ANASTACIO LAURELvs.
ERIBERTO MISA severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto
Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition
for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and
based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered
to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during
the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114
of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation
of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a
qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance, which consists in the
obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
government or sovereign; and that this absolute and
permanent allegiance should not be confused with the
qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner
owes to the government or sovereign of the territory
wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in
return for the protection he receives, and which
consists in the obedience to the laws of the
government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States,
21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report
to the President of the United States in the case of
Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent
allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied
by the enemy of their legitimate government or
sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases
of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75
Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75
Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant
it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular
government (which is the supreme power which
governs a body politic or society which constitute the
state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the
rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or
suspended because the existence of sovereignty
cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least
during the so-called period of suspension; that what
may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to
the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty
of the legitimate government in a territory occupied
by the military forces of the enemy during the war,
"although the former is in fact prevented from
exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the
"rules of international law of our times"; (II
Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482),
recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23,
44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a
corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself
is not suspended and subsists during the enemy
occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and
therefore there is no such thing as suspended
allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric
of the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty
of the United State was suspended in Castine, set
forth in the decision in the case of United
States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in
1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co
Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in
connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but
of the existence of a government de facto therein and
its power to promulgate rules and laws in the
occupied territory, must have been based, either on
the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague
Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of
an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty
to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word
"sovereignty" used therein should be construed to
mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty,
because as this remains vested in the legitimate
government and is not transferred to the occupier, it
cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting said government thereof; and
that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion
or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty
itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the
Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not
be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words
"temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim
and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations
borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by
the enemy toward the military government
established over them, such allegiance may, at most,
be considered similar to the temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government or
sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return
for the protection he receives as above described, and
does not do away with the absolute and permanent
allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign
country owes to his own government or sovereign;
that just as a citizen or subject of a government or
sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of
treason committed in a foreign country, in the same
way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the
military forces of the enemy may commit treason
against his own legitimate government or sovereign if
he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them
aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen
or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing
more than obedience to its laws in return for the
protection he receives, it would necessarily follow
that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state
would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship
thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate
the social and commercial life, in return for the
protection he receives, and would, on the other hand,
lose his original citizenship, because he would not be
bound to obey most of the laws of his own
government or sovereign, and would not receive,
while in a foreign country, the protection he is
entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of
the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the
legitimate government in the territory occupied by
the enemy military forces, because the authority of
the legitimate power to govern has passed into the
hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague
Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the
reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government
and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during
military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as
they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate
government, they are inoperative or not applicable to
the government established by the occupant; that the
crimes against national security, such as treason and
espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with
hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as
those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition,
and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which
are of political complexion because they bear relation
to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as
crimes against the legitimate government, are also
suspended or become inapplicable as against the
occupant, because they can not be committed against
the latter (Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra); and
that, while the offenses against public order to be
preserved by the legitimate government were
inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the
reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were
also inoperative as against the ousted government for
the latter was not responsible for the preservation of
the public order in the occupied territory, yet article
114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable
to treason committed against the national security of
the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of
the occupied territory were still bound by their
allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is
enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless
absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those
laws that enforce public order and regulate the social
and commercial life of the country, he has,
nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government
and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing
laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the
military service demand such action, that is, when it
is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control
of the country and the protection of his army, subject
to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the
Hague Regulations, the usages established by
civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the
requirements of public conscience
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United
States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that,
consequently, all acts of the military occupant
dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon
the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to
obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government
which have not been adopted, as well and those
which, though continued in force, are in conflict with
such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be
considered as suspended or not in force and binding
upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the
allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience
of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign
does not demand from him a positive action, but only
passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the
occupant has no power, as a corollary of the
preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the
operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants
to their legitimate government, or compel them to
adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is
evident that such action is not demanded by the
exigencies of the military service or not necessary for
the control of the inhabitants and the safety and
protection of his army, and because it is tantamount
to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant
their allegiance to the titular government or
sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the
occupied territory were compelled illegally by the
military occupant, through force, threat or
intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former
may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or
submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of
suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states,
and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow
invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling
inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against
their own government without the latter incurring the
risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel
those who are not aid them in their military operation
against the resisting enemy forces in order to
completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and
thus deprive them all of their own independence or
sovereignty such theory would sanction the action
of invaders in forcing the people of a free and
sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task
of depriving themselves of their own freedom and
independence and repressing the exercise by them of
their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a
political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the
government of the Philippines defined and penalized
in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally
intended to be a crime against said government as
then organized by authority of the sovereign people
of the United States, exercised through their
authorized representative, the Congress and the
President of the United States, was made, upon the
establishment of the Commonwealth Government in
1935, a crime against the Government of the
Philippines established by authority of the people of
the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides
according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution
of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of
section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that
"All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution .
