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:FirstDivision

FIRSTDIVISION

[G.R.No.129169.November17,1999]

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA), petitioner, vs. HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
ARBITRATION COMMISSION, and HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS
CORPORATION,respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE,JR.,C.J.:

In this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the National Irrigation
Administration(hereafterNIA),seekstoannulandsetasidetheResolutions[1]oftheCourtofAppealsinCA
GR.SPNo.37180dated28June1996and24February1997,whichdismissedrespectivelyNIAspetitionfor
certiorariandprohibitionagainsttheConstructionIndustryArbitrationCommission(hereafterCIAC),andthe
motionforreconsiderationthereafterfiled.
Records show that in a competitive bidding held by NIA in August 1978, Hydro Resources Contractors
Corporation(hereafterHYDRO)wasawardedContractMPIC2fortheconstructionofthemaincivilworksof
theMagatRiverMultiPurposeProject.ThecontractprovidedthatHYDROwouldbepaidpartlyinPhilippine
pesosandpartlyinU.S.dollars.HYDROsubstantiallycompletedtheworksunderthecontractin1982andfinal
acceptancebyNIAwasmadein1984.HYDROthereafterdeterminedthatitstillhadanaccountreceivablefrom
NIArepresentingthedollarratedifferentialofthepriceescalationforthecontract.[2]
After unsuccessfully pursuing its case with NIA, HYDRO, on 7 December 1994, filed with the CIAC a
Request for Adjudication of the aforesaid claim. HYDRO nominated six arbitrators for the arbitration panel,
fromamongwhomCIACappointedEngr.LauroM.Cruz.On6January1995,NIAfileditsAnswerwhereinit
questioned the jurisdiction of the CIAC alleging lack of cause of action, laches and estoppel in view of
HYDROsallegedfailuretoavailofitsrighttosubmitthedisputetoarbitrationwithintheprescribedperiodas
providedinthecontract.Onthesamedate,NIAfiledaCompliancewhereinitnominatedsixarbitrators,from
among whom CIAC appointed Atty. Custodio O. Parlade, and made a counterclaim for P1,000,000 as moral
damagesatleastP100,000asexemplarydamagesP100,000asattorneysfeesandthecostsofthearbitration.
[3]

ThetwodesignatedarbitratorsappointedCertifiedPublicAccountantJovenB.JoaquinasChairmanofthe
ArbitrationPanel.Thepartieswererequiredtosubmitcopiesoftheevidencetheyintendedtopresentduringthe
proceedingsandwereprovidedthedraftTermsofReference.[4]
At the preliminary conference, NIA through its counsel Atty. Joy C. Legaspi of the Office of the
GovernmentCorporateCounsel,manifestedthatitcouldnotadmitthegenuinenessofHYDROsevidencesince
NIAs records had already been destroyed. NIA requested an opportunity to examine the originals of the
documentswhichHYDROagreedtoprovide.[5]
Afterreachinganaccordontheissuestobeconsideredbythearbitrationpanel,thepartiesscheduledthe
datesofhearingsandofsubmissionofsimultaneousmemoranda.[6]

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On 13 March 1995, NIA filed a Motion to Dismiss[7]alleging lack of jurisdiction over the disputes. NIA
contendedthattherewasnoagreementwithHYDROtosubmitthedisputetoCIACforarbitrationconsidering
thattheconstructioncontractwasexecutedin1978andtheprojectcompletedin1982,whereastheConstruction
IndustryArbitrationLawcreatingCIACwassignedonlyin1985andthatwhiletheyhaveagreedtoarbitration
as a mode of settlement of disputes, they could not have contemplated submission of their disputes to CIAC.
NIAfurtherarguedthatrecordsshowthatithadnotvoluntarilysubmitteditselftoarbitrationbyCIACciting
TESCOServices,Inc.v.Hon.AbrahamVera,etal.,[8]whereinitwasruled:

CIACdidnotacquirejurisdictionoverthedisputearisingfromthesubcontractagreementbetweenpetitioner
TESCOandprivaterespondentLAROSA.Therecordsdonotshowthatthepartiesagreedtosubmitthe
disputestoarbitrationbytheCIACxxxx.Whilebothpartiesinthesubcontracthadagreedtosubmitthematter
toarbitration,thiswasonlybetweenthemselves,norequesthavingbeenmadebybothwiththeCIAC.Hence,
asalreadystated,theCIAC,hasnojurisdictionoverthedispute.xxxx.Nowhereinthesaidarticle(subcontract)
doesitmentiontheCIAC,muchless,vestjurisdictionwiththeCIAC.

