IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL VS HON.

COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962)

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No.
1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and
recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.

The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area
of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by
inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana
Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on
June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of
registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the
title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action
of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about
105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less,
had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).

On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against
respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint
(docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and
continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of
ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as
attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves,
asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the
year 1933 to the present.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the
portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof
to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:

It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of
alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that
the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern
boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is
indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro
Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs,
the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the
declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the
land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants'
witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4
hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for
taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land.
We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee.
No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But,
the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they
become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that
ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in
question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the
plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has
been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require
any act of possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes
manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of
appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial
formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).

This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in
possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they
occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January 25,
1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired
the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law,
part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the
meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the decision
adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:

That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the
early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless
some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in
accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have
acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo,
has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question
pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion,
consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered
land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession";
and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or less
than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was instituted.

As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a
natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility
of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and
described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the
title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the
identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has
stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil.
55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the
area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the
provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition
area by another person through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v.
Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.

We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time
that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in
question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1).
This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality
wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two
witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of
Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or
1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified
to the same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The
area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.

We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of the
plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants
occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was
his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action
until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor,
Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes
thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he
tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey
included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who,
accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square
meters.1wph1.t

The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession from 1933 to 1958 is
not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who
declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really
been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to
recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the
certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan,
is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with
their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands,
in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they
allege, they had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the
evidence, that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion
started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958.
By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question
through prescription.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are
the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The
question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is
covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by
extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the
Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a
river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely
confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws
wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the
Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is
not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system.
Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a question
which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of
Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since
1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958.
This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence
presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code,
since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and
before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.

CONSUELO LEGARDA vs.N.M. SALEEBY

(G.R. No. L-8936, October 2, 1915)

From the record the following facts appear:

First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of
Manila.

Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located
on the lot of the plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed
that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the
torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.

Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of
said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in
the petition of the defendant also included said wall.

Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been
included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They
immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error
committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without
notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the
registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the
wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The
wall is not a joint wall.

Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant
was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and
oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the
lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name.
Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged
to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying
that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same
registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by
simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the
wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that
some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the
affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real
purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except
claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing
his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is
judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result
is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De
la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)

While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are
parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no
innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of
registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are
parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again
cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The
registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already
have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of
registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its
owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in
registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in
a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under the
torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like
the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered
in the name of two different persons.

The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to
future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must
follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action.
This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with
certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even
by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by
prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice.
No one can plead ignorance of the registration.

The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented to the
courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has
been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent
discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two
certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in
the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R.,
193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register
of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by
the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title
of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be
conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of
Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where
two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where
more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the
prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who
is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest
certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two
certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one
continues to hold the title" (p. 237).

Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall
not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land
Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest.

It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any
court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not
be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or
set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that
way.

We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land when the
same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides,
among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to
the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the
vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of
registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land
Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions,
they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under
said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the
torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land
Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.

In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says, among
other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the
defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that
of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right
thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree
adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for
impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be
to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".

As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a
certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with
registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense
incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the
present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title,
they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That
mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the
duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages,
taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present
case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he
can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an
action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear
and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be
permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court
of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to
oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth
against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee
should be applied to the appellants than to him.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest
certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive
vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is
discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land
has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under
that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later
certificate.

We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the vendee
acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may
acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available
rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to
say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to
enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case
Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the
appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of
their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by
virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an
"innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in
said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are
to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should
be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in
giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.

May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns,
or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The
record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing
with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record
discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern
National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests,
legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn.,
97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509;
Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the
title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed
to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome
by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any
more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons
must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any
variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.

While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real property be
recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record
of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a
mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third
parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its
existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after
the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May
there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the
mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as
obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law.
The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that
they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical
to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.

In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second original
certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of
another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such
purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He
cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original
certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of
the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land
included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of
innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original
certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we
think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be
limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system.
When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent
transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth
of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus
had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had
included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent
purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the
original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the
registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the
title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are
more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the
purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for
damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been
guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest
secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete
knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts
contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should
suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who
was innocent of any act of negligence.

The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double registration
under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of
the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the
view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is
correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and
recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real
status of the title to the land.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold
that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The
record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land
court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in
including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in
all other duplicate certificates issued.

Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

Separate Opinions

TRENT, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the reasoning and authority on which it is
held in the majority opinion (first) that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the
original holder of the later certificate, where there has been no transfer of title by either party to an innocent
purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion, being at fault in permitting the double registration to take place;
(second) that an innocent purchaser claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original
holder of the later certificate, and also as against innocent purchasers from the holder of the later certificate; the
innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the issuance of the later certificate.

But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority opinion sustains the
proposition that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against an innocent purchaser
from the holder of the later certificate.

As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that the rules laid down by both
Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly subject to exception, and of course of no binding force or
authority where the reasoning upon which these rules are based is applicable to the facts developed in a particular
case.

In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the proposition set forth in the last
page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would seem to be a just and equitable rule, when two persons have
acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law should be protected." The rule, as applied to the matter in hand, may be stated as follows: It
would seem to be a just and equitable rule when two persons have acquired separate and independent registered
titles to the same land, under the Land Registration Act, to hold that the one who first acquired registered title and
who has complied with all the requirements of the law in that regard should be protected, in the absence of any
express statutory provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to be applied in cases of double or
overlapping registration under the Land Registration Act; for it is true as stated in the majority opinion that in the
adjudication and registration of titles by the Courts of Land Registration "mistakes are bound to occur, and
sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable;" and that in the absence of statutory provisions covering such
cases, "it is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties, under such circumstances, so as to minimize
such damages, taking into consideration all of the conditions, and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid
them."

But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a case wherein the reasons on
which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still more forceful reasons demand the application of a contrary
rule.

The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well settled equity rule that: "Where
conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first occurred will be given the preference." But it is
universally laid down by all the courts which have had occasion to apply this equity rule that "it should be the last
test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other equitable ground for preference exists." ( See 19 Cent.
Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and may cases cited in 16 Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that in
cases of double or overlapping registration the earlier certificate should be protected, ought not to prevail so as to
deprive an innocent purchaser under the later certificate of his title of the earlier certificate contributed to the
issuance of the later certificate. Hence the holder of the earlier certificate of title should not be heard to invoke
the "just and equitable rule" as laid down in the majority opinion, in order to have his own title protected and the title
of an innocent purchaser of a later certificate cancelled or annulled, in any case wherein it appears that the holder of
the later certificate was wholly without fault, while the holder of the issuance of the later certificate, in that he might
have prevented its issuance by merely entering his appearance in court in response to lawful summons personally
served upon him in the course of the proceedings for the issuance of the second certificate, and pleading his
superior rights under the earlier certificate, instead of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment
to be entered against him adjudicating title in favor of the second applicant.

The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am contending for by reasoning (with which
I am inclined to agree) whereby it undertakes to demonstrate that as between the original holders of the double or
overlapping registration the general rule should prevail, because both such original parties must held to have been
fault and, their equities being equal, preference should be given to the earlier title.

The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the reasoning whereby it undertakes to
sustain the application of the general rule in favor of the original holder of the earlier certificate against purchasers
from the original holder of the later certificate, by an attempt to demonstrate that such purchasers can in no event be
held to be innocent purchasers; because, as it is said, negligence may and should always be imputed to such a
purchaser, so that in no event can he claim to be without fault when it appears that the lands purchased by him from
the holder of a duly registered certificate of title are included within the bounds of the lands described in a certificate
of title of an earlier date.

At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid down under the various systems of
land registration, other than those based on the torrens system) insists that a purchaser of land land duly registered
in the Land Registration Court, is charged with notice of the contents of each and every one of the thousands and
tens of thousands of certificates of registry on file in the land registry office, so that negligence may be imputed to
him if he does not ascertain that all or any part of the land purchased by him is included within the boundary lines of
any one of the thousands or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose original registry bears an earlier date than the
date of the original registry of the land purchased by him. It is contended that he cannot claim to be without fault
should he buy such land because, as it is said, it was possible for him to discover that the land purchased by him
had been made the subject of double or overlapping registration by a comparison of the description and boundary
lines of the thousands of tracts and parcels of land to be found in the land registry office.

But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by the introduction and adoption
of the so-called torrens system for the registration of land. The avowed intent of that system of land registration is to
relieve the purchase of registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of the vendor
in order that he may rest secure as to the validity of the title to the lands conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the
majority opinion that he is charged with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the office of the
registrar so that his failure to acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as negligence.

If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land registration, instead of making
transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and secure, and instead of avoiding the necessity for expensive and
oftimes uncertain searches of the land record and registries, in order to ascertain the true condition of the title before
purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor, expense and uncertainty of any attempt by a purchaser to satisfy
himself as to the validity of the title to lands purchased by him.