. . and all references in such laws to the Government
or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this
constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the
Philippines was a sovereign government, though not
absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in
the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance
appended to our Constitution, was recognized not
only by the Legislative Department or Congress of
the United States in approving the Independence Law
above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines,
which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also
by the Executive Department of the United States;
that the late President Roosevelt in one of his
messages to Congress said, among others, "As I
stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in
practice regards the Philippines as having now the
status as a government of other independent nations
in fact all the attributes of complete and respected
nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6,
page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the
Supreme Court of the United States in many cases,
among them in the case of Jones vs. United States
(137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the
question of sovereignty is "a purely political
question, the determination of which by the
legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges, as well as
all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution which provides that
pending the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the
Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United
States", was one of the few limitations of the
sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the
United States, but these limitations do not away or
are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the
same way that the people of each State of the Union
preserves its own sovereignty although limited by
that of the United States conferred upon the latter by
the States; that just as to reason may be committed
against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been
committed during the Japanese occupation against
the sovereignty of the United States as well as against
the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth;
and that the change of our form of government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason committed during the Commonwealth,
because it is an offense against the same government
and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of
our Constitution provides that "The government
established by this constitution shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final
and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the
United States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines
shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the
Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later
on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's
petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above
set forth and for others to be stated in the said
opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion
therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros
dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto
concurs in a separate opinion.
THE PEOPLE vs.ELEUTERIO CAA,
The appellant Eleuterio Caa was charged in the
People's Court with treason under seven counts. After
trial, he was sentence to fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the
law, to pay a fine of P5,000, plus costs.
This is relatively an old case. The reason for the
delay in the determination of appeal is that it was first
received in the court and later, because of the penalty
imposed which apparently had jurisdiction over it.
However, said court because according to its
resolution the case to the opinion that the penalty
applicable is reclusion perpetua.
For purpose of reference, we are reproducing the first
five counts under which the People Court found the
appellant guilty:
1. That said accused, Eleuterio Caa , with intent to
give aid and comfort to the enemy, wilfully ,
feloniously and treasonably acted and served as
puppet Mayor of the Japanese in the municipality of
Abuyog, Leyte, Philippines, and from June to
October, 1942, and from November, 1943, to August,
1944, and as such puppet Mayor he willfully,
feloniously and treasonably performed the following
acts:
(a) That he forced the people of Abuyog including
government employees to dig trenches and foxholes
and build stables for the Japanese Armed Forces;
(b) That he told the people of Abuyog that the
Americans would not return to the Philippine and that
he was not afraid of the Filipino soldiers and
guerrillas because the Japanese Armed Forces were
behind him;
(c) That the people of Abulog must obey his orders
and tell the guerrillas and their relatives to surrender;
and
(d) That he provided the Japanese soldiers with
houses to live and ejected the Filipino civilians of
Abuyog out of their houses to give room to the
Japanese.
2. That the herein accused, Eleuterio Caa, with
intent to give aid and or comfort to give aid and or
comfort to the enemy during his incumbency as
puppet Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte, Philippines,
especially in November, 1943, February and May,
1944, wilfully, feloniously, treasonably led, guided
and accompanied Japanese patrols to the barrios of
Abuyog to apprehend guerrilla suspects and their
supports and also to locate hideouts.
3. That during the months of April and May, 1944,
the herein accused, Eleuterio Caa, with intent to
give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, and taking
advantage of his position as puppet Municipal Mayor
of Abuyog, Leyte did then there wilfully, feloniously
and treasonably force the people to harvest palay in
the outlying farms and did confiscate the palay taken
therefrom giving part of it to Japanese soldier.
