G.R. No.

L-12449 May 30, 1961 accompanied at the time of the shooting by two persons time she was under the influence of fear of Inocencio Hervas.
whom she could not recognize. This statement (Exhibit "1" Explaining this, she declared that the morning after the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Alido, 2 Hervas), of Concepcion Laserna was made on June shooting she sent her daughter Ofelia to the house of
ESPIRIDION ALIDO, ET AL., defendants.
13, 1955. A similar statement was made by her daughter, Inocencio Hervas to tell him that she should bury her
INOCENCIO HERVAS and MARCELO HERVAS, defendants-
Ofelia Hervas, and to the same effect. husband; that Inocencio Hervas threatened to kill her if she
appellants.
should disclose or point to him as the author of the death;
The municipal police of Maasin could not effect the arrest of
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. that he just suggested to her that she should explain that the
Alido, but before July 13, 1955, he surrendered to the
Felipe R. Hipolito for defendants-appellants. cause of her husband's death was his having bolo wounds,
Philippine Constabulary at Sta. Barbara, Iloilo. He surrendered
instead of gunshot wounds. Upon being asked the probable
LABRADOR, J.: to Sgt. Silverio Balmaceda at the barracks. Balmaceda
reason why her husband was killed by the accused, she
referred him to Cpl. Delfin de la Torre, who was then
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, investigator of the company. Alido's statement was taken declared that it was because the accused had taken away
Hon. F. Imperial Reyes, presiding, finding accused-appellants down in writing and was presented in court during the trial as bamboos from the land which the deceased was taking care
Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas guilty of the murder of Exhibit "C". According to this statement, Inocencio Hervas of, and her husband had denounced them to the owner of the
their cousin, Francisco Hervas, and sentencing each of them invited him on May 29, 1955 to the house of one Carlos land, namely, Eugenio Maquiling.
to reclusion perpetua and to pay 1/3 of the indemnity of Camral, on the occasion of the killing of a pig that in the The Constabulary investigator, Sgt. Pelagio Agraviador, who
P6,000. Espiridion Alido was also sentenced to suffer the afternoon of that day, Inocencio, he and Marcelo proceeded to had seen the exhumation, corroborates this alleged fear of
indeterminate penalty of from 10 years and 1 day the house of Francisco Hervas, armed as follows: Inocencio, Inocencio Hervas of Concepcion Laserna. He testified that at
of prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day with a shot gun (paltik), Marcelo with a rifle, and he with a the time he was investigating Concepcion Laserna, Inocencio
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased bolo; that once near the house of Francisco Hervas, he heard Hervas was present, and that every time Concepcion was
Francisco Hervas 1/3 of the sum of P6,000, and to pay a one shot and upon hearing it he ran away, returning to the asked a question she would first look at Inocencio before
proportionate share of the costs, but he did not appeal. house of Carlos Camral that about 9:00 that evening, answering the question. Further elaborating on the matter,
On or before May 29, 1955, Francisco Hervas, his wife and Inocencio Hervas came back to the house of Camral with a this witness declared that when the investigation was being
their children were living in their house on a land situated in shotgun, boasting that they could now live in peace because made in the building of the puericulture center, the persons
the barrio of Dagami, Municipality of Maasin, Province of Iloilo. the arrogant man is already dead (referring to the deceased who were present were Concepcion Laserna, her daughter
At about 6:00 in the evening of that day, Francisco Hervas Francisco Hervas.) . Ofelia Hervas, Inocencio Hervas, a policeman and himself,
seemed to have heard some noise coming from his cornfield As a result of this affidavit of Alido further investigation and that he observed that every time a question was directed
near their house, so he went to the batalan adjacent to their petitions were made. Concepcion Laserna was again to Concepcion Laserna, she would look at Inocencio who, in
house to find out what was the noise about, but suddenly a examined this time before the Justice of the Peace of Maasin, turn would look at her with sharp eyes; that he noticed such
shotgun exploded from the neighboring field, and the shot and she then, declared in her affidavit (Exhibit I, Alido, 3 interest on the part of Inocencio that in the middle part of the
from it hit Francisco on the chest and he fell down dead. The Hervas) dated July 20, 1955 that it was Inocencio Hervas who questioning of Concepcion, he had to ask Inocencio to go out.
following morning, the widow, Concepcion Laserna sent her fired the shot that killed her husband, and that Marcelo He also declared that when Ofelia Hervas was investigated,
eldest child, Ofelia Hervas, to the house of Inocencio Hervas, Hervas and Espiridion Alido were with Inocencio at the time of Inocencio Hervas again went inside the room where the
one of the accused, which was nearest their house, and to the the shooting. On July 20, 1955, the information was filed in investigation was being conducted and again he had to ask
house of the brother of the deceased, Proceso Hervas, farther the Justice of the Peace Court of Maasin, charging the three him to go out of the room, because he wanted to have
away, to inform them of the incident. The brother of the accused with the murder of the deceased. The information secrecy in the investigation.
deceased happened to be away from home and as Ofelia charges the accused with having committed the crime with All of the three accused denied having participated in the
returned, she passed by the house of Inocencio Hervas, treachery and evident premeditation. commission of the crime, including Espiridion Alido, who did
informing him that the brother of the deceased could not not appeal from the decision. Inocencio Hervas declared that
come, so Inocencio went to the house of the victim, Concepcion Laserna testified at the trial that three persons he was always in good terms with Francisco Hervas and his
accompanied by three individuals who helped him dig the had approached their house on the afternoon of May 29, wife; that he was living at a distance of one-half kilometer
grave some distance away from the house and there interred 1955, namely, Inocencio Hervas, Marcelo Hervas and from the house of Francisco Hervas, and that the one carrying
him. Espiridion Alido that Inocencio was provided with a paltik,
the work of the family was the wife, Concepcion Laserna,
Espiridion had a rifle and Marcelo had a bolo; that she actually
No steps were taken by the family or by relatives of the saw that it was Inocencio who fired the shot that killed her because one of the hands of Francisco Hervas had been cut in
deceased to Investigate who the author of the crime was. But husband; and that as soon as her husband had fallen down a fight during the Japanese regime; that about 4:00 o'clock in
news of the killing came to the ears of the Philippine after the shot, the three persons ran away. She further the afternoon of the day of the shooting, he had to go to the
Constabulary. So one day the Philippine Constabulary had the declared that she saw the assailant because she was at the house of one Carlos to help in the slaughter of a pig, and did
remains of the deceased exhumed. Those present at the time of the shooting at the window of their house. Demetrio not know of the death of Francisco Hervas until the following
exhumation were the investigator of the Constabulary, Sgt. Hervas, a son of the deceased, also testified and declared morning when the daughter of the deceased, Ofelia, informed
Pelagio Agraviador the Chief of Police, the sanitary inspector that when his father went to the batalan attracted by a noise him thereof; that when she went to the house of Francisco
and the municipal mayor. They proceeded to the barrio of in the cornfield, he (witness) was at the door of the house; there was no one there except the wife and the children, and
Dagami, passing first by the house of Inocencio Hervas, and that when he heard the shot which felled his father, he when he asked her if she recognized the persons who killed
with the latter they went to the place where the body of the immediately directed his eyes towards the place where the her husband, she answered she did not because it was very
deceased had been interred. The grave was dug and the dead explosion had come and saw the aggressor, Inocencio Hervas, dark; that thereafter she left the house and went home, with
body was brought out. They found out that there were nine and his companions, Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido. the instruction that when the brother of the deceased would
pellet holes. arrive he (the accused) would be called. Further testifying, he
Upon being asked why in her statement made before the declared that he returned at about 4:00 in the afternoon, and
Thereafter, the Constabulary began questioning the widow, Municipal Mayor on June 13, 1955 (Exhibit "2" Hervas; that since the younger brother of the deceased, Proceso
Concepcion Laserna. Her statement was taken at the Exhibit "1" Alido), she declared that she saw Espiridion Hervas, did not come, they buried the deceased with the help
municipal building and she declared that she was able to Alido fired the shot that killed her husband and that she did of his children, namely, Carlos, Martin and Juan. Testifying on
recognize Espiridion Alido as the one who shot her husband, not recognize Alido's companions, she explained that at that the exhumation, he declared that the mayor, the Chief of

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 1 of 63

Police and some policemen came on the Sunday following the
burial on Monday; that the Chief of Police and the mayor
called for him at his house; that the son of Francisco Hervas,
named Demetrio Hervas, Juan and Martin were also called;
that some Philippine Constabulary soldiers were also with the
party, and that it was he and the son of Francisco that
indicated to them where the body was buried; that they did
not make any investigation that afternoon because it was
already very late when the exhumation was finished; that
they passed the night at his house and the following morning
the party returned back to the poblacion together with the
wife of the deceased. He also testified that he, the widow and
her children were brought to town, as the Mayor had asked
him to accompany the widow. He denied that at the time the
widow was being investigated, he used to look at her with
sharp eyes. On being asked the possible reason why he was
being accused, he declared that he had an altercation with
one Estong Amorte and Fabian Resano, because when a
certain parcel of land was surveyed, he stopped them
because his brother Marcelo was not present. (It is important
to note that the land which was supposed to be surveyed
appears to be the cause of the trouble, as it is the very land
occupied by Francisco Hervas. Francisco Hervas was the one
named by the original owner, Eugenio Maquiling, to cultivate
and stay on the land. Later, Maquiling transferred it to Estong
Amorte and Fabian Resano.)
The accused Marcelo Hervas also denied the imputation,
declaring that on the day of the shooting, he was away from
his house, and that he learned of the death of Francisco
Hervas only when he arrived home on Tuesday (killing
occurred on Monday). He stated. that he had come from the
poblacion because he was engaged in the business of making
gold teeth for his patients, so he had to go to the poblacion
very often; that on the day following his arrival on Tuesday,
he asked for the wife of the deceased, and he inquired from
her what was the cause of her husbands death, and she had
answered that the deceased had stepped on a bolo; that she
told him that at the time of the wounding of her husband she
had heard a sound similar to a falling can. Asked if there was
any ill-feeling between Francisco Hervas and his family, he
declared that there was none and the deceased even
frequented his house to drink tuba, the deceased being his
first cousin. Asked what the probable reason was why the
widow had pointed to him as one of the authors of the death
of her husband, he declared that she acted under the advice
of their enemies Estong Amorte and Fabian Resano.
Explaining this matter he said that Fabian Resano had
purchased a piece of land from Arcadio Maquiling, the son of
Eugenio Maquiling and as Resano surveyed the land, he
(Resano) tried to include the land belonging to him (Marcelo),
and that he (Marcelo), did not agree to this. As to the charge
that he had been stealing bamboos, he answered that the
bamboos were not Maquiling's but his own.
A consideration of the circumstances brought out at trial both
by the prosecution as well as by the defense, indicate that the
probable cause of the killing is, as indicated by the widow,
Concepcion Laserna, that is, Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo
Hervas resented the act of Francisco Hervas in denouncing
them for cutting bamboos on the land of Maquiling. The land
on which the house of Francisco Hervas is erected belonged
to Eugenio Maquiling. Marcelo Hervas claimed that the notice of the fact that in the month of May and June, the days
bamboos that he cut were his own; that when the land of are long and the sun sets after 6:00 in the afternoon, for
Maquiling was sold to Fabian Resano and the latter was trying which reason even though it was actually 6:00 in the
to survey it, Marcelo objected to the survey on the ground afternoon, when the assault was made, both Demetrio Hervas
that Resano was including a portion of his own land. Both and his mother could easily see and recognize the assailants
accused-appellants Inocencio and Marcelo, both surnamed of the deceased because it was not yet dark. The assailants
Hervas, admitted that the relationship between them and the are well known to them, two of them being first cousins of the
deceased and his family was cordial. There is, therefore, no deceased; so was Alido known to them. It is not that their
reason why the widow should point out to Marcelo and to faces were clearly seen a person can necessary easily be
Inocencio as the authors of the death of her husband, unless recognized from his stature, by the way he stands and moves.
she and her children had actually seen them do the criminal We are, therefore, satisfied that the two witnesses, the
act. widow and her son, actually recognized the assailants as
Espiridion Alido, Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas. The
Her statement when she was brought to the municipal
testimony of the boy, Demetrio, could not be impeached on
building for investigation on June 13, 1955 pointing to
the cross-examination. His testimony was positive and direct,
Espiridion Alido as the one who killed her husband and that
leaving absolutely no doubt as to the circumstances under
his companions could not be recognized by her must have
which he saw the shooting and the certainty of his
been due to the fact that she was then under the influence of
identification of the accused-appellants. As to the widow, the
fear of Inocencio Hervas. The conduct of Inocencio Hervas, a
explanation given as hereinabove stated, to the fact that she
first cousin of the deceased, in not initiating the move to have
was under the influence of fear of Inocencio Hervas,
the authors of the death of his cousin investigated and his
sufficiently explains why in her statement before the mayor
advice of a prompt burial, in locate a guilty conscience he
on June 13, 1955, she pretended not to have recognized the
must have had part therein and he wanted to be saved from
companions of Espiridion Alido on the evening of May 29,
being held to account for he murder. His advice that the
1955.
widow should declare hat the deceased had been killed by a
bolo wound, also attests to his interest in suppressing the There was one other last incident which proves the
truth, certainly to save himself. The testimony of Marcelo to consciousness of guilt of Marcelo Hervas. This is the fact that
the effect hat the widow had told him that the deceased died he pretended to be away and was not in his house when
of a bolo wound is the very explanation that was taught by Ofelia went to notify him of the death of her father. When the
Inocencio Hervas to the widow. Both of them, Inocencio and Constabulary also went to his house, when the matter was
Marcelo, must have thought of pretending that the death of investigated, after the surrender of Alido, he again was not at
Francisco Hervas was due to a bolo wound, not from a home. As a barrio lieutenant, he should have been the first to
gunshot wound, to suppress or prevent the investigation of make steps to report the crime, but he pretended to be away.
the crime. Marcelo Hervas was the barrio lieutenant. Why did These are the circumstances which show consciousness of
he not take steps to have the matter reported to the guilt on his part.
authorities for investigation? His only excuse was that the
With the above circumstances and the testimony of two
widow supposedly told him that he lied of a bolo wound. If he
witnesses identifying the two accused-appellants and the
was satisfied with this false explanation, it must have been
finding of the trial judge who heard the witnesses and the
because he wanted to shelter he culprits from investigation,
appellants testify, that the appellants are guilty, we are forced
which fact in turn shows also a guilty mind.
to the conclusion that the said accused-appellants
The statement of the widow on June 13, 1955, when participated in the commission of the offense charged, jointly
examined by the municipal mayor, is explained away by he with Espiridion Alido and are guilty thereof. The crime
testimony of the sergeant of the Constabulary who was resent committed is that of murder, qualified by the circumstance of
at the time of the taking of the statement, to the effect that alevosia, as the attack was unexpected and the victim was
every time a question was asked the widow, he would look at even no opportunity to defend himself. As to the aggravating
Inocencio for an answer. This corroborates the story of the circumstance of evident premeditation, it is true that the
widow that she was then under influence of Inocencio and her confession of Espiridion Alido, Exhibit "C" is to the effect that
fear of him. Inocencio had invited Alido, to go with them to kill the
deceased, and that he provided his companions with requisite
We are satisfied with the above circumstances and
arms. However, this confession of Alido is not admissible in
explanation of the widow that her statement on June 13, was
evidence against Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas. We
induced by her fear of Inocencio. Proceeding now to the
therefore had no sufficient evidence of the evident
consideration of the direct evidence, we find that both
premeditation.
Demetrio Hervas, 15 years old, and his mother, Concepcion
Laserna, positively asserted that they saw the three accused WHEREFORE, we affirm the judgment of the court below
Espiridion Alido, Marcelo Hervas and Inocencio Hervas near finding the appellants guilty of murder and the sentence
their house on May 29, 1955 and that they recognized the imposed upon each of them with costs of this appeal against
latter as the one who fired the shot from the "Paltik", that the appellants.
killed Francisco Hervas. Demetrio Her was testified that it was
in the afternoon when the assault was made. The statement
of the widow before the mayor on June 13, 1955 placed the G.R. No. L-16664 March 30, 1962
time of the assault at 6:10 in the afternoon. We take judicial
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 2 of 63
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN separated the kitchen from the sala, running to escape from Domingo, with whom he was living then. But the barrio of
AYONAYON and GASPAR ACERADOR, defendants- the gunfire. Santo Domingo is only seven kilometers from the house of the
appellants. Lazos, the victims, and he could easily have gone from his
As she was about to cross the batalan to the sala, she saw
place of residence to the house of the Lazos in 10 minutes by
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. towards the left the two accused Juan Ayonayon and Gaspar
jeepney. For his part, Acerador was living in a barrio of Panay,
Bonifacio T. Doria for defendants-appellants. Acerador. At that time, Ayonayon was already on top of the
which is only a kilometer away from the scene of the crime.
stairs, while his companion was on the last rung of the stairs.
LABRADOR, J.: The fact, therefore, that the relatives of the accused stated
The prosecution also proved that, that same evening, upon that they were in their respective houses around 6:00 o'clock
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance in the evening of the day of the crime, does not discount the
receipt of news of the murders in the barrio of Namalpalan, a
of Ilocos Sur, Hon. Felix Q. Antonio, presiding, finding Juan possibility that the accused themselves had actually gone to
group of Constabulary soldiers stationed in the poblacion,
Ayonayon and Gaspar Acerador guilty of murder, for the the house of their victims at about the time of 6: 00 o'clock in
together with the municipal health officers and others, went
killing of Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo and, frustrated the evening. It must be noted that the time given was merely
to the scene of the murders. The soldiers found 30-calibre
murder, for the wounding of Genoveva Lazo, and sentencing a calculation, and what may have been considered by one
empty shells on the ground near the kitchen, also on
each of them to death for the crime of murder, and to an witness as six o'clock may actually have been 5:30, etc. So
the batalan above the stairs. They also found that the walls of
indeterminate penalty of from 8 years of prision mayor as that the defenses of alibis appear to Us as of very little weight
the kitchen and a wall of the sala was pierced by bullet holes.
minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion or value, especially in view of the fact that the witnesses for
The dead body of Florentino Lazo was found lying on the floor
temporal as maximum, for the frustrated murder, with the the prosecution clearly identified the accused, such
of the sala, and that of Jose Lazo also in the kitchen, both of
proper indemnities and the accessories of the law, and to pay identification being positive and immediate because given as
them riddled with bullets. Genoveva Lazo was found near the
each his proportional part of the costs. soon as the officers of the Constabulary arrived.
stove. Pergentino Lazo, upon being questioned by the
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on August 5, Constabulary sergeant, gave details of the incident, also We will now proceed to the principal issue, namely, whether
1959, while Florentino Lazo and members of his family, already described by the witnesses for the prosecution, and the three witnesses who testified to having identified the
namely, his wife, Juana Resuello, his children, Jose Lazo, 25 pointed to the two accused herein as the ones responsible for accused were really in a position to and did actually identify
years, Pergentino Lazo, 17 years, Genoveva Lazo, 21 years, the assault. them. The first witness was Genoveva Lazo who said that she
Samuel Lazo, 7 years, and Juan Lazo, 12 years, were taking peeped out of the window and saw the face and figure of a
It is also shown that paraffin casts were taken of the hands of
their supper around a low table in the bamboo kitchen of their man who later she identified as Gaspar Acerador. The
both accused and the casts, upon examination in the National
house at barrio Namalpalan, Municipality of Magsingal, Ilocos description that she gave at the trial coincides with the
Bureau of Investigation, had positive traces of nitrate.
Sur, their two dogs suddenly started barking and running to physical features that the court saw in the person of the said
and fro, below and near the house. Genoveva Lazo called the Various slugs were extracted from the body of the deceased accused at the time of the trial. Gaspar Acerador was also
attention of her father to the unusual behaviour of the dogs Jose Lazo and another was also extracted from that of identified by the wife of the deceased, Juana Resuello, who
and commented that there must be some persons on the Genoveva Lazo, and these, upon examination, were found to declared that Acerador was seen by her on the last rung of
ground. So she stood up and peeped thru the window of the have been fired from a semi-automatic or an automatic .30- the stairs leading to their batalan. Pergentino Lazo also
kitchen and saw a man dressed in dark green fatigue clothes, caliber carbine, from the same gun firing the empty shells. identified both accused when, looking thru the window near
standing on the ground on the opposite end of the kitchen, the stairs, he saw them firing their guns at the deceased
It was further shown that upon learning who the assailants
peeping at the southwestern part thereof in a semi-stooping Florentino Lazo.
were, as per information by Pergentino Lazo, two soldiers
position, with his gun pointed thru the corner of the kitchen.
went to the house of accused Gaspar Acerador. He was not in With respect to Juan Ayonayon, his identification by Juana
The kitchen floor was about four feet eight inches from the
his house and as he was then wearing undershirt and Resuello is beyond question. As Juana was going to cross
ground. The wall of the kitchen was made of bamboo split and
drawers, he had to be taken to his house so he could put on the batalan, she saw Juan Ayonayon already on
flattened as in "sawali". She heard a burst of gunfire (parac-
his clothes, before being brought to town for examination. the batalan and was about to speak to him. He, Ayonayon,
pac-pac) and she felt that she was hit on her left shoulder.
The constabulary men who accompanied him to his house was known to her, consequently, the identification was
She fell to the floor of the kitchen wounded, and lying flat on
saw that a green fatigue suit and poncho were hanging on the prompt and immediate. It is a fact that when one meets a
the floor hid herself near the stove.
wall. On the other hand, Juan Ayonayon was arrested by a person known to him, identification takes place at first sight,
With the first burst of the gunfire, Jose Lazo was also hit and Constabulary captain and his company that same evening in so the testimony of Juana Resuello that she identified
he fell dead on the floor of the kitchen. Pergentino Lazo, upon the house of Marcelino Uberita in Santo Domingo, about Ayonayon, who was known to her, should be accepted. The
observing the gunfire and what had happened to his brother seven kilometers from Magsingal. same fact of identification is true as to the accused Gaspar
and sister, promptly ran away from the kitchen, crossing Acerador, also known to Juana Resuello..
As possible motive for the crime, it was shown that accused
the batalan that separated the kitchen from the sala, and to
Gaspar Acerador had been accused of the murder of Pablo As to the testimony of Pergentino Lazo, which testimony is
the sala, towards a side beside a wardrobe. Here, behind the
Resuello, the brother of Juana Resuello, wife of Florentino being attacked, it is to be noted that he saw the two accused
wardrobe, he hid himself. From this position, behind the
Lazo, the deceased. On the other hand, Florentino Lazo used while the latter were already on the batalan. From a diagram
wardrobe, he heard gunfire from the batalan near the stairs of
to drive a carromata where Hipolito Peralta, who was accused of the house, We note that place where the accused were
the house, and, directed his eyes to the place where the
of the murder of a relative of a cousin of Ayonayon, usually standing, while firing at the decease Florentino Lazo, was
gunfire came from, he saw through the opening of the window
rode in going to court. While nobody could testify as to the visible through a window from the place beside
just above the stairs, the accused Juan Ayonayon and his
motive of the murder, it is apparent from these circumstances the aparador where Pergentino Lazo, had stationed himself.
companion, the other accused Gaspar Acerador. From the top
that enmity must have existed between Florentino Lazo and But the fact that Pergentino Lazo, when the officers came in
of the stairs, the accused fired at his father who had run to
his wife Juana Resuello on one hand, and the accused Gaspar the same evening, declared to the Constabulary officers that
the sala, but who fell down on the other side opposite the
Acerador and Juan Ayonayon, on the other. the assailants were Ayonayon and Acerador, this readiness,
wardrobe.
The defenses presented by the accused are alibis testified to shows that he was able positively identify them at the time of
Juana Resuello, got her two minor sons in her arms, Juan and the assault, the accused being known to him.
by their respective relatives. Juan Ayonayon stated that at
Samuel, and tried to run away from the kitchen also. It so
about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the day in question, he Counsel for Acerador argues that since at the time of the
happened, however, that her husband Florentino was already
was in the house of his cousin Engineer Uberita in Santo assault, which was 6:00 o'clock in the evening, it was already
ahead of her and was already crossing the batalan that

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 3 of 63

dark, the accused could not have been identified by Francisco G. Munsayac, Sr. for appellant Madera. Upon reaching the Municipal Building, Patrolman Feliciano told
Genoveva Lazo, Juana Resuello or Pergentino Lazo. We Elino Bana that he would have to take down his written
Apolinar F. Tolentino and Jose C. Vitug for appellant Andres, et
checked the time when the sun set on August 5, 1959 and We statement regarding the shooting incident, and the latter
al.
have been informed that the sun set on that date at about agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was then 3:00 o'clock
6:38 in the evening, which shows that at 6:00 o'clock, the Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant in the morning. In said dying declaration, he was asked who
surrounding of the house where the victims were shot, were Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. shot him and the answer was: Mundo Madera and two others
not yet dark. The use of a kerosene lamp inside a house does Ancheta for appellee. whom he could not recognize.
not mean that outside the house, where the assailants were
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to
seen, was also dark. The inside of a house is necessarily
the testimony of Patrolman Feliciano that while they were on
darker than the outside; so the use of a kerosene lamp while FERNANDEZ, J.:p their way to the Municipal Building, Elino Bana told him that
the inmates are taking supper, does not mean that persons
outside cannot be identified from within the house. This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants he could not identify the persons who shot him. Said
from a decision of the Circuit Criminal Court 1 finding them policeman has been an investigator in the police force since
Capital is made of the fact that the witness Genoveva Lazo guilty of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer 1964. He should have asked Elino Bana while he was giving
said that during the day there were stars. She did not say that the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally his dying declaration in the Municipal Building why he said
during the daytime there were stars; she must have meant indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00 earlier that he did not know who shot him. But Patrolman
that during the time when the assault was made there were without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to Feliciano did not do this. It must be noted that not only
stars in the sky at night. Beside we take judicial notice of the pay the cost proportionately. Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco Viloria, a witness to the
fact that while it is true that the month of August is dying declaration, testified to its lawful execution.
characterized by showers or rains, they generally are passing There is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the early
morning of April 20, 1970, three men barged at the doorstep The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal
showers and rains, after which the atmosphere becomes
clear. of the house of the victim Elino Bana in Sitio Baag, Barrio right away the identities of the appellants to the Victim
Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the himself and to their relatives Conrado Bana and Francisco
But as the most compelling reason why the witnesses for the first rung of the stairs of the house, fired a volley of shots Viloria, does not militate against their credibility. There is no
prosecution must be believed as to the identification of the from a .45 caliber gun at Elino Bana who was then sleeping on evidence on record that they were asked by their relatives
accused by them, is the fact that they had no cause or reason the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot wounds about the identity of the appellants. Had they been asked,
to charge or point out the accused as the ones responsible for were inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the one that they would have readily revealed appellants' identities as
the offense, there being no strong reason why they should hit him on the abdominal region. Elino Bana did not die they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of
violate their oaths and declare falsely. immediately. He stood up and told his wife to call for his Gabaldon only a few hours after the fateful incident, during a
formal investigation of the case in the Office of the Chief of
After a review of all the evidence, We are convinced that the brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house. The
Police when and where they executed their respective sworn
two accused were really the ones who assaulted and fired at victim's wife fetched Conrado; but when they returned, the
statements.
Genoveva, Florentino and Jose Lazo, and killed Florentino Lazo wounded man was no longer at home for he was already
and Jose Lazo, and that their guilt has been proved beyond brought to the Municipal Building of Gabaldon. He was carried In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970,
reasonable doubt. The penalty that was imposed by the lower by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the assistance of subscribed and sworn on the same date before the Mayor of
court is that of death for the murders of Florentino Lazo and some people. From the Municipal Building, he was brought to Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito Bana categorically
Jose Lazo. There is no question that the murders were the Nueva Ecija General Hospital, but he died on the way that stated that Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo Madera @
committed with the qualifying circumstance of evident same day, April 20,1970. Mundo, while Ross and Totoy Andres were downstairs.
premeditation, and with the aggravating circumstances of We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has
Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be
treachery and dwelling of the offended party. But while the proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Raymundo
familiar with their house. He testified on direct examination
penalty imposed appears justified by the aggravating Madera was the one who fired the shots at the victim Elino
that he slept in the balcony of their house. On cross
circumstances, there is no sufficient number of votes to affirm Bana, one of which was the fatal shot, and that appellants
examination, he said that he slept inside their house. That
the penalty of death for the reason that it does not appear Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with Madera at
does not show any inconsistency in his testimony, because on
from the evidence that the accused-appellants were so the time.
further questioning, he said that the balcony referred to by
perverse as to deserve the supreme penalty. Hence, no
him was inside their house. Yes, he said that after he heard
sufficient number of Justices voted to affirm the imposition of Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was
the death penalty. awakened by the gunfire and saw the appellant Raymundo the shots, he jumped to the ground through the back portion
Madera standing on the first step of their stairs holding a .45 of their house. The falsity of this statement has not been
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified caliber firearm. He also saw the appellants Marianito Andres shown by the defense. The pictures presented by it which
by imposing upon each of the accused-appellants the penalty and Generoso Andres just behind the appellant Madera, at a apparently show that there was no such opening, can be
of reclusion perpetua for the murder of Florentino Lazo and distance of 1 1/2 meters from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife explained by the fact that the tall grasses could obscure the
Jose Lazo, but the judgment is hereby affirmed in all other of the victim, declared that she saw Raymundo Madem as the back portion of the house where the kitchen door was
respects. The judgment and sentence imposed upon them for one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm, and located.
the wounding of Genoveva Lazo is affirmed, with costs appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were then
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he
against accused-appellants. So ordered. with Madera. heard the burst of gunfire. But that would not prove that he
In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the failed to recognize the appellants.
G.R. No. L-35133 May 31, 1974 prosecution presented the dying, declaration of the victim An excited person may overlook the presence of another
Elino Bana. The trip from the house of Elino Bana to the whom he would otherwise have observed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Municipal Building took only about thirty minutes. On the way,
RAYMUNDO MADERA @ "Mundo", MARIANITO V. they were met by policeman Ambrosio Feliciano from Under some circumstance, however, excitement may
ANDRES @ "Totoy", GENEROSO ANDRES @ Gabaldon who was fetched from his house by Barrio Captain whet the attention to a keen edge. In some other cases,
"Ross", defendants-appellants. Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look into the shooting incident. it has been observed, in effect, that the emotion incident

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 4 of 63

 to the impending peril may not be the kind of excitement
which confuses, but that which focalizes the faculties to
scrutinize. the circumstance of the threatened danger in
order to avoid it. 2
The appellants asserted in their briefs 3 that "the evidence on
record does not show that there was a moon shining in the
early morning of April 20, 1970, at Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon,
Nueva Ecija;" that it was then "a moonless night;" hence,
Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana could not have recognized
the appellants. This position is untenable. Why?
The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of
4 agreement and in order to establish the existence of
nature" and, under this rule, of the time when the moon
rises or sets on a particular day. 5 This not withstanding and
for certainty, We took it unto Ourselves to get a certification
from the Weather Bureau 6 which shows that the moon was
bright at the time of the shooting incident. It reads:
To whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that, based on the computations made
by this office, the following astronomical data for
Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and correct:
1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and
set the following day, April 20, at 4:27 A.M.;
2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at
an altitude of 34 degrees above the western horizon with
bearing of South 73 degrees West;
3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on
April 20, 1970, full moon having occurred at 00.21 A.M.
on April 22,1970.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mr.
Estanislao Fernandez, Associate Justice, Supreme Court,
Manila.
For the Administrator:
(Sgd) Simeon V. Inciong
SIMEON V. INCIONG Chief, Astronomical Division
It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on
the part of the appellants for there is no doubt as to their
identities.
It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic
chemist of the NBI, appellant Raymundo Madera was found
negative in a paraffin test. But Obra himself admitted that,
the paraffin test having been conducted fourteen days after
the incident, the test could have given a negative result even
if the appellant had fired a gun fourteen days earlier, because
the nitrate deposits on his hands could have been washed off
by washing or could have been removed by perspiration.
The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense of the prosecution of criminal cases that the prosecutor's
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the finest hour is not when he wins a case with the conviction of
appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of the accused. His finest hour is still when, overcoming the
appellant Raymundo Madera is just about 400 meters away advocate's natural obsession for victory, he stands up before
from that of the victim Elino Bana.
We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres because
the Solicitor General recommended their acquittal. And We
agree.
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind
appellant Madera when the latter fired shots at Elino Bana,
did not make them liable for what Madera did, there being no
proof whatsoever of any conspiracy among the three
appellants. They were not armed. They did nothing to help
Madera. Their mere passive presence at the scene of the
crime did not make them liable either as co-principals or
accomplices. In one of the latest decisions of this Court,
penned by Justice Felix Q. Antonio, We held:
It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy
presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or
such a circumstance, it is not enough that the persons
supposedly engaged or connected with the same be
present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be
established a logical relationship between the
commission of the crime and the supposed conspirators,
evidencing a clear and more intimate connection
between and among the latter, such as by their overt
acts committed in pursuance of a common design.
Considering the far-reaching consequences, of criminal
conspiracy, the same degree of proof required for
establishing the crime is required to support a finding of
its presence that is, it must be shown to exist as clearly
and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.
The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold
him liable, upon the other hand, as an accomplice, it
must be shown that he had knowledge of the criminal
intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated by
previous or simultaneous acts which contributes to the
commission of the offense as aid thereto whether
physical or moral. As aptly stated in People v. Tamayo: "It
is an essential condition to the existence of complicity,
not only that there should be a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice, but it is further necessary that
the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should
cooperate with the intention of supplying material or
moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious
way." ... From our view of the evidence it has not been
convincingly established that appellant cooperated in the
commission of the offense, either morally, through
advice, encouragement or agreement or materially
through external acts indicating a manifest intent of
supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an
efficacious way. Such circumstances being absent, his
mere passive presence at the scene of the crime
certainly does not make him either a co-principal or an
accomplice in the commission of the offense. 7
This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge
the Court and pleads not for the conviction of the accused but
for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to prosecute
only the guilty and to protect the innocent. We, therefore,
commend Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant
Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions
for having correctly recommended the acquittal of the
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed
with respect to the appellant Raymundo Madera alias
"Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against him; and it is
hereby reversed as regards appellants Marianito Andres alias
"Totoy" and Generoso Andres alias "Ross", who are hereby
acquitted of the crime charged with proportionate costs de
oficio. Their immediate release from confinement is hereby
ordered unless they are held for another legal cause.
G.R. No. L-45857 October 27, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES, defendant-appellant.
Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Emilio Abrogena for defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J:
In her sworn complaint, complainant Violeta Begino y Aquino
accused defendant-appellant of forcible abduction with rape
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1973, in Quezon
City Philippines, the above-named accused with lewd
design, and then and there wilfully, unlawfully appeal
feloniously, by means of force and intimidation abduct
the undersigned, by then and there forcibly dragging her
into a tricycle, after which the undersigned was brought
to a house located at Novaliches. this City where said
accused by means of force and intimidation had carnal
knowledge of the undersigned, all against the will and
without the consent of the undersigned, to her damage
and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Contrary to law (p. 2, rec.).
The trial court convicted him of the charge and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
accessories of the law, to indemnify the complainant in the
sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs,
crediting him however with the entire period of his temporary
detention.
Complainant Violeta Begino, a native of Cabcab Catanduanes,
was about 15 years and 10 months old on July 15, 1973, a
Sunday. About 4 feet and 7 inches tall and weighing about 93
lbs., she was the housemaid of Jose Baruela of Galas, Quezon
City.
Between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, July 15,
1973, Violeta was standing at the corner of Luzon Avenue and
Union Civica St., Galas, Quezon City, waiting for a ride to
Quiapo, Manila to buy slippers for her employer. Appellant
Ernesto Sison, then about 23 years old, who was courting her,
approached her and invited her to take the tricycle then
driving. When she refused, appellant allegedly drew 7-inch
knife and poked it at her abdomen, threatening to kill her if
Page 5 of 63
she did not board his tricycle. He allegedly seized her and were other pass but she did not make any outcry nor ask help routes, the heavy population in Metropolitan Manila, and the
forced her to get into the tricycle. from the other passengers during that long trip from habits of the residents therein.
Balintawak to Novaliches, which is a lot farther than from
This is quite incredible because on such Sunday afternoon, There is nothing in the record to indicate as to why her
Espaa Rotonda to Balintawak. Balintawak is also a busy
with many people passing by or walking in the vicinity, as mother and her employer did not look for her during the six
street all the way to Clover Leaf (the hub connecting to
Galas is thickly populated by low-income and middle-class days that she was missing from the house of her employer
Novaliches) and there are many houses' and shops along the
groups - of which fact the Supreme Court can take judicial and why they did not report to the police authorities said fact
way - more so upon reaching the busy market near the Clover
notice - she could have resisted and shouted for help. It was of her being missing for almost a week. Neither is there any
Leaf. And then from Clover Leaf through Quirino Avenue
not easy for appellant to grab her and force her into the intimation that her employer inquired about the money he
towards Novaliches, there must have been numerous persons
tricycle without being noticed by passersby and bystanders. gave to her to purchase slippers, which is quite unnatural.
that Sunday afternoon, because Quirino Avenue is likewise a
She claims that after she was seated inside the tricycle,
busy avenue, being the only route to Novaliches from the All the foregoing circumstances not only negate the
appellant drove his tricycle to the Espaa Rotonda, a busy
Clover Leaf and the traffic along that thoroughfare is heavy at conclusion that she was sexually assaulted by appellant
intersection of Espaa St., Manila, Quezon Avenue, Espaa
all hours of the day because of the numerous passenger against her will, but also affirm that she went willingly with
Extension (now E. Rodriguez Ave.), Mayon St., and Pulog St.
buses, jeepneys, cargo trucks, and private cars on the road. the appellant and submitted to his lewd design.
going towards Galas, Quezon City. Said rotonda is over one
But she did not cry for help.
kilometer from Galas, with several street corners to pass Consequently, the only possible conclusion is that she
along the way. At Novaliches, appellant led her to the house of another aunt, voluntarily went with appellant on that six-day tryst with him.
Maria Aviles Reyes and took her purse containing P12.00. for which appellant could have been convicted of consented
With appellant driving the tricycle, complainant could have
After eating their supper, appellant allegedly brought her to a abduction as Violeta was then over 12 but under 18 years of
shouted for help while seated in the rear compartment for
room and ordered her to lie down. She resisted and appellant age (Art. 343, R.P.C.), if the complaint included the essential
passengers behind him, since as aforestated, from the corner
slapped her repeatedly. She became unconscious and upon elements of abduction with consent Valdepeha vs. People, 16
where she was allegedly forced to board the tricycle up to
regaining consciousness, she found herself naked with SCRA 871, April 30, 1966; U.S. vs. Asuncion, 31 Phil. 614, Oct.
Espaa Rotonda is quite a distance, with so many houses and
appellant on top of her and his penis inside her vagina "up to 2, 1915). Unfortunately, the complaint as aforequoted does
several persons along the way. And children would be playing
her stomach." If she resisted as she claimed, there should not allege that the offended party was a virgin, over 12 years
on the streets. Or she could have jumped out of the tricycle
have been some commotion and maybe pieces of furniture and under 18 years of age Barba vs. People, 89 SCRA 112,
for a tricycle does not run fast and the tricycle is always open
like chairs and tables being pushed or the sound of shuffling March 28,1979; People vs. Castro, 58 SCRA 473, Aug. 19,
at its right side just behind appellant who was on the driver's
feet, accompanied by her cries or screaming indicating 1974; People vs. Samillano, 56 SCRA 573, April 22, 1974;
seat. Appellant could not be poking a knife with one hand at
resistance. When he slapped her repeatedly, she must have People vs. Magat, 94 Phil. 118, Dec. 29, 1953).
Violeta and driving the tricycle with the other hand.
shouted in pain and even cursed him aloud with the usual
Hence, the appellant should be acquitted of the charge.
From the Espaa Rotonda, they took a passenger jeepney for vulgar rivectives With such commotion, screaming, cries of
Balintawak, Quezon City. They were allegedly the only pain and vulgar purses it is unthinkable that the aunt and the WHEREFORE, APPELLANT ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES IS
passengers of the jeepney, with appellant holding her hands rest of the inmates of the house would not have heard the HEREBY ACQUITTED. WITH COSTS DE OFICIO.
and telling her that he would kill her if she tried to go home. same. They could have been curious about the commotion
From Espaa Rotonda to Balintawak is a distance of about five and could have frustrated whatever criminal Intention HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED UNLESS HE IS
kilometers. Being a passenger jeepney, it presumably took appellant might have towards her. HELD FOR SOME OTHER VALID CHARGES.
the usual passenger jeepney routes. It would be unbelievable
She alleged that he had sexual intercourse with her three
that all throughout the distance of about five kilometers, a
times that July 15 even as she was experiencing pain. The G.R. No. L-54886 September 10, 1981
Sunday afternoon, no other passenger boarded the jeepney
following day (July 16), he had sexual intercourse with her
between Espaa Rotonda and Balintawak. The route of said REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE
four times. Then on the third day (July 17), he did the same to
jeepney must pass through Mayon St. towards North HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Special Second
her. They stayed in Novaliches from July 15 to July 21,
Cemetery beside Balintawak. But even assuming that they Division), COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN,
1973. .Never did she complain to his aunt or to the other
were the lone passengers of the jeepney throughout the TURANDOT, TRAVIATA, MARCELITA, MARLENE, PACITA,
inmates of the house about what appellant did to her. During
distance she could have shouted for help or created a MATTHEW, VICTORIA and ROSARY, all surnamed
those six days, she must have gone out of the room to eat or
commotion to alert the jeepney driver. It is also possible that ALDABA, respondents.
to attend to personal necessities in the bathroom. During
she must have seen policemen along the route, especially
those six days too, his aunt and the other members of the MAKASIAR, J.:
near the gate of the North Cemetery. The various jeepney
family would have noticed her painful expression or her
routes from Quezon City to North Cemetery include Mayor Petitioner, through this petition for review by certiorari, seeks
moaning in pain and would have asked her the cause of the
Norberto Amoranto St. (formerly Retiro), Del Monte Avenue, to annul and set aside the respondent Court of Appeals' April
same.
Dapitan, Laong-Laan St., and from Manila to the North 29, 1980 decision and August 15, 1980 resolution in CA G.R.
Cemetery then to Balintawak, via Dimasalang St., and coming In the afternoon of July 21, 1973, appellant, with his mother No. 10081-SP, entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus
from Rizal Avenue Extension and passing the Chinese General and his aunt Maria, brought Violeta to his house in Sampaloc, Hon. Roque Tamayo, et al. " a special action for certiorari,
Hospital via Blumentritt. Upon reaching the busy intersection Manila, and from there, to Violeta's mother at 11-B Luzon prohibition and mandamus sustaining the lower court's
in front of the North Cemetery gate, with a lot of people Avenue, Galas, Quezon City. All the mother did was to slap action in dismissing petitioner's appeal as not having been
around, including employees of the gas station just across the her. perfected on time.
gate of the North Cemetery, she could have screamed for
It should be stressed, as heretofore intimated, that this Court The root case is an expropriation proceedings initiated by the
help, but she did not.
sitting in Metro Manila, can take judicial notice of the petitioner over a 15,000 square meter lot of private
At Balintawak, appellant allegedly brought her to the house of geography of said metropolis, and the approximate distance respondents situated in Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan,
his aunt, to whom he allegedly introduced her as his from Galas to Espaa Rotonda, from Espaa Rotonda to docketed in the lower court as Civil Case No. 525, entitled "
girlfriend. After talking to her aunt, he and complainant left Balintawak, and from Balintawak to Novaliches, the Republic of the Philippines vs. Turandot Aldaba, et al. " The
the house and rode in a passenger jeepney bound for passenger routes to said place, the nature of traffic along said subject parcel of land is needed by the petitioner to set up a
Novaliches, passengers inside the jeepney Quezon City. There permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop, Bureau of

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 6 of 63

Equipment, Department of Public Highways, a public purpose granted a second extension of thirty (30) days from February appeal. The record on appeal was filed only on June 11,
authorized by law to be undertaken by the Ministry of Public 17, 1979, within which to file the record on appeal of the 1979 (should be June 7), which is well beyond the period
Highways. On March 2, 1978, the lower court issued a writ of Republic of the Philippines" (p. 79, C.A. rec.). to file record on appeal Moreover, the last motion for
possession placing the petitioner in possession of the land in extension which was not acted upon by the Court had
Again, on March 22, 1979, the lower court granted petitioner's
question, upon its deposit of the amount of P7,200.00 as only been filed on May 21, 1979 as shown by the stamp
third motion for an extension of thirty (30) days from March
provisional value. On March 31, 1978, counsel for private of the Manila Post Office, the date of the mailing which
19, 1979 within which to file its record on appeal (p. 80, C.A.
respondents filed a motion praying for the creation of a three should be reckoned with in computing periods of mailed
rec.).
(3)- man committee in accordance with Section 5, Rule 67 of pleadings, and received by the Court on June 22, 1979.
the Rules of Court, to study and submit a report as to the just Subsequently, the lower court, in an order dated April 24, Both the motion for extension filed on May 21, 1979 and
and reasonable compensation for the parcel of land subject of 1980, acted favorably upon petitioner's motion for a fourth the record on appeal filed on June 11, 1979 (should be
expropriation. On July 31, 1978, the lower court issued an extension of thirty (30) days from April 19, 1979 within which June 7), have therefore been filed beyond the
order naming the chairman and members of the committee of to file its record on appeal and petitioner's request that the reglementary period of 30 days from April 18, 1979, or
three. On November 17. 1978, the three-man committee records of the expropriation case be forwarded to the Solicitor up to May 18,1979.
submitted a joint report to the lower court, recommending General (p. 81, C.A. rec.).
xxx xxx xxx
that the just compensation of the expropriated land be fixed
at P50.00 per square meter. In this petition, the Solicitor In a motion dated May 17, 1979, the petitioner, invoking
(pp. 34-35, rec.).
General claims that he was not served copies of the heavy pressure of work, asked for a fifth extension of thirty
aforementioned March 31, 1978 motion of private (30) days from May 18, 1979 or until June 17, 1979, within On October 4, 1979, petitioner filed a motion for
respondents, July 31, 1978 order of the respondent lower which to file its record on appeal (pp. 82-83, C.A. rec.). reconsideration claiming that "l) there is merit in plaintiff's
court and the November 17, 1978 report of the three-man appeal from tills Honorable Court's order of December 8,
On June 7, 1979, when its motion for a fifth extension has not
committee. The records reveal that the Solicitor General 1978, a copy of which was received on December 18, 1978;
yet been acted upon by the lower court, petitioner filed its
authorized the provincial fiscal of Bulacan to represent him in 2) plaintiff's May 17, 1979 motion for 30 days extension from
record on appeal (p. 13, rec.).
that proceedings (pp. 11-12, C.A. rec.). Parenthetically, May 17, 1979 to file Record on Appeal, was actually filed on
private respondents in their comment to this petition, alleged On June 15, 1979, eight (8) days after petitioner had filed its May 18, 1919; and 3) the Honorable Court denied plaintiff's
"that the Provincial Fiscal, being duly authorized by the officerecord on appeal, private respondents filed an opposition to appeal without first resolving plaintiff's motion for a 30-day
the aforesaid fifth motion for extension (pp. 85-87, C.A. rec.), extension, from May 18, 1979 to file Record on Appeal" (pp.
of the Solicitor General to represent the latter in this case, the
court merely furnished the office of the Provincial Fiscal with and an objection to petitioner's record on appeal (pp. 88-89, 14-15, rec.; pp. 52-66, C.A. rec.). Relative to the timeliness of
all the pleadings and other papers of the case,, (p. 53, rec.). C.A. rec.), on the ground that the same was filed beyond the the filing of its fifth motion for extension of time, petitioner
reglementary period, because petitioner's motion dated May submitted a certification of the Postmaster of the Central
On December 18, 1978, the Solicitor General received a copy 17, 1979 for extension to file record on appeal was mailed Office of the Bureau of Posts, Manila, that registered letter No.
of the lower court's order dated December 8, 1978. The order only on May 21, 1979 (pp. 13-14, rec.). 3273 containing the aforesaid motion addressed to the Clerk
reads in part: of Court of the Court of First Instance of Malolos, Bulacan ...
On June 27, 1979, petitioner filed its opposition to the was received by this Office late Friday afternoon, May 18,
The joint report filed by the three-man committee aforesaid objection to its record on appeal, contending that
1979. The letter was not included in the only morning
charged with the determination of the just compensation the said May 17, 1979 motion for extension of time was
dispatch of May 19 to Bulacan and was dispatched May 21,
of the property herein sought to be condemned is hereby actually mailed on May 18, 1979, which was the last day of
1979, Monday (May 20, being a Sunday) under the Manila
APPROVED, such that the just compensation of the land the extended period allowed by the lower court's order of
Malolos Bill No. 202, page 1, line 15" (p. 66, C.A. rec.).
described in Paragraph 11 of the Complaint is fixed at April 24, 1979 (p. 14, rec.).
Thirty Pesos (P30.00) per square meter. On the merits of the dismissed appeal, petitioner stressed
In an order dated August 13, 1979 but received by the that the creation of a three-man committee to fix the just
The defendant may now withdraw from the Philippine Solicitor General only on September 10, 1979, the lower court
compensation of the expropriated lot was without legal basis,
National Bank, Malolos, Branch, the sum of P7,200.00 dismissed the appeal of petitioner on the ground that the fifth
because Section 5, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court upon which
deposited by the Third Regional Equipment Services, motion for extension of time dated May 17,1979 within which
the same was anchored had already been repealed by the
Department of Public Highways under Account No, to file the record on appeal and the record on appeal were
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 76 which took effect on
35109, said sum to be part of the total amount of filed out of time. The lower court found that the said fifth
December 6, 1972 under which the court has no
P450,000.00 (15,000 square meters at P30.00 per square motion for extension of time was actually mailed on May 21,
alternative but to base the just compensation of expropriated
meter), which the Department of Public Highways, Third 1979 and not on May 18, 1979 as claimed by petitioner (pp.
property upon the current and fair market value declared by
Regional Equipment Services, Malolos, Bulacan, shall, 14, 34-35, rec.). The order of dismissal reads:
the owner or administrator. or such market value as
and is hereby ordered, to pay to the herein defendants
as just compensation for the subject property. Upon consideration of the approval of the record on determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
appeal filed by the Republic and acting on the On October 31, 1979, the lower court denied petitioner's
On December 22, 1978, the Solicitor General filed through the manifestation filed on July 25, 1979 by the defendants motion for reconsideration for lack of merit (pp. 36-40, rec.;
mail a notice of appeal as well as a first motion for extension thru counsel, the Court finds no merit in the same. pp. 2832, C.A. rec.), thus:
of time of 30 days from January 17, 1979 within which to file
record on appeal. The extension sought for was granted by The last motion of the Office of the Solicitor General for The grounds advanced by the plaintiff Republic of the
the lower court in its order dated January 17, 1979. extension of time to file record on appeal was on May 17, Philippines have been fully taken into account by the
1979, seeking for an additional extension of thirty (30) Court in its order of August 13, 1979, particularly the late
On February 13, 1979, the lower court, acting upon days from April 18, 1979. filing of the record on appeal. Plaintiff's counsel should
petitioner's manifestation filed on January 9, 1979 and motion
The thirty-day period requested by the Solicitor General not have assumed that the motion for extension of the
filed on February 8, 1979, allowed the Solicitor General to
from May 18, 1979 therefore expired on June 17, 1979. period for filing of the record on appeal would be
borrow the records of the expropriation case "under proper
But this last request for extension was not acted upon by granted.
receipt, the Clerk of Court taking the necessary steps to index
and number the pages thereof and to ensure its integrity; and the court. The Republic of the Philippines had therefore
only up to May 17, 1979, within which to file record on

