G.R. No.

129807 December 9, 2005 Respondents asserted in their complaint that these demands by had been substituted with an unauthorized lead seal and the
petitioner were without proper and correct basis as they had paid government seal which should be attached to said electric meter
DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., Petitioner, vs. CRISTINA
all their electric bills for the period 1983 to 1988. They also stated was already missing. The inspection team also noticed that said
OPEA and TEOFILO RAMOS, JR., Respondents.
that the charges for unbilled electric consumption could have electric meters second and third dials from the right were
DECISION emanated from fraudulent manipulations executed by petitioner misaligned. Just like electric meter number 47019, Engr. Reyes
itself. also subjected electric meter number 1587 to a test which
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: revealed that it was not registering any electric consumption at
Respondents, therefore, prayed for the following reliefs from the
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the trial court: light load and recorded only 33.53% of electricity utilized at full
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 35114 dated 29 May 1997 load.
affirming, with modification, the decision2 of the Regional Trial a) Forthwith issue a temporary restraining order before notice As the two electric meters in question were already inaccurate,
Court (RTC), Branch 17, Davao City, in Civil Case No. 19,648-89 and a writ of preliminary injunction, directing the defendants or Engr. Reyes and petitioner decided to remove them and had them
declaring as null and void the documents presented by petitioner any person acting for and in its behalf to desist and refrain from individually wrapped, sealed, and brought to petitioners office
with regard to respondents unbilled consumption. doing any act that would disconnect the electrical light
for safekeeping.
connection at plaintiffs house and office, and also desist in
The records establish the following facts: enforcing the so-called "Computations" referred to. Pursuant to the procedure adopted by petitioner in cases of meter
In their complaint filed on 19 July 1989 before the RTC of Davao b) Order the defendants to adjust correctly or calibrate the tampering, respondents were required to make a deposit for the
City, respondents, as plaintiffs below, alleged that petitioner electric meters by competent men or persons. repair and replacement of the two electric meters. The amount of
Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. (DLPC), defendant below, is a deposit required in this case was pegged at P4,000.00 for each
franchise holder authorized to operate an electric and power c) To declare null and void the documents (Annexes "C" to "C-*" account which was paid by respondent Ramos, Jr. on 19
plant in Davao City. Respondents, on the other hand, are and "G" to "G-*") denoted as "Computation of Tampered Meter". September 1988. With this payment, petitioner immediately
petitioners customers as electric meter nos. 47019 and 1587 installed "good meters" at respondents residence and office.
d) Order the payment of moral and exemplary damages in the
were attached to respondent Teofilo Ramos, Jr.s (respondent Everything seemed back to normal following the replacement of
amounts of P 200,000.00 and P 50,000.00 respectively.
Ramos, Jr.) office and residence, respectively. Under the the allegedly tampered electric meters on 19 September 1988.
agreement between respondents, respondent Ramos, Jr. was e) Direct defendants to reimburse plaintiffs the amount Problem, however, arose anew when in January 1989,
supposed to pay the electric bills to petitioner although both of P 2,000.00 as initial expenses in the preparation and filing of respondents received from petitioner an electric bill charging
electric meters were under the account name of his mother-in- the complaint; and to further pay the amount of P 33,477.86 in them with the amount of P7,894.99 for account number 510-4019
law, respondent Cristina Opea (respondent Opea). concept of attorneys fee. prompting respondents to file a complaint with petitioner. On
Sometime in 1988, petitioner, through its fieldmen or inspection f) To make the preliminary injunction final. verification, it was discovered that electric meter number 7168
team, examined the electric meter in respondent Ramos, Jr.s which replaced electric meter number 47019 erroneously
PLAINTIFFS further pray for such other relief that may be just and recorded respondents electric consumption beginning
office allegedly in response to a report of an alleged "broken
proper in the premises.6 November 1989. Accordingly, respondents January electric bill
Davao Light seal." As a consequence of said inspection, both
electric meters were removed and eventually replaced. Traversing the allegations of the complaint, petitioner declared in was revised to only P5,625.55 and credit memorandum no. 38711
its answer7 that at the time of the institution of this suit, petitioner dated 07 February 1989 was issued in favor of respondents.
11
Respondents purportedly observed that their electric
consumption a few months after the installation of the continuously supplied electrical services to respondents On or about 17 March 1989, petitioners customer relations
replacement meters were relatively similar with their usage as pursuant to the service contracts it entered into with respondent department received a letter-complaint from Konsumo
recorded by the previous electric meters. Thus, they were taken Opea. One of these service contracts was dated 30 May Dabaw regarding respondents recomputed electric bill for
aback when petitioner charged them the amount of P 7,894.99 for 19778 under account number 510-4019 with meter number 47019. account number 510-4019. Petitioner thereafter conducted
one billing month. After they complained about this excessive The other service contract was dated 07 November 19509 under another verification of electric meter number 7168 and it was then
amount, petitioner made an adjustment and subsequently account number 510-4020 with meter number 1587. discovered that said meter was running backwards, and that no
reduced said electric bill to P5,625.55 which respondents paid
under protest. On 16 September 1988, petitioners representatives, together error was committed by petitioner in respondents meter reading
with an energy regulation analyst of the Energy Regulatory Board on 14 January 1989. Accordingly, petitioner sent a
(ERB) and a photographer, went to respondents office building letter to Konsumo Dabaw explaining this matter and on 30
12
On 17 May 1989, petitioner wrote respondent Opea charging
her P84,398.76 for the alleged unbilled electric consumption of and residential house to examine and test the electric meters March 1989, petitioner replaced electric meter number 7168 with
respondent Ramos, Jr.s office from September 1983 to installed thereat. The examination and testing of electric meter electric meter number 24305.
September 1988.3 The amount was allegedly arrived at based on number 47019 was allegedly witnessed by respondent Ramos, In the third week of June 1989, petitioner adjusted respondents
the highest recorded consumption from 1983 to 1988. Jr.s employee named Myrna Galagar (Galagar). In the case of December 1988 to May 1989 electric bills based on the latters
electric meter number 1587, Joy Perucho (Perucho),10 another monthly consumption as registered by electric meter number
On 17 June 1989, petitioner sent another letter4 to respondent
employee of respondent Ramos, Jr., purportedly observed the 24305 and taking into consideration credit memorandum no.
Opea reiterating its demand for the payment of the unbilled
procedure. 3887.
electric consumption. This time, the letter contained a threat that
respondents failure to settle their obligation within ten days According to petitioner, the examination of electric meter number Petitioner likewise claimed in its answer that respondents
would compel petitioner to take the necessary legal action before 47019 showed that petitioners murray seal, otherwise known as unbilled consumption amounting to P84,398.76 relative to
the proper court and would result in the immediate disconnection the outer seal, was already broken while the government seal or account number 510-401913 and P49,512.63 for account number
of the electric supply to respondents. inner seal was deformed. In addition, the meter testing conducted 510-402014 covered the period September 1983 to September
by the ERB regulation analyst Engr. Carlos V. Reyes (Engr. Reyes) 1988 and was based on the highest registration of the electric
On 23 June 1989, petitioner again wrote respondent Opea
revealed that electric meter number 47019 was not registering meter for each account - 1,047 kilowatthours for account number
demanding the amount of P49,512.63 allegedly representing the
any electric consumption at light load and, when it was tested at 510-401915 and 963 kilowatthours in the case of account number
amount of unbilled electric consumption of respondent Ramos,
full load, the same only recorded a 27.57% consumption. 510-4020.16The amounts claimed as unbilled consumption,
Jr.s residence.5 As was stated in the 17 May 1989 letter,
petitioner claimed that this amount was computed based on the On the other hand, the examination of electric meter number 1587 however, merely represented petitioners initial bargaining
highest recorded consumption from 1983 to 1988. indicated that its murray seal was no longer attached thereto and position with respondents in the hope that the latter would come