4. That the herein accused, Eleuterio Caa, with
intent to give aid and or comfort to the enemy, during
the time of the his incumbency as puppet Municipal
Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte, did then and there lead,
guide and accompany patrols composed patrols
composed of Japanese and Constabulary soldiers
patrols to the barrios of Himara, Mahapalag, Union,
Ogis, Mahayahay, Polahongon all in the Layog
District, and in the barrios of Bayabas, Dingle,
Combos, Laray, Taleque, Habadyang, sitio Malasiga,
sitio Maitum, parts of the Barrio Anglad, of the all of
Hogasaan District, which patrols machine gunned
and burned the houses in the abovementioned places.
5. That sometime during the month of July, 1944, the
herein accused , Eleuterio Caa, with intent to give
aid and /or comfort to enemy, during his incumbency
as puppet Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably informed the Japanese
garrison of Abuyog as a guerrilla suspect, was the
father-law of the guerrilla lieutenant named Nicolas
Camintoy, and due to this information, said Basilio
Pacatan was investigated, imprisoned and tortured by
the Japanese soldiers for a period of over thirty days.
In the open court the accused admitted that he was
and had always been a Filipino citizen.
The following facts are not disputed. In the last
elections helds before the last World (Pacific ) War,
Pedro Gallego and defendant Eleuterio Caa were
elected Mayor and Vice Mayor respectively, for the
town of Abuyog, Leyte. When the Japanese forces
went to Abuyog in June, 1942, they found the town
without a Mayor because Gallego served as town
chief executive only to May, 1942, after which he
went to the mountains and joined the guerrilla forces
as a Mayor. The appellant being the vice mayor elect,
was designated acting mayor by the provincial
governor and he acted as such form June to October,
1942, when the Japanese garrison was removed form
the town. Again, he acted as Mayor form November,
1943 when another Japanese garrison was stationed
there, until August, 1944, when the garrison was
withdrawn. The acts of treason of which he was
accused were supposedly committed during his
incumbency as Acting Mayor of Abuyog.
Under the first count, we find from the evidence that
the defendant really recruited laborers to dig
trenches, foxholes and air raids shelters around the
Japanese garrison and in some streets, and to build
stables for the Japanese cavalry horses. It has also
been established that the accused had intervened in
the Japanese soldiers and officers stationed in the
town, although there is evidence to the effect that rent
was paid by said Japanese forces for the use of the
houses. It was also proven that in the poblacion of
Abuyog as well as in some barrios, such as
Malagikay, Anlag and San Roque he called people to
meetings where he made speeches in the Visayan
dialect, telling the people that the real government
was the one established and sponsored by the
Japanese; that the Americans, will never come back
to the Philippine because they were afraid of the
Japanese forces who where stronger; that they must
pay their taxes for the support of the Japanese
sponsored government; and that he (defendant) was
note afraid of the guerrillas because the Japanese
Army was behind him.
Considering the fact that the accused was then acting
as mayor of his under orders of the Japanese garrison
commander, there is every reason to believe that
defendants act in recruiting laborers for the
construction of the trenches, foxholes. air raid
shelters and stables for the use of the Japanese forces
was in obedience to the wishes and orders of the
Japanese commander. The same thing may be said of
the commandeering of private houses. It is a matter
of public knowledge, of which we may take judicial
notice, that during the occupation, not infrequently,
the enemy forces restored labor to fill in their military
needs and also commandered indiscriminately private
houses not only for their accommodation but even for
their civilian agencies, and that in such cases then
services or intervention of the executive of the town
were availed of, voluntarily or otherwise.
Furthermore, we agree with the Solicitor General that
these acts of collaboration, including his making
speeches during the meeting is called by him,
endorsing the Japanese regime may be considered as
political in nature are covered by Amnesty
Proclamation No. 51 of the January 1, 1948, which
he now invokes (People vs. Alvero, 86 Phil., 58 ). We
may therefore discard count No. 1.
Under counts 2 and 4, is the following evidence:
Bonifacio Laher, barrio lieutenant of Anlag, Abuyog
stated that on February 2, 1944, a Japanese patrol of
about 80 soldiers arrived at his barrio, headed by the
defendant Caa who was armed with a revolver.
Caa called a meeting which about 60 residents
attend. The accused made a speech in the Visayan
dialect and asked the people about the whereabouts
of Mayor Gallego and Captain Landia of the
guerrillas, saying that if they ever came with their
forces, the resident should report the matter to him or
to the Japanese government was the real government.
The patrol spent the night in the barrio and the
witness as lieutenant of the barrio was ordered by the
accused to return the following morning to
accompany the patrol. The next day, February 3rd.
