JOSE v. People, GR.

162052, January 13, 2005

*RA 9344 enacted on July 25, 2005

Facts: Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga are accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, not
being licensed or authorized by law, unlawfully and feloniously sold and delivered to other person SHABU. (CRIME
happened on Nov. 14, 1995)

RTC: Sonny and Alvin are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating RA 6425 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of Indeterminate Sentence Law.

CA: Rendered judgement affirming the RTCs decision with modification. Apparently Alvin Jose was 13 years old
when he committed the crime, thus entitling him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and a reduction
of the penalty by two degrees. But the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration since the information given by the
prosecution failed to allege that Alvin acted with discernment when the crime was committed. CA denied this motion.

Jose files for certiorari since he was only 13 years old and no proof that he acted with discernment.

Petitioner asserts that under par. 3, Art. 12 of the RPC, a minor over 9 and under 15 (now amended) at the time of the
commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with discernment. Burden of proof to prove
his discernment was on the prosecution and they failed to do so, which means that he must be acquitted.

OSG asserts that the petitioner and co-accused conspired and confederated to sell the shabu and implied that the
petitioner acted with discernment and not necessary any more to express finding that the petitioner acted with
discernment since his acts show that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed with judgement to know that
the acts he committed were wrong.

ISSUE: W/N Jose, a minor, acted with discernment

HELD: JOSE IS ACQUITTED OF THE CRIME CHARGED FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

Petition is meritorious. Under Article 12(3) of the RPC, a minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt
from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applied even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and
penalized by a special penal law. It is the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him to be exempt from
criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a
crime the capacity to know what is wrong. For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is
burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment,
meaning that he know what he was doing and that it was wrong.

In the case, prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner acted with discernment. Petitioner
merely sat inside the car and had no participation whatsoever in the transactions between the accused Zarraga and
the buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic bag.

Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It
presupposes capacity of the parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is wrong. Since the
prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded that he
conspired with his co-accused.
People v. Hernandez, GR. 90641, Feb. 27, 1990

FACTS: On November 6, 1981, Ilagan, answering a call of nature, was circled and attacked by a group of three men.
Two men held his hands, while the third stabbed him repeatedly in different parts of his body. He had 12 stab wounds,
and cause of death was diagnosed as hypogelemic shock due to multiple stab wounds on the waist, abdomen, and
extremities. Three assailants were identified as Hernandez, Remo and Remo. On Sept. 20, 1982, Romeo Hernandez
and Vivencio Remo were arrested and arraigned for crime of Murder under Article 248 or RPC. Both, armed with
bladed weapons, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping each other,
with abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attach, assault and stab with
said weapons Arturo Ilagan, which caused multiple wounds and caused his death.

Witness was Joyag, who accused only met during the party.

Vivencio Remo died and case against him was dismissed.

RTC: Romeo Hernandez guilty of murder as principal by indispensable cooperation with conspiracy with the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength without any attendant modifying circumstance.

CA: Gave full credit to the testimony of Joyag because there is no reason why Joyag would testify falsely against
accused. Hernandez, another witness and who reported the crime, changed his story to cover up for his cousin, the
accused.

RULING: CA and RTC was right when they found that the appellant guilty as a co-conspirator in the murder of Ilagan
qualified by abuse of superior strength. For a collective responsibility among the accused to be established, it is
sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all of them acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfil their common
design to kill their victim. Although one of them may have actually stabbed Ilagan, the act of one is deemed to be the
act of all.

The crime committed by the accused was murder with treachery by taking advantage of superior strength with the aid
of armed men or by employing means to weaken the defence. Three men, armed with a knife, crept up in the dark
against defenceless and unsuspecting victim who was answering a call of nature. When two of Ilagans attackers
pinioned his arms so that their companion could stab him repeatedly and with impunity, they thereby employed means
which assured the execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising from the defence that their victim might
take.
People v. Formigones, GR L-3246, November 29, 1950

FACTS: In November 1946, Formigones was living on his farm with his wife and 5 children. From there they lived with
his half-brother, to find employment as harvesters of palay. On December 28, 1946, his wife was sitting at the head of
the stairs of the house, and Formigones without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from
the wall of the house and stabbed his wife in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe
haemorrhage resulting in her death. His wifes body toppled down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by
Formigones, took her up in his arms, carried her up the house and laid her on the floor of the living room and laid
down beside her. In this position, he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts of help made by his
eldest daughter who witnessed and testified the stabbing of her mother by her father.