As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the torrens system of land
registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled is to facilitate the transfer of real estate. To
that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and all others dealing in registered lands from
the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands furnished by the Court of Land Registration,
and I cannot, therefore, give my consent to a ruling which charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered lands with
notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be
imputed to him should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack of such knowledge.

Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act desires to avoid the
imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such lands have been made the subject of double or
overlapping registration, what course should he pursue? What measures should he adopt in order to search out the
information with notice of which he is charged? There are no indexes to guide him nor is there anything in the record
or the certificate of title of the land he proposes to buy which necessarily or even with reasonable probability will
furnish him a clue as to the fact of the existence of such double or overlapping registration. Indeed the only course
open to him, if he desires to assure himself against the possibility of double or overlapping registration, would even
seem to be a careful, laborious and extensive comparison of the registered boundary lines contained in the
certificate of title of the tract of land he proposes to buy with those contained in all the earlier certificates of title to be
found in the land registry. Assuredly it was never the intention of the author of the new Land Registration Act to
impose such a burden on a purchaser of duly registered real estate, under penalty that a lack of the knowledge
which might thus be acquired may be imputed to him by this court as negligence in ruling upon the respective
equities of the holders of lands which have been the subject of double or overlapping registration.

On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a registered certificate of
title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be entered against him, adjudicating all or any part of his
registered lands to another applicant, if it appears that he was served with notice or had actual notice of the
pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration wherein such default judgment was entered.

The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court of Land Registration may
reasonably be required to appear and defend his title when he has actual notice that proceedings are pending in
that court wherein another applicant, claiming the land as his own, is seeking to secure its registry in his name. All
that is necessary for him to do is to enter his appearance in those proceedings, invite the court's attention to the
certificate of title registered in his name, and thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all the damage and
inconvenience flowing from the double or overlapping registration of the land in question. There is nothing in the
new system of land registration which seems to render it either expedient or necessary to relieve a holder of a
registered title of the duty of appearing and defending that title, when he has actual notice that it is being attacked in
a court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as a result of his neglect or failure so to do, his lands become subject to
double or overlapping registration, he should not be permitted to subject an innocent purchaser, holding under the
later certificate, to all the loss and damage resulting from the double or overlapping registration, while he goes scot
free and holds the land under a manifest misapplication of the equitable rule that "where conflicting equities are
otherwise equal in merit, that which first accrued will be given the preference." It is only where both or neither of the
parties are at fault that the rule is properly applicable as between opposing claimants under an earlier and a later
certificate of registry to the same land.

Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the right of the holder of a certificate
to rest secure in his registered title so that those dealing with registered lands can confidently rely upon registry
certificates thereto is equally forceful by way of argument in favor of the holder of one or the other certificate in case
of double or overlapping registration. The problem is to determine which of the certificate holders is entitled to the
land. The decision of that question in favor of either one must necessarily have the effect of destroying the value of
the registered title of the other and to that extent shaking the public confidence in the value of the whole system for
the registration of lands. But, in the language of the majority opinion, "that mistakes are bound to occur cannot be
denied and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the
parties under such circumstances so as to minimize the damages, taking into consideration all the conditions and
the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them." lawphil.net

It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down in the majority opinion, to case
wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of title has actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course
of which the latter certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which he has received personal notice of the
pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of the pendency of such proceedings I readily agree
with the reasoning of the majority opinion so far as it holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should not be
imputed to him for failure to appear and defend his title so as to defeat his right to the benefit of the equitable rule. It
is true that the order of publication in such cases having been duly complied with, all the world is charged with notice
thereof, but it does not necessarily follow that, in the absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in permitting a
default judgment to be entered against him may be imputed to the holder of the earlier certificate so as to defeat his
right to the land under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate. Such a holding would have the effect (to
quote the language of the majority opinion) of requiring the holder of a certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the
portals of the court" and to sit in the "mirador de su casa" in order to avoid the possibility of losing his lands; and I
agree with the writer of the majority opinion that to do so would place an unreasonable burden on the holders of
such certificate, which was not contemplated by the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable
burden is placed upon the holder of a registered title by a rule which imputes culpable negligence to him when he
sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default be entered against him adjudicating title to his lands in favor of
another applicant, despite the fact that he has actual knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings in which such
judgment is entered and despite the fact that he has been personally served with summons to appear and default
his title.
"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties," it seems to me that there
is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting equities set up by an innocent purchaser who acquires title to the
land under a registered certificate, and the holder of an earlier certificate who permitted a default judgment to be
entered against him, despite actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the later
certificate was issued.