Laher a accompanied the accused and the Japanese
troops to the mountains. On reaching sitio Malasiga,
The patrol passed by the houses of Gonzalo
Ablanque and Rosendo Fortaleza, and the latter was
called from his house and made to join the patrol to
the house of Daniel Bolero where the soldiers ate
pineapples and papaya. The defendant asked Bolero
who were the owners of the two houses they had
passed and on being informed that they belonged to
Ablanque and Fortaleza, appellant exclaimed: "These
are the houses where the guerrillas used to live."
Thereafter, the defendant conversed with Capt.
Mikawa who commanded the patrol, after which
Mikawa called two Japanese soldiers and ordered
them to burn the houses of Ablanque and Fortaleza.
At the time said two houses contained agricultural
products of different kinds, including furniture and
household goods. According to Fortaleza, he pleaded
with the defendant not to burn his house, but the
accused paid no attention to him and the two houses
were burned to the ground.
Laureano Pacia, a captain of the guerrillas told the
court that on February 3rd, a Japanese patrol of about
80 soldiers headed by the accused who was then
armed with a revolver, arrived at the barrio of Anlag.
The next day the patrol went to the barrio of
Malagikay. Pacia followed the patrol at a safe
distance in order to observe as per instructions of his
superiors. He saw that in Malagikay the Japanese
soldiers shot pigs and chickens for food. The
defendant called the people to attend a meeting in
front of the barrio school building at which meeting
he spoke and asked about the guerrillas , particularly
Major Gallego and Captain Landia. He urged his
hearers to fight them (the guerrillas) if they ever
came and to report their presence to the poblacion.
After the defendant, a lieutenant of the Philippine
Constabulary also spoke.
About these doings of defendant and the Japanese
patrol in Malagikay, Pacia was corroborated by
Major Gallego who was with Pacia observing what
was happening and listening to the speeches,
particularly that of the defendant.
Major Gallego in his testimony also told the People's
Court that on May 27, 1944, he saw the defendant
Caa armed with a revolver at the head of a Japanese
patrol composed of about 80 soldiers in the barrio of
San Roque, Abuyog. They shots pigs and chickens
for food and in the afternoon. The school bell and
assembled the people , and at the meeting the
defendant made a speech in the Visayan dialect,
asking the people if there were any guerrillas in the
vicinity, telling them that if they (guerrillas) came.
The people should not give them food so that they
would starve, and to report their presence to them
town so that the Japanese forces could come and
catch them. He urged the people to help the
government, the real government sponsored by the
Japanese, and not wait for the Americans go will
never come back. With sarcasm he told the people
that if they were still interested in the Americans,
they had better swim across the Pacific Ocean to get
to them in America. At the time that the accused
spoke, there were no Japanese around him. In his
testimony about the arrival of the Japanese patrol in
San Roque and the speech of the appellant, Gallego
was corroborated by Felix Balga who added that the
defendant in his speech said that to show that the
government sponsored by the Japanese was the true
government he (defendant) was accompanying the
Japanese patrol.
Pelagio Elmeda stated to court that on February 2,
1944. He was at his post at barrio Bayabas on duty as
captain of the Volunteer Guards attached to the
guerrillas under orders of Captain Landia. On that
date, he saw a Japanese patrol of about 80 soldiers
headed by the accused pass by the said barrio of
Bayabas, apparently the same patrol that later went to
the barrio of Anlag and still later to the barrio of
Malagikay on February 4th. The accused was then
carrying a revolver. When the patrol saw no people in
the said barrio the soldiers burned all the five houses
in the vicinity. The owners of said houses were then
in the mountains, having evacuated thereto because
of the fear of the Japanese.
Under the court 3, Filomeno Tupa and Marcial
Costen testified to the effect that the defendant as
Mayor asked the people in the poblacion of Abuyog
belonging to the neighborhood associations to go to
the farms and under the protection of Japanese
soldiers, harvest palay therefrom: that one-half of the
harvest was given to the harvester; one fourth to the
municipality and the remaining one-forth to the
Japanese garrison to feed its cavalry forces. The
evidence on this point, however, further shows that
almost invariably, the owners of these lands had
evacuated to the mountains and that said owners were
afraid to harvest their own palay for fear of the
Japanese soldiers who might suspect them of
harvesting said palay to give to the guerrillas who
frequented the farms. Their is reason to believe who
frequented the farms. There is reason to believe and
conclude from the evidence that these harvests of
palays directed by the defendant were not made with
the intention of aiding the enemy but rather to avoid
loss or prevent the ripe palay form rotting in the
fields and to utilized the harvest to aid the people. As
already stated , one-half of the harvest was given to
the people who effected the harvest and one-fourth
was given to the municipality, said portion according
to the uncontradicted evidence for the defense having
been utilized to feed the indigent people, and that a
portion of it was sent to the capital (Tacloban)
presumably. For the same purpose of aiding the poor
in the province.