On 11 April 1995, the arbitral body issued an order[9] which deferred the determination of the motion to
dismissandresolvedtoproceedwiththehearingofthecaseonthemeritsasthegroundscitedbyNIAdidnot
seem to be indubitable. NIA filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. CIAC in denying the
motionforreconsiderationruledthatithasjurisdictionovertheHYDROsclaimoverNIApursuanttoE.O1008
andthatthehearingshouldproceedasscheduled.[10]
On26May1996,NIAfiledwiththeCourtofAppealsanoriginalactionofcertiorariandprohibitionwith
prayerforrestrainingorderand/orinjunction,seekingtoannultheOrdersoftheCIACforhavingbeenissued
withoutorinexcessofjurisdiction.InsupportofitspetitionNIAallegedthat:
A

RESPONDENTCIACHASNOAUTHORITYORJURIDICTIONTOHEARANDTRYTHISDISPUTE
BETWEENTHEHEREINPARTIESASE.O.NO.1008HADNORETROACTIVEEFFECT.

THEDISPUTEBETWEENTHEPARTIESSHOULDBESETTLEDINACCORDANCEWITHGCNO.25,
ART.2046OFTHECIVILCODEANDR.A.NO.876THEGOVERNINGLAWSATTHETIME
CONTRACTWASEXECUTEDANDTERMINATED.

E.O.NO.1008ISASUBSTANTIVELAW,NOTMERELYPROCEDURALASRULEDBYTHECIAC.

ANINDORSEMENTOFTHEAUDITORGENERALDECIDINGACONTROVERSYISADECISION
BECAUSEALLTHEELEMENTSFORJUDGMENTARETHERETHECONTROVERSY,THE
AUTHORITYTODECIDEANDTHEDECISION.IFITISNOTAPPEALEDSEASONABLY,THESAME
BECOMESFINAL.

NIAHASTIMELYRAISEDTHEISSUEOFJURISDICTION.ITDIDNOTWAIVENORISITESTOPPED
FROMASSAILINGTHESAME.

THELEGALDOCTRINETHATJURISDICTIONISDETERMINEDBYTHESTATUTEINFORCEAT
THETIMEOFTHECOMMENCEMENTOFTHEACTIONDOESNOTONLYAPPLYTOTHEINSTANT
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CASE.[11]