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 7 of 63

The plaintiff's counsel's belief that their May 17, 1979
motion would be granted cannot be the basis for the
plaintiff to be absolved of the effect of late filing of the
record on appeal considering that the Court had liberally
extended for five times *, each for thirty (30) days, the
filing of said record. This Court considers said extensions
as sufficient time for the counsel for plaintiff to prepare
its record on appeal. Plaintiff's counsel, with all the
resources it has to protect its client's interests, should
have been vigilant enough not to assume and should not
expect that their motion for extension would be granted.
It is not correct therefore that only three days had
elapsed after the reglementary period to perfect appeal
because the reglementary period ended not on June 17,
1979, but on May 17, 1979, because the last motion for
extension was not granted by the Court.
The Court deplores the insinuation of plaintiff's counsel
that it took hook, line and sinker, defendant's allegation
about the fact of mailing. I t has carefully gone over the
record and found that the date of mailing of the motion
for extension is May 21, 1979, as shown by the stamp
'Registered, Manila, Philippines, May 1, 1979 appearing
on the covering envelope containing the motion for
extension. Therefore, the explanation contained in Annex
B of the motion for reconsideration to the effect that
registered Letter No. 3273, addressed to the Clerk of
Court, Court of First Instance of Malolos, Bulacan, was
received by the Manila Post Office late Friday afternoon,
May 18, 1979, but was not included in the "only" morning
dispatch of May 19 to Bulacan and was dispatched May
21, 1979, Monday (May 20 being a Sunday), under the
ManilaMalolos Bill No. 202, page 1, line 15', can not
overturn the fact of date of actual mailing which is May
21, 1979, because it is of judicial knowledge that a
registered letter when posted is immediately stamped
with the date of its receipt, indicating therein the number
of the registry, both on the covering envelope itself and
on the receipt delivered to the person who delivered the
letter to the post office. The letter Annex B of the motion
therefore lacks sufficient weight and persuasiveness to
prove the fact that the letter asking for another
extension was actually filed on May 18, 1979, and not
May 21, 1979.
Regarding the creation of a three-man committee which
according to plaintiff the Court sorely lacked the
prerogative to create pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court because it has been superseded by the
provisions of PD 76 which definitely fixed the guidelines
for the determination of just compensation of private
property acquired by the State for public use, the Court
had to resort to this old method of determining fair
market value, which is defined as:
The "current and fair market value" shall be
understood to mean the "price of which a willing
seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy
neither being under abnormal pressure", because,
firstly; the plaintiff failed to show evidence thereof
as declared by the owner or administrator of the
property under the provisions of PD 76, or the
valuation or assessment of the value as determined
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions
by the assessor, whichever is lower. Hence, for all
intents and purposes, the findings of the three-man
committee have become the basis of the evaluation,
Paragraph Ill of the complaint notwithstanding,
because allegation in the complaint, unless proved,
are not binding as evidence.
Presidential Decree No. 42, from its very caption, which
reads:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 42 AUTHORIZING THE
PLAINTIFF IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS TO
TAKE POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY INVOLVED
UPON DEPOSITING THE ASSESSED VALUE FOR
PURPOSES OF TAXATION
does not fix the value of the property to be expropriated,
but rather for the purpose of taking possession of the
property involved, the assessed value for purposes of
taxation is required to be deposited in the Philippine
National Bank or any of its branches or agencies. This is
borne out by the first Whereas of the decree which finds
the existing procedure for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain not expeditious enough to enable the
plaintiff to take or enter upon the possession of the real
property involved, when needed for public purposes. The
second Whereas states that the measure is in the
national interest in order to effect the desired changes
and reforms to create a new society and economic order
for the benefit of the country and its people.
The body of the law does not specify the valuation
of the property, but rather the method by which
seizure of the property could be done immediately,
and that is by the act of depositing with the
Philippine National Bank, in its main office or any of
its branches or agencies, an amount equivalent to
the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation, to be held by said bank subject to the
orders and final disposition of the Court.
Only in this respect are the provisions of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court and or any other existing law contrary to
or inconsistent therewith repealed. If at an, the decree,
PD 42, fixes only a provisional value of the property
which does not necessarily represent the true and
correct value of the land as defined in PD 76. It is only
provisional or tentative to serve as the basis for the
immediate occupancy of the property being expropriated
by the condemnor. This is in line with the recent decisionAppeals was misled by private respondents' counsel in
of the Honorable Supreme Court promulgated on October
18, 1979, in the case of the Municipality of Daet,
Petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Li Seng Giap & Co., 1979, not on May 18, 1979 (which was the last day within
Inc., Respondents, G.R. No. L-45861, which states in part:which to file petitioner's record on appeal); hence, this
..., it can already be gleaned that said decree fixes
only the provisional value of the property. As a
provisional value, it does not necessarily represent
the true and correct value of the land. The value is
only "provisional" or "tentative" to serve as the
basis for the immediate occupancy of the property
being expropriated by the condemnor.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 28-32, rec.).
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid orders of the lower court,
petitioner on December 3, 1979 filed with the respondent
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. No. 10081-
Sp, entitled: Republic of the Philippines versus Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch VI, presided over by Hon. Roque
Tamayo, et al., whereby it prayed that: 1) This petition be
given due course; 2) A writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary retraining order be issued ex-parte restraining
respondent court from executing, enforcing and/or
implementing its Order dated December 8, 1978, ... and its
orders dated August 13, 1979 and October 31, 1979 ...; 3)
After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered: [a]
annulling and setting aside respondent court's Orders of
August 13, 1979 ... : [b] Directing and compelling respondent
court to allow and approve petitioner's record on appeal and
to certify and elevate the same to this Honorable Court; [c]
Declaring the writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order herein prayed for to be made permanent and perpetual"
and for such other relief as the Court may deem just and
equitable in the premises.
On December 14, 1979, respondent Court of Appeals issued a
temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo, and
required private respondents to file their comment (pp. 67-68,
C.A. rec.).
On January 2, 1980, private respondents filed the required
comment (pp. 69-91, C.A. rec.).
On April 29, 1980, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner's action and set aside its December 14, 1979
restraining order. The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that
"A review of the whole record convinces Us that the
challenged orders are not a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion ..."
(pp. 44-45, rec.). The Solicitor General received a copy of the
aforesaid decision on May 19, 1980.
On May 30, 1980, the Solicitor General sought a thirty-day
extension from June 3, 1980 within which to file a motion for
reconsideration (pp. 106-107, C.A. rec.).
On June 20, 1980, the respondent Court of Appeals granted
the extension sought (p. 108, C.A. rec.).
On June 23, 1980, the Solicitor General filed his motion for
reconsideration on the ground that, "The Honorable Court of
holding that petitioner's motion for extension of time to file
record on appeal dated May 17, 1979 ... was filed on May 21,
Honorable Court was not correct in ARRIVING AT THE
CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER'S AFORESAID MOTION FOR
EXTENSION was filed beyond the reglementary period" (pp.
109-118, C.A. rec.). Petitioner also moved to set the case for
oral argument (p. 119, C.A. rec.). Petitioner vehemently
insisted as it did in the main action (pp. 10-12, C.A. rec.), that
it is erroneous to conclude that its
... motion for extension dated May 17, 1979 ... was filed
on May 21, 1979 and not on May 18, 1979 which is the
Page 8 of 63
last day of the extended period fixed by respondent court
for petitioner to file its record on appeal. It is submitted
that the motion for extension dated May 17, 1979 ... was
actually filed on May 18,1979 as there is incontrovertible
proof that the same was in fact mailed on May 18, 1979
via registered mail (Registry Letter 3273) at the Manila
Central Office of the Bureau of Posts. A letter dated
September 26, 1979 of Delfin Celis, postmaster of
Central Post Office, Manila, to the Chief of the Records
Section of the Office of the Solicitor General shows that
the envelope containing the May 17, 1979 motion was
received by the Post Office of Manila on May 17, 1979.
Said letter states:
In compliance to your request in your letter dated
September 20, 1979 in connection with registered
letter No. 3273 addressed to the Clerk of Court,
Court of First Instance Malolos, Bulacan, please be
informed that it was received by this Office late
Friday afternoon, May 18, 1979. The letter was not
included in the only morning dispatch of May 19 to
Bulacan and was dispatched May 21, 19719,
Monday (May 20, being a Sunday) under the Manila-
Malolos Bill No. 202, page 1, line 15.
Thus, it is conceded that the envelope containing the
registered letter of petitioner's motion for extension to
file record on appeal dated May 17, 1979 has on its face
the date May 21, 1979 stamped thereon ... . If the
aforesaid proof of mailing presented by private
respondent is taken into account solely without taking
into consideration the letter of postmaster Delfin Celis
dated September 25, 1979 ... , then it could be said that
petitioner's motion for extension to file record on appeal
dated May 17, 1979 was filed out of time. However, the
certification of the Postmaster stating that the letter was
actually received in the Post Office on May 18, 1979
conclusively shows that such date is the date of mailing,
and the date May 21, was thus wrongly stamped thereon
by an employee of the Post Office. Petitioner should not
be blamed for the mistake committed by the personnel
of the Post Office of stamping May 21, 1979 on the
envelope of said Registered Letter No. 3273. Petitioner's
counsel had nothing to do with the aforesaid mistake
that had been committed by the personnel of the Post
Office.
In resume it can be said with certainty that the records of no copies of the aforesaid pleadings of the private
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Post Office of respondents were ever served on and received by him (p. 18,
Manila clearly show that the petitioner's motion for rec.). Indeed, said pleadings of the private respondents do not
extension dated May 17, 1979 was seasonably filed on show nor indicate that copies thereof were served on the
May 18, 1979 as the latter was actually the date of its Solicitor General (pp. 121-123, C.A. rec.).
mailing and therefore said date should be deemed as the
actual date of its filing before respondent court.
At this juncture, it may be stated that undersigned
counsel were constrained to seek extension to file record
on appeal because of the pressure of work and their
need to borrow the records of the case from the trial
court. Thus, as early as January 9, 19-i 9, they were
borrowing the expediente of the case so as to enable
them to prepare an accurate record on appeal. Petitioner
in its motion and manifestation of January 9, 1979 stated
why it wanted to borrow the expediente of the case at
bar, as follows:
3. The records of the undersigned counsel may not
be complete as it had authorized the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan to appear in the hearings before
this honorable Court, thus it is possible that the
Office of the Solicitor General may not have been
furnished copies of Orders of this honorable Court,
as well as pleadings that may have been furnished
the provincial Fiscal of Bulacan.
4. This being the case, undersigned counsel can not
prepare an accurate and concise record on appeal,
hence it is necessary that the records of the case be
lent to the undersigned counsel pursuant to Sec. 14,
Rule 1:36, of the Revised Rules of Court' (pp. 6-7
Motion for Reconsideration [in the CFI of Bulacan];
see pp. 52, 57-58, C.A. rec.),
On April 10, 1979, undersigned counsel reiterated their
desire to borrow said expediente but it was not until May
3, 1979 that the expediente of the case consisting of 164
pages were received by the Docket Section of the Office
of the Solicitor General. It was only on May 16, 1979 that
said expediente were delivered to undersigned Solicitor,
thus compelling him to prepare the May 17, 1979
motion. And for the same reasons, it was only on June 7,
1979 that the record on appeal was filed, which was well
within the 30 days extension from May 18, 1979 prayed
for in petitioner's motion of May 17, 1979.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 109-113, C.A. rec.).
On July 14, 1980, respondent Court of Appeals resolved to
require private respondents to comment on the motion for
reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt of the
resolution (p. 12 1, C.A. rec.).
Earlier, however, or on July 8, 1980, private respondents
mailed their opposition to the motion for reconsideration and
their waiver to appear for oral argument (pp. 122-123, C.A.
rec.), Both were received by the Court of Appeals on July 14,
1980, the very day the resolution requiring private
respondents to comment on the motion for reconsideration,
was released by the Court of Appeals. In the petition
before this Court, the Solicitor General laments the fact that
In the aforesaid opposition of private respondents, they
claimed that
The undersigned counsel merely stated that the date of
filing the fifth motion for extension to file record on
appeal by the office of the Solicitor General was on May
21, 1979, as shown on the envelope bearing the stamp
of the Manila Post Office, which clearly reads 'May 21,
1979 and the undersigned counsel brought to the
attention of the lower court that the date of filing of this
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions
fifth extension was the date shown when the mailing was
made as stamped on the envelope. That there can be no
other date than the date stamped on the envelope made
by the Manila Post Office when the fifth request for
extension of filing the record on appeal was mailed. This
fact of the date of mailing, May 21, 1979, was stamped
on the envelope.
The office of the Solicitor General further alleged:
If ... taken into account solely without taking into
consideration the letter of the Post Master Delfin
Cells, dated September 25, 1979 x x, then it could
be said that petitioner's motion for extension to file
record on appeal, dated May 17, 1979, was filed out
of time.
From the above statement of the Office of the Solicitor
General there can never be any abuse in the exercise of
judgment as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion.
the lower court chose to rely on the date stamped on the
envelope by the Manila Post Office rather than
considering as paramount a mere letter from the Manila
Post Office employee, Delfin Cells.
xxx xxx xxx
If we are to believe that the stamped date, May 21,
1979, was wrongly stamped by an employee of the
Manila Post Office, then thousands of mails received and
or mailed on that date were all wrongly stamped. How
can the lower court believe that the date May 21, 1979,
was merely erroneously stamped on the envelope? The
lower court's finding of facts on this regard, must also be
sustained.
The other reason given by the Office of the Solicitor
General was that they have asked for the complete
record of the case but that it was only forwarded to their
office sometime on May 3, 1979.
The record of the case cannot be easily forwarded to the
Solicitor General because there was the case of motion
for intervention filed in connection with the case.
The failure on the part of the court to immediately
comply with the request of the office of the Solicitor
General cannot be a justifying reason for failure to
comply with the rules of court and of the order of filing
the record on appeal within the reglementary period, or
time given by the court.
The office of the Solicitor General gave the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan the power to handle the case for (them)
and the office of the Provincial Fiscal was furnished with
all pleadings, orders and other papers of the case. The
record therefore of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal can
easily be available to them. Besides no less than five (5)
extensions of time had been requested and the last one
was not acted upon by the Court and yet the Office of
the Solicitor General filed the Record on Appeal only on
June 17, 1979 should be June 7, 1979), which is far
beyond the reglementary period which was May 17, 1979
(should be May 18, 1979).
xxx xxx xxx
Page 9 of 63
 (pp. 123-125, C.A. rec.). filed within the period of time herein provided, the appeal upon any of the subjects in this section stated, when it shag
shall be dismissed; and Section 14, Rule 41; A motion to find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for
On August 15, 1980, respondent Court of Appeals issued a
dismiss an appeal on any of the grounds mentioned in the its aid to appropriate books or documents or reference."
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, thus:
preceding section may be filed in the Court of First Instance
Undoubtedly, the post office practice of which the Court of
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated June 23, prior to the transmittal of the record to the appellate court.
First Instance took judicial notice is not covered by any of the
1980 filed by the Solicitor General and the opposition
The Court of First Instance of Bulacan dismissed herein specific instances cited above. Neither can it be classified
thereto filed on July 8, 1980 by the respondents and
petitioner's appeal on the bases of the foregoing provision under "matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable
considering that the said motion does not cite new
upon its finding that the record on appeal of petitioner was of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
matters which have not been considered in the decision
filed out of time as it was filed only on June 7, 1979 or twenty judges because of their judicial functions ... . " For a matter to
promulgated on April 29, 1980, the said motion is hereby
(20) days after May 18, 1979, the last day of the appeal be taken judicial notice of by the courts of law, it must be a
denied.
period s extended petitioner fifth extension of time of thirty subject of common and general knowledge. In other words,
Petitioner's Motion to Set Case for Oral Argument' dated days from May 18, 1979, not having been favorably acted Judicial notice of facts is measured by general knowledge of
June 23, 1980 is likewise DENIED. upon by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan upon its finding the same facts. A fact is said to be generally recognized or
that the same was also filed late or three days after the last known when its existence or operation is accepted by the
Aforesaid resolution was received by the Solicitor General on day of the extended appeal period. The implication of the public without qualification or contention. The test is whether
August 20, 1980. questioned orders of the Court of First Instance is that since the 'act involved is so notoriously known as to make it proper
Hence, this recourse. the fifth extension of time was filed out of time, no action may to assume its existence without proof. The fact that a belief is
be taken thereon by it; hence, petitioner Republic had only up not universal, however, is not controlling for it is very seldom
Petition was filed on October 24, 1980; two extensions of time to May 18, 1979 within which to file the record on appeal. that any belief is accepted by everyone. It is enough that the
of thirty (30) days each having been previously asked by and Consequently, the filing thereof only on June 7, 1979 was too matters are familiarly known to the majority of mankind or
granted to petitioner Republic of the Philippines. late. those persons f with the particular matter in question (20 Am
On October 29, 1980, WE resolved to require respondents to Jur 49-50; Martin, Rules of Court 37, Second Edition).
The petitioner, however, herein contends as it did before the
comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice of Furthermore, a matter may be personally known to the judge
Court of First Instance of Bulacan and before the respondent
the resolution and at the same time issued a temporary and yet tot be a matter of judicial knowledge and vice versa,
Court of Appeals, that its fifth extension of time was actually
restraining order enjoining respondents from executing, a matter may not be actually known to an individual judge,
filed on May 18, 1979, not on May 21, 1979 as found out by
enforcing and/or implementing the decision dated April 28, and nevertheless be a proper subject of judicial cognizance.
the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals and in
1980 issued in CA G.R. No. SP-10081, entitled "Republic of the support thereof, pointed to the certification of the postmaster The post office practice herein involved is not tested by the
Philippines, Petitioner, versus Hon. Roque Tamayo, etc., et al., of the Central Office of the Bureau of Posts, dated September aforestated considerations, a proper matter of judicial notice.
Respondents" of the Court of Appeals, and the Order dated 25, 1949 (P. 47, rec.) to the effect that the said motion for Moreover, the certification issued by the very postmaster of
December 8, 1978 issued in Civil Case No. 5257-M, entitled extension of time as contained in registered mail No. 3273 the post office where the letter containing the questioned
"Republic of the Philippines. Plaintiff, versus Turandot Aldaba, addressed to the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Bulacan motion for extension of time was posted, is a very clear
et al., Defendants" of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, (Malolos) ... was received by this office late Friday afternoon, manifestation that the said post office practice is not of
Branch VI at Malolos, Bulacan, (pp. 49-51, rec.). May 8, 1979. The letter was not included in the only morning unquestionable demonstration. Indeed, the doctrine of judicial
On November 14, 1980, private respondents filed their dispatch of May 19, to Bulacan and was dispatched May 21, notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The
comment to the petition contending that no abuse of 1979, Monday (May 20 being a Sunday) under the Manila- power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts
discretion or act in excess of jurisdiction exists as to require a Malolos Bill No. 202 page 1, line 15." with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
review by this honorable Court (pp. 52-64, rec.). exists; and every reasonable doubts upon the subject should
But the Court of First Instance of Bulacan opined that said
be promptly resolved in the negative (31 CJS 522; Martin,
On November 24, 1980, WE resolved to give due course to certification cannot override the prevailing practice in post Rules of Court 38, Second Edition).
the petition and to declare the case submitted for decision (p. offices "that a registered letter when posted is immediately
65, rec.). stamped with the date of its receipt, indicating therein the It is therefore manifest from the foregoing that the Court of
number of the registry, both on the covering envelope itself First Instance of Bulacan committed a palpable error
But on December 22, 1980, private respondent filed a motion, and on the receipt delivered to the person who delivered the amounting to a grave abuse of discretion in relying on the
praying for the outright dismissal of the instant petition on letter to the office" of which it took judicial notice. alleged post office practice aforementioned over the
the main ground that the decision of the respondent Court of uncontroverted certification of the postmaster earlier referred
Appeals sought to be reviewed has already become final and WE entertain grave doubts that the aforesaid post office to. That being so, the dismissal of petitioner's appeal
executors hence, unappealable, because this petition was practice is a proper subject of judicial notice. therefore lacks factual basis. It should have acted on
filed out of time as the petitioner's motion for reconsideration Section 1 of Rule 129 on judicial notice provides that "The petitioner's fifth motion for extension of time which WE find to
iii the Court of Appeals was pro forma (pp. 66-67, rec.). existence and territorial extent of states, their forms of have been filed on time.
The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, The records reveal that a favorable action on the aforesaid
respondent Court of Appeals itself committed a grave abuse the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their fifth motion for extension of time is warranted by the
of discretion in not finding that the respondent trial court seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, following circumstances: (1) the record on appeal was filed by
committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial petitioner even before the lower court could consider the
petitioner's appeal. The questioned orders should be set departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the questioned motion for extension of time; and private
aside. measure of time, the geographical divisions and political
respondents objected to the said motion only after petitioner
history of the world and all similar matters which are of public
I. It must be underscored that the basic provisions of the knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, had filed the record on appeal; (2) the order of the lower court
Rules of Court basis of the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial granting the fourth extension of time did not contain any
by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as sustained by the functions, shall be judicially recognized by the court without caveat that no further extension shall be allowed; (3) the fact
respondent Court of Appeals are Section 13, Rule 41; Where the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence that the CFI records of the case were sent to the Solicitor
the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal are not General only on May 3, 1979 and ostensibly handed to the

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 10 of 63

Solicitor assigned to the case only on May .16, 1979 or barely
two (2) days before the expiration of the extended appeal
period; and (4) pressure of work in the undermanned Office of
the Solicitor General who is the counsel of the National
Government and all other governmental agencies and
instrumentalities; and (5) and the unconscionable amount of
P450,000.00 for a parcel of 1.5 hectares situated in a barrio of
Malolos, Bulacan, with only a provisional value of P7,200.00
obviously based upon its assessed value appearing on its tax
declaration. No sugar, rice or coconut land of only 15,000
square meters could command such a fabulous price.
WE therefore rule that the respondent Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in affirming the disputed orders
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
II. But even assuming that the motion for extension to file
record on appeal dated May 17, 1979 was filed not on May
18, 1979 but on May 21, 1979 as claimed by private
respondents, which is a delay of only one (1) working day,
May 19 and 20 being Saturday and Sunday, respectively, that
circumstance alone would not justify the outright dismissal of
the appeal of petitioner Republic of the Philippines, especially
so in the light of the undisputed fact that petitioner had
already filed with the lower court the record on appeal at the
time the questioned dismissal order was issued by the lower
court. For, as ruled in one case, "... the delay of four days in
filing a notice of appeal and a motion for an extension of time
to file a record on appeal can be excused on the basis of
equity and considering that the record on appeal is now with
the respondent judge. ( Ramos vs. Bagasao, et al., G.R. No.
51552, February 28, 1980, Second Division; emphasis
supplied). Moreover, WE have already liberalized in a number
of cases the jurisprudence on the matter of perfection of
appeals. For one, in De Las Alas vs. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA
200-216 [19781), WE ruled that:
... litigation should, as much as possible, be decided on
their merits and not on technicality, and under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, We said in the case
of Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals (L-4351 1, July 23, 1976,
72 SCRA 120, 126), thus:
... Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds
is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to
encourage hearing of appeals on their merits. The
rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used
only to help secure, not override, substantial justice.
If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is
made, their aim would be defeated.
xxx xxx xxx
III. Moreover, a special circumstance which is the subject of
one of the main issues raised by petitioner in its appeal
warrants US to exercise once more OUR exclusive prerogative
to suspend OUR own rules or to exempt a particular case from
its operation as in the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (83 SCRA 459, 478-480
119781), thus: ... The Rules have been drafted with the
primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting
justice. As a corollary, if their application and operation tend
to subvert and defeat instead of promote and enhance it,
their suspension is justified. In the words of Justice Antonio P.
Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo,
'(T)his Court, through the revered and eminent Mr. Justice
Abad Santos, found occasion in the case of C. Viuda de
Ordoverza v. Raymundo, to lay down for recognition in
holding that ' "it is always in the power of the court (Supreme
Court) to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case
from its operation whenever the purposes of justice require
it . . . . .' " (Emphasis supplied). As emphasized by the
Solicitor General, if the questioned orders are not annulled
and set aside, its enforcement and implementation will result
to the prejudice of, and irreparable injury to, public interest."
This is so because the Government would lose its opportunity
to assail the order of the lower court dated December 8,
1978, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The joint report filed by the three-man committee
charged with the determination of the just compensation
of the property herein sought to be condemned is hereby
approved, such that the just compensation of the land
described in Paragraph 11 of the Complaint is fixed at
Thirty Pesos (P30.00) per square meter.
The defendant may now withdraw from the Philippine
National Bank, Malolos Branch, the sum of P7,200.00
deposited by the Third Regional Equipment Services,
Department of Public Highways under Account No.
35109, said sum to be part of the total amount of
P450,000.00 (15,000 square meters at P30.00 per square
meter), which the Department of Public Highways, Third
Regional Equipment Services, Malolos, Bulacan, shall,
and is hereby ordered, to pay to the herein defendants
as just compensation for the subject property.
SO ORDERED (pp. 3-4, Order dated December 8, 1978).
It must be stressed at this stage that the Government
would lose no less than P425,000.00 if the lower court's
order of December 8, 1978 is not scrutinized on appeal.
It must be stated that the lower court was without
jurisdiction to create a three-man committee because
Sec. 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court was
repealed by P.D. 76 which took effect on December 6,
1972, the salient features of which read, as follows:
The "current and fair market value" shall be
understood to mean the price of which a willing
seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy
neither being under abnormal pressure.
For purposes of just compensation in cases of
private property acquired by the government for
public use, the basis shall be the current and fair
market value declared by the owner or
administrator or such market value as determined
by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Thus, from December 6, 1972, the effectivity date of PD
76, the just compensation to be paid for private property
acquired by the government for public use is the current
and fair market value declared by the owner or
administrator or such market value as determined by the
Assessor whichever is lower. Pursuant to said Decree, the
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions
government's obligation to private respondent would
only be P24,376.00. The lower court thus had no
jurisdiction to fix an amount of just compensation higher
than P24,376.00. It follows therefore that the joint report
submitted by the three-man committee created by the
lower court could not serve as a legal basis for the
determination of the just compensation of the property
sought to be condemned.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 19-21, rec.).
IV. With respect to the motion to dismiss filed on December
22, 1980 by private respondents, WE find no merit therein.
The contention of private respondents that the June 23, 1980
motion for reconsideration of petitioner with the Court of
Appeals was pro forma is belied by the results obtained in this
petition before US.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED; THE DECISION
DATED APRIL 29, 1980 AND THE RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST
15, 1980 OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE
HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE; AND THE RESPONDENT
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN IS HEREBY DIRECTED
TO APPROVE PETITIONER'S RECORD ON APPEAL AND TO
ELEVATE THE SAME TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.
NO COST.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-50999 March 23, 1990
JOSE SONGCO, ROMEO CIPRES, and AMANCIO
MANUEL, petitioners, vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), LABOR ARBITER
FLAVIO AGUAS, and F.E. ZUELLIG (M), INC., respondents.
Raul E. Espinosa for petitioners.
Lucas Emmanuel B. Canilao for petitioner A. Manuel.
Atienza, Tabora, Del Rosario & Castillo for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to modify the decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No.
RB-IV-20840-78-T entitled, "Jose Songco and Romeo Cipres,
Complainants-Appellants, v. F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., Respondent-
Appellee" and NLRC Case No. RN- IV-20855-78-T
entitled, "Amancio Manuel, Complainant-Appellant, v. F.E.
Zuellig (M), Inc., Respondent-Appellee," which dismissed the
appeal of petitioners herein and in effect affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering private respondent to
pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to their one month
salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every
year of service.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., (hereinafter referred
to as Zuellig) filed with the Department of Labor (Regional
Office No. 4) an application seeking clearance to terminate
the services of petitioners Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres, and
Amancio Manuel (hereinafter referred to as petitioners)
Page 11 of 63
allegedly on the ground of retrenchment due to financial
losses. This application was seasonably opposed by
petitioners alleging that the company is not suffering from
any losses. They alleged further that they are being dismissed
because of their membership in the union. At the last hearing
of the case, however, petitioners manifested that they are no
longer contesting their dismissal. The parties then agreed
that the sole issue to be resolved is the basis of the
separation pay due to petitioners. Petitioners, who were in the
sales force of Zuellig received monthly salaries of at least
P40,000. In addition, they received commissions for every
On June 26,1978, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the
sale they made.
dispositive portion of which reads (p. 78, Rollo):
The collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between
Zuellig and F.E. Zuellig Employees Association, of which
petitioners are members, contains the following provision (p.
71, Rollo):
ARTICLE XIV Retirement Gratuity
Section l(a)-Any employee, who is separated from
employment due to old age, sickness, death or
permanent lay-off not due to the fault of said employee
shall receive from the company a retirement gratuity in
an amount equivalent to one (1) month's salary per year
of service. One month of salary as used in this paragraph
shall be deemed equivalent to the salary at date of
retirement; years of service shall be deemed equivalent
to total service credits, a fraction of at least six months
being considered one year, including probationary
employment. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Article 284 of the Labor Code then
prevailing provides:
Art. 284. Reduction of personnel. The termination of
employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor saving-devices, redundancy, retrenchment to
prevent losses, and other similar causes, shall entitle the
employee affected thereby to separation pay. In case of
termination due to the installation of labor-saving
devices or redundancy, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one (1)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and other
similar causes, the separation pay shall be equivalent to
one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction
of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1)
whole year. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, Sections 9(b) and 10, Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code provide:
xxx
Sec. 9(b). Where the termination of employment is due
to retrechment initiated by the employer to prevent
losses or other similar causes, or where the employee
suffers from a disease and his continued employment is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health or to the
health of his co-employees, the employee shall be
entitled to termination pay equivalent at least to his one
month salary, or to one-half month pay for every year of Zuellig argues that if it were really the intention of the Labor
Code as well as its implementing rules to include commission
service, whichever is higher, a fraction of at least six (6) in the computation of separation pay, it could have explicitly
months being considered as one whole year. said so in clear and unequivocal terms. Furthermore, in the
definition of the term "wage", "commission" is used only as
xxx
one of the features or designations attached to the word
Sec. 10. Basis of termination pay. The computation of remuneration or earnings.
the termination pay of an employee as provided herein
Insofar as the issue of whether or not allowances should be
shall be based on his latest salary rate, unless the same
included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose
was reduced by the employer to defeat the intention of
of computation of their separation pay is concerned, this has
the Code, in which case the basis of computation shall be
been settled in the case of Santos v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
the rate before its deduction. (Emphasis supplied)
76721, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166, where We ruled
that "in the computation of backwages and separation pay,
account must be taken not only of the basic salary of
petitioner but also of her transportation and emergency living
RESPONSIVE TO THE FOREGOING, respondent should be allowances." This ruling was reiterated in Soriano v. NLRC, et
as it is hereby, ordered to pay the complainants al., G.R. No. 75510, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 124 and
separation pay equivalent to their one month salary recently, in Planters Products, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
(exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every 78524, January 20, 1989.
year of service that they have worked with the company.
We shall concern ourselves now with the issue of whether or
SO ORDERED. not earned sales commission should be included in the
The appeal by petitioners to the National Labor Relations monthly salary of petitioner for the purpose of computation of
Commission was dismissed for lack of merit. their separation pay.
Hence, the present petition. Article 97(f) by itself is explicit that commission is included in
the definition of the term "wage". It has been repeatedly
On June 2, 1980, the Court, acting on the verified "Notice of declared by the courts that where the law speaks in clear and
Voluntary Abandonment and Withdrawal of Petition dated categorical language, there is no room for interpretation or
April 7, 1980 filed by petitioner Romeo Cipres, based on the construction; there is only room for application (Cebu Portland
ground that he wants "to abide by the decision appealed Cement Co. v. Municipality of Naga, G.R. Nos. 24116-17,
from" since he had "received, to his full and complete August 22, 1968, 24 SCRA 708; Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,
satisfaction, his separation pay," resolved to dismiss the G.R.No. L-2 7455, June 28,1973, 51 SCRA 381). A plain and
petition as to him. unambiguous statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to
The issue is whether or not earned sales commissions and make it clearer is vain labor and tends only to obscurity. How
allowances should be included in the monthly salary of ever, it may be argued that if We correlate Article 97(f) with
petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation Article XIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 284
pay. of the Labor Code and Sections 9(b) and 10 of the
Implementing Rules, there appears to be an ambiguity. In this
The petition is impressed with merit. regard, the Labor Arbiter rationalized his decision in this
Petitioners' position was that in arriving at the correct and manner (pp. 74-76, Rollo):
legal amount of separation pay due them, whether under the The definition of 'wage' provided in Article 96 (sic) of the
Labor Code or the CBA, their basic salary, earned sales Code can be correctly be (sic) stated as a general
commissions and allowances should be added together. They definition. It is 'wage ' in its generic sense. A careful
cited Article 97(f) of the Labor Code which includes perusal of the same does not show any indication that
commission as part on one's salary, to wit; commission is part of salary. We can say that commission
(f) 'Wage' paid to any employee shall mean the by itself may be considered a wage. This is not
remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable something novel for it cannot be gainsaid that certain
of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or types of employees like agents, field personnel and
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, salesmen do not earn any regular daily, weekly or
or other method of calculating the same, which is monthly salaries, but rely mainly on commission earned.
payable by an employer to an employee under a written Upon the other hand, the provisions of Section 10, Rule
or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to 1, Book VI of the implementing rules in conjunction with
be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered, and Articles 273 and 274 (sic) of the Code specifically states
includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by that the basis of the termination pay due to one who is
the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other sought to be legally separated from the service is 'his
facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the latest salary rates.
employee. 'Fair reasonable value' shall not include any
profit to the employer or to any person affiliated with the x x x.
employer. Even Articles 273 and 274 (sic) invariably use 'monthly
pay or monthly salary'.
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 12 of 63
 The above terms found in those Articles and the
particular Rules were intentionally used to express the
intent of the framers of the law that for purposes of
separation pay they mean to be specifically referring to
salary only.
.... Each particular benefit provided in the Code and other
Decrees on Labor has its own pecularities and nuances
and should be interpreted in that light. Thus, for a
specific provision, a specific meaning is attached to
simplify matters that may arise there from. The general
guidelines in (sic) the formation of specific rules for
particular purpose. Thus, that what should be controlling
in matters concerning termination pay should be the
specific provisions of both Book VI of the Code and the
Rules. At any rate, settled is the rule that in matters of
conflict between the general provision of law and that of
a particular- or specific provision, the latter should
prevail.
On its part, the NLRC ruled (p. 110, Rollo):
From the aforequoted provisions of the law and the
implementing rules, it could be deduced that wage is
used in its generic sense and obviously refers to the
basic wage rate to be ascertained on a time, task, piece
or commission basis or other method of calculating the
same. It does not, however, mean that commission,
allowances or analogous income necessarily forms part
of the employee's salary because to do so would lead to
anomalies (sic), if not absurd, construction of the word
"salary." For what will prevent the employee from
insisting that emergency living allowance, 13th month
pay, overtime, and premium pay, and other fringe
benefits should be added to the computation of their
separation pay. This situation, to our mind, is not the real
intent of the Code and its rules.
We rule otherwise. The ambiguity between Article 97(f), which the streets to face the harsh necessities of life.
defines the term 'wage' and Article XIV of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, Article 284 of the Labor Code and
Sections 9(b) and 10 of the Implementing Rules, which
mention the terms "pay" and "salary", is more apparent than
real. Broadly, the word "salary" means a recompense or
consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in
another man's business. Whether it be derived from
"salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the
Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of
compensation for services rendered. Indeed, there is eminent
authority for holding that the words "wages" and "salary" are
in essence synonymous (Words and Phrases, Vol. 38
Permanent Edition, p. 44 citing Hopkins vs. Cromwell, 85
N.Y.S. 839,841,89 App. Div. 481; 38 Am. Jur. 496). "Salary,"
the etymology of which is the Latin word "salarium," is often
used interchangeably with "wage", the etymology of which is
the Middle English word "wagen". Both words generally refer The final consideration is, in carrying out and interpreting the
to one and the same meaning, that is, a reward or Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the
recompense for services performed. Likewise, "pay" is the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and
synonym of "wages" and "salary" (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives
Ed.). Inasmuch as the words "wages", "pay" and "salary" have meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate
the same meaning, and commission is included in the spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code
definition of "wage", the logical conclusion, therefore, is, in which states that "all doubts in the implementation and
the computation of the separation pay of petitioners, their interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its
salary base should include also their earned sales
commissions.
The aforequoted provisions are not the only consideration for
deciding the petition in favor of the petitioners.
We agree with the Solicitor General that granting, in gratia
argumenti, that the commissions were in the form of
incentives or encouragement, so that the petitioners would be
inspired to put a little more industry on the jobs particularly
assigned to them, still these commissions are direct
remuneration services rendered which contributed to the
increase of income of Zuellig . Commission is the
recompense, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman,
executor, trustees, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the
same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his
transactions or on the profit to the principal (Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed., citing Weiner v. Swales, 217 Md. 123, 141
A.2d 749, 750). The nature of the work of a salesman and the
reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered
demonstrate clearly that commission are part of petitioners'
wage or salary. We take judicial notice of the fact that some
salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend on
commissions and allowances or commissions alone, are part
of petitioners' wage or salary. We take judicial notice of the
fact that some salesman do not received any basic salary but
depend on commissions and allowances or commissions
alone, although an employer-employee relationship exists.
Bearing in mind the preceeding dicussions, if we adopt the
opposite view that commissions, do not form part of wage or
salary, then, in effect, We will be saying that this kind of
salesmen do not receive any salary and therefore, not entitled
to separation pay in the event of discharge from employment.
Will this not be absurd? This narrow interpretation is not in
accord with the liberal spirit of our labor laws and considering
the purpose of separation pay which is, to alleviate the
difficulties which confront a dismissed employee thrown the
Additionally, in Soriano v. NLRC, et al., supra, in resolving the
issue of the salary base that should be used in computing the
separation pay, We held that:
The commissions also claimed by petitioner ('override
commission' plus 'net deposit incentive') are not properly
includible in such base figure since such commissions
must be earned by actual market transactions
attributable to petitioner.
Applying this by analogy, since the commissions in the
present case were earned by actual market transactions
attributable to petitioners, these should be included in their
separation pay. In the computation thereof, what should be
taken into account is the average commissions earned during
their last year of employment.
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor
of labor" (Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No. 71812, July 30,1987,152
SCRA 140; Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
78763, July 12,1989), and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which
provides that "in case of doubt, all labor legislation and all
labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and
decent living for the laborer.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision
of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
MODIFIED by including allowances and commissions in the
separation pay of petitioners Jose Songco and Amancio
Manuel. The case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the
proper computation of said separation pay.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119850 June 20, 1996
MANDARIN VILLA, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, and CLODUALDO DE JESUS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:p
With ample evidentiary support are the following antecedent
facts:
In the evening of October 19, 1989, private respondent,
Clodualdo de Jesus, a practicing lawyer and businessman,
hosted a dinner for his friends at the petitioner's restaurant,
the Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village Greenhills, Mandaluyong
City. After dinner the waiter handed to him the bill in the
amount of P2,658.50. Private respondent offered to pay the
bill through his credit card issued by Philippine Commercial
Credit Card Inc. (BANKARD). This card was accepted by the
waiter who immediately proceeded to the restaurant's cashier
for card verification. Ten minutes later, however, the waiter
returned and audibly informed private respondent that his
credit card had expired. 1 Private respondent remonstrated
that said credit card had yet to expire on September 1990, as
embossed on its face. 2 The waiter was unmoved, thus,
private respondent and two of his guests approached the
restaurant's cashier who again passed the credit card over
the verification computer. The same information was
produced, i.e., CARD EXPIRED. Private respondent and his
guests returned to their table and at this juncture, Professor
Lirag, another guest, uttered the following remarks:
"Clody [referring to Clodualdo de Jesus], may problema
ba? Baka kailangang maghugas na kami ng
pinggan?"3 Thereupon, private respondent left the restaurant
and got his BPI Express Credit Card from his car and offered it
to pay their bill. This was accepted and honored by the
cashier after verification. 4 Petitioner and his companions left
afterwards.
The incident triggered the filing of a suit for damages by
private respondent. Following a full-dress trial, judgment was
rendered directing the petitioner and BANKARD to pay jointly
and severally the private respondent: (a) moral damages in
the amount of P250,000.00; (b) exemplary damages in the
Page 13 of 63
amount of P100,000.00, and (c) attorney's fees and litigationautri and under Article 1311 of the Civil Code private In this connection, we quote with approval the following
expenses in the amount of P50,000.00. respondent may demand its fulfillment provided he observations of the respondent Court.
communicated his acceptance to the petitioner before its
Both the petitioner and BANKARD appealed to the respondent Mandarin argues that based on the POS Guidelines
revocation. 8 In this case, private respondent's offer to pay by
Court of Appeals which rendered a decision, thus: (supra), it has three options in case the verification
means of his BANKARD credit card constitutes not only an
machine flashes "CARD EXPIRED". It chose to exercise
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby acceptance of the said stipulation but also an explicit
option (c) by not honoring appellee's credit card.
MODIFIED by: communication of his acceptance to the obligor.
However, appellant apparently intentionally glossed over
1. Finding appellant MANDARIN solely responsible for In addition, the record shows that petitioner posted a logo option "(a) Check expiry date on card" (id.) which would
damages in favor of appellee; inside Mandarin Villa Seafood Village stating that "Bankard is have shown without any shadow of doubt that the expiry
9
accepted here. This representation is conclusive upon the date embossed on the BANKARD was "SEP 90". (Exhibit
2. Absolving appellant BANKARD of any responsibility for petitioner which it cannot deny or disprove as against the "D".) A cursory look at the appellee's BANKARD would
damages; private respondent, the party relying thereon. Petitioner, also reveal that appellee had been as of that date a
3. Reducing moral damages awarded to appellee to therefore, cannot disclaim its obligation to accept private cardholder since 1982, a fact which would have entitled
TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND and 00/100 (P25,000.00) respondent's BANKARD credit card without violating the the customer the courtesy of better treatment. 14
10
PESOS; equitable principle of estoppel.
Petitioner, however, argues that private respondent's own
4. Reducing exemplary damages awarded to appellee to Anent the second issue, petitioner insists that it is not negligence in not bringing with him sufficient cash was the
TEN THOUSAND and 00/100 (P10,000.00) PESOS; negligent. In support thereof, petitioner cites its good faith in proximate cause of his damage. It likewise sought exculpation
checking, not just once but twice, the validity of the by contending that the remark of Professor Lirag 15 is a
5. Reversing and setting aside the award of P250,000.00 aforementioned credit card prior to its dishonor. It argues that supervening event and at the same time the proximate cause
for attorney's fees as well as interest awarded, and since the verification machine flashed an information that the of private respondent's injury.
6. AFFIRMING the dismissal of all counterclaims and credit card has expired, petitioner could not be expected to
We find this contention also devoid of merit. While it is true
cross-claims. honor the same much less be adjudged negligent for
that private respondent did not have sufficient cash on hand
dishonoring it. Further, petitioner asseverates that it only
Costs against appellant Mandarin. when he hosted a dinner at petitioner's restaurant, this fact
followed the guidelines and instructions issued by BANKARD
alone does not constitute negligence on his part. Neither can
SO ORDERED. 5 in dishonoring the aforementioned credit card. The argument
it be claimed that the same was the proximate cause of
is untenable.
Mandarin Villa, thus, interposed this present petition, faulting private respondent's damage. We take judicial notice 16 of the
the respondent court with six (6) assigned errors which may The test for determining the existence of negligence in a current practice among major establishments, petitioner
be reduced to the following issues, to wit: (1) whether or not particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in included, to accept payment by means of credit cards in lieu
petitioner is bound to accept payment by means of credit doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and of cash. Thus, petitioner accepted private respondent's BPI
card; (2) whether or not petitioner is negligent under the caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in Express Credit Card after verifying its validity, 17 a fact which
circumstances obtaining in this case; and (3) if negligent, the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of all the more refutes petitioner's imputation of negligence on
whether or not such negligence is the proximate cause of the negligence. 11 The Point of Sale (POS) Guidelines which the private respondent.
private respondent's damage. outlined the steps that petitioner must follow under the
Neither can we conclude that the remark of Professor Lirag
circumstances provides.
Petitioner contends that it cannot be faulted for its cashier's was a supervening event and the proximate cause of private
refusal to accept private respondent's BANKARD credit card, xxx xxx xxx respondent's injury. The humiliation and embarrassment of
the same not being a legal tender. It argues that private the private respondent was brought about not by such a
CARD EXPIRED
respondent's offer to pay by means of credit card partook of remark of Professor Lirag but by the fact of dishonor by the
the nature of a proposal to novate an existing obligation for a. Check expiry date on card. petitioner of private respondent's valid BANKARD credit card.
which petitioner, as creditor, must first give its consent If at all, the remark of Professor Lirag served only to
b. If unexpired, refer to CB. aggravate the embarrassment then felt by private
otherwise there will be no binding contract between them.
Petitioner cannot seek refuge behind this averment. b.1. If valid, honor up to maximum of SPL only. respondent, albeit silently within himself.