Defendant signed a written statement where he admitted that he killed his wife with motive of jealousy because he
often saw his wife in the company of his brother and suspected them of having an affair.

During the preliminary investigation by the justice of peace, accused pleaded guilty. At the trial of the case in the court
of First Instance, he entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented testimony that he behaved
like an insane person in the provincial jail. The appeal is based on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and
therefore exempt from criminal liability under Article 12 of the RPC.

RTC: Not exempted of criminal liability under Article 12 of RPC. According to the doctor that examined the accused,
he was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.

ISSUE: W/N Formigones can be exempted from criminal liability under Art. 12 of RPC for imbecility

RULING: No, he cannot.

A person could be regarded as an imbecile under Art. 12 of RPC if he must be deprived completely of intelligence in
committing the act, that is that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that
he acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a
total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that imbecility or insanity at the time of the
commission of the act, should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality
of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.

Accused strange behaviour during confinement, may simply be attributed to his being feeblemindedness or eccentric
or remorse to having killed his wife. No evidence shows that he is an imbecile. During his marriage for about 16 years,
he hasnt done anything or conduct himself to warrant that he is an imbecile. A man who was simply jealous,
vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.

Although the deceased was struck in the back, the court doesnt find that the aggravating circumstance of treachery
was attended in the commission of the crime. The prosecution also has no intent to prove it. Court also sympathizes
with the accused and sees that he is indeed feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. Court also
believes that the accused really believes that his wife and brother were in an affair. Thus the act of killing his wife was
an act upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation where he killed his wife in a
fit of jealousy. Therefore, accused with the presence of two mitigating circumstance (Art. 13, either par. 8/9 and par.
6), without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, his sentence is reduced.

Appellant is guilty of parricide with two mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance.
People v. Martinez, GR. 71838

Martinez is accused of unlawfully selling, delivering, and transporting marijuana to Pat. Estamo who acted as a
poseur-buyer.

RTC: Appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling prohibited drugs.

The alleged maltreatment of the accused is contradicted by the positive testimony of the arresting officers regarding
the circumstances of his arrest. The trial court, having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the prosecution
witnesses and of the accused and his witnesses on the witness stand, and to listen to their respective testimonies,
gave more credence to the statements of the arresting officers. Policemen had no known motive or reason to imputely
falsely a serious and unfounded charge against the accused and that the testimonies of the same carry with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. They found the credibility of the defence witnesses
doubtful.

The accused pleads instigation as a defence. Testimony of Pat. Estamo was clear and straightforward and
demonstrated that the accused already had in possession of prohibited drugs when the policemen entrapped him to
reveal such possessions. Entrapment is not prohibited by the RPC.

Trial court did not commit an error in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
People v. Geronimo, GR L-35700

3 Accused Enrico Geronimo, Romeo Geronimo and Jose Geronimo

Enrico pleaded guilty to the charge but Romeo and Jose pleaded not guilty.

Fermin (deceased) was hit by a slingshot and fell to the ground. Romeo ran to where he had fallen and held him, while
Jose went around and hit Fermin on the head with a stone. Enrico took Fermins bolo and hacked his right ankle and
Jose boloed his left ankle, almost severing it. Fermin died.

RTC: The accused were filed with conspiring, confederating, and helping each other, with superior strength and with
evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stone and
stab Fermin which led to his eventual death.

Upon arraignment, Enrico pleaded guilty but he alone inflicted the injuries of the deceased.

Romeo and Jose appealed that the lower court erred in not crediting them with the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and as to Romeo, with the alternative mitigating circumstance of
lack of instruction

There was treachery since it is shown in the nature and location of the wounds that the victim was attacked from
behind.

If all are liable, atleast Romeo and Jose be credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed. Since the location of the wound were not on the vital parts of the body, they should
be granted the mitigating circumstance.

Court ruled that the mitigating circumstance is only for Jose who alone inflicted injury without intent to case the death
of the victim when Romeo was holding him.

SC Decision: Appellants acts were committed with treachery. Jose lacked the intent to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed. Romeo is liable as an accomplice.
People v Bandian, GR. 45186

Facts: Bandian was charged with infanticide.

RTC: Ruled Infanticide

Solicter-General does not agree with both. He argues that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor, and
the abandonment resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.

No evidence showing how the child in question died. Infanticide and abandonment of minor, to be punishable, must be
committed wilfully or consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. The
evidence doesnt show that the appellant, in causing her childs death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the
thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently.