TheCourtofAppeals,afterfindingthattherewasnograveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheCIACin
issuing the aforesaid Orders, dismissed the petition in its Resolution dated 28 June 1996. NIAs motion for
reconsiderationofthesaiddecisionwaslikewisedeniedbytheCourtofAppealson26February1997.
On2June1997,NIAfiledbeforeusanoriginalactionforcertiorariandprohibitionwithurgentprayerfor
temporaryrestrainingorderandwritofpreliminaryinjunction,prayingfortheannulmentoftheResolutionsof
the Court of Appeals dated 28 June 1996 and 24 February 1997.In the said special civil action, NIA merely
reiteratestheissuesitraisedbeforetheCourtofAppeals.[12]
We take judicial notice that on 10 June 1997, CIAC rendered a decision in the main case in favor of
HYDRO.[13]NIAassailedthesaiddecisionwiththeCourtofAppeals.Inviewofthependencyofthepresent
petitions before us the appellate court issued a resolution dated 26 March 1998 holding in abeyance the
resolutionofthesameuntilaftertheinstantpetitionshavebeenfinallydecided.[14]
Attheoutset,wenotethatthepetitionsuffersfromaproceduraldefectthatwarrantsitsoutrightdismissal.
ThequestionedresolutionsoftheCourtofAppealshavealreadybecomefinalandexecutorybyreasonofthe
failureofNIAtoappealtherefrom.Instead of filing this petition for certiorariunderRule65oftheRulesof
Court,NIAshouldhavefiledatimelypetitionforreviewunderRule45.
ThereisnodoubtthattheCourtofAppealshasjurisdictionoverthespecialcivilactionforcertiorariunder
Rule65filedbeforeitbyNIA.TheoriginaljurisdictionoftheCourtofAppealsoverspecialcivilactionsfor
certiorari is vested upon it under Section 9(1) of B.P. 129. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Supreme
Court[15]andwiththeRegionalTrialCourt.[16]
Thus, since the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65, any alleged errors
committedbyitintheexerciseofitsjurisdictionwouldbeerrorsofjudgmentwhicharereviewablebytimely
appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari.[17] If the aggrieved party fails to do so within the
reglementaryperiod,andthedecisionaccordinglybecomesfinalandexecutory,hecannotavailhimselfofthe
writofcertiorari,hispredicamentbeingtheeffectofhisdeliberateinaction.[18]
TheappealfromafinaldispositionoftheCourtofAppealsisapetitionforreviewunderRule45andnota
special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, now Rule 45 and Rule 65, respectively, of the 1997
RulesofCivilProcedure.[19]Rule45isclearthatdecisions,finalordersorresolutionsoftheCourtofAppeals
inanycase,i.e.,regardlessofthenatureoftheactionorproceedingsinvolved,maybeappealedtothisCourtby
filingapetitionforreview,whichwouldbebutacontinuationoftheappellateprocessovertheoriginalcase.[20]
Under Rule 45 the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or denial of
motionforreconsideration.[21]
IntheinstantcasetheResolutionoftheCourtofAppealsdated24February1997denyingthemotionfor
reconsiderationofitsResolutiondated28June1997wasreceivedbyNIAon4March1997.Thus,ithaduntil19
March1997withinwhichtoperfectitsappeal.NIAdidnotappeal.Whatitdidwastofileanoriginalactionfor
certioraribeforethisCourt,reiteratingtheissuesandargumentsitraisedbeforetheCourtofAppeals.
ForthewritofcertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourttoissue,apetitionermustshowthathehasno
plain,speedyandadequateremedyintheordinarycourseoflawagainstitsperceivedgrievance.[22]Aremedyis
consideredplain,speedyandadequateifitwillpromptlyrelievethepetitionerfromtheinjuriouseffectsofthe
judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency.[23] In this case, appeal was not only available but also a
speedyandadequateremedy.
Obviously, NIA interposed the present special civil action of certiorari not because it is the speedy and
adequateremedybuttomakeupfortheloss,throughomissionoroversight,oftherightofordinaryappeal.Itis
elementarythatthespecialcivilactionofcertiorariisnotandcannotbeasubstituteforanappeal,wherethe
latterremedyisavailable,asitwasinthiscase.AspecialcivilactionunderRule65oftheRulesofCourtwill