It will be remembered that during the occupation
there was no importation of rice in order to make up
for the deficiency, our production being insufficient
for the needs of the population, and that if the palay
crop belonging to those who had evacuated to the
mountains were not harvested the critical food
situation would have worsened. It is not difficult to
see that members of the neighborhood associations
living in the poblacion of Abuyog and needing rice
for their consumption, may have even suggested to
the defendant to harvest the palay in the outlying
districts under the protection of the Japanese soldiers
against the guerrillas. Among the farms where palay
was then growing and ready for harvest there must
have been some which belonged to these very
members of neighborhood association living in the
poblacion who, fearing that the guerrillas would
interfere with the harvest of their own palay, asked
for protection from the Japanese Forces.
As to the one fourth portion of the harvest given to
the Japanese garrison, undoubtedly, said portion was
given pursuant to the wishes and orders of said
garrison for its needs and also in return for the
protection services rendered by its solders during the
harvest. We find that under the circumstances the
defendant cannot be held liable under this count No.
3.
Under count 5, Basilio Pacatan, 69 years of age,
stated in court that on June 1, 1944, a Japanese patrol
composed of about 44 soldiers headed by the
defendant who was then armed with a revolver came
to the barrio of Quarry, Abuyog and found him
pasturing his carabao. Some of the soldiers in the
patrol caught him, tied his hands behind his back and
then took him to the main body of the patrol where
the defendant was. He was asked about Capt. Landia
and Capt. Nicolas Camintoy, his (Pacatan's) son in
law, both of the guerrillas. He told them that when
Col. Kangleon passed by that place he took some of
the resident with him, presumably including
Camintoy. The defendant Caa told Pacatan that until
his son-in law Nicolas, surrendered he (Pacatan) will
be kept as a hostage. After being slapped and kicked
by the Japanese soldiers he was taken to the garrison
in the poblacion and imprisoned there for a month
and a half. As regards his arrest and his arrest and his
being tied and taken to the poblacion, Pacatan was
corroborated by his stepson Pio Balida who stated
that in the Japanese patrol there were four Filipinos,
among them the defendant Caa. He said that he saw
all this because at the time he was with his step father
Pacatan altho at some distance from him.
In connection with the imprisonment of Basilio
Pacatan in the Japanese garrison in the poblacion of
Abuyog, Filomeno Tupa and Maricel Costen in their
testimonies said that the accused had once stated
within their hearing that he would oppose the release
of Basilio Pacatan unless his son in law , Nicolas
Camintoy, a captain in the guerrilla first surrendered
and that when a delegation composed of leaders of
neighborhood association went to petition the
Japanese captain for release of Pactan, saying that he
was a good man, the defendant who was present
voiced objection to the release his (Pacatan's)
guerrilla son-in-law , Nicolas Camintoy. first
surrendered as a result of which Pacatan's release was
refused by the Japanese officer. It was further stated
that the defendant enjoyed the confidence of the
Japanese officers, in proof of which , he had
previously obtained the release of three prisoners, C.
Tan, Barcelo and Briones who had sons in the
guerrilla forces and who promised to have said
surrender to the Japanese.
In his defense, the appellant with his witnesses tried
prove that although he accompanied the Japanese
patrols in their reconnaissance trips to the barrios, he
did so not of his own free will but under compulsion
by the Japanese officer of the garrison . He also said
that he acted merely as interpreter of Japanese officer
who spoke at the meetings held in the barrios. The
People's Court did not believed this claim of the
defendant and we find nothing in the record to
warrant correcting and disturbing this mental attitude
and action of the People's Court. There is ample
evidence to show that when appellant spoke in the
barrios as head of Japanese patrols, he did not act as a
mere interpreter but that he made his own speeches.
