in Figure 9. It can be seen that a
significant increase of the temperature starts after the fuel
cladding temperature exceeds 800 900 oC, when the exothermic
reaction starts. The RELAP5/MOD3.3 does not evaluate the
specific severe accident phenomena as fuel melting. Thus, in the
calculation, it is assumed that the released heat due to the steam-
zirconium reaction is used only for the heating of fuel. This
explains very high (not realistic) fuel temperatures in Figure 9.
As it is presented in Figure 11, the injection of water in the SFP
with the overheated SFAs leads to the exothermic steam-
zirconium reaction and fast increase of temperatures of fuel
claddings. Such reaction appears in all groups of SFAs (ROD1
ROD4). The maximal fuel temperatures exceed 2000 oC: in
such case all fuel claddings will be damaged, oxidised from both
sides and melting of claddings and stainless steel grids will
appear.

3000 2500
ROD 1
steam - zirconium reaction is
2500 taken into account ROD 2
2000
ROD 3 start of water supply
steam -
Temperature, C

Temperature, C
2000 ROD 4
o

o
zirconium
1500
reaction is not
1500 start of water supply evaluated
1000
1000

500 500

0 0
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
Time, s
Time, s

Figure 9. Comparison of maximal fuel temperatures calculated Figure 11. Maximal fuel temperatures calculated using ASTEC
without evaluation of steamzirconium reaction and when this code
exothermic reaction was taken into account
In the ASTEC calculations the total amount of hydrogen
The generation of hydrogen and exothermic reaction starts in the generated due to the steam-zirconium reaction is about 8350 kg
3rd stage, before the emergency water injection. The calculated (Figure 12). Such total amount of hydrogen is very similar,
total amount of generated hydrogen is presented in Figure 10. As comparing to the RELAP5 calculation (Figure 10).
it is shown in the figure, the total amount of hydrogen generated
from 7901 SFAs is 8040 kg. The total hydrogen mass generated 8000
by the metal-water reaction is calculated by multiplying the mass
Total amount of generated .

7000
of zirconium reacted by the ratio of the molecular weight of 4 6000
hydrogen atoms to 1 zirconium atom [7]. Because the RELAP5
hydrogen, kg

5000
model assumes that there is an unlimited amount of steam
4000
available for the metal-water reaction, the start of hydrogen start of water supply
3000
generation and increase of fuel temperatures are not related to the
2000
moment when the supply of water starts.
1000
0
8000 0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
Total amount of generated .

7000 Time, s
6000
Figure 12. Hydrogen generation due to Zr oxidation in the
hydrogen, kg

5000 ASTEC analysis

4000
start of water supply
3000
2000
1000
0
0 100000 200000
Time, s
Figure 10. Total amount of generated hydrogen, calculated using
RELAP5
Analysis of spent fuel pool dryout and reflooding using
ASTEC code
To understand the real processes during the overheating and
further reflooding of fuel rods, the analysis was performed using
ASTEC computer code. This code is designed for the analyses of
severe accidents in NPPs. The all initial conditions (geometry of
SFPs, initial volume of water, water level, water leakage and
injection of cold water) in the ASTEC model of SFPs were
assumed the same as in the above-described RELAP5 model. The
fuel rod models ROD1, ROD2, ROD3 and ROD4
represent the same groups of SFAs as heat structures 12111,
12211, 12121 and 12211 in RELAP5 model (see Table 1).
Influence of spent fuel pool compartments volume on the
results of analysis
In the above presented calculations it was assumed that the area
300000 400000 500000 of concrete walls around the pools with spent fuel assemblies is
1145 m2 and the area of concrete walls around the top part of SFP
building is 645 m2 form the outer side. The thickness of concrete
wall is assumed to be 0.5 m. During the accident, the heat
generated in the fuel assemblies is transferred by convection and
radiation to the structures of SFP building to the concrete walls.
Some part of heat is transferred through the walls (by thermal
conductivity) and dissipated in the outside air. The amount of
heat removed by air depends on the heat transfer area surface
area of walls of SFP building. From the other hand, as it can be
seen from Figure 1, the building of SFP in Ignalina NPP has very
big volume of air above the water level and significant areas of
outer walls. To model the volume above the water, the REPAP5
model of SFPs was modified, increasing the cross flow area of
branch 302 up to 530 m3 and the height up to 20 m (see Figure
13). Thus, the surface area of concrete walls in the top part of
SFP building increases up to 2005 m2 from inner side and up to
2068 m2 form the outer side. This situation is more realistic and
less conservative. The analysis of water leak from SFP accident
was performed for the maximal possible residual heat case, using
RELAP5 Mod 3.3 code. The initially, boundary conditions and
60
operators actions were assumed the same as for above case.

Total amount of generated .

50
As it is presented in Figures 14 16, the more realistic
(increased) volume of air above the water level in the part of SFP 40

hydrogen, kg
building significantly influenced the results of calculations. The
30
peak values of temperatures of fuel pellets in the SFAs are below
770 oC, temperatures of SFP wall from inner side below 300 oC, 20
outer side below 120 oC. The maximal possible amount of start of water supply
10
generated hydrogen reaches only 47 kg in this case. Thus, the
bigger volume of air in the top part of SFP building and increased 0
amount of concrete walls absorbed significant amount of heat, 0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
which is generated in SFAs. Time, s

ATMOSPHERE Figure 16. Total amount of generated hydrogen, calculated using

400 507
36.18 m 13022 RELAP5
D 31.91 m

20 m
D 32.91 m Analysis of water leak from spent fuel pool at today level of
301 302 505
Nodes
residual heat
16.18m
1m

