Piandiong vs.

The Philippines

Facts:
Piandiong and Morallos were arrested on 27 February 1994, on suspicion of having participated, on 21
February 1994, in the robbery of passengers of a jeepney in Caloocan City, during which one of the
passengers, a policeman, was killed. After arriving in the police station, Piandiong and Morallos were hit
in the stomach in order to make them confess, but they refused. During a line up, the eyewitnesses failed
to recognize them as the robbers. The police then placed them in a room by themselves, and directed the
eyewitnesses to point them out. No counsel was present to assist the accused. During the trial, Piandiong,
Morallos and Bulan testified under oath, but the judge chose to disregard their testimony, because of lack
of independent corroboration.

Counsel further complains that the death sentence was wrongly imposed, because the judge considered
that an aggravating circumstance existed, as the crime was committed by more than three armed persons.
However, this was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, counsel states that the judge should
have taken into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, since they came with the
police without resisting. Counsel further states that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses deserved no
credence, because the eyewitnesses were close friends of the deceased and their description of the
perpetrators did not coincide with the way they actually looked. Counsel also states that the judge erred
when he did not give credence to the alibi defence. Finally, counsel complains that the death penalty was
unconstitutional and should not have been imposed for anything but the most heinous crime.

On 7 November 1994, Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan were convicted of robbery with homicide and
sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The Supreme Court denied the appeal,
and confirmed both conviction and sentence by judgement of 19 February 1997. Further motions for
reconsideration were denied on 3 March 1998. After the execution had been scheduled, the Office of the
President granted a three month reprieve of execution. No clemency was however granted and counsel
presented a communication to the Committee under the Optional Protocol. The Committee transmitted the
communication to the State party with a request to provide information and observations in respect of
both admissibility and merits of the claims. The State party was also requested not to carry out the death
sentence against Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan, while their case was under consideration by the
Committee. The Committee was informed by counsel that a warrant for execution had been issued. After
having contacted the State partys representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva, the Committee
was informed that the executions would go ahead as scheduled, despite the Committees request, since the
State party was of the opinion that the Authors received a fair trial. Counsel for the Authors filed a
petition with the Supreme Court seeking an injunction, which was refused by the Court. However,
Messrs. Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan were executed by lethal injection. Counsel argues that Authors
considered resort to the President as a domestic remedy necessary for them to exhaust before presenting
their communication to the Human Rights Committee. They argue therefore that it was not improper for
them to wait until it became clear that clemency was not going to be granted. With respect to the State
partys argument that clemency could not be granted because the crime could not be considered as
poverty driven, counsel notes that Messrs. Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan disputed the very finding of
their supposed authorship of the crime.

With regard to the State partys argument that the Supreme Court has ruled the death penalty and method
of execution constitutional, counsel argues that the Supreme Courts judgement deserves to be
reconsidered.

Issue/s:
1. The Human Rights Committee must decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol
to the Covenant.
2. Whether or not the accused were identified in Court by the eyewitnesses and that this identification was
sufficient.
3. Whether or not the courts of States parties, and not for the Committee, shall evaluate facts and evidence
in a particular case, and shall interpret the relevant domestic legislation.
4. Whether or not the crime for which they were convicted was a most serious crime as stipulated by
article 6(2), and whether the re-introduction of the death penalty in the Philippines is in compliance with
the State partys obligations under article 6(1) (2) and (6) of the Covenant.

Ruling/Comment:
1. The Committee notes that the State party has not raised any objections to the admissibility of the
communication. The Committee is not aware of any obstacles to the admissibility of the communication
and accordingly declares the communication admissible and proceeds without delay with the
consideration of the merits
2. Counsel has claimed that the identification of Messrs. Piandiong and Morallos by eyewitnesses during
the police line-up was irregular, since the first time around none of the eyewitnesses recognized them,
upon which they were put aside in a room and policemen directed the eyewitnesses to point them out. The
Court rejected their claim in this respect, as it was uncorroborated by any disinterested and reliable
witness.
3. The Committee reiterates that it is for the courts of States parties, and not for the Committee, to
evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case, and to interpret the relevant domestic legislation. There is
no information before the Committee to show that the decisions by the courts were arbitrary or that they
amounted to denial of justice. In the circumstances, the Committee finds that the facts before it do not
reveal a violation of the Covenant in this respect.
4. The Committee is not in a position to address these issues, since neither counsel nor the State party has
made submissions in this respect.

