Are, M, 3/2005, UDK 111.83:27-4 Original navn ad BRUCE H. KIRMMSE_ Connecticut College IAM NOT A CHRISTIAN” - A SUBLIME LIE”? OR: «WITHOUT AUTHORITY”, PLAYING DESDEMONA TO CHRISTENDOM’S OTHELLO ‘The attack on the Church which marked Soren Kierkegaard’ final year has always ‘eon a stumbling block. This attack was undeniably of great importance and equally “undeniably has been a source of considerable embarrassment. Scholars in general and theologians in particular have avoided the issue lke the plague. Nonetheless it is im= portant to keep our eye on Kierkegnard’s concluding polemic: His exit, like that of his ‘mentor Socrates, casts decisively important retrospective light of urgeney and radicali- ty upon all his previous achievements. Sill, itis dificult not to be troubled, in particular, by what is perhaps the core pro- nouncement of Kierkegaard’s attack, namely his repeated insistence that , am not a Cristian,” How are we to understand this assertion? Just because it may make ws un- comfortable does not mean that iti permissible to go , behind” his statement, to cajole Kierkegaard as it were to get him to confirm that, Afterall, unter uns, weall know that ‘you ‘really’ are & Christian right? - that you only sad those outrageous things to tease the Danish bourgeoisie, but that ‘realy” you area Christian, right? (nudge, nudge, wink, wink)” Any attempt to ,save” Kierkegaard in this manner is clearly impermissible. Kierkegaard’s statement must be allowed to stand in all its starkness and radiealty ‘And yet, suppose Kierkegaard’ statement was a lie? fone cannot speak with ,authorty” about the most important things, we know that one tactic isto use pseudonyms, And during much of Kierkegaaed’s career he did {ust this. But after the publication of Aféluttende widenskabelig Ejterskift (Concludi- ‘ng Unscientific Postseript) in 1846, with the exception of two relatively minor works = Tvende ethisk-religieuse Smaa-Ajhandlinger (1849; Two Minor Ethical-Religious Es- says) and the essay on the atress Johanne Luise Heiberg, ,Krisen og en Krise ion Skue- spillerindes Liv” (1848; The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress) - Kierkegaard ‘wrote only in his own name and in the name of the transparent pseudonym Anti-Cl 9‘macus, a pseudony-mity which was in any case revoked during the heat of his attack fon the Church, ‘We will return tothe revocation of the Anti-Climacus pseudonym later, but for now ‘we will keep attention focused on the fact that after February 1846 Kierkegaard wrote almost exclusively in his own name. So the question immediately arises: If one feels ‘oneself unable to speak with authority on the most important things, and if one has renounced pseudonymity, what then? Some, starting with Peter-Christian Kierkegaard in his funeral eulogy of his younger brother, have argued that even when Kierkegaard ‘wrote in his own name it was in effect just another pseudonym. But we ought to reject this sort of reasoning as destructive both of the notion of the pseudonym and of the ‘name; it plunges us into the infinite night of so-called postmodenity and its inherently self-contradictory notion of ,absolute relativity.” ‘The problem remains: How do we construc the statement, ,L am not a Christian"? ‘Toward the end of William Shakespeare's Orhello, as Desdemona is dying at the hhands of her husband, a third party, Emilia, enters the room, and the following ex- change ensues: Ena, 0, who hath done this deed? ‘Desdemona, Nobody. [myself Farewell. Commend me to my kind lod, ©, Farewell! Othello, Why, bow should she be murdered? Enila. Alas, who knows? Othello, Your beard her say herself it was not Ena, She sid so. Lust needs report a eth, Othello, She's like lar gone to burning bell: “Fwas I that killed her. nla. O, the more angel she, and you the blacker devil! Ali i statement the teller knows to be untrue told with the purpose of deceiving the hearer, By this criterion Desdemona’ statoment is certainly a lie. But there are lies and there ae lies. There are lies which are told to gain some advantage forthe teller, ‘but there are also lies which are told forthe sake ofthe hearer or of athied party. lero Desdemona is lying, but eerainly not for her own advantage. She lies to protect the hhusband she loves, a man gone mad, DDescdemona’s example has not been seized out of the ar, at randosn, In 1799, the German philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Iacobi defended his understanding of Chris tianity in a ler to Johann Gottlieb Fichte in which he attacked the latter's notion of the ego as the only starting point for knowledge of the Truc: By the Tiue, understand something