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 1 of 17

clean and submit proof as to when they had the electric meters After the pre-trial, the continuous trial of the case proceeded in consumed by respondent Ramos, Jr. Particularly, electric meter
tampered and made additions to their connected load. reverse order as agreed upon by the parties in order for number 47019 did not record electric consumption at light load
petitioner, as defendant below, to prove its allegation of meter and 27.57% consumption at full load.24 Similarly, electric meter
Also, petitioner asserted in its answer that its letter dated 16 June
tampering. number 1587 did not register any rotation when tested at light
198917 giving respondents the period of ten days within which to
load; at full load, it reflected only a 33.53% accuracy.25
settle the matter with petitioner was designed to bring JOSE ROBERTO A. SARDINIA (Sardinia) testified that at the time
respondents to the bargaining table for a fair and just settlement material to this case, he was the legal assistant in petitioners Further, Engr. Reyes corroborated Sardinias testimony that the
of petitioners claim and that the threatened actions contained in Legal Affairs and Public Relation Department. On 16 September government seal of electric meter number 47019 was deformed
said letter were never implemented by petitioner. 1988, petitioners system department ordered the conduct of or tampered with. In his report as regards electric meter number
inspection and examination of alleged tampered electric meters. 1587, Engr. Reyes shared Sardinias observation that its DLPCs
Furthermore, based on the summaries of respondents monthly
Relative to said directive, two teams were formed, one of which seal was deformed while its government seal was missing.
electric consumption from September 1983 to June 198918 it
was headed by Sardinia himself. The other members of his team
would appear that the tampering of electric meter number 47019 Lucero testified that he was assigned in the laboratory section of
were an instrument technician from petitioners laboratory
occurred between late December 1983 or early January 1984 petitioner. He maintained that it was the standard procedure
department named Alfredo Lucero (Lucero); driver; lineman;
when said meter registered only 302 kilowatthours a drastic observed by petitioner that electric meters acquired by the latter
photographer; a representative of the city electrician office; and
drop in consumption considering its recording of 708 are tested26 using a standard testing instrument and thereafter,
Engr. Reyes.
kilowatthours for the previous billing period. As regards electric the meters are turned over to the representatives of the Board of
meter number 1587, its tampering allegedly occurred sometime In the afternoon of said date, his team proceeded to the place Energy (BOE)27 who subject the meters to their own examination.
in late July or early August 1985 when this electric meter where the electric meters in question were installed. There, they After the BOE establishes the accuracy of an electric meter, it
registered only 170 kilowatthours which was way below its were met by respondent Ramos, Jr.s employees Perucho and attaches thereto a seal which is known as the BOE seal. This seal
previous recording of 663 kilowatthours for the previous billing Galagar. Perucho and Galagar informed Sardinia that it was their protects the meter from being opened such that one cannot get
period. employer, respondent Ramos, Jr., who actually paid the electric into the internal component of an electric meter without breaking
bills under the account name of respondent Opea. In addition, the BOE seal. Once an electric meter bearing the BOE seal is
In its answer, petitioner moreover presented another method of
Perucho and Galagar told the team that respondent Ramos, Jr., installed, petitioner attaches to its bottom portion an outside seal
computing respondents unbilled consumption which was arrived
was in Manila during that time. Despite this information, the which prevents the meter from being pulled out anytime.
at using respondents daily average consumption registered by
inspection team proceeded with their planned examination of the
the new electric meters and multiplying this by thirty days. Thus, In addition, Lucero averred that on 16 September 1988, he was a
two electric meters. Engr. Reyes conducted the meter testing
for account number 510-4019, petitioner charged respondents member of the inspection team which examined the electric
which was witnessed by Perucho and Galagar. The photographer
the amount of P65,918.13 as of September 1988 plus 2% monthly meters issued under the account name of respondent Opea. As
who accompanied the inspection team likewise took photos of the
surcharge from October 1988 to July 1989 totalling P8,636.12. In part of the team, it was his task to make a load inspection
two electric meters while these were being examined.21
addition, this amount was supposed to carry the 2% monthly report28 for each electric meter listing therein the various
surcharge until fully paid. With respect to account number 510- As part of his duty as the team leader, Sardinia made written electrical items connected to every meter.
4020, petitioner claimed the amount of P28,328.45 for the period reports of the results of the meter testing. According to Sardinia,
Another witness for petitioner was ARSENIO SACAMOS, JR.
August 1985 to September 1988, plus P4,028.74 representing 2% the government seal (inner seal) of the electric meter bearing
(Sacamos, Jr.), head of petitioners billing and collection
monthly surcharge from October 1988 to July 1989. Similarly, this serial number 47019 was deformed and its DLPC seal (outer seal)
department. Sacamos, Jr. stated in the witness stand that he was
amount would carry the 2% surcharge until fully settled by was broken.22 As for electric meter number 1587, the inspection
requested by Atty. Oscar Breva, petitioners counsel, to prepare
respondents. revealed that its government seal was missing while its DLPCs
a summary of kilowatt consumption for account numbers 510-
seal was substituted with a deformed lead seal which was not the
Ultimately, petitioner prayed that judgment in its favor be given 4019 and 510-4020. In the case of account number 510-4019, his
type used by petitioner.23
ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay: department collated the material data from September 1983 to
After the electric meters were tested by Engr. Reyes, Sardinia June 1989. His analysis of the data established a drastic drop in
(1) The sum of P74,554.25 as unbilled consumption under
had them wrapped with manila paper. Sardinias name and electric consumption recorded by electric meter number 47019
Account No. 510-4019 inclusive of 2% monthly surcharge up to
signature as well as those of Engr. Reyes and an employee of commencing in January 1984 until September 1988 when the
July, 1989, plus 2% monthly surcharge thereon from August, 1989
respondent Ramos, Jr. were written on the tape used for sealing replacement meter registered a high consumption.
until fully paid.
the wrapping paper. Thereafter, the electric meters were taken
As regards account number 510-4020, Sacamos, Jr. averred that
(2) The sum of P32,357.19 as unbilled consumption under to petitioners office.
they gathered the pertinent information from September 1983 to
Account No. 510-4020 inclusive of 2% monthly surcharge up to
When asked by the court, Sardinia stated that the information June 1989 and data revealed a severe drop in electric
July, 1989, plus 2% monthly surcharge thereon from August, 1989
regarding the existence of tampered electric meters was relayed consumption from July 1985 until September 1988 when electric
until fully paid.
to petitioner by an informant whose identity he refused to divulge. meter number 1587 was replaced.
(3) The sum of P50,000.00 as damages for attorneys fee and Moreover, due to the alleged urgency of the situation, his team
As the two electric meters were not accurately registering the
expenses of litigation, plus an additional P30,000.00 should there could not afford to wait for respondent Ramos, Jr. to return from
amount of electricity used by respondent Ramos, Jr., petitioner
be an appeal or petition for certiorari. Manila; hence, they continued with the inspection.
demanded from the latter payments of unbilled consumption for
(4) The sums of P20,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral damages Petitioner next presented ENGR. REYES on the witness stand. the two accounts. For account number 510-4019, he prepared a
and exemplary damages.19 Essentially, he testified that his work involved using standard computation of unbilled consumption of respondents indicating
metering instrument and conducting inspections and that as of 19 September 1988, a total unpaid consumption
On 20 July 1989, Presiding Judge Renato A. Fuentes, considering investigations of alleged tampering of electric meters both in amounting to P65,918.13 for the period January 1984 to
the nature of the complaint and the urgency of the provisional residential and commercial buildings. September 1988 inclusive of P22,737.49 cumulative surcharge.
remedy prayed for, ordered petitioner from doing any act
complained of within twenty days from receipt of said order and According to Engr. Reyes, on 16 September 1988, he inspected In account number 510-4020, the unbilled consumption prepared
scheduled the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary two electric meters as evidenced by the reports he accomplished by their department indicated a total unbilled consumption to
injunction on 01 August 1989.20 and marked as Exhibits "4" and "5" for petitioner. Using a be P28,328.45 which includes P8,184.72 in surcharges.29
standard equipment of his office, he discovered that the two
electric meters were not accurately registering the electricity

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 2 of 17

Over the vigorous objection by respondents counsel, the trial letter dated provided sufficiently, a key to [plaintiffs] involvement [to] the
court received in evidence the updated summary of kilowatthour 19 September 198835 which, in part, reads: alleged "tampering," . . .38
consumption prepared by Sacamos, Jr.s department for the
September 19, 1988 Another point taken against petitioner was its insistence to
period July 1989 to March 1990 of account number 510-4019 as
conduct the examination of the electric meters in question
recorded by electric meter number 24305.30 A similar summary The Manager
despite the absence of respondent Ramos, Jr. As the trial court
was prepared for account number 510-4020 as registered by
Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. observed, both Galagar and Perucho did not know anything about
electric meter number 45908 which replaced electric meter
electricity and the procedure undertaken by petitioners
number 1587.31 Davao City inspection team. Moreover, the presence of respondent Ramos,
In the course of his testimony, Sacamos, Jr. also explained the Dear Sir: Jr. could have presented petitioner with the opportunity to
processes of computing a consumers actual electric confront him on the matter of electric meter tampering.
consumption. The first method simply involves computing the This has reference to kilowatthour Meter No. 47019/1587 under
Account Nos. 510-4019/-4020 connected to the electrical As for the amount of unbilled consumption, it was the trial courts
average consumption of electric power while the second involves
installation in the name of my mother-in-law CRISTINA OPENA finding that the procedure adopted by petitioner in computing the
calculating the average monthly reading at a certain period of
which I understand has been reported to you as having been amounts being claimed from respondents were "unreliable and
time after a defective electric meter was replaced.
tampered. highly speculative"39 as the factors considered such as average
Petitioner then presented as its witness the head of its customers monthly consumption seemed to have been arbitrarily arrived at.
relation department in 1983, JOSELITO ORTIZ. Ortiz testified ...
Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, petitioner elevated its
regarding a letter-complaint of respondent Ramos, Jr. coursed Very truly yours, case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed, with modification,
through Konsumo Dabaw complaining of the abnormal reading of
(SGD)TEOFILO RAMOS, JR. the findings of the court a quo, to wit:
the replacement meter for account number 510-4019. In his
response to said letter-complaint, Ortiz wrote separate letters After the trial, the court a quo issued its decision dated 01 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, except for
to Konsumo Dabaw32 and to respondent Ramos, Jr.33explaining October 199036 the dispositive portion of which reads: the deletion therefrom of the award of moral damages, exemplary
that the erroneous meter reading was because the meter damages and attorneys fees, the appealed judgment is hereby
installed in lieu of the purported tampered one was registering WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of plaintiff, sufficient by AFFIRMED, in all other respects.40
electric consumption backwards. Because of this finding, preponderance, to sustain relief in the enforcement of
another electric meter was installed under account number 510- defendants computation of alleged tampered meters, marked as Petitioner is now before this Court, through the instant petition for
4019 and a credit adjustment was made on the electric bills under plaintiffs [Annexes] "C," to "C-8" up to "G" and "G-8," finding the review, relying upon the following arguments:
the name of respondent Opea. evidence of defendant in the reverse order of trial, not sufficient 1. Passage of R.A. No. 783241 vindicates petitioner.
by preponderance of evidence, to warrant enforcement of
The last witness for petitioner was MANUEL ORIG, vice-president [defendants] so-called unbilled electrical consumption against 2. Broken, deformed, and missing seals are prima facie evidence
of petitioner who stated in his testimony that petitioner suffered plaintiff, the above-documents, are declared null and void, of meter-tampering.
damages because of the filing of this case by respondents, to wit: without any effect, against plaintiff.
moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00; exemplary damages 3. Consumption record of respondents show a significant drop in
amounting to P10,000.00; attorneys fees of P40,000.00; and As a consequence of the filing of this case, on account of the consumption.
litigation expenses of P10,000.00.34 trouble, worries, mental agony, suffered by plaintiff due to 4. Failure to disclose tipster does not destroy presumption.
defendants unreasonable imposition of the so-called unbilled
On the other hand, respondents presented for their first witness consumption, without any factual and legal basis, defendant is 5. Concern of the Court of Appeals over possible defect of electric
GALAGAR. Galagar testified that after the removal of the two ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as moral meters or that the tipster was responsible for the tampering is
electric meters involved in this case, the inspection team damages, including exemplary damages, by way of example to misplaced.
requested her and her former fellow employee Perucho to the public, in the amount of P5,000.00 and cost against
observe the meter testing and examination conducted by the defendant. 6. Manner of computation of the amount and period of the unbilled
team despite their lack of knowledge about the whole procedure. consumption (now called differential billing under R.A. No. 7832)
After the testing, she and Perucho signed the inspection reports As a result of this decision, defendants counterclaim, is denied.37 is legal and reasonable.42
prepared by Sardinias team which were marked during the trial
The trial court dismissed as without basis petitioners claim that Essentially, petitioner raises the issues of: (1) whether the Court
as Exhibits "7" and "AA." In addition, Galagar stated that during
electric meter numbers 1587 and 47019 were tampered with. The of Appeals erred in not retroactively applying Republic Act No.
the entire period of her employment with respondent Ramos, Jr.,
trial court pointed to the fact that petitioners evidence and 7832 and (2) whether the appellate court erred in not finding
she never saw anyone tinker with the subject electric meters.
testimonies given by Sardinia, Engr. Reyes, and Lucero failed to respondents liable for unbilled consumption.
The second witness presented by respondents was respondent bolster its position that the subject electric meters were indeed The petition is bereft of merit.
RAMOS, JR. himself who declared that he learned about the tampered particularly since the identity of the purported
removal of the two electric meters upon his return from his trip to perpetrator of the misdeed was never established by petitioner. The law in force at the time of the institution of the present case
Manila. Soon thereafter, he went to petitioners office to clarify Petitioners recalcitrance to reveal its confidential source did not was Presidential Decree No. 401 or the law Penalizing the
what transpired in the afternoon of 16 September 1988 and was also escape the trial courts perceptiveness, thus: Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
told by Atty. Braganza that the inspection team removed the Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters,
Indeed, why defendant cannot reveal the identity of the source of
electric meters because they were defective. In addition, he was and Other Acts. The pertinent portion of this statute provides:
its information, as to the defect of the subject meters, when
informed that the electric supply to his residence and his office
precisely, it was because of the said information, that prompted . . . [A]ny person who installs any water, electrical or telephone
would be reconnected upon his payment of the P2,000.00 deposit
defendant to inspect and test the subject [meters]? There is connection without previous authority from the Metropolitan
for each electric meter. Respondent Ramos, Jr. also declared in
nothing urgently dangerous to protect the identity of said Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company
court that he had no participation in the alleged tampering of the
informant because anyway, he or she, can be safely protected by or the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, as the case
electric meters nor did he cause anyone else to tamper the same.
defendant and that anyway everything was known, so that may be; tampers and/or uses tampered water or electrical meters
On cross-examination, respondent Ramos, Jr. admitted that at plaintiff or anybody else, cannot do anything to run after the or jumpers or other devices whereby water or electricity is stolen;
the time he paid the deposit to petitioner, he was made to sign a alleged informant. As it [turned-out], said information, could have steals or pilfers water and/or electric meters or water, electric