Accused also continuously had fever during the time of her pregnancy, and may have caused haemorrhage, while she
had given birth, coupled with the circumstance that she is a primpara (only 23, no experience in childbirth, a mere
laboror who is uneducated, due to her dizziness, led to her actions. This can be considered lawful or insuperable
cause to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance.

Taking into account the facts and considerations, and granting that the appellant was aware of her involuntary
childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of
causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower court were true.
Appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstance in her favour, and therefore acquitted.
Guevarra v. Almodovar

FACTS: John, 11 years old, was playing with Teodoro and three other children in their backyard. They were target
shooting a bottle cap with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a
pellet on his left collar bone which caused his death.

After investigation, Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to
be an accident. But the parents of deceased appealed to the Ministry of Justice to file a case against petitioner for
homicide with reckless imprudence.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable

RULING:

Controversy is whether discernment is synonymous with intent. Intent is design, a determination to do certain things,
an aim the purpose of the mind, including suck knowledge as is essential to such intent, the design to resolve, or
determination with which a person acts. Discernment constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability
of a minor under 15 of age but over 9, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between wrong and right.

In evaluating felonies commited by means of culpa, 3 elements are indispensable: intelligence, freedom of action and
negligence. Intent in felonies. Intelligence remains an essential element, therefore it is necessary that a minor above 9
but below 15 years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act. For him to be criminally liable,
he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act.
Oriel v. People, GR. 161308

FACTS: Lino was fatally stabbed. The stabbing was preceded by a fight during a basketball game between Ross,
Linos son and Ronald. In that fight, Ronald hit Ross with a piece of stone and was brought to the hospital for
treatment. When Lino learned that his son had been injured he went to the house of the Medinas together with his
drinking buddies. He had a bread knife tucked in the back, but his companions were unarmed. On the way, Lino met
Randolf who he had a heated argument with while Randolf was explaining what really happened between them. Lino
lashed out at Randolf. Lino swung his knife at Randolf but he was not hit. Randolf took two empty bottles and attacked
Lino with them. Ricardo saw what was happening and confronted Lino. A commotion ensued between them. Ricardo
entered their house to get a knife, came out. Lino made a thrust to Ricardo but failed. Ricardo stabbed lino on the left
side of his chest near the heart. Lino fell, and Ricardo walked away, and Randolf threw the broken bottles at Lino.
Cause of death was stab wound of the chest.

Ricardo alleges that victims cause of death was self-inflicted when he fell on his knife

Office of Prosecutor: Both as co-conspirators, with intent to kill, feloniously attacked Lino

RTC: Acquitted Randolf but convicted Ricardo of homicide. No evidence of conspiracy between Randolf and Ricardo
because their actions appeared to be independent and separate from each other and did not show that they mounted
a joint attack against Lino.

CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in making a finding that the petitioner stabbed the deceased but disregarded the justifying
circumstance of defence of a relative

RULING: Supreme Court affirms CAs decision. No defense of relative was present.

In order that defense of a relative is to be given weight, the following requisites must concur: unlawful aggression by
the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression and in case the
provocation was given by the person attached, the person making the defense took no part in the provocation. The
accused carries the burden to prove that these requisites are present in killing the victim.

In his invoking of defense of a relative, Ricardo states that his immediate impulse upon seeing Randolf being attacked
by Lino with a knife was to get his own weapon and to aid in the defense of Randolf. But this theory was inconsistent
with his declaration at the trial that Linos fatal wound was self-inflicted, as it presupposes direct responsibility for
inflicting the mortal wound. Defense was unworthy of belief.
People v. Umawid

Facts of Prosecution: Umawid attacked Victor Ringor while holding 2 year old granddaughter, Maureen. Vicente was
able to evade the blows but hit Maureen instead, causing her instantaneous death. Umawid after went to a nearby
house where Jeffrey was sleeping. He attacked him and delivered fatal blows that would result to his death but didnt
kill Jeffrey.

Umawids Defense: Set up defense of insanity but didnt take the stand. Presented testimonies of doctors but they
couldnt tell with certainty if Umawid was psychotic at the time of the commission of the crime.

RTC: Umawid guilty of the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder. Accused with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked Maureen Ringor causing
her death; and frustrated murder for Jeffrey Mercado. Treachery because both Maureen and Jeffrey had in no means
to defend themselves.