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notbeacureforfailuretotimelyfileapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt.[24]
Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary
appeal,includingthatunderRule45,[25]especiallyifsuchlossorlapsewasoccasionedbyonesownneglector
errorinthechoiceofremedies.[26]
Forobviousreasonstherulesforbidrecoursetoaspecialcivilactionforcertiorariifappealisavailable,as
the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[27] Although
thereareexceptionstotherules,noneispresentinthecaseatbar.NIAfailedtoshowcircumstancesthatwill
justify a deviation from the general rule as to make available a petition for certiorari in lieu of taking an
appropriateappeal.
Basedontheforegoing,theinstantpetitionshouldbedismissed.
Inanycase,eveniftheissueoftechnicalityisdisregardedandrecourseunderRule65isallowed,thesame
resultwouldbereachedsinceareviewofthequestionedresolutionsoftheCIACshowsthatitcommittedno
graveabuseofdiscretion.
ContrarytotheclaimofNIA,theCIAChasjurisdictionoverthecontroversy.Executive Order No.1008,
otherwise known as the Construction Industry Arbitration Law which was promulgated on 4 February 1985,
vests upon CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with contracts
enteredintobypartiesinvolvedinconstructioninthePhilippines,whetherthedisputearisesbeforeorafterthe
completionofthecontract,oraftertheabandonmentorbreachthereof.Thedisputesmayinvolvegovernmentor
privatecontracts.FortheBoardtoacquirejurisdiction,thepartiestoadisputemustagreetosubmitthesameto
voluntaryarbitration.[28]
ThecomplaintofHYDROagainstNIAonthebasisofthecontractexecutedbetweenthemwasfiledon7
December1994,duringtheeffectivityofE.O.No.1008.Hence,itiswellwithinthejurisdictionofCIAC.The
jurisdictionofacourtisdeterminedbythelawinforceatthetimeofthecommencementoftheaction.[29]
NIAs argument that CIAC had no jurisdiction to arbitrate on contract which preceded its existence is
untenable.E.O. 1008 is clear that the CIAC has jurisdiction over all disputes arising from or connected with
constructioncontractwhetherthedisputearisesbeforeorafterthecompletionofthecontract.Thus,thedatethe
parties entered into a contract and the date of completion of the same, even if these occurred before the
constitutionoftheCIAC,didnotautomaticallydivesttheCIACofjurisdictionaslongasthedisputesubmitted
forarbitrationaroseaftertheconstitutionoftheCIAC.Stateddifferently,thejurisdictionofCIACisoverthe
dispute,notthecontractandtheinstantdisputehavingarisenwhenCIACwasalreadyconstituted,thearbitral
boardwasactuallyexercisingcurrent,notretroactive,jurisdiction.Assuch,thereisnoneedtopassuponthe
issueofwhetherE.O.No.1008isasubstantiveorproceduralstatute.
NIAalsocontendedthattheCIACdidnotacquirejurisdictionoverthedisputesinceitwasonlyHYDRO
thatrequestedforarbitration.Itassertsthattoacquirejurisdictionoveracase,asprovidedunderE.O.1008,the
requestforarbitrationfiledwithCIACshouldbemadebybothparties,andhencetherequestbyonepartyisnot
enough.
ItisundisputedthatthecontractsbetweenHYDROandNIAcontainedanarbitrationclausewhereinthey
agreedtosubmittoarbitrationanydisputebetweenthemthatmayarisebeforeoraftertheterminationofthe
agreement.Consequently,theclaimofHYDROhavingarisenfromthecontractisarbitrable.NIAsreliancewith
therulingonthecaseofTescoServicesIncorporatedv.Vera,[30]ismisplaced.
The1988CIACRulesofProcedurewhichwereappliedbythisCourtinTescocasehadbeendulyamended
byCIACResolutionsNo.291and393,Section1ofArticleIIIofwhichreadasfollows:

SubmissiontoCIACJurisdictionAnarbitrationclauseinaconstructioncontractorasubmissiontoarbitration
ofaconstructioncontractorasubmissiontoarbitrationofaconstructiondisputeshallbedeemedanagreement
tosubmitanexistingorfuturecontroversytoCIACjurisdiction,notwithstandingthereferencetoadifferent
arbitrationinstitutionorarbitralbodyinsuchcontractorsubmission.Whenacontractcontainsaclauseforthe

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submissionofafuturecontroversytoarbitration,itisnotnecessaryforthepartiestoenterintoasubmission
agreementbeforetheclaimantmayinvokethejurisdictionofCIAC.