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 3 of 17

and/or telephone wires; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered In Jison v. Court of Appeals,45 we declared A - Yes, sir.
water and/or electrical meters as well as stolen or pilfered water,
The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the Q - And it is located about 2-1/2 to 3 meters high?
electrical and/or telephone wires, shall, upon conviction, be
general rules on evidence, in light of the burden of proof in civil
punished by prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine A - I think, it is higher than that.
case, i.e., preponderance of evidence, and the shifting of the
ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both. . .
burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the Q - And the place is surrounded by residential houses?
On 08 December 1994, Rep. Act No. 7832 otherwise known as the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the
"Anti-electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, A - Yes, sir.
Pilferage Act of 1994" was approved. Section 2 of this law in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out Q - It is also a busy street?
enumerates the acts constitutive of illegal use of electricity, to a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence
wit: shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, A - I think.
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Q - We said busy, because several trucks, several jeepneys,
SEC. 2. Illegal Use of Electricity. - . . .
Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must several cars and even pedestrian passed the street?
... produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff
having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon A - Yes, sir.
(c) Tamper, install or use a tampered electrical meter, jumper, the weakness of the defendants. The concept of "preponderance
current reversing transformer, shorting or shunting wire, loop Q - Would you agree with me, that if somebody opened or touched
of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight or more the meter, just facing the Quezon Boulevard street, this is very
connection or any other device which interferes with the proper convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it
or accurate registry or metering of electric current or otherwise visible to people around?
means probability of truth.46
results in its diversion in a manner whereby electricity is stolen or A - I dont think, I can agree with you, because the location of
wasted; In other words, the proof of the existence of the prima meter is quite higher, considering that this is beyond [reach of]
facie evidence is still the burden of the plaintiff. Moreover, as will ordinary people.
(d) Damage or destroy an electric meter, equipment, wire, or be shown later, Rep. Act No. 7832 cannot apply because it was
conduit or allow any of them to be so damaged or destroyed as to only approved on 08 December 1994; hence, the general rules on Q - But it can be seen by people around or even by the pedestrian
interfere with the proper or accurate metering of electric current; evidence must be applied. [passing] by?
and
In this case, petitioner anchors its claim of meter tampering on A - Yes, sir.
(e) Knowingly use or receive the direct benefit of electric service the result of the examination conducted by its inspection team. Its
obtained through any of the acts mentioned in subsections (a), witnesses Q - In fact, even the passing passengers inside the jeep, it can be
(b), (c), and (d) above. seen?
Sardinia, Engr. Reyes, and Lucero - all testified that a plain view
On the other hand, Section 4 of the same law lists the of the electric meters in question showed that the inner and outer A - It can be seen.
circumstances which shall establish the prima facie evidence of seals which were supposed to be attached thereto were either Q - In other words, if somebody touches or opens [tinkers] with
illegal use of electricity. Among these are: deformed, missing, or replaced with ordinary lead wire. that meter, it can be easily visible to the people around?
(iii) The existence of any wiring connection which affects the Furthermore, the meter testing conducted by Engr. Reyes A - I think.47
normal operation or registration of the electric meter; revealed that the two electric meters were not accurately
recording the electric consumption of respondents. On the other hand, Luceros cross-examination proceeded thus:
(iv) The presence of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the
meter, or mutilated, altered, or tampered meter recording chart We hold that petitioners evidence is insufficient for us to rule in
Q - On September 16, 1988, when you went to the place of plaintiff,
or graph, or computerized chart, graph or log; its favor. you knew that the electric meter was installed outside the
While it is true that respondent Ramos, Jr. merely offered a residence?

categorical denial of the accusation hurled against him and his A - The installation of the meter?
(vi) The mutilation, alteration, reconnection, disconnection, co-respondent Opea, nevertheless, the records of this case
bypassisng or tampering of instruments, transformers, and present other factors which should tilt the scale of evidence in Q - The meter was outside the residence fronting Boulevard
accessories; favor of respondents. Avenue?
(vii) The destruction of, or attempt to destroy, any integral As established by petitioners witnesses Sardinia and Lucero, the A - Yes, Sir.
accessory of the metering device box which encases an electric allegedly tampered electric meters were installed in conspicuous
Q - And it is elevated about three meters high from the ground?
meter or its metering accessories; and. . . portions of respondent Ramos, Jr.s residence and office. In his
A - I cannot remember.
Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred when it did not cross-examination Sardinia testified in the following manner:
apply the presumption of meter tampering in this case. It argues ATTY. CADIENTE: Q - But it is above the ground?
that the broken, deformed, and missing seals are prima
facie evidence of meter tampering and, when taken together with Q - You are familiar with the place of Cristina Opea and/or Teofilo A - It is above the ground.
the significant drop in the registered electric consumption of Ramos? Q - Can it be reached by a hand without stepping on a certain
respondents, establishes that the latter clearly benefited from the A - I am not really that familiar, but I have seen the place when I object or you have to step on a ladder?
inaccuracy of electric meters 47019 and 1587. We do not agree. inspected. A - I cannot remember.
In the case of United States v. Luling,43 this Court recognized Q - It is located along Quezon Boulevard in this city, is that Q - And you admit that Quezon Boulevard is a very busy street
"that no constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing correct?
that proof by the state of some material fact or facts shall whereby trucks, jeeps and several pedestrians pass from time to
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden A - Yes, sir. time?
is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such
Q - The meter is located also in front of the building facing Quezon A - Yes, Sir.48
act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful
Boulevard?
intention."44