22 Water level 15.18m

Today the total decay heat of spent nuclear fuel in SFP of Unit 2
Cooling by outside air

21 201 202
203
20 decreased down to 810 kW. The decay heat of different groups of
POOLWALL

19
18
1222 SFAs, which are modelled in RELAP5 and ASTEC modules,
17.78 m

1 11.0 8 m
17
16 more as three years after shutdown of reactor, are presented in
Heat structure

15
Table 2.
6.8m

14 1211
13 12211 12121
12 1 6.8 m
11
10 The remaining parameters: assumed geometry of SFPs, initial
Heat structure

Heat structure
Heat structure

12032

9
8 4 .28 m
7 level and temperature of water in SFPs and etc. were assumed the
503
6.8m

6
5
4 same as in the first case analysis for theoretically maximal
3
2
1
0.0 m possible decay heat of spent fuel in SFPs. The volume of SFPs
-1.6 m
-1.6 m compartments was assumed conservatively the same as the first
100
011 021
- 1. 723 m
case analysis. The accident scenario was assumed the same also.
010 020 Taking into account this decreased level of decay heat of SFAs,
the calculation were repeated using RELAP5 model of spent fuel
Figure 13. SFP and SFAs nodalization scheme in modified pools. It was assumed the identical action of operators the
RELAP5 model injection of fresh water is started 400,000 s (111.1 h) after the
beginning of accident when all SFAs are already uncovered.
The flow rate of injected water 27.8 kg/s was assumed the same
"12111" "12211" "12121" "12221"
800
start of uncovering
as for theoretically maximal decay heat in SFPs.
of fuel assemblies
"12111", "12211", The behaviours of calculated temperatures of fuel and pool wall
600 "12121" temperatures are presented in Figures 17 and 18. As it is shown
Temperature, C
o

start of
in these figures, the peek temperature of fuel in the fuel pellets
400 uncovering centre is below 250 oC, the temperature of inner surface of SFP
of fuel wall is approximately 100 oC, when the temperature of outer
assemblies
200 "12221" surface of concrete walls is below 80 oC. Thus, the results of
start of water supply calculation showed that at low level of spent fuel assemblies
0 decay heat, no damage of fuel rods claddings would occur.
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
Time, s
Groups Groups of SFAs in SFA Amount of Group
Figure 14. Behaviour of fuel temperatures in SFP RELAP5 and decay SFAs in power,
ASTEC models heat, W group kW
SFP wall temperature (water side) SFAs in
300 Heat Structure
SFP wall temperature (air side) 236/2 153 166 25.4
12111; ROD1
room
pool filled by water SFAs in
Temperature, C

200 Heat Structure

o

236/2 121.9 1182 144.1

12211; ROD2
room
start of water supply
SFAs in
100
236/1 Heat Structure
121.9 892 108.7
and 234 12121; ROD3
0
rooms
SFBs in
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 Heat Structure
shipping 93.9 5661 531.4
Time, s 12221; ROD4
casks
Figure 15. Behaviour of SFP wall temperatures Total: 7901 809.6
Table 2. Parameters of groups of SFAs in the RELAP5 and
ASTEC models, according situation at 2012
 "12111" "12211" "12121" "12221" The additional analysis performed with realistic volume of SFP
250 building (this volume is higher as assumed for base case
start of uncovering
of fuel assemblies calculation) showed that, the bigger volume of air in the top part
200 "12111", "12211",
"12121" of SFP building and increased amount of concrete walls absorbed
Temperature, C
o

150 significant amount of heat, which is generated in SFAs.

start of
uncovering
100
The performed analyses are useful for the evaluation of different
of fuel
assemblies accident mitigation measures. The modifications of SFP models
50 "12221" and benchmarking of calculations with different models,
start of water supply
developed using other codes, are planned in the future.
0
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 Acknowledgments
Time, s This research was funded by Ministry of Education and Science
as Lithuanian Energy Institute institutional long-term R&D
Figure 17. Behaviour of fuel temperatures in SFP
program Research of process during nuclear power plants
SFP wall temperature (water side) decommissioning and radioactive waste and spent fuel
120 SFP wall temperature (air side) management and analysis of radiation effects
100
pool filled by water References
Temperature, C

80
o

60
40 start of water supply
20
0 processes in spent fuel pools of Ignalina NPP in case of loss
0 100000 200000 300000
Time, s
Figure 18. Behaviour of SFP wall temperatures
Conclusions
This paper presents the calculation results of the most probable
severe accident in spent fuel pools, i.e. the loss of heat removal
due to water leakage in SFP. The analysis of this event, which
covers all possible phenomena in SFPs, was performed for SFP at
Ignalina NPP Unit 2.
For the analysis of the accident, the model of spent fuel pools
was developed using RELAP5 and ASTEC codes. The developed
models allowed to model different phenomena: uncovering and
heat-up of fuel rods, steamzirconium reaction, quenching of hot
fuel rods by water, etc. The results of the analysis showed, that
assuming the theoretically maximal possible residual heat of fuel
assemblies in SFP (4253 kW), the late operator actions: injection
of water in to SFP with overheated fuel rods can lead to the
generation of huge amount of hydrogen, failure of fuel claddings
and release of radioactive isotopes to the environment.
The analysis was performed also for the today situation of
Ignalina NPP more as three years after the permanent shutdown
of Unit 2 reactor. The total decay heat of spent nuclear fuel in
SFP of Unit 2 decreased down to 810 kW. In the case of low
level of spent fuel assemblies decay heat the increase of fuel
temperature is very slow, and assuming some operator actions no
damage of fuel rods claddings would occur.
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