We note that Mandarin Villa Seafood Village is affiliated with b.2. If in CB as Lost, do procedures 2a to 2e., WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
BANKARD. In fact, an "Agreement" 6 entered into by petitioner b.3. If in CB as Suspended/Cancelled, do not honor card. SO ORDERED.
and BANKARD dated June 23, 1989, provides inter alia:
12
c. If expired, do not honor card.
The MERCHANT shall honor validly issued PCCCI credit
cards presented by their corresponding holders in the A cursory reading of said rule reveals that whenever the G.R. Nos. 137278-79 February 17, 2003
purchase of goods and/or services supplied by it words CARD EXPIRED flashes on the screen of the verification PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
provided that the card expiration date has not elapsed machine, petitioner should check the credit card's expiry date FRIVALDO BESMONTE y LORENO and SONNY APUYAN y
and the card number does not appear on the latest embossed on the card itself. If unexpired, petitioner should MORIN, accused-appellants.
cancellation bulletin of lost, suspended and canceled honor the card provided it is not invalid, cancelled or
PCCCI credit cards and, no signs of tampering, otherwise suspended. But if expired, petitioner should not D E C I S I ON
alterations or irregularities appear on the face of the honor the card. In this case, private respondent's BANKARD
QUISUMBING, J.:
credit card. 7 credit card has an embossed expiry date of September
1990. 13 Clearly, it has not yet expired on October 19, 1989, On appeal is the consolidated judgment 1 of the Regional Trial
While private respondent, may not be a party to the said when the same was wrongfully dishonored by the petitioner. Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, dated September 7,
agreement, the above-quoted stipulation conferred a favor Hence, petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution 1998, in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-3918-19, finding herein
upon the private respondent, a holder of credit card validly which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the appellants Frivaldo Besmonte y Loreno and Sonny Apuyan y
issued by BANKARD. This stipulation is a stipulation pour same situation and as such petitioner is guilty of negligence.

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 14 of 63

Morin guilty of rape and sentencing them to suffer the penalty December 15, 1994, appellant Besmonte also raped executing a counter-affidavit which stated that he was ready
of reclusion perpetua. her.81a\^/phi1.net to marry Melanie as she was carrying his child.32
The young victim in these cases, Melanie A. Gozmo, 2 is After learning about the rapes, Agnes then took Melanie and For his part, appellant Besmonte declared that he could not
related to the appellants. Apuyan is the brother of her her siblings to live with her at Binisitihan Norte, Magallanes, have raped Melanie on December 15, 1994 since on that date
mother, while Besmonte is the second husband of Melanies Sorsogon.9 he was in Sorsogon, Sorsogon buying bamboo to be used in
maternal grandmother. She was staying at the house of the the mussel farm (tahungan) of a certain Zaldy. 33 He worked at
On April 17, 1995, Agnes reported the rape of Melanie at the
appellant Apuyan, where appellant Besmonte likewise said mussel farm from May 30, 1994 to January 1, 1995. 34 It
Magallanes Police Station where she executed a sworn
resided, at the time of the rapes complained of. 10 was only on the latter date that he found time to return to
statement.
Hubo, Magallanes and he stayed there only for three days.
On June 6, 1995, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
Agnes likewise brought the victim to a doctor where an Afterwards, he returned to Sorsogon,
Sorsogon filed an information for rape against appellant
examination confirmed that she was pregnant. 11 The victim Sorsogon.1a\^/phi1.net Besmonte could not think of any
Besmonte. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-3918, the
gave birth to a baby boy in 1995.12 reason why the victim should charge him with rape. 35He said
accusatory portion of the charge sheet read as follows:
he treated her like his own child and even sent her to
Private complainant testified that after the death of her father school.36 He was also unaware of any bad blood between him
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1994, at about
in 1992, she was brought by her mother to Hubo, Magallanes, and Agnes Hinanay.37
12:00 oclock noon at Barangay Hubo, Municipality of
Sorsogon to live in the house of her uncle, appellant
Magallanes, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
Apuyan.13 At about midnight of May 31, 1994, while To corroborate appellant Besmontes alibi his wife, Rosalina
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
complainant was sleeping in said house, Apuyan undressed Apuyan, testified that from May 1994 to December 1994, he
accused, armed with a bladed instrument, with lewd designs 38
her and placed himself on top of her.14 She was awakened and was in Sorsogon, Sorsogon. It was only on January 1995 that
and by means of force, violence and/or intimidation, did then
found herself in the nude. She tried to resist appellant but she he visited them.39 According to Rosalina, her granddaughter,
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
was overpowered when he poked a knife at her Melanie, could not have been raped given the circumstance
knowledge of one Melanie A. Gozmo, a 15 year old minor,
neck.15 Appellant then thrust his phallus into her vagina 16 and that she slept side by side with several persons. There were
against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of
"let it in and let it out." 17Melanie felt pain and her private 12 persons who called Apuyans house their home. Melanie
the latter.
parts bled as a result. 18 After, Apuyan had satiated his slept close to the room of the Besmontes, according to
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 libidinous desires, he warned her not to tell anybody about Rosalina. She could see Melanie from their room, if any of the
the incident, as otherwise, he would kill her and her siblings. 19 appellants approached her at night,40 said the witness.
That same day, another information for the same offense was
filed against appellant Apuyan. Docketed as Criminal Case No. Melanie also claimed that on the night of December 15, 1994, On September 7, 1998, the trial court promulgated its
95-3919, it averred: while she was sleeping at Apuyans house, her grandmothers consolidated decision, thus:
husband, Besmonte, placed himself on top of her and inserted
That on or about the 31st day of May 1994 at about 12:00 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused
his penis inside her vagina. 20 She was not able to resist as
oclock midnight and for several occasions and dates Frivaldo Besmonte y Loreno in Criminal Case No. 95-3918 and
Besmonte threatened to kill her and her siblings, if she would
thereafter, at barangay Hubo, Municipality of Magallanes, 21 Sonny Apuyan y Morin in Criminal Case No. 95-3919 guilty
report the matter. Although it was dark, she was able to
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Art. 335
recognize Besmonte by his voice and underarm
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed [of the Revised Penal Code] and hereby sentences each of
odor.221a\^/phi1.net
with a knife, with lewd designs and by means of force, them [to] the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the
violence and/or intimidation, did then and there, willfully, Despite the threats, Melanie reported the incidents to her sum of P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity and P10,000.00 as
unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one mother and her grandmother. The mother did nothing while moral damages to the complainant without subsidiary
Melanie A. Gozmo, a 15 year old minor, against her will and the grandmother struck her with a piece of bamboo and told imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. her not to make any fuss lest the matter reach the barrio folks cost.1awphi1.nt
of Hubo, Magallanes.23 Melanie then revealed her plight to her
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 In the service of their sentence, they shall be credited with
cousin, prosecution witness Agnes Hinanay, and her aunt,
24 the full period of their confinement pursuant to law.
On July 27, 1995, appellant Besmonte was arraigned in Elsa Mirandilla. The two took her and her siblings away from
41
Criminal Case No. 95-3918 and with assistance of counsel, the house of appellant Apuyan, reported the matter to the SO ORDERED.
pleaded not guilty to the charge. police, and had her examined by a doctor who advised her
Before us, appellants now appeal their conviction, imputing to
that she was pregnant. She delivered a boy on August 25,
Appellant Apuyan was, in turn, arraigned on September 25, 1995.25 At the time she was raped, Melanie was only 15 years the trial court the following errors:
1995 and duly assisted by counsel de officio, likewise entered old.26
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE
a plea of not guilty.
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MELANIE
Appellants raised the defenses of denial and alibi.
The two cases were then consolidated and jointly tried. GOZMO.
In his defense, appellant Apuyan testified that on May 31,
The prosecution presented two witnesses: Agnes Hinanay, a 1994, he was in the barangay proper of Hubo, Magallanes II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
paternal first cousin of the victim, and the private having a drinking spree with his friends Rowan Perdigon, Ryan ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE GROUND THAT HIS (sic) GUILT
complainant, Melanie A. Gozmo. WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
de los Santos, and Noel de los Santos. 27 They started drinking
Agnes Hinanay testified that on April 17, 1995, she paid the gin from four oclock in the afternoon to ten oclock in the III
28
victim a visit at appellant Apuyans house in Hubo, evening. They consumed a dozen bottles of gin. He then
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
Magallanes, Sorsogon.5 Agnes noticed that private staggered home and upon reaching his house, he fell into a
29 APPELLANT FRIVALDO BESMONTE DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE
complainant was pregnant. 6 When Agnes asked Melanie about drunken sleep. He only woke up the following morning. At
WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED.42
her pregnancy, the latter revealed that she was raped by that time, there were 13 persons inside his house, which had
30
appellant Apuyan on May 31, 1994 and on several other two rooms. He slept alone while the rest slept side by In sum, we find the issues to be: (1) the credibility of
31
occasions thereafter.7 Melanie further disclosed to her that on side. He denied raping Melanie. He likewise denied complaining witness; (2) the sufficiency of the prosecutions

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 15 of 63

evidence; and (3) the identification of appellant Besmonte as In ruling upon Melanies credibility, the trial court found her
one of the rapists. testimony to be "forthright, clear, and free from serious
contradictions."49 The trial courts assessment of
Appellants submit that the first and second issues are
complainants credibility, considering that it had the
interrelated, hence jointly discussed.
advantage of observing her demeanor as she testified, is not
On the first and second issues, appellants assail Melanies easily discarded. The trial court judge is in the best position to
testimony as unworthy of belief and hence, a flimsy ground determine the truthfulness of the complainants testimony.
for their conviction. In describing private complainants Unless it is shown that the trial court overlooked,
testimony as "incredible," they ask us to note the fact that misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
both times when she was allegedly raped, complainant was weight or substance that would otherwise affect the result of
lying beside and very close to her siblings. Yet neither her the case, its findings will not be disturbed on appeal. 50 We find
brother nor her sister was awakened. Appellants assert that no compelling reason now to depart from said rule. We have
this is very much contrary to common knowledge and human carefully read the victims testimony and find that the
experience. Appellants argue that it is difficult to believe that discrepancy harped upon by appellants focused more on her
appellants raped her at times when almost all members of the account of events immediately preceding the rape by Apuyan.
family were present in the house. They did not zero in on her narration of the crime itself.
Complainants testimony may not be flawless, but its
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
substance, veracity, and weight were unaffected by the
points out jurisprudence has recognized that rape can take
triviality of the alleged inconsistency.
place in circumstances of crowding similar to that of the
instant cases. Appellants cannot exonerate themselves by What is material here is Melanies testimony on how she was
claiming that the crimes charged could not possibly take sexually abused. She positively identified appellants in open
place since there were several other persons present inside court as her ravishers without any hesitation. Indeed, where
the house. Precedents abound undermining appellants the accusing words come from a girl of tender years and they
contention. are directed against her own relatives, they are difficult to
disbelieve. We further note that Melanie broke out in tears
The presence of people nearby is no guarantee that rape will while testifying.51 The crying of a victim during her testimony
not be committed, for lust is no respecter of time and is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of
place.43 Rape has been committed in places where people such emotion indicates the pain that the victim feels when
congregate, like parks or school premises and even in a house asked to recount her traumatic experience.52 Melanie testified
where there are other occupants.44 There is no rule or norm in a categorical, straightforward, and frank manner, and she
that a woman can only be raped in seclusion. 45 It has been remained consistent under cross-examination. The
committed in a room adjacent to where other members of the inescapable conclusion is that she is a credible witness. The
family stay or in a room, which the victim shared with sole testimony of a rape victim, if credible, suffices to
others.46 We have more than once observed that rape could convict.53
take place in the same room where other members of the
family were sleeping.47 In the instant cases, both rapes On the third issue, appellant Besmonte argues that his
complained of were committed in the middle of the night. It is identification by complaining witness as her rapist on
of judicial notice that it is at this time when children are in December 15, 1994 is doubtful and cannot serve as the basis
deep slumber and could not be easily awakened. 48 The fact of his conviction, as it was undisputed that the room where he
that Melanies siblings were not awakened at the times she supposedly raped Melanie had no illumination. Hence,
was ravished is not improbable. Hence, appellants thesis that assuming arguendo, that she was indeed raped, it was
it was impossible for them to have committed the rape in the improbable for her to positively identify him as her assailant
presence of private complainants siblings who were sleeping given the total darkness of the surroundings. She only
next to her deserves scant consideration. presumed that it was him on account of his underarm odor.
Besmonte contends that it would be unjust to conclude that
Appellants ask us to discredit private complainants testimony he was the real culprit on account of his underarm odor. After
because she was inconsistent in her account. They point out all, he is not the only person with that smell.
that when she testified as to how Apuyan raped her at
knifepoint, she initially claimed that he poked a knife at her The OSG, however, points out that private complainant was
neck using her right hand, while his left hand was cupped able to identify Besmonte not just from his underarm smell
over her mouth. When grilled further, she changed her but also from his voice. She was familiar with both, as the two
statement and said that he propped himself up on the mat of them had been living in the same house for at least four
with his right hand. Moreover, they say complainant had a years prior to her rape by Besmonte. Her identification of
poor memory and could hardly remember her Besmonte must be deemed both sufficient and indubitable,
birthday.1awphi1.nt Hence, they conclude that the trial court said the OSG.
should have taken great caution in giving credence to her
Appellant Besmontes bid for exoneration on the theory of
testimony.
doubtful identification, in our view, is an exercise in futility.
The OSG counters that the alleged inconsistency is minor or The absence of illumination in the place of the commission of
trivial. It pertains only to peripheral matters. Hence, it cannot the crime does not detract from the positive identification by
impair private complainants credibility as a witness. Melanie of Besmonte as her ravisher. Although visibility is an
important factor in the identification of a felon, its relative
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions
significance depends largely on the attending circumstances
and the discretion of the trial court. 54 We have held that the
sense of smell, in the right circumstances, might be a reliable
mode of identification, but it could also prove to be tenuous if
it were the sole source of identification under circumstances
that leave much room for other probabilities to contend
with.55 In the case against Besmonte, there is not much room
to doubt the positive identification on account of the victims
olfactory faculties.
The prosecutions case against Besmonte is founded on
Melanies familiarity with him. If she was not at all familiar
with appellant Besmonte, the prosecutions whole case
against him collapses, for such familiarity was its very
foundation. In the instant case, it was not disputed that
Melanie had lived in the same house with Besmonte for
almost four years prior to the incident. In fact, Besmonte
himself testified that he had treated her like a daughter and
was even responsible for her schooling. 56 Thus, the basis for
her identification was her long familiarity with Besmonte. She
pointed to him because she knew him well prior to the sexual
assault. Melanie was familiar with his body smell. No doubt
she could perceive and recognize that smell at the time of
sexual contact. At that time, private complainant was as close
to Besmonte as was physically possible, for a man and a
woman could not be physically closer to each other than
during a sexual act.57 Moreover, the victim did not solely rely
upon her sense of smell in identifying her ravisher. She
emphatically declared in open court that she also recognized
Besmonte from his voice58 when he uttered threatening words
to her in the dark. It is highly inconceivable that complainant
would not recognize Besmontes voice, having lived with him
for quite some time. The sound of the voice of a person is an
acceptable means of identification where it is established that
the witness and the accused knew each other personally and
closely for a number of years.59
We find no reason to doubt the accuracy of the identification
of the malefactor based on auditory and olfactory perception
by the victim on December 15, 1994. Under the
circumstances, Melanie was able to perceive who her rapist
was and to make known that perception. Nor is there any
reason to doubt her sincerity to tell the truth, for there is no
showing at all by the defense that she charged Besmonte
with rape due to an evil or corrupt motive.
In sum, the defense of denial and alibi interposed by
appellants cannot prevail over their positive identification by
the victim. It is a time-honored principle that the positive and
categorical assertions of a witness generally prevail over bare
denials.60 In the case against Apuyan, greater probative value
and evidentiary weight must be accorded to Melanies
unwavering and categorical identification of appellant Apuyan
as one of her tormentors over this appellants feeble, self-
serving, and uncorroborated denial. Affirmative testimony
from a credible witness is stronger and more trustworthy than
a bare negative testimony. 61
Equally unmeritorious is appellant Besmontes alibi that he
could not have raped Melanie because he was in Sorsogon,
Sorsogon from May 1994 to January 1995. For alibi to prosper,
appellant must not only prove that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed, he must also convincingly
Page 16 of 63
demonstrate the physical impossibility of his presence at even if proved, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in transaction spawned the succeeding events hereunder
the locus criminis at the time of the incident. 62 In Besmontes determining the proper penalty.72 chronologically narrated, eventuating in this appeal wherein
case, it was not physically impossible for Besmonte to have we are now expected to pen the judicial omega.
In Criminal Case No. 95-3919, the relationship between
been at the crime scene at the time the rape was committed,
Apuyan and his victim was not alleged in the information. It appears from the records that the Olizon spouses failed to
in view of the trial courts observation that:
Hence, for purposes of determining the penalty to be pay their aforestated obligation upon its maturity, so private
It is of judicial notice that the poblacion of Magallanes can be imposed, the relationship even if proved during the trial, respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate
reached thru a jeep, which is the means of transportation should not be considered as a generic aggravating mortgage. At a public auction thereafter held on March 11,
from the town of Sorsogon for about one (1) hour only. circumstance. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1975, the subject property was sold to respondent bank as
Accused did not even present the person he resides with providing that aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary the highest bidder, pursuant to which it was issued a
while in Sorsogon.63 or qualifying, must be so stated in the complaint or certificate of sale as of the same date. On March 12, 1974,
information,73 applies to the cases against appellants under the said certificate of sale was duly annotated at the back of
That Besmontes wife corroborated his alibi is no moment. No
the principle of retroactivity of procedural law because the petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604.
other witness unrelated to appellant Besmonte was presented
rules favor the accused. Since no aggravating circumstance
to corroborate his claim. Alibi cannot prosper if it is On June 5, 1978, again due to the failure of petitioner spouses
could be appreciated in the commission of rape in Criminal
established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not to redeem the foreclosed property within the period of
Case No. 95-3919, the trial court did not err in applying Article
by credible persons.64 This is because alibi is easy to contrive redemption, title to the property was consolidated in favor of
63 (2)74 of the Revised Penal Code by imposing on appellant
and difficult to disprove.65 respondent bank. 1
Apuyan only the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Rape is committed when a man has carnal knowledge of a On January 14, 1986, respondent bank filed with the Regional
Concerning damages awarded below, we find that the trial
victim with the use of force and intimidation. 66 In both cases, Trial Court of Kalookan City a petition to reconstitute Transfer
court awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity but
Melanie credibly testified on the details of her harrowing Certificate of Title No. 24604, which was lost in the Office of
only P10,000.00 as moral damages to the victim. The amount
experiences and positively identified the appellants as the the Registry of Deeds of Kalookan City, the said proceeding
awarded as civil indemnity is sufficient but moral damages
persons who raped her. The evidence for the prosecution has being docketed as Case No. C-2746. 2
should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with current
established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of carnal
jurisprudence.75 The award of P25,000.00 as exemplary On June 11, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City
knowledge and force or intimidation. Hence, we must sustain
damages should be sustained, by way of public example and ordered the reconstitution prayed for. As a consequence,
the conviction of both appellants and deny their respective
to prevent minors from being sexually abused 76 by their Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 24604 in the name of the
appeals.
elders. Olizon spouses was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer
But did the trial court correctly impose the penalty of Certificate of Title No. 149858 was issued on June 5, 1987 in
WHEREFORE, the consolidated judgment of the Regional Trial
reclusion perpetua on appellants? the name of respondent bank. 3
Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Cases
The OSG disagrees only in regard to appellant Apuyan. It Nos. 95-3918 and 95-3919, finding appellants Frivaldo On November 27, 1989, respondent bank this time filed with
recommends the imposition of the death penalty on him. The Besmonte Loreno and Sonny Apuyan y Morin guilty of one (1) the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, a petition for the
OSG argues that with the amendment of the Revised Penal count of rape each and sentencing them to suffer the penalty issuance of a writ of possession against petitioner spouses,
Code by R.A. No. 8353,67 rape was reclassified as a crime of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Each docketed as LRC Case No. C-3094, 4 and which petition was
against persons. Under Article 266-B 68 of the Revised Penal of the appellants is also sentenced to pay the victim, Melanie granted by the trial court on February 8, 1990. 5
Code, as so amended, rape is now punishable with reclusion Gozmo, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
On March 8, 1990, a petition, by way of opposition, was filed
perpetua to death whenever the rape is committed with the damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as
by petitioner spouses wherein they sought the cancellation of
use of a deadly weapon. The OSG stresses that the qualifying the costs.
the writ of possession, the nullification of the certificate of
circumstance of deadly weapon was proven with respect to
SO ORDERED. sale dated March 11, 1974, and/or the nullification of the
appellant Apuyan. Moreover, according to the OSG, the
foreclosure proceedings. In support thereof, they alleged lack
relationship of Melanie with Apuyan, while not alleged in the
of notice of the auction sale and lack of posting of the notice
information, was nonetheless proven during the trial and now
G.R. No. 107075 September 1, 1994 of sale as required by Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as
should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance,
amended. 6
for purposes of imposing the penalty. With the presence of the ARMANDO S. OLIZON and ILUMINADA C.
qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in the OLIZON, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and After trial, the court a quo issued an order dated July 16,
commission of the rape coupled with the generic aggravating PRUDENTIAL BANK, respondents. 1990, with the following dispositive portion:
circumstance of relationship, without any mitigating
circumstance, then the proper penalty for appellant Apuyan Roberto T. Neri for petitioners. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares that:
should be death, the OSG said. Magno & Associates for private respondent. 1. The foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed
As the OSG points out, since appellant Apuyan committed the by the spouses Olizons, as well as the certificate of sale
rape with the use of knife, a deadly weapon, the crime is dated March 11, 1974 as (sic) null and void;
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. 69 However, the REGALADO, J.:
2. The writ of possession is hereby set aside; and
OSGs stance that the relationship between Apuyan (uncle) The factual alpha of the present dispute was sometime in
and Melanie (niece) should be treated as a generic 3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to
1967 when the spouses Armando and Iluminada Olizon
aggravating circumstance to justify imposing the death cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 149858 issued in
obtained a loan from respondent Prudential Bank in the
penalty is precipitate. the name of Prudential Bank and to reinstate Transfer
amount of P25,000.00 and, as security therefor, they
Certificate of Title No. 24604 to (sic) spouses Armando S.
Under Sections 870 and 971 Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules executed in favor of respondent bank a real estate mortgage Olizon and Iluminada C. Olizon.
of Criminal Procedure, a qualifying or aggravating over a parcel of land consisting of 1,000 square meters 7
circumstance must first be specifically alleged in the located at Barrio Calaanan, Kalookan City and registered in SO ORDERED.
information and then duly proved during the trial. Otherwise, their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604 of
the Registry of Deeds of Kalookan City. Unfortunately, that

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 17 of 63

Private respondent appealed the said decision to the Court of
Appeals which rendered its questioned decision in CAG.R.
CV No. 29482, dated September 9, 1992, with a disposition of
reversal, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision (sic) dated July 16, 1990 of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan in LRC Case No.
3094 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
rendered upholding the validity of the foreclosure sale of
the real estate mortgage and the writ of possession
dated February 8, 1990. 8
Petitioners have now come to us through the present petition
wherein they contend that:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court
since there is evidence to show that the requirements of
Sec. 3, Act No. 3135, as amended, were not complied
with.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners
had notice of the foreclosure sale.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners
had totally abandoned the subject property, as this is not
supported by the evidence. 9
We do not find substantial merit in the petition.
Herein petitioners are now seeking the annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale conducted more than 20 years
ago, invoking therefor two grounds, namely, lack of personal
notice to the mortgagors about the foreclosure sale, and the
failure of the mortgagee bank to comply with the posting
requirement under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
It is now a well-settled rule that personal notice to the
mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not
necessary. 10 Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgages, as amended by Act No.
4118, requires only the posting of the notice of sale in three
public places and the publication of that notice in a
newspaper of general circulation. Hence, the lack of personal
notice to the mortgagors, herein petitioners, is not a ground
to set aside the foreclosure sale.
Neither can the supposed failure of respondent bank to
comply with the posting requirement as provided under the
aforesaid Section 3, under the factual ambiance and
circumstances which obtained in this case, be considered a
sufficient ground for annulling the aforementioned sale. We
are not unaware of the rulings in some cases that, under
normal situations, the statutory provisions governing
publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sales must be
strictly complied with and that failure to publish the notice of
auction sale as required by the statute constitutes a
jurisdictional defect which invalidates the sale. However, the
unusual nature of the attendant facts and the peculiarity of
the confluent circumstances involved in this case require that
we rule otherwise.
Petitioners' cited authority on the requisite publication of
notices is not so all-embracing as to deny justified exceptions
thereto under appropriate situations. Petitioners quote this
passage from Tambunting et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al. 11 which is not conclusive hereon for not being exactly in together with a copy of the Notice of Sale. The document
point, based as it is on different facts, thus: is more than ten (10) years old and the absence of a
registry receipt in the case folder of the foreclosure
The rule is that statutory provisions governing
records of the Sheriff of the City of Caloocan, does not
publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must
indicate that the Olizons did not receive a copy of the
be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations
aforesaid notice of sale, it being presumed that the
therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale
sheriff performed her duties and that foreclosure
at least voidable. Interpreting Sec. 457 of the Code of
proceedings are regular. . . . (Citations omitted.) 12
Civil Procedure (reproduced in Sec. 18[c] of Rule 39,
Rules of Court and in Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135) Furthermore, unlike the situation in previous cases 13 where
in Campomanes vs. Bartolome and German & Co. (38 the foreclosure sales were annulled by reason of failure to
Phil. 8081), this Court held that if a sheriff sells without comply with the notice requirement under Section 3 of Act No.
the notice prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure 3135, as amended, what is allegedly lacking here is the
induced thereto by the judgment creditor, the sale is posting of the notice in three public places, and not the
absolutely void and no title passes. . . . (Emphasis publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation.
supplied.)
We take judicial notice of the fact that newspaper publications
At any rate, respondent Court of Appeals has this have more far-reaching effects than posting on bulletin
commendable ratiocination on the aforestated twin errors boards in public places. There is a greater probability that an
assigned by petitioners: announcement or notice published in a newspaper of general
circulation, which is distributed nationwide, shall have a
The decisive issue which must be resolved is whether or
readership of more people than that posted in a public
not the statutory requirements of notice have been
bulletin board, no matter how strategic its location may be,
complied with in this case. Section 12 of the mortgage
which caters only to a limited few. Hence, the publication of
contract reads:
the notice of sale in the newspaper of general circulation
"12. All correspondence relative to this mortgage, alone is more than sufficient compliance with the notice-
including demand letters, summonses, subpoenas or posting requirement of the law. By such publication, a
notifications of any judicial or extrajudicial action shall be reasonably wide publicity had been effected such that those
sent to the Mortgagor at No. 82 Naval Street, Malabon, interested might attend the public sale, and the purpose of
Rizal or at the address that may hereafter be given in the law had been thereby subserved.
writing by the Mortgagor to the Mortgagee. The mere act
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the
of sending any correspondence by mail or by personal
nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the
delivery to the said address shall be valid and effective
time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the
notice to the Mortgagor for all legal purposes, and . . .
purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the
shall not excuse or relieve the mortgagor from the
property. If these objects are attained, immaterial errors and
effects of such notice." (Emphasis supplied.)
mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if
The foregoing stipulation is the law between petitioner mistakes or omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are
and oppositors-spouses and should be complied with calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to depreciate the
faithfully. value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair
price, such mistakes or omissions will be fatal to the validity
That the mortgagors were actually notified by appellant of the notice, and also to the sale made pursuant thereto. 14
bank of the foreclosure proceedings is shown by its
letters to the Olizons before the actual sale at public In the instant case, the aforesaid objective was attained since
auction of the subject property, to wit: (1) Letter dated there was sufficient publicity of the sale through the
January 16, 1973 of Atty. Octavio D. Fule, Legal Officer of newspaper publication. There is completely no showing that
appellant bank to the Olizons informing the latter that the property was sold for a price far below its value as to
their failure to pay their obligations will constrain insinuate any bad faith, nor was there any showing or even an
appellant bank to institute appropriate legal action intimation of collusion between the sheriff who conducted the
against them; (2) Letter dated January 31, 1974 of Atty. sale and respondent bank. This being so, the alleged non-
Octavio D. Fule, Legal Officer of appellant bank, compliance with the posting requirement, even if true, will not
informing the Olizons that Prudential Bank has filed justify the setting aside of the sale.
foreclosure proceedings under Act 3135, as amended.
Moreover, herein petitioners failed to discharge the burden of
xxx xxx xxx proving by convincing evidence their allegation that there
was actually no compliance with the posting requirement. The
Furthermore, notice of sale was duly published in foreclosure proceeding has in its favor the presumption of
accordance with law and furnished the Olizons. The regularity, 15 and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is
evidence presented during the trial of the case show that on petitioners. Where the allegation is an essential part of the
the then Clerk of Court, Emma Ona, sent a printed letter cause of action or defense in a civil case, whether posited in
dated February 18, 1974 informing the Olizons that an affirmative or negative form, the burden of evidence
appellant bank had filed an application to foreclosure thereon lies with the pleader. 16 Besides, the fact alone that
their real estate mortgage and the public auction of the there was no certificate of posting attached to the sheriff's
mortgaged parcel of land was sent on March 11, 1974,
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 18 of 63
 reasonable time, or his laches will bar him of relief. 20 Thus, a We, therefore, cannot but concur in these observations of
records of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale is not sufficient to
prove the lack of posting, especially in this case where the party seeking to set aside a foreclosure sale made under a respondent Court:
questioned act and the record thereof are already 16 years power of sale must bring his action without unreasonable
The evidence on record, likewise show that after the
old. It is quite unfair to now shift to respondent bank the delay. The court generally will refuse to grant relief when
foreclosure proceedings in 1974, the Olizons had totally
burden of proving the fact of posting considering the length of there has been great and unreasonable delay, amounting to
abandoned actual ownership over the subject property in
time that has elapsed, aside from the fact that the sheriff who laches, in seeking its aid. 21
favor of appellant bank, leaving it to appellant bank to
conducted the public sale and who was responsible for the
Besides, it has been said that in seeking to set aside a pay the real estate taxes over the subject property. In
posting of the notice of sale is already out of the country, with
foreclosure sale, the moving party must act promptly after he fact, in the reconstitution of the owner's title in Case No.
the records being silent on his present whereabouts or the
becomes aware of the facts on which he bases his complaint, C-2746, while the Olizons entered their appearance
possibility of his returning here.
and in this connection, notice of an irregularity may be before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan, they did not
Indeed, even on equitable considerations alone, the presumed from the fact that the mortgagor has knowledge of oppose the petition of appellant bank, despite the fact
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty the sale, as he is thereby put on inquiry, and is bound to use that the certificate of sale and final deed of sale as well
must stand. As aptly found by the Court of Appeals: diligence in discovering any defects in the as consolidation of the ownership were submitted as
22
proceedings. Having failed to do so, petitioners cannot now evidence by appellant bank in the reconstitution process.
. . . It is not a matter of lack of compliance with the
be heard on their much belated plaints. It was only after they noticed the lack of certain
requirements of the law, rather, it is a matter of
documents in the possession of the sheriff that they
unavailability of certain documents due to the loss Moreover, it is an entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that
thought of raising technicalities. . . . 27
thereof, considering that more than sixteen (16) years registration in a public registry is notice to the whole world.
had lapsed from the date of the extra-judicial foreclosure The record is a constructive notice of its contents as well as of WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit
of the real estate mortgage. Indeed, the presumption of all interest, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is
regularity in the performance of official duty by the are charged with knowledge of what it contains. 23 Therefore, hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
sheriff, more particularly, compliance with the provisions in the case at bar, the annotation of the certificate of sale on
SO ORDERED.
of Act 3135, as amended, has not been overturned by petitioners' Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604 and the
the Olizons. 17 filing of the affidavit of consolidation with the Register of
Deeds constituted constructive notice of both acts to herein
Nor are these all that we wish to expound hereon, for this is
petitioners. Consequently, as early as March 11, 1974 24 when A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 December 11, 1995
one case where we find the necessity for the application of
the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of their title, STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants, vs. JUDGE MANUEL
the equitable principle of estoppel by laches in order to avoid
petitioners were already charged with knowledge of the T. MURO, respondent.
an injustice.
foreclosure sale, yet they still failed or refused to take the
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an necessary steps to protect their rights over the subject RESOLUTION
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that property. PER CURIAM:
which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been
It also bears stressing that petitioners entered their In a PER CURIAM Decision dated September 19, 1994, the
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
appearance in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City where Court declared that respondent judge Manuel T. Muro's motu
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
the petition for reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title propio dismissal of eleven (11) criminal cases filed against
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
No. 24604 was filed by respondent bank, as shown by said Mrs. Imelda Marcos for violation of Central Bank foreign
to assert it. 18
court's order dated June 11, 1986. 25 It was then incumbent exchange restrictions, admittedly prompted by mere
In the case at bar, petitioners are already considered on petitioners to have filed an objection or opposition to the newspaper reports of the lifting of all foreign exchange
estopped through laches from questioning the regularity of reconstitution if they sincerely believed that the property restrictions which are characterized as "hearsay evidence,
the sale as well as the ownership of the land in question. It is rightfully belongs to them. Significantly, petitioners neither twice removed" 1 and therefore not only inadmissible but
evident from the records that the petition to annul the moved for the reconsideration of nor appealed from the order without any probative value at all whether objected to or
foreclosure sale was filed by herein petitioners only after 16 of the lower court granting reconstitution of title in the name not, 2 and without waiting for the defense to file a motion to
long years from the date of sale and only after a transfer of respondent bank. quash nor at least affording the prosecution the opportunity
certificate of title over the subject property had long been
Finally, the negligence or omission to assert a right within a to be heard on the matter, constitutes gross ignorance of the
issued to respondent bank. Herein petitioners failed to
reasonable time warrants not only a presumption that the law calling for his dismissal from the service with cancellation
advance any justification for their prolonged inaction. It would
party entitled to assert it either had abandoned it or declined of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
be inequitable to allow petitioners, after the lapse of an
to assert it, but also casts doubt on the validity of the claim of benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the
almost interminable period of time, to defeat an otherwise
ownership. Such neglect to assert a right taken in conjunction government service.
indefeasible title by the simple and dubious expedient of
with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other Respondent filed the instant motion for reconsideration of
invoking a purported irregularity in the foreclosure
circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party, said decision to which complainants (state prosecutors) filed a
proceedings.
operates as a bar in a court of equity. 26In the present case, at comment. Respondent's reply thereto was further opposed by
Although a sale under a power contained in a mortgage or no time after the debt became due and demandable and the complainants' rejoinder. Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court
trust deed has been defectively executed and the mortgagor mortgage property had been foreclosed, or even thereafter, Judges Association of Manila, Inc. and the Movement of
has the right to disaffirm the same, he may, by laches or by did petitioners offer to pay their mortgage obligation to Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc.
acts amounting to an estoppel or ratification, cure the defect redeem their property. Petitioners' collective acts are, (MABINI) filed separate petitions ". . . For Leave to Intervene
and render the sale valid. 19 Where a sale under a power is therefore, indicative of their acquiescence to and As Amicus Curiae". Both petitions were however denied by
voidable at the election of the mortgagor for some irregularity acknowledgment of the validity of the foreclosure the Court in its Resolutions of October 18, 1994 and
such as that the mortgagee purchased without authority, proceedings and the sale, as well as a recognition of November 8, 1994, respectively.
or that there was an inadequacy in the price obtained, a want respondent bank's just and legal title over the property
of sufficient or proper notice, or the like the mortgagor acquired thereby. In pressing for the dismissal of the complaint against him,
must institute proceedings for avoidance within apt and respondent, in a nutshell, maintains that his dismissal of the

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 19 of 63

criminal charges against Mrs. Marcos in the aforedescribed
manner was not motivated by bad faith or by any corrupt and
insidious intent. And to further belie his imputed "gross
ignorance of the law", respondent stresses that "he graduated
from the law school,
magna cum laude, the valedictorian of his class and placed
6th in the Bar examination". 3
It may be conceded that respondent, in acting the way he did,
committed a legal error which usually is remediable by appeal
or by any other modes sanctioned by the Rules of Court 4 and
"does not raise a question of improper judicial conduct
subject to judicial discipline". 5 But egregious legal error, legal
error motivated by bad faith, or a continuing pattern of legal
error do amount to misconduct subject to discipline, ranging
from admonishment to removal from office. 6 And legal error
is egregious and serious enough to amount to misconduct
when judges deny individuals their basic or fundamental
rights, such as when defendants were not advised of their
constitutional right to counsel, coerced to plead guilty,
sentenced to jail when only a fine is provided by law,
sentenced to jail for a period longer than the maximum
sentence allowed by law, or particularly similar to this case
when defendants were denied a full and fair hearing 7 a
constitutional right equally afforded to the prosecution but
unceremoniously ignored by respondent. The gravity of his
actuation cannot be shrugged off casually. Respondent has
followed a course of judicial conduct which is in utter
disregard of the law, established rules of practice and basic
notions of fair play, and his impressive scholastic record as
student of law all the more punctuates his blunder rather than
temper it. Thus, we reiterate with the same fervor that:
xxx xxx xxx
IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or
erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of
respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the
eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash
having been filed by the accused, and without at least
giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard
on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral
argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due
process to the Government but is palpably indicative of
bad faith and partiality.
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily
dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for
abuse of judicial power and discretion, nor does such
professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of
the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its
right to due process of law.
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of
complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to
dismiss the cases without the benefit of a hearing and
without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably
opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality
for the accused. Regardless of how carefully he may
have evaluated changes in the factual situation and legal These indeed are favorable considerations warranting the
standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper commutation of respondent's penalty of dismissal, if only to
report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no give him the chance to redeem himself from an error of this
chance whatsoever to show or prove that if had strong magnitude which he committed only for the first time. After
evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he
thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right
to due process. More importantly, notwithstanding the
fact that respondent was not sure of the effects and
implications of the President's announcement, as by his
own admission he was in doubt whether or not he should
dismiss the cases, he nonetheless deliberately refrained
from requiring the prosecution to comment thereon. In a
puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can but
rhetorically ask: "What explanation could have been
given? That the President was talking "through his hat"
and should not be believed? That I should wait for the
publication of a still then nonexistent CB Circular?" The
pretended cogency of this ratiocination cannot stand
even the minutest legal scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he
should have the patience and circumspection to give the
opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if
he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not be
adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A
display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of
the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with
the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge". At the very
least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with
unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of the eleven
cases, and thereby rendered his actuation highly
dubious. 8
However, certain notable matters and turn of events since the
filing of respondent's motion for reconsideration stir the Court
to undertake a re-examination of the penalty of dismissal
originally imposed on him. Respondent attests to his unsullied
name and service record prior to this administrative case and
further displays a humble and contrite gesture by making a
"solemn commitment" that:
a) he will avoid creating a situation that spawns
suspicion of arbitrary and improper conduct (Canon of
Judicial Ethics, par. 17);
b) he would "adopt the usual and expected method of
doing justice and not seek to be extreme or peculiar in
his judgment or spectacular or sensational in the conduct
of the court." (Ibid, par. 39);
c) he would avoid all appearances of impropriety,
specially those that create suspicion of partiality, bias or
improper motive. (Ibid, par. 3; Code of Judicial Conduct,
Canon 2). 9
And as if moved by the verity of respondent's attestation
and the sincerity of his renewed pledge, complainants, in
their Comment 10 to the motion for reconsideration and
Rejoinder 11 to respondent's reply to their Comment, have
mellowed down in pushing for respondent's removal from
the sevice and now leave to these Court's sound
discretion whether to lessen or modify respondent's
penalty.
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions
all, this Court is not bereft of compassion and mercy. But
respondent ought to be reminded of certain fundamental
legal precepts which just might have escaped him
momentarily and which will keep him guarded against
committing the same or similar mistake a second time.
Although a speedy determination of an action or
proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be borne in
mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial.
Careful and deliberate consideration for the
administration of justice is more important than a race to
end the trial. A genuine respect for the rights of all
parties, thoughtful consideration before ruling on
important questions, and a zealous regard for the just
administration of law are some of the qualities of a good
trial judge, which are more important than a reputation
for hasty disposal of cases. 12
In every litigation, . . ., the manner and attitude of a trial
judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended
party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to
indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the
at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He
is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or
prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays
himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings
rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his
own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to
the parties as well as the public that he follows the
traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear
both sides with patience and understanding to keep the
risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not
necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in
law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true.
What is equally important is that he should avoid any
conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has
been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is
impressed with constitutional significance. 13
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An
independent judiciary does not mean that judges can
resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There
are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges
perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal
values and the explicit limits are substantive and
procedural rules of law. 14
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free.
He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-
errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic
sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is
to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the
social life." 15
In line with the Court's pronouncement in "In Re: Petition for
the Dismissal from Service and/or Disbarment of Judge
Baltazar R. Dizon" 16 and borrowing the words therein, the
decision to dismiss respondent judge took effect on
September 19, 1994. On the basis of the foregoing
Page 20 of 63
considerations, we feel he has been sufficiently punished for
the administrative infraction. We, therefore, order his
reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Court's September
19, 1994 Decision is MODIFIED. Respondent Judge Manuel T.
Muro is considered suspended from office without pay for the
period from September 19, 1994 to the date this Resolution is
promulgated. He may, therefore, be REINSTATED to office
immediately. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the
respondent's personal record.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131472 March 28, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROMEO TIPAY Y NUITE, accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision of Branch 56 of the
Regional Trial Court of the 5th Judicial Region stationed in
Libmanan, Camarines Sur, the Honorable Lore R. Valencia-
Bagalacsa presiding, the dispositive portion of which reads:
The Court is morally convinced that the accused ROMEO
TIPAY y NUITE, is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Article
335(2)(3) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
7659, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum
penalty of DEATH. He is directed to indemnify the
offended party the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages and Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to
acknowledge his offspring Marissa, with the offended
party.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 36-37, Rollo.)
The instant case was initiated by a complaint against
accused-appellant Romeo Tipay y Nuite filed by Flora Deguio
[also referred to in the record as Dequio], grandmother of
victim Susan Pelaez, which reads:
That sometime February or March of 1995 at Bgy.
Inandaw, Ragay, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is the step-father of the private offended
party, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse for several times with one Susan Pelaez y
Dequio, 15 years of age, against the latter's will, to her
damage and prejudice.
(p. 12, Rollo.)
During his arraignment on April 29, 1996, accused-appellant
entered a plea of not guilty. Afterwards, trial on the merits
ensued, resulting in the judgment of conviction now under
automatic review considering that the supreme penalty of
death was imposed.
The inculpatory facts, as summarized by the Solicitor General, Flora went to the police headquarters of Ragay to file a
and based on the testimony of private complainant Susan complaint against appellant (p. 48, TSN, April 21, 1997).
Pelaez, her mother Marissa Deguio-Pelaez, her grandmother Susan was subsequently brought to Dr. Marilyn Cerilo
Flora Deguio, and Dr. Marilyn Cerilo-Folloso, the physician Folloso, officer of Municipal Health Office of Ragay,
who examined the victim, are as follows: Camarines Sur, who testified that Susan had a healed
hymenal-laceration at 6 o'clock and there was no
Prosecution witness and private complainant Susan
menstruation due to a 4 to 5 month pregnancy (p. 38,
Pelaez was 17 year old at the time she testified in 1997.
TSN, Jan. 6, 1997). Susan gave birth to a daughter sired
She was diagnosed as suffering from mild mental
by appellant on October 10, 1996 (p. 78, April 22, 1997).
retardation and transient psychotic illness (p. 4, TSN,
Dec. 6, 1996) and with the mental age of an eight to nine Appellant was arrested in October 1995 claiming that the
year old (Exhibit "A"). rape complaint was a mere fabrication of Flora Deguino
because she was angry at appellant for cohabiting with
Sometime in February or March 1995, about three weeks
her daughter, Marilyn Deguino. During his testimony in
before classes ended, Susan who was then fifteen years
court, appellant also claimed that on July 10, 1995, he
old and in Grade V, and was living with her grandmother,
saw Romeo Deguino the son of Flora raping Susan (pp.
Flora Deguino, in Barangay F. Simeon, was asked to stop
93, 97, TSN, May 19, 1997).
schooling by her mother, Marilyn, and her live-in partner,
the appellant Romeo Tipay. She was brought to the house (pp. 106-109, Rollo.)
in Barangay Inandawan where the couple lived.
Accused-appellant denied all of Susan's allegations. He
One day in Barangay Inandawan, while Marilyn was out argued that his mother-in-law, Flora Deguio, was just angry
of the house and Susan's siblings were at school, her at him because the latter was against his live-in relationship
mother's live-in partner Romeo Tipay (herein appellant) with Susan's mother, Marilyn; that he never subjected Susan
poked a knife at her and made her lie down and ordered to maltreatment which she imputed against him; and that his
her to undress but Susan did not obey. Appellant got relationship with Marilyn's three children by her first husband
angry and slapped her and banged her head to the post was fine and they even called him "itay". As regards Susan's
and she lost her consciousness until her siblings arrived child, he claimed that it was sired by Mario Deguio, Marilyn's
when Susan regained her consciousness. She noticed brother. He witnessed the incident when he was about to
that her vagina was hurting (p. 67-69, April 22, 1997). return the coconut grater to Flora's house. He saw Mario
Petitioner threatened Susan not to tell anybody or he having intercourse with Susan. He informed Marilyn when he
would kill all of her family (p. 75, ibid.). Intimidated, got home and the latter cried.
Susan suffered in silence while appellant was
Atty. Edwina Romanes, the Public Assistance Office (PAO)
emboldened and continued to abuse her.
lawyer who was assigned in Ragay, Camarines Sur, assisted
The above incident was repeated several times accused-appellant in the circuit court and interviewed Marilyn
whenever her mother and sibling were not around (ibid., Pelaez, her son Ariel Pelaez, and Purificacion Ipay. Said three
p. 67). The abuse continued in Barangay F. Simeon where witnesses gave statements showing that accused-appellant
Marilyn and appellant also occupied a house next to that did not commit the crime charged.
of Flora Deguino who took care of their children who
As mentioned above, the trial court found accused-appellant
were attending school in Barangay F. Simeon. Appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as
would not allow her to watch television with her siblings
defined and penalized under Article 335 (2)(3) of the Revised
on the pretext that he would massage her. Instead he
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Its ruling
switched off the light, covered her mouth and undressed
reads in relevant part as follows:
her and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her
(pp. 70-71, TSN, April 22, 1997). Out of fear for the life of In an almost inaudible voice, Susan related how Romeo
her family, Susan kept her ordeal secret. Tipay, the person whom she recognized as her surrogate
father, told her to undress then slapped her and banged
In October 19, 1995 when Susan was back in Barangay F.
her head when she disobeyed. She could not remember
Simeon and in Grade VI in Pagod Elementary School, she
her sexual defloration, but she vividly recalled that when
was complaining to Flora Deguino of headache and
she came to after accused's physical assault, her vagina
spoke angrily about appellant's cruelty (p. 45, April 21,
was painful. She was however consistent and steadfast
1997). In the last week of October, Flora was summoned
in her declaration that her stepfather, Romeo Tipay,
by a midwife Mrs. Helen Inciong, who after examining
sexually abused her. She did not waver in her testimony
Susan informed them that Susan was pregnant (p. 46,
despite the lengthy cross-examination. She emphatically
TSN, April 21, 1997, p. 18, Dec. 2, 1997). Upon reaching
asserted that it was the accused, not any other person
home, Flora Deguino asked Susan who impregnated her.
who raped her and positively identified him as the
It was only then that Susan informed her grandmother
person who ravished her. Her statements clearly indicate
that she was being raped by appellant but was too afraid
that her answers are neither rehearsed nor dictated upon
to tell anyone about it (p. 47, TSN, ibid.). At that time
by her vindictive grandmother, or even her mother. So it
Marilyn and her children were staying in F. Simeon in a
was held that "when a woman, more so a minor, says
house beside the house of Flora since there was no
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
school in Inandawa.
necessary to show that rape was committed." (Pp. v.
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 21 of 63
 Vitor, 245 SCRA 392 [1995]). Moreover, "a candid and accused-appellant's testimony that he actually saw said man are no longer around, I was made to lie down, I resisted
straightforward narration by the victim of how she had as the perpetrators of the crime, as well as in disregarding the but I was threatened, by him.
been raped bears the earmarks of credibility (Pp. v. affidavit of Marilyn Deguio dated November 13, 1995, which
Q: You said that he threatened you, how did he threaten
Umali, 242 SCRA 17 [1995]). was voluntarily executed, attesting to accused-appellant's
you?
innocence. Accused-appellant also posits that Marilyn's
There is no showing that the offended party harbored evil
disclaimer was prompted by her desire to get back at him A: He poked a knife (witness pointed to the left side of
motives against the accused. Even if she was taught by
since he expressed his intentions to separate from her. Lastly, her neck).
her grandmother to point out to Romeo Tipay as her
he argues that it was grave error for the trial court to convict
rapist, there was no way for the latter to let her Q: After poking the knife what did he do?
him under a fatally defective complaint as it was Susan's
memorize the details of what was done to her. Victim's
grandmother who filed the same, when it should have been A: He made me undressed.
answers to the questions propounded were spontaneous
Marilyn, in accordance with Section 5, Paragraph 3, Rule 110,
and categorical, lending credence to her narration. Her Q: Did you follow him?
Rules of Court.1wphi1.nt
declarations are substantiated on material points by the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses and the In a long line of cases (People vs. Guamos, 241 SCRA 528 A: No, sir until such time when my brothers and sister
medical certificate issued by the doctor who examined [1995]; People vs. Ramirez, 266 SCRA 336 [1997]; People vs. arrived.
the victim. Such medical evidence is an eloquent proof of Abad, 268 SCRA 246 [1997]; People vs. Corea, 269 SCRA 76 Q: You said you did not obey what he wanted and when
the "after the fact condition" of the coerced sexual [1997] People vs. Perez, 270 SCRA 526 [1997]; People vs. you did not obey him, what did Romeo Tipay do to you?
congress. Moreover, even without the testimonies of the Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Pizarro, 211 SCRA
other witnesses for the prosecution, it is axiomatic in 325 [1992]; People vs. Dela Cruz, 207 SCRA 449 [1992]), the A: He would hurt me.
rape cases that the lone declaration of facts of the Court has laid down certain guiding principles in reviewing Q: How would he hurt you?
offended party if credible, is sufficient to sustain a rape cases, to wit: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with
conviction (Pp. vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]). facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even A: He would slapped me and banged my head to the
more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to post.
(p. 32, Rollo.)
disprove the charge; (b) considering the intrinsic nature of the
Q: What happened whenever he slapped you and banged
In his brief, accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred crime, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of your head to the post?
in: (1) finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized
crime charged: (2) not considering his testimony that it was with great caution, and (c) the evidence for the prosecution A: I felt dizzy.
Mario Deguio that he saw raping Susan Pelaez; and (3) must stand or fail on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the Q: Which post are you referring to? The post of your
disregarding the affidavit executed by Marilyn Deguio.
defense. house?
In support of the aforementioned arguments, accused-
A: Yes, sir.
appellant reiterates that Flora Deguio, grandmother of The crux of the prosecution's evidence would then rely on the
Susan, harbored ill-feelings against him since she vehemently credibility of Susan Pelaez's testimony. As mentioned above, Q: Now, you said that after your head was banged to the
objected to the live-in partnership of her daughter Marilyn the trial court found Susan's testimony spontaneous and post, aside from dizziness. what else happened to you?
and accused-appellant, and that Flora's antipathy toward him categorical, and not based on any ill motive. The trial court
and her desire to have Marilyn break up with him was the recognized the probability of her grandmother pointing out A: I don't recall anymore what happened next.
primary motive why Flora prosecuted him. Considering Flora's accused-appellant as her aggressor but held that this did not Q: You mean you were unconscious?
moral ascendancy over Susan, accused-appellant insists that affect the credibility of her testimony.
the latter was manipulated to believe that it was her A: Yes, sir.
It has long been held that the trial court's evaluation as to the
stepfather who impregnated her. Further, he contends that he xxx xxx xxx
credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the
wanted to leave Marilyn and that was why the latter had him
highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude, PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
jailed. Initially, she executed an affidavit favoring accused-
having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses'
appellant and denying the latter's culpability for the crime Would you kindly tell us when did you recover
demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in
charged. Later, however, she realized that accused-appellant consciousness, before or after the arrival of your brothers
which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge, therefore,
wanted to leave her. She then had a change of heart, and and sister?
can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth,
reneged on her earlier statement, to prevent accused-
being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. A: When my brothers and sister arrived that I recovered
appellant from leaving her. This was also the reason for
Thus, unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of consciousness.
Marilyn's belated act of having accused-appellant
substance and value which, if considered, might affect the
incarcerated (which was only in October, 1995) when in truth Q: After recovering consciousness what did you observe
result of the case, his assessment on credibility must be
and in fact she had known about the alleged rape as early as from your self?
respected (People vs. Ramirez, supra; People vs. Gabris. 258
February, 1995.
SCRA 663 [1996]; People vs. Vallena, 244 SCRA 685 [1995]).
A: I felt something painful.
Accused-appellant also argues that Susan Pelaez's testimony
This spontaneity is exhibited in the following excerpt of
creates a doubt on a very material point considering that in Q: Which one was painful?
Susan's direct testimony:
her testimony in court, she said that she was raped at
A: Witness pointed to her vagina.
Barangay F. Simeon, Ragay, Camarines Sur, or in her Q: While you were still in Grade V, do you know what
grandmother's home; whereas the criminal complaint avers unusual thing done by Romeo Tipay? ATTY. NACIONAL:
that it took place at Barangay Inandawa, Ragay, Camarines
A: There was, sir. May we ask that it should be specified.
Sur, particularly at her mother's house.
Q: What did he do to you? PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
Accused-appellant likewise supports his denial by insisting
that he saw Mario Deguio actually rape Susan Pelaez. A: Whenever my mother is away, I was made to take What do you call that part of your body which you said
Consequently, the trial court gravely erred in not considering care of the children and when any brothers and sisters was painful?