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 4 of 17

As can be gleaned from the testimonies of petitioners witnesses, buyer himself positively identified the accused as the one who Indeed, it is highly inequitable if we are to allow a public utility
the electric meters were mounted in notable places within the sold to him one deck of methamphetamine hydrochloride or company to be continuously remiss in its duty and then later on
premises owned by respondent Opea. More than that, the "shabu." The trial court then properly relied on the testimonies of charge the consumer exorbitant amount for the alleged unbilled
building itself was situated along a busy street in Davao City. This the police officers despite the prosecutions decision not to consumption or differential billing when such a situation could
being the case, it becomes highly inconceivable that no one present the informer. have been easily averted. We simply cannot sanction petitioners
witnessed the alleged tampering of the subject electric meters utter neglect of its duty over a number of years as this would
In this case, as the testimonies of petitioners witnesses failed to
considering the surroundings where they were set up. Indeed, undoubtedly be detrimental to the interest of the consuming
directly link respondents to the alleged meter tampering, it was
any person tinkering with the meters could have easily attracted public.
essential for petitioner to present, as its witness, the supposed
the attention and suspicion of neighbors and passers-by.
informer instead of simply relying on the testimonies of some WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and
Even if this Court indulges petitioner in its claim that it received a members of the inspection team. As the records show, the the Court of Appeals decision dated 29 May 1997 in CA-G.R. CV
confidential information from an unidentified source regarding testimonies of Sardinia, Engr. Reyes, and Lucero were bereft of No. 35114, affirming with modification the decision of the
the claimed meter tampering, still, such allegation cannot support any indication that respondents either tampered or caused the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City in Civil Case No.
a finding against respondents. As aptly observed by the Court of claimed tampering of the electric meters. 19,648-89, is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.
Appeals:
Anent the issue of unbilled consumption, petitioner contends that SO ORDERED.
Appellants49 (petitioner herein) admit that they have no direct the amount to be charged to a consumer for unbilled consumption
evidence to show that appellees (respondents herein) caused the cannot be calculated with exactitude. Thus, even Rep. No. 7832
meter to be tampered, claiming that in cases such as this, it is well itself provides for five different methods of computing the sum of G.R. No. 110015 October 13, 1995
nigh impossible to secure such kind of evidence because it is a unbilled consumption and two modes of determining the period of
clandestine operation. back-billing 52 and that the two methods it employed in MANILA BAY CLUB CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT
determining respondents unbilled consumption in this case are OF APPEALS, MODESTA SABENIANO and MIRIAM SABENIANO,
However, appellants contradicted their own stand when they JUDITH SABENIANO, JOY DENNIS SABENIANO, et.
now incorporated into the said legislation. This, petitioner
claim that they have their own source which furnished them al., respondents.
maintains, proves that there was nothing arbitrary in its
information regarding the alleged tampering. Appellants witness
determination of the unbilled consumption it seeks from RESOLUTION
Jose R. Sardinia in answer to the courts query testified
respondents. These techniques involve the use of the highest
Q - Did the Court understand from you Mr. Sardinia that the recorded monthly consumption within the five-year billing period FRANCISCO, J.:
source of this alleged tampering were submitted to your [field] preceding the time of the discovery and employing the highest After carefully perusing the instant motion for reconsideration,
office confidentially? recorded monthly consumption within four (4) months after the petitioner's arguments, in sum, dwell on the focal issues involved
time of discovery.53 in the controversy which have been passed upon in the Court's
A - Yes, Your Honor.
Petitioners argument fails to convince. July 11, 1995 Decision sought to be reconsidered. No reasons of
Q - As Assistant Legal Officer of the Davao Light, this confidential significant and compelling import have been advanced to alter
matter is not even known to you? It is a basic rule in our jurisdiction that laws do not have the Court's observation and conclusion that 1) petitioner's non-
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.54 In the designation of private respondents as beneficiaries of the
A - It was given to me in confidentially (sic) and I am not going to present case, Rep. Act No. 7832 is bereft of any indication that
insurance policies was a violation of the "insurance clause"
divulge it. the legislature intended to give it a retroactive application. On the amounting to a "substantial", and not a mere "slight or casual",
Q - Meaning that confidential has something to do with the contrary, Section 17 of said law clearly provides that it "shall take breach entitling private respondents to rescind the lease
business of Davao Light or confidentially in the sources of effect thirty (30) days after its publication in the Official Gazette contract, and 2) the amount of rentals/damages petitioner was
information itself? or in any two (2) national papers of general circulation." As the bound to pay was correctly adjudged by respondent Court of
Rep. Act No. 7832 plainly states its prospective application, we Appeals after slightly modifying the trial court's assessment. The
A - Yes, I think, this is confidentially taken in order for the cannot give credence to petitioners argument that its passage
Court, however, would like to make some additional disquisitions
company to protect it safeguard also the person. validates the amounts it imposed on respondents for unbilled in response to certain noteworthy contentions raised by
Q - Meaning you are safeguarding the identity of the informer? consumption.55 petitioner.
A - Yes, Your Honor. Moreover, petitioner, as a public utility corporation, "has the Anent the issue of the rentals/damages, petitioner avers that "the
imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its Decision awards excessive damages" since "the Decision of this
Notwithstanding the fact that appellants have the best or apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, Honorable Court condemned the petitioner to pay, up front, the
complete evidence entirely within their control, they refused to and the due diligence to discover and repair the defects total sum of P12,029,800.00", "a staggering sum by any
produce or at least, refrained from producing the same. Thus therein."56 calculation . . . that will probably reduce the petitioner to utter
appellants failed to prove their claim with the best evidence bankruptcy"; It is likewise maintained that private respondents
obtainable their informer/source. As claimed by petitioner, the sudden "drastic" drop in the
registered electric consumption commenced sometime in will be "unjustly enriched" simply because petitioner failed to
On this matter, it has been held that where a party fails to present December 1983 or January 1984 for account number 510-4019 present controverting evidence, or rebut Mrs. Sabeniano's
a fact necessary to his case when it is within his power to do so, and July 1985 or August 1985 for account number 510- testimony which, according to petitioner, is mere "speculation".
it will be presumed that such fact does not exist. 50 4020.57 Inexplicably, petitioner allowed several years to lapse We need to stress the one decisive fact that petitioner had all the
On this point, petitioner relies heavily on this Courts holding in before deciding to conduct an inspection of the electric meters opportunity at its disposal before the trial court to refute, with all
the case of People of the Philippines v. Lopez51where we ruled involved in this case. Such failure on its part to detect the allowable pieces of evidence it can produce, Mrs. Sabeniano's
that the testimony of an informer is not indispensable in view of extended unusual pattern in the recorded electric consumption testimony or any other evidence of private respondents, and
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses who participated in clearly demonstrates gross negligence on its part and palpable there is nothing to indicate that petitioner was ever denied such
the "buy-bust" operation. Such reliance is misplaced. violation of its duty "to make a reasonable and proper inspection opportunity/opportunities by the trial court. The trial court,
of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not respondent court and this Court cannot be faulted for taking
In the Lopez case, we held that there was no need for the malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair defects private respondents' uncontroverted evidence below vis-a-
prosecution to present the confidential informer as the poseur- therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence."58 vis the monthly rentals on its face value no matter how