prior to and heyond knowledge With one's reason a porson is not given a capacity for knowledge ofthe True (On the contrary, one is given only the feeling [Gefthl] and the conseiousness ‘of one's fgnorance: a presentiment [,Almndang,” i.e, Ahmung) of the True. Tust as surely as T possess reason, with this human reason of mine T do 40‘not possess the Good and the True in their entirety. And just as certainly as 1 do not possess these things - and now I do not possess them - with that same certainty Ifo that there sa higher Being, and that [have my origin in Him. Tn connection with his, the watchword for myself and for my reason i no” ‘On the contrary it sy More than I! Rete than I! - someone quite Other” [do not, and 1 may not exist f He doesnot exist! I myself, indeed, cannot be the highest heing for myself. - So my rsaon teaches me instinctively: Goa. “That which is highest in me points with iresistible force to a supremely high Being [cin Allerhdchstes] above and beyond me - indeed to believe in what isin its concept impossible - within me, beyond me, from love and through love. [AJs soon a 1 assume that there is no connection to higher Being of ‘Truth, everyting Ihave called good, beautiful, and holy is only destructive to ‘my spit i only a eimera [Uinding] that tears my heart fom my’ breast, So L admit that 1 do not know that which in itself Good [das an sich Gre} or that which i self is True, tat T only have a distant presentiment of it I declare that offends me when someone wishes to foree pon me the Hill 1o Nothing [den Willen der Nichis|« this hollow shell of independence and fireedom in absolute unconditionality -and thea, when I struggle agains this, tobe accused of atheism, of true and genuine goulessness. ‘Yes, [am an atheist and a godless person, a person whom those who will the Will 0 Nothing find revolting I willie like Desdemona ied when dying, lie and deceive like Pylades when e presented himself as Orestes. Tam this ‘godless person, and therefore I mock the philosophy which ealls me godless Tmock it and its highest Being because F know, withthe holiest conscience have, tht the tre majesty of a human being, the seal of one’s worth, is ‘one's godly nature, To be iv unison with oneself [Einstinmighett des Menschen mit sich selfs], lasting unity isthe highest notion... But this unity isnot the Being, ot the True. This unity itself in tel, is merely void, deserted, and empty. [Nor ean its Ins hecome the heart of a person and try elevate one above ‘oneself. Transcendental philosophy may no rip this heart out of one’s breast and put in its place meray a sheer instinet of ness. [will not permit myself toe freed from the dependence of Lave to find happiness only in Prd. If the highest thing I can think of or contemplate is my unalloyed, empty, naked, sheer,” with its independence and freedom, then thoughtful sel-contempla- ton and reasonableness area curse to me - I daran my existence ‘We should pay special attention to Jacobi's praise of Desdemona’s lying and, in con- ‘nection with this, to Jacobi’s proud acceptance ofthe epithets ,cihest” and ,gouless”. Jacobi gives lying and atheism strikingly positive connotations: It is better to lie like Desdemona, to be an atheist ~as Jacobi says he has been accused of being - than to go along with Fichte's egocentric pantheism, Some lies are worth telling, * Jacobian Fee” Frieck Hetch aco: Nk 3 Lp Gahan Riche: 815 pec Roth sd Frdrch Kappes, es Dante Wonemcliche Bochgelical, 1968, 52-1, All malo a ht ‘Ss aby th pee ator 41Frygt og Beeven (Fear and Trembling) was published in October 1843, In an article written shortly thereafter and published on January 1, 1844, Bishop Mynster, writ- ing under bis semi-transparent pseudonym .Kts.,” bad warm, if qualified praise for ‘Kierkegaard’s book, and he specifically linked it to Jacobi’s praise of Desdemona’s lying: have also read the remarkable hook Fear and Trembling, and despite wha ‘ever lacks I may notin the book, it is eertainly not lacking in a deep religious foundation, nor ina spirit which is capable of attending to life's most impor- tant problems. Ina lively fasion, it has reminded me of the famous passage in Jacobi: Yes, am an atheist and a godless person, a person whom those who ‘ill the Hi to Nothing find revolting. Lillie like Desdemona lied when dy ing, lie and deceive lke Pylades when he presented himself as Oreste, et (Uacobi to Fichte, 32). The book isn no way an imitation oF an echo of fob, ‘however. But why does the hook have the tile Fear and Trembling? Because its autor as vividly apprehended, has deoply felt, has expressed withthe ‘entire force of language the teror