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 22 of 63

A: My vagina "puke"
Q: What did you observe from your vagina?
A: It was painful.
Q: Tell us how many times did Romeo Tipay did that to
you?
ATTY. NACIONAL:
What similar act?
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
How many times if you could still remember did Romeo
Tipay banged your head and you lost consciousness,
then after regaining consciousness you felt your vagina
painful?
ATTY. NACIONAL:
Your Honor, it is a vague question, considering that this
witness is mentally. . . .
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
Okay, I'll reform my question. Tell us how many times did
Romeo Tipay banged your head to the post?
A: He used to banged my head on the post almost
everyday.
Q: Can you tell us how many times you lost
consciousness everytime Romeo Tipay banged your head
to the post?
A: I can't remember anymore because it's a long time
already.
Q: And will you also kindly tell us how many times did
you observe pain in your vagina after you regain
consciousness?
A: I can't remember how many times, but many times.
Q: Aside from banging your head in the post, what else
did Romeo Tipay do to you?
A: He slapped me.
Q: While you were still in Grade V what other things did
Romeo Tipay do to you?
A: Whenever I asked permission to go to the movies he
would not permit me.
Q: Why after you were not permitted to go to the movies
what did Romeo Tipay do to you?
A: "Humihilot pero iba naman ang ginagawa".
Q: Who is "humihilot"?
A: He would tell me that he will massage me but he does
not massage me but he did other things, switch off the (tsn, April 22, 1997, pp. 6-11)
light.
Another significant point of consideration is the fact that
Q: You said he does not actually massage you but did Susan Pelaez, although a young woman of 17 years, was
something. What is it? diagnosed as suffering from mild mental retardation and
transient psychotic illness (tsn, December 6, 1996, p. 4) and
A: He covers my mouth, so I could not shout. with the mental age of an eight or nine year old child (Exhibit (tsn, April 22, 1997, p. 3.)
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions
Q: After he covers my mouth, what else did he do to you? "A"). Her demeanor in the courtroom was described by the
trial court in this wise:
A: He raped me.
Susan Pelaez, is a dark-skinned, well-built seventeen
Q: What do you mean by raped you?
year old who washes clothes for a living. In the
A: He undressed me. Courtroom she was observed to be unmindful of what is
happening around her, she laughs or sleeps whenever
Q: After he undressed you what did he do with his penis? she wanted to do so. She taps her fingers on the table or
bites her fingernails even at the witness stand. However,
ATTY. NACIONAL:
she answered the questions in a straightforward and
No. categorical manner, although her r's and s' were
pronounced as "y" and "t", hence, "Mayita" and the like,
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
but her declarations can easily be understood. She can
When she said he raped me, it's possibly attributed by narrate her experiences, recognize persons, and explain
counsel by the terminology of the term, rape means that whatever is asked of her. She exuded the naivette and
there was a penetration made by the accused to her. innocence of a child, despite her ordeal. She glared and
ATTY. NACIONAL: made faces at the accused everytime she had the
opportunity to do so.
No, we will not admit we will cling to the fact that what is
(pp. 29-30, Rollo.)
being testified to when she said she undressed me.
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS: Mental retardation refers significantly to sub-average
intellectual functioning which originates during the
After undressing? developmental period and is associated with impairment in
adaptive behavior (The Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-
ATTY. NACIONAL:
Legal Dictionary, 1987 ed., p. 616). That explains the finding
Well, the question was what did you understand when that despite her age (17 years), Susan had a mental age of an
you said "ginagahasa"? eight or nine year old child. Psychosis, on the other hand,
refers to a serious mental disorder where the individual's
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS: behavior and thought process are so disturbed that he or she
That would be now my follow up question because the is out of touch with reality and can not cope with the
term rape may not be what counsel was in mind with demands of daily life (Atkinson, Atkinson & Hilgard,
what this witness had in mind. Further clarification from Introduction to Psychology, 1983 ed., p. 455). As diagnosed
this witness what she means when she said rape, taking by Dr. Cuyos-Belmonte, Susan's psychosis is reactive and is
into consideration her mental ability. considered to be mild, and thus may improve even with short
term treatment. However, her mental retardation was
ATTY. NACIONAL: diagnosed as a permanent organic condition and no amount
of treatment can improve the same (p. 135, Record). From
She reached Grade VI.
this diagnosis, it may be deduced that Susan is not mentally
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS: equipped for the difficult situations in life. Unfortunately, she
But she is mentally retarded, you should understand that was cruelly subjected to one of the most trying and bestial
also. experiences which fortunately is visited on only a few.
In point is People vs. San Juan, (270 SCRA 693 [1997]) where
Q: After you were undressed, what else did Romeo Tipay
do to you? the Court encountered a similar scenario. A 26-year old victim
had the mental development of a 5-year old child. We held
A: He covered my mouth so that I could not shout. then that this fact did not lessen her credibility since the
victim had shown her ability to communicate her ordeal
Q: What else?
clearly and consistently. In the same vein, the preliminary a
A: Whenever my lola calls me he covers my mouth and questioning during Susan's direct testimony shows that her
tell me not to shout or else I'll be killed. mental retardation was not an obstacle to the disclosure of
the truth, to wit:
Q: Why, why did he warned you not to shout or else he
will kill you, what was he doing to you? PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
A: "Ni-re-rape niya po ako". He was raping me. Susan, you were made to raise your right hand a while
ago, do you know what does that mean?
A: That I will tell the truth, sir.
Q: Why, if you tell a lie, is that good?
A: No, sir.
Page 23 of 63
Further, it was held in People vs. Atuel (261 SCRA 339
[1996]), that sexual intercourse with an insane, deranged, or
mentally deficient, feebleminded, or idiotic woman is rape,
pure and simple.
It can be observed from the aforequoted portion of Susan's
testimony that notwithstanding her mental handicap, she is a
credible witness and this handicap is not an obstacle to her
perseverance in attaining justice for the bestiality that was
done to her.
As aptly held in People vs. Ramirez (supra), citing People vs.
Dela Cruz (251 SCRA 77 [1995]) and People vs. Sanchez (250
SCRA 14 [1995]), no woman especially one who is of tender
age would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself
to be subjected to a public trial, if she is not motivated solely
by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished,
for considering that the victim was of tender years and not
exposed to the ways of the world, it is most improbable that
she would impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it
were not true.
Significantly, Susan did not impute the crime just to any man,
but to her surrogate father.
In response to the helpless child's cry for succor, surrogate
father, accused-appellant, opted to attempt to escape from
liability by denying the charge on the basis of a concocted
story.
First, he imputes the falsity of the charge on Flora Deguio's
antipathy toward him for living in with her daughter. We find
such evasion flimsy. No grandmother would be so callous as
to instigate her own granddaughter to report a rape and
(tsn, April 22, 1997, pp. 5-6)
subject her to the trouble and humiliation of a public trial, if
the rape never happened. xxx
Second, accused-appellant banks on the inconsistency in
Susan's testimony as regards the place of the crime. The
Information states Barangay Inandawa, Ragay, Camarines
Sur, whereas during Susan's direct testimony, she named two
places as follows:
Q: While in Grade V were do you stay?
A: I was with my lola in Pugod.
Q: Is Pugod a barangay of Ragay?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: During off school days, where do you stay?
A: At Inandawa.
Q: While you were still in Grade V, did you stay at
Inandawa?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: With whom?
A: With lola.
Q: In whose house?
A: Our house.
Q: When you said "our house" is it the house also of your Q: How many times?
Nanay and Romeo Tipay?
A: I cannot recall anymore, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell us in what place you were first raped?
Q: Who were your companions in that house in
A: At F. Simeon, sir.
Inandawa?
Q: In whose house?
A: My siblings.
A: At the house of my grandmother, sir.
Q: Who were those siblings you said were your
companions in that house in Inandawa? Q: But who are living in that house of your grandmother?
A: Romnick, Romelyn and Fidel. A: The siblings of my mother.
Q: What about Mario, Roman and Rommel? Q: Where were the siblings of your mother when you
were first raped?
A: No, sir.
A: They were at the dance hall.
Q: Why, where do they live?
Q: Who were the only persons in the house when you
A: They are weaving sawali.
were first raped?
Q: Where?
A: Children of Romeo Tipay.
A: At the sawali factory.
Q: When you said children of Romeo Tipay, whom are
Q: While you were still in Grade V, do you know what you referring?
unusual thing done by Romeo Tipay?
A: Romar and Romelyn.
A: There was, sir.
Q: What were Romar and Romelyn doing when you were
Q: What did he do to you? first raped?
A: Whenever my mother is away, I was made to take A: They were all asleep, sir.
care of the children and when my brothers and sisters
(tsn, April 22, 1997, pp. 13-14)
are no longer around, I was made to lie sisters down, I
resisted but I was threatened, by him. An examination of Susan Pelaez's direct testimony will show
that the rape referred to in the information was committed at
the residence of her mother Marilyn and stepfather accused-
xxx xxx appellant at Barangay Inandawa, Ragay, Camarines Sur. And
the abuse was repeated at Barangay F. Simeon, Ragay,
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
Camarines Sur, where Marilyn and accused-appellant later
You said that your head was banged against the post of resided, next to Flora Deguio's house. In Marilyn's affidavit
the house. Is that house also the place where you were presented during the preliminary examination stage of the
raped? case at bar wherein she stated: "[W]hen my daughter Susan
was in Grade I to Grade IV, she stayed with her grandmother
A: Yes, sir. in F. Simeon, because our residence then was still in
Q: Were you raped only in that place? Inandawa, Ragay, Camarines Sur. It was only in July, 1995
that we decided to move to F. Simeon. Since then, Susan
A: Anywhere, sir. stayed with us. On week-ends, however, whenever I join my
Q: When you said anywhere, which place are you husband in Inandawa, she is left either at our own house or in
referring to? the house of my mother" (p. 33, Record). However, the very
first time Susan was raped, it occurred at Flora Deguio's
ATTY. NACIONAL: house in F. Simeon when her uncles were all at the dance hall.
Your Honor, at this point in time, we will agree with the Thus, when she said she was raped "anywhere," spoke the
observation report that there is only one charge of rape truth. Verily, it is quite unfortunate that the information failed
in this case and any other rape that was committed will to charge the other counts of rape.
be immaterial. Nevertheless, inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness
with respect to minor details or inconsequential matters may
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
be disregarded without impairing the witness' credibility
When you said you were raped elsewhere or anywhere (People vs. Magalang, 244 SCRA 17 [1995]) especially when
did it happen on February or March 1995? these do not in actuality touch the basic aspects of the whys
and wherefores of the crime (People vs. Tacapit, 242 SCRA
A: Yes, sir.
241 [1995]).
Q: After February or March 1995, were you still raped?
A: Yes, sir.
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 24 of 63
Third, accused-appellant attempts to shift the blame to Mario As correctly pointed gut by the Solicitor General, accused- xxx xxx xxx
Deguio, Susan's uncle and housemate. Accused-appellant appellant, who was supposed to act as Susan's surrogate
Q: It was Atty. Edwina Romanes who interviewed you?
testified that he saw Deguio rape Susan, as follow: father, did not even report the concocted incident to the
proper authorities, or even to Flora Deguio at whose house A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell the Hon. Court if you knew who was
he allegedly witnessed the rape. He testified that he told
responsible for the pregnancy and giving birth of Susan Q: Before your were interviewed where you able to talk
Marilyn about the incident, but that was all that he did. Such
Pelaez? or confer with Romeo Tipay?
inaction is definitely contrary to logic and human experience.
A: What I know sir is that the one responsible is Romeo He failed to act as a father naturally would upon seeing a A: Yes, sir. Romeo Tipay told his parents what to do.
Dequio, the brother of my live-in partner. child under his care being mercilessly ravished.
Q: How long have you conferred with Romeo Tipay before
Q: Why do you say that he was the one responsible? Further, Susan, who was subjected to grueling cross you were interviewed by Atty. Romanes?
examination by the counsel for the defense never faltered in
A: When I went to the house of my mother-in law on July her story. She was the one raped. She definitely knew who A: About 30 minutes.
10, 1995, I saw how Romeo Dequio raped Susan. attacked her and who did not. As held in People vs. Q: How long have you stayed in the office of Atty.
Q: When you saw Susan Pelaez being raped by Romeo Castaeda (252 SCRA 247 [1996]), during the rape, the Romanes?
Dequio, what did you do? complainant is close to her assailant as physically as possible,
for a man and woman cannot be physically closer to each A: It was long, I didn't remember how long.
A: I was afraid because Romeo had a knife being poked other than during a sexual act. There is thus no doubt that
at Susan Pelaez. Q: This affidavit you identified was read to you in Bicol by
complainant had a good look at the physical features of Judge Ramos?
Q: You said that it was on July 10 1995 that Romeo accused-appellant and hence could not have been mistaken
Dequio raped Susan, can you tell the Court why you in her charge, especially when the person who ravished is one A: Yes, sir, but I did not understand other Bicol.
went there at the house of your mother-in-law on that well known to her, he being her stepfather. Q: It was explained to you by Atty. Edwina Romanes
date? As regards the effect of Marilyn's retraction, we apply our before you sign the affidavit?
A: I was about to take back the coconut grater which was ruling in Molina vs. People (259 SCRA 138 [1996]), where we A: Yes, sir but I did not sign yet.
borrowed by my mother-in-law because we have to make held:
something, to cook a merienda out of banana. Q: So you signed the affidavit before Judge Ramos?
. . . The rule is settled that in cases where previous
Q: When you arrived there in the house of your mother- testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not A: Yes, sir because I was forced by the mother of Romeo
in-law on July 10, 1995 who were the persons who were contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the Tipay because everything has to be ended already.
in that house? test to decide which testimony to believe is one of
comparison coupled with the application of the general Q: Did you not complain?
A: I saw only Susan Pelaez and Romeo Dequio and that rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in court A: No, sir. They were infront of me.
was the time that Susan Dequio was being raped by should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and
Romeo Dequio. before this can be done, both the previous testimony and Q: You did not complain to the police?

Q: How about Mrs. Flora Dequio? Where was she?
A: I don't know, sir.
Q: How about her husband?
A: I don't know, sir.
When Marilyn Deguio was asked on the stand why she being abandoned. However, when she took the stand on
Q: You mean to say that Susan Dequio Pelaez and
retracted her previous testimony attesting to accused- December 3, 1996, she did so as a mother, with her maternal
Romeo Dequio were alone?
appellant's innocence, she said:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After you were able to get the coconut grater, what
did you do?
A: I went home and reported what I saw, what Romeo
Dequio did to Susan Pelaez, to live-in partner.
Q: What did Marilyn do after you reported the incident to
her?
A: She cried and while she was crying, she was saying
why Romeo Dequio did it to her daughter.
Q: What other actions did you do?
A: I was not able to do other things because Romeo
Dequio's knife was poked at Susan Pelaez.
(tsn, May 19, 1997, pp. 7-8)
the subsequent one should be carefully compared and A: Because they did not let me go.
juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was
made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons (tsn, December 3, 1996, pp. 7-9)
or motives for the charge, discriminatingly analyzed. We have reason to believe that Marilyn Deguio executed her
(at p. 159) affidavit of November 13, 1995 for fear of being left by
accused-appellant. She executed the same as a wife afraid of
instincts prevailing over her dependence both financially and
Q: You mentioned in the direct that you made an emotionally, on a man.
affidavit, you said it was not true. I am showing you Lastly, we pass upon the procedural issue raised by accused-
again the affidavit you identified yesterday. appellant, that is, the complaint having been filed by Susan's
A: Yes, sir. grandmother contrary to Section 5, Paragraph 3, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court.
Q: When you executed this affidavit you were at the
Prosecutor's Office at Ragay, Camarines Sur with Edwina The above-cited provision reads:
Romanes? Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. . . .
A: Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx
Q: You were there because a notice was sent to you on The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
November 13, 1995? lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
A: Yes, sir. complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
Q: Who were with you when you made the affidavit on offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-
November 13, 1995? named persons, as the case may be. In case the
A: I was accompanied by Romeo Tipay and his parents. offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she
could file the complaint and has no known parents,

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 25 of 63

 grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the A: He was already apprehended by the police. age of ten is quite manifest and the court can take judicial
criminal action in her behalf. notice thereof. The crucial years pertain to the ages of fifteen
Q: So you have no knowledge that a case was filed to
to seventeen where minority may seem to be dubitable due
The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the him in Ragay Police Station?
to one's physical appearance. In this situation, the
right to initiate the prosecution for the above offenses,
A: I have knowledge, in fact I have entrusted to my prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty the fact
independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian,
mother to take care of the case because I have no mean that the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was
unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon
to support the case. committed in order to justify the imposition of the death
grounds other than her minority. Where the offended
penalty under the above-cited provision.
party who is a minor fails to file the complaint, her Q: What date was that?
parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The record of the case at bar is bereft of any independent
The right to the action granted to the parents, A: October 27, 1995. evidence which would accurately show complainant's age.
grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all other (tsn, December 3, 1996, p. 7) That complainant's was alleged in the information and/or
persons and shall be exercised successively in the order complaint as under 16 years is not sufficient. Nor does the
herein provided, except as stated in the immediately The foregoing testimony clearly exhibits the consent of the lack of denial on the part of accused-appellant excuse the
preceding paragraph. mother to publicly pursue Susan's assailant in compliance prosecution from discharging its burden in this regard (People
with the requirements of the law and jurisprudence. vs. Javier, supra).
The substantive law counterpart of the foregoing section is
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which, until its We, however, hold that the trial court erred in imposing the Consequently, considering that the penalty of death cannot
amendment by Republic No. 8353, effective October 13, 1997 death penalty on accused-appellant. Article 335 of the be imposed in the case at bar due to the aforestated technical
(which reclassified rape as a crime against persons and no Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic flaw, accused-appellant should be made to pay P50,000.00
longer a private crime, for which reason, the complaint can Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law), reads relevantly: (not P75,000.00) as indemnification for the rape committed
now be instituted by any person), read: xxx xxx xxx (People v. Betonio, 279 SCRA 532 [19971), the ruling
in People v. Victor (G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998) being
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of inapplicable.
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
lasciviousness. . . . circumstances: The award of P50,000.00 granted by the trial court as and for
moral damages is, however, sustained in accordance with the
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of I. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age ruling in People vs. Prades (G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998)
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, that moral damages may additionally be awarded to the
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the victim in rape cases, in such amount as the court deems just,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the without the necessity for pleading or proof as basis thereof.
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above parent of the victim.
named persons, as the case may be. Lastly, the award of P50,000,00 granted by the trial court as
xxx xxx xxx exemplary damages should be reduced to P25,000.00 which
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, the trial court imposed the Court believes is the reasonable amount to deter similar
The condition provided by law for the proper prosecution of the penalty of death upon accused-appellant, taking into perversities, particularly the raping of one's step-daughter
the aforementioned offenses has been imposed out of account the minority of the victim as she is said to have been and consequently siring a child with her, in line with recent
consideration for the offended woman and her family who only 15 years old at the time of the rape incident, as well as jurisprudence (People vs. Sangil, 276 SCRA 532 [1997];
might prefer suffer the outrage in silence rather than go the relationship of step-father and daughter between them. People vs. Cristobal, 252 SCRA 507 [1996]).
through with the scandal of public trial (Valdepeas vs. However, in a similar and recent case (People vs. Javier, G.R.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED,
People, 16 SCRA 871 [1966]). In People vs. Estrebella (164 No. 12696, July 26, 1999), this court pronounced:
with the following modifications: (a) the penalty imposed is
SCRA 114 [1988]), we held that any technical defect in a
complaint for rape would be remedied by testimony showing . . . [I]t is significant to note that the prosecution failed to reduced to reclusion perpetua; (b) aside from the payment of
the consent and willingness of the family of the complainant present the birth certificate of the complainant. Although Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages to the
who cannot give her consent (due to minority or mental the victim's age was not contested by the defense, proof victim, accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify
retardation, for instance), to have the private offense publicly of age of the victim is particularly necessary in this case private complainant in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
tried. Substantially, this is what is required by the rules. considering that the victim's age which was then 16 (P50,000.00); and (c) the exemplary damages awarded by the
Evidently, by undergoing trial, the family of complainant years old is just two years less than the majority age of trial court in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
chose to publicly denounce the injustice committed against 18. In this age of modernism, there is hardly any are reduced to Twenty-five Thousand Pesos
difference between a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old (P25,000.00).1wphi1.nt
the latter and thus agreed to bear the personal effects of said
exposure (also see People vs. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 one insofar as physical features and attributes are SO ORDERED.
[1991]). concerned. A physically developed 16-year old lass may
be mistaken for an 18-year old young woman, in the
In the case at bar, Marilyn Deguio, complainant's mother same manner that a frail and young looking 18-year old G.R. No. 126538-39 November 20, 2001
herself requested Susan's grandmother to take care of the lady may pass as a 16-year old minor. Thus, it is in this
case, as follows: context that independent proof of the actual age of a PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Q: In fact, there was no supporting affidavit to the rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove RODELIO MARCELO, accused-appellant.
affidavit of your mother Flora? an iota of doubt that the victim is indeed under 18 years QUISUMBING, J.:
of age as to fall under the qualifying circumstances
A: I asked my mother to take care of the case because I enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659. On automatic review is the decision 1 of the Regional Trial
have no means to support the case. Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, finding accused-appellant
This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the Rodelio Marcelo guilty in two out of three cases of rape and
Q: On October 1995, you did not go to the police? certificate of birth is at all times necessary to prove minority.
The minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 26 of 63

sentencing him to death in one case and reclusion Marikina, on September 16, 1994. Her sister, Cecilia, used to latter lived after she was sexually abused by appellant. She
perpetua in another. live with them but left them on September 10, 1994. also narrated the stories told to her by Cecilia regarding the
Thereafter, Cecilia would just go to their house occasionally to latter's experience.10
Appellant was originally charged under three separate
"change her dress". Worried, Cynthia wrote their mother in
Informations: In his defense, appellant RODELIO MARCELO denied the
Bicol to ask her to come to Manila to talk to Cecilia. On March
accusations against him. He alleged that Cecilia's complaint
Criminal Case No. 107976-H: 24, 1995, their mother and Cecilia coincidentally met in her
could have been motivated by his refusal to succumb to her
house. Cynthia remembered that on March 31, 1995, she
That on or about the 10th day of September, 1994 in the sexual advances. He also opined that his wife might be the
asked Cecilia to stay so they could talk but the latter refused
City of Pasig, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this one responsible for the false accusations of their daughters as
and went back to her boarding house. Cynthia followed her
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of she wanted to get rid of him so that she may live with her
and confronted her sister about her unwillingness to stay with
threats, force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, lover, a certain Jack Victorino.11
them. Cecilia revealed that appellant raped her. Upon hearing
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge to (sic) this, Cynthia brought Cecilia to her home in Sta. Teresita. MONINA MARCELO, cousin of appellant, was also presented to
the complainant, Cecilia Osorio, against her will and There appellant admitted to her that he raped Cecilia but only establish the fact that Cecilia had told her of her sexual
consent. because, according to him, "pinasukan ng demonyo ang utak experience in Singapore, and that Cecilia was a promiscuous
CONTRARY TO LAW. ko" (the devil possessed my brain). Appellant then left them. woman who had sexual contacts with her lovers. 12
Criminal Case No. 108000-H: Cynthia recounted that on April 11, 1995, appellant returned SINFROSA13 MENDOZA, aunt of appellant, testified that
and asked her if they could still live together. After she appellant's wife and a certain Jack Victorino were indeed
That sometime prior to March 31, 1995, in the City of refused, appellant left her a letter to give to his parents. lovers.14
Pasig, Philippines; and within the jurisdiction of this Confused, Cynthia decided to call her Auntie Adelaida 6 Reyes
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of for advice. As they spoke, they were rudely interrupted by her On August 6, 1996, the trial court promulgated its decision,
threats, force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, daughters, Mary Cyndel and Mariedel, who kept on talking disposing as follows:
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge to (sic) about a "snake" which their father used when he played with
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby
Mary Cyndel Marcelo, his own daughter, a minor 4 years them. According to them, this "snake" was placed by their
renders judgment finding accused RODELIO MARCELO
of age, against her will and consent. father inside their mouths, in their anuses and their private GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of Rape
CONTRARY TO LAW. parts. Curious, Adelaida took them inside a room and asked and sentences him to suffer:
the younger brother of Cynthia to remove his shorts. Mary
Criminal Case No. 108001-H: Cyndel pointed to the boy's penis and told the elders that the 1. In Criminal Case No. 107976-H, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; and
That sometime prior to March 31, 1995, in the City of "snake" of her father was much bigger than the "snake" of the
Pasig, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this boy. Cynthia brought her children to Camp Crame Crime 2. In Criminal Case No. 108001-H, the penalty of death.
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of Laboratory to have them examined. Upon reaching said
He is further ordered to pay complainant Cecilia Osorio
threats, force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, laboratory Mary Cyndel pointed to a sketch of a male's
and Mariedel Marcelo the sum of Fifty thousand pesos
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge to (sic) genitalia7 and told her mother that it was like her father's
(Php 50,000.00) each as moral damages; the sum of Fifty
Mariedel2 Marcelo, his own daughter, a minor 3 years of "snake."
thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) each as exemplary
age, against her will and consent. CECILIA OSORIO, sister-in-law of appellant, testified that she damages and cost of suit.
CONTRARY TO LAW. stayed in her sister Cynthia's home while she was working for
Purefoods. At around 3:00 A.M. of September 10, 1994, while Insofar as Criminal Case No. 108000-H is concerned, the
During his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the asleep, something touched her body. When she opened her Court hereby ACQUITS the accused for insufficiency of
charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. eyes, she saw appellant near her, naked. She pleaded with evidence.
him not to pursue whatever he had in mind, but he just poked In view of the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No.
The first witness for the prosecution was DR. OWEN J.
a knife at her and covered her mouth to prevent her from 108001-H, let the records of this case be elevated to the
LEBAQUIN, medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
shouting. His threat to kill her terrified her. Appellant removed Supreme Court for automatic review.
He testified that he examined Cecilia Osorio, Mary Cyndel and
his hand from her mouth and started undressing her. After
Mariedel Marcelo and his findings reveal that both Cecilia and
ejaculating inside her, appellant sat down and repeated his SO ORDERED.15
Mariedel suffered lacerations in their hymen and were in non-
threat to kill her and her sister if she reported what he did to
virgin states. On the other hand, Mary Cyndel's hymen was Appellant raises the following errors in his brief:
her. Days after, Cecilia left and lived with a friend somewhere
still intact and she was, in fact, a virgin.3
in Parang, Marikina.8 I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFORDING FULL CREDENCE TO
SPO1 LARRY PABLO testified that he was one of the police THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION THRU ITS
MARY CYNDEL MARCELO, the four-year-old daughter of the
officers who apprehended appellant and who investigated the WITNESS-COMPLAINANT CECILIA OSORIO TO SUPPORT A
4 couple, testified that her father often played with her and her
case. CONVICTION AGAINST THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
sister Mariedel, using his "snake". He would place this "snake"
107976-H
ADELAIDA REYES, principal and guidance counselor of Silahis inside their mouths, anuses and private parts while all of
Katarungan Elementary School, was presented to corroborate them were naked. With Atty. Mateo posing as appellant, Mary II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
the testimonies of Cecilia and Cynthia on how Mary Cyndel Cyndel pointed to the area of the groin when asked to point BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE BASIS OF THE
and Mariedel first related their harrowing experiences at the where her father's "snake" was. She also testified that TOTALITY OF ALL THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE
hands of their father.5 whenever her father placed this "snake" inside her mouth and PROSECUTION IN RESPECT TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. 108000-H
that of Mariedel's, it emitted a worm- like substance from its (sic)16
Appellant's wife, MA. CYNTHIA IMELDA MARCELO, testified head arid then it dies. The said worm-like substance was
that she is the sister of complainant Cecilia Osorio and the described by Mary Cyndel as "malagkit " and "lasang sipon."9 The issues here concern the credibility of witnesses and the
mother of Mary Cyndel Marcelo and Mariedel. She recalled sufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution.
that she and appellant lived in Santolan, Pasig, on September The last prosecution witness was ESTRELLA RAGUNOT. She
10, 1994 and transferred to Sta. Teresita Village in Parang, testified that she was a friend of Cecilia Osorio with whom the

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 27 of 63

Appellant describes the testimony of Cecilia as full of half
-truths, contradictions and improbabilities. He assails the
delay of six months which Cecilia allowed to pass before she
reported the alleged rape. He insists that Cecilia's complaint
is nothing more than an act of "vengeance" for his refusal to
give in to her sexual propositions. On the alleged rape
committed against Mariedel, appellant attacks the paucity of
evidence to prove the same. He asserts that the testimony of
Mary Cyndel was too fluid, precise and was promptly given
after each question, giving the impression that the responses
were rehearsed and memorized. Appellant also points out
that the cross- examination of Mary Cyndel reveals that the
"snake" she constantly refers to is not the sexual organ of her
father. Appellant likewise dismisses the findings of Dr.
Lebaquin with regard to the lacerations found in Mariedel's
private parts for the simple reason that he was not able to
identify the perpetrator thereof. Finally, appellant insists that
the testimonies of Cynthia, Cecilia and Adelaida are all
hearsay and deserve no probative value,17
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, avers
that there is no reason to detract from the trial court's finding
of credibility on the part of the prosecution's witnesses, The
OSG argues that delay and vacillation on the part of rape
victims in reporting their sordid experience do not impair their
credibility, especially when such delay is grounded on fear. It
also points out that the testimony of Mary Cyndel was carried
out in a candid, straightforward and innocent manner as only
a child of her age can, and it deserves utmost credence and
belief.18
In resolving cases of rape, this Court is guided by the
following principal (a) an accusation for rape can be made
with facility; it is difficult to prove but even more difficult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; (c) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense;19 and (d) the evaluation of the trial court
judges regarding the credibility of witnesses deserves utmost
respect on the ground that they are in the best position to
observe the demeanor, act, conduct, and attitude of the
witnesses in court while testifying.20
Guided by these principles and after a careful review of the
records of this case, we find no reason to overturn the
conclusion reached by the trial court concerning the guilt of
the accused-appellant,
The testimony of Cecilia Osorio was given in a candid and
straightforward manner leaving no room for doubt that she is
telling the truth. Appellant tried to discredit her testimony by
pointing out that it took Cecilia more than six months before
she reported the incident to her family and, eventually, to the
police. A delay of six months under the circumstances present
in this case, however, is not enough to taint Cecilia's
credibility. In the first place, she adequately explained why it
took her a long time before she reported the incident.
According to her, she was afraid and confused. This is
expected considering that the person who raped her was her
brother-in-law. Further, she had just gone through a harrowing
experience. We cannot categorically state what might have
entered the thoughts and minds of a young lady who had
such an experience, from the time she was raped up to the
time she decided to come out in the open. We are certain,
however, that delay and her reluctance to make public the
assault on her virtue is neither unknown or uncommon.
In People vs. Malagar, 238 SCRA 512 (1994), the Court said:
Vacillation in the filing of complaint by rape victim is not
an uncommon phenomenon. This crime is normally
accompanied by the rapist's threat on the victim's life,
and the fear can last for quite a while. There is also the
natural reluctance of a woman to admit her sullied
chastity, accepting thereby all the stigma it leaves, and
to then expose herself to the morbid curiosity of the
public whom she may likely perceived rightly or wrongly,
to be more interested in the prurient details of the
ravishment than in her vindication and the punishment
of the rapist. In People vs. Coloma (222 SCRA 255) we
have even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the
long history of rape by the victim's father as
understandable and so not enough to render incredible
the complaint of a 13-year old daughter. 21
Cecilia's fear is a viable reason for her long silence. This not committed.
should not be take against her. It is fear, springing from the
initial rape, from which the perpetrator hopes to build up a
climate of extreme psychological terror, which would numb
22
his victim to silence and submissiveness. And even if delay
could not be attributed to death threats and intimidation, the
failure of complainant in promptly reporting the offense to the
proper authorities would not destroy the truth per se of the
complaint.23
The attempt of the appellant to picture Cecilia as an
indiscreet and sexually promiscuous woman deserves scant
consideration. Prior sexual intercourse with a different person
is irrelevant in a rape case. 24
The "scorned woman theory" of appellant, i.e., his contention
that the charge of rape was brought about as an act of spite
and vengeance on the part of Cecilia because of his refusal to
give in to her sexual desires, hardly inspires belief. If it were
true that Cecilia entertained secret desires for appellant, she
would not leave all of a sudden. Her tendency would have
been to keep close to the man she was secretly in love with.
She would not fabricate a charge of rape for this would only
expose her supposedly "secret love" and thwart her hidden
designs. In other words, appellant's attempt to find solace in
the literary aphorism, " Hell hath no fury like a woman
scorned" has no basis in either the facts of this case or the
law applicable. It is not a credible motivation for Cecilia to
humiliate and expose herself to public scrutiny, even ridicule,
in the course of a public trial. No woman would cry rape, allow
an examination of her private parts, subject herself to
humiliation, go through the rigors of public trial and taint her
good name if her claim were not true.25
Coming now to the testimony of Mary Cyndel Marcelo,
appellant suggests that her testimony is too fluid and precise,
signifying that it had been memorized and rehearsed. A close
perusal of Mary Cyndel's testimony reveals, however, that it
was spontaneous, candid and straightforward. Mary Cyndel
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions
was only four years old then, so innocent that she did not
even know the word for a man and woman's private parts.
Such testimony is generally given much weight and cannot be
easily disregarded by appellant's mere denial. 26 Note that
Mary Cyndel testified with only her younger sister by her side.
Her mother and other relatives were asked by the court to
leave the trial room. Notwithstanding the intimidating
situation wherein a young witness is confronted and
scrutinized by a judge and rigidly cross examined by the
defense counsel, Mary Cyndel remained steadfast in her
narration. Her consistency is a strong indication that her
narration was not fabricated. At such a tender age, Mary
Cyndel could hardly be expected to weave with uncanny
recollection such a complicated tale as the sexual assault
unconscionably perpetrated against her and her sister by
their own father.27 It is unfortunate that despite the weighty
and trustworthy testimony of Mary Cyndel, appellant was
acquitted of the charge of rape he committed against her on
the sole basis that the doctor did not find any laceration in
her private parts, and that his medical report indicated her
hymen was intact. The trial court apparently missed our ruling
in People vs. Palicte28and People vs. Castro29 that the mere
fact that the hymen remained intact is no proof that rape was
30
The testimonies of Mary Cyndel and Dr. Lebaquin suffice to
support appellant's conviction for the rape of Mariedel. Mary
Cyndel clearly testified that her younger sister was ravished
by appellant:
Q: You said you love your mother, how about your
father do you love him?
A: No, Ma'm.
Q: Why?
A: "Kasi nilalagyan kami ng snake". (when literally
translated because he is placing snake on us)
Q: You mentioned we, aside from you, to whom was
the snake being placed?
A: The two of us.
Q: And where is your Daddy placing snake on you?
A: (witness pointing to her private part)
COURT:
Make it of record that the witness lifted her maong skirt.
PROS. UMALI:
For the better appreciation of the Court, may we request
the witness to please stand so that she could point (sic)
out where the snake was placed by her Daddy.
(witness pointing to the area of her private part)
Q: What about Maridel, where did Daddy place his
snake on Maridel?
A: (Likewise the witness pointed to the area of her
private part)
Q: Where else?
Page 28 of 63
 A: To the mouth. (witness pointing to the mouth) Q: And this snake that your daddy played with you, is groin area of the paper dolls, marked as Exh. "U" 37; (3)
colored green, right? physical evidence showing that Mariedel had been sexually
Q: Where else?
molested is consistent with Mary Cyndel's testimony; (4)
A: Yes, sir.
A: (witness pointing to the area of her anus) testimony of Mary Cyndel was substantially corroborated by
Q: And that snake colored green was the same snake Cecilia, Adelaida and Cynthia on its material points; (5) Mary
Q: Where else Ms. witness aside from the mouth, Cyndel categorically stated that her father was naked when
that your daddy put into your mouth?
your private part and the anus, where else? he showed the "snake"; and (6) she mentioned that after
A: Yes, sir. inserting the snake into her and her sister's mouths, the said
A: "Doon lang".
Q: And from, that colored green snake, came out of snake would "die" and a white, worm-like substance which
Q: What about Maridel, where did Daddy place the is "malagkit" and "lasang sipon" would come out. It is beyond
the worm?
snake aside from the private part? any doubt that this white substance refers to no less than
A: Yes, sir. semen coming out from appellant's penis after he had
A: To the mouth, the private part and also at the
back.31 Q: And that is the very same colored green snake ejaculated inside the victim's mouth.1wphi1.nt
that your daddy used to place in the mouth of your Apparently Mary Cyndel was misled by the suggestion that
And who would not be moved by Mary Cyndel's declaration,
sister, right? the color of the "snake" was green. That suggestion had no
to wit:
A: Yes, sir. basis. Nor is it material. What is material is that the "snake"
Q: When your daddy was playing that green snake, was placed by appellant in the anus, vagina and mouth of
putting it in your body, and the parts of the body of your Q: And from that snake, you came to know that a babes, including the witness and her 3-year-old sister,
sister, did you cry, laugh or enjoy? worm comes out to the mouth of your sister? Mariedel.
A: Yes, I cried, sir. A: Yes, sir. Appellant's assertion that it was Cynthia, Mary Cyndel's
Q: Why did you cry? Q: And that is the very same snake that your daddy mother, who put her up to accuse him and instructed her to
placed at about your anus, right? lie in court, so that Cynthia could get rid of him appears to us
A: Because my daddy is placing his snake to far-fetched. No mother in her right mind would stoop so low
Mariedel, sir. A: Yes, sir. just to assuage her own hurt feelings as to subject her own
daughter to the hardship and shame concomitant to a rape
Q: That was the only reason why you cried, because Q: And that is the very same green snake that your
prosecution, especially if the one accused is the girl's own
your daddy placed his snake to Mariedel? daddy placed at about the area of your front organ,
father. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an
right?
A: .Yes, sir. engine of malice and sacrifice her to the altar of public
A: Yes, sir. ridicule if she, in fact, has not been motivated by an honest
Q: You cried because you pity your sister? desire to have the culprit punished. 38 The insistence of
Q: And that is the very same colored green snake appellant that his wife fabricated the rape charges because
A: Yes, sir.32
that your daddy placed in the front portion of your organ she had a lover and wanted to get rid of appellant also
This testimony and the medical finding that and anus? appears baseless and illogical. It is not supported by the
Mariedel33 suffered "deep healed laceration on her hymen at evidence. Moreover, appellant had testified that he left his
A: Yes, sir.35
3:00 o'clock position and was in a non-virgin state family and even wrote a letter to his parents explaining why. If
physically"34 constitute conclusive proof that Mariedel was Appellant insists that the green snake Mary Cyndel was he had already left, there was no more reason for his wife to
raped by appellant. Considering that Mariedel herself was referring to could not have been his penis. According to him, falsely accuse him.
only 3 years old, and could hardly be expected to verbalize this casts a doubt on the commission of the alleged rape.
her ordeal and grief, she was not placed on the witness stand. However, we have to bear in mind that the above testimony Appellant says that the testimony of Dr. Lebaquin on the
That the prosecution presented her person to medical came from a four-year-old child whose testimony ought not to lacerations suffered by the victim should be disregarded since
examination and the results thereof presented by the PNP be treated similarly as that of an adult. It is not made clear he did not after all identify who the perpetrator was.
medico-legal officer, Dr. Lebaquin, should suffice to prove the whether Mary Cyndel knows what "green" means. It was not Appellant's contention deserves no serious consideration.
extent of her injury. established that Mary Cyndel clearly understood the question Naturally, Dr. Lebaquin could not have identified the
about the "grass" asked by defense counsel before she perpetrator because said witness was not present when these
Appellant urges that we disregard the testimony of Mary
answered. But the reference of "grass" could be to the pubic lacerations were inflicted. His role was only that of an expert
Cyndel because her cross-examination revealed that she was
hair. And the "snake" therein is the penis. We note the witness, a physician, and not as an eyewitness to the crime.
referring to a green snake found in the grass. The pertinent
manifestation and objection of Prosecutor Umali, thus: In sum, we agree with the trial court's finding that appellant is
portion of said cross-examination is as follows:
Pros. Umali: guilty of raping Cecilia Osorio and Mariedel Marcelo. However,
Q: Have you seen a snake before you draw this we are unable to agree that the death penalty be imposed on
thing? Objection, your Honor, at this juncture may we suspend appellant in Criminal Case No. 108001-H, concerning the rape
the questioning, your Honor, because it appears that the of Mariedel Marcelo.
A: Yes, sir.
witness had been answering "yes" when the question of
Q: Where did you see that snake, in the house or in counsel in English had not yet been translated in Tagalog Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, 39 the law governing at the
the grass or in what place? and these children are not English speaking, your time the offenses were committed, provides that the death
Honor. 36 penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
A: In the grass, sir. with any of the following attendant circumstances:
We are convinced that what Mary Cyndel referred to as
Q: Did you remember the color of the snake which "snake" is appellant's penis. This conclusion is supported by xxx
you saw, whether it was green, brown or what? the following: (1) Mary Cyndel was able to point to the groin 1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
A: Green, sir. area of Atty. Mateo when asked where the snake of her father and the offender is a parent,..
can be located; (2) Mary Cyndel drew the snake along the