The Human Rights Committee of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, is of the view that it cannot make a finding of a violation of any of the articles of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee reiterates its conclusion that the
State committed a grave breach of its obligations under the Protocol by putting the alleged victims to
death before the Committee had concluded its consideration of the communication.

Baroy vs. The Philippines

Facts: The author and an (adult) co-accused were thereafter charged with three counts of rape. It is alleged
that on the date of the offence, the author would have been 14 years, 1 month and 14 days old, by virtue
of being born on 19 January 1984. At trial, the defense introduced the issue of minority through the
author, who claimed to have been born in 1982. The trial court instructed the appropriate government
agencies to submit evidence on his true age. Three documents were submitted. A Certificate of Live Birth
listed the date as 19 January 1984, while a Certificate of Late Registration of Birth showed the date as 19
January 1981, and an Elementary School permanent record as 19 January 1980. The trial court
considered, in the light of the author's physical appearance, that the author's true date of birth was 19
January 1980, thus making him over 18 years of age at the time the offence was committed.

On 1999, the author and his (adult) co-accused were each convicted of three counts of rape with a deadly
weapon and sentenced to death by lethal injection. In imposing the maximum penalty available, the Court
considered that there were the aggravating circumstances of night-time and confederation, and no
mitigating circumstances. On 2002, the Supreme Court, on automatic review, affirmed the conviction but
reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, on the basis that no aggravating circumstances had
been sufficiently alleged and proven to exist.

The author claims to have been a victim of a violation of article 6, paragraph 2, both alone and in
conjunction with paragraph 6. The author explains that following the constitutional abolition of capital
punishment in 1987, the Congress in 1994 reintroduced the death penalty by electrocution through the
Republic Act 7659. The author claims a violation of article 10, paragraph 3, as after his conviction he was
detained on death row with other convicts sentenced to death, regardless of his age. The author further
claims a violation of article 14, in particular paragraph 4. He was not accorded a separate procedure that
would protect his rights considering his legal status as a minor. No preliminary determination was made
as to his minority, with the trial court simply placing the burden of proof on the defense. The author
finally claims a violation of article 26, in that his age was arbitrarily determined to be 18, despite evidence
of his birth being either in 1981 or 1984. The trial court refused to treat him as a minor and singled him
out with the intention of arbitrarily determining the year of his birth, contrary to the evidence presented.

Issues:
1. Whether or not there is a violation of article 10, paragraph 3, as after his conviction he was detained on
death row with other convicts sentenced to death, regardless of his age.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of article 14, in particular paragraph 4 when he was not accorded a
separate procedure that would protect his rights considering his legal status as a minor.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of article 26, in that his age was arbitrarily determined to be 18,
despite evidence of his birth being either in 1981 or 1984.

Ruling:
In spite of this conclusion with respect to the claims under article 6, the Committee observes that
sentencing a person to death and placing him or her on death row in circumstances where his or her
minority has not been finally determined raises serious issues under articles 10 and 14, as well as
potentially under article 7, of the Covenant. The Committee observes, however, with respect to the
exhaustion of domestic remedies, that the author has filed a "partial motion for reconsideration", currently
pending before the Supreme Court, requesting the Court to reconsider its treatment of his minority in its
judgment of 9 May 2002. The Committee recalls that its position in relation to issues of exhaustion of
domestic remedies is that, absent exceptional circumstances, this aspect of a registered communication is
to be assessed at the time of its consideration of the case. In the present case, accordingly, the Committee
considers that the questions of the authors' age and the means by which it was determined by the courts
are, by the author's own action, currently before a judicial forum with authority to resolve definitively
these particular claims. It follows that issues arising under articles 10 and 14 and, potentially, article 7
from the author's age and the manner in which the courts sought to determine this question are
inadmissible, for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.