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 5 of 17

"staggering" it may appear for petitioner's omission to rebut
that which would have naturally invited an immediate, pervasive
and stiff opposition from petitioner created an adverse inference
that either the controverting evidences to be presented by
petitioner will only prejudice its case, or that the uncontroverted
evidence of private respondents indeed speaks of the truth. And
such adverse inference, recognized and adhered to by courts in
judging the weight of evidence in all kinds of proceedings, surely
is not without basis the rationale and effect of which rest on
sound, logical and practical considerations.
The presumption that a man will do that which tends to his
obvious advantage, if he possesses the means, supplies a
most important test for judging of the comparative weight
of evidence . . . If, on the supposition that a charge or claim
is unfounded, the party against whom it is made has
evidence within his reach by which he may repel that
which is offered to his prejudice, his omission to do so
supplies a strong presumption that the charge or claim is
well founded; it would be contrary to every principle of
reason, and to all experience of human conduct, to form
any other conclusion. (Starkie on Evidence, p. 846, Moore
on Facts, Vol. I, p. 544).
Where the evidence tends to fix a liability on a party who
has it in his power to offer evidence of all the facts as they
existed and to rebut the inferences which the proof tends
to establish, and he neglects or refuses to offer such
proof, the natural inference is that the proof, if produced,
instead of rebutting, would support the inference against
him. (Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Anoka Nat. Bank, 108 Fed.
Rep. 482, 486, 47 C.C.A. 454, per Caldwell, C.J., Moore on
Facts, Vol. I, p. 545. Emphasis supplied)
It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to
prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party,
and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from
its very nature must overthrow the case made against him
if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such
evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if
produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the
case of his adversary. (Missouri, etc. R. Co. v. Elliott, 102
Fed. Rep. 96, 102, 42 C.C.A. 188, per Caldwell, C.J., Moore
on Facts, Vol. I, p. 546. Emphasis supplied)
No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it
in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved,
would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as
conclusive that the fact does not exist. (Wheeling v.
Hawley, 18 W. Va. 472, 476, per Patterson, J., quoted in
Union Trust Co. v. McClellan, 40 W. Va. 405, 21 S.E. Rep.
1025, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 544)
Where the burden is on a party to a suit to prove a material
fact in issue, the failure, without excuse, to produce an
important and necessary witness to such fact raises the
conclusive presumption that such witness's testimony, if
introduced, would be adverse to the pretensions of such
party. (Union Trust Co. v. McClellan, 40 W. Va. 405, 21 S.E.
Rep. 1025, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 545).
compelled, quite regrettably, to answer in the affirmative.
The rule is that where a party to an issue on trial has proof
in his power which, if produced, would render material, With regard to petitioner's contention that it "did not raise a fresh the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25, 1990, stating
but doubtful, facts certain, the law presumes against him matter on appeal", the Court merely reiterates that petitioner's that:
if he omits to produce that proof, and authorizes a jury to invocation of the principles of trust found its way only for the first
resolve all doubts adversely to his defense. (People v. time in its "Motion For Reconsideration" of the respondent court's
Sharp, 107, N. Y. 427, 465, 14 N.E. Rep. 319, 342, per decision. If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an
Danforth, J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 546). issue only for the first time on appeal proper, with more reason
should such issue be disallowed or disregarded when initially
Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate
raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
inferences going to establish the ultimate fact that the
appellate court.
evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be
affected by the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to We cannot finally put this case to rest without confronting the
deny or explain them, they may wall be taken as admitted perceived "unusual dispatch" in its resolution the petitioner is
with all the effect of the inferences afforded. (Somers v. "genuinely disturbed" of consisting in the rendition of the
McCready, 96 Md. 437, 53 Atl. Rep. 1117, per Jones, C.J., judgment (July 11, 1995) having been made in six (6) months from
Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 559) the ponente's appointment to the Court on January 5, 1995.
Petitioner amplifies that: 1) ". . . hardly has the ponente warmed
The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge
his seat, the case would be decided . . .", and 2) ". . . when prior
peculiarly within his own control, and refuses to divulge it,
to the appointment of the ponente, it took the rest of the Justices
cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable
of the Third Division of this Honorable Court more than a year to
construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure
deliberate on the Petition, . . . ".
would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the
opposing party. (Societe, etc., v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep. 815, It is the practice of the Court to encourage the speedy resolution
817, 33 C.C.A. 282, per Taft, C.J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, of cases unloaded to a newly-appointed Member, especially those
p. 561) cases that are already ripe for decision and in which motions for
their early resolution have been filed by either of the parties
The inference still holds even if it be assumed, for argument's
concerned, as in this case. This is the reason why it became
sake, that Mrs. Sabeniano's testimony is improbable or weak,
imperative to resolve this case at the soonest possible time and
for it has likewise been said that:
without further delay, lest we be charged with footdragging on the
Even if a party's testimony is improbable, the failure of the case thereby putting the Court in a more objectionable situation.
opposite party to contradict it, although it was entirely
In fact, the undersigned ponente has come across some of the
within his power to do so if it were false, fully entitles it to
maiden decisions of one of petitioner's counsels, Mr. Justice
belief. (Nutting v. El. R. Co., 21 N.Y. App. Div. 72, 47 N.Y.
Abraham F. Sarmiento, a distinguished former magistrate of this
Supp. 327, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 572)
Court himself who the undersigned holds in high-respect, which
Weak evidence becomes strong by the neglect of the were disposed of by him in less than six (6) months from the date
party against whom it is put in, in not showing by means of his appointment to the Court on January 26, 1987. To name a
within the easy control of that party that the conclusion few are: People v. Decierdo, G.R. No. L-46956, May 7, 1987, 149
drawn from such evidence is untrue. (Pittsburgh, etc., R. SCRA 496; People v. Saavedra, G.R. No. L-48738, May 18, 1987,
Co. v. Callaghan, 50 III. App. 678, 681, Moore on Facts, 149 SCRA 610; People v. Pecato, G.R. No. L-41008, June 18,
Vol. I, p. 572) 1987, 151 SCRA 14; People v. Ferrera, G.R. No. L-66965, June 18,
1987, 151 SCRA 113; Madrigal & Company, Inc. v. Zamora, G.R.
As weak evidence is often strengthened by failure of an Nos. L-49023 and L-48237, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 355 (Labor
opposing party to contradict by evidence within his Case); Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank v. Pardo, G.R.
power, so the trier of facts may infer that testimony in No.
chief is worth its full face value when the other party is L-55354, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 481; and Del Rosario v.
content to let it stand without cross-examination or Hamoy, G.R. No. L-77154, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 719. And in
contradiction by other evidence. (Moore on Facts, Vol. II, all honesty, the undersigned ponente regards such prompt
p. 1417) disposition as something commendable, not condemnable.
As petitioner seemed willing to admit private respondents' WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion For
evidence bearing on the fair rental value without question, the Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
trial court was well-justified in having done the same
exhibiting, still, due consideration when it reduced the
monthly rental value from P400,000.00 as per Mrs.
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
Sabeniano's uncontroverted testimony, to P250,000.00. In
answer, therefore, to petitioner's questions, i.e., D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
". . . does Mrs. Sabeniano's testimony cease to be speculation MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
because the petitioner failed to present 'controverting
KAPUNAN, J.:
evidence'?", and "The fact that Mrs. Sabeniano could have
testified that she was offered P1 Million, indeed, P10 Million, At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a
indeed, P100 Million but would that, too, 'stand' simply construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
because the petitioner failed to rebut it?", the Court is Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 6 of 17
 x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE testimony of the officer who executed the report.
arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and
around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
was available for cross-examination, the portions of the
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT report which were of his personal knowledge or which
while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were not
Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE. 3
hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the
the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is statements of the parties based on their sworn statements
Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise. It (which were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter,
(steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an having been included in the first purpose of the offer [as part
plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners exception to the hearsay rule. of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered
and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt as independently relevant statements which were gathered in
or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as
with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has
assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the are derived from his perception.4 A witness, therefore, may not been said that:
elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction testify as what he merely learned from others either because he
was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered "Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement,
thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2)
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule
companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
has learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule. does not apply, but the statement may be shown.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
when the [p]latform he was then on board and performing Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant
removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted as oral statements. 6
as to the existence of such a fact."
to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for
without a safety lock.1 deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and petitioners on his Report and made himself available for
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed as it proved that certain utterances were made (but not their
deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the
among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the excludes evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination.8 aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood,
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among this section does away with the testimony in open court of the
officer who made the official record, considers the matter as
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow which are entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130
provides: an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said
Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this
defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows: made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego. specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages. daily needed; the occasions in which the officials would be
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juegos earning In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al., this Court, citing the
10
summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a
capacity. work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites for witness are numberless. The public officers are few in
admissibility under the above rule: whose daily work something is not done in which
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages. testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another
5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit. no exception for official statements, hosts of officials
person specially enjoined by law to do so;
would be found devoting the greater part of their time to
SO ORDERED.2 (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a before an officer. The work of administration of
the decision of the RTC in toto. duty specially enjoined by law; and government and the interest of the public having business
with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is accorded
following grounds: knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
such documents, which is not extended to private
acquired by him personally or through official information.
documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites.
POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not present. The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers
ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER. that it presumes they will discharge their several trusts
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE question, also testified before the trial court. In Rodriguez vs. they do in discharge of their duty may be given in evidence
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR [sic] IS APPLICABLE TO Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of
PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER. the officer who signed the fire report also testified before the trial caution as to the nature and circumstances of each case
court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the may appear to require.
purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in the

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 7 of 17

 It would have been an entirely different matter if Major
Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report. In that
case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have
been ripe for determination, and this Court would have
agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e.,
inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not
that necessary evidence is absent or not available.22
satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information
of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information,"
there being no showing that, at the very least, they were under
a duty to give the statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the
purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained therein
but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of
PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanuevas
testimony which were of his personal knowledge suffice to prove
that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3
Villanueva had seen Juegos remains at the morgue,12 making the
latters death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an
ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the
incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that
the platform was crushed15 and that it was totally
damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to
bring the chain block to the police headquarters. Upon
inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting
machine, without any pin or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanuevas
testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform was the
loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such
portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain
exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not
admissible.19
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of
the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the
doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere
fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present
instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine in the case at bar:
of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof
of negligence. 20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and
while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not
generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was
due to negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or
transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the
thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or
circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to
raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person
who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which
caused the injury complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence
resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of
things would not happen if those who had its control or
management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence,
or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence
of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or
was caused by the defendants want of care.21
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory
that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which
causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or
has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff
has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the
happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.
The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon
the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether
culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the
defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendants negligence is
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes
presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the
a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause,
reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the
cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant
in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of
necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the
peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it
is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no
negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendants
negligence is beyond plaintiffs power. Accordingly, some
court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the
injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to
the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with
negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for
explanation of the accident.23
There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the
14th floor of a building to the basement while he was working
with appellants construction project, resulting to his death.
The construction site is within the exclusive control and
management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project
superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in
complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances
of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within
the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other
hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused
the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it
applies where evidence is absent or not readily available,
provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident
was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused
the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while performing work in a construction site unless
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions
someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As
explained earlier, the construction site with all its
paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the
injury is under the exclusive control and management of
appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No
contributory negligence was attributed to the appellees
deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present.
All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or
inference of appellants negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption
or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved
that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell
respondents husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the
burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The presumption or
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and,
under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such
as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.27 It
is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent
the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the
defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the
circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been
established.1wphi1.nt
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman
Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police investigator as
evidence of its due care. According to Fabros sworn statement,
the company enacted rules and regulations for the safety and
security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and
the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as
proof of its due care but, in arguing that private respondent failed
to prove negligence on the part of petitioners employees, also
assails the same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabros sworn statement is hearsay and
inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the
hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is
based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the
adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the
commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared
by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language
in writing the affiants statements which may either be omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore,
cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any more than
private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husbands
death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to
rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the
application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense
relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously
availed of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code and
Page 8 of 17
is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceaseds
employer damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. Unless otherwise provided,
the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall
be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer
to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled
to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title
shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act
Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic
Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act
Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and
other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or
by other agencies of the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the
Workmens Compensation Act, provided that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a
personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws
because of said injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act allowed
recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil Code used to
be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled
the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which
involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the
Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation,
in violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take the
required precautions for the protection of the employees, the
heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex
Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex
Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The heirs sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of
remedies, majority of the Court En Banc,31 following the rule
in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of
or choice of action between availing themselves of the remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs.
workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper
suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again
damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act
by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:
whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the
Workmens Compensation Act and sue in addition for
damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs. Cebu
Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker
has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Workmens Compensation Act or to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for
higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said
case to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code despite
having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmens
Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex
in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a
quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely
Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla
and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation
to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor
and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967,
except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be
paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by
herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss
dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the
defense that the claims were filed under the Workmens
Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of
the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by
Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of
Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter
dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the
benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act, such my
not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular
court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex
has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the
deceased miners only after receiving compensation under
the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of
government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the
Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first
remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which
nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The
case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be
successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments
made under the Workmens Compensation Act should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their
favor. [Underscoring supplied.]
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages
sustained by workers in the course of their employment could
be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the
exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In Floresca,
this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the
claimants may invoke either the Workmens Compensation
Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the
consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the
other and that the acceptance of compensation under the
remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions
under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant
who has already been paid under the Workmens
Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil
Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments
occurring after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under the
exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed
the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the
police investigation report and the Prosecutors Memorandum
dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioners personnel.
While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the
respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted
in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in nature."
The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the
alleged negligence of appellant as early as November 25,
1990, the date of the police investigators report. The appellee
merely executed her sworn statement before the police
investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her
relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident. She
did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to
Homicide" against appellants employees. It was the
investigator who recommended the filing of said case and his
supervisor referred the same to the prosecutors office. This
is a standard operating procedure for police investigators
which appellee may not have even known. This may explain
why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement
of the public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February
6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being
charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to
Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a
chance to appear before the public prosecutor as can be
inferred from the following statement in said memorandum:
"Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law waived their
rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no
reason for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee.
Hence, notice of appellants negligence cannot be imputed on
appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or
before she received the first payment therefrom. Her using
the police investigation report to support her complaint filed
on May 9, 1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a
copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the
Prosecutors Office dismissing the criminal complaint for
insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The death of
the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of
the respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this
case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering
the foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellees
allegation that she learned about appellants negligence only
after she applied for and received the benefits under ECC.
This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the
exception held in the Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant
of the facts, but of her rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached
only elementary school for her educational attainment; that
she did not know what damages could be recovered from the
Page 9 of 17
 death of her husband; and that she did not know that she may It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40.
also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x petitioners contentions. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC
x.36 is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private
the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had
to the trial court for such determination. Should the trial court find
respondent "failed to allege in her complaint that her application availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for
that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already
and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an
received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be
or mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial, issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead
deducted from the trial court' award of damages. Consistent with
the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue." waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise,
our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double
the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have compensation.
now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue
been ignorant of the facts because as early as November 28,
when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal
the trial court. of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its
complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against
decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed
petitioners employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts
by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC,
the filing of the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee that led to her husbands death and the rights pertaining to a
payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the
issued a resolution finding that, although there was insufficient choice of remedies?
Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects,
evidence against petitioners employees, the case was "civil in
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
nature." These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death
or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis
benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month
for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioners
thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two choices of
employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007
remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive
after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be
the benefits from the ECC. ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner, vs. Minor JOANNE
civil liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining
RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election corporation and its violation of government rules and regulations.
C. Diaz, respondent.
between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any Negligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, for
action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, that matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over DECISION
in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds
acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar. Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing (1) the Decision1 of the
responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that
to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double Resolution2 of the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying
her husband died in the elevator crash when on November 15,
redress for a single wrong.38 petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC.
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support
a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne),
cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code application in her behalf on November 27, 1990. represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky),
and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the
The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment
remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was
waived the other. be rendered:
filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39 not aware of her rights. (a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, Diaz as his daughter.
has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support
must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly
the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, support.
time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this
partys rights or of all material facts upon which they Courts ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies. (c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in
depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no the sum of P100,000.00.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited
basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material (d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe
to mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from
fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a just and equitable in the premises.4
the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a persons
consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into
person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was
upon which to make an intelligent decision. ignorance thereof cannot be held against her. already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial
of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. damages. The records do not indicate the total amount private Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.5
That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio
illustrated on the record or by the evidence.40 from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment cohabited and lived together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at
representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a
1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit
remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 10 of 17