I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent purchaser in cases such as that
now under discussion, there are strong reasons of convenience and public policy which militate in favor of the
recognition of his title rather than that of the holder of the earlier title.

One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown, unspecified and uncertain
dangers, to guard against which all such persons will be put to additional cost, annoyance and labor on every
occasion when any transaction is had with regard to such lands; while the other ruling tends to eliminate
consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object for which the land registration law was enacted, and
imposes no burden upon any holder of a certificate of registered lands other than that of defending his title on those
rare, definite and specific occasions wherein he has actual notice that his title is being challenged in a Court of Land
Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and expense is reduced to the minimum by the conclusive character of
his certificate of title in support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the innocent purchaser and
in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case such as that under consideration must inevitably tend to
increase the danger of double or overlapping registrations by encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or
fraudulently and conclusively, to permit default judgments to be entered against them adjudicating title to all or a part
of their registered lands in favor of other applicants, despite actual notice of the pendency of judicial proceedings
had for that purpose, and this, without adding in any appreciable degree to the security of thir titles, and merely to
save them the very slight trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in the court in which their own
titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact that their right, title and ownership in the lands in questions has
already been conclusively adjudicated.

The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration without actual notice to the
holder of the earlier certificate must in the very nature of things to be so rare as to be practically negligible. Double
or overlapping registration almost invariably occurs in relation to lands held by adjoining occupants or claimants. It is
difficult to conceive of a case wherein double registration can take place, in the absence of fraud, without personal
service of notice of the pendency of the proceedings upon the holder of the earlier certificate, the statute requiring
such notice to be served upon the owner or occupant of all lands adjoining those for which application for
registration is made; and the cases wherein an adjoining land owner can, even by the use of fraud, conduct
proceedings for the registration of his land to a successful conclusion without actual notice to the adjoining property
owners must be rare indeed.

In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original holder of a certificate of title issued
by the Court of Land Registration, relying upon the records of the Court of Land Registration with reference thereto
and with no knowledge that any part of the land thus purchased was included in an earlier certificate of title issued
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder of the earlier certificate of title, negligently permitted a default judgment to be
entered against him in the Court of Land Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included in his own certificate of
title in favor of another applicant, from whom the defendant in this action acquired title, and this despite the fact that
he was an adjoining land owner, had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings and was personally served
with summons to appear and defends his rights in the premises. It seems to me that there can be no reason for
doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of the parties, and further that the judgment of the majority in favor
of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase the number of cases wherein registered land owners in the future will
fail to appear and defend their titles when challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land Registration,
thereby enormously increasing the possibility and probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and
dealers in registered lands generally, arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the
Courts of Land Registration.

Carson, J., concurs

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013)

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of
the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that
they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1)
or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20,
1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for
land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the
property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for
more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. 1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during
trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr.
Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and
described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. 2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for land registration,
disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of
Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-
04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with
residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred
in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto), 4 the CA declared that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes
of computing Malabanans period of possession.

Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs decision of
February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit 5 (Naguit) remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning
of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property
Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of
the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a
mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void
ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to support their argument that the
property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30
years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property
through prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient
evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 9they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership
thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for
registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from
1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of
the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property, 10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the
State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. 13 Land that is other
than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it
belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by
Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, 14 all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated
them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public
lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, 18lands of the public domain were classified into
three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. 19Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of
the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987
Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but
added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may
be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a
positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other
natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, 23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the
public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of
alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive act of the Government is necessary
to enable such reclassification,25and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested
in the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that
the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber,
or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act.
What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further
limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must
satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation
of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public
domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land
is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on
the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural
land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not
be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that
the full legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and
occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of
the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent
appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only
the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no
requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or
title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere
lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the
public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result
of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. 30 It is for this reason that the
property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is
inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may
run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
title that is acquired by reason of the applicants possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are
complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right
to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that
such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered
lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of
years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails,
as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No.
10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to
qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations. 34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of
national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private
land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. 35 As such,
prescription can now run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public
domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to
the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
 (a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the
exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject
of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12,
1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land
by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of
the public domain and has become private property. 37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public
use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and
are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated
or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine
qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and
period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12,
1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent
declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land
has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth. 1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion
for Reconsideration for their lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES, JOSE AMO,

SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES, JOSEPH L. NUEZ,
GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T. TORRES, LUZ G.
TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR., IMELDA
CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION,
NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES,
REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T. GADON,
ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO ECO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of
Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA, MORADO
PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ and CALOMA
MOISES, respondents/intervernors.