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 29 of 63

xxx
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below
seven (7) years old.
We find that, in regard to the first qualifying circumstance the prosecution to establish, beyond a shadow of a doubt,
abovecited, the victim's minority and her relationship to the that (1) Mariedel was a minor and that appellant is her father,
offender have been alleged. But the fact of his being the or (2) Mariedel was aged below seven. Failure to discharge
father of Mariedel has not been sufficiently established by this duty on the part of the prosecution bars conviction of the
competent and independent evidence. For the imposition of accused for the crime of rape in its qualified form. Absent
capital punishment, we cannot rely on the silence of appellant clear, categorical, unequivocal and indubitable proof of the
regarding this point. In the case of qualified rape, the qualifying circumstance required to convict for qualified rape,
prosecution bears the burden of establishing the qualifying appellant must be spared from capital punishment.
circumstances that characterize the offense as such.
Unfortunately, the prosecution here did not present any
documentary proof to establish that appellant is the father of
Mariedel. Nor did it try to elicit a categorical declaration from
the mother, or even from the appellant himself, that indeed
Mariedel was his offspring. As held in People vs. Javier:
...in a criminal prosecution especially of cases involving present case law.48
the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which an accused is charged must be
established by the prosecution in order for said penalty
to upheld.40
Likewise, in regard to the fourth qualifying circumstance of
Section 11 of R.A. 7659 earlier cited, we find that it was not
proved adequately. This circumstance pertinently requires
that the victim must be below seven years old. Mariedel was
allowed to sit beside Mary Cyndel while the latter
testified,41 apparently to impress on the court by their
youthful appearances that the sisters were minors and below
seven years old. But Mariedel was not presented so that her
age could be of judicial notice. 42 Nor was there any admission
by the defense of her age, much less a hearing expressly on
the point of her age being below seven years. Their mother's
testimony that Mary Cyndel was four while Mariedel was three
years old, was not sufficient nor indubitable proof of their
ages. The failure of the prosecution to present Mariedel's birth
certificate without credible explanation leads to doubt, if not
to an adverse conclusion.
We are not unmindful that in People vs. Tipay,43 citing People
vs. Javier, G.R. No. 126096, 311 SCRA 122 (1999), we said
that, "The minority of the victim of tender age who may be
below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court may take
judicial notice thereof." Neither have we overlooked that
in People vs. Dela Cruz,44 we accepted the testimony of the
mother as proof of the minority of the victims who were 15
and 14 years old, without requiring their birth certificates in
compliance with the first circumstance of R.A. 7659. Note,
however, that these aforementioned cases referred to proof of
minority and not of actual age. Carefully considered, said
cases" are not on all fours with the present case. We must
stress that here what is required to qualify the penalty to
death is definite, independent, and indubitable proof that
Mariedel was below seven years old at the time of her rape,
conformably with the fourth circumstance of Section 11, R.A.
7659.45
To put a man to death based on implications and
assumptions, or on his silence regarding allegations against
him, could be the height of injustice. As oftenly repeated, the within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own named accused, with lewd designs and by means of
merit, and it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the force, threats, violence and intimidation, did then and
weakness of the evidence for the defense.46 It is the duty of there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the undersigned complainant Eula
Padilla, a 10 year old girl, who is his own daughter
against the latter's will and consent.2
On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the
offense charged but upon being informed that the imposable
mandatory penalty is death, he withdrew his former plea and
entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial.
The prosecution presented as evidence the testimonies as
Anent the damages awarded, we find that modifications are
well as the sworn statements of private complainant Eula
called for. In Criminal Case No. 107976-H, the case of Cecilia
Padilla and her mother, Esmeralda Sarmiento and the sworn
Osorio, aside from the award of P50,000 as moral damages,
statements of Dr. Owen Libaquin, the examining physician
there should also be an award of P50,000 as civil indemnity in
and Police Officer I Romeo Oreta, the arresting officer.
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 47 The award of
exemplary damages is reduced to P25,000 pursuant to Eula Padilla recounted the incident as follows:
At around three o'clock in the morning of November 4, 1995,
In Criminal Case No. 108001-H, the case of Mariedel Marcelo, while she was sleeping in their house at No. 44 Pag-asa
aside from the award of moral damages, we should likewise Street, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila, her father Ireneo
grant civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000. The award for Padilla, the accused-appellant, tied both her hands and feet,
exemplary damages should also be pegged at P25,000, covered her mouth and undressed her. The accused-appellant
pursuant to current jurisprudence. then forcibly inserted his penis inside her vagina. Eula felt
pain in her private part and cried but she could not do
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding appellant
anything because her hands and feet were tied. After the
Rodelio Marcelo guilty of two counts of rape is AFFIRMED,
sexual act, her father untied her and immediately left the
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
house.
(a) In Criminal Case No. 107976-H, the appellant is
At noontime of the same day, her mother noticed bloodstains
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
on her shorts. Unsure of whether the bloodstains were caused
perpetua. Appellant is ordered to pay the offended party
by menstrual period, her mother called her grandmother who
P50,000 as civil indemnity , P50,000 as moral damages,
lived just a few houses away. Upon confrontation by her
and P25,000 as exemplary damages.1wphi1.nt
grandmother, Eula disclosed that she was raped by her father.
(b) In Criminal Case No. 108001-H, the appellant's The following day, November 5, 1995, her mother brought her
sentence of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua. He is to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory Service
ordered to pay the offended party P50,000 as civil (PNPCLS) in Camp Crame, Quezon City for medical
indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as examination.3
exemplary damages.
Complainant's mother, Esmeralda Sarmiento Padilla,
SO ORDERED. corroborated complainant's account. She testified that
accused-appellant Ireneo Padilla is her husband and private
complainant Eula Padilla is their daughter. On November 4,
G.R. No. 137648 March 30, 2001 1995, she noticed bloodstains on the shorts of Eula so she
asked her to change. Unsure of whether her daughter was
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. already menstruating, she her mother (complainant's
IRENEO PADILLA y VILLASEOR alias "Iring", defendant- grandmother) who talked to private complainant and asked
appellant. her what happened. It was then that Eula disclosed that she
PER CURIAM: was raped by the accused-appellant. Esmeralda confronted
her husband and asked him if there was any truth to what her
On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial daughter narrated. The accused-appellant replied, "Hindi daw
Court, Branch 166 of Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 109270-H niya alam kung bakit nagawa niya iyon." After taking her
finding herein accused-appellant Ireneo Padilla y Villaseor daughter to the Rizal Medical Center for treatment, she
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his own daughter reported the incident to the police. On November 5, 1995, the
and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. police headed by Police Officer I Romeo Oreta arrested the
On November 8, 1995, Eula Padilla,1 assisted by her mother, accused-appellant in his house and brought him to the police
Esmeralda D. Sarmiento, filed a complaint charging her station where he was investigated and detained. Esmeralda
father, Ireneo Padilla with rape, committed as follows: voluntarily turned over her daughter to the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). 4
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995 in the
Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 30 of 63
After conducting a physical examination of private THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE q If that statement is presented to you can you
complainant, Dr. Owen Libaquin, the medico-legal officer, ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE VAGUE recognize it?
submitted the following findings in his Medico-Legal Report: TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
a Yes sir.
General and Extra-Genital: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH
q I am presenting to you a one page sworn statement
PENALTY DESPITE THE PROSECUTION (sic) FAILURE TO PROVE
Fairly nourished, fairly developed, and coherent female will you please examine it and tell us if this is the
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP.
child. Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and statement?
tight. The Court has repeatedly reiterated the three principles that
a Yes this my statement (sic).
guide its review of rape cases, to wit: (1) an accusation for
Genital:
rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more q There is a signature above the name Eula S. Padilla,
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, difficult for the person accused to disprove; (2) in view of the do you know whose signature is this?
convex and coaptated with an abraded and congested intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons
a Mine sir.
labia minora presenting in between. On separating the are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is
same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type and markedly scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the q Do you now affirm the contents of this statement?
congested hymen with fresh, compound laceration at prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be
6:00 o'clock extending to the posterior fourchette. allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. 8 a Yes sir.
External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the FISCAL PANDAC:
Conviction or acquittal in a rape case more often than not
introduction of the examining index finger. Vaginal canal
depends almost entirely on the credibility of the May I request that this be marked as Exh. A and the
is tight and reveals fresh and clotted blood.
complainant's testimony because by the very nature of this signature as Exh. A-1.
Conclusion: crime, it is usually only the victim who can testify as to its
occurrence.9 In rape cases, the accused may be convicted q In this question No. 9 and also the answer which I
Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity. solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim, provided quote "Sinong isusumbong mo?" and your answer "Ang
There are no external signs of application of any form of that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and tatay ko po" do you affirm this?
violence. consistent with human nature and the normal course of a Yes sir.
things.10 And, in the evaluation of the credibility of the
Remarks: complainant's testimony, the sound determination and q And also in question no. 10 which I quote "Bakit mo
Vaginal and periurethral smears are negative for gram- conclusion by the trial court is accorded much weight and isusumbong ang tatay mo? "Kasi po itinali niya ang
negative diplococci and for spermatozoa.5 respect.11 kamay pati paa ko at tinakpan niya ang bibig ko
pagkatapos po ay hinubaran niya ako at pinilit niyang
In view of the admission by counsel for the accused-appellant In the case under scrutiny, we find no compelling reason to ipinasok ang bird niya sa ari ko", do you understand this?
of the due execution of the medico-legal report prepared by overturn the factual findings of the trial court. The testimony
Dr. Libaquin, his testimony was dispensed with. The of the complainant, Eula Padilla, who was only ten years old a Yes sir, I confirm that.
prosecution also admitted the due execution of the sworn at the time she testified, deserves full faith and credit. Her
FISCAL PANDAC:
statement of SPO1 Romeo Oreta and he was no longer simple, positive and straightforward recounting on the
presented on the witness stand.6 witness stand of her harrowing experience lends credence to May I request your Honor that question no. 10 be
her accusation. Moreover, being a mere child of tender years, marked as Exh. A-2.
On the other hand, accused-appellant Ireneo Padilla her age belies any allegation that her charge was a mere
vehemently denied the accusation against him. He claimed concoction or fabrication impelled by some ill motive or q Did you ask your father why he do that to you? (sic)
that in the evening of November 3, 1995, he was sleeping revenge. As has been stressed by this Court in numerous a No sir.
with his wife Esmeralda and their three children, Eula, 10 cases, when a woman or a child victim says that she has been
years old, Joel, 7 years, and Angie, 5 in their house at No. 38 raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that xxx xxx xxx
Pag-asa Street, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila. At around rape was indeed committed.12 q In question no. 12 and 13 which I quote "Naipasok
six o'clock of the following morning, he left their house and ba naman ng tatay mo ang bird niya sa ari mo?" and
proceeded to the talipapa to check on his fruit and vegetable Accused-appellant faults the prosecution in the way it your answer "Opo, naipasok po", do you affirm this?
stall as it rained the whole night due to typhoon "Rosing." In conducted its direct examination of the complainant. It is
the early morning of November 5, 1995, he was surprised argued that a rape case is not prosecuted by merely referring a Yes sir.
when several police officers arrested him in their house and to the sworn statement executed by the complainant and
q This q-13 ano naman ang naramdaman mo"
brought him to the Taguig Police Station. He denied having asking her to confirm such statements; on the contrary, all
answer "masakit po", do you affirm this?
sexually abused his daughter Eula and maintained that it is a the material allegations sufficient to prove the crime
mere fabrication instigated by his parents-in-law who did not complained of should be established by the clear testimony of a Yes sir.
like him.7 the complainant on the witness stand. Reference is made to
the following portions of the direct examination: q This tanong no. 14 "Ano naman ang ginawa mo ng
On January 12, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision maramdaman mong masakit?" sagot "sinabi ko po sa
convicting accused-appellant and sentencing him as follows: COURT: tatay ko na masakit pero wala po akong magawa dahil
The question is too general, you better ask her the nakagapos po ako", do you affirm this?
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Irineo Padilla y
Villaseor Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of event and the date. a Yes sir.
Rape charged in the Information and is hereby sentenced q Do you remember having executed or signed a
to suffer the supreme penalty of Death, and indemnify FISCAL PANDAC:
sworn statement?
the victim Eula Padilla, the sum of Fifty Thousand May I request that the question no. 12, 13 and 14
(P50,000.00) Pesos. a Yes sir. be bracketed and marked as Exh. A3.
The accused-appellant raises the following errors before us:

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 31 of 63

 q In tanong no. 15 which I quote "kailan ba naman q At that time when your father do (sic) that act to a After I was raped and after my mother came to
ginawa sa iyo ng tatay mo?" sagot "Noon pong you, where was your mother? know about it, she followed my father at Baybreeze.
bumabagyo ng gabi pets (sic) 3 ng Nobyembre 1995", do
a She was asleep. q Did you report the matter to the police authorities?
you affirm this?
q Which part of the house were your mother is a Yes sir.
a Yes sir.
sleeping? (sic)
q And your father was apprehended by the police
q Tanong no. 16 "Saang lugar ba naman ginawa sa
a Beside my father. after the report was made?
iyo ito ng tatay mo? sagot "sa loob po ng bahay namin",
do you affirm this? q Did your mother do anything to protect you when a Yes sir.
your father did that to you?
a Yes sir. q Right there at the police station, you pointed the
a Yes, she followed-up at Baybreeze. person of your father as the one who did the act to you?
q In Tanong No. 17 "Anong oras ba naman ginawa sa
iyo ito ng tatay mo"? sagot "mag-uumaga na po, sa q Why, where was your father at that time after he a Yes sir.
tingin ko po'y mag-aalas-tres ng umaga", do you affirm did that act to you?
this? q Now, did you see a doctor in connection with your
a At Baybreeze. case?
a Yes sir.
q Where is that Baybreeze located? a Yes sir.16
FISCAL PANDAC:
a At Tambak. Complainant also positively testified as to the
May I request that questions Nos. 15, 16 and 17 circumstances surrounding the rape when she was cross
and the answers be marked as Exh. A-4.13 q At the time when your father having a sexual inter-
examined by counsel for the accused:
course with you, what did your mother do at that time?
We do not agree with accused-appellant's contention. It is not (sic) q You have mentioned Ms. witness that your hands
correct to say that the direct examination of the complainant were tied, is that correct?
consisted merely of her oral confirmation of the contents of a She was asleep.
the sworn statement she executed before the police. Indeed, a Yes ma'm.
q Is there any other person aside from you, your
in the direct examination of the complainant, the prosecutor mother, and your father in that room? q Could you describe how were they tied?
read to her certain portions of her sworn statement and asked
her if she made them and to confirm the truth thereof. The a No more. a With the hands at the back.
trial court allowed the procedure without any objection from xxx xxx xxx q And when you said that your feet were tied, are
the defense. Moreover, in the hearing of February 12, 1997, you telling the court that your both feet were tied
where the prosecution made its offer of documentary q You testified that at the time when your father do
together?
evidence, the counsel for the accused-appellant admitted the the act, your mother is also sleeping inside the room, did
sworn statement as part of the testimony of the complainant your mother came to know the incident right there and a Yes ma'm.
Eula Padilla: here? (sic)
q And you said that your mouth was covered also, is
xxx xxx xxx a No sir. that correct?
Atty. Antonano: q At what time did you report the incident to your a Yes ma'm.
mother?
Your Honor, please, by way of comments and objections xxx xxx xxx
to the offer of exhibits, the defense admits the existence a Tanghali po.
q While the tying of the hands was being done to
of Exhibit "A" the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Eula Padilla q How about to your Lola? you, did you not even try to cry Ms. witness?
is offered as part of her testimony but this cannot prove
sexual abuse by the accused in the person of the a Also noontime. a I cried.
complainant Eula Padilla.
q Do you know what did your mother or Lola do after q How loud was your cry?
xxx xxx xxx14 you reported the matter to them?
a Mahina lang po.
The Solicitor General correctly made this observation on the ATTY. ANTONANO:
xxx xxx xxx
examination of witnesses: "[T]he Court gives considerable
Witness is having a hard time answering the
latitude and indulgence to characteristics of counsel, who is q You said that while your father was tying your
question.
allowed, for the most part, to follow the dictates of common hands, your mother was sleeping, where was she
sense and to choose his own methods of effective COURT: sleeping?
presentation of his side of the case, but subject always to the
control of the trial judge."15 Another question. a On the bamboo bed.

It also bears stressing that the testimony of Eula on direct q You testified awhile ago that your mother looked for xxx xxx xxx
examination did not consist alone of her affirmation of the the whereabouts of your father at Baybreeze, do you
q You said that you also reported the incident to your
contents of her sworn statement. She also made direct and know why your mother is looking for your father?
Lola, is that correct?
straightforward declarations that she was raped by her father, a Yes sir.
thus: a Yes ma'm.
q Can you inform this court about that?
xxx xxx xxx

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 32 of 63

 q Do I get you right that you only come to report the S: Noon pong bumabagyo ng gabi, petsa-03 ng documents or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose may be
incident to your lola because according to you your short Nobyembre 1995.20 presented.30
stained with blood? (sic)
Moreover, the testimony of complainant was buttressed by In the present case, we find sufficient evidence of
q And that your Lola saw these stains of blood? the declaration of her mother21 to whom the victim related complainants minority and her relationship with the accused
the dastardly acts committed by accused-appellant on her. even if independent proof of minority was not presented.
a Yes ma'm.
The medico-legal officer found fresh hymenal lacerations on Complainant declared on the witness stand that she was ten
xxx xxx xxx her organ and concluded that his " findings are compatible years old when she was ravished by her father. 31 Moreover,
with (her) recent loss of virginity."22Ineluctably, the bare her testimony was corroborated by her mother who also
q Where was the short that your grandmother saw denial of herein accused-appellant cannot overcome the clear testified that her daughter's age at the time she was raped
blood stain in it? and positive evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove was ten.32
a It was with the clothes to be laudered.(sic) the commission of the crime charged.
In the case of People vs. Nelson dela Cruz,33 the two victims
xxx xxx xxx17 Thus, this Court affirms the finding of the trial court that the were 14 and 15 years old when their father allegedly raped
accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping them. The evidence as to their minority consisted of the
Accused-appellant brands as vague the portion of complainant Eula Padilla. testimonies of the victims themselves and their mother. On
complainant's testimony how she was raped: "ipinasok niya the basis thereof, we ruled that the prosecution proved the
ang bird niya sa ari ko."18 It is appellant's contention that such The amendment introduced by Republic Act 7659, otherwise minority age of the victims beyond reasonable doubt. The
testimony does not positively establish that the rape was known as the Death Penalty Law, to the crime of rape under Court found no reason to doubt the testimony of the victims'
committed. Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, enumerates the
mother who, as a mother, has personal knowledge of the
special qualifying circumstances which warrant the
The Court does not agree. To say that the word "bird" is vague mandatory imposition of the death penalty. Since these ages of her children.
is plain sophistry. A child victim of rape could not be expected special qualifying circumstances raise the penalty for the In those cases where the Court required independent proof of
to be sophisticated and knowledgeable in the ways of crime of rape by one degree, that is, from reclusion age of the victim, 34 the complainants' ages ranged from 13 to
sex.19 What she meant by the word "bird" was no other than a perpetua to the maximum penalty of death, great caution 16 years old. Under such circumstances, independent
male genital organ. Although the term is not as definitive as must be taken by the trial court in their evaluation. For these evidence that accurately shows the victim's age is thus
the word "penis," a young and innocent child cannot be special qualifying circumstances to be appreciated, they must necessary because the age range is so near the borderline
expected to be as graphic and explicit in her language as an both be specifically pleaded in the information or complaint age of 18. As the Court succinctly pointed out in the case
adult. and duly proven during trial 23and the degree of proof required of People vs. Javier:35
In fact, the victim also described her father's sexual organ as is proof beyond
24
reasonable doubt, or equal certainty as the
. . . Although the victim's age was not contested by
"bird" in her sworn statement before the police on November crime itself. the defense, proof of age of the victim is particularly
8, 1995, the truth of which she later affirmed on the witness The first qualifying circumstance, under which accused- necessary in this case considering that the victim's
stand. She declared in her affidavit: appellant is prosecuted, provides: age which was then 16 years old [was] just two
xxx xxx xxx years less than the majority age of 18. In this age of
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
modernism, there is hardly any difference between
T: Bakit ka nasa pulis? rape is committed with any of the following
a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old one insofar as
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
S: Magsusumbong po ako. physical features and attributes are concerned. . . .
xxx xxx xxx Thus, it is in this context that independent proof of
T: Sinong isusumbong mo? the actual age of the rape victim becomes vital and
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age essential as to remove any iota of doubt that the
S: Ang tatay ko po. and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, victim was indeed under 18 years of age as to fall
T: Bakit mo isusumbong ang tatay mo? guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the Republic Act 7659. . . .
S: Kasi po itinali niya ang kamay pati paa ko at parent of the victim;
tinakpan niya ang bibig ko pagkatapos po ay hinubaran In the case at bar, however, the victim was only ten years old
niya ako at pinilit niyang ipinasok ang bird niya sa ari ko. xxx xxx xxx when the rape was committed. In such an instance, the court
may take judicial notice of the victim's age and independent
T: Naipasok ba naman ng Tatay mo ang bird niya sa It must be pointed out that the circumstances of25minority and proof of minority may not be necessary. In the case of People
ari mo? relationship under paragraph (1) must concur; otherwise, if
there is failure to allege either one in the information, or to vs. Tipay,36 the Court pronounced that the presentation of the
S: Opo, naipasok niy (sic) po. prove either during trial, the penalty of death cannot be certificate of birth is not at all times necessary to prove
imposed. minority and the minority of a victim of tender age who may
T: Ano ba naman ang naramdaman mo ng maipasok be below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court can
ng tatay mo ang bird niya? In the case at bar, the complaint properly pleaded the special take judicial notice thereof. In People vs. Bali-balita,37 the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. 26 victim was only ten years old when she was raped by the live-
S: Masakit po.
As a rule, even if the age of the victim is not contested, there in partner of her mother. The Court held that the victim's
T: Anong ginawa mo nang maramdaman mong minority was sufficiently proven. As the victim, who was ten
must be independent proof of the age of the victim, 27 as well
masakit? years and four months old at the time of the rape, testified in
as the filiation between the victim and the
S: Sinabi ko po sa tatay ko na masakit pero wala po accused.28 Independent proof of age may consist of the court only about four months after the rape, it would not have
akong magawa dahil nakagapos ako. certificate of live birth or the baptismal certificate of the been difficult for the trial court to take judicial notice that she
victim.29 Should such documents be unavailable, it must be was under 18 years of age.
T: Kailan ba naman ginawa sa iyo ito ng Tatay mo? shown that they were either lost or destroyed, and other The Courts rulings in the two aforecited cases find application
in the present case. Complainant Eula was only ten years old

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 33 of 63

at the time of the rape. And at the time she testified in court,
only five months had elapsed from the day of the commission
of the crime. Thus, the trial court could have easily taken
judicial notice of her minority.
Relationship between the victim and the accused has likewise
been established. Complainant categorically declared that the
accused-appellant is her father. This was corroborated by her
mother who testified that the accused is her husband.
Accused-appellant himself, in his direct testimony admitted
that complainant Eula Padilla is one of his three children. 38
Thus, having proven both minority and relationship, the
penalty of death was correctly meted out by the trial court.
Four members of the Court maintain their position that
Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the
ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should be
accordingly imposed.
In accordance with recent jurisprudence, we increase the
amount of civil indemnity from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 as
the crime of rape is qualified by circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty. 39We additionally impose the
award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to the
victim without need for proof of the victim's mental and
physical suffering as such injury has been consistently
recognized as being inherently concomitant with and
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape. 40
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 166 finding the accused IRENEO PADILLA guilty
of Rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Section 11 of RA 7659 and imposing upon him the penalty
of death is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the amount
of P50,000.00 civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00 and
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is additionally
imposed.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,
amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality
of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise
of pardoning power. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123096 December 18, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MARIO DUMANON y DUMANACAL and RICARDO
LABRADOR y SUACILLO, alias "RIC-RIC," accused-
appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellants Mario Dumanon y Dumanacal (hereafter
MARIO) and Ricardo Labrador y Suacillo (hereafter RICARDO)
appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Surigao City, Branch 30, in Criminal Case No. 4247, finding
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and to pay the complainant Anacurita Anib (hereafter
ANACURITA) the amount of P20,000 as moral damages and The prosecution opposed the motion for reinvestigation. It
the costs of the suit. claimed that MARIO and RICARDO were actually required but
failed to submit their counter-affidavits. Moreover, since it
On 3 December 1993, Dominga Anib filed a complaint for
was already resolved that ANACURITA is a retardate, thus
rape2 against MARIO and RICARDO on behalf of her mentally
mentally incapacitated, the law recognizes the right of her
retarded daughter ANACURITA before the Municipal Circuit
mother to file the complaint on her behalf. However, as stated
Trial Court (MCTC) of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte. The
in the decision of the trial court, MARIO and RICARDO
complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. 993, alleged that
abandoned the motion and instead proceeded with the
ANACURITA is a "retardate" and the crime was committed at
arraignment wherein they separately entered a plea of not
midnight of 2 December 1993. Submitted in support of the
guilty.7
complaint was a medical certificate 3 issued by the Surigao
Provincial Hospital and the affidavits4 of Dominga Anib, Trial on the merits started only on 2 June 1994 and was
Eduardo Diaz and Anita Lisondra. completed on 22 November 1994. In its decision the trial
court attributed the delay "to postponements at the instance
After conducting a preliminary examination, the MCTC found
of both the prosecution and the defense, especially that the
a prima facie case for rape, confirmed the arrest and
parties, being related, manifested for a possible settlement of
detention of MARIO and RICARDO without bail, and required
the case." The prosecution presented as witnesses
them to submit their counter-affidavits. Instead of filing their
ANACURITA, Dominga Anib, Eduardo Dizon and Dr. Gregoria
counter-affidavits, MARIO and RICARDO filed a joint motion to
Beberino-Comelon.
dismiss the case on the grounds that the crime of rape cannot
be prosecuted de oficio and the complaint was not signed by ANACURITA testified in court seven months after she was
the offended party, there being no proof that the latter was raped. She was then thirty-eight years old. According to her
incapacitated. she knew MARIO and RICARDO as they were her friends and
5 townmates. In the early evening of 2 December 1993, she
In its resolution of 10 January 1994, the MCTC ruled that the
was in the municipal gymnasium of Tagana-an, Surigao del
complaint was properly filed by the mother of ANACURITA
Norte, watching a parade of gays. At about 11:00 p.m. she
since the latter is a retarded woman and stated that "by
left and headed for her home in barangay Aurora, Tagana-an.
merely looking upon the victim, the Court finds that indeed
As she was walking, she passed by RICARDO who was then
Anacurita Anib is a retarded woman." It also found probable
sitting on a bench, apparently drunk. Suddenly, RICARDO
cause that MARIO and RICARDO committed the crime charged
blocked her way. She tried to break free but he continued to
and forwarded the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for the
obstruct her way. Then he pulled her and brought her to the
filing of the information.
deserted house of Jaime Batac, which was just about nine
On 24 January 1994, the Provincial Prosecutors Office of meters away from her home. Inside the house, RICARDO
Surigao del Norte filed with the Regional Trial Court of Surigao stripped off his clothes and immediately removed her
del Norte a complaint6 for rape, bearing the thumb mark of underwear. He then placed his penis inside her vagina. After
ANACURITA and approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. The satisfying his lust, RICARDO ran away. Then she put on her
complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4247 and assigned underwear. After a few minutes, MARIO, who was likewise
drunk, entered Jaimes house, pulled her down and undressed
to Branch 30 thereof, alleges as follows:
her. Mario inserted his penis inside her vagina and just like
That on or about the 2nd day of December 1993, at 12:00 RICARDO ran away after the sexual intercourse. ANACURITA
oclock [sic] midnight, more or less, at Barangay Aurora, went home and told her mother what had happened. 8
Tagana-an, Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused with full Dominga Anib testified that MARIO and RICARDO are her
freedom and intelligence did then and there willfully, neighbors and that the former is even her relative. In the
unlawfully and feloniously by means of violence and evening of 2 December 1993, ANACURITA was out watching a
intimidation, and taking advantage of nighttime drag MISS show at the municipal gymnasium. At about midnight she was
ANACURITA ANIB y DUMANACAL inside the vacant house of awakened by her husband who told her that ANACURITA had
Jaime Batac and have carnal knowledge of herein complainant not yet arrived. When she turned on the light, she heard the
against her will. protesting voice of her daughter coming from the house of
Jaime Batac. She went to the house and dragged ANACURITA
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstances of home. ANACURITA was holding her underwear and her hair
nighttime and in an uninhabited place.
and dress were soiled. She asked ANACURITA if any man did
MARIO and RICARDO sought for a reinvestigation of the case. anything to her. ANACURITA told her that she had just been
They questioned the unsigned complaint for rape and alleged raped by RICARDO and MARIO inside Jaimes house.
that ANACURITAs filing of the complaint belied her mental Accompanied by Eduardo Diaz, Dominga immediately
incapacity. Moreover, she never gave a categorical statement reported the incident to the barangay captain and then later,
that she was raped. The defense further asserted as hearsay to the police. On 4 December 1993, Dominga brought
the statement of Dominga Anib and Anita Lisondra in their ANACURITA to the Provincial Hospital of Surigao del Norte for
affidavits that ANACURITA confessed to them that she was examination. The turn of events caused Dominga to suffer
raped. They also assailed the prosecution for its failure to shame and embarrassment.
9
present any eyewitness. Finally, they maintained that they According to Eduardo Diaz, he knew MARIO and RICARDO.
were deprived of their right to submit their counter-affidavits. MARIO is a close friend and relative. He, MARIO and RICARDO
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 34 of 63
and the Anibs reside along the same street. On 2 December
1993, Eduardo was in the municipal gymnasium to watch a
show. He left for home at 10:00 p.m. Along the way he saw
MARIO and RICARDO. When he arrived home, he learned that
there was no more kerosene for the lamps. He went out to
buy kerosene and a cigarette at the store next door. He saw
MARIO at the store who asked a cigarette from him. He
obliged and then went back home. He wanted to eat; but
when he found out that there was no more food, he decided
to request some viand from MARIO. On the road he saw
MARIO going inside the house of Jaime Batac. So, he returned
home. Later, he heard the voice of Dominga Anib from her
house berating her weeping daughter ANACURITA. He
overheard that ANACURITA came from the house of Jaime
Batac, which was near the house of the Anibs. Dominga
ordered ANACURITA to stay upstairs while she went out of
their house. It was about midnight.
Dominga saw Eduardo and sought his help. Eduardo
accompanied Dominga to the barangay captain, Mr. Jaime
Pelarco.10 The latter looked for RICARDO and MARIO, who
were eventually arrested and detained.
Dr. Gregoria Beberino-Comelon physically examined
ANACURITA on 4 December 1993 and issued the
11
corresponding medical certificate. She noted a fresh
hymenal laceration at 6 oclock and a hematoma on the thigh.
The laceration could have been caused by an erect male
penis while the hematoma was probably inflicted by a fist
blow. She also found a vaginal discharge of yellowish and
whitish substance. She had the specimen brought to the
laboratory for examination for the presence of sperms.
However, she was not informed of the results of the
examination.12
Only MARIO testified for the defense while RICARDO opted not
to take the witness stand.
MARIO claimed that he and ANACURITA, his distant cousin,
were lovers. On the evening of 2 December 1993 he was also
at the municipal gymnasium to watch a coronation event. At
about 10:15 p.m. he decided to go home and along the way,
he saw ANACURITA and they talked by the fence of Jaime
Batacs house. He confessed his love for her and he
suggested if it was possible for them to have sexual
intercourse. ANACURITA nodded her head in consent and
replied that she had yearned to bear a child at her age. They
talked for ten minutes. ANACURITA invited him inside the
abandoned house of Jaime so that they would not be seen by
her mother. Inside Jaimes house, he asked her again if he
could have sexual intercourse with her. She consented.
ANACURITA had no reaction at all during their sexual intimacy.
After they were done, he escorted her to her house and then
he walked toward his house. He immediately heard Dominga
Anib scold ANACURITA. Dominga demanded to know where
she came from and why she arrived late. In the early morning
of the following day the police arrested and detained him. 13
After the defense rested its case the trial court required both
parties to submit their respective memoranda. The parties
waived the submission thereof.
The trial court rendered its decision of 21 June 1995. It
specifically noted therein the trial judges personal impression
which he entered in his personal notes that ANACURITA is "a Complaint. Neither can they be liable for rape committed with
mongoloid (physically) and mentally deficient who has the use of force and intimidation since the same was not
difficulty in understanding the questions." While conceding sufficiently proven by the evidence for the prosecution.
that ANACURITAs narration of how she was sexually abused
MARIO and RICARDO emphasize that their conviction was
by the accused-appellants was not "detailed," it nevertheless
based on the trial courts conclusion that ANACURITA is a
concluded that it was "candidly told by one who is mentally
mental retardate. Such a conclusion has no basis since no
deficient." She was "able to show and convince the Court that
medical or expert opinion categorically affirming such
she, in fact, was taken advantage of by the two drunken
condition was offered by the prosecution. Accordingly, they
neighbors." It gave full credence to her testimony, which was
pray for their acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove
supported by the medical findings. It held that MARIO and
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RICARDO, especially the former, who is her cousin, knew of
ANACURITAs mental condition. It ruled that "(e)vidently, In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General
Anacurita Anib, in her retarded understanding, was overcome (OSG) refutes the errors raised by MARIO and RICARDO. It
with shock, fear and, otherwise, intimidated by her two counters that the trial court did not convict MARIO and
drunken neighbors, who accosted her." RICARDO of rape of a mental retardate deprived of reason,
but of simple rape through force and intimidation, although
The trial court characterized MARIOs version as "simply out
not necessarily employed with immense measure but one
of this world," and "even assuming that it was what has
that was sufficient for the victim not to resist. The force
happened, it only manifests that the victim is, in fact,
contemplated by law in the commission of rape is relative,
abnormal, not capacitated to give a valid consent."
depending on the age, size and strength of the parties. The
The trial court also considered RICARDOs silence as an only requirement is that force or intimidation be sufficient to
admission of the charge against him. The trial court then consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.
decreed: Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victims perception
and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, MARIO DUMANON
not by any hard and fast rule.
Y DUMANACAL and RICARDO LABRADOR Y SUACILLO, alias
"Ric-Ric", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of The OSG asserts that in this case the trial court found that
Rape, defined and penalized in Article 355, of the Revised ANACURITA was mentally deficient, as revealed by its
Penal Code, and metes out the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; personal notes quoted in its decision, its forbearance in
to indemnify complainant-victim Anacurita Anib the sum of allowing the prosecution to proceed with leading questions
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos moral damages, jointly during her direct examination due to her difficulty in
and severally, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of comprehending and responsively answering the questions,
insolvency; to suffer the accessory penalties, provided for by and in acknowledging the observation of the MCTC judge in
law; and, to pay the costs. his Resolution that ANACURITA was different from or less than
those of a fully functioning adult. Hence, the degree of force
On 13 July 1995, MARIO and RICARDO seasonably appealed
needed to overwhelm her is less. The force which may not be
from the decision, which the Court accepted on 23 September
sufficient for the rape of a normal person, may be more than
1995. However, there was an undue delay in the filing of the
enough when employed in the rape of a mentally deficient
Appellants Brief, and counsel for accused-appellants had to
person, like ANACURITA.
be fined before he finally filed the Appellants Brief on 19 July
1999. The OSG further asseverates that rape committed against a
feeble-minded victim does not require the use of physical
In their Appellants Brief, MARIO and RICARDO allege that:
force since the commission of the sexual act constitutes the
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED- force itself. There was thus no need to establish that
APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE COMMITTED ON A ANACURITA is a mental retardate since her rape was
MENTAL RETARDATE WHEN THE INFORMATION ACCUSES attendant with force and intimidation. It also points out that
THEM OF RAPE COMMITTED ON A WOMAN WITH THE USE OF the attempt of MARIO and RICARDO to settle the case was an
FORCE AND INTIMIDATION. implied admission of their guilt.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE Finally, the OSG seeks an award of civil indemnity to
COMPLAINANT IS A MENTAL RETARDATE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANACURITA in the amount of P50,000 and an increase of the
CLEAR MEDICAL OR EXPERT EVIDENCE SHOWING SUCH award of moral damages from P20,000 to P50,000.
ABNORMAL PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION.
We sustain the conviction of MARIO and RICARDO.
3. NO FORCE OR INTIMIDATION ATTENDED THE SEX ACT
On the issue of whether or not ANACURITA is a retardate, as
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND THE
correctly pointed out by the defense, no expert testimony was
COMPLAINANT.
offered to prove that, indeed ANACURITA is a retardate. But,
MARIO and RICARDO underscore the fact that the complaint this matter gains importance if, in fact, the trial courts
filed with the court below alleges that the rape was conviction for rape was based on a finding that her
committed with the use of force and intimidation and hence retardation was of such an extent that she was deprived of
they cannot be held guilty of rape committed on a mental reason or that she had mental age of a child of less than 12
retardate since this circumstance was never alleged in the years old. As will be shown later, such is not the situation
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 35 of 63
obtaining in the case at bar, for we agree with the trial courts
finding that MARIO and RICARDO are guilty of rape by the use
of force and intimidation.
It has been held that mental retardation can be proved by
evidence other than medical evidence. 14 Thus, it is our
considered opinion that for purposes of determining whether
ANACURITA is mentally normal or does not have the mental
capacity of a normal person, the personal observation of the
trial judge would suffice as a measure of determining the
impact on her of the force and intimidation foisted by MARIO
and RICARDO vis-a-vis the legal requirement to prove the
commission of the crime of rape.
15
The original complaint, filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte by Dominga Anib
on behalf of ANACURITA, alleged that ANACURITA is a
retardate. The translation of the affidavit 16of Dominga Anib,
which was submitted in support of the original complaint,
alleged that ANACURITA is "not mentally normal." During the
preliminary examination Dominga testified that ANACURITA is
mentally retarded.17The Resolution18 of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte categorically
declared that "by merely looking upon the victim,"
ANACURITA is indeed a "retarded woman."
The transcript of stenographic notes is also replete with
particulars on ANACURITAs mental condition. When she first
testified, the trial court ordered to "make it on record the
physical appearance of the witness [ANACURITA] having [a]
hard time in understanding the question of the interpreter,"
and that she is "mentally deficient." As she continued with
her testimony, it further observed that she had difficulty
answering the questions and, under the circumstances, it
allowed leading questions during her direct examination. 19
The appealed decision likewise bears the trial courts personal
impression that ANACURITA "appears to be mongoloid
(physically) and mentally deficient who has difficulty in
understanding the questions."20 We often call a person who is
suffering from mongolism as a mongoloid. Mongolism is a
condition characterized by a small, anteroposteriorly flattened
skull, short, flat-bridged nose, epicanthus, short-phalanges,
and widened space between the first and second digits of
hands and feet, with moderate to severe mental retardation
and associated with a chromosomal abnormality. 21 It is known
as mongolism because its physiognomic features are
suggestive of those normally exhibited by the Mongolian
race.22 It is also known as Downs Syndrome.23 Hence, the
courts can take judicial notice of the appearance and features
of those suffering from mongolism and based thereon,
conclude that a victim, like ANACURITA, is a mongoloid.
Having established that ANACURITA is a retardate even in the
absence of an expert opinion thereon, we shall now determine
if MARIO and RICARDO were properly charged with rape by
means of force and intimidation. A thorough review of the
assailed decision supports the findings and conclusion of the
trial court that ANACURITA was indeed raped by means of
force and intimidation. ANACURITA in her testimony declared
that while she was on her way home, RICARDO, then drunk,
blocked her way, pulled her toward the uninhabited house of
Jaime Batac and once inside the house he undressed her and
took off her panty and inserted his penis into her Q Without talking to you Mario Dumanon removed his pants?
vagina.24 After he was through, RICARDO ran away. Then later
A Yes, sir.
MARIO arrived. MARIO pulled ANACURITA and also inserted his
penis into her vagina.25 xxx
The blocking, the holding of the hand, the pulling towards an Q As a matter of fact when he removed your pantie [sic] you
uninhabited house, the removal of the panty and the fact that did not resist by telling him "not to do that to me"?
both MARIO and RICARDO were in a state of drunkenness,
were enough force and intimidation considering the mental A He was also drunk.
state of ANACURITA. Q And when he pulled you to lie down with him because he
was already lying down, you did not pushed [sic] him away?
The use of force or intimidation was further shown in the
cross-examination of ANACURITA by defense counsel, Atty. A He was drunk.
Medina, thus:
Q You could have run away by pushing his hands but you did
xxx not, is it not a fact of the situation?
Q Lets go to that testimony of yours that Ricardo Labrador A Yes, sir.
grab [sic] you to the house of Jaime Batac, how did Ricardo
Labrador grab you? Q Although you knew that you could have run away yet you
did not run away?
A He pulled me.
A The door is too small.
xxx
Q Whether the door is small or not yet there is [sic] no
Q So you went [sic] to tell the Court that Ric-Ric was just attempt on your part to run away?
leading you towards the house of Jaime and not dragging you
with the used [sic] of one hand? A No, sir.
A He pulled me, sir. Q You did not even shout for help?
Q You did not shout when Ric-Ric Labrador was pulling you A No, sir.26
towards the house of Jaime?
Furthermore, the hematoma found on the victims left thigh
A No, sir. as shown by the medical certificate issued by the examining
physician27 is physical evidence of the use of force in the
Q You did not also pulled [sic] back your hand to free it from consummation of the beastly act.
the hand of Ricardo Labrador?
It is a settled rule that force in rape is relative, depending on
A No, also sir. the age, size and strength of the parties. In the same manner,
Q There was not even an attempt on your part to free your intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims
hand? perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime and not by any hard and fast rule. When the victim is a
A I struggle [sic], sir. retardate the force required to overcome her is of a lesser
degree than that used against a normal adult. 28 Thus, the
Q How did you attempt to free your hand?
degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is a
A (Witness indicating her answer by pulling her hand towards normal person, may be more than enough when employed
the right side of her body reaching as far as his palm as her against an imbecile.29
palm towards her right side).
With the foregoing disquisition, MARIO and RICARDO were
Q But you were not able to free your hand? correctly convicted of rape under the first circumstance of
Article 335, i.e. by the use of force or intimidation. Once the
A I was able to free my hand.
elements of force and intimidation were properly alleged in
Q So when you succeeded in freeing your hand from the the Information and duly proven during the trial, as in this
grabs [sic] of Ricardo Labrador you did not make an attempt case, the conviction becomes a matter of course. As correctly
to run away? assessed by the OSG, the conviction for rape decreed by the
trial court was not based on the fact that ANACURITA is a
A I was not able to run, it did not occur to my mind. mental retardate, but on the use of force and intimidation.
Q Even if you were able to free your hand from the grab of The mental retardation of ANACURITA was only a
Ric-Ric still you went with Ric-Ric towards the house of Jaime? circumstance which the trial court considered in evaluating
the degree and extent of the force and intimidation.1wphi1
A I try [sic] to run away but he blocked my way.
We also take note of the trial courts pronouncement 30 that
xxx accused-appellants manifested a possible settlement of the
Q And when Mario Dumanon arrived, did he say anything to case. The offer of compromise is an implied admission of guilt
you? pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.31
A None.
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 36 of 63
Finally, as regards the civil aspects in this case, in accordance
with current jurisprudence32 we grant the award of P50,000 as
civil indemnity for the rape of ANACURITA, and the increase of
moral damages from P20,000 to P50,000 even without proof
thereof.33
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Surigao City, Branch 30, finding accused-appellants MARIO
DUMANON y DUMANCAL and RICARDO LABRADOR y
SUACILLO, alias "RIC-RIC," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that they are further ordered to pay civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000 to the complainant
ANACURITA ANIB, and the amount of moral damages awarded
to the latter is increased from P20,000 to P50,000.
Costs against accused-appellants.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-54094 August 30, l982
ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and RAMON D.
BAGATSING, petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL E.
VALENZUELA, (Presiding Judge, CFI, Rizal, Pasay City,
Branch XXIX) and NICOLAS A. PASCUAL CRISANTO F.
PASCUAL, ANSELMO F. PASCUAL, MAMERTO F.
PASCUAL, PASCUALA A. MEJIA, DAMIANA A. MEJIA,
CIRILO S. PASCUAL, CATALINA S. PASCUAL and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, MAKATI
BRANCH, respondents.
R,D. Bagatsing & Associates for petitioners.
Ramon S. Nieves for respondent.
Dennis E. Angeles and Oscar Herrera, Jr. for intervenor
Greenfield Dev. Corp.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
On the authority of relevant and controlling pronouncements
in the related case of "Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. Court
of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal,
respondents; Greenfield Development Corporation,
intervenor; Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D.
Bagatsing, intervenors," * the Court declares as null and void
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City,
Branch XXIX in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land
Registration Case No. 9368 granting the reconstitution of the
certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the
name of Manuela Aquial supposedly covering Lots 2 and 4 of
Survey Plan II-4374. As in the authoritative case above
mentioned, the said decision suffers from jurisdictional
infirmity, fatal to the petition for reconstitution since said
petition and the notice thereof lacked essential data
mandatorily required by the law, 1 and, just as importantly,
the decision was invalidly issued without actual and personal
notice having been served upon possessors, actual occupants
and adjoining owners of the property involved who are
indispensable parties in interest and without whom a valid
judgment cannot be rendered.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against the and documents relevant and pertinent thereto as required by
order of reconstitution alleges that the petitioners are Rule 65, section I and 2, Rules of Court; that certiorari being a
registered owners as evidenced by certain Transfer remedy against jurisdictional infirmity, the absence of any
Certificates of Title 2 all issued by the Register of Deeds of allegation of ultimate facts tending to show such infirmity is
Rizal covering parcels of land located at Barrio Cupang, fatal to the petition; that there is no allegation that private
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that TCT Nos. 175223 to 175235 respondents knew of such alleged facts and the addresses of
were the subject of petition for Consolidation-Subdivision Plan petitioners' vendees and/or that they have better rights than
PCS 5878, LRC Record No. 6137 after approval by the Bureau the alleged boundary owners who were notified, that
of Lands and the Land Registration Commission on petition of petitioner Alabang Development Corporation is an intangible
Alabang Development Corporation with the Court of First juridical person incapable of physical possession of the
Instance of Rizal, Branch XIII; that after hearing the Court property and petitioner Bagatsing who is publicly known to be
issued an order dated April 19, 1969, by virtue of which the residing in Manila is not in physical possession or occupation
Register of Deeds of Rizal issued among others sixty-seven of any property adjacent to the property in question; that the
(67) Transfer Certificates of Titles; 3 that said parcels of land question of boundary owners not having been notified is a
surrounded by a high perimeter wall on their boundaries were factual question not determinable a priori but in a proper
sold to innocent purchasers in good faith for valuable action for ownership of any overlapping; that if there is any
consideration as part of Alabang Hills Village Subdivision, "sensible question" (sic) raised in the petition, the same is
owned by petitioner Alabang Development Corporation, many ownership over the alleged overlappings which cannot be
of whom were already issued in turn the corresponding sweepingly adjudicated in a certiorari proceeding or a
Transfer Certificates of Title in their favor; and that these reconstitution case "especially if a good issue is on the
innocent purchasers for value have been in open, actual, validity of petitioners' titles;" "that non-joinder of some
adverse, continuous, notorious and uninterrupted possession alleged owners would render ineffective any judgment
of their respective lands since 1969. petitioners may get in these proceedings;" that the existence
of respondents' title is indubitably established with the
Petitioners further alleged that in the reconstitution case
existence of the corresponding decree in the Land
below, filed only in 1977, herein respondents as petitioners
Registration Commission which was examined and found
therein sought to reconstitute a lost certificate of
authentic and genuine by NBI and PC handwriting experts,
title, original and owner's duplicate copy (allegedly lost or
approved plans reproduced from the microfilm (the plans duly
destroyed over 30 years earlier in the last World War II) and
approved by the Director of Lands on July 25, 1911), survey
issued allegedly pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March
plan, and relocation and verification plans in the Bureau of
4, 1914 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest,
Lands - all government document; and that private
deceased Manuela Aquial, covering two lots, 2 and 4,
respondents have been in continuous possession of the land
indicated in Plan II-4374, situated in Barrio San Dionisio,
and have been up to date in the payment of land taxes
Paraaque, Rizal, now Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal; that
thereof.
on the basis of the technical descriptions contained in
petitioners' titles and as appear in the alleged title sought to After both parties had submitted their respective memoranda,
be reconstituted, the latter overlap the parcels of land owned Greenfield Development Corporation moved to intervene in
by petitioners and duly registered in their names; that the proceedings stating, in brief, that upon comparison of the
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in technical descriptions of the two parcels of land with an
open, actual, continuous, adverse, notorious possession since aggregate area of 43 hectares designated as Lots 2 and 4 of
time immemorial of these parcels of land and that they have Plan 11-4374, as set forth in the alleged copy of Decree No.
been paying religiously the real estate taxes thereon up to 15170, Land Registration Case 9368, relied upon by
the present time; that petitioners being actual possessors and respondents in their petition for reconstitution, with those
registered owners were not served with notice of the hearing technical descriptions set forth in the certificates of title in the
of the petition for reconstitution in violation of Republic Act 26 name of said intervenor, 4it appears that the lots supposedly
such that the court a quo acted without or in excess of its covered by the title sought to be reconstituted overlap and
jurisdiction in granting the reconstitution and that there is no include a substantial portion of intervenor's land covered by
appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the its titles. As in the Bernal case, supra, 5 the Court is called
ordinary course of law. upon to allow such intervention of an indispensable party "in
view of the higher and greater interest of the public and in
As prayed for, the Court issued on June 27, 1980 a temporary
order to administer justice consistent with a just, speedy and
restraining order upon the filing of the petition and restrained
inexpensive determination of the respective claims of the
the respondents from enforcing the challenged decision, and
parties and their numerous successors-in-interest," in view of
specifically the Register of Deeds of Rizal from issuing a
the overlapping titles that respondent judge would authorize
reconstituted title based on Decree No. 15170 in the name of
in his questioned decision in derogation of the underlying
the respondents-members of the Aquial-Pascual family.
indefeasibility and stability of the Torrens System of
Respondents on the other hand alleged that the petitioners registration. As the Court therein stressed, "the sprawling
filed in the court below a belated intervention and motion for area of the property in question where various subdivisions,
new trial which were denied by respondent judge, and since residential houses and homes and infrastructures have
neither appealed therefrom nor did they question such mushroomed and the great number of people living or having
denials by way of certiorari, the petition is barred by laches; proprietary rights and interests in such a vast property would
that the petition is not accompanied by copies of all pleadings certainly bring about the swamping of the courts and the
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 37 of 63
clogging of their dockets with cases involving not only the the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main and posting of notices, which failure is fatal to the
original parties and the movants but also their successors-in- entrance of the municipality or city in which the land is jurisdiction of the Court. (Emphasis supplied)
interest. This litigation will have no end, which this Court will situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal
The rule on notification to the possessor or one having
not allow nor tolerate." 6 building at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.
interest in the property whose title is sought to be
The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be
Unlike in the Bernal case, however, the Director of Lands reconstituted is laid down explicitly in Manila Railroad
sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of
need not be directed to conduct anew a relocation-verification Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al., L-17913, June 22,
the petitioner, to every person named therein whose
survey of the properties involved in this case, as the petition 1965, 14 SCRA 358, thus:
address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of
before us is simply a special civil action attacking the
hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the 'Where a petition for reconstitution would have the
jurisdiction of the lower court, and not a petition for review
number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if certificates of title reconstituted from the plans and
where the court would need to delve deep into the issues on
known, the name of the registered owner, the names of technical descriptions of the lots involved, which
the merits. But even if the Court found some need to do so,
the occupants or persons in possession of the property, sources may fall properly under section 3(e) or 3(f ) of
the land involved insofar as herein petitioners and intervenor
the owners of the adjoining properties and all other Republic Act No. 26, the possessor thereof or the one
are concerned refers to one and same area involved in
interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of who is known to have an interest in the property
the Bernal case, and the report of the Bureau of Lands in that
the property, and the date on which all persons having should be sent a copy of the notice of the petition at
sister case would suffice to enlighten us on the question of
any interest therein must appear and file their claim or the expense of the petitioner, pursuant to section 13
surrounding improvements, boundaries and overlappings.
objections to the petition.t@lF The petitioner shall, at of the said Act.
The basic issue in the case at bar is the jurisdiction of the the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and
service of the notice as directed by the court. 'If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution
lower court to act upon the petition for reconstitution.
case is served on a possessor or one having interest in
Section 12 and 13 of Republic Act 26 entitled "An Act Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the property involved, he is deprived of his day in
Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens the Court notes that some essential data required in section court and the order of reconstitution is null and void,
Certificates of Titles Lost or Destroyed," read- 12 and section 13 of Republic Act 26 have been omitted: the even if otherwise the said order should have been final
nature and description of the buildings or improvements, and executory.
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names
enumerated in section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(e), and addresses of the owners of such buildings or 'Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, notice by
and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court improvements, and the names and addresses of the publication is not sufficient but such notice must be
of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the actually sent or delivered to parties affected by the
any person having an interest in the property. The owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may petition for reconstitution.'
petition shall state or contain, among other things, the have any interest in the property. Neither do these data
The rule We have stated and quoted from Manila
following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate appear in the Notice of Hearing. 7 such that no adjoining
Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al. supra, is
of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co- owner, occupant or possessor was ever served a copy thereof
rightly so because one who seeks the reconstitution of
owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been by registered mail or otherwise. On these glaringly
his title to the property is dutybound to know who are
issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been conspicuous omissions, the Court repeats its pronouncement
the occupants, possessors thereof, or persons having an
lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of in the Bernal case, to wit.
interest in the property involved, specially where the
the property; (d) the nature and description of the
And since the above data do not appear in the Amended property is so vast and situated in a suitable residential
buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to
Petition, the same data do not also appear in the Notice and commercial location, where buildings and
the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of
of Hearing of the petition published in the Official improvements have been or are being constructed
the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the
Gazette. Patently, the provisions of Section 12 which openly and publicly. As stated earlier, indispensable
names and addresses of the occupants or persons in
enumerates mandatorily the contents of the Petition for parties have appeared, claiming ownership, possession,
possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining
Reconstitution and Section 13 which similarly require the and valuable interests in the property, which are not only
properties and of all persons who may have any interest
contents of the Notice have not been complied with. In numerous but also patently conspicuous that private
in the property; (f) a detailed description of the
view of these multiple omissions which constitute non- respondent cannot feign ignorance, much less
encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a
compliance with the above cited sections of the Act, We unawareness, nor blindness as to their existence of her
statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting
rule that said defects have not invested the Court with or within her claimed property. (Emphasis supplied)
the property have been presented for registration, or, if
there be any, the registration thereof has not been the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case After passing upon the jurisdiction issue, the Court cannot just
accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as let go unmentioned its observation that the lots 8involved in
authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not this reconstitution case are part of the survey plan (Plan II-
evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings 4373) allegedly covering also Lots 1 and 3 which are involved
be attached thereto and filed with the same; Provided, utterly null and void. We hold that the mere Notice that in the Bernal case. In other words, these lots are covered by
That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively 'all interested parties are hereby cited to appear and the same survey plan and they are contiguous. As a matter of
from sources enumerated in section 2 (f) or 3(f) of this show cause if any they have why said petition should not fact, "Annex 5-A" 9 of respondents' memorandum which they
Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan be granted' is not sufficient for the law must be claim to be a survey plan for their mother Manuela Aquial is
and technical description of the property duly approved interpreted strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with actually entitled "Plan of Property of Olimpia D. Sta. Maria."
by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or exactness and precision. We agree with the ruling of the Olimpia Sta. Maria is supposed to be the predecessor-in-
with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior trial court granting the motion to amend the original interest of petitioner Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, the
certificate of title covering the same property. petition provided all the requisites for publication and petitioner in the Bernal reconstitution case involving Lots 1
posting of notices be complied with, it appearing that the and 3. Also, in each of the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, amendment is quite substantial in nature. As We pointed 3 of Plan II-4374 embodied in the petition for reconstitution
filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the above, respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal filed by Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal 10, Manuela Aquial
expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of failed to comply with all the requirements for publication consistently appears to be an adjoining owner. This