Pimentel vs. The Philippines

Facts:
Human rights victims (Pimentel) brought a class action suit against Philippine President Ferdinand
Marcos. Pimentel obtained a nearly $2 billion judgment and later tried to attach a brokerage account at
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. (Merrill Lynch) (plaintiff), which was owned by Arelma, S.A.
(Arelma), a company incorporated by Marcos. The Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (collectively, the Republic) claimed the money in the
brokerage account belonged to the Republic under Philippine law and asked Merrill Lynch to transfer the
money to the Philippine National Banc (PNB), pending a decision by a Philippine court. Instead, Merrill
Lynch filed an interpleader lawsuit in federal court to settle all the claims in one case, naming the
Republic, Arelma, PNB, Pimentel, and others as defendants. The Republic claimed sovereign immunity
and was dismissed from the lawsuit. The Republic then moved to dismiss the interpleader action, arguing
that the case could not proceed without it because it was an indispensable party under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) 19. The district court denied the motion and continued to adjudicate the case. The
Republic appealed the denial, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and
issued a stay, pending the outcome of the litigation in the Philippine court. The district judge vacated the
stay and awarded the money to Pimentel. The Republic asked the Philippine court to declare the money
forfeited, but that court has not yet ruled. The Republic, Arelma, and PNB appealed, but the court of
appeals affirmed this time, largely because the Republic, despite being a required party under FRCP Rule
19(a), was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim. The defendants petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted.

Lumanog and Santos vs. The Philippines

Facts:
The authors of the communication are Mr. Lenido Lumanog and Mr. Augusto Santos, Filipino nationals
who, at the time of the submission of the communication, were on death row, at New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, the Philippines. They claim to be victims of a violation by the Philippines of articles 6,
paragraph 1; 9, paragraph 1; 14, paragraphs 1, 3 (c) and 5; and 26 of the Covenant. They are represented
by counsels, Soliman Santos and Cecilia Jimenez.

The authors and three other individuals were sentenced to death for the murder of former Colonel
Rolando Abadilla, occurred on June 1996. They have been in detention since June 1996. After their
motions for reconsideration and new trial were rejected by the RTC in January 2000, the case was
transmitted to the Supreme Court in February 2000 for automatic review (appeal) of the death penalty. All
defence and prosecution appeals briefs for the purpose of the Supreme Court review were filed by June
2004. Soon after the last appeal brief, on 6 July 2004, the authors filed a Consolidated Motion for Early
Decisions. On 10 December 2004, they filed a Motion for Early Decision, which was responded to by
Supreme Court is resolution of January 2005. In the latter resolution, the Supreme Court transferred the
case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, in conformity with its new
jurisprudence pursuant to the judgment in Mateo. As a result, the authors filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of Transfer to the Court of Appeals on 24 February 2005, stressing that the
jurisprudence in Mateo should not be applied automatically to each death penalty case. Furthermore, it
was argued that the Supreme Court was in a position to proceed with the review of the case. The Supreme
Court rejected the Motion March 2005 for lack of merits. A new similar and more substantiated request to
reconsider the Supreme Courts decision was filed on June 2005, but by Resolution of July 2005 the
Supreme Court reiterated its decision to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals, declaring that its
decision was in conformity with the Mateo decision. The review of the case has been pending before
the Court of Appeals since January 2005. On January 2007, due to internal organizational matters of the
Court of Appeals, the criminal case concerning the authors (Cesar Fortuna et Al.) was transferred to a
newly appointed judge in the Court.

With respect to Mr. Lumanog only, it is submitted that he was denied interlocutory relief while the case
was pending before the Supreme Court. The Court denied his Motion for New Trial and Related Relief.
On November 2004, the Supreme Court denied another motion filed by Mr. Lumanog, who had become a
kidney transplant patient in 2003 and asked the Court to be returned to the specialist kidney hospital
where he was treated as a patient in 2002 instead of being placed in the prisons general hospital. Mr.
Lumanog went back to his cell, on his own request, as he preferred the conditions there to those of the
prisons hospital.