From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was
conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central
Luzon Doctors Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and
Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and
the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joannes
needs recognizing the child as his.
The RTC finally held:
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky,
and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is
not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and
continued failing and refusing to give support for the child and to
acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the
heretofore adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter
failed to file any responsive pleading despite repeated motions
for extension, prompting the trial court to declare him in default
in its Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelios Answer with
Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative Defenses was received
by the trial court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial court
on 23 April 1999 rendered a decision granting the reliefs prayed
for in the complaint.
In its Decision6 dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural
child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly
support of P10,000.00 and further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys fees in the
amount of P5,000.00 and the cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default
and a motion for reconsideration seeking the courts
understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to find
a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.7
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer
that the decision of the trial court dated 23 April 1999 be vacated
and the case be considered for trial de novo pursuant to the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.8
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelios
Motion for New Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new trial to be
impressed with merit, the same is hereby granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the
decision is this court dated April 23, 1999 are hereby set aside
but the evidence adduced shall remain in record, subject to
cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate stage of
the proceedings.
In the meantime defendants answer is hereby admitted,
subject to the right of plaintiff to file a reply and/or answer to
defendants counterclaim within the period fixed by the Rules
of Court.
Acting on plaintiffs application for support pendente lite On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and
which this court finds to be warranted, defendant is hereby disposed:
ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum of P2,000.00 a
month from January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support
pendente lite in arrears and the amount of P4,000.00 every
month thereafter as regular support pendente lite during the
pendency of this case.9
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for
is the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother Jinky Diaz
was married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the
law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the spouses
Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code).
The child is still presumed legitimate even if the mother may
have declared against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the same
Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there must
be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days following the birth of the child because of
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way
that sexual intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual
intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese
national and that he was living outside of the country (TSN,
Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home only once a year.
Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was
outside the country and no evidence was shown that he ever
arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of
plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a
relationship with another man before she met the defendant,
there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with
other men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin.
Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see Exh. "A"), so her first
child, a certain Nicole (according to defendant) must have a
different father or may be the son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered
the hospital bills representing the expenses in connection
with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of admission that he
is the real father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even
when he stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to
go to motels even after 1996. Defendant also admitted that on
some instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth of
Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who fetched
Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne
Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant Rogelio Ong and it
is but just that the latter should support plaintiff.10
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne
Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio
Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this Court awarding
support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed
and that the support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz
shall have reached majority age.11
lack of merit in an Order of the trial court dated 19 January
2001.12 From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio
appealed to the Court of Appeals. After all the responsive
pleadings had been filed, the case was submitted for decision and
ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and report as early
as 12 July 2002.13
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals,
Rogelios counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court that
Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution
was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in
the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong,14 which motion was
accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.15
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is
hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated December
15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch
63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the court a quo for the issuance of an
order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA
analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of
plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in
coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of DNA
analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as
follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant
Rogelio G. Ong, in the early stage of the proceedings
volunteered and suggested that he and plaintiffs mother
submit themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue
of paternity, as a sign of good faith. However, the trial court
did not consider resorting to this modern scientific procedure
notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant that he is
the biological father of the plaintiff even as he admitted having
actual sexual relations with plaintiffs mother. We believe that
DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms,
would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the
present paternity dispute. Considering, however, the
untimely demise of defendant-appellant during the pendency
of this appeal, the trial court, in consultation with out
laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis, can
possibly avail of such procedure with whatever remaining
DNA samples from the deceased defendant alleged to be the
putative father of plaintiff minor whose illegitimate filiations is
the subject of this action for support.17
Page 11 of 17
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA
resolution: offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an individual (except
in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single,
I WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being
IT DID NOT DISMISS RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FOR conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to
a component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code23 provides:
individuals blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva,
ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three or other body parts.
II WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are
WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
known as A (Adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T
LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER JAPANESE
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other (thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an
HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO
than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands having individuals DNA determines his or her physical make up. And
REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty since DNA is a double stranded molecule, it is composed of
III WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These
WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR child. are called "genes."
DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO LONGER
This physical impossibility may be caused: Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs
FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.18
distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a person his
1) By the impotence of the husband; or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework,
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be 2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as
modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding the case to the such a way that access was not possible; "polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA
trial court for DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In other words, DNA
of minor Joanne for compulsory recognition, and by declaring the 3) By the serious illness of the husband.24 typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."
minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.19 The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows: How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it
finds it prudent to concentrate its attention on the third one, the any of the following: in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA
propriety of the appellate courts decision remanding the case to typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length
the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing. Considering that a (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which
definitive result of the DNA testing will decisively lay to rest the judgment; or was used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37
issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; DNA process; VNTR
the first two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent (variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which
rendered moot by the result of the DNA testing. concerned. is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR
(short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the
filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the filiation shall be proved by: process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample
said minor. a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the
legitimate child; or
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and
paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special can match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error
inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who laws. rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are
There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are
paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, legitimate children. done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence
affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known"
resemblance between the putative father and child. 20 There had been divergent and incongruent statements and print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the
assertions bandied about by the parties to the present petition. same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the
presumed legitimate.21 As a guaranty in favor of the child and to availability of new technology, it can now be determined with then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is
protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.
provides: the minor, through DNA testing. As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire variations between people. In each of these regions, a person
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same possesses two genetic types called "allele," one inherited
or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist
in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in Hence, a persons DNA profile can determine his identity.25 produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of
favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of
recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals22: biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the must have been inherited from the biological father. The
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether
of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The unique for each person, except for identical twins. he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal
types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 12 of 17