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 38 of 63

remarkable coincidence warrants a reproduction here of the
Court's findings as to the non-veracity and falsity of the
survey plan II-4374 submitted in support of reconstitution in
the Bernal case.
It is to be remembered that per resolution of this Court dated
September 25, 1979 in the Bernal case, the Chief of the
Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands was directed to
conduct a relocation survey of the property involved therein.
Pursuant to such directive, a "Final Report" on the matter was
submitted by Amante R. Dumag, Officer-in-Charge, National
Capital Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands, based upon a
memorandum addressed to him by the Staff Supervisor for
Technical Plan and Standards of said Bureau. Excerpts from
both the report and the memorandum as reproduced in the
decision in the Bernal case are hereunder quoted.
I. From the Final Report:
3. That while making a research on the survey data of
the lands involved in this case the surveyors of the
Bureau of Lands found out that the properties claimed by
private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal
consisting of lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374, does not have an
original copy of a plan in the Records Division of the
Bureau of Lands. Attached with this Report is a certified
photocopy of a letter dated January 30, 1978 marked as
Annex 'A' to form an integral part of this Report sent by
the Staff Supervisor for Technical Plan and Standards,
Bureau of Lands, Manila, addressed to the Officer- in-
Charge, Region IV, Bureau of Lands, Metro Manila,
informing the latter of the non-existence of the original
copy of plan II-4374. However, he further informed that
there exists a microfilm copy of plan II-4374 with
Accession No. 385637, but he expressed his doubts as to
its source and authenticity, and gave his reasons for his
apprehension in his aforementioned letter dated January
30, 1978 to the Officer-in-Charge of Region IV, Metro
Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
6. That it was ascertained during the verification survey
that the lands known as Lots I and 3, plan II-4374
claimed by private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda.
de Bernal does not actually exist on the ground;
7. That the properties claimed by private respondent Sta.
Maria Vda. de Bernal consisting of Lots 1 and 3, plan II-
4374, were platted on the plan Vs-04-000153 using the
xerox copies of uncertified technical descriptions
furnished by the Office of the Solicitor General;
8. That as directed by this Honorable Court, the location
of industries, factories, warehouses, plants and other
commercial infrastructures, residential buildings, public
or private roads and other landmarks found inside the
areas concerned are properly indicated on the white print
copies of plan Vs-04-000153 (Annex 'D').
II. From the Memorandum:
1. Inventory record book of the maps and plans salvaged
after the last world war and subsequently microfilmed
during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton Consultancy, clearly
shows that Plan II-4374 was not among those salvaged. no reason for this Court not to use it likewise as basis for
Indeed, there is no copy of this plan in the file of reaching. The conclusion that Lots 2 and 4 supposedly
Technical Reference Section records were recently turned covered by the same Survey Plan II-4374 are purely
over to the Records Division. A perusal of the folder of imaginary and "do not actually exist on the ground."
the case in the Records Division also shows that on July
There are a number of other observations in the Bernal case
17, 1972 Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief of the
that would warrant rejection of the totality of the evidence
Records Division certified that his division (Survey
presented by respondents in support of their petition for
Records Section in particular) has no copy of II-4374
reconstitution 11 but a discussion thereon would be
(page 183 of the folio).
superfluous since the weight of all such other evidence is
2. A further perusal of the records (pages 1 and 2) shows anchored upon the veracity or falsity of Survey Plan II-4374 as
that on May 15, 1970 Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired determined by the office of the Bureau of Lands
surveyor, issued technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of commissioned by the Court for that purpose, and also
II-4374 allegedly approved on July 25, 1911. This record considering, as stated earlier, that this is a special civil action
was submitted to the Court. Stated therein is the alleged wherein a ruling on jurisdiction is sufficient to adjudicate the
source of data Accession No. 195551. This record turns matter in controversy.
out to be Plan 11-4005 approved on February 7, 1911
The herein respondents attribute laches to the petitioners for
and the land is the property of the Municipality of Liloan,
not appealing from the order of the lower court denying their
Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte.
motion to intervene and motion for new trial hence allowing
3. Apparently because of this finding, on November 5, the said order/decision to become final. There is no laches nor
1971, Mr. Anselmo Almazan, then Chief of Reconstruction finality of any decision to speak of since the decision under
Section upon request of the interested party, issued question is herein pronounced null and void for having been
technical descriptions for Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374. (This rendered without jurisdiction. Prescinding therefrom, as
document was submitted to the Court as part of the admitted by themselves in their comment, the judgment of
petition for reconstitution of title [pp. 1 and 2 of folio]) As reconstitution is "ineffective" against the owners of lands
to how the data were reconstituted by the then Chief of covered thereby who were not joined as parties in the
Reconstruction Section in the absence of the original proceeding. As the Court ruled in the Bernal case on the
copy of the plan is not known. This not our standard matter of intervention 12"a valid judgment cannot even be
operating procedure since we always issue technical rendered where there is want of indispensable parties" such
descriptions based on available approved survey records. as petitioners who hold subsisting Torrens Titles to the
properties in question and "this aspect of the case commands
4. It appears in the records of the case that later Mr.
the joinder of indispensable parties to allow them to uphold
Modesto Eloriaga, then Chief, Reproduction Section,
their interests based upon the Torrens titles they hold
certified a copy of the microfilm enlargement of a frame
overrides any question of late intervention." Petitioners have
with Accession No. 385637 which frame bears the survey
precisely availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy
number II-4374. As to how a record that was not
of the present special civil action of certiorari and prohibition
salvaged after the war not microfilmed is a mystery.
to annul and set aside for want of jurisdiction the decision and
Furthermore, as to how this frame is pinpointed without
all proceedings of respondent judge.
the locator card indeed confounds us. We are not now
privy to the testimonies made in Court regarding this If there is any laches at all to speak about, it is the
Microfilm. respondents who should be held culpable thereof. For they
appear to have slept on their supposed rights to the property
5. We are surprised to learn that Reel No. 560 now bears
claimed by them. It is of record that the petition for
II-4374. For this reason, we caused the preparation of an
reconstitution was prepared and filed in September 1977,
enlargement of said microfilm for further examination
more than thirty years after the alleged loss or destruction of
and evaluation.
the alleged certificate of title in the last World War II. During
6. A closer examination of said microfilm enlargement this long span of time, herein respondents never protested
showed the following significant discrepancies and the development and building of residential subdivisions as
well as factories, roads and infrastructures in the area which
deviations from similar survey plans on record ...
unexplained inaction taken together with the falsity of their
7. Considering the discrepancies and deviations of the basic survey plan, supra, impress upon their petition a most
microfilm enlargement of the frame that purports to be dubious character to say the least.
that of survey plan II-4374 bearing Accession No.
385637, our conclusion is that said plan is not authentic To repeat what the writer hereof said in his concurring opinion
and does not and has never represented any parcel of in the Bernal Case, "The first lesson to be drawn here is that
land properly surveyed and approved by this Bureau. courts must exercise the greatest caution in entertaining such
petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost certificates of title,
(Emphasis supplied)
particularly where the petitions are filed, as in this case, after
As the Court accepted and approved in the Bernal case the an inexplicable delay of 25 years after the alleged loss.
above final report on the relocation-verification survey of the Furthermore, the courts must likewise make sure
regional officer of the Bureau of Lands and admitted it as that indispensable parties, i.e. the actual owners and
evidence of the falsity of the survey plan in question, there is possessors of the lands involved, are duly served with actual
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 39 of 63
and personal notice of the petition (not by mere general SO ORDERED. an apparent poisoning which is under
publication), particularly where the lands involved constitute investigation.4
prime developed commercial land including a part of the
Name : Jasmin Cuaresma
South Superhighway. The stability and indefeasibility of the G.R. Nos. 182978-79 April 7, 2009
Sex : Female
Torrens System would have been greatly imperiled had the
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, Marital : Single Nationality: Philipino (sic)
appellate court's judgment granting reconstitution prevailed,
INC., Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA Status
resulting in two holders of Torrens certificates over the same
CUARESMA (for and in behalf of their daughter, Jasmin Religion : Christian
lands. We can take judicial notice of innumerable litigations
G. Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and Profession : Nurse
and controversies that have been spawned by the reckless
JAIME ORTIZ (President,White Falcon Services, Address : Al-Birk Genrl. Hospital Birth Place: The
and hasty grant of such reconstitution of alleged lost or
Inc.), Respondents. Philippines
destroyed titles as well as of the numerous purchasers who
On 27.2.1419H, Dr. Tariq Abdulminnem and Dr. Ashoki Komar,
have been victimized only to find that the 'lands' purchased x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x both have examined the dead body of Jasmin Cuaresma, at
by them were covered by forged or fake titles or their areas
G.R. Nos. 184298-99 April 7, 2009 12.20 P.M., Sunday, 22.2.14189H, and the result was:
simply 'expanded' through 'table surveys' with the
cooperation of unscrupulous officials." (Emphasis supplied) SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in 1. Report of the Police on the death
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by behalf of their daughter, Jasmin G. 2. Medical Examination: Blue skin and paleness on the
duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become Cuaresma),Petitioners, vs. WHITE FALCON SERVICES, Extrimes (sic), total halt to blood circulation and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their INC. and BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND respiratory system and brain damage. There were no
issuance under section 38 of the land Registration Act) cannot PROMOTION, INC., Respondents. external injuries. Likely poisoning by taking poisonous
be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost DECISION substance, yet not determined. There was a bad smell
or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing in the mouth and unknown to us.5(Emphasis supplied)
by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. (And YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
as the Court reiterated in the recent case of Silvestre vs. Jasmins body was repatriated to Manila on September 3,
These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision 1 of
1998. The following day, the City Health Officer of
Court of Appeals, 13 "in cases of annulment and/or the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No.
reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting
80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 finding White Falcon medical report indicated that Jasmin died under violent
merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and Services, Inc. and Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion,
convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found by the
Inc. solidarily liable to indemnify spouses Simplicio and Mila
KSA examining physician. The City Health Officer found that
his.") The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by Cuaresma the amount of US$4,686.73 in actual damages with
such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or Jasmin had abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated
interest. wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated
destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly
issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions
owners.t@lF The very concept of stability andby Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. 2(Becmen) to and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular
indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of hemorrhage at the anterior chest; rib fracture; puncture
registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration of three years, wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal
with a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month.
certificates of title over the same land to two different holders area.6
thereof. A fortiori, such proceedings for "reconstitution" On March 11, 1999, Jasmins remains were exhumed and
Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.
without actual notice to the duly registered owners and examined by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The
holders of Torrens Titles to the land are null and void. Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested negative for
Applicants, land officials and judges who disregard these 21, 1998, Jasmin was found dead by a female cleaner lying on non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides. 7
basic and fundamental principles will be held duly the floor inside her dormitory room with her mouth foaming
accountable therefor. and smelling of poison.3 Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmins
parents and her surviving heirs, received from the Overseas
WHEREFORE, the subject judgment of the lower court Based on the police report and the medical report of the Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following
ordering the register of deeds of Metro Manila, Makati Branch examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital, who conducted an amounts: P50,000.00 for death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss
IV to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170 and the plan and autopsy of Jasmins body, the likely cause of her death was of life; P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for
technical descriptions submitted, the alleged certificate of poisoning. Thus: medical reimbursement.
title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of
Manuela Aquial is hereby annulled and set aside, and the According to letter No. 199, dated 27.2.1419H, issued by Al- On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint
petition for reconstitution is ordered dismissed. Birk Police Station, for examining the corpse of Jasmin against Becmen and its principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah
Cuaresma, 12.20 P.M. 27.2.1419H, Sunday, at Al-Birk Hospital. Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as
The temporary restraining order of June 27, 1980 issued well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmins death. 8
against respondents is hereby made and declared permanent. 1. The Police Report on the Death
With costs jointly and severally against private respondents. 2. The Medical Diagnosis In their complaint, the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmins death
was work-related, having occurred at the employers
The Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to furnish the Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian premises;9 that under Jasmins contract with Becmen, she is
Honorable Minister of Justice a copy of the decision at bar (as entitled to "iqama insurance" coverage; that Jasmin is entitled
well as a copy, for ready reference, of the decision of January The said person was brought to the Emergency Room of
to compensatory damages in the amount of US$103,740.00,
27, 1981 in the related Bernal case, G.R. No. L-45168, the hospital; time 12.20 P.M. and she was unconscious,
which is the sum total of her monthly salary of US$247.00 per
previously ordered furnished to him) for the institution of blue, no pulse, no respiration and the first aid esd
month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35
appropriate criminal proceedings against private respondents undertaken but without success.
years (or the remaining years of her productive life had death
and all others who have assisted or conspired with them as 3. Diagnosis and Opinion: Halt in blood circulation not supervened at age 25, assuming that she lived and would
may be warranted by the evidence of record. respiratory system and brain damage due to have retired at age 60).

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 40 of 63

The Cuaresmas assert that as a result of Jasmins death under
mysterious circumstances, they suffered sleepless nights and
mental anguish. The situation, they claim, was aggravated by
findings in the autopsy and exhumation reports which
evidently show that a grave injustice has been committed
against them and their daughter, for which those responsible
should likewise be made to pay moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin
committed suicide, citing a prior unsuccessful suicide attempt
sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical
report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They
likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas already
recovered death and other benefits totaling P130,000.00 from
the OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to
"iqama insurance" because this refers to the "issuance" not
insurance of iqama, or residency/work permit required in the
KSA. On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, they
claim that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same
because they have not acted with fraud, nor have they been
in bad faith in handling Jasmins case.
While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation
and motion for substitution alleging that Rajab terminated
their agency relationship and had appointed White Falcon
Services, Inc. (White Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in
the Philippines. Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as
respondent as well, and it adopted and reiterated Becmens
arguments in the position paper it subsequently filed.
On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision10 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Giving
weight to the medical report of the Al-Birk Hospital finding
that Jasmin died of poisoning, the Labor Arbiter concluded
that Jasmin committed suicide. In any case, Jasmins death
was not service-connected, nor was it shown that it occurred
while she was on duty; besides, her parents have received all
corresponding benefits they were entitled to under the law. In
regard to damages, the Labor Arbiter found no legal basis to
warrant a grant thereof.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
(Commission) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of
Cabanatuan City and the NBI as contained in their autopsy
and toxicology report, respectively, the Commission, via its
November 22, 2002 Resolution11 declared that, based on
substantial evidence adduced, Jasmin was the victim of
compensable work-connected criminal aggression. It
disregarded the Al-Birk Hospital attending physicians report
as well as the KSA police report, finding the same to be
inconclusive. It declared that Jasmins death was the result of
an "accident" occurring within the employers premises that is
attributable to her employment, or to the conditions under
which she lived, and thus arose out of and in the course of her
employment as nurse. Thus, the Cuaresmas are entitled to
actual damages in the form of Jasmins lost earnings,
including future earnings, in the total amount of
US$113,000.00. The Commission, however, dismissed all
other claims in the complaint.
Becmen, Rajab and White Falcon moved for reconsideration, THE MEDICAL AND POLICE REPORTS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY
whereupon the Commission issued its October 9, 2003 OF HEALTH OF KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND AL-BIRK
Resolution12 reducing the award of US$113,000.00 as actual HOSPITAL.
damages to US$80,000.00.13 The NLRC likewise declared
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ON THE
Becmen and White Falcon as solidarily liable for payment of
BASIS OF THE POSITION PAPERS AND ANNEXES THERETO
the award.
INCLUDING THE AUTOPSY REPORT, IT CONCLUDED THAT THE
Becmen and White Falcon brought separate petitions for DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS CAUSED BY CRIMINAL
certiorari to the Court of Appeals. 14 On June 28, 2006, the AGGRESSION.
appellate court rendered its Decision, 15 the dispositive portion
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD
of which reads, as follows:
THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS COMPENSABLE
WHEREFORE, the subject petitions are DENIED but in the PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
execution of the decision, it should first be enforced against TALLER VS. YNCHAUSTI, G.R. NO. 35741, DECEMBER 20,
White Falcon Services and then against Becmen Services 1932, WHICH IT FOUND TO BE STILL GOOD LAW.
when it is already impossible, impractical and futile to go
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD
against it (White Falcon).
BECMEN LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA
SO ORDERED.16 NOTWITHSTANDING ITS ADMISSIONS THAT "IQAMA
INSURANCE" WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR SINCE "IQAMA"
The appellate court affirmed the NLRCs findings that Jasmins
IS NOT AN INSURANCE.
death was compensable, the same having occurred at the
dormitory, which was contractually provided by the employer. (THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
Thus her death should be considered to have occurred within CONCLUDED THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN WAS WORK
the employers premises, arising out of and in the course of RELATED.
her employment.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD
Becmen and White Falcon moved for reconsideration. On May BECMEN LIABLE TO JASMINS BENEFICIARIES FOR THE
14, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Amended REMAINDER OF HER 36-MONTH CONTRACT COMPUTED IN
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows: THIS MANNER: MONTHLY SALARY OF US$246.67 MULTIPLIED
BY 19 MONTHS, THE REMAINDER OF THE TERM OF JASMINS
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED.
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, IS EQUAL TO US$4,686.73.
Accordingly, the award of US$80,000.00 in actual damages is
hereby reduced to US$4,686.73 plus interest at the legal rate (THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD
computed from the time it became due until fully paid. BECMEN LIABLE TO PAY INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE FROM
Petitioners are hereby adjudged jointly and solidarily liable THE TIME IT WAS DUE UNTIL FULLY PAID.
with the employer for the monetary awards with Becmen
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD
Service Exporter and Promotions, Inc. having a right of
BECMEN AND WHITE FALCON JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
reimbursement from White Falcon Services, Inc.
WITH THE EMPLOYER NOTWITHSTANDING THE ASSUMPTION
SO ORDERED.17 OF LIABILITY EXECUTED BY WHITE FALCON IN FAVOR OF
BECMEN.
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals found that
although Jasmins death was compensable, however, there is On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 184298-99, the Cuaresmas
no evidentiary basis to support an award of actual damages raise the following issues:
in the amount of US$80,000.00. Nor may lost earnings be
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE
collected, because the same may be charged only against the
PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE CONSIDERED GENERAL LAW
perpetrator of the crime or quasi-delict. Instead, the appellate
DESPITE THE CASE BEING COVERED BY E.O. 247, R.A. 8042
court held that Jasmins beneficiaries should be entitled only
AND LABOR CODE CONSIDERED AS SPECIAL LAWS.
to the sum equivalent of the remainder of her 36-month
employment contract, or her monthly salary of US$247.00 (THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING
multiplied by nineteen (19) months, with legal interest. THE DECEASEDS FUTURE EARNINGS WHICH IS (AN)
INHERENT FACTOR IN THE COMPUTATION OF DEATH BENEFITS
Becmen filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (G.R.
OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO CONTRACT WORKERS.
Nos. 182978-79). The Cuaresmas, on the other hand, moved
for a reconsideration of the amended decision, but it was (THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN REDUCING THE
denied. They are now before us via G.R. Nos. 184298-99. DEATH BENEFITS AWARDED BY NLRC CONSIDERED FINDINGS
OF FACT THAT CANNOT BE DISTURBED THROUGH CERTIORARI
On October 6, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R.
UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
Nos. 184298-99 with G.R. Nos. 182978-79.
The issue for resolution is whether the Cuaresmas are entitled
In G.R. Nos. 182978-79, Becmen raises the following issues
to monetary claims, by way of benefits and damages, for the
for our resolution:
death of their daughter Jasmin.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GAVE
The terms and conditions of Jasmins 1996 Employment
MORE CREDENCE AND WEIGHT TO THE AUTOPSY REPORT
Agreement which she and her employer Rajab freely entered
CONDUCTED BY THE CABANATUAN CITY HEALTH OFFICE THAN
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 41 of 63
into constitute the law between them. As a rule, stipulations
in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public
policy, public order or morals have the force of law between
the contracting parties.18 An examination of said employment
agreement shows that it provides for no other monetary or
other benefits/privileges than the following:
1. 1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;
2. Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and
to the Philippines at the end thereof, as well as for her
vacation at the end of each twenty four-month service;
3. Transportation to and from work;
4. Free living accommodations;
5. Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental
operations, plastic surgery charges and lenses, and
medical treatment obtained outside of KSA;
6. Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and
her employer, but the exit/re-entry visa fees, fees for
Iqama issuance, renewal, replacement, passport renewal,
sponsorship transfer and other liabilities shall be borne
by her;
7. Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets
to Manila after twenty four-months of continuous service;
8. Eight days public holidays per year;
9. The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her
service will be calculated as per labor laws of KSA.
Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for
insurance, or for accident, death or other benefits that the
Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and
appellate court granted variably in the guise of compensatory
damages.
However, the absence of provisions for social security and
other benefits does not make Jasmins employment contract
infirm. Under KSA law, her foreign employer is not obliged to
provide her these benefits; and neither is Jasmin entitled to
minimum wage unless of course the KSA labor laws have
been amended to the opposite effect, or that a bilateral wage
agreement has been entered into.
Our next inquiry is, should Jasmins death be considered as
work-connected and thus compensable? The evidence
indicates that it is not. At the time of her death, she was not
on duty, or else evidence to the contrary would have been
adduced. Neither was she within hospital premises at the
time. Instead, she was at her dormitory room on personal
time when she died. Neither has it been shown, nor does the
evidence suggest, that at the time she died, Jasmin was
performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental to her
employment as nurse, because she was at her dormitory
room. It is reasonable to suppose that all her work is
performed at the Al-birk Hospital, and not at her dormitory
room.
We cannot expect that the foreign employer should ensure
her safety even while she is not on duty. It is not fair to
require employers to answer even for their employees
personal time away from work, which the latter are free to
spend of their own choosing. Whether they choose to spend seek employment abroad and face uncertainty in a foreign
their free time in the pursuit of safe or perilous undertakings,land, only to commit suicide for unexplained reasons.
in the company of friends or strangers, lovers or enemies, this Deciding to leave their family, loved ones, and the comfort
is not one area which their employers should be made and safety of home, to work in a strange land requires
accountable for. While we have emphasized the need to unrivaled strength and courage. Indeed, many of our women
observe official work time strictly, 19 what an employee does OFWs who are unfortunate to end up with undesirable
on free time is beyond the employers sphere of inquiry. employers have been there more times than they care to,
beaten up and broken in body yet they have remained
While the "employers premises" may be defined very broadly
strong in mind, refusing to give up the will to live. Raped,
not only to include premises owned by it, but also premises it
burned with cigarettes, kicked in the chest with sharp high-
leases, hires, supplies or uses, 20 we are not prepared to rule
heeled shoes, starved for days or even weeks, stabbed,
that the dormitory wherein Jasmin stayed should constitute
slaved with incessant work, locked in their rooms, forced to
employers premises as would allow a finding that death or
serve their masters naked, grossly debased, dehumanized
injury therein is considered to have been incurred or
and insulted, their spirits fought on and they lived for the day
sustained in the course of or arose out of her employment.
that they would once again be reunited with their families and
There are certainly exceptions, 21 but they do not appear to
loved ones. Their bodies surrendered, but their will to survive
apply here. Moreover, a complete determination would have
remained strong.
to depend on the unique circumstances obtaining and the
overall factual environment of the case, which are here It is surprising, therefore, that Rajab, Becmen and White
lacking. Falcon should insist on suicide, without even lifting a finger to
help solve the mystery of Jasmins death. Being in the
But, did Jasmin commit suicide? Rajab, Becmen and White
business of sending OFWs to work abroad, Becmen and White
Falcon vehemently insist that she did; thus, her heirs may not
Falcon should know what happens to some of our OFWs. It is
claim benefits or damages based on criminal aggression. On
impossible for them to be completely unaware that cruelties
the other hand, the Cuaresmas do not believe so.
and inhumanities are inflicted on OFWs who are unfortunate
The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed to be employed by vicious employers, or upon those who
suicide while halfway into her employment contract. It is work in communities or environments where they are liable to
beyond human comprehension that a 25-year old Filipina, in become victims of crime. By now they should know that our
the prime of her life and working abroad with a chance at women OFWs do not readily succumb to the temptation of
making a decent living with a high-paying job which she could killing themselves even when assaulted, abused, starved,
not find in her own country, would simply commit suicide for debased and, worst, raped.
no compelling reason.
Indeed, what we have seen is Rajab and Becmens revolting
The Saudi police and autopsy reports which state that scheme of conveniently avoiding responsibility by clinging to
Jasmin is a likely/or apparent victim of poisoning the absurd theory that Jasmin took her own life. Abandoning
are patently inconclusive. They are thus unreliable as their legal, moral and social obligation (as employer and
evidence. recruiter) to assist Jasmins family in obtaining justice for her
death, they immediately gave up on Jasmins case, which has
On the contrary, the autopsy report of the Cabanatuan City remained under investigation as the autopsy and police
Health Officer and the exhumation report of the NBI reports themselves indicate. Instead of taking the cudgels for
categorically and unqualifiedly show that Jasmin sustained Jasmin, who had no relative or representative in the KSA who
external and internal injuries, specifically abrasions at her would naturally demand and seek an investigation of her
inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on case, Rajab and Becmen chose to take the most convenient
her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and route to avoiding and denying liability, by casting Jasmins
hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and fate to oblivion. It appears from the record that to this date,
hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular no follow up of Jasmins case was ever made at all by them,
hemorrhage at the anterior chest; a fractured and they seem to have expediently treated Jasmins death as
rib; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia a closed case. Despite being given the lead via the autopsy
minora of the vaginal area. The NBI toxicology report and toxicology reports of the Philippine authorities, they failed
came up negative on the presence of poison. and refused to act and pursue justice for Jasmins sake and to
All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly restore honor to her name.
raped prior to her death. Indeed, their nonchalant and uncaring attitude may be seen
Even if we were to agree with the Saudi police and autopsy from how Jasmins remains were repatriated. No official
reports that indicate Jasmin was poisoned to death, we do not representative from Rajab or Becmen was kind enough to
believe that it was self-induced. If ever Jasmin was poisoned, make personal representations with Jasmins parents, if only
the assailants who beat her up and possibly raped her are to extend their condolences or sympathies; instead, a mere
certainly responsible therefor. colleague, nurse Jessie Fajardo, was designated to accompany
Jasmins body home.
We are not exactly ignorant of what goes on with our OFWs.
Nor is the rest of the world blind to the realities of life being Of all lifes tragedies, the death of ones own child must be
suffered by migrant workers in the hands of some foreign the most painful for a parent. Not knowing why or how
employers. It is inconceivable that our Filipina women would Jasmins life was snuffed out makes the pain doubly
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 42 of 63
unbearable for Jasmins parents, and further aggravated by parents can do is to coordinate with Philippine authorities as stationed. Upon them lies the primary obligation to protect
Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcons baseless insistence and mandated under R.A. 8042, obtain free legal assistance and the rights and ensure the welfare of our OFWs, whether
accusation that it was a self-inflicted death, a mortal sin by secure the aid of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the distressed or not. Who else is in a better position, if not these
any religious standard. Department of Labor and Employment, the POEA and the recruitment agencies, to render immediate aid to their
OWWA in trying to solve the case or obtain relief, in deployed OFWs abroad?
Thus we categorically hold, based on the evidence; the actual
accordance with Section 23 27 of R.A. 8042. To our mind, the
experiences of our OFWs; and the resilient and courageous Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must,
Cuaresmas did all that was within their power, short of
spirit of the Filipina that transcends the vilest desecration of in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
actually flying to the KSA. Indeed, the Cuaresmas went even
her physical self, that Jasmin did not commit suicide but a duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
further. To the best of their abilities and capacities, they
victim of murderous aggression. honesty and good faith. Article 21 of the Code states that any
ventured to investigate Jasmins case on their own: they
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcons indifference to Jasmins caused another autopsy on Jasmins remains as soon as it
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
case has caused unfathomable pain and suffering upon her arrived to inquire into the true cause of her death. Beyond
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. And, lastly,
parents. They have turned away from their moral obligation, that, they subjected themselves to the painful and distressful
Article 24 requires that in all contractual, property or other
as employer and recruiter and as entities laden with social experience of exhuming Jasmins remains in order to obtain
relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on
and civic obligations in society, to pursue justice for and in another autopsy for the sole purpose of determining whether
account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
behalf of Jasmin, her parents and those she left behind. or not their daughter was poisoned. Their quest for the truth
mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts
Possessed with the resources to determine the truth and to and justice is equally to be expected of all loving parents. All
must be vigilant for his protection.
pursue justice, they chose to stand idly for the sake of this time, Rajab and Becmen instead of extending their full
convenience and in order that they may avoid pecuniary cooperation to the Cuaresma family merely sat on their Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcons acts and omissions
liability, turning a blind eye to the Philippine authorities laurels in seeming unconcern. are against public policy because they undermine and subvert
autopsy and toxicology reports instead of taking action upon the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad, who are
In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC,28 a seaman
them as leads in pursuing justice for Jasmins death. They entitled to full protection under the law. They set an awful
who was being repatriated after his employment contract
have placed their own financial and corporate interests above example of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies
expired, failed to make his Bangkok to Manila connecting
their moral and social obligations, and chose to secure and should treat and act with respect to their distressed
flight as he began to wander the streets of Bangkok aimlessly.
insulate themselves from the perceived responsibility of employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous
He was shot to death by Thai police four days after, on
having to answer for and indemnify Jasmins heirs for her treatment of Jasmins case; their uncaring attitude; their
account of running amuck with a knife in hand and
death. unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the determination of
threatening to harm anybody within sight. The employer,
the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death,
Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant sued for death and other benefits as well as damages,
and instead finding satisfaction in the unreasonable
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, 22 the State shall, interposed as defense the provision in the seafarer
insistence that she committed suicide just so they can
at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in agreement which provides that "no compensation shall be
conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own
country or overseas, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death
corporate interests above of the welfare of their employees
in particular.23 The State shall provide adequate and timely resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman." The
all these are contrary to morals, good customs and public
social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant Court rejected the defense on the view, among others, that
policy, and constitute taking advantage of the poor employee
workers.24 The rights and interest of distressed25 overseas the recruitment agency should have observed some
and her familys ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack
Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in precautionary measures and should not have allowed the
of power and resources to seek the truth and obtain justice
particular, documented or undocumented, are adequately seaman, who was later on found to be mentally ill, to travel
for the death of a loved one.
protected and safeguarded.26 home alone, and its failure to do so rendered it liable for the
seamans death. We ruled therein that Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide,
Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment
and adamantly insisting on it just to protect Rajab and
agencies, miserably failed to abide by the provisions of R.A. The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its
Becmens material interest despite evidence to the contrary
8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend contract to provide a companion for a returning employee,
is against the moral law and runs contrary to the good
assistance to their deployed OFWs, especially those in but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its
custom of not denouncing ones fellowmen for alleged grave
distress. Instead, they abandoned Jasmins case and allowed agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The
wrongdoings that undermine their good name and honor. 30
it to remain unsolved to further their interests and avoid uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who,
anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin would knowing fully well that its employee had been Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers
certainly exact from them. They willfully refused to protect suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social
and tend to the welfare of the deceased Jasmin, treating her allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary
case as just one of those unsolved crimes that is not worth the least. Such attitude harks back to another time notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the
wasting their time and resources on. The evidence does not when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs, basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor,
even show that Becmen and Rajab lifted a finger to provide and disposed of them when the latter had grown old, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities
29
legal representation and seek an investigation of Jasmins sick or otherwise lost their usefulness. (Emphasis regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations
case. Worst of all, they unnecessarily trampled upon the supplied) between workers and employers. This ruling is likewise
person and dignity of Jasmin by standing pat on the argument rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which
Thus, more than just recruiting and deploying OFWs to their
that Jasmin committed suicide, which is a grave accusation states that laws which have for their object public order,
foreign principals, recruitment agencies have equally
given its un-Christian nature. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
significant responsibilities. In a foreign land where OFWs are
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
We cannot reasonably expect that Jasmins parents should be likely to encounter uneven if not discriminatory treatment
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
the ones to actively pursue a just resolution of her case in the from the foreign government, and certainly a delayed access
country.31
KSA, unless they are provided with the finances to undertake to language interpretation, legal aid, and the Philippine
this herculean task. Sadly, Becmen and Rajab did not lend consulate, the recruitment agencies should be the first to The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with
any assistance at all in this respect. The most Jasmins come to the rescue of our distressed OFWs since they know public interest,32 and neither shall act oppressively against
the employers and the addresses where they are deployed or

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 43 of 63

the other, or impair the interest or convenience of the PADILLA, J.: house at 30 Long beach, Merville, Paranaque. Rizal in the
public.33 In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor * evening of November 30, 1967, and that he started to
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent live with her at her dwelling after December 16, 1967,
in CA-G.R. No. 51078-R, dated 29 August 1978, which
living for the laborer.34 the date they finished their cruise to Mindoro Island.
dismissed petitioner"s action for recognition and support
The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of against private respondent, and from the respondent Court"s On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met
misconduct on the part of the employer is sanctioned by resolution, dated 11 October 1978, denying petitioner"s ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club,
Article 2219 (10)35 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of motion for reconsideration of said decision. however, maintains that this was on December 14, 1967
such damages in actions referred to in Article 21.36 because the day following, he and his guests: ARLENE,
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor,
Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie Litonjua went to
Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the represented by her mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene
Mindoro by boat. He dated ARLENE four times in January,
Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages, which Becmen and Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support with the
1968. He remembered he had carnal knowledge of her
White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay, together Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private
for the first time on January 18, 1968, because that was
with exemplary damages for wanton and oppressive behavior, respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity so the
a week after his birthday and it was only in May, 1968
and by way of example for the public good. parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due
that he started cohabiting with her at the Excelsior
course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation
Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
(NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood
liable with the foreign-based employer for any violation of the
grouping test, held 21 January 1969, indicated that Janice These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in
recruitment agreement or contract of employment. This joint
could not have been the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and resolving the paternity of JANICE, the role of the blood
and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment
Arlene S. Salgado.1 grouping tests conducted by the NBI and which resulted
agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the
in the negative finding that in a union with ARLENE, JAO
aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally
could not be the father of JANICE.
what is due him.37 If the recruitment/placement agency is a conclusive but upon plaintiff"s (herein petitioner"s) second
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and after which, Janice was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling the NBI is not in a position to determine with
solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the her to his monthly support. mathematical precision the issue of parentage by blood
aforesaid claims and damages.38 grouping test, considering the rulings of this Court ...
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial
where the blood grouping tests of the NBI were admitted;
White Falcons assumption of Becmens liability does not court"s failure to appreciate the result of the blood grouping
especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo
automatically result in Becmens freedom or release from tests. As there was no showing whatsoever that there was
Sunico who conducted the test and it appears that in the
liability. This has been ruled in ABD Overseas Manpower any irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao
present case, the same Dr. Sunico approved the findings
Corporation v. NLRC.39 Instead, both Becmen and White argued that the result of the tests should have been
and report. ... In Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil.
Falcon should be held liable solidarily, without prejudice to conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
188, the Supreme Court had given weight to the findings
each having the right to be reimbursed under the provision of
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao"s contentions and reversed of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be
the Civil Code that whoever pays for another may demand
the trial court"s decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeals gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct
from the debtor what he has paid.40
held: blood grouping tests has been recognized as early as the
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals 1950"s.
From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears
dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP
undisputed that JAO was introduced to ARLENE at the The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be
No. 81030 is SET ASIDE. Rajab & Silsilah
Saddle and Sirloin, Bay Side Club, by Melvin Yabut. After stated as follows:
Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service
this meeting, JAO dated and courted ARLENE. Not long
Exporter and Promotion, Inc., and their corporate Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the
thereafter, they had their first sexual intercourse and
directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child,
subsequently, they lived together as husband and
and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin Cuaresma, and the alleged father, it can be established
wife. ...
spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma, the following amounts: conclusively that the man is not the father of the
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO child. But group blood testing cannot show that a
1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
accompanied ARLENE to the Marian General Hospital for man is the father of a particular child, but at least
(P2,500,000.00) as moral damages;
medical check-up and her confinement was with JAO"s can show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in
2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS consent. JAO paid the rentals where they lived, the many states, and courts in others, have recognized
(P2,500,000.00) as exemplary damages; salaries of the maids, and other household expenses. ... the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of
the decisions have recognized the conclusive
3) Attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on presumption of non-paternity where the results of
total monetary award; and, August 16, 1968, after completing 36 weeks of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the
pregnancy, which indicates that ARLENE must have impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of
4) Costs of suit.
conceived JANICE on or about the first week of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court
SO ORDERED. December, 1967. "Thus, one issue to be resolved in this may scientifically be completely accurate, and
appeal is whether on or about that time, JAO and ARLENE intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred
had sexual intercourse and were already living with one where the finding is allowed to turn on oral
G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987 another as husband and wife. testimony conflicting with the results of the test.
JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met The findings of such blood tests are not admissible
guardian ad litem, ARLENE S. SALGADO, petitioner, vs. JAO sometime in the third or fourth week of November, to prove the fact of paternity as they show only a
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. 1967 at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club; that after possibility that the alleged father or any one of
JAO, respondents. several dates, she had carnal knowledge with him at her many others with the same blood type may have

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 44 of 63

 been the father of the child. But the Uniform Act
recognizes that the tests may have some probative
value to establish paternity where the blood type
and the combination in the child is shown to be rare,
in which case the judge is given discretion to let it in
(I Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194).
In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups,
scientific opinion is now in accord in accepting the
fact that there is a causative relation between the
trait of the progenitor and the trait of the progeny. In
other words, the blood composition of a child may
be some evidence as to the child"s paternity. But
thus far this trait (in the present state of scientific
discovery as generally accepted) can be used
only negatively i.e. to evidence that a particular
man F is not the father of a particular child C. (I
Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed., pp. 610-611).
In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and
competency of the blood test, JANICE claims that
probative value was given to blood tests only in cases
where they tended to establish paternity; and that there
has been no case where the blood test was invoked to
establish non-paternity, thereby implying that blood tests
have probative value only when the result is a possible
affirmative and not when in the negative. This contention
is fallacious and must be rejected. To sustain her
contention, in effect, would be recognizing only the
possible affirmative finding but not the blood grouping
test itself for if the result were negative, the test is
regarded worthless. Indeed, this is illogical. .... As an
admitted test, it is admissible in subsequent similar
proceedings whether the result be in the negative or in
the affirmative. ...
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary
to petitioner"s contention that JAO"s actions before and after
JANICE was born were tantamount to recognition. Said the
respondent appellate court:
On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not
recognize her as his own. In fact, he filed a petition that
his name as father of JANICE in the latter"s certificate of
live birth be deleted, evidencing his repudiation, rather
than recognition. The mere acts of JAO in cohabiting with
ARLENE, the attention given to her during her pregnancy
and the financial assistance extended to her cannot
overcome the result of the blood grouping test. These
acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the
unborn JANICE as his own as the possession of such
status cannot be founded on conjectures and
presumptions, especially so that, We have earlier said,
JAO refused to acknowledge JANICE after the latter"s
birth.
JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on
paragraph 2 of Article 283 in relation to Article 289 of the
New Civil Code which provides: "When the child is in
continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter.
Nor can there be compulsory recognition under
paragraphs 3 or 4 of said article which states:
(3) When the child was conceived during the time already become an important legal procedure. There is now
when the mother cohabited with the supposed almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping
father; tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or
type of the child is a possible product of the mother and
proof that the defendant is his father.
alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is
As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not
have been conceived from November 20, 1967 to the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and
December 4, 1967. Indeed, ARLENE claims that her first that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the
4
sexual intercourse with JAO was on November 30, 1967 child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
while the latter avers it was one week after January 18,
In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of
1968. However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-quoted,
blood tests results to prove non-paternity has already been
JANICE must have been conceived when ARLENE and JAO
passed upon in several cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin5 the positive
started to cohabit with one another. Since ARLENE
results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it
herself testified that their cohabitation started only after
was shown that proper safeguards were drawn around the
December 16, 1967, then it cannot be gainsaid that
testing procedures, were recognized as final on the question
JANICE was not conceived during this cohabitation.
of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo6 evidence of non-paternity
Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily, recognition
consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted
cannot be had under paragraph 4 as JANICE has no other
despite a finding that the alleged father had cohabited with
evidence or proof of her alleged paternity.
the mother within the period of gestation. The Court said that
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the the competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in
critical time of conception, ARLENE had carnal knowledge favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would be
with two other men: "Oying" Fernandez and Melvin Yabut, tantamount to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was stated,
which was not even rebutted; and considering that it was should apply the results of science when competently
Melvin Yabut, who introduced ARLENE to JAO at the obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
7
Bayside Club. Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE is not result was to deny progress. This ruling was also echoed
8
wholly reliable. When the trial court said that "the Court in Clark v. Rysedorph, a filiation proceeding where an
is further convinced of plaintiff"s cause by ARLENE"s uncontradicted blood grouping test evidence, excluding
manner of testifying in a most straight-forward and paternity, was held conclusive. 9 Legislation expressly
candid manner," the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force in several
movie actress may have been overlooked so that not states.10 Tolentino,11 affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of
even the trial court could detect, by her acts, whether non-paternity, thus
she was lying or not.
Medical science has shown that there are four types of
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set blood in man which can be transmitted through heredity.
aside and a new one entered dismissing plaintiff- Although the presence of the same type of blood in two
appellee"s complaint. Without pronouncement as to persons does not indicate that one was begotten by the
costs. SO ORDERED. other, yet the fact that they are of different types will
indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the
The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of other. Thus, when the supposed father and the alleged
admissibility and conclusiveness of the result of blood child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be
grouping tests to prove non-paternity. father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other today regard a blood test exclusion as an unanswerable
evidence, to, affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. and indisputable proof of non-paternity. 12
Court of Appeals,2 an action for declaration of filiation, Moreover,
support and damages. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of
the blood tests stated that "from their blood groups and The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed
types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." father cannot be a ground for compulsory recognition if
From this statement the defendant contended that the child such cohabitation could not have produced the
must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: conception of the child. This would be the case, for
"For obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance instance, if the cohabitation took place outside of the
that the appellant was the father of the child; he can only period of conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be
give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, proved by blood tests that the child and the supposed
coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation
during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant Co by itself cannot be a ground for recognition. 13
3
Tao is the father of the child Manuel."
Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests in the instant case by impugning the
grouping tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed the tests
more definite in their conclusions. For the past three decades, and the conduct of the tests themselves. Her allegations, in
the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has this regard, appear to be without merit. The NBI"s forensic
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 45 of 63
chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has The antecedent facts follow. buy the land if the value thereof is higher than the value
had extensive practice in this area for several years. The of the improvements.
Sometime in 1947, the late Eusebio Pigao, petitioners father,
blood tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2)
together with his family, settled on a 240 square meter lot 3. Dismissing the case against defendant Gil Ymata for
scientifically recognized blood grouping systems, the MN Test
located at 92 (now 102) K-5th Street, Kamuning, Quezon City. lack of cause of action there being no privity of contract
and the ABO System,14 under witness and supervision.15
The parcel of land used to be government property owned by between him and [petitioners];
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation
4. Dismissing both [petitioners] and [respondents]
to have been a proper subject for accurate blood tests must (PHHC),3 under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
claims for damages and attorneys fees there being no
fall, since nearly two years after the first blood test, she, 27287.4 Eusebio applied for the purchase of the subject lot
satisfactory warrant thereto; and
represented by her mother, declined to undergo the same and a contract to sell for a consideration of P1,022.19 was
blood test to prove or disprove their allegations, even as Jao thereafter entered into by Eusebio and PHHC. 5. No pronouncements as to costs.
was willing to undergo such a test again.161avvphi1
In 1959, Eusebio executed a deed of assignment of rights IT IS SO ORDERED.6
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of over one-half of the property in favor of respondent, for a
Appeals and holds that the result of the blood grouping tests consideration of P1,000. Respondent proceeded to occupy the As stated earlier, the CA reversed the RTC decision and ruled
involved in the case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on front half portion, established a residential building thereon, in favor of respondent.
the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. and paid the amortizations for the said portion. Petitioners filed this petition on the following grounds:
No evidence has been presented showing any defect in the
In 1970, Eusebio executed a deed of mortgage over the same I. THE [CA] ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE SUBJECT DEED OF
testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate
half-portion of the property in favor of respondent. After the ASSIGNMENT IS VALID AND THAT THERE IS NO PROHIBITION
safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The result of
amortizations on the subject lot were fully paid in 1973, the [AGAINST] THE SALE [OF] RIGHTS OVER THE AWARDED LOT
such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting
PHHC issued a deed of sale over the entire lot in favor of MADE BY EUSEBIO PIGAO.
a scientific fact.
Eusebio. Consequently, TCT No. 197941 was issued in
In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, Eusebios name. In 1978, respondent executed an affidavit of II. THE [CA] ERRED IN DECLARING THAT A RELATIONSHIP OF
as heretofore quoted, which are binding on this Court, we do adverse claim over the front half portion of the lot registered IMPLIED TRUST OVER THE [ONE-HALF] (1/2) PORTION OF THE
not find it necessary to further pass upon the issue of in Eusebios name. This affidavit was duly annotated on TCT SUBJECT LOT WAS CREATED BETWEEN EUSEBIO PIGAO AND
recognition raised by petitioner. No. 197941. On June 17, 1979, Eusebio died and was survived [RESPONDENT].7
by his children, herein petitioners. The first issue before us is the validity of the deed of
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied.
Without pronouncement as to costs. In 1988, after the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon assignment whereby Eusebio assigned to respondent his
City was gutted by fire, petitioner Estrella Pigao applied for rights to half of the lot. Petitioners argue that the lot subject
SO ORDERED. of this case was public land granted by the PHHC to their
the reconstitution of the original of TCT No. 197941 that was
burned. This was approved in 1990 and TCT No. RT-11374 was predecessor, Eusebio. Hence, they contend that Section 118
issued, still in the name of Eusebio. This reconstituted title no of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141)8otherwise known as
G.R. No. 150712 May 2, 2006 longer carried the annotation of the adverse claim of the Public Land Act, was applicable:
ESTRELLA PIGAO, ROMEO PIGAO, EMMANUEL PIGAO, respondent. Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its
ISABELITA ABAD, PURITA SARTIGA, CESAR PIGAO, In 1992, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free
TERESITA PIGAO, VIRGILIO PIGAO and EVANGELINE Eusebios estate among themselves, including the entire patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
KIUNISALA, Petitioners, vs. SAMUEL subject lot. As a consequence, TCT No. 56210 was issued for encumbrance or alienation from the date of the
RABANILLO, Respondent. the entire lot in the name of petitioners. Respondent approval of the application and for a term of five years
continued to occupy the front half portion through his tenant, from and after the date of issuance of the patent or
DECISION
Gil Ymata. On January 29, 1996, petitioners instituted civil grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any
CORONA, J.: case no. Q-96-26270 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision 1 of Quezon City, Branch 95, against respondent and Ymata
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 29, 2001 in CA-G.R. wherein they sought to quiet their title over the entire lot and
to recover possession of the front half portion. They averred (emphasis supplied)
CV No. 60069, the dispositive portion of which read:
that Eusebios deed of assignment and deed of mortgage xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-96- were clouds on their title which should be nullified. 5 The RTC
26270 on February 27, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET ruled in favor of petitioners: Petitioners assert that the deed of assignment was null and
ASIDE. As prayed for in the answer, Transfer Certificate of void because it was entered into during the prohibited
Title No. 56210 over the 240 square-meter lot located at 92 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the following: period,9 i.e., the entire period from the date of approval of
(now 102) K-5th Street, Kamuning, Quezon City issued in the 1. Declaring [petitioners] the absolute owners of the Eusebios application to purchase up to five years from and
name of Eusebio Pigaos children is hereby ordered entire land described in TCT No. 56210 and declaring the after the date of issuance of the patent to him in 1973.
CANCELLED and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is deed of assignment issued by the late Eusebio Pigao in Respondent counters that CA 141 did not apply because it
hereby ordered to ISSUE a new one in lieu thereof in the favor of [respondent] null and void. covered only homestead or sales patents. 10
names of both Eusebio Pigaos children and Samuel Rabanillo,
with the front half portion of the lot pertaining to the latter 2. Ordering [petitioners] to pay [respondent] the value of We agree that CA 141 was inapplicable. The proscription
and the back half portion pertaining to the former. the house and improvements thereon in the event that under CA 141 on re-sale within the five-year restricted 11
period
they choose to appropriate the same in which case referred to free patents and homestead lands only. Here, the
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds [respondent] is given the right of retention until he has lot in dispute was neither homestead land nor one acquired
of Quezon City for proper action. been reimbursed by [petitioners]; or to compel through patent. It was owned by PHHC, a government
2 [respondent] to buy the land in case they choose not to. corporation,12 under TCT No. 27287.13
SO ORDERED.
In the latter case, [respondent] cannot be compelled to

