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Vol. 20, No. 3, May 2009, pp. 676–678 doi 10.1287/orsc.1090.0433

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Performativity of Theory, Arbitrary Conventions, and

Possible Worlds: A Reality Check
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Teppo Felin
Marriott School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602, teppo.felin@byu.edu

Nicolai J. Foss
Center for Strategic Management and Globalization, Copenhagen Business School, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark, and
Department of Strategy and Management, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration,
N-5045 Bergen, Norway, njf.smg@cbs.dk

W e argue that Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton build on a scientifically problematic conception of the relationship between
theory and social reality. Specifically, the performativity perspective that they build on makes tenuous assumptions
about the role that theories, whether true or not, play in strongly constructing social reality, but the perspective fundamentally
ignores central matters related to human nature and the boundaries of possibility. We argue for a more realistic approach to
theory building and social science, one that recognizes the role that true theories play in helping us understand and explain
reality, but also in turn shaping that reality given this better theoretical understanding.
Key words: performativity; economics; philosophy of social science
History: Published online in Articles in Advance April 27, 2009.

We appreciate the opportunity to briefly address
Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton’s (2009) response (hence-
forth “FPS”). Given space constraints, we will largely
focus on the merits and implicit assumptions of the “per-
formativity perspective” that FPS build on heavily (Cal-
lon 1998, 2007).
As FPS emphasize in their response, their arguments
build on a much wider literature in the philosophy
and sociology of science, the performativity perspective.
The performativity literature argues that theories (pre-
dictions, assumptions, explanations, and expectations),
independent of ex ante correspondence with truth and
reality, fulfill themselves due to social, political, and
technical reasons, and create the very realities that the
theories predict. According to the performativity per-
spective, then, we cannot even meaningfully speak of
the ex ante “truth” or “reality” of theories, because theo-
ries themselves participate in defining and creating what
is truthful and what is real. Theories, as argued by one
of the founders of this perspective, are “arbitrary con-
ventions” (Callon 2007, p. 322) that are self-fulfilling
(MacKenzie 2006)—arbitrary conventions that are not
true ex ante but they “perform” themselves and thus
become true ex post.
The problem, however, is that if one holds that the
content of theories indeed is arbitrary ex ante, how is
one then somehow able to assess the falsity or truth
of other’s theories? Logically, one cannot—any asser-
tions of the falsity or truth of theories would be self-
676
refuting. But FPS nonetheless reduce other’s theoretical
efforts, particularly in mainstream economics, not just
to arbitrariness but false ideology. Logically, the perfor-
mativity perspective must also reduce its own theoretical
efforts to historical, ex post story telling and labeling
(MacKenzie 2006), or worse, politics and ideology.
If not truth, what then should be the basis for choosing
a particular theory over others? On this front, the perfor-
mativity perspective develops an agenda that radically
changes the very purposes of science, specifically, where
social scientists “no longer have to choose between inter-
preting the world and transforming it” (Callon 1998, p.
352). Competition, self-interest, incentives, and markets
(or any other factor for that matter) may just be arbitrary,
cultural or theoretical constructions; in line with this
agenda, the “point [of the performativity perspective] is
to question the very naturalness of markets” (Fourcade
2007, p. 1025; cf. MacKenzie 2009). Indeed, if the con-
tent of our theories is arbitrary, then why not create the
best of all possible worlds?
But, even if we reduce theoretical efforts to ideology,
an immediate question then is which of many competing
ideologies ought to be adopted and why? Thus, ironi-
cally, we come back to the need to judge the ex ante
content of the theory itself, along with associated evi-
dence. The problem is that the performativity perspective
does not allow for any form of ex ante judgment about
the potential correctness of given theories because “there
are no context-free or supercultural norms of rationality”
Felin and Foss: Crossroads
Organization Science 20(3), pp. 676–678, © 2009 INFORMS
(Barnes and Bloor 1982, p. 27) by which to judge truth.
An additional problem is that the performativity perspec-
tive only focuses on selective, ex post evidence for its
arguments, and thus the approach amounts to the stalk-
ing of various historical models and all-too opportunisti-
cally pointing out how (some of) these models changed
or constructed the world. In other words, the performa-
tivity perspective—as a recent incarnation of the science
studies program, which failed (Mirowski and Nik-Khah
2007, cf. Latour and Woolgar 1979)—never addresses
the range of possible, other (ex ante “arbitrary,” “false,”
or “true”), competing theories that may potentially also
have been realized nor the possibility of meaningful
progress. Might, for example, the Black-Sholes model
have worked better than other ex ante approaches to
understanding option value? Undoubtedly so, which is
partly why it was used; thus, one can scarcely label the
model as arbitrary. Did prices come to reflect the model?
Yes. Was the model the perfect tool? No, in fact, no
model is (science indeed progresses over time), but the
model provided an approximation and one that was later
checked by “reality” and modified accordingly.
Overall, then, the range of “possible worlds” that social
scientists might create are bounded by ex ante realities,
realities that one cannot transform by simply theorizing
and hoping, and thus making them come true (cf. Austin
1962, Bloor 1991, Butler 1997). For example, scarcity
and costs are a reality. No amount of theorizing will
change this. Human universals and nature are an ex ante
reality (Brown 1991): some people are self-interested,
others are selfless; some people are motivated by extrin-
sic factors, others perhaps not; some are talented in par-
ticular areas, others are not. Understanding these ex ante
realities is fundamental to theorizing, and these reali-
ties cannot be labeled arbitrary (Felin and Foss 2009).
Might, then, for example, market institutions actually
protect from opportunistic behavior rather than create it
(Williamson 1985)?
The bulk of evidence in Ferraro et al. (2005) for
the self-fulfilling nature of theories comes from their
extension of the performativity argument into the lit-
erature on how people’s expectations or stereotypes of
others fulfill themselves, even when false. But, to say
that people blindly follow inaccurate stereotypes is to
deny rationality, free will, and individuating information.
That is, review studies persuasively show that individ-
uating information and accurate informational updating
drives stereotypes rather than stereotypes falsely fulfill-
ing themselves (see Funder 1995, Jussim et al. 2009,
Jussim and Harber 2005). We might also add that the
Ferraro et al. (2005) language “mechanism” builds on an
antiquated conception of the supposedly strong influence
that language has on behavior, perceptions, and the con-
struction of reality. Specifically, the thesis of linguistic
determinism (Sapir 1911), relativism, and performativity
has been refuted by studies in linguistics and psychology
677
(for an overview, see Pinker 2007) as well as philosophy
(Searle 1989).
A final concern with FPS’s arguments is that they
have, perhaps inadvertently, taken a rather definitive
stand with the strongly social constructionist side in
the so-called “science wars” (Boghossian 2006, Brown
2001, Goldman 1999) by heavily anchoring their argu-
ments on the performativity perspective. But, if orga-
nizational scholars want to be taken seriously, then we
cannot simply reduce science to arbitrary convention,
rhetoric, and ideology. Thus, our hope is that a modicum
of reality is infused into interdisciplinary discussions,
and that the arguments and evidence rather than rhetoric
and ideology drive the joint effort to create the best of
all possible worlds.
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