with which person's soli gripped when te is confionted witha task which contains a challenge from which he dare ‘not shrink -a conftontation in which a person’s understanding remains unable tw dispel the apparent fact that the challenge , seems to call him away from the «ternal order to which every being must submit.” “Mynster’s reference to Desdemona and Jacobi was not lost on Kierkegaard, Wheth- cer or not it was Mynster who directed Kierkegaard’s attention to this particular passage {in Jacobi, it certainly seems to have struck a sympathetic ehord. From his university ‘education and particularly from Hans L. Martensen’s lectures, during the academic year 1838-39, on the history of philosophy from Kant to Hegel, Kierkegaard had at Teast a passing acquaintance with Jacobi, Among Kierkegaard’s papers there isa set of notes on Martensen’s lectures, a fair copy written in a hand other than Kierkegaard’ I cannot be confirmed with certainty that they area copyist’s version of Kierkegaard’'s ‘own notes, though this seems likely. In any ease the notes make fascinating reading and contain a number of passages, descriptive of Jacobi, which could easly be applied to Kierkegaard himself. Still, however suggestive these notes on Jacobi may be, it must be remembered that they are notes on what Martensen said in his lectures and not necessarily on Kierkegaard’s own thoughts. But there is one possible exception: In the ‘middle of summarizing Martensen’s remarks on Jacobi, the narrative pauses and there isan exhortation set off from the rest of the text by slashes and colons: ,Read hint"! ‘When he was in Berlin inthe winter of 1841-42, Kierkegaard once again heard Ja- cobi mentioned in a lecture series, this time by Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling, bu there is no concrete evidence that Kierkegaard did much to make good on any intention of reading Jacobi before he encountered Mynster’s review in January 1844. And it was precisely in 1844 that Kierkegaard became preoceupied with reading Jacobi. (As an 2 ke UP Mt) ith Poke": eliza nine af 1 Meher. 4-2 amar 1, 1844, 105506 terest wrong page ner rn aco The panage in quesion sm age 37, page 2aside, particularly in view of how Kieekegaard’s life ended, we should note the itony in the fac that it was Martensen who first really introduced Kierkegaard to Jacobi, and ‘Mynster who rekindled that interest.) One of the journal entries ftom 184 which ale ludes to Jacobi is of particular interest in the present context; ,However much I would like someone to share my views, do Ihave any right whatever to use my artiste talent to.win over a person? Isnt that deceiving him ina way’? Not long after this, in Stadler pac Livets Fei (Stages on Life's Way), which he wrote in late 184 - early 1845 and published at the end of April 1845, Kierkegaard referred explicitly to Jacobi’s mention of Desdemona: ,Desdemona is great because of her “sublime lie fophoiede Lan]. We admire her, we must admire her" And yet there is something strange here, Neither Jacobi’s original passage nor Mynster's discussion of itmakes any reference to sublime lie” but Kierkegaard nonetheless cites the phrase {in quotation marks, “The ots on Mars eres an pubis Pap I 25 (85839). pint ap XIE 280.331 ‘emu onc The coexisting ace acai sal ha he Th 0 Be pape Sth Ao thao exit Se Kaa ie twa aly omehing ofl he lasune whic pet we acb suid th fh wa wha wa oy His ne ftatfeeecon, however Hc emote poison between ath anno ae bie ether ged ‘out though ad eng ses wat ie hs experienced nhs aeos sol is preston teat uy Illi But he as ssc ida tn wef varition, whi he pots thc his SShemeutscl He warts ihwpbcl pacer ant rte not pout det te ch a presi nis wens we can nt dept te bse emt Ren i 301) Fer Jace the Ding ext and ante rae hy he eran, uty means sith ch rs he {hinge whiereeon only sour ethng Three al pesophy exes onl at ond haw! He as ‘hs ponte he nme lin coacouss bagel raped by Sccemocher ce yj a ‘Beau tanl Godeisoaly othe son wo kms het whe oa ss We Tah does aac 1 Lact ays, A God who cn te ac iso Gf’ ko Hina purely i kon ist aa in” al kage hes ne! nt option tam Gad eit (2). is Uc celtin to Nata. seetins compares Xie wih Sorts aa Felon. Tuy isin being even (33) Me cb himself was ala ious, al lever (38, ‘Wek tht Kirton on acbs ols works (nh on reed not 2, hats ot kao whee pcs ho Iso eet oe at afer Kicks dest hs pod el a dt ele Tian Brose pursue his ein f Jct te tn of Riaz ry In his cots about ‘eta, ohne lu, with ep oat Boo he paced Gt ain, tha he age a cpske to emia! hi of Soren Keegan Ge Brace HL Kits, Exowses wih Kirepad Lj as ‘Sony te Connor, Pact Peace Unset ess, 1986220 eat any at pie ‘rot