CA: Affirmed RTCs ruling

ISSUE: W/N Umawids conviction should be upheld for Exempting circumstance of Insanity and Aggravating
Circumstance of Treachery

RULING: SC confirmed CA and RTCs ruling

Insanity

As case law instructs, the defense of insanity is in the nature of the confession and avoidance because an accused
invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of such insanity.
As there is a presumption in favour of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the burden of proving it with
clear and convincing evidence. The evidence on this matter must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged.

Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, when the accused is
deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment. Mere abnormalities of the faculties is not enough, especially
if the offender hasnt lost consciousness of his acts. In order to give credence to defense of insanity, it must be shown
that the accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts. Defense
merely showed evidence of Doctors testimonies which didnt show that during the time of commission of the crime, he
was insane.

Treachery

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. 2
conditions must concur: employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate, and the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.

Jurisprudence states that an unexpected and sudden attack renders the victim unable and unprepared to put a
defense is the essence of treachery. Also, killing of a child is characterized by treachery. While it wasnt shown that
Umawid consciously employed treachery to insure the death of Maureen, but killing by an adult of a minor is
treacherous. Also, though Jeffrey could have defended himself, he is likewise a minor of 15 years of age. The attack
on him was considered as acts with treachery. If the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor, treachery is
evident. Minor children, by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Therefore, if an adult
illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists.
People v. Rossel

Edwin Rossel was found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape and Frustrated Murder.

Prosecution: AAA was stabbed while being raped by accused. This was corroborated with findings of her injuries and
testimonial of the Doctor.

Defense: Invoked the defense of insanity. He also testified before the incident that he and AAA had an illicit
relationship for 2 months until they broke up. He had to use a knife to have sex with her. He admitted to the stabbing
but he claims he cannot understand why he did it. Doctors testimonials showed that Isal was suffering from a major
depressive disorder with psychotic features with hallucinations, poor impulse control, poor judgement, and low
frustration tolerance but couldnt say if exactly on date of commission of crime that appellant was insane.

RTC Ruling: Convicted Isla of the crimes of rape and frustrated murder with treachery, evident premeditation, and
abuse of superior strength. No credibility to his defense of insanity because it noted that Isla committed the crime
during a lucid interval. He knew what he was doing was unlawful and no indication that he was deprived of reason or
discernment and freedom of will when he committed all the acts attending the commission of the crime.

CA: Affirmed RTC Ruling

ISSUE: W/N court erred in not finding that the accused was insane at the time of the offense

RULING: SC ruled that only Frustrated Murder with no treachery, premeditation and abuse of superior power

In the case at bar, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The qualified experts failed to support its
claim of insanity. No conclusion as to Islas insanity immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the
crimes which the expert witnesses also corroborated.

Isla acted with discernment can be seen from his acts before, during and after the commission of the crime. The overt
acts the accused committed is attributed to a criminal mind, not a lunatic. No indication that he was completely
deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he stood for a while by the door of complainants house.
His actions were calculated to ensure consummation of his act.

No treachery. Definition of treachery. It is important in ascertaining the existence of treachery that it be proven that
the attack was made swiftly, deliberately, unexpectedly and without a warning, thus affording the victim no chance to
resist or escape. In the case at bar, Islas attack wasnt sudden, swift, deliberate and without warning. He stabbed
victim during the course of the struggle. Prosecution failed to show that the stabbing was so calculated as not to afford
the victim the chance to evade the attack.

Attack wasnt with evident premeditation. Elements of premeditation: previous decision by the accused to commit the
crime, overt acts manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination, and a lapse of time between the
decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow accused to reflect upon the consequences of
his acts. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at
a calm judgement. In the case at bar, there was no sufficient time that elapsed for Isla to decide to commit the crime
and reflect on its consequences and there was no showing that he performed other overt acts to show that was
determined to commit murder.

There is also no showing that Isla took advantage of his superior strength to consummate the crime.
People v. Tellis

Accused was arrested for allegedly selling dried marijuana leaves to one of the NARCOM, Sgt. De la Cruz. Time of
arrest, accused was 17 years old (Dec. 2, 1986), and is being detained. He pleaded not guilty.

Issue: W/N Accused was induced/instigated to the crime he is being accused for

Ruling: Accused is entitled to acquittal and reversed the ruling of the RTC and CA.