(G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002)

The Case

This Petition seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 22, 1992, in
[1] [2]

CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared null and void the Decision dated January 30, 1991 of the
[3]

Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179,
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land.

The Facts
 On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an application
for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766
hectares (Lot for brevity).The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso),
Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620.Attached to the application was the
technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-
Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, [t]his survey is inside IN-12
Mariquina Watershed. On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application
to include additional co-applicants. Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as
[4]

petitioners for brevity).

[5]

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo,
through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners
application. In due course, the land registration court issued an order of general default against the
whole world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has
been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of
Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners
declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes. According to
them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares of five hectares each.During the
hearings, petitioners submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights among
them and their predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the Applicants who was in
actual, open, notorious and continuous possession of the property in the concept of owner. He had
the property surveyed in his name on 22 March 1902 (Exhibit W and W-1 testimonies of J. Torres
on 16 December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the property. He had
the property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28, 1928 (Exhibit X and X-1; testimony of
Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva before the Japanese
Occupation of the Philippines during World War II. He owned and possessed the
property until 1958. He declared the property for tax purposes, the latest of which was under Tax
Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3 February 1957 (Exhibit I and testimony of Mariano Leyva,
supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by virtue of a Deed of
Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit H). During the ownership of the property by Angelina
Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the grandson of Sesinando Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the
farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her name
under Tax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3
August 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and under Tax
Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16 October 1982 through
a Deed of Sale (Exhibit G).
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of Sale dated 28 April
1984 (Exhibit P-1 to P-3).
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO, VICENTE
TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of the property from Edna Collado
through a Deed of Sale on 6 November 1985 (Exhibit Q to Q-3).
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO FABREGAS,
FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES JR.,
RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION, CHONA
MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIQUE, DANTE
MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD
bought portions of the property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit S to S-3).
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and AMELIA
MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA
CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO through a Deed of Sale dated 18
January 1987 (Exhibit T to T-9).[6]
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial prosecutor appeared without
the Solicitor General. For failure of the oppositors to present their evidence, the land registration court
issued an order considering the case submitted for decision based on the evidence of the
petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the hearing to January 14, 1991 for the
presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On this date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear
again despite due notice. Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the case for decision
based on the evidence of the petitioners.

The Trial Courts Ruling

After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration court held that
petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the
Lot.Accordingly, the court rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We quote
the pertinent portions of the courts decision, as follows:

From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the witnesses presented by the
Applicants, the property applied for is in actual, open, public and notorious possession by the applicants and
their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial and said possession had been testified to by witnesses
Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre, Jose Amo and one Chona who were all cross-examined by
Counsel for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.

Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
previous owners and the corresponding taxes were paid by the Applicants and the previous owners and said
property was planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing purposes.

To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to establish registrable title over said
property applied for by them.

On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the Court can only add that all
Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed are subject to private
rights.

In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734, 1983 private rights is proof of
acquisition through (sic) among means of acquisition of public lands.

In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by private rights means that applicant should
show clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors
either by composition title from the Spanish government or by Possessory Information title, or any other means
for the acquisition of public landsxxx (underscoring supplied).

The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated, Applicants have acquired private rights to
which the Presidential Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private
rights.

At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants that as per Certification issued by the
Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1980, the area applied for was verified to be within the area
excluded from the operation of the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per
Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974 which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation,
amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite
Reservation. (Exhibit K).[7]

In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6, 1991, petitioners
alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991 confirming their title had become final after the
Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the
land registration court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary decree in their
favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal whether
the land registration court had already rendered a decision and if so, whether the Provincial
Prosecutor would recommend an appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the
query.
 According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of the land registration
courts decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on February 18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in
their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order directing the Land
Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there had been no clear
showing that the Lot had been previously classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to
private appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of
certificates of stewardship issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR
for brevity) under its Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISF for brevity), filed with the Court of
Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention. They likewise opposed
the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is situated inside the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the
certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the preliminary conference
held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary conference, all the parties as represented by their
respective counsels agreed that the only issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part
of the public domain. [8]

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared null
and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land registration court. The Court of Appeals
explained thus:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and
1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the
private respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA
296).

A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to convert it into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).

In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for as
described in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent
authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description of Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of
private respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."

That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is confirmed by the Administrator of the
National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March 2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case
No. 269-A.These documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in private respondent Collados
application that said parcel of land known as Psu-162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public
land application and are not within any government reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis supplied). The
respondent court could not have missed the import of these vital documents which are binding upon the courts
inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department to classify public lands. They should
have forewarned the respondent judge from assuming jurisdiction over the case.

x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the public domain, it is the Director
of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition of the same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural
Resources and Environment), and not the courts. x x x Even assuming that petitioners did have the said
properties surveyed even before the same was declared to be part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact
remains that it was so converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more reason that this action must
fail. Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into
private property. And courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of
Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Emphasissupplied).

Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud or that it is
contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total
nullity and may be struck down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339). [9]

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:

I

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE
PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;

II

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING
DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC
LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;

III

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING
DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS PETITION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF
TIME OR LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 (EO 33 for brevity) dated July 26,
1904 established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR for brevity) situated in the Municipality
[10]

of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the
technical, literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners claim over the Lot is
that all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed
Reservation are subject to private rights. They point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the
reservations are subject to existing private rights, if any there be.Petitioners contend that their claim
of ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando
Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 andPublic Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and
claimed by individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and
disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of
EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the
[11]

Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book
4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias whichlaid the foundation that all lands that
[12]

were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
 Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in
[13]

the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. [14]

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893.The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the Mortgage Law
as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the adjustment or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands
would revert to the state. [15]

Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests and
claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December 10,
1898. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the
terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for
the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of
lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to
public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to
public landsprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States. The term public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property
of the government and the friar lands. [16]

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act
No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands
are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After the passage of the
1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141 for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA
141, as amended, remains to this day as the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. [17]

In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which recorded title becomes
absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act, which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in
the Philippines under the Torrens system. The Torrens system requires the government to issue a
[18]

certificate of title stating that the person named in the title is the owner of the property described
therein, subject to liens and encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of
title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance
of the certificate. PD 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978,
[19]

[20]
amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the
state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. Justice Reynato
[21]

S. Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
explained thus:
[22]

One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention
in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the
states power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was
introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the
Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the
Regalian doctrine.
 Thus, Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, on Conservation and Utilization of Natural
[23]

Resources barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were
the only natural resources the State could alienate. The 1973 Constitutionreiterated the Regalian
doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation. The
[24]

1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on National Economy
[25]

and Patrimony.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except
agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands
of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong
to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged
lands, but also, features which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit
of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted
to park and recreational purposes. [26]

In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al ., the Court had occasion
[27]

to discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether the parcel of land which
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is
exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL for
brevity). The Court defined watershed as an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed
[28]

by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds. However, the Court also
recognized that:

The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a
watershed is water which is one of the most important human necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures
an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property
but also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now.

Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:

Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may be
declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be
promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within
the protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or
interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters.

The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed areas and took
note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of
the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:

The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering
the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with
proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks.Degradation of the
land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the
Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would
mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that
the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldnt care less
even if it would be destroyed.

The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of
inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious
resource water. x x x

Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so, the
introduction of earth disturbing activities like road building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless
the pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before
these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of
thousands of people dependent upon it.Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed
development policy and program be immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage
finally happens.

The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and Adjudication Board or DARAB to
re-evaluate and determine the nature of the parcels of land involved in order to resolve the issue of its
coverage by the CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of natural resources
such as watershed reservations which are akin to forest zones. Population growth and
industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the environment. Environmental degradation from
unchecked human activities could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations. Hence,
by constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties of the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue,
private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a
watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets
the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the presumption that the
land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may have been
derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special
grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase.
Or, that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
[29]

of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding the filing
of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The
same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January
25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners application for registration was filed on April 25,
1985. As amended, Section 48 (b) now reads:
[30]

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act requires that the
applicant must prove the following:

(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
[31]

Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to register the Lot is
predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the
failure to complete the required period of possession, whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA
141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired ownership
or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as for instance by
acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two
years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the number of
years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33
in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and
inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has
been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted
because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and
disposable public agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are excluded. It is
axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private
ownership. In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that
[32]

inalienable public lands -

x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run
against the State.

The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless
the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State.

Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeal s is in point. In Gordula, petitioners did not contest the
[33]

nature of the land. They admitted that the land lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest
Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners
in Gordula contended, however, that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of
landowners prior to the reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the subject
land. The Court ruled:

We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from
the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show that
petitioner Gordula did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No.
573.He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of
Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve,
was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good.

Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, private rights, in Proclamation No. 573, should not be interpreted as
requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant had occupied and cultivated the property for so many
number of years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate taxes [which are]
accepted by the government, and [his] occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested and
recognized by the government. Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge that the 25-year possession by
petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year possession required under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the private rights
recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573.

The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming
the protection of private rights to exclude his land from a military or forest reservation must show x x x by clear
and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by [any] x x x means for the acquisition of
public lands.