Issues:
1. Whether or not there are violations of the Covenant caused by the transfer of their case from the
Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals.
2. Whether or not the decision of the Supreme Court not to review their case and transfer it to the Court of
Appeals violates article 14, paragraph 5 of the Covenant insofar as it violates their right to have their
conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of article 14, paragraph 3(c) of the Covenant, since their case had
been pending for five years before the Supreme Court and was ready for a decision when it was
transferred to the Court of Appeals, thereby unduly delaying the hearing.
4. Whether or not there is a violation of article 6, paragraph 1 and article 9, paragraph 1, since the alleged
violations of article 14 occurred in the context of a death penalty case with prolonged detention which had
very detrimental effect on the authors, and notably for Mr. Lumanog.

Ruling:
In relation to the authors claim under article 14, paragraph 3 (c), it may be noted that the right of the
accused to be tried without undue delay relates not only to the time between the formal charging of the
accused and the time by which a trial should commence, but also the time until the final judgment on
appeal3. All stages whether at first instance or on appeal, must be completed without undue delay.
Therefore, the Committee must not limit its consideration exclusively to the part of the judicial
proceedings subsequent to the transfer of the case from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, but
rather take into account the totality of time. With respect to the alleged violation of article 14, paragraph
5, of the Covenant, the Committee notes that the authors appeal remains pending before the Court of
Appeals, a higher tribunal within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 5, which is seized of the case so as
to enable it to review all factual issues pertaining to the authors conviction. This part of the
communication is therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. The Committee
therefore decides that the communication is admissible only insofar as it raises issues under article 6,
paragraph 1, and article 14, paragraph 3(c), of the Covenant.

In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to
provide the authors with an effective remedy, including the prompt review of their appeal before the
Court of Appeals and compensation for the undue delay. The State party is also under an obligation to
take measures to prevent similar violations in the future. By becoming a party to the Protocol, the State
party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of
the Covenant and, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure all
individuals within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to
provide an effective and enforceable remedy in case a violation has been established. In this respect, the
Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken
to give effect to the Committees Views. The State party is also requested to publish the Committees
Views.
 Marcellana and Gumanoy vs. The Philippines

Facts:
Marcellana was the former Secretary General of Karapatan-Southern Tagalog (a human rights
organisation) and Mr. Eddie Gumanoy was the former chairperson of Kasama Tk (an organization of
farmers). They were leading a fact finding mission in the province of Mindoro Oriental, to enquire about
the abduction of three individuals in Gloria town allegedly committed by elements of the 204th infantry
brigade and the killing and disappearance of civilians and burning of properties by the military in the
town of Pinamalayan. The victims were travelling on the highway when their van was stopped by ten
armed men. All the belongings of the members of the fact-finding mission, including mobile phones,
documents and photos of the mission, were then seized. After the armed men tied them up, they were
taken into a vehicle (jeepney). The armed men were not all hooded and some of them could be
identified as being former rebels and currently associated with the military. The victims were later
dropped along the roadside in different parts of Bongagbong municipality. The dead bodies of Ms.
Marcellana and Mr. Eddie Gumanoy were found the following day. Forensic reports and the death
certificates indicate that their death was caused by gun-shot wounds.

The authors filed a complaint for kidnapping and murder before the Department of Justice (DOJ) but
dismissed the complaint on 2004 and the charges against one of the alleged perpetrators on the ground of
insufficient evidence. The authors filed a Petition for Review which was 2006. The authors filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was dismissed on 2007. The authors appealed the DOJs decisions before the
Office of the President of the Republic. The appeal requested that the DOJ decision be reversed and that
charges be filed against Aniano Silver Flores and Richard Waway Falla. That appeal is still pending.

A complaint was also filed with the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines. This complaint was
later withdrawn, due to the authors assessment that they would not obtain justice from this body.
Complaints were also filed with the House of Representatives of the Philippines, the Senate, and under
the Comprehensive Agreement on respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, but no
action was taken. The authors add that, in spite of widespread and public opposition, one of the principal
suspected perpetrators, Col. Palparan, was later promoted to Major General by the President.

The complaint
The authors claim a violation by the State party of article 2, paragraphs 1 and 3; article 6, paragraph 1;
article 7; article 9, paragraph 1; article 10, paragraph 1; article 17; and article 26 of the Covenant.