Though the trail courts findings of the facts are given great weight since they have the privilege to examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while on the stand, it laid stress on the testimony or the evidence of the prosecution. But if
we meticulously scrutinize the prosecutions testimony, there are inconsistencies and contradictions. The accuseds
testimony shows that he was maltreated by the officers and was illegally detained. The witness even admitted in open
court that he was aware that the detention was illegal. It will be erroneous to give credence to their testimonies.

In contrast, the testimony of the accused is direct, consistent and devoid of any prevarication. His testimony remained
unshaken despite rigid cross examination. The accused also maintained that he does not sell nor smoke marijuana.

From the cross-examination of the officials, they made the accused sign documents without counsel, and didnt inform
him of his rights to silence, and etc.

Evidence doesnt show that shows that Yutuc participated in the sale of marijuana. But assuming he did sell, was it an
inducement/instigation or merely entrapment to look for marijuana to sell?

In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. While instigation is when the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into
the commission of the offense, making him a co-principal. In entrapment, crime has already been committed.

In the case at bar, the accused denied having sold marijuana to the Narcom agents. His statement is confirmed by the
fact that he has no police or criminal record. It was Sgt. De la Cruz who proposed to buy marijuana from the accused
after having been introduced to the latter as a user. Without the proposal and instigation of Sgt. De la cruz, the alleged
sale of marijuana wouldnt have transpired. Sgt de la Cruz suggested the commission of the crime by offering the
accused P50 for the drug.
People v Casio

FACTS: Shirley Casio is charged for trafficking a minor for purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation. She asked
police if the wanted women. Police entrapped her. One of the women she trafficked is a minor when she started.

RTC: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in trafficking in persons with aggravating of minority.

CA: Affirmed RTCs ruling. Accused filed a notice of appeal and CA gave due course for the resolution. Ordered the
confinement of accused to Correctional Institution for Women.

ISSUE: W/N the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid, considering that there was no prior
surveillance and the police didnt know the subject of the operation; W/N the prosecution was able to prove accused
guilt beyond reasonable doubt even though there was no evidence presented to show that accused has a history of
engaging human trafficking

RULING: Affirm Casios conviction. Casio was positively identified by the witnesses. Entrapment operations are valid
and have been recognized by courts.

Trafficking: Use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person

Qualified Trafficking: when the trafficked person is a child; committed by a syndicate, as a band; when offender is a
relative or exercises authority over the trafficked person, or when the offense is committed by a person in public office;
etc.

Prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused committed the offense of trafficking in persons,
qualifying by the fact that one of the victims was a child.

Test for entrapment whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding
person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense

There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in
the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. In
entrapment, it originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In
instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea
and carries it into execution.

Accused was the one who commenced the transaction with the police officers by calling their attention on whether
they wanted girls for the evening. It was accused who asked them whether they wanted girls. There was no illicit
inducement on the part of the police for the accused to commit the crime.
People v. Genosa

Facts:

Marivic Genosa was convicted of Parricide for killing her husband, Ben Genosa. Appellant testified that every time her
husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. On the night of the killing, appellant and
the victim quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. The appellant however invoked self-defense and defense of her
unborn child when she admittedly having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against
the appellant however alleged the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe to the
nape. After the trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide with an
aggravating circumstance of treachery. She was meted with the penalty of death.

Appellant subsequently filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for her examination by expert psychologists and
psychiatrist to prove her claim of self- defense on the theory of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS).

Issue:

1.) Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the BWS as constituting self-defense.
2.) Whether or not treachery attend the killing of her husband, Ben Genosa.

Ruling:

1.) The court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is inflicted with the BWS.

The BWS is characterized by the so- called cycle of violence, which has three phases:
1. The tension- building phase
2. The acute bettering incident
3. The tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern
for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second
time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to
prove that in at least another battering episode in the past. Each of the phases must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her partner. The existing facts of the
present case, however was not established.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were however taken in favor of
the appellant. It should be clarified that those circumstances did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological
paralysis which lead to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power. Pasion and obfuscation was the
result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts by the husband

2.) NO. The appellant acted upon and impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation.
The constant battering she suffered from the hands of her husband overwhelmed her and impelled her to
vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.
3.) The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of
two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed
upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
Criminal Law. Elements of carnapping. Murder (treachery). Uncontrollable fear as exempting circumstance.
People of the Philippines v. Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista and Edgar Pimentel
G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014
Carpio, Acting C.J.:

FACTS:
Accused-appellants Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista and Edgar Pimentel are detention prisoners who are charged for
the murder of two jail guards and for carnapping. The RTC and the CA found petitioners guilty of the crimes charged.