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 46 of 63

It was not disputed that Eusebio and respondent entered into
a deed of assignment in 1959, long before PHHC executed a
(final) deed of sale in favor of Eusebio in 1973. At that time,
title to the lot was still in the name of PHHC. The deed of
assignment itself explicitly stated that the property was
"owned by the PHHC." 14 And when the (final) deed of sale was
issued by PHHC in favor of Eusebio in 1973, this deed
contained a prohibition against the alienation of the lot:
(2) Within a period of one year from the issuance of the
Certificate of Title by virtue of this deed, no transfer or
alienation whatsoever of the property subject hereof, in whole
or in part, shall be made or registered without the written
consent of the Vendor, and such transfer or alienation may be
made only in favor of persons qualified to acquire residential
lands under the laws of the Philippines.15
The CA, however, held that what was assigned by Eusebio in
1959 was his right to buy, own and occupy the front half
portion of the lot and not the lot itself. It went on to conclude
that the deed of assignment was perfectly valid since Eusebio
was under no prohibition to sell such right.
Petitioners insist there was such a prohibition. To support their
claim, they request this Court to take judicial notice of the
fact that the pro-forma conditional contracts-to- sell between
PHHC and applicants for the purchase of its lots contained a
condition stating that "the applicant agree(d) not to sell,
assign, encumber, mortgage, lease, sublet or in any other
manner affect his right under this contract, at any time, in
any manner whatsoever, in whole or in part, without first
obtaining the written consent of the Corporation." Although
they admitted that they failed to present during the trial the
conditional contract to sell between Eusebio and PHHC, they
claimed that they did not have a copy thereof. 16 In fact, what
they submitted to this Court was a copy of a conditional
contract to sell between a certain Armando Bernabe and the
PHHC pertaining to a lot located at 94 K-5th St., Kamuning,
Quezon City17 to prove the existence of the aforementioned
condition. Respondent objects to this attempt of petitioners to
seek admission of evidence which was presented neither
during trial nor on appeal.18
We agree with respondent. We cannot take cognizance of this
document the conditional contract to sell between Bernabe
and the PHHC alleged to be the pro-forma contract used by
PHHC with its applicants - which petitioners are presenting for
the first time. This document is not among the matters the
law mandatorily requires us to take judicial notice of. 19 Neither
can we consider it of public knowledge nor capable of
unquestionable demonstration nor ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.20 We have held
that:
Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within
the limits of jurisdiction of the court. The power of taking
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution. Care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be
promptly resolved in the negative.21 (emphasis supplied)
Consequently, for this document to be properly considered by exercise. As a personal right, it could not be transferred to
us, it should have been presented during trial and formally just another person.
offered as evidence. Otherwise, we would be denying due
Any transfer of rights, to be valid, must be in line with the
process of law to respondent:
policy of PHHC which was to provide "decent housing for
It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that those who may be found unable otherwise to provide
which has been formally offered. xxx If [petitioners] neglected themselves therewith." Thus, any transfer of an applicants
to offer [any document] in evidence, however vital [it] may right to buy a lot was invalid if done without the consent of
be, [they] only have themselves to blame, not respondent PHHC. The same policy was enunciated by the terms of the
who was not even given a chance to object as the documents deed of sale.25 There is no showing that the PHHCs approval
were never offered in evidence. for the assignment of half of the lot to respondent was ever
obtained. Stated otherwise, there is no proof that respondent
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence
would have been allowed to avail of the preferential rights
when it is simply marked for identification; it must be formally
exclusively granted to bona fide occupants of PHHC-owned
offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to
lots like Eusebio. Thus, the assignment of rights by Eusebio to
object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove
respondent, who was not a bona fide occupant of the lot,
or identify it. A formal offer is necessary since judges are
frustrated the public policy of the government. It should
required to base their findings of fact and judgment only
therefore be struck down as null and void.
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the
trial. To allow a party to attach any document to his pleading It follows that the second issue of whether an implied trust
and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may relationship was created between Eusebio and his heirs as
draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be trustees and respondent as beneficiary must also be resolved
deprived of his chance to examine the document and object against respondent. We do not agree with the reasoning of
to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty the CA:
reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court
xxx [A]fter the execution of the deed of assignment,
below. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court
[respondent] proceeded to buy the front half portion from
on the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or
PHHC by paying the amortizations due thereon in exercise of
exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to include such
the right which he purchased by way of deed of assignment.
pleadings or documents not offered at the hearing of the
He also established his residence on this portion since he was
case.22
then secure in the knowledge that he eventually will own the
Besides, this document does not even pertain to the lot and same portion having also purchased this right to own in the
parties involved here. Accordingly, it is neither relevant nor deed of assignment. Therefore, when the purchase price for
material evidence. But even assuming that it were, then it the entire lot was finally paid, the deed of its conveyance was
would substantially affect the outcome of the case so finally executed and the title to the entire lot was issued in
respondent should have been given the chance to scrutinize Eusebio Pigaos name, an implied trust relationship was
the document and object to it during the trial of the case. It is created over the front half portion between Pigao and
too late to present it now when nothing prevented petitioners [respondent].
from introducing it before.
Per Article 1448 of the Civil Code, "there is an implied trust
Nevertheless, we hold that the deed of assignment between when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one
Eusebio and respondent is null and void for being contrary to party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of
public policy. Under PHHC rules, preference for the purchase having the beneficial interest of the property." The former
of residential lots from the PHHC was accorded to bona fide party is referred to as the trustee, while the latter is referred
occupants of such lots.23 This policy was supported by the to as the beneficiary.
PHHC charter given that one of the purposes of the PHHC
In the case at bench, the trustee is Pigao, who, with the title
was:
to the entire lot issued to him, holds the front half portion
to acquire, develop, improve, subdivide, lease and sell lands thereof in trust for [respondent], who is the beneficiary.
and construct, lease and sell buildings or any interest therein
xxx xxx xxx26
in the cities and populous towns in the Philippines with the
object of providing decent housing for those who may The CA declared that Article 1448 of the Civil Code was
be found unable otherwise to provide themselves applicable:
therewith.24 (emphasis supplied)
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and
Eusebio, as a bona fide occupant of the subject lot, had a the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid
vested right to buy the property. This did not, however, give by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of
him the unbridled freedom to transfer his right to a third the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the
party, specially one who was unqualified to avail of it. beneficiary.
Undoubtedly, the PHHC was clothed with authority to
determine if a person was qualified to purchase a residential xxx xxx xxx
lot from it. The right to purchase was a personal right that the In Morales v. Court of Appeals,27 we extensively discussed the
qualified applicant, as determined by PHHC, must personally concept of "trust:"
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 47 of 63
A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an Otherwise stated, as an exception to the law on trusts, Company, Ltd., decided to forge a joint venture and establish
equitable ownership in property and another person owning "[a] trust or a provision in the terms of a trust is a corporation, under the name of the Mindanao Ferroalloy
the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the invalid if the enforcement of the trust or provision Corporation (Corporation for brevity) with principal offices in
former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and would be against public policy, even though its Iligan City. Ricardo P. Guevara was the President and
the exercise of certain powers by the latter. performance does not involve the commission of a criminal or Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Corporation. Jong-
tortious act by the trustee." The parties must necessarily be Won Hong, the General Manager of Ssangyong Corporation,
xxx xxx xxx
subject to the same limitations on allowable stipulations in was the Vice-President of the Corporation for Finance,
Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are ordinary contracts, i.e., their stipulations must not be contrary Marketing and Administration. So was Teresita R. Cu. On
created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. November 26, 1990, the Board of Directors of the Corporation
implied trusts come into being by operation of law, either What the parties then cannot expressly provide in their approved a Resolution authorizing its President and
through implication of an intention to create a trust as a contracts for being contrary to law and public policy, they Chairman of the Board of Directors or Teresita R. Cu, acting
matter of law or through the imposition of the trust cannot impliedly or implicitly do so in the guise of a resulting together with Jong-Won Hong, to secure an omnibus line in
irrespective of, and even contrary to, any such intention. In trust.30 (emphasis supplied) the aggregate amount of P30,000,000.00 from the Solidbank
turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. x x x.
Admittedly, respondent shouldered half of the amortizations
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that
which were received by Eusebios wife 31 and paid to the PHHC xxxxxxxxx
valuable consideration and not legal title determines the
for the purchase of the lot. He also paid for the realty taxes
equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have "In the meantime, the Corporation started its operations
for the said portion.32 However, this was not an implied trust
been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature sometime in April, 1991. Its indebtedness ballooned
wherein petitioners held the title over the front half portion in
or circumstances of the consideration involved in a to P200,453,686.69 compared to its assets of
trust for respondent. Otherwise, it would again run against
transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested only P65,476,000.00. On May 21, 1991, the Corporation
public policy.
with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title secured an ordinary time loan from the Solidbank in the
for the benefit of another. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The amount of P3,200,000.00. Another ordinary time loan was
Court of Appeals decision dated October 29, 2001 in CA-G.R. granted by the Bank to the Corporation on May 28, 1991, in
xxx xxx xxx
CV No. 60069 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the amount of P1,800,000.00 or in the total amount
A resulting trust is exemplified by Article 1448 of the Civil the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95 in Civil of P5,000,000.00, due on July 15 and 26, 1991, respectively.
Code xxx Case No. Q-96-26270 is REINSTATED.
"However, the Corporation and the Bank agreed to
The trust created under the first sentence of Article 1448 is SO ORDERED. consolidate and, at the same time, restructure the two (2)
sometimes referred to as a purchase money resulting trust. loan availments, the same payable on September 20, 1991.
The trust is created in order to effectuate what the law The Corporation executed Promissory Note No. 96-91-00865-
presumes to have been the intention of the parties in the G.R. No. 153535. July 28, 2005 6 in favor of the Bank evidencing its loan in the amount
circumstances that the person to whom the land was of P5,160,000.00, payable on September 20, 1991. Teresita
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. MINDANAO Cu and Jong-Won Hong affixed their signatures on the note. To
conveyed holds it as trustee for the person who supplied the
FERROALLOY CORPORATION, Spouses JONG-WON HONG secure the payment of the said loan, the Corporation, through
purchase money.
and SOO-OK KIM HONG, *TERESITA CU, and RICARDO P. Jong-Won Hong and Teresita Cu, executed a Deed of
To give rise to a purchase money resulting trust, it is essential GUEVARA and Spouse,** respondents. Assignment in favor of the Bank covering its rights, title and
that there be: interest to the following:
DECISION
1. an actual payment of money, property or services, or The entire proceeds of drafts drawn under Irrevocable Letter
PANGANIBAN, J.:
an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; of Credit No. M-S-041-2002080 opened with The Mitsubishi
To justify an award for moral and exemplary damages under Bank Ltd. Tokyo dated June 13, 1991 for the account of
2. and such consideration must be furnished by the
Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code (on human relations), the Ssangyong Japan Corporation, 7F. Matsuoka-Tamura-Cho
alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust.
claimants must establish the other partys malice or bad faith Bldg., 22-10, 5-Chome, Shimbashi, Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan up
There are recognized exceptions to the establishment of an by clear and convincing evidence. to the extent of US$197,679.00
implied resulting trust. The first is stated in the last part of
The Case "The Corporation likewise executed a Quedan, by way of
Article 1448 itself. Thus, where A pays the purchase money
and title is conveyed by absolute deed to A's child or to a Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules additional security, under which the Corporation bound and
person to whom A stands in loco parentis and who makes no of Court, assailing the December 21, 2001 Decision 2 and the obliged to keep and hold, in trust for the Bank or its Order,
express promise, a trust does not result, the presumption May 15, 2002 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- Ferrosilicon for US$197,679.00. Jong-Won Hong and Teresita
being that a gift was intended. Another exception is, of GR CV No. 67482. The CA disposed as follows: Cu affixed their signatures thereon for the Corporation. The
course, that in which an actual contrary intention is proved. Corporation, also, through Jong-Won Hong and Teresita Cu,
Also where the purchase is made in violation of an existing "IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal 4
executed a Trust Receipt Agreement, by way of additional
statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED." security for said loan, the Corporation undertaking to hold in
result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. 28 The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied trust, for the Bank, as its property, the following:
Another exception to the establishment of an implied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. 1. THE MITSUBISHI BANK LTD., Tokyo L/C No. M-S-041-
resulting trust under Article 1448 is when its enforcement The Facts 2002080 for account of Ssangyong Japan Corporation, Tokyo,
contravenes public policy. We have already ruled that the Japan for US$197,679.00 Ferrosilicon to expire September 20,
transfer of rights by Eusebio to respondent was null and The CA narrated the antecedents as follows: 1991.
void ab initio for being contrary to public policy. As we held "The Maria Cristina Chemical Industries (MCCI) and three (3) 2. SEC QUEDAN NO. 91-476 dated June 26, 1991 covering the
in Ramos v. Court of Appeals:29 Korean corporations, namely, the Ssangyong Corporation, the following:
Pohang Iron and Steel Company and the Dongil Industries
Ferrosilicon for US$197,679.00

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 48 of 63

"However, shortly after the execution of the said deeds, the "In the interim, the Corporation filed, on June 20, 1994, a In its appeal, petitioner argued that (1) it had adduced the
Corporation stopped its operations. The Corporation failed to Petition, with the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, for requisite evidence to prove the solidary liability of the
pay its loan availments from the Bank inclusive of accrued Voluntary Insolvency x x x. individual respondents, and (2) it was not liable for their
interest. On February 11, 1992, the Bank sent a letter to the counterclaims for damages and attorneys fees.
xxxxxxxxx
Corporation demanding payment of its loan availments
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
inclusive of interests due. The Corporation failed to comply "Appended to the Petition was a list of its creditors, including
with the demand of the Bank. On November 23, 1992, the [petitioner], for the amount of P8,144,916.05. The Court Affirming the RTC, the appellate court ruled that the individual
Bank sent another letter to the [Corporation] demanding issued an Order, on July 12, 1994, finding the Petition respondents were not solidarily liable with the Mindanao
payment of its account which, by November 23, 1992, had sufficient in form and substance x x x. Ferroalloy Corporation, because they had acted merely as
amounted to P7,283,913.33. The Corporation again failed to officers of the corporation, which was the real party in
comply with the demand of the Bank. xxxxxxxxx
interest. Respondent Guevara was not even a signatory to the
"In view of said development, the Court issued an Order, in Promissory Note, the Trust Receipt Agreement, the Deed of
"On January 6, 1993, the Bank filed a complaint against the
Assignment or the Quedan; he was merely authorized to
Corporation with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Civil Case No. 93-038, suspending the proceedings as against
represent Minfaco to negotiate with and secure the loans from
entitled and docketed as Solidbank Corporation vs. Mindanao the Defendant Corporation but ordering the proceedings to
the bank. On the other hand, the CA noted that Respondents
Ferroalloy Corporation, Sps. Jong-Won Hong and the Sps. proceed as against the individual defendants x x x.
Cu and Hong had not signed the above documents as
Teresita R. Cu, Civil Case No. 93-038 for Sum of Money with x x x x x x x x x
comakers, but as signatories in their representative capacities
a plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. x
"On December 10, 1999, the Court rendered a Decision as officers of Minfaco.
xx
dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action of Likewise, the CA held that the individual respondents were
xxxxxxxxx [petitioner] against the Spouses Jong-Won Hong, Teresita Cu not liable to petitioner for damages, simply because (1) they
"Under its Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that it and the Spouses Ricardo Guevara, x x x. had not received the proceeds of the irrevocable Letter of
impleaded Ricardo Guevara and his wife as Defendants x x x x x x x x x Credit, which was the subject of the Deed of Assignment; and
because, [among others]: (2) the goods subject of the Trust Receipt Agreement had
"In dismissing the complaint against the individual been found to be nonexistent. The appellate court took
Defendants JONG-WON HONG and TERESITA CU, are the Vice- [respondents], the Court a quo found and declared that
judicial notice of the practice of banks and financing
Presidents of defendant corporation, and also members of the [petitioner] failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to prove the
institutions to investigate, examine and assess all properties
companys Board of Directors. They are impleaded as joint personal liability of the said [respondents] for the claims of
offered by borrowers as collaterals, in order to determine the
and solidary debtors of [petitioner] bank having signed the [petitioner] and that the latter impleaded the [respondents],
feasibility and advisability of granting loans. Before agreeing
Promissory Note, Quedan, and Trust Receipt agreements with in its complaint and amended complaint, solely to put more
to the consolidation of Minfacos loans, it presumed that
[petitioner], in this case. pressure on the Defendant Corporation to pay its obligations petitioner had done its homework.
x x x x x x x x x to [petitioner].
As to the award of damages to the individual respondents, the
"[Petitioner] likewise filed a criminal complaint x x x entitled "[Petitioner] x x x interposed an appeal, from the Decision of CA upheld the trial courts findings that it was clearly unfair
and docketed as Solidbank Corporation vs. Ricardo Guevara, the Court a quo and posed, for x x x resolution, the issue of on petitioners part to have impleaded the wives of Guevara
Teresita R. Cu and Jong Won Hong x x x for Violation of P.D. whether or not the individual [respondents], are jointly and and Hong, because the women were not privy to any of the
115. On April 14, 1993, the investigating Prosecutor issued a severally liable to [petitioner] for the loan availments of the transactions between petitioner and Minfaco. Under Articles
Resolution finding no probable cause for violation of P.D. 115 [respondent] Corporation, inclusive of accrued interests and 19, 20 and 2229 of the Civil Code, such reckless and wanton
against the Respondents as the goods covered by the quedan penalties. act of pressuring individual respondents to settle the
were nonexistent: "In the meantime, on motion of [petitioner], the Court set corporations obligations is a ground to award moral and
xxxxxxxxx aside its Order, dated February 2, 1995, suspending the exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.
proceedings as against the [respondent] Corporation. Hence this Petition.6
"In their Answer to the complaint [in the civil case], the [Petitioner] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against the
Spouses Jong-Won Hong and Soo-ok Kim Hong alleged, inter [respondent] Corporation. On February 28, 2000, the Court Issues
alia, that [petitioner] had no cause of action against them as: rendered a Summary Judgment against the [respondent] In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
Corporation, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
x x x the clean loan of P5.1 M obtained was a corporate
"A. Whether or not there is ample evidence on record to
undertaking of defendant MINFACO executed through its duly WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby
support the joint and solidary liability of individual
authorized representatives, Ms. Teresita R. Cu and Mr. Jong- resolves to give due course to the motion for summary
respondents with Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation.
Won Hong, both Vice Presidents then of MINFACO. x x x. judgment filed by herein [petitioner]. Consequently, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of [Petitioner] SOLIDBANK "B. In the absence of joint and solidary liability[,] will the
xxxxxxxxx
CORPORATION and against [Respondent] MINDANAO provision of Article 1208 in relation to Article 1207 of the New
"[On their part, respondents] Teresita Cu and Ricardo Guevara FERROALLOY CORPORATION, ordering the latter to pay the Civil Code providing for joint liability be applicable to the case
alleged that [petitioner] had no cause of action against them former the amount of P7,086,686.70, representing the at bar.
because: (a) Ricardo Guevara did not sign any of the outstanding balance of the subject loan as of 24 September
"C. May bank practices be the proper subject of judicial notice
documents in favor of [petitioner]; (b) Teresita Cu signed the 1994, plus stipulated interest at the rate of 16% per annum to
under Sec. 1 [of] Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Promissory Note, Deed of Assignment, Trust Receipt and be computed from the aforesaid date until fully paid together
Quedan in blank and merely as representative and, hence, with an amount equivalent to 12% of the total amount due "D. Whether or not there is evidence to sustain the claim that
for and in behalf of the Defendant Corporation and, hence, each year from 24 September 1994 until fully paid. Lastly, respondents were impleaded to apply pressure upon them to
was not personally liable to [petitioner]. said [respondent] is hereby ordered to pay [petitioner] the pay the obligations in lieu of MINFACO that is declared
amount of P25,000.00 to [petitioner] as reasonable attorneys insolvent.
fees as well as cost of litigation."5

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 49 of 63

"E. Whether or not there are sufficient bases for the award of "Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer Furthermore, nothing supports the alleged joint liability of the
various kinds of and substantial amounts in damages along (although not necessarily) with the corporation may so individual petitioners because, as correctly pointed out by the
including payment for attorneys fees. validly attach, as a rule, only when two lower courts, the evidence shows that there is only one
debtor: the corporation. In a joint obligation, there must be at
"F. Whether or not respondents committed fraud and 1. He assents (a) to a patently unlawful act of the
least two debtors, each of whom is liable only for a
misrepresentations and acted in bad faith. corporation, or (b) for bad faith or gross negligence in
proportionate part of the debt; and the creditor is entitled
directing its affairs, or (c) for conflict of interest, resulting in
"G. Whether or not the inclusion of respondents spouses is only to a proportionate part of the credit. 15
damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other
proper under certain circumstances and supported by
persons; Moreover, it is rather late in the day to raise the alleged joint
prevailing jurisprudence."7
liability, as this matter has not been pleaded before the trial
2. He consents to the issuance of watered stocks or who,
In sum, there are two main questions: (1) whether the and the appellate courts. Before the lower courts, petitioner
having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the
individual respondents are liable, either jointly or solidarily, anchored its claim solely on the alleged joint and several (or
corporate secretary his written objection thereto;
with the Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation; and (2) whether solidary) liability of the individual respondents. Petitioner
the award of damages to the individual respondents is valid 3. He agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable must be reminded that an issue cannot be raised for the first
and legal. with the corporation; or time on appeal, but seasonably in the proceedings before the
trial court.16
The Courts Ruling 4. He is made, by a specific provision of law, to personally
answer for his corporate action." So too, the Promissory Note in question is a negotiable
The Petition is partly meritorious. instrument. Under Section 19 of the Negotiable Instruments
Consistent with the foregoing principles, we sustain the CAs Law, agents or representatives may sign for the principal.
First Issue:
ruling that Respondent Guevara was not personally liable for Their authority may be established, as in other cases of
Liability of Individual Respondents the contracts. First, it is beyond cavil that he was duly agency. Section 20 of the law provides that a person signing
authorized to act on behalf of the corporation; and that in
Petitioner argues that the individual respondents were jointly negotiating the loans with petitioner, he did so in his official "for and on behalf of a [disclosed] principal or in a
or solidarily liable with Minfaco, either because their capacity. Second, no sufficient and specific evidence was representative capacity x x x is not liable on the instrument if
participation in the loan contract and the loan documents presented to show that he had acted in bad faith or gross he was duly authorized."
made them comakers; or because they committed fraud and negligence in that negotiation. Third, he did not hold himself The authority of Respondents Cu and Hong to sign for and on
deception, which justifies the piercing of the corporate veil. personally and solidarily liable with the corporation. Neither is behalf of the corporation has been amply established by the
The first contention hinges on certain factual determinations there any specific provision of law making him personally Resolution of Minfacos Board of Directors, stating that "Atty.
made by the trial and the appellate courts. These tribunals answerable for the subject corporate acts. Ricardo P. Guevara (President and Chairman), or Ms. Teresita
found that, although he had not signed any document in On the other hand, Respondents Cu and Hong signed the R. Cu (Vice President), acting together with Mr. Jong Won
connection with the subject transaction, Respondent Guevara Promissory Note without the word "by" preceding their Hong (Vice President), be as they are hereby authorized for
was authorized to represent Minfaco in negotiating for a P30 signatures, atop the designation "Maker/Borrower" and the and in behalf of the Corporation to: 1. Negotiate with and
million loan from petitioner. As to Cu and Hong, it was printed name of the corporation, as follows: obtain from (petitioner) the extension of an omnibus line in
determined, among others, that their signatures on the loan the aggregate of P30 million x x x; and 2. Execute and deliver
documents other than the Deed of Assignment were not __(Sgd) Cu/Hong__ all documentation necessary to implement all of the
prefaced with the word "by," and that there were no other foregoing."17
(Maker/Borrower)
signatures to indicate who had signed for and on behalf of Further, the agreement involved here is a "contract of
Minfaco, the principal borrower. In the Promissory Note, they MINDANAO FERROALLOY adhesion," which was prepared entirely by one party and
signed above the printed name of the corporation -- on the
While their signatures appear without qualification, the offered to the other on a "take it or leave it" basis. Following
space provided for "Maker/Borrower," not on that provided for
inference that they signed in their individual capacities is the general rule, the contract must be read18against petitioner,
"Co-maker."
negated by the following facts: 1) the name and the address because it was the party that prepared it, more so because
Petitioner has not shown any exceptional circumstance that of the corporation appeared on the space provided for a bank is19held to high standards of care in the conduct of its
sanctions the disregard of these findings of fact, which are "Maker/Borrower"; 2) Respondents Cu and Hong had only one business.
thus deemed final and conclusive upon this Court and may set of signatures on the instrument, when there should have In the totality of the circumstances, we hold that Respondents
not be reviewed on appeal.8 been two, if indeed they had intended to be bound solidarily -- Cu and Hong clearly signed the Note merely as
the first as representatives of the corporation, and the second representatives of Minfaco.
No Personal Liability for Corporate Deeds
as themselves in their individual capacities; 3) they did not
Basic is the principle that a corporation is vested by law with sign under the spaces provided for "Co-maker," and neither No Reason to Pierce the Corporate Veil
a personality separate and distinct from that of each person were their addresses reflected there; and 4) at the back of the Under certain circumstances, courts may treat a corporation
composing9 or representing it.10 Equally fundamental is the Promissory Note, they signed above the words "Authorized as a mere aggroupment of persons, to whom liability will
general rule that corporate officers cannot be held personally Representative." directly attach. The distinct and separate corporate
liable for the consequences of their acts, for as long as these personality may be disregarded, inter alia, when the
Solidary Liability Not Lightly Inferred
are for and on behalf of the corporation, within the scope of corporate identity is used to defeat public convenience, justify
their authority and in good faith.11 The separate corporate Moreover, it is axiomatic that solidary liability cannot be a wrong, protect a fraud, or defend a crime. Likewise, the
personality is a shield against the personal liability of lightly inferred.14 Under Article 1207 of the Civil Code, "there corporate veil may be pierced when the corporation acts as a
corporate officers, whose acts are properly attributed to the is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or when it is
corporation.12 states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation so organized and controlled and its affairs so conducted as to
requires solidarity." Since solidary liability is not clearly make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct
Tramat Mercantile v. Court of Appeals 13 held thus:
expressed in the Promissory Note and is not required by law of another corporation.20 But to disregard the separate
or the nature of the obligation in this case, no conclusion of
solidary liability can be made.

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 50 of 63

juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be Judicial Notice of Bank Practices the presumption of law on the side of good faith, and in the
clearly and convincingly established; it cannot be presumed. 21 absence of adequate proof of malice, we find that petitioner
This point brings us to the alleged error of the appellate court
impleaded the spouses because it honestly believed that the
Petitioner contends that the corporation was used to protect in taking judicial notice of the practice of banks in conducting
conjugal partnerships had benefited from the proceeds of the
the fraud foisted upon it by the individual respondents. It background checks on borrowers and sureties. While a court
loan, as stated in their Complaint and subsequent pleadings.
argues that the CA failed to consider the following badges of is not mandated to take judicial notice of this practice under
Its act does not amount to evident bad faith or malice; hence,
fraud and evident bad faith: 1) the individual respondents Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it nevertheless
an award for damages is not proper. The adverse result of an
misrepresented the corporation as solvent and financially may do so under Section 2 of the same Rule. The latter Rule
act per se neither makes the act wrongful nor subjects the
capable of paying its loan; 2) they knew that prices of provides that a court, in its discretion, may take judicial notice
actor to the payment of damages, because the law could not
ferrosilicon were declining in the world market when they of "matters which are of public knowledge, or ought to be
have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. 40
secured the loan in June 1991; 3) not a single centavo was known to judges because of their judicial functions."
paid for the loan; and 4) the corporation suspended its For the same reason, attorneys fees cannot be granted.
Thus, the Court has taken judicial notice of the practices of
operations shortly after the loan was granted. 22 Article 2208 of the Civil Code states that in the absence of a
banks and other financial institutions. Precisely, it has noted
stipulation, attorneys fees cannot be recovered, except in
Fraud refers to all kinds of deception -- whether through that it is their uniform practice, before approving a loan, to
any of the following circumstances:
insidious machination, manipulation, concealment or investigate, examine and assess would-be borrowers credit
misrepresentation -- that would lead an ordinarily prudent standing or real estate32 offered as security for the loan "(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
person into error after taking the circumstances into applied for.
"(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the
account.23 In contracts, a fraud known as dolo causante or
Second Issue: plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
causal fraud24 is basically a deception used by one party prior
protect his interest;
to or simultaneous with the contract, in order to secure the Award of Damages
consent of the other.25 Needless to say, the deceit employed "(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
must be serious. In contradistinction, only some particular or The individual respondents were awarded moral and
plaintiff;
accident of the obligation is referred to by incidental fraud exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees under Articles
or dolo incidente,26 or that which is not serious in character 19 to 21 of the Civil Code, on the basic premise that the suit "(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding
and without which the other party would have entered into was clearly malicious and intended merely to harass. against the plaintiff;
the contract anyway.27 Article 19 of the Civil Code expresses the fundamental "(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith
Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence; principle of law on human conduct that a person "must, in the in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and
mere preponderance of evidence is not adequate. 28 Bad faith, exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act demandable claim;
on the other hand, imports a dishonest purpose or some with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and "(6) In actions for legal support;
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, not simply good faith." Under this basic postulate, the exercise of a right,
bad judgment or negligence.29 It is synonymous with fraud, in though legal by itself, must nonetheless be done in "(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers,
that it involves a design to mislead or deceive another. 30 accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised laborers and skilled workers;
arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to
Unfortunately, petitioner was unable to establish clearly and another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer "(8) In actions for indemnity under workmens compensation
precisely how the alleged fraud was committed. It failed to must be held responsible.33 and employers liability laws;
establish that it was deceived into granting the loans because "(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising
of respondents misrepresentations and/or insidious actions. To be liable under the abuse-of-rights principle, three from a crime;
Quite the contrary, circumstances indicate the weakness of its elements must concur: a) a legal right or duty, b) its exercise
submission. in bad faith, and c) the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring "(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
another.34 Needless to say, absence of good faith 35 must be
First, petitioner does not deny that the P5 million loan sufficiently established. "(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
represented the consolidation of two loans,31 granted long equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
before the bank required the individual respondents to Article 20 makes "[e]very person who, contrary to law, should be recovered."
execute the Promissory Note, Trust Receipt Agreement, willfully or negligently causes damage to another" liable for In the instant case, none of the enumerated grounds for
Quedan or Deed of Assignment. Hence, no words, acts or damages. Upon the other hand, held liable for damages under recovery of attorneys fees are present.
machinations arising from any of those instruments could Article 21 is one who "willfully causes loss or injury to another
have been used by them prior to or simultaneous with the in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or WHEREFORE, this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
execution of the contract, or even as some accident or public policy." assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but the award of moral and
particular of the obligation. For damages to be properly awarded under the above exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees is DELETED. No
Second, petitioner bank was in a position to verify for itself provisions, it is necessary to demonstrate by clear and costs.
36
the solvency and trustworthiness of respondent corporation. convincing evidence that the action instituted by petitioner SO ORDERED.
In fact, ordinary business prudence required it to do so before was clearly so unfounded and37
untenable as to amount to
granting the multimillion loans. It is of common knowledge gross and evident bad faith. To justify an award of damages
that, as a matter of practice, banks conduct exhaustive for malicious prosecution, one must prove two elements: G.R. No. 159467 December 9, 2005
investigations of the financial standing of an applicant debtor, malice or sinister design to vex or humiliate and want of
as well as appraisals of collaterals offered as securities for probable cause.
38
SPOUSES NORA SAGUID and ROLANDO P.
loans to ensure their prompt and satisfactory payment. To Petitioner was proven wrong in impleading Spouses Guevara SAGUID, Petitioners, vs. SECURITY FINANCE,
uphold petitioners cry of fraud when it failed to verify the and Hong. Beyond that fact, however, respondents have not INC., Respondent.
existence of the goods covered by the Trust Receipt established that the suit was so patently malicious as to D E C I S I O N
Agreement and the Quedan is to condone its negligence. warrant the award of damages under the Civil Codes Articles
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
19 to 21, which are grounded on malice or bad faith. 39 With

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 51 of 63

Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68129 dated 31 January
2003 reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 98-1803, dated
07 July 2000, ordering respondent Security Finance, Inc. to
pay petitioner Spouses Nora and Rolando Saguid the daily
earnings of the seized motor vehicle as well as damages,
attorneys fees and costs of suit, and its Resolution 2 dated 10
June 2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On 30 July 1998, respondent filed a case for Recovery of
Possession with Replevin with Alternative Prayer for Sum of
Money and Damages against petitioners and one John Doe in
whose possession and custody the mortgaged property may
be found.3 It alleged that petitioners, for value, jointly and
severally executed in its favor a Promissory Note 4 in the
amount of P508,248.00, payable in monthly installments per
schedule indicated therein. To secure payment of the
Promissory Note, petitioners executed a Chattel
Mortgage5 over a motor vehicle particularly described as
follows:
MAKE : TOYOTA COROLLA XL
MODEL : 1996
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
Respondent alleged that petitioners defaulted in complying
with the terms and conditions of the Promissory Note and
Chattel Mortgage by failing to pay several monthly
installments on the Promissory Note. As provided for in the
Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage, the failure of the
petitioners to pay any installment when due shall make the
entire balance of the obligation immediately due and payable.
The total obligation of petitioners amounted to P756,634.64
as of 15 May 1998.6
Despite demand7 for payment or the surrender, if in good
order and condition, of the mortgaged motor vehicle,
petitioners failed and refused to comply with the demand.
Thus, respondent was constrained to file the instant case
praying that (1) a Writ of Replevin be issued ordering the
seizure of the afore-described vehicle, complete with all its
accessories, and that same be delivered to it; or (2) in the
event that manual delivery thereof cannot be effected, order
the petitioners to pay the amount of P756,634.64 exclusive of
accruing interest and penalty charges thereon at the rate of
five percent (5%) per month until fully paid. In either case, to
order petitioners to pay respondent the amount
of P189,158.66 as and for attorneys fees, replevin bond The plaintiff presented two (2) witnesses: 1] Rosauro G. and that he will help him secure one. Rolando was able to
premium and other expenses incurred in the seizure of the
motor vehicle, and costs of suit.
On 03 August 1998, the Hon. Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding 37 years of age, married, an employee of the plaintiff, and a asked to sign documents in blank. The name of the plaintiff
Judge, Branch 135, RTC, Makati City, issued an Order directing resident of 263 Santo Cristo Street, Angat, Bulacan.
the branch sheriff to seize the aforementioned vehicle upon
filing of a bond in the amount of P1,513,270.00 which is It can be culled from plaintiffs evidence that an application to sign and that he will take care of everything. Nora did not
double the value of the property to be seized, and to take it [Exhibit A] for a loan to finance the purchases [of] a new car sign the documents because at that time she was in Australia.
into his custody upon further orders from the court. 8
Upon being informed by respondent in a Motion for Marketing Assistant of the plaintiff. The application was
Clarification9 that the reasonable estimated value of the evaluated and investigated and was approved. The
vehicle involved is P150,000.00, the RTC lowered the Replevin Promissory Note No. 96-01447 dated April 23, 1996 [Exhibit
Bond to be filed to P300,000.0010 which respondent filed on B] and the Chattel Mortgage Contract dated September 3,
12 August 1998. 1996 [Exhibit D] were signed. Submitted to the plaintiff were
postdated checks [Exhibits E, E-1 to E-12]. When deposited
On 12 October 1998, the RTC issued a Writ of Seizure ordering
these checks were dishonored for the reason that the account
the Branch Sheriff to seize the vehicle, to keep it in his
was already closed. The dishonored checks were replaced
possession for five (5) days, and then to deliver it to
with P27,137.67 cash for which O.R. No. 12467 dated June 27,
respondent.11
1996 [Exhibit F]. After the payment made on June 27, 1996,
On 13 October 1998, after service upon petitioners of the the checks that subsequently bounced were not replaced. The
copy of the summons with the complaint and annexes, case was referred to counsel for collection. A demand letter
affidavit, writ of seizure and bond, the vehicle subject of this was delivered by witness Placido to the residence of the
case was repossessed by the sheriff upon issuance of the defendants. There being no response from the defendants
corresponding receipt. On 20 October 1998, the vehicle was this case was filed against them. Placido conducted a
delivered to respondent.12 surveillance of the place where the vehicle could possibly be
found. He accompanied the sheriff in implementing the writ of
13
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioners seizure. After seizure of the vehicle it was stowed at the
specifically denied the allegations in the Complaint. They warehouse of plaintiff in Las Pinas.
maintained they, whether individually or as spouses, did not
and never executed a Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage On cross-examination of Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., Assistant
in favor of respondent. They claimed they bought the car Vice-President for Marketing of the plaintiff, it was established
subject of the case in cash as evidenced by the Vehicle Sales that the mortgage of subject motor vehicle was not registered
Invoice14 of Toyota Balintawak, Inc. dated 15 March 1996. with the LTO because the dealer did not submit to plaintiff the
Petitioner Nora Saguid alleged that she could not have certificate of registration. In transactions of this nature, loan
physically executed the Promissory Note on 23 April 1996 as applicants are required to submit the original certificate of
she was in Australia when the same was supposedly registration and the official receipt. The dealer, Toyota
executed. On the part of petitioner Rolando Saguid, he Balintawak, did not send to the plaintiff these documents. 16
admitted that he signed the promissory note in preparation
Evidence of the Respondent:
for an application for loan upon the request of one Sonny
Quijano who promised to facilitate the same for the purchase Defendants testified for and in their behalf. Zenaida
of another motor vehicle to be converted into a taxicab, but Marquinez Maralit, 33 years of age, single, a resident of Orlon
not with respondent. As compulsory counterclaim, they ask Street, Litex Village, San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal, and the Credit
that respondent be ordered to pay moral, exemplary and and Collection Head of Toyota Balintawak testified for the
actual damages, as well as attorneys fees and costs of suit. defendants. Defendant Rolando bought in cash the subject
motor vehicle from Toyota Balintawak. He was issued Vehicle
After pre-trial, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order containing the
Delivery Invoice No. 7104 [Exhibit1] and Vehicle Delivery Note
following stipulation of facts:
No. 7104 [Exhibit 2]. The same vehicle was registered [Exhibit
1. The personal and corporate personalities of the parties; 3]. He identified his signatures in the promissory note [Exhibit
B] and in the chattel mortgage [Exhibit D]. He was asked by
2. That the promissory note dated April 23, 1996 in the one Sonny Quijano to sign these documents in blank on the
amount of P508,248.00 in favor of plaintiff was signed by representation of the latter that he will help him secure
defendant Rolando Saguid; and additional capital to enable him to purchase another taxi.
3. That the chattel mortgage was signed by defendant Rolando met for the first time Sonny Quijano sometime in
Rolando Saguid; . . .15 January 1996 at Toyota Quezon Avenue. Rolando was then
Trial ensued. The respective evidence of the parties are planning to purchase two units of taxi colored white. But at
that time there was only one available unit at Toyota Quezon
substantially summarized in the decision of the RTC.
Avenue. Quijano approached Rolando informing him that
Evidence of the Petitioners: there are units colored white available at Toyota Balintawak
Maghirang, Jr., 43 years of age, married, Assistant Vice- secure one. In the month of May, Quijano went to the house
President for Marketing of the plaintiff, and a resident of No. of defendants and asked Rolando if he is still interested in
140 J. Molina Street, Marikina City; and 2] Antonio B. Placido, getting additional capital to purchase a taxi. Rolando was
does not appear in these documents. When Rolando asked
Quijano why the documents are in blank, Quijano told him just
was filed with the plaintiff. The application was not signed by Rolando do (sic) not know what happened to the documents
any of the defendants. The signature appearing on the he signed. He read from the papers that Quijano was shot. He
application [Exhibit A] belongs to one David Garcia, a denied the issuance of the checks [Exhibits E, E-1 to E-12].
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 52 of 63
Defendants received a letter [Exhibit 8] dated February 21, On 31 January 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the SIGNED THE DOCUMENTS WAS MERELY IN PREPARATION FOR
1997 from De Castro Law Office. Rolando went to this Law assailed decision. It reversed and set aside the decision of the A LOAN APPLICATION PRESENTED TO HIM BY THE LATE SONNY
Office and presented his documents evidencing payment of RTC and ruled in favor of respondent. It disposed of the case QUIJANO, A CAR SALES AGENT.
the subject motor vehicle. He was told by Atty. De Castro that as follows:
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
everything is okay and that he will take care of everything.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
On October 28, 1998 at about 7:00 in the morning two [2] the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and PROMISSORY NOTE AND THE DEED OF MORTGAGE ARE NOT
units of taxi including subject motor vehicle were seized by another one is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant. VALID AND NOT BINDING ON THE PETITIONERS CONSIDERING
the sheriff assisted by three [3] SWAT members. The Costs against the defendants-appellees.20 PETITIONER ROLANDO SAGUIDS EXPLANATION REGARDING
boundary of the subject motor vehicle, which is a taxi, is HIS ADMISSION AND THE SOLID AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE
The Court of Appeals found the ruling of the trial court that
P750.00 for every 24 hours. From October 28, 1998 to THAT PETITIONER WIFE WAS NOT IN THE PHILIPPINES AT THE
there was no valid contract entered into between the parties
October 1999 defendants lost P180,000 in income. TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE SAID DOCUMENTS BUT WAS
on the ground there was no cause or consideration when they
Defendants retained the services of counsel for P100,000 plus IN AUSTRALIA.
executed the same, and that respondent failed to show with
P1,500 per appearance. With this incident on October 28,
convincing evidence that it loaned the money to petitioners III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
1998, Rolando was embarrassed in front of his neighbors. For
which was used to purchase the subject motor vehicle, to be GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE
his sufferings Rolando is praying for P1 Million in damages
bereft of factual and legal basis. It relied heavily on the WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR
plus P3 Million in exemplary damages.
admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid during pre-trial and CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT AND ORDERED PETITIONER TO
Witness Maralit corroborated that testimony of Rolando that during his direct-examination that he signed the promissory DELIVER THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLE TO RESPONDENT AND
the subject motor vehicle was purchased in cash and not note dated 23 April 1996 and the chattel mortgage dated 03 TO PAY RESPONDENT THE AMOUNT OF P508,248.00 PLUS
through financing. Had subject vehicle been purchased September 1996. It did not give weight to petitioners bare INTEREST AND PENALTY CHARGES IN CASE MANUAL DELIVERY
through financing the original Certificate of Registration and denial that they never transacted with respondent for the OF THE VEHICLE WAS NOT FEASIBLE, OVERLOOKING THE
Certificate of Registration would have been transmitted to the subject loan and that they never executed the promissory FACT THAT THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLE WAS ALREADY
financing company marked by the LTO "encumbered". This did note and the deed of chattel mortgage because it belied the FORCIBLY CONFISCATED AND SEIZED BY THE SHERIFF BY
not happen in this case. Security Finance, the plaintiff in this admission made by petitioner Rolando Saguid. VIRTUE OF THE WRIT OF SEIZURE ISSUED BY THE TRIAL
case was not accredited by Toyota Balintawak not even in one COURT AND DULY ACKNOWLEDGED TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 21 dated 24
transaction. The appearance in both Exhibits 1 and 2 of "SPQ BY THE SHERIFF FROM THE PETITIONERS.
February 2003 while respondent filed a Motion for
Center/Nora Saguid" as purchaser of the subject motor
Clarificatory Judgment22 dated 17 February 2003. Respondent would like to impress on the Court that there is a
vehicle was satisfactorily explained by witness Maralit. The
valid Contract of Loan between it and petitioners, and that
subject motor vehicle was initially reserved by SPQ Center but In a resolution dated 10 June 2003, the Court of Appeals
the proceeds of the loan were used to buy the vehicle
later on it waived its right in favor of Nora. It is for this reason denied the Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Motion
involved in this case. In support thereof, it offered, among
that "SPQ Center/Nora Saguid" appears as the purchaser of for Clarificatory Judgment. It amended the dispostive portion
other things, a Promissory Note 24 dated 23 April 1996 and
the vehicle.17 of its 31 January 2003 decision as follows:
Chattel Mortgage25 dated 03 September 1996 over the
In its decision18 dated 07 July 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of subject vehicle which served as security for the payment of
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads: the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the amount indicated in the former. On the other hand,
another one is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant petitioners contend that they neither entered into any
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiff
ordering the defendants-appellees: contract with respondent nor did they receive any money
SECURITY FINANCE, INCORPORATED to pay defendant-
from it that was used to buy the subject car. Though
spouses ROLANDO and NORA SAGUID: 1) To deliver to the plaintiff-appellant the motor vehicle petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted that the signatures in the
described as follows: Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage are his, he clarified
1. The total amount of the daily earnings of the seized motor
vehicle computed from the date of its seizure on October 28, MAKE : Toyota Corolla XL that when he signed said documents upon the prodding of
1998 up to its return to the defendants, at the rate of P750.00 Sonny Quijano, he signed them in blank. Petitioner Nora
daily; MODEL : 1996 Saguid, on her part, denied signing said documents. She
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512 claimed that the signatures purporting to be hers are
2. The amount of P500,000 for moral damages; forgeries since she was in Australia when said documents
3. The amount of P1,000,000 for exemplary damages; SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787 were executed.