The State Party

On admissibility, the State party claims that the authors have not exhausted all available domestic
remedies. State party argues that the communication is inadmissible under article 5, paragraph 2 (a) of the
Optional Protocol as the same matter is being examined by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions,. State party also challenges the admissibility of the communication on
grounds of abuse of the right of submission, as the authors refuse to recognize and respect its authority to
investigate, prosecute and resolve criminal acts within its territorial jurisdiction. The authors are trying to
involve the international community in the handling of a case about the State partys domestic criminal
laws, which constitutes an undue interference with the State partys domestic affairs.

Finally, the State party maintains that the communication does not sufficiently substantiate the alleged
violations of the Covenant committed by the State party. The narration of the facts only establishes that
Ms. Marcellana and Mr. Gumanoy were kidnapped and murdered, that some armed men were the
perpetrators and that three of those men were allegedly identified. However, the required link between
those facts and the authorities of the State party has not been established.
Furthermore, the State party contends that the communication fails to establish how the State party has
violated the Covenant. It submits that the killings of Ms. Marcellana and Mr. Gumanoy are not
attributable to its armed forces or to the State but to individuals acting in their own interest. Nevertheless,
it is doing its best to ensure that the fundamental rights and liberties of its citizens are respected. The State
party recalls that if a State fails to investigate, prosecute or redress private, nonstate acts in violation of
fundamental rights; it is in effect aiding the perpetrators of such violations for which it could be held
responsible under international law.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the communication is inadmissible on the ground of failure to exhaust domestic
remedies.
2. Whether or not the State partys contention that the case is inadmissible because the subject matter of
the communication is being or was examined by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions.
3. Whether or not the authors have abused their right of submission.

Ruling:
1. The authors have conceded non-exhaustion of domestic remedies but claim that remedies have been
ineffective and unreasonably prolonged. The Committee refers to its case law, to the effect that, for the
purposes of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol, domestic remedies must both be effective
and available, and must not be unduly prolonged.
2. The Committee observes that fact-finding country visits by a Special Rapporteur do not constitute a
procedure of international investigation or settlement within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2(a), of
the Optional Protocol. The Committee further recalls that the study of human rights problems in a country
by a Special Rapporteur, although it might refer to or draw on information concerning individuals, could
not be regarded as being the same matter as the examination of individual cases within the meaning of
article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the 2007
country visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, does not
render the communication inadmissible under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol.
3. The Committee rejects this view: On the contrary, it is clear that pursuant to article 1 of the Optional
Protocol [a] State party to the Covenant that becomes a party to the [] Protocol recognizes the
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its
jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State party. In the absence of any valid
reason offered as to why the present communication constitutes an abuse of right of submission, the
Committee is of the view that the case is not inadmissible on this ground.

In the present case, though over five years have elapsed since the killings took place, the State partys
authorities have not indicted, prosecuted or brought to justice anyone in connection with these events. The
Committee notes that the State partys prosecutorial authorities have, after a preliminary investigation,
decided not to initiate criminal proceedings against one of the suspects due to lack of sufficient evidence.
The Committee has not been provided with any information, other than about initiatives at the policy
level, as to whether any investigations were carried out to ascertain the responsibility of the other
members of the armed group identified by the witnesses. Absence of investigations to establish
responsibility for the kidnapping and murder of the victims amounted to a denial of justice. The State
party must accordingly be held to be in breach of its obligation, under article 6, in conjunction with article
2, paragraph 3, properly to investigate the death of the victims and take appropriate action against those
found guilty.

By becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the
Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant or not and that, pursuant to
article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant, and to provide an effective and
enforceable remedy in case a violation has been established.

Larranaga vs. The Philippines

Facts:
On 1999, the author, along with six co-defendants, was found guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention of Jacqueline Chiong by the Special Heinous Crimes Court in Cebu City and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. On 3 February 2004, the Supreme Court of the Philippines found the author also
guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape of Marijoy Chiong and
sentenced him to death. He was also sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention of Jacqueline Chiong.

According to the author, he travelled from Cebu City to Quezon City on 8 June 1997 to pursue a Diploma
at the Centre for culinary arts in Quezon City. On 16 July 1997, he was taking examinations during the
entire day and then went to a restaurant in the evening. He stayed with friends until the next morning. On
17 July 1997, he took another examination before taking a plane back to Cebu City at 5pm.