Records show that Julius Chan went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing scheduled
for that day. JO2 Niturada answered the telephone in the administration building and upon returning, he saw Chan
place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was seated, and Chan shot the latter with a short firearm.

Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an armalite. Cornista struck JO1
Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboas gun, shot
JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal took the armalite from JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned
fire with his .38 caliber handgun.

Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep belonging to
Benjamin Bauzon, without the latters knowledge and consent. They picked up Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan
along the way. The group then transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck. Eventually they abandoned the vehicle and ran
towards a cane field where they were arrested.

Appellants deny any criminal liability. Anent the crime of carnapping, they allege that they were under the influence of
uncontrollable fear from Leal, who forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail. With regards to
the crime of murder, accused-appellants allege that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and that there can be no treachery in the case since the jail guards were all issued with firearms to protect themselves
from danger.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and carnapping?

HELD:
YES, the guilt of the petitioners are proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant argue that there can be no treachery
since the jail guards were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from danger and to maintain peace and order
within the compound. This argument is untenable.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might take.

In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded any chance of defending themselves.
Without warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan held the shoulder of JO2
Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and
to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun and shot JO1 Bacolor. Hence, there is treachery.

Anent the crime of carnapping, the prosecution likewise proved all the elements of the offense in this case. The
elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to
gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; and (4) the
taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things.

All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep
and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, Benjamin Bauzon, testified that he did not consent to the taking of his
vehicle by appellants.

The defense of uncontrollable fear is likewise untenable. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the
compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It
is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal
combat.
In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first place, Leal was already armed when Fieldad
voluntarily followed him to the place where the Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle stopped three times: to board
Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped to transfer vehicles. The circumstances under which appellants
participated in the commission of the carnapping would not justify in any way their claim that they acted under an
uncontrollable fear of being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the circumstances establish the fact that
appellants, in their flight from jail, consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep without
the consent of its owner.

Hence, with all the foregoing, the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
of carnapping.
Ortega v. People, G. R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008

Facts:
At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13 years old while the victim was 6. The case was pending when
the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) was enacted amending among others the age of criminal
irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already
reached the age of majority.

Issue:
Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied, in the resolution of the
case.

Held:
The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied. By virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of
criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old, this law is evidently favorable to the accused.
Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the
certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioners age
was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the
commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
People of the Philippines v. Henry Arpon y Juntilla
G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Arpon was charged with one count of statutory rape and seven counts of rape. The RTC and CA
convicted accused-appellants of all counts of rape charged.

Records show that the first count of rape against private complainant AAA was committed by accused-appellant in the
house of the former when she was still eight years old (1995). In July 1999, she was again raped by accused-
appellant for five times on different nights. She avers that accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the
stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAAs neighbor. He came to AAAs house, took off her panty and went on top of
her. When asked again how the accused-appellant raped her for five nights in July of the said year, AAA narrated that
accused-appellant pulled down her panty, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain as he put his penis into her
vagina. Every time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain.

AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August 1999 at nighttime. He kissed her and
then he took off his shirt, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in her chest because he was
heavy. She related that the accused-appellant was her uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said that she
did not tell anybody about the rapes because the accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did. She only
filed a complaint when he proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD

Accused-appellant interpose alibi and denial as his defense. He further assails the credibility of AAA for having
inconsistencies in her testimony.

ISSUE:
Is the accused-appellant guilty of all counts of rape charged against him?

HELD:
NO, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances when the accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of her.

The first incident of rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA was only eight years old. Article 266-A
(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. Contrary to the
posturing of the accused-appellant, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of
rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details
which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal. As regards the first incident of rape, the
RTC credited with veracity the substance of AAAs testimony and the Court sees no cogent reason to disturb the
finding of the RTC.

Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July 1999, the Court disagrees with the
ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty. AAAs testimony merely described a single
incident of rape. She made no reference whatsoever to the other four instances of rape that were likewise supposedly
committed in the month of July 1999. The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in
August 1999.

Accused-appellants defense of alibi cannot stand. Hence, accused-appellant is proven to have committed three
counts of rape against AAA. He is, however, exempted from criminal liability for the first count of rape (statutory) on
account of him being a minor when he committed the crime. As such, he is only guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of qualified rape with his relationship as an uncle to the victim as a qualifying circumstance.