pcase he aco ede pss een kw td Ben of pet sgn w Kisgua Kictegard scopy of eb oss now te celine Raya Lay in Cops, * Sages on Lifes ay. SW sheet SV 1 VI 136 (KW 11, 142), BMoreover, Kierkegaard’s peculiar preoceupation with Jacobi and Desdemona’s sublime lie” was no passing faney. In the Postscript, writen immediately after the publication of Stages on Lifes Way (late April - late December 1845) and published at the end of February 1846, Kierkegaard again alludes to the Jacobi-Desdemona passage, this time referring explicitly to Mynster’s review of Fear and Trembling In my view, its appropriate to call this book ,a sublime lie” [eine erhabene Liige as the frm Kts [Mynster) did when recalling Jacobi and Desdemona, inasmuch as the term [sublime ie itself contains a contradiction, The use of the opposite fonn is absolutely necessary in every prodction in these spheres. In the form of direct communication - of bellowing - eae and wembling ae insignificant hecase direct communication means precisely thatthe direction is outward, on the order of yelling - not inward, nto the abyss of inwardness ‘where fear and trembling” first become terrifying, where what is expressed ‘ean only exist in a deceptive form.” This time, Kierkegaard attributes the phrase ,sublime lie” to Mynster (though he ‘now cites it in German rather than in Danish, as he had done Stages on Life’ Way), The fact is, however, that Mynster does not use the expression at all, in ether language, and that, a8 noted. sublime lie is otto be found in Jacobi either. It is clear that Kierkeg- aard has appropriated the term for his own use and has filled it with his own meaning: ‘To recall Kierkegaard’s previously cited journal entry from 1844, sublime lie” means deceiving a person, ina way.” A sublime li isa form of indirect communication. In its Yery concept i contains an internal contradietion between sublimity and apparent truth ‘value tis contradiction is requited when the most important things must be communi- cated - when, as Kierkegaard writes in the Postscript, ,what is expressed can only exist in a deceptive form”. Thus, ifa person: 1) wishes to communicate the most important things; 2 believes that he or she is ,Without authority”; and 3) has renounced the use of pseudonyms - then one is compelled to bea sublime liar. ‘Buc this is not the end of the story because, as has already been noted, Kierkegaard did not entirely renounce the use of pseudonyms after 1846, inasmuch as two of his ‘most important books, Sygdommen ti! Doden (1849; The Sickness Unto Death) and Indovelse i Christendom (1850; Practice in Christianity) were of course attributed to Anli-Climacus, albeit with Kierkegaard’s name on the title page as editor.” In these books Kierkegaard was free to speak with radical stress - to rake the established * Coun Uncefc Porgy SW 1 NI, 2122 (KW 124, 26; as In is bing piece Sunt fr min Foran Th Pon of View fo My Work an Aah) tent 88, icp posthumously in 18) Kegan agai makes lente wat cf Mya of Fear and “ictal be noted shat Was on procsly this tpi, lying tat Sven Kirke’ older brother Peter Chistian awe his nt tel hess De Nove ge Tine Mend Commer, which he susstaly subject fa very favorable review by Pou Martin Mol, roessr of poopy atthe Univerity of Copenhagen San npr dare on Kite urn he nr’ yeas he evry PM. Mr ee at Pb n Maas for Let, 7 (162), 58-85 a ws pid Mal feria Ser 5S SH Capeagen CA Rel 1886.19.21 “4(Church quite literally over the coals of Hell - while still of course remaining authority.” After all the hooks were not by him, but by an ideal” authorial voice, that ‘of Anti-Climacus, wivo in any ease also gave his readers some respite inthe Moral” to the first part ofthe book, just as Kierkegaard himself provided his readers with a bit of ‘breathing room in the book's thrice-repeated ,.ditor’s Preface.” ;Bucthen, on May 16, 1855, in the heat of his battle against the Church, and just prior to transforming his campaign from a series of newspaper articles into an independently published magazine, Oieblikker (The Moment), Kierkegaard publicly retracted all the butlers, all the layers of insulation, in which he had packaged Anti-Climacus’ Practice in Christianity. Alhough Kierkegaard clearly included himself under his indictment of Christendom, he was saying serious and terrible things, and now he was saying them in his own name, He was neither invoking authority nor, any longer, speaking under a pscudonym, ‘The terrible things Kierkegaard says during the atack on the Church essentially bs down t statements of two sorts: 1) you people who call yourselves Christians are not Christians; and 2) ,L am not a Christian’” These