In fine, one claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for
acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and possession of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year
period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or
possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious
possession.

Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the Lot prior to EO 33 in
1904, the President of the Philippines had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public domain
and made the Lot alienable and disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21,
1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an area of 3,780 hectares
from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that
Lot Psu-162620 is a small part of this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town
sites are considered alienable and disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:

PROCLAMATION NO. 1283

EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS
AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED
THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME, TOGETHER WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF
THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.

Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority
vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the
operation of Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both
series of 1915, which established the Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province
of Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein and reserve the same, together with the
adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the
Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision survey in accordance with
the development plan to be prepared and approved by the Department of Local Government and Community
Development, which parcels are more particularly described as follows:

Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)

A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of the Marikina Watershed, IN-2),
situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked 1 on
sketch plan, being N-74-30 E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence N 33 28 W
1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40 26 W 1538.50 m. to point 3; thence N 30 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence
N 75 02 W 704.33 m. to point5; thence N 14 18 W 1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43 25 W 477.04 m. to point
7; thence N 71 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W 1025.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 490.38
m. to point 10; thence Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12;thence Due
East 1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15;
thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East 1075.00 m.
to point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due
South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point
23; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West 636.56 m. to point of
beginning. Containing an area of three thousand seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less.

Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)

A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of alienable and disposable portion of
public domain) situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon.Beginning at a point
marked 1 on sketch plan being N 74 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal; thence
Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4;
thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to point 6; thence Due North 1000.00 m.
to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to point 12;
thence S. 31 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71 38 E 458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04 m.
to point 15; thence S 14 18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30 50 E
503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33 23 e 1575.00 m to point of
beginning. Containing an area of one thousand two hundred twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.

Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines
to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 21 day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
st
 (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 1637 issued on April 18,
1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and location of the proposed townsite.According to
then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot
claimed by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR coverage. Proclamation
[34]

No. 1637 reads:

PROCLAMATION NO. 1637

AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE
TOWNSITERESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE
OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING PROCLAMATIONNO. 765
DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT SITE.

Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law,
I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated
June 21, 1974 which established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area and revising the technical descriptions of the land
embraced therein, subject to private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land is more particularly described
as follows:

(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)

A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation amending the area under SWO-
41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San
Mateo, and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-
10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along
lines 23-24-25 by the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the Municipalities of
Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the
Angat Watershed Reservation.Beginning at a point marked 1 on theTopographic Maps with the Scale of
1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed Reservation.

xxx xxx xxx

NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.

Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely within the herein Lungsod Silangan
Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines
to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President of the Philippines
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is needed to declassify
land which had been earlier classified as a watershed reservation and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Unless and until the land classified as such is
[35]

released in an official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. [36]

The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private character of the Lot is the
Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from
the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The Certification reads:
Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
 REGION IV
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City

MAR 18 1986

VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of
1,269,766 square meters, as shown and described on the reverse side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer
Telesforo Cabading for Angelina C. Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of
Marikina Watershed Reservation established under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per
Proclamation No. 1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation,
amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.

Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D. 1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the
sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human Settlements, to the exclusion of any other government agencies.

This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as contained in his internal
memorandum dated March 18, 1986.

Verified by:

(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO

Cartographer II

Checked by:

(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ

Supervising Cartographer

ATTESTED:

(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY

Chief, Forest Engineering &
Infrastructure Section
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had occurred, and that the
Lot is covered by the reclassification, is contradicted by several documents submitted by the Solicitor
General before the land registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a Report dated March 2, 1988,
[37]

signed by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration, confirming that the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms part of the MWR. He thus
recommended the dismissal of the application for registration.The Report states:

COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Commission and to this
Honorable Court respectfully reports that:

1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San Isidro, Municipality of
Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for registration of title in the case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found that a portion of the SW,
described as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was previously the subject of registration in Land Reg.
Case No. N-9578, LRC Record No. N-55948 and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4,
1986 in the name of Apolonia Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of the
Decree dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984, respectively, and the remaining portion of plan
Psu-162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x
WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its information
and guidance with the recommendation that the application in the instant proceedings be
dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining supplied).
 Likewise, in a letter dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land Inspector, DENR, Region IV,
[38]

Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the
Lot is within the MWR. The letter states:

That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly
described in Psu-162620, which is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive Order No. 33
dated July 2, 1904 which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12) x x x.

xxx

That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the Registration Applicant but part of the public
domain, not subjected to disposition and is covered by Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry
Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended for rejection(Underlining supplied). Copy of the letter is
attached herewith as Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof.

Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T. Collados [as original
applicant] application is the technical description of the Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan,
[39]

Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description
categorically stated that the Lot is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively
that the Lot had been officially released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included
within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a
presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing
evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Lot
for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Even
if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR upon the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners possession as of the filing of their application on
April 25, 1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in
1974. The result will not change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly
possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners case falters even more
because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then DENR
Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where
petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated and vibrant
communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may be applied to this case by analogy:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually
be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be
on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until
the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[40]

Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment

should have been given due course.

Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republics petition for annulment
of judgment which was filed long after the decision of the land registration court had allegedly become
final and executory. The land registration court rendered its decision on January 30, 1991 and the
Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on April 23, 1991. Petitioners point out that the
[41]

Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for annulment of judgment invoking
Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 only on August 6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become final
[42]

and executory. Moreover, petitioners further point out that the Solicitor General filed the petition for
annulment after the land registration court issued its order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land
Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground that the land
registration court had no jurisdiction over the case, specifically, over the Lot which was not alienable
and disposable. The Solicitor General maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer available because it is
barred by the principle of res judicata. They insist that the land registration court had jurisdiction over
the case which involves private land. They also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning
the land registration courts jurisdiction considering that the Republic participated in the
proceedingsbefore the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and disposable
public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and convincingly show that the Lot,
described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a watershed
reservation of the public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged
procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial
since the land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land
registration court involving the Lot are therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, as follows:
[43]

The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers
which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private
applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate
of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the
State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.

We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns over technicalities and
rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles, which involved the registration of public lands, specifically
[44]

parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to silence the Republics
claim over public lands.The Court said:

It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a
sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or
public policy, and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to
technicality.

The Court further held that the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties
registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not
prescribe.
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of
stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social Forestry Program, filed with the Court of
Appeals on November 29, 1991 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which petitioners sought to
register. Aware that the parcels of land which their forefathers had occupied, developed
and tilled belong to the Government,they filed a petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and
then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to take steps for the
segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for development under the DENRs ISF
Programs. Subsequently, then President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990
excluding 1,430 hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the DENRs
Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:

PROCLAMATION NO. 585

AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED
THE MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN
PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN,
VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.

Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority
vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the
operation of Executive Order No. 33, which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain parcel of
land of the public domain embraced therein situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San
Joseph and Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and place the same under the Integrated Social
Forestry Program of the Departmentof Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with existing laws,
rules and regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:

A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, beginning at point 1 on plan, being identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation;
thence

xxx xxx xxx

Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430) Hectares.

All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as amended, not otherwise affected by this
Proclamation, shall remain in force and effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines
to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 5 day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety.
th

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

President of the Philippines
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through the Regional
Executive Director of the DENR (Region IV), issued sometime between the years 1989 to 1991
certificates of stewardship contracts to bona fide residents of the barangays mentioned in the
proclamation as qualified recipients of the ISF programs. Among those awarded were
intervenors. The certificates of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the DENR to
actual occupants of parcels of land under its ISF programs for a period of twenty-five (25) years,
renewable for another twenty-five (25) years. The DENR awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF
[45]

participants in Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other barangays based on the Inventory
of Forest Occupants the DENR had conducted. [46]

According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the pendency of LRC Case
No. 269-A before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion
for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Opposition in Intervention before the land registration court to
assert their rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that the land registration
court had already rendered a decision on January 30, 1991 confirming petitioners imperfect
title. Intervenors counsel received a copy of the decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for new trial before the
land registration court. According to intervenors, the land registration court could not act on its
motions due to the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the
land registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor General in its petition
for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus constrained to file a petition for intervention
before the Court of Appeals which allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
[47]

Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court, or an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the inertvenors rights may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the
trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original
parties.

As a rule, intervention is allowed before rendition of judgment by the trial court, as Section 2, Rule
19 expressly provides. However, the Court has recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of
substantial justice. Mago vs. Court of Appeals reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court
[48]

of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when the case had already
reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:

It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings
where trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme
Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the
rules of Court.

But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the
whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for
justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice
to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.

To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of intervenors in relation to
the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the validity of the certificates of stewardship contracts
which intervenors allegedly possessed inquired into considering this too was not in issue. In fact,
intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration that the Lot in question
remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the
intervention, if only to provide the rival groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case
has already claimed at least five lives due to the raging dispute between the rival camps of the
petitioners on one side and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It also spawned a number of
criminal cases between the two rival groups including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict
application of the rules would blur this bigger, far more important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 22,
1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated January 30, 1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.