 the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types
match, then he is not excluded as the father.26
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA
profiles, results and other genetic information directly
generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from
DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a person,
which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating
from that person;
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific
methods which include the extraction of DNA from biological
samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison
of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological
samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable
certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more
distinct biological samples originates from the same person
(direct identification) or if the biological samples originate
from related persons (kinship analysis); and
(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical estimate
for the likelihood of parentage of a putative parent compared
with the probability of a random match of two unrelated
individuals in a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis,
the resolution thereof may provide the definitive key to the
resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne. Our
articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals27 is particularly
relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast
in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals (336 Phil.
741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against
the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science,
(had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our
courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such
conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating
acts,verbal and written, by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA
as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the
other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the
alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique,
the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence.
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to
For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
science when competently obtained in aid of situations
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
presented, since to reject said results is to deny progress.
confirmation for good reasons;
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in
2002 with out en banc decision in People v. Vallejo [G.R. No. (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce
144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the
murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes case; and
of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that
"the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of
reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to the DNA testing.
various chemical processes to establish their profile. From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as
2003, 400 SCRA 584], we acquitted the accused charged with long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
rape for lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed) in our As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any
mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex organic material originating from a persons body, even if found
offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This
perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and
evidence to still our doubts." bones.29
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434, Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples
161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277], where the as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA
Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of
presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated: obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to the conduct of DNA testing.
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from testing. In People v. Umanito,30 citing Tecson v. Commission on
body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical Elections,31 this Court held:
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A
positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R.
In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277] likewise reiterated
the strong weight of DNA testing... the acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in this wise:
"[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar [G.R. satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed the testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
principal evidence for which included DNA test results. x long dead parent could be resorted to."
x x.
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, appellant is the father of AAAs child, which may be
petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order by the accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and
Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of
DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and
argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while
no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar,
alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in
purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does
argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA not, in the course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it
Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu
28
would be more appropriate that the case be remanded to the
proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with
in the matter in litigation, thus: due notice to the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of
court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application Appeals32:
of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been
due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence.
following: The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally
provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 13 of 17
 abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of net income earnings of Emilia who was employed as a public subsidiary capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the
DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the school teacher at the time of her death.7 principle of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that a presumption of
past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has negligence on the part of a defendant may be inferred if the thing
Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims
finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of that caused an injury is shown to be under his management and
deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that the Monsaluds have no cause of
evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to that in the ordinary course of things, the accident would not have
action against them because he and his wife do not own the jeep
forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means happened had there been an exercise of care. Said court
and that they were never the employers of Allan.8 For his part,
of determining paternity. ratiocinated that Oscar Jr., as the registered owner of the jeep,
Oscar Jr. claimed to be a victim himself. He alleged that Allan and
managed and controlled the same through his driver Rodrigo, in
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The his friends stole his jeep while it was parked beside his drivers
9
whose house the jeep was usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr.
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its rented house to take it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle
and Rodrigo were well aware that the jeep could easily be started
Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against mechanic testified that the subject jeep can easily be started by
by a mere push even without the ignition key, they should have
petitioner. mere pushing sans the ignition key. The vehicles engine shall
taken the necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle from being
then run but without any headlights on.10 And implying that this
SO ORDERED. used by unauthorized persons like Allan. The RTC thus concluded
was the manner by which the vehicle was illegally taken, Oscar
that such lack of proper precaution, due care and foresight
Jr. submitted as part of his documentary evidence the
constitute negligence making the registered owner of the vehicle
statements of Jemar Alarcon (Jemar) and Benjamin Andujar
11
G.R. No. 173870 April 25, 2012 civilly liable for the damage caused by the same.
(Benjamin). The two, who were with Allan in the jeep at the time of
OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., Petitioner, vs. GERONIMO BACOY, the accident, declared before the investigating officer that during The RTC disposed of the case as follows:
Guardian and representing the children, namely: MARY said time, the vehicles headlights were off. Because of this
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the plaintiffs
MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, ERIC B. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN B. allegation, Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial court a
and against the defendants Allan Maglasang and Oscar del
MONSALUD, KAREEN B. MONSALUD, LEONARDO B. carnapping case against Allan and his companions docketed as
Carmen, Jr. ordering
MONSALUD, JR., and CRISTINA B. MONSALUD, Respondents. Criminal Case No. 93-10380.12 The case was, however, dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence.13 1. Defendant ALLAN MAGLASANG to pay the plaintiffs, and in
DECISION case of insolvency, for defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR.,
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it
DEL CASTILLO, J.: to pay the plaintiffs, the following sums:
was the latters brother, Rodrigo Maglasang (Rodrigo), who was
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 the registered owner of employed as the driver.14 In any event, Allans employment as a. P73,112.00 for their funeral and burial expenses;
a motor vehicle challenges the Decision2 dated July 11, 2006 of conductor was already severed before the mishap occurred on
January 1, 1993 since he served as such conductor only from the b. P1,000,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 which held him Emilia Monsalud;
liable for damages to the heirs of the victims who were run over first week of December until December 14, 1992.15 In support of
by the said vehicle. this, Oscar Jr. presented as witnesses Faustino Sismundo c. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late
(Faustino) and Cresencio "Junior" Baobao (Cresencio). Faustino, Leonardo Monsalud, Sr.;
Factual Antecedents a resident of Molave, testified that when he boarded the jeep
d. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late
At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud heading to Sominot on December 31, 1992, it was Cresencio who Glenda Monsalud;
(Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their was the conductor. He also believed that Crecencio started to
daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home from a work as such at around December 15 or 16, 1992. Cresencio,
16
e. P40, 000.00, for exemplary damages;
Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, Sominot, for his part, testified that he worked as Oscar Jr.s conductor
f. P20,000.00 attorneys fees; and
Zamboanga Del Sur. Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, from December 15, 1992 to January 1, 1993 and that Rodrigo was
they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate his driver. He stated that upon learning that the jeep figured in
17
g. The cost of this proceedings.
number UV-PEK-600 that was being driven by Allan Maglasang an accident, he never bothered to verify the news. Instead, he
2. The dismissal of the complaint as against the spouses
(Allan). The jeep was registered in the name of petitioner Oscar went to Midsalip to work there as a conductor for his brothers
OSCAR DEL CARMEN SR. and NORMA DEL CARMEN.
del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle vehicle, thereby terminating his employment with Oscar Jr.
18

plying the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga Oscar Jr. likewise testified that it was routinary that after a days SO ORDERED.23
del Sur and vice versa route. trip, the jeep would be parked beside Rodrigos rented
Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration24 contending that the
Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No. 93- house for the next early-morning operation.
19
provision on vicarious liability of the employer under Article 2180
103473 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still Oscar of the Civil Code25 requires the existence of employer-employee
was filed against Allan before the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Jr.s employee subsequent to December 14, 1992. To prove this, relationship and that the employee was acting within the scope of
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23. In a Decision dated March 13, he presented as witnesses Saturnino Jumawan (Saturnino) and his employment when the tort occurred. He stressed that even
1997, said court declared Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt Jose Navarro (Jose). Saturnino testified that he would pay his fare assuming that Allan was his employee, he was hired not as a
of the crime charged.4 to Allan every time he would board the jeep in going to Molave and driver but as a conductor. Hence, Allan acted beyond the scope
of his employment when he drove the jeep.
During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, that the last time he rode the subject vehicle was on December
Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the six minor 23, 1992. He also claimed that immediately before January 1, Oscar Jr. also stressed that the fact that the jeep was running
children5 of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96-20219,6 an 1993, Rodrigo and Allan used to park the jeep at the yard of his
without its headlights on at the time of the accident indubitably
independent civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana. house. Jose likewise attested that Allan was still the jeep shows that the same was stolen. He further alleged that the jeep
20

Aside from Allan, also impleaded therein were his alleged conductor during the said period as he had ridden the jeep many
could not have been taken by only one person. As Rodrigo
employers, namely, the spouses Oscar del Carmen, Sr. (Oscar times in mid-December of 1992.
21
declared in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 (carnapping case), based
Sr.) and Norma del Carmen (Spouses del Carmen) and the Ruling of the Regional Trial Court on his experience, the jeep cannot be pushed by only one person
registered owner of the jeep, their son Oscar Jr. Geronimo but by at least five people in order for it to start. This was due to
prayed for the reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses, as In its Decision dated April 17, 2000, the RTC exculpated the the vehicles mass and the deep canal which separates the
22

well as the award of attorneys fees, moral and exemplary spouses del Carmen from civil liability for insufficiency of parking area from the curved road that was obstructed by a
damages resulting from the death of the three victims, and loss of evidence. However, their son Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable in a house.26