statements are combined in an article from the last issue of The Moment entitled ,My Task”: Tam nota Christian, and unfortunately {ean make it apparent thatthe others are not either - indeed, that they ae even les o than I, Because they imagine that they are, or chy ie heir way int it [being Christian... The only analogy Told before myself is Sorat, So no one is going to fool sme: I do not call myself Christian. Ina certain sense it seems easy enough to get rid of me, because the others ae of course fellows ofa completly dtferent sort, they are true Christians. Yes, yes, soit ‘seems. Bui isn't so, and precisely bocause Ido nor call myselfa Christian, i is impossible to get rid of me. ‘And they want to say that this about me not being a Christian i a concealed ‘oan of pridea because I must certainly he what I ean show the others are nor. But this isa misunderstanding. 111s entirely true. Iam Iota Christian? So: Was Kierkegaard telling the ruth when be said, am not a Christian?” Kierke- ‘guard's claim is analogous to Socrates" claim that he Was ignorant. The statements of both figures were atthe same time both true and untrue. In Socrates case, measured against his notion of what true knowledge was, he was indeed right in maintaining his own ignorance. Thus be was telling the truth about his ignorance. But his fellow citizens were ignorant in a deeper sense. On the other hand, ‘we must bear in mind that Socrates did, afterall, know something, and something very ‘important, namely concerning his own ignorance. So Socrates” claim of ignorance can also be seen as. sort of lie, lie he gave his life defending. But is fellow citizens were ignorant in a deeper sense In Kierkogaard’s case the claim that he was not a Christian was similarly both true and untrue. Measured against the standard of the Christianity of the New Testament” * The Moment, 10. SV 1 XIN, 351-2; mph ad 45as advanced in his book Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard was certainly no Chris tian, Kierkegaard says, in effect: I stand under the judgment of Christianity like the rest of you. If Christianity is what ‘the Christianity of the New Testament’ says it is, then I am no Christian, Lam not a Christian, but [ know it, And you're not Christians either, but you don’t know it. My only analogy is to Socrates, who was atleast aware of his own ignorance. If you continue to say you are Christians, you are liars.” So ‘Kierkegaard’s statement was no lie. But his fellow citizens were liars On the other hand, Kierkegaard knew that his own sense of inadequacy in relation to Christianity in fact positioned him a good deal closer to Christianity than his fellow citizens who claimed to be Christians." Kierkegaard said, in effect, ,1P Christianity is ‘what you people say iis, then I am no Christian, fit is what ‘the New Testament says. itis, then Lam stil no Christian, But nonetheless I am a lot closer to Christianity than ‘you are.” Soto this extent Kierkegaard was lying when he categorically denied being a ‘Christian. Bur his fellow citizens were liars ina deeper sense, Kierkegaard’ statement was a sublime le, a statement in an ironie form, containing concealed knowledge like Socrates" concealed knowledge that he did, ater all, know something. Similarly, Kierkegaard’s statement was a parallel 10 Jacobi's confession of atheism in the face of Fichte's pantheist. Sometimes it is better to lie «and die - like Tacobi's Desdemona, like Soerates, of Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s friend Emil Boesen reports that Kierkegaard refused the sacrament ‘on his deathbed, because he would not accept i fom a government official!" This ean- not have been an easy decision for Kierkegaard, It was his hemlock, and like Socrates, Kierkegaard can be said to have chosen to die as he did forthe sake of his city, in order to shock the conscience of his fellow citizens. If, in accordance with Jacobi’s prescrip- tion, Kierkegaard went to his death ,a liar” like Desdemona, he did so, as she did, in ‘order to shock the est of us into the knowledge that our easily acquired cultural Chis tianity makes of us much ,blacker devils” than he. Almost 150 years later, we are still at the ground zero of Kierkegaard’ attack on the (Church. Kierkegaard said to hs society: ,You ‘lie your way’ into Christianity. The only way to fight alie is with lic. Then you will never be able to getrid of me.” And to this day wo have been unable to get rid of Soren Kierkegaard. He was without authority, but the was a sublime lia.* See Phe Moment, 0p. 383. Oj eat Bt cma rit a rs np ARIE, ppt Sagan poly and aha ‘us Sooo Kegan, sera sa tats Rody, 30, S36, 46