4. The amount P200,000 for and as attorneys fees; and
5. The Costs.
In reaching its verdict, the RTC ruled that the promissory note
and the deed of mortgage were not valid contracts and were
not binding on petitioners. It explained that respondent failed
to show with convincing evidence that it loaned to petitioners
the money used in the purchase of the subject motor vehicle.
On the contrary, it found that there was preponderance of
evidence showing that the motor vehicle was purchased in
cash by petitioners from Toyota Balintawak, Inc.
Respondent appealed the decision to the Court of INTO A TRANSACTION WITH RESPONDENT CONCERNING THE basic and elementary in this jurisdiction that what determines
Appeals via a Notice of Appeal.19
2) In the event the manual delivery of the above-described Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in
motor vehicle is not feasible, to pay the plaintiff appellant the holding that they entered into a transaction with respondent
amount of P508,248.00 plus interest and penalty charges at based on the promissory note and chattel mortgage despite
the legal rate per annum until fully paid, in line with the petitioner Rolando Saguids explanation of the circumstances
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Medel vs. Court surrounding his signing thereof, and in not holding that these
of Appeals, 299 SCRA 481; and documents are not valid and binding on them.
3) To pay the costs of suit.23 To ascertain whether or not petitioners are bound by the
promissory note and chattel mortgage, it must be established
Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
that all the elements of a contract of loan are present. Like
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE any other contract, a contract of loan is governed by the rules
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ENTERED as to the requisites and validity of contracts in general. It is
SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLE BASED ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE the validity of a contract, in general, is the presence of the
AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT elements constituting the same, namely: (1) consent of the
PETITIONER ROLANDO SAGUIDS ADMISSION OF HAVING

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 53 of 63

contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject The Court of Appeals should have ruled on the same it being Q: By the way, being the head of the Credit and Collection,
matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which the primal defense of petitioners. It should not have wholly what are your duties and functions?
is established.26 In this case, petitioners insist the third disregarded the qualification made by petitioner Rolando
A: We are in-charge of collection, we are in-charge of the
element is lacking since they never transacted with Saguid considering that said defense can easily be supported
documentation with LTO, insurance and financing documents.
respondent for the proceeds of the loan which were used in by other competent evidence. Instead of relying heavily on
purchasing the subject motor vehicle. the admitted signatures, it should have evaluated other Q: As far as the purchase of vehicle through financing, what is
evidence that could have either bolstered or disproved the your specific duty?
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners transacted with
defense of petitioners.
respondent and are bound by the promissory note and chattel A: We are the one who asked the client to sign the
mortgage they signed. It anchored its ruling on the admission This did not happen in this case. The Court of Appeals documents.
of petitioner Rolando Saguid that he signed said documents. conveniently did not mention in its decision the testimony of
Citing Section 4, Rule 12927 of the Rules of Court, it reasoned Zenaida M. Maralit, an employee of Toyota Balintawak, Inc., Q: Will you tell the Honorable Court what is the procedure in
out that petitioner Rolando Saguids bare denial cannot who testified as to the circumstances on how the subject car case the vehicle is purchased from your office through
qualify the admission he made during pre-trial and during trial was bought, and the documentary evidence that originated financing?
that they transacted with respondent and executed the from Toyota Balintawak, Inc. We consider her to be an A: After the client signed the documents, we get all the
aforesaid documents. It brushed aside the explanation made impartial witness whose testimony is vital in the proper requirements based on the credit advice issued by the
by petitioner Rolando Saguid that he signed the same in blank resolution of this case. financing company. So together with the documents and all
and only as preparation for a loan application presented to the requirements, valid ID, post dated checks, we are the one
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
him by Sonny Quijano. transmitting them to the financing company and after
reversing the ruling of the trial court that the promissory note
From the record, it is clear that what petitioner Rolando and the deed of chattel mortgage are not valid contracts and processing, the financing company gave us the proceed two
Saguid admitted was only his signatures in the are not binding on them on the ground that the contracts did to four days after the release of the vehicle.
aforementioned documents and not the contents thereof. In not contain the essential element of cause. The Court of Q: As far as the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt
petitioners Answer, Rolando Saguid admitted signing the Appeals said the trial court did not clearly declare in are concerned, what did you do with them if the vehicle was
promissory note in preparation for an application for loan categorical terms the absence of cause in the aforesaid purchased through financing?
upon the request of Sonny Quijano who promised to facilitate contracts and that petitioners failed to disprove that they are
the same for the purchase of another motor vehicle to be debtors of respondent since it is presumed that the cause A: If it was through financing, the original Official Receipt and
converted into a taxicab, but not with respondent. During exists in the contract. Certificate of Registration goes to the financing company. We
trial, Rolando Saguid explained the circumstances under are the one transmitting them. Only the xerox copies of the
Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration go to the client
which he signed the documents with emphasis that he signed
consideration28 exists and is lawful unless the debtor proves through financing transaction.
them in blank.
the contrary.29 Moreover, under Section 3(r) of Rule 131 of the
We find that the Court of Appeals committed an error when it Rules of Court, it is presumed that there is a sufficient Q: As far as the security of the financing company, when it
closed its eyes to the clarification made by petitioner Rolando consideration for a contract. The presumption that a contract comes to purchase of vehicle through financing, what do you
Saguid on the ground that same belied his admission. The has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere do with the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration?
rule that an admission cannot be contradicted unless it can assertion that it has no consideration. 30 To overcome the A: The LTO marked there encumbered. It means it was
be shown that it was made through palpable mistake or that presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of mortgaged to that particular financing company.
no such admission was made will not apply under the consideration must be shown by preponderance of
circumstances obtaining in this case. It does not follow that evidence.31 Q: Where it was marked?
the admission of the signatures carries with it the admission A: At the Certificate of Registration, it was marked
In proving that there is no consideration for the
of the contents of the documents especially when the person encumbered.
aforementioned documents, petitioners proffered in evidence
who affixed his signatures thereon questions its execution and
the following documents that showed that they bought the Q: On the face?
the veracity of the details embodied therein. Petitioners could
subject vehicle in cash and not in installment basis: (a)
have been bound by the terms and conditions of the
Vehicle Sales Invoice No. 7104; 32 (b) Vehicle Delivery A: On the face.
promissory note and chattel mortgage if petitioner Rolando
Note;33 (c) Official Receipts No. 20864634 and No.
Saguid admitted not only his signatures but also as to what Q: Do you have any policy as far as your company is
208648;35 (d) Certificate of Registration No. 32862328; 36 and
are contained therein. This is not to be in the case before us. 37 concerned with regards to the purchase of vehicle through
(e) Official Receipt No. 40459605. In addition, Ms. Zenaida
Petitioners can therefore adduce evidence that would nullify financing?
Maralit of Toyota Balintawak, Inc. confirmed that the subject
or invalidate both the promissory note and the chattel
car was indeed paid in cash and not through financing for the A: We have only the accredited financing companies.
mortgage. In other words, they can show that the elements of
reasons that the originals of the Certificate of Registration
the contract of loan are wanting. Q: Is the plaintiff herein, Security Finance, accredited in your
and the Official Receipt of the subject vehicle have not been
The Court of Appeals held that it was not in a proper position marked as encumbered by the Land Transportation Office and company?
to entangle itself in resolving the matter as regards the are in the possession of the buyer. She added that respondent A: No, not even in one transaction.
qualification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on his is not accredited in Toyota Balintawak, Inc. She testified:
admission because whatever the documents he signed in Q: What would be the significance if the original copy of the
Q: Madam Witness, do you know if this vehicle was purchased Certificate of Registration and the corresponding Official
favor of Mr. Quijano is not the concern of the court as the
in cash or through financing? Receipt is in the possession of the buyer?
same is not one of the issues presented before it, and that Mr.
Quijano is not a party in the case. Petitioners claim that if only A: It was purchased in cash. A: That means it was on cash transaction.38
the Court of Appeals ruled on the matter, it could have ruled
in their favor and sustained the decision of the trial court. Q: What proof do you have to show that it was purchased in On the other hand, respondent, through Rosauro G.
cash? Maghirang, Jr., Vice-President for Marketing, said that it paid
A: There was an invoice cash return.

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 54 of 63

the dealer in checks and that they have proof of payment. He longer be delivered in the condition when it was seized, the possession of the subject vehicle to petitioners, or, in the
testified: respondent shall pay petitioners the amount alternative if such delivery can no longer be made, to pay
of P150,000.0045 plus interest of 6% per annum to be petitioners the amount of P150,000.00 plus interest of 6% per
Q: Mr. witness, you said you paid the dealer. In what form did
computed from 13 October 1998, 46 the date when said vehicle annum to be computed from 13 October 1998 until finality of
you pay the dealer?
was seized, until finality of judgment after which interest rate judgment after which interest rate shall become 12% per
A: In checks, sir. shall become 12% per annum until actual payment. annum until actual payment. Respondent is also ordered to
pay petitioners P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as
Q: Do you have any proof of your payment? We now go to the award of damages.
exemplary damages and P20,000.00 by way of attorneys
A: Yes, sir. 39 It is well-settled that actual or compensatory damages must fees.
be proved and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A
It is thus clear that the subject car was bought in cash and party is entitled only up to such compensation for the No pronouncement as to costs.
not through financing via respondent. We find the evidence pecuniary loss that he has duly proven. 47 It cannot be SO ORDERED.
presented by respondent to be unreliable and erratic. The presumed.48 Absent proof of the amount of actual damages
testimony of Rosauro Maghirang, Jr. that respondent paid sustained, the Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures,
Toyota Balintawak, Inc. is simply unsubstantiated by or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but
G.R. NO. 148273 April 19, 2006
competent evidence. If respondent truly paid the dealer how must depend upon competent proof that they have been
come it never presented the checks it used to pay Toyota suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable MILAGROS SIMON and LIBORIO
Balintawak, Inc.? Even assuming arguendo that respondent evidence of the actual amount thereof.49 BALATICO, Petitioners, vs. GUIA W. CANLAS, Respondent.
released the loan proceeds to petitioners, the same would be
DECISION
inconsistent with its allegation that it was the one that paid In the instant case, the trial court awarded as actual damages
the dealer. Furthermore, another telltale sign that strengthens the amount of P750.00 per day as daily earnings of the seized AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
the claim of petitioners that they did not transact with vehicle from 28 October 1998 until its return. Same should be
respondent for a loan was the fact that the alleged loan/credit deleted for lack of competent proof. The bare assertion of Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
application40 was not signed by any or both of them. petitioner Rolando Saguid that the subject vehicle was Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 23, 2001 in
earning P750.00 a day before it was seized is inadequate, if CA-G.R. CV No. 62789 which affirmed the Decision of the
Respondents contention that petitioners did not deny not speculative, and should not be accepted because it is not Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Tarlac City dated July
drawing postdated checks in its favor is untenable. Petitioner supported by independent evidence. Petitioners should have 31, 1998 in Civil Case No. 7384.
Rolando Saguid categorically denied issuing the check and at least presented a record or journal that would clearly show
claimed that the signatures appearing thereon were not his. 41 how much the vehicle earned in a specific period. This, The factual background of the case is as follows:

As to the alleged signature of petitioner Nora Saguid in the petitioners failed to do. Instead, they relied on mere On February 11, 1991, Edgar H. Canlas (Edgar) filed a
promissory note, evidence points that she could not have allegations that do not prove anything. complaint for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage
signed the document she being in Australia when she Petitioners are entitled to moral damages having suffered against Milagros Simon (Milagros) and her husband, Liborio
allegedly executed said document on 23 April 1996 as undue embarrassment when the subject vehicle was seized Balatico (petitioners). In the complaint, Edgar alleges that: on
established by a certification42 from the Bureau of from their home. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the September 10, 1987, Milagros obtained a loan from him in the
Immigration that she left for Sydney, Australia, on 30 determination of what would be a fair amount of moral amount of P220,000.00 secured by a real estate
September 1995 and returned to the country on 15 June damages since each case must be governed by its own mortgage2 over her paraphernal property, a 748-square meter
1996. parcel of land located at San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac, covered
peculiar facts. The yardstick should be that it is not palpably by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 139884; the loan was
50
From the foregoing, the Court is convinced that petitioners and scandalously excessive. We find the amount payable within a period of three years or until September 18,
allegation of absence of consideration has been substantiated of P500,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be excessive. 1990; Milagros defaulted in the payment of the loan and
and the presumption of consideration disproved and In our view, the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is repeated demands for payment went unheeded, prompting
overcome. We are of the mind that petitioners bought the car reasonable under the facts obtaining in this case. the filing of a case in court.3
with their own money. There being no cause or consideration Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of On March 25, 1991, petitioners filed their Answer with
in the contract of loan allegedly entered into by the parties, example or correction for the public good, in addition to the Counterclaim, alleging that Milagros never transacted any
the promissory note is not binding on the petitioners. moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory business with Edgar and she did not receive the consideration
As regards the chattel mortgage, it is settled that a mortgage damages.51 When moral damages are awarded, exemplary of the alleged mortgage.4
is a mere accessory contract and its validity would depend on damages may also be granted. 52 We, however, find
the validity of the loan secured by it. 43 The chattel mortgage the P1,000,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be On March 26, 1991, Edgar filed his Reply and Answer to
constituted over the subject vehicle is an accessory contract excessive and should accordingly be reduced to P50,000.00. Counterclaim, reiterating validity and due execution of the
to the loan obligation as embodied in the promissory note. It real estate mortgage.5
Moreover, attorneys fees may be awarded when a party is
cannot exist as an independent contract since its 6
compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest On November 12, 1991, with leave of court, petitioners filed
consideration is the same as that of the principal contract. A by reason of an unjustified act of the other party. 53 Petitioners a Third-Party Complaint against Virginia Canlas (Virginia) and
principal obligation is an indispensable condition for the are entitled thereto because they were compelled to litigate Aurelia Delos Reyes (Aurelia), claiming that they duped
existence of an accessory contract. 44 Since it has been in order to protect their interest. Moreover, there being an Milagros to part with her title and sign the mortgage
sufficiently established that there was no cause or award for exemplary damages,54it follows that there should be documents without giving her the consideration and refusing
consideration for the promissory note, it follows that the an award thereof. An award of P20,000.00 will be sufficient as to return her title when demanded.
7

chattel mortgage has no leg to stand on. Hence, it must be
extinguished and cannot have any legal effect on petitioners.
Having ruled that both promissory note and chattel mortgage
are not binding on petitioners, the return of the subject
vehicle to petitioners is in order. In case the vehicle can no
the award of P200,000.00 by the RTC is too much.
On November 18, 1991, Virginia and Aurelia filed their Answer
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court with Counterclaim to Third-Party Complaint, alleging that the
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68129 is REVERSED and SET complaint states no cause of action against them since they
ASIDE. Respondent Security Finance, Inc. is ordered to deliver are not privies to the real estate mortgage and Aurelia is only
a witness to the mortgage document.8

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 55 of 63

On November 28, 1991, petitioners filed their Reply and to represent them in the said hearing considering that it when the RTC decided the case without petitioners
Answer to Counterclaim, reiterating their claims in the third- postponed motu propio the hearing in the interest of justice evidence.25 On October 16, 1998, the RTC denied the motion
party complaint.9 over the vigorous objection of the respondent due to failure of for reconsideration, holding that petitioners were given ample
petitioners counsel to appear for three successive times. It opportunity to hire a counsel, prepare for trial and adduce
Edgar died during the pendency of the case. On December 4,
warned petitioners that in case they would be unable to evidence, which they took for granted and they should bear
1991, upon proper motion,10 the RTC ordered that Edgar be
present evidence in the next scheduled hearing, they would the fault.26
substituted by his wife, Guia W. Canlas (respondent), as
11 be deemed to have waived their right to present further
plaintiff. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On May
evidence.21
23, 2001, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. 27The CA
On August 12, 1996, the RTC issued a pre-trial order stating
On July 9, 1998, Atty. Sedico filed an Urgent Motion to Reset ruled that petitioners were not denied due process since they
that the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. However, they
the scheduled hearing on July 15, 1998 due to a previously were duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and
agreed to stipulate on the following: "[t]hat the defendant
scheduled hearing on the same date of Criminal Case Nos. present evidence to substantiate their defense but they
executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of the
6463 to 6510 for Estafa entitled "People of the Philippines v. forfeited their right for not appearing in court together with
plaintiff involving a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 139884
Eddie Sentero" before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, their counsel at the scheduled hearings; that since Milagros
located at San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac." 12
Valenzuela. He reiterated that his trial calendar for the whole admitted the existence, due execution, authenticity and
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with respondent month of July is fully occupied and requested the hearing be validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage during the Pre-
22
presenting her witnesses, namely: Nelson Nulud, the records reset to August 10 or 19, 1998. Trial Conference on June 7, 1995, absence of consideration is
custodian of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac; Aurelia, the third- no longer an issue; that, in any case, the amount
At the scheduled hearing on July 15, 1998, the RTC was
party defendant and one of the instrumental witnesses to the of P220,000.00 was actually received by Milagros per the
apprised of the Urgent Motion to Reset filed by petitioners
real estate mortgage; and respondent herself. When testimony of Aurelia; that petitioners slept on their rights, if
counsel. In view of the vigorous objection of respondents
petitioners turn came, they presented Crisostomo Astrero, they had any, since they never lifted a finger to protect and
counsel on the ground that the case has been postponed
the other instrumental witness to the real estate mortgage. preserve their alleged rights and interests; and that the
several times at petitioners instance, the RTC denied the
mortgaged property is not conjugal property but the exclusive
On April 15, 1998, petitioners counsel, Atty. Norberto De motion to reset and petitioners were deemed to have waived property of Milagros which she could validly dispose of or
Jesus, filed an Ex-Parte Urgent Motion for Postponement since their right to present evidence. The case was then considered encumber without her husbands consent.
23
he is busy campaigning as a candidate in the coming submitted for decision.
elections.13 There being no objection from respondent, the The CA merely noted that the RTC failed to dispose of
Sixteen days later, on July 31, 1998, the RTC rendered its
RTC reset the hearing to May 28, 1998.14 petitioners third-party complaint and without any further
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
discussion, dismissed the third-party complaint in the
On May 28, 1998, Atty. De Jesus and petitioners failed to dispositive portion of its decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having substantiated her claim by a
appear in court. The RTC reset the hearing on June 17, 1998
preponderance of evidence, this Court hereby renders
with a warning that if the petitioners will still fail to appear on WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby
judgment in her favor, ordering the defendants to pay the
said date, they will be considered to have waived their right AFFIRMED in toto as to the main case. The third-party
plaintiff within a period of ninety (90) days from the entry of
to present further evidence. 15 complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
judgment hereof, the following sums of:
On June 17, 1998, Atty. De Jesus failed to appear in court but SO ORDERED.28
(1) P220,000.00, representing the principal obligation
petitioners were present. Milagros informed the RTC that Atty.
plus interest thereof of 12% per annum from the filing of Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored
De Jesus withdrew his appearance as their counsel. In view
the complaint until fully paid; on the following Assignment of Errors:
thereof, the RTC directed petitioners to secure the services of
another counsel and the hearing was reset to June 24, 1998 (2) P30,000.00 as attorneys fees; and 1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND
with a warning that should petitioners still fail to present ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
(3) The costs of suit.
evidence at said hearing, they will be considered to have TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
waived their right to present further evidence. 16 On June 23, It is further adjudged that in the event defendants default in JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE
1998, Atty. De Jesus filed his Withdrawal of Appearance as the payment of the above determined amounts, Lot No. 2763, QUESTIONED REAL ESTATE MORTAGE EVEN AS THERE
Counsel for the Defendants with the conformity of Milagros. 17 with an area of 748 square meters situated in San Nicolas, WAS LACK OF CONSIDERATION AND THAT THE SAME WAS
Victoria, Tarlac and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. EXECUTED THROUGH FRAUDULENTLY [sic] SCHEME;
On June 24, 1998, Milagros informed the RTC that they have
13984 Tarlac Registry, particularly identified and described
retained Atty. Alejo Y. Sedico 18 as new counsel. The hearing 2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND
in the Real Estate Mortgage contract (Exhibit "A"), shall be
was again reset to July 2, 1998 with the final warning that ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
sold at public auction to satisfy this judgment.
should petitioners witnesses fail to appear at the said TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
hearing, they would be considered to have waived their right SO ORDERED.24 JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DUE
to present further evidence.19 EXECUTION OF THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE WAS
The RTC held that Milagros executed a deed of real estate ADMITTED WHILE WHAT WAS ADMITTED ONLY IS ITS
On July 1, 1998, Atty. Sedico formally filed his Entry of mortgage in favor of Edgar and she received the
EXECUTION;
Appearance with Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Reset, praying consideration for the mortgage in the amount of P220,000.00;
that the hearing scheduled on July 2, 1998 be reset to August that petitioners inaction for three years before the filing of 3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND
12, 1998 due to conflict of schedule and his trial calendar for the complaint against them to protest the alleged non-receipt ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
July is fully occupied, as well as to give him more time to of the consideration for the mortgage casts serious doubts on TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
study the case since he had just been retained.20 their claim; and that the deed of real estate mortgage was JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE SUBJECT REAL
duly notarized and assumed the character of a public PROPERTY IS PARAPHERNAL EVEN AS EXISTING LAW AND
On July 2, 1998, the RTC allowed, in the interest of justice, the
instrument. JURISPRUDENCE HAD CONSIDERED IT CONJUGAL OR
resetting of the hearing for presentation of petitioners
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY;
evidence for the last time on July 15, 1998. The RTC directed On September 2, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for
petitioners to secure the services of a counsel of their choice Reconsideration, claiming that they were denied due process

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 56 of 63

 4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same time when Atty. Sedicos motion to reset was denied on July
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING liberal treatment in this case. While unquestionably, the Court 15, 1998.47 Such intervening time cannot be said to have
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF has the discretion to dismiss the appeal for being defective, greatly impaired the substantial rights of respondent. Thus,
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT DESPITE OF [sic] sound policy dictates that it is far better to dispose of cases absent unreasonable delay and manifest intent to employ
HAVING DENIED PETITIONER TO BE REPRESENT [sic] BY A on the merits, rather than on technicality as the latter dilatory tactic prejudicial to the respondent and trifling court
COUNSEL OF CHOICE DUE PROCESS IS SATISFIED.29 approach may result in injustice.34 This is in accordance with processes, Atty. Sedicos request for resetting should have
Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 35 which been granted.
Petitioners contend that the real estate mortgage was
encourages a reading of the procedural requirements in a
fraudulently executed and there was lack of consideration but It cannot be disputed that the case has been pending since
manner that will help secure and not defeat justice. 36
material facts relating thereto were not fully ventilated February 11 1991,48 or more than seven years until
because the RTC denied petitioners motion to reset the As to respondents claim that the petition lacks verification, a petitioners were able to start their presentation of their
hearing. They maintain that they never admitted the due certification against forum shopping and a copy of the evidence on March 11, 1998.49
execution of the real estate mortgage, but only its execution assailed CA decision, the Court has carefully examined the
The Court is as aware as anyone of the need for the speedy
or existence. They further insist that the mortgaged property rollo of the case and found them to be attached to the
disposition of cases. However, it must be emphasized that
is conjugal, not paraphernal, and therefore, Milagros could not petition.37
speed alone is not the chief objective of a trial. It is the
dispose of or encumber without her husbands consent; and
Anent respondents submission that the petition failed to raise careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of
the CA disregarded Article 9930 of the Family Code which
a question of law, the Court disagrees. For a question to be justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the
provides that all the property owned by the spouses at the
one of law, it must not involve an examination of the requirements of procedural due process, and an adherence to
time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or this Courts standing admonition that the disposition of cases
forms part of the community property. Lastly, they submit
any of them.38 Petitioners contention that they were denied should always be predicated on the consideration that more
that while they were given the opportunity to secure the
substantive due process is a pure question of law.39 than the mere convenience of the courts and of the parties in
services of a new counsel to defend them, the RTCs apathy to
the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served
the plight of petitioners counsel on the latters conflict of As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is
thereby. These are more important than a race to end the
schedule amounted to stripping such right to counsel and addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which should
trial.50Indeed, court litigations are primarily for the search for
denial of due process. always be predicated on the consideration that more than the
truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both
mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case,
For her part, respondent contends that the petition should be parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is
the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby.
dismissed outright for impleading the CA as respondent, the best way to ferret out such truth.51
After all, postponements and continuances are part and
despite the clear directive of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
parcel of our procedural system of dispensing justice." 40 When Ironically, the precipitate action of the RTC prolonged the
against it. She further points out that the petition lacks
no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is litigation and unnecessarily delayed the case, in the process,
verification, a certification against forum shopping, a copy of
not manifest with the corresponding motion to transfer the causing the very evil it apparently sought to avoid. Instead of
the assailed CA decision, and it fails to raise any specific
hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial unclogging dockets, it has actually increased the workload of
question of law but only presents and discusses an
discretion to allow the same to the end that the merits of the the justice system as a whole. Such action does not inspire
"assignment of errors."
case may be fully ventilated.41 Thus, in considering motions public confidence in the administration of justice.
In any event, even if these procedural defects are for postponements, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the
Moreover, it is noted that petitioners filed a third-party
disregarded, respondent argues that petitioners were not reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case
complaint which the RTC simply disregarded. On the other
denied due process when the RTC denied their motion for of the movant.42 Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown,
hand, the CA, while stating in its Decision that "[a]ll thus told,
postponement since they were duly accorded all the such discretion will not be interfered with either
we find no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court,
opportunities to be heard and to present their evidence to by mandamus or appeal.43
except that it failed to dispose of the third-party
substantiate their defense but they forfeited this right for not
In the present case, there are circumstances that justify complaint,"52 it simply proceeded to dismiss the third-party
appearing in court together with their counsel at the
postponement of the July 15, 1998 hearing. Atty. Sedico had complaint in the dispositive portion of herein assailed
scheduled hearings. They also aver that the real estate
only been formally retained as petitioners new counsel as of decision, without giving any reason or justification therefor.
mortgage is valid and duly executed and the mortgaged
July 1, 1998, or merely two weeks before July 15, 1998. Atty.
property is the paraphernal property of Milagros such that she As to the effect of petitioners admission of the due execution
Sedico also had a previously intransferable hearing in a
can validly dispose of or encumber it without her husbands of the real estate mortgage during the pre-trial conference, it
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172,
consent. must be noted that in Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. Court of
Valenzuela scheduled on the same date of July 15, 1998. The
Appeals, 53 this Court ruled that the admission of the
Anent the procedural defects raised by respondent, the Court distance factor, from Valenzuela to Tarlac, is enough
genuineness and due execution of a document simply means
agrees that the correct procedure, as mandated by Section 4, consideration to call for postponement. Moreover, Atty. Sedico
that the party whose signature it bears admits that he
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is not to implead twice informed the RTC that his entire calendar for July is
voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another
the lower court which rendered the assailed already full such that he requested specific dates in August
for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it
decision.31 However, impleading the lower court as for the hearing.44 The motion to reset the hearing has not
was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of
respondent in the petition for review on certiorari does not been shown to be manifestly dilatory. Besides, except for the
the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered;
automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal but merely May 28, 1998 scheduled hearing, 45 petitioners have always
and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
authorizes the dismissal of the petition. 32Besides, formal been present in court. They cannot be said to have lost
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are
defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has interest in fighting the civil case to the end; only that Atty. De
waived by him. However, it does not preclude a party from
encountered previous petitions for review on certiorari that Jesus withdrew his appearance as their counsel and
arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise,
erroneously impleaded the CA. In those cases, the Court petitioners had to look for new counsel to take their case on
payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of
merely called the petitioners attention to the defects and short notice. Absolutely wanting from the records is any
consideration. Petitioners therefore are not barred from
proceeded to resolve the case on their merits. 33 evidence that the change of counsel was intended to delay
presenting evidence regarding their claim of want of
the proceedings. In fact, only 48 days have lapsed from the
consideration.
time Atty. De Jesus failed to appear on May 28, 1998 46 to the

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 57 of 63

It bears stressing that the matter of absence of consideration 2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary testify in court to substantiate her claim. Moreover, no
and alleged fraudulent scheme perpetuated by third-party compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor, one of the children and
witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to
defendants, being evidentiary, should be threshed out in a compulsory heirs of Telesforo I. Alfelor whose intestate the existence of an original copy of the document or any
proper trial. To deny petitioners their right to present estate is subject to herein special proceedings for public officer who had custody thereof. According to the court,
evidence constitutes a denial of due process, since there are partition; the determinative factor in this case was the good faith of
issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on Teresita in contracting the second marriage with the late Jose
3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single
the merits. Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been
centavo from the share of her late husband Jose K.
previously married. Thus, the evidence of the intervenor did
Ordinarily, when there is sufficient evidence before the Court Alfelor to the intestate estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor.
not satisfy the quantum of proof required to allow the
to enable it to resolve the fundamental issues, the Court will 13
WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene intervention. Citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, the RTC
dispense with the regular procedure of remanding the case to
in this case and to submit attached Answer in Intervention. 5 ruled that while Josefina submitted a machine copy of the
the lower court, in order to avoid further delays in the
marriage contract, the lack of its identification and the
resolution of the case.54 However, a remand in this case, while Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in accompanying testimony on its execution and ceremonial
time-consuming, is necessary, because the proceedings had 6
Intervention, claiming that she was the surviving spouse of manifestation or formalities required by law could not be
in the RTC are grossly inadequate to settle factual issues. Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita was void equated to proof of its validity and legality.
Petitioners were unduly deprived of the full opportunity to ab initio for having been contracted during the subsistence of
present evidence on the merits of their defense and third- a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that Joshua and The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children,
party complaint. Maria Katrina were not her husbands children. Josefina Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the legal and legitimate heirs
prayed, among others, for the appointment of a special of the late Jose K. Alfelor, considering that the latter referred
Considering the foregoing, the Court need not delve on the
administrator to take charge of the estate. Josefina attached to them as his children in his Statement of Assets and
other issues raised by petitioners. Suffice it to say that such
to her pleading a copy of the marriage contract 7 which Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the oppositor did not
matters are best decided by the RTC only after full reception
indicated that she and Jose were married on February 1, present evidence to dispute the same. The dispositive portion
of petitioners evidence.
1956. of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina
Decision dated May 23, 2001 of the Court of Appeals and the
motion for hearing. Josefina presented the marriage contract (sic) Halasan through counsel, not sufficient to prove a
Decision dated July 31, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
as well as the Reply-in- Intervention 8 filed by the heirs of the preponderance of evidence and compliance with the basic
Branch 65, Tarlac City in Civil Case No. 7384,
deceased, where Teresita declared that she knew "of the rules of evidence to proved (sic) the competent and relevant
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with that of the issues of the complaint-in-intervention, as legal heir of the
the said Regional Trial Court for reception of petitioners
herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956. 9However, Josefina did deceased Jose K. Alfelor, the complaint (sic) of intervention is
evidence and further proceedings.
not appear in court. ordered dismiss (sic) with cost[s] de oficio.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13, 2002. 10 She On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon
SO ORDERED. narrated that she and the deceased were married in civil rites Aleflor, oppositor through counsel sufficient to proved (sic)
at Tagum City, Davao Province on February 12, 1966, and that the requirement of the Rules of Evidence, in accordance with
they were subsequently married in religious rites at the duly supporting and prevailing jurisprudence, oppositor,
G.R. No. 165987 March 31, 2006 Assumption Church on April 30, 1966. Among those listed as Teresita Sorongon Alfelor and her children, Joshua S. Alfelor
secondary sponsors were Josefinas own relativesAtty. and Maria Katrina S. Alfelor, are declared legal and legitimate
JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. Margarito Halasan, her brother, and Valentino Halasan, her Heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, for all purposes, to entitled
ALFELOR, Petitioners, vs. JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and father.11 While she did not know Josefina personally, she knew (sic) them, in the intestate estate of the latter in accordance
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. that her husband had been previously married to Josefina and to (sic) law, of all properties in his name and/or maybe
DECISION that the two did not live together as husband and wife. She entitled to any testate or intestate proceedings of his
knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Joses relatives consented predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive such inheritance,
CALLEJO, SR., J.: to her (Teresitas) marriage with Jose because there had been they are legally entitled, along with the other heirs, as the
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the no news of Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few months case maybe (sic).13
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. after the marriage, Josefina disappeared, and Jose even Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 insisting that
74757, as well as the Resolution 2 dated June 28, 2004 looked for her in Cebu, Bohol, and Manila. Despite his efforts, under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, an
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. Jose failed to locate Josefina and her whereabouts remained
admission need not be proved. She pointed out that Teresita
unknown.
On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late admitted in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999
spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not that she (Teresita) knew of Joses previous marriage to her.
Partition3 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. have his marriage to Josefina annulled because he believed in Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of the
Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two good faith that he had the right to remarry, not having seen previous marriage.16 Since the existence of the first marriage
children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the her for more than seven years. This opinion was shared by was proven in accordance with the basic rules of evidence,
surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the Joses sister who was a judge. Teresita also declared that she pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the
deceased Alfelor Spouses. The case, docketed as Civil Case met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she second marriage was void from the beginning. Moreover,
No. 26,047-98, was raffled to Branch 17 of said court. had been married three times, was now happily married to an contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Article 83 of the Civil
Englishman and residing in the United States. Code provides that the person entitled to claim good faith is
On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a the "spouse present" (thus, the deceased Jose and not
Motion for Intervention,4 alleging as follows: On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Teresita). Josefina concluded that if the validity of the second
Order12 denying the motion and dismissed her complaint, marriage were to be upheld, and at the same time admit the
1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in ruling that respondent was not able to prove her claim. The
existence of the second marriage, an absurd situation would
the above-entitled case for partition between plaintiffs trial court pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to
and defendants;

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 58 of 63

arise: the late Jose Alfelor would then be survived by two hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Resultantly, the Regional controversy.24 Consequently, an admission made in the
legitimate spouses. Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ordered to admit pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such
petitioners complaint in intervention and to forthwith conduct admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs
The trial court denied the motion in its Order 17 dated October
the proper proceeding with dispatch. No costs. to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored,
30, 2002.
whether objection is interposed by the party or not. 25 The
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading
before the CA, alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in petition, assailing the ruling of the appellate court. subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with
declaring that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to what was pleaded.26
Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or
Jose, in considering the bigamous marriage valid and
not the CA erred in ordering the admission of private On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for
declaring the second wife as legal heir of the deceased.
respondents intervention in S.P. Civil Case No. 26,047-98. intervention, the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of
Josefina also stressed that Articles 80 and 83 of the New Civil
They insist that in setting aside the Orders of the trial court, Court is Section 1, Rule 19, which provides:
Code provide for a presumption of law that any subsequent
dated September 13, 2002 and October 30, 2002, the CA
marriage is null and void. She insisted that no evidence was SEC. 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal
completely disregarded the hearsay rule. They aver that while
presented to prove that she had been absent for seven interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence
consecutive years before the second marriage. of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as
provides that an admission does not require proof, such
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that admission may be contradicted by showing that it was made
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
anyone who claims to be the legal wife must show proof through palpable mistake. Moreover, Teresitas statement in
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
thereof. They pointed out that Josefina failed to present any of the Reply-in-Intervention dated February 22, 1999, admitting
action. The court shall consider whether or not the
the following to prove the fact of the previous marriage: the knowledge of the alleged first marriage, is without probative
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couples public value for being hearsay.
the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate
wedding; the birth and the baptismal certificates of children
involved in this case fall under Section 4, Rule 129 of the proceeding.
during such union, and other subsequent documents
Revised Rules of Evidence, and thus qualify as a judicial
mentioning such union. Regarding Teresitas alleged Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person
admission which does not require proof. Consequently, the CA
admission of the first marriage in her Reply in Intervention has (1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the
did not commit any palpable error when it ruled in her favor.
dated February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it was mere success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the
hearsay, without probative value, as she heard of the alleged Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely
prior marriage of decedent Jose Alfelor to Josefina only from knowledge of Joses previous marriage to private respondent affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the
other persons, not based on her own personal knowledge. in the said Reply-in- Intervention, Teresita also testified during custody of the court or an officer thereof. 27Intervention is "a
They also pointed out that Josefina did not dispute the fact of the hearing, for the purpose, that the matter was merely proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is
having left and abandoned Jose after their alleged marriage in "told" to her by the latter, and thus should be considered permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining
1956, and only appeared for the first time in 1988 during the hearsay. They also point out that private respondent failed to plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or
filing of the case for partition of the latters share in his appear and substantiate her Complaint-in-Intervention before uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or
parents estate. They further pointed out that Josefina does the RTC, and only submitted a machine copy of a purported demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or
not even use the surname of the deceased Alfelor. Contrary to marriage contract with the deceased Jose Alfelor. proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit
the allegations of Josefina, paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of
Code, now Article 41 of the Family Code, is applicable. The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings,
Moreover, her inaction all this time brought to question her decedent, a fact admitted by the other party who claims to be by which such person becomes a party thereto for the
claim that she had not been heard of for more than seven the second wife, should be allowed to intervene in an action protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be
years. for partition involving the share of the deceased "husband" in affected by such proceedings."28
the estate of his parents.
In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners mother,
ruling of the trial court. It held that Teresita had already The petition is dismissed. the Court rules that respondent Josefina Halasan sufficiently
admitted (both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had been The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, established her right to intervene in the partition case. She
married to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the petitioners herein, admitted the existence of the first has shown that she has legal interest in the matter in
Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no longer marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC, to wit: litigation. As the Court ruled in Nordic Asia Ltd. v. Court of
requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and Appeals:29
establish the fact that Josefa was married to the decedent. 1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the
x x x [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a
Citing Santiago v. De los Santos,18 the appellate court ruled previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the
20 suit between other parties must be in the matter in litigation
that an admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted herein intervenor were married on February 1, 1956;
and of such direct and immediate character that the
by the party making such admission, and is conclusive as to Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several
intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation
such party; and all contrary or inconsistent proofs submitted times that she knew that her late husband had been
and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties
by the party who made the admission should be ignored previously married to another. To the Courts mind, this
to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would
whether objection is interposed by the other party or not. The admission constitutes a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal"
become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and
CA concluded that the trial court thus gravely abused its statement; made as it was in the course of judicial
interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law.
discretion in ordering the dismissal of Josefinas Complaint-in- proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial
The words "an interest in the subject" means a direct interest
Intervention. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: admission.21 A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would put the
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed challenge 22
that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of
23
intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the
orders, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion are proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial
admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 59 of 63

complaint without the establishment of which plaintiff could
not recover.30
In Uy v. Court of Appeals, 31 the Court allowed petitioners (who
claimed to be the surviving legal spouse and the legitimate
child of the decedent) to intervene in the intestate
proceedings even after the parties had already submitted a
compromise agreement involving the properties of the
decedent, upon which the intestate court had issued a writ of
execution. In setting aside the compromise agreement, the
Court held that petitioners were indispensable parties and
that "in the interest of adjudicating the whole controversy,
petitioners inclusion in the action for partition, given the
circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in
the proper disposition of the case."32
Contrary to petitioners argument, the case of Sarmiento v.
Court of Appeals33 is not in point, as the Court therein did not
discuss the propriety of allowing a motion for intervention,
but resolved the validity of a marriage. In relying on the
merits of the complaint for partition, the Court ultimately
determined the legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein
and her entitlement to a share in the subject properties.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit
respondent Josefina Halasans Complaint-in-Intervention and
forthwith conduct the proper proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAITPetitioners, vs. MA.
JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI
Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner,
the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the
position of medical technologist under a two-year contract,
denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a
monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a
probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by
Kuwaits Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was
terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not
having allegedly passed the probationary period.
As the Ministry denied respondents request for
reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17,
2001, shouldering her own air fare.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint 2 for illegal dismissal
against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency,
represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the
Ministry, as the foreign principal.
By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding The petition fails.
that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot
warrant respondents dismissal nor that she failed to qualify
evade responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino
as a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally
workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere
dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her
expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a
US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months
government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that
unexpired portion of her contract.
such foreign principals liability must first be established
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
Labor Arbiters decision by Resolution 4 of January 26, 2004.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by
recruitment agencies with their foreign principals, Republic
Resolution5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of
Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and
Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a
assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is
foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as
due them. Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad8 explains:
such, the immunity extended to them; and that respondent
was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance . . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment
rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwaits agreement entered into by and between the local
Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous
should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI. with the term of such agreement so that if either or both
of the parties decide to end the agreement, the
By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed
responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted
the NLRC Resolution.
employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the
In brushing aside petitioners contention that they only acted same extends up to and until the expiration of the
as agent of the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly employment contracts of the employees recruited and
and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that employed pursuant to the said recruitment
under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the
responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of very purpose for which the law governing the
employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was
jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any enacted. (emphasis supplied)
violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the
employment.
policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the
As to Ikdals liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. working class.9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the
10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the
Filipinos Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and judicial determination of the foreign principals liability before
partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and
and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for money solidary liability inutile.
claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by probationary employment are not applicable since it was
7
the appellate court by Resolution of June 27, 2007, the expressly provided in respondents employment contract,
present petition for review on certiorari was filed. which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her
engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable
Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord
because respondents employment contract specifically
respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host
stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil
country, the same was not substantiated.
Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude
that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law
appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses,
probationary employment in deciding the present case. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including
the laws which they wish to govern their respective
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas
obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals,
Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment
good customs, public order or public policy.
contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations)
accord respect to the "customs, practices, company policies It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the
and labor laws and legislation of the host country." application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law,
under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that
case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Courts ruling in EDI-
Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the foreign
Staffbuilders Intl., v. NLRC10 illuminates:
principal is a government agency which is immune from suit,
as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran
jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters
held liable, more so since the Ministrys liability had not been not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for
judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it. termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law
Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 60 of 63
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating in her shift of work schedule. RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
to the termination of the employment of Gran.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not PANGANIBAN, J.:
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the
the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial
know only domestic or forum law. Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere
notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other
certifications attesting only to the correctness of the
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the
translations of the MOA and the termination letter
Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on
which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service
of presumed-identity approach or processual evidence.
laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such
presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not
Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus The Case
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is
the subject certifications read:
that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
labor laws in determining the issues presented before us. x x x x Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision 1 and the
(emphasis and underscoring supplied) March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. presented to this Office for review and certification and the
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a same was/were found to be in order. This Office, however, "WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between
copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on
of the Revised Rules of Court which reads: document/s. January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and
both parties can now remarry under existing and
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public This certification is being issued upon request of the
applicable laws to any and/or both parties." 3
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when interested party for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1 The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having quoted Decision.
Respecting Ikdals joint and solidary liability as a corporate
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
officer, the same is in order too following the express The Facts
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson,
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate SEC. 10. Money Claims.Notwithstanding any provision of an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims
authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied) arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen,
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a the Australian government.6 Petitioner a Filipina and
deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
other forms of damages.
the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. 7 In
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part The liability of the principal/employer and the their application for a marriage license, respondent was
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under declared as "single" and "Filipino."8
the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
court. shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. 9
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration
probationary period of one (1) year and that the host
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the court a quo, on the ground of
countrys Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a
be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
to respondent stating that she did not pass the probation
damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha
terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a
translated copy of the certificate of termination, 12 both of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Samson only in November, 1997.
which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993,
of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs SO ORDERED. he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondents subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage
letter13 of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a
that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 61 of 63

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's The Court's Ruling xxx xxx xxx
wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was
The Petition is partly meritorious. "ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has
pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree
been previously married, the applicant shall be required
from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the First Issue:
to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate
"marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." 13
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha required in the last preceding article, the death
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be Samson certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce previous marriage. x x x.
respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v.
20 "ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
documentary evidence of both parties. 16 After they submitted Cheong Seng Gee, petitioner argues that the divorce decree,
nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in
this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
resolution.17
foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
Order. failed to establish these elements. otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Ruling of the Trial Court Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian
of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are divorce decree is a public document a written official act of
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground
governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further
that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized
(the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the proof of its authenticity and due execution.
in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on
presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the
the basis of any defect in an essential element of the Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place
marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
where the marriage was performed.
to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree document must first be presented and admitted in
obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment
or annual. provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written
it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a
Hence, this Petition.18
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles foreign country.32
Issues 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 25 of the Family Code
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration: writing or document may be proven as a public or official
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
"I. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse or (2) a copy thereof attested 33 by the officer having legal
26
decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
with the petitioner. respective national laws.27
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
"2. The failure of the respondent, who is now a A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. the seal of his office.34
capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
respondent. valid according to their national law." 28 Therefore, before a
court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
"3. The trial court seriously erred in the application of with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case. demonstrated.
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
"4. The trial court patently and grievously erred in it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree
disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case. petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry
"5. The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the 36
in evidence, it must first comply with the registration of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was
divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. 37Hence, it was
decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso These articles read as follows: admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the "ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court
divorce decree before our courts."19 the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn of Sydney, Australia.38
application for such license with the proper local civil
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this registrar which shall specify the following: Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the
Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson xxx xxx xxx bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be 39
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of
legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest. rights belonging to a citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 62 of 63

the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; 58 (d) Exhibit "4"
their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" Statutory Declaration
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace
laws. was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60
from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only
Burden of Proving Australian Law Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
after proof of good behavior.47
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
restriction that reads: 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends
quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce "1. A party to a marriage who marries again before
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, this decree becomes absolute (unless the other
48 requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."
Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not marriage.
notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he
the prosecution or defense of an action." 41 In civil cases, divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
defendants have the burden of proving the material
raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to
allegations in their answer when they introduce new
to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may
matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by
of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing
law validating it falls squarely upon him.
under Australian laws. marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1,
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12,
judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required 1994.
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
reason of their judicial function. 44 The power of judicial notice with the application for a marriage license. According to her, substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. capacity to remarry. show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and
Second Issue: We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
determined by the national law of the party concerned. The ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would SO ORDERED.
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
her in 1994. authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence
of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
for a marriage license.50
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of
legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
the records before this Court shows that only the following
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for
51
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" Complaint; (b) Exhibit "B"
for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-
different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994
or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; 52(c) Exhibit "C" Certificate
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D.
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 45 There Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
53
is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was Manila; (d) Exhibit "D" Office of the City Registrar of
procured by respondent. Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of
annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of
decree a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; 55 (2) for
in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended Answer; 56 (b) Exhibit "S"
although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. 46 the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of

Evidence CASES: IV. Judicial notice and judicial admissions Page 63 of 63