UnderthepresentRulesofProcedure,foraparticularconstructioncontracttofallwithinthejurisdictionof
CIAC, it is merely required that the parties agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. Unlike in the
originalversionofSection1,asappliedintheTesco case, the law as it now stands does not provide that the
parties should agree to submit disputes arising from their agreement specifically to the CIAC for the latter to
acquire jurisdiction over the same. Rather, it is plain and clear that as long as the parties agree to submit to
voluntaryarbitration,regardlessofwhatforumtheymaychoose,theiragreementwillfallwithinthejurisdiction
oftheCIAC,suchthat,eveniftheyspecificallychooseanotherforum,thepartieswillnotbeprecludedfrom
electingtosubmittheirdisputebeforetheCIACbecausethisrighthasbeenvesteduponeachpartybylaw,i.e.,
E.O.No.1008.[31]
Moreover,itisundeniablethatNIAagreedtosubmitthedisputeforarbitrationtotheCIAC.NIAthrough
itscounselactivelyparticipatedinthearbitrationproceedingsbyfilingananswerwithcounterclaim,aswellas
itscompliancewhereinitnominatedarbitratorstotheproposedpanel,participatinginthedeliberationson,and
the formulation of, the Terms of Reference of the arbitration proceeding, and examining the documents
submittedbyHYDROafterNIAaskedfortheoriginalsofthesaiddocuments.[32]
Astothedefensesoflachesandprescription,theyareevidentiaryinnaturewhichcouldnotbeestablished
by mere allegations in the pleadings and must not be resolved in a motion to dismiss. Those issues must be
resolvedatthetrialofthecaseonthemeritswhereinbothpartieswillbegivenampleopportunitytoprovetheir
respectiveclaimsanddefenses.[33]Undertherule[34]thedefermentoftheresolutionofthesaidissueswas,thus,
inorder.Anallegationofprescriptioncaneffectivelybeusedinamotiontodismissonlywhenthecomplainton
itsfaceshowsthatindeedtheactionhasalreadyprescribed.[35]Intheinstantcase,theissueofprescriptionand
lachescannotberesolvedonthebasissolelyofthecomplaint.Itmust,however,bepointedthatunderthenew
rules,[36]defermentoftheresolutionisnolongerpermitted.Thecourtmayeithergrantthemotiontodismiss,
denyit,orordertheamendmentofthepleading.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals is hereby
DIRECTEDtoproceedwithreasonabledispatchinthedispositionofC.A.G.R.No.44527andincludeinthe
resolutionthereoftheissueoflachesandprescription.
SOORDERED.
Puno,Kapunan,Pardo,andYnaresSantiago,JJ.,concur.

[1]Rollo,3750.PerSalas,B.,J.,withParas,G.andAustriaMartinez,A.,JJ.,concurring.

[2]Rollo,151152.

[3]Id.,73,112,152153.

[4]Id.,73.

[5]Rollo,74.

[6]Id.,113.

[7]SeeAnnexA,C.A.Rollo,163164.

[8]209SCRA440[1992].

[9]AnnexI,Rollo,7378.

[10]Annex K, C.A. Rollo, 8487.

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[11]Petition, Id., 19.

[12]Rollo,17.

[13]Id.,111129.PerJoaquin,JParlade,C.,andCruz,L.

[14]Id.,338.

[15]Section5(1),ArticleVIII,ConstitutionSection17,JudiciaryActof1948,asamended.

[16]Section21(1)ofB.P.Blg.129SeealsoMoralesv.CourtofAppeals,etal.,283SCRA211[1997]PAAv.CourtofAppeals,282
SCRA448[1997].
[17]B.F.Corporationv.CourtofAppeals,288SCRA267[1998].

[18]Giron,etal.v.Caluag,etal.,8SCRA285[1963].

[19]DirectorofLandsv.CourtofAppeals,276SCRA276[1997].

[20]HeirsofMarcelinoPagobov.CourtofAppeals,280SCRA870,883[1997].

[21] Section1,Rule45oftheRulesofCourtNationalInvestmentandDevelopmentCorp.v.CourtofAppeals,270SCRA497
[1997].
[22]SunshineTransportationv.NLRC,254SCRA51,55[1996].

[23]SeeSilvestrev.Torres,57Phil.885[1933]citing11C.J.113.

[24]DeEspinav.Abaya,16SCRA312[1991]Escuderov.Dulay,158SCRA69[1998].

[25]HeirsofMarcelinoPagobov.CourtofAppeals,280SCRA870,883[1997].

[26]Sempio,etal.v.CourtofAppeals,etal.,263SCRA617,624,citingFajardov.Bautista,232SCRA291[1994]AqualynCorp.v.
CA,214SCRA312[1992]Syv.Romero,214SCRA193[1992].
[27]FederationofFreeWorkersv.Inciong,208SCRA157[1992].

[28]SeeSection4.

[29]Peoplev.Magallanes,etal.,249SCRA212[1995].

[30]209SCRA440[1992].

[31] ChinaChangJiangEnergyCorporationv.RosalInfrastructureBuilders,etal.,ThirdDivisionResolutiondated30September
1996.
[32]Rollo,84.

[33]SeeEspano,Sr.v.CourtofAppeals,268SCRA211[1997].

[34]Section3,Rule16,RulesofCourt.

[35]Francisco,etal.v.Robles,etal.,94Phil.1035[1954].

[36]Section3,Rule16,1997RulesofCivilProcedure.

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