The prosecution presented its first and main witness, the defendant Davidson Valiente Rusia, who was
promised immunity from prosecution if he told the truth. The author gave written consent to the
withdrawal of his counsel and requested three weeks to hire a new counsel.

The Special Heinous Crimes Court found the author guilty of the kidnapping and serious illegal detention
of Jacqueline Chiong and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It decided that there was insufficient
evidence to find him guilty of the kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape of
Marijoy Chiong.

Isues:
1. Whether or not death penalty may be imposed upon Larranaga.
2. Whether or not the principle of presumption of innocence has been violated.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (b) and (d), of the Covenant.
4. Whether or not there is a violation of Article 14, paragraph 3(c). 5. Whether or not there is a violation
of Article 7.

Ruling:
The Committee notes from the judgments that the author was convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape under article 267 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "when
the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped ||, the maximum penalty shall
be imposed". Thus, the death penalty was imposed automatically by the operation of article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that the automatic and mandatory
imposition of the death penalty constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life, in violation of article 6,
paragraph 1, of the Covenant, in circumstances where the death penalty is imposed without any
possibility of taking into account the defendant's personal circumstances or the circumstances of the
particular offence. It follows that his rights under article 6, paragraph 1, of the Covenant were violated. At
the same time, the Committee notes that the State party has adopted Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting
the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines. The Committee has noted the arguments of the author
that the reintroduction of the death penalty for "heinous crimes", as set out in Republic Act No. 7659,
constitutes a violation of article 6 of the Covenant.
The Committee concludes that the author's trial did not respect the principle of presumption of innocence,
in violation of article 14, paragraph 2. The Committee is cognizant that some States require that a defence
of alibi must be raised by the defendant, and that a certain standard of proof must be met before the
defence is cognizable. In the present case, the trial judge put a number of leading questions to the
prosecution which tend to justify the conclusion that the author was not presumed innocent until proven
guilty. Moreover, incriminating evidence against a person provided by an accomplice charged with the
same crime should, in the Committee's opinion, be treated cautiously, particularly where the accomplice
was found to lie about his previous criminal convictions, was granted immunity from prosecution, and
eventually admitted to raping one of the victims. In the present case, it considers that, despite all the
issues mentioned above having been raised by the author, neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court
addressed them appropriately.

The judge refused to grant the requests allegedly because the trial had to be terminated within sixty days.
The Committee considers that in a capital case, when counsel for the defendant requests an adjournment
because he was not given enough time to acquaint himself with the case, the court must ensure that the
defendant is given an opportunity to prepare his defence. In the instant case, both the author's appointed
and chosen counsel should have been granted an adjournment. In the circumstances, the Committee finds
a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (b) and (d), of the Covenant.

The Committee has noted the State party's explanations concerning the delay in the trial proceedings
against the author. Nevertheless, it finds that the delay was caused by the authorities and that no
substantial delay can be attributable to the author. In any case, the fact that the author appealed cannot be
held against him. Article 14, paragraph 3(c), requires that all accused shall be entitled to be tried without
undue delay, and the requirement applies equally to the right of review of conviction and sentence
guaranteed by article 14, paragraph 5.

With regard to the alleged violation of article 7, the Committee considers that to impose a death sentence
on a person after an unfair trial is to subject that person wrongfully to the fear that he will be executed. In
circumstances where there is a real possibility that the sentence will be enforced, that fear must give rise
to considerable anguish. Such anguish cannot be dissociated from the unfairness of the proceedings
underlying the sentence. Indeed, as the Committee has previously observed [FN58], the imposition of any
death sentence that cannot be saved by article 6 would automatically entail a violation of article 7. The
Committee therefore concludes that the imposition of the death sentence on the author after the
conclusion of proceedings which did not meet the requirements of article 14 of the Covenant amounts to
inhuman treatment, in violation of article 7.

Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the
competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant or not and
that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, that State party has undertaken to ensure all individuals within
its territory or subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective
and enforceable remedy in case a violation has been established.