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 14 of 17

Setting aside its earlier decision, the lower court in its
Order27 dated June 21, 2000 granted the Motion for
Reconsideration and absolved Oscar Jr. from civil liability. It cited
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that for an
employer to be subsidiarily liable for the criminal acts of his
employee, the latter should have committed the same in the
discharge of his duties. The court agreed with Oscar Jr. that this
condition is wanting in Allans case as he was not acting in the
discharge of his duties as a conductor when he drove the jeep.
The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
inapplicable since the property owner cannot be made
responsible for the damages caused by his property by reason of
the criminal acts of another. It then adjudged that only Allan
should bear the consequences of his criminal acts. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION is granted, and defendant OSCAR DEL
CARMEN JR. is hereby absolved from all civil liability arising from
the felonious acts of convicted accused ALLAN MAGLASANG.
IT IS SO ORDERED.28
Geronimo appealed.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its July 11, 2006 Decision,29 the CA granted the appeal.
In resolving the case, the CA first determined the preliminary
issue of whether there was an employer-employee relationship
between Oscar Jr. and Allan at the time of the accident. It ruled in
the affirmative and gave more credence to the testimonies of
Geronimos witnesses than to those of Oscar Jr.s witnesses,
Faustino and Cresencio. The CA ratiocinated that unlike the
witness presented by Geronimo, Faustino never resided in
Poblacion and thus has limited knowledge of the place. His
testimony was also unreliable considering that he only rode the
subject jeep twice30 during the last two weeks of December 1992.
As regards Cresencios testimony, the appellate court found it
puzzling why he appeared to have acted uninterested upon
learning that the jeep was the subject of an accident when it was
his bread and butter. Said court likewise considered questionable
Oscar Jr.s asseveration that Cresencio replaced Allan as
conductor when Cresencio testified that he replaced a certain
Sumagang Jr.31
With regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to
the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the registered
owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the
injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such
vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.s defense that the jeep was
stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan
and his companions was dismissed but also because, given the
circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the
implied permission to use the subject vehicle. To support its
conclusion, the CA cited the following circumstances: siblings
Rodrigo and Allan were both employees assigned to the said jeep;
after a days work, said vehicle would be parked just beside
Rodrigos house where Allan also lived; the jeep could easily be
started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking
area was not fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use
of the vehicle which can be started even without the ignition key. Our Ruling
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is Petitioners own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his jeep
GRANTED. The assailed Order dated 21 June 2000 of the was stolen by Allan and his alleged cohorts. Negligence is
Regional Trial Court (Branch 23), Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, in presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Civil Case No. 96-20,219 is SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby
Oscar Jr.s core defense to release him from responsibility for the
entered. OSCAR DEL CARMEN, Jr. and ALLAN MAGLASANG are
death of the Monsaluds is that his jeep was stolen. He highlights
held primarily liable, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs-
that the unauthorized taking of the jeep from the parking area was
appellants:
indeed carried out by the clandestine and concerted efforts of
1. Civil indemnity for the death of Emilia Bacoy Monsalud, Allan and his five companions, notwithstanding the obstacles
Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud in the amount surrounding the parking area and the weight of the jeep.
of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) each or for the total
Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group
amount of One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00);
was already dismissed by the RTC for insufficiency of evidence.
2. Temperate damages in the amount of Twenty-five But even in this civil case and as correctly concluded by the CA,
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each for the death of Emilia the evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence required
Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud was likewise not met to support Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep
(collectively the Monsaluds) or for the total amount of was unlawfully taken.
Seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00);
Two of Allans co-accused in the carnapping case, Jemar and
3. Moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos Benjamin, declared before the police that when Allan invited them
(P50,000.00) each for the death of the Monsaluds or for a to ride with him, he was already driving the jeep:
total amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
04. Q- On that night, on or about 11:30 oclock on December
(P150,000.00);
31, 1992, where were you?
4. Exemplary damages of Forty Thousand Pesos
A- I went to the disco near [the] Public Market[,] Sominot,
(P40,000.00).
Zamboanga del Sur.
No pronouncement as to costs.
05. Q- While you were in disco place, do you know if there
SO ORDERED. 32 was an incident [that] happened?
Issues A- No sir but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at
dawn more or less[,] January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang
As a result of the adverse judgment, Oscar Jr. filed this Petition
arrived driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together
for Review on Certiorari alleging that the CA erred in:
with Benjamin Andujar, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rezada and
1. x x x basing its conclusions and findings on speculations, Joven Orot.34
surmises and conjectures; misapprehension of facts which
xxxx
are in conflict with the findings of the trial court;
04. Q- On that night, on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening
2. x x x declaring a question of substance not in accord with
more or less on December 31, 1992, where were you?
law and with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
A- I went to the disco at [the] Public Market[,] Sominot,
3. x x x departing from the regular course of the judicial
Zamboanga del Sur.
proceedings in the disposition of the appeal and [in going]
beyond the issues of the case.33 05. Q- While you were in the disco place, do you know if there
was an incident [that] happened?
Oscar Jr. points out that the CA failed to consider the RTCs ruling
in its June 21, 2000 Order which was in accord with Article 2180 A- No, sir, but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at
of the Civil Code, i.e., that the tort committed by an employee dawn more or less[,] January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang
should have been done within the scope of his assigned tasks arrive[d] driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together
for an employer to be held liable under culpa aquiliana. However, with Jemar Alarcon, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rizada and Joven
the CA never touched upon this matter even if it was glaring that Orot.35
Allans driving the subject vehicle was not within the scope of his
There were six accused in the carnapping case. If Jemar and
previous employment as conductor. Moreover, Oscar Jr. insists
Benjamin were fetched by Allan who was driving the jeep, this
that his jeep was stolen and stresses that the liability of a
would mean that only three men pushed the jeep contrary to
registered owner of a vehicle as to third persons, as well as the
Rodrigos testimony in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 that it has to
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, should not apply to him. He asserts
be pushed by at least five people so that it could start without the
that although Allan and his companions were not found to have
ignition key.
committed the crime of carnapping beyond reasonable doubt, it
was nevertheless established that the jeep was illicitly taken by On direct examination,36 Oscar Jr. was asked as to what Rodrigo,
them from a well secured area. This is considering that the his driver who had informed him about the accident on January 1,
vehicle was running without its headlights on at the time of the 1993 at around 7:00 a.m., turned over to him after the
accident, a proof that it was started without the ignition key. incident, viz:
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 15 of 17
 Q: When Rodrigo Maglasang, your driver informed you about Q: And that case for carnapping was dismissed, is that 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of
the accident, what did he carry with him if any and turned correct? the person in charge and
over to you?
A: Yes Sir. 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
A: The OR (Official Receipt) and the CR (Certificate of voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
Q: Even the case of Allan Maglasang, was also dismissed, is
Registration) Sir. injured.44
that correct
Q: How about the key of the vehicle? The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person
A: Yes Sir.
just walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and
A: It was not turned over, Sir.37
Q: Because there was no sufficient evidence to establish that run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the
Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same the jeep was carnapped, is that correct? said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused
pushed by a group, the ignition key should then be with Rodrigo the injury was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its
A: Yes Sir.39 owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he
as he was entrusted with the jeeps possession. Thus, at the time
Rodrigo faced his employer hours after the incident, it is While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to had the power to instruct him with regard to the specific
reasonable to expect that the driver should have also returned the support his claim that his jeep was stolen, this circumstance by restrictions of the jeeps use, including who or who may not drive
key to the operator together with the Official Receipt and itself will not prove that it really was stolen. The reason why the it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key,
Certificate of Registration. Notably, Rodrigo did not do so and headlights were not on at the time of the accident was not he also has the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to
instead, the key was allegedly handed over to the police for sufficiently established during the trial. Besides, the fact that the instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution.
reasons unexplained and not available from the records. headlights were not on cannot be exclusively attributed to the Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the victims was due
Interestingly, Oscar Jr. never presented Rodrigo as his witness. lack of ignition key in starting the jeep as there may be other to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.
Neither was he able to attest on cross-examination that Allan possibilities such as electrical problems, broken headlights, or The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises
really stole the jeep by pushing or that the key was handed over that they were simply turned off. a presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could
to him by Rodrigo:
Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and other relevant have overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and
Q: On December 31, 1992, you did not know that it was evidence to support the defense of unauthorized taking, we diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep.
Rodrigo Maglasang who gave the key to Allan Maglasang. Is cannot subscribe to Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was stolen. Unfortunately, he failed to do so.
that correct? The evidence on record brings forth more questions than clear- What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs
cut answers. conclusion that Oscar Jr. gave his implied permission for Allan to
A: I was not there. So, I do not know but he had an affidavit
to show that he turned it over to the police. Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under the use the jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.s failure to provide solid
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (literally, the thing speaks for itself) proof that he ensured that the parking area is well secured and
Q: What I was asking you is that, [o]n the night of December
should not have been applied because he was vigilant in securing that he had expressly imposed restrictions as to the use of the
31, 1992, when it was driven by Allan Maglasang, you did not
his vehicle. He claims that the jeep was parked in a well secured jeep when he entrusted the same to his driver Rodrigo. As fittingly
know that the key was voluntarily given by Rodrigo inferred by the CA, the jeep could have been endorsed to Allan by
area not remote to the watchful senses of its driver Rodrigo.
Maglasang to Allan Maglasang? his brother Rodrigo since as already mentioned, Oscar Jr. did not
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "[w]here the thing that give Rodrigo any specific and strict instructions on matters
A: I was not there.
caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the regarding its use. Rodrigo therefore is deemed to have been
Q: So, you could not testify on that, is that correct? management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, given the absolute discretion as to the vehicles operation,
in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who including the discretion to allow his brother Allan to use it.
A: Yes Sir, I was not there. 38
had management or control used proper care, it affords
Furthermore, Oscar Jr. acknowledged the dismissal of the reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to
carnapping case, thus: and logical explanation by defendant that the accident arose third persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its
from or was caused by the defendants want of care."40 Res ipsa operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the
Q: Now, there was a case filed against Allan Maglasang and loquitur is "merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere registered owners vehicle in connection with his employment.
[his] x x x co-accused x x x [n]amely: Benjamin Andojar, procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and
Dioscoro Sol, Joven Orot, [Jemar Azarcon] and [Arniel] relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of Without disputing the factual finding of the CA that Allan was still
Rizada, for carnapping. Is that correct? his
negligence."41 It "recognizes that parties may establish prima
A: Yes Sir. facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle employee at the time of the accident, a finding which we see no
to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the reason to disturb, Oscar Jr. contends that Allan drove the jeep in
Q: That case was filed by you because you alleged that on plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the his private capacity and thus, an employers vicarious liability for
December 31, 1992, your jeep was carnapped by Allan attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an the employees fault under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot
Maglasang and his co-accused, the said mentioned, is that inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the apply to him.
correct? defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on
The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial
A: Yes Sir. his part."42 The doctrine is based partly on "the theory that the
Savings Bank,45 the car of therein respondent bank caused the
defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury
Q: You testified on the case in Aurora, is that correct? death of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant
either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity
vice president. Despite Article 2180, we still held the bank liable
A: Yes, Sir. of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is
for damages for the accident as said provision should defer to the
therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms." 43
settled doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor
Q: And you could well remember that this representation is
vehicles, i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
the counsel of the co-accused of Allan Maglasang, is that The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established
by jurisprudence are as follows: used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the
correct?
public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the
A: Yes Sir. 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.46 We have
unless someone is negligent; already ratiocinated that:

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 16 of 17

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner
so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is
caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility
therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered
owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public
highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other
vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or
with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that
the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest
of the determination of persons responsible for damages or
injuries caused on public highways.47
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use48 or that the
subject vehicle was stolen49 which are valid defenses available to
a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-
delict resulting from his jeeps use.1wphi1
All told and considering that the amounts of damages awarded
are in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court
concurs with the findings of the CA and sustains the awards
made. In addition, pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,50 an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on
the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time
the judgment of the RTC is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve
percent (12%) per annum on such amount upon finality of this
Decision until the payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DENIED. The Decision dated July 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 is hereby AFFIRMED with further
MODIFICATION that an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on
the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve
percent (12%) per annum on such amount upon finality of this
Decision until the payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 17 of 17