Many times there were no Japanese around when he
spoke because the members of the patrol were either
going around the barrio or the house evidently
checking up and looking for guerrillas, or doing
things looking toward their accommodation and
shelter for the night or preparing their meals from the
pigs and chickens they had previously shot. And the
vehemence or apparent sincerity of the accused in his
speeches wherein he urged the people to support the
municipal government which he head, to support the
presence of guerrillas in the barrios and to abandon
all hope of the return of the Americans because they
were afraid of the Japanese soldiers, sufficiently
shows that he went with the patrols voluntarily and of
his own free will. He was really determined to
suppressed the guerrilla movement in his locality as
may be inferred from his speeches but also from his
strong opposition to the release from the garrison of
Basilio Pacatan unless the latter's son-in-law first
surrendered. His action telling the Japanese officer of
the patrol in the sitio of Malasiga that the houses of
Ablanque and Fortaleza had been occupied by the
guerrillas. Followed by his private conference with
said Japanese officer after which said two house were
set on fire and burned to the ground despite the pleas
of Fortaleza with him, fortifies this belief and
finding.
Considering all the evidence submitted, we agree
with the People's Court and Solicitor General that
appellant is guilty under counts 2,4 and 5. Ordinarily,
in the penalty should be imposed in its medium
degree, namely,reclusion perpetua as opined by the
Court of Appeals. However, taking a broad view of
the case, we are inclined to impose a lighter penalty
as did the People Court. We must bear in mind that
treason is not considered and punished according to
the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances provided for in Revised Penal Code. It
is a very serious crime committed during war by one
who, forgetting his loyalty and oath of allegiance to
his own country, aids the enemy and gives it aid and
comfort. The amount or degrees of said aid or
comfort given the enemy as well as the separate and
distinct acts of treason committed by the accused,
rather than the circumstances aggravating or
mitigating attending its commission. determine of the
penalty to be imposed. This court as rule, has
imposed the death penalty upon treason indicates
proven not only to have aided the enemy but also
while giving such aid, to have either tortured or killed
their own countrymen, and even then, only when the
necessary number of votes was secured. Where the
necessary number of votes could not be obtained
even when the defendant was guilty of killing or
torturing his own countrymen, the penalty imposed
has been reclusion perpetua. Where the acts of
treason by a defendant in a treason case, consist in
acting as a spy for the Japanese, as a result of which
guerrillas or suspects tortured or killed by the
Japanese forces themselves without any direct
participation by the defendant, the punishment
imposed has invariably been reclusion perpetua. That
is to say, the penalty for treason in its medium period.
And when the acts proven against an accused has
been acting as informer and spy for the enemy
resulting merely in the temporary confinement of
guerrillas suspects, we have imposed the penalty in
its minimum, namely, reclusion temporal. In other
words, we have punished the commission of treason
on the basis of the seriousness of the treasonable acts,
and of the presence or absence of atrocities on the
victim, rather the presence of atrocities on the
victims, rather than on the presence or absence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Here there
has been no killing, not even torture of prisoners, at
least not on the part of appellant. The People's Court
may have been imbued with this same attitude and
viewpoint when it imposed an imprisonment of 15
years without making any reference to the existence
of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. We
might add that the fact that the appellant has been in
jail since the beginning of a liberal and benign view
of his case.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant .
G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964
People vs Amado Hernandez
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from
the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its
Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs. Amado V.
Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No.
15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal
Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for
Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and
Robberies; the appellants are Amado V. Hernandez,
Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday,
Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino
Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were
among those sentenced in the judgment appealed
from, but they have withdrawn their appeal. In
Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the
charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and
kidnappings; the accused are Bayani Espiritu
Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all
appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal.
The information filed against defendants Hernandez
and others in Criminal Case No. 15481 alleged:
I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some
time before the said date and continuously thereafter,
until the present time, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and the place which they had chosen as
the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the
different parts of the Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each
other, as well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082,
14270, 14315 and 14344 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also
with others whose whereabouts and identities are still
unknown, the said accused and their other co-
conspirators, being then high ranking officers and/or
members of, or otherwise affiliated with the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which
is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against
the Government of the Philippines thru act
theretofore committed and planned to be further
committed in Manila and other places in the
Philippines, and of which party the "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or
formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks),
unlawfully and did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote,
maintain, cause, direct and/or command the
"Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the
"Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms
against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise
participate in such armed public uprising, for the
purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines
from the allegiance to the government and laws
thereof as in fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan" or "Hukbalahaps" have risen publicly and
taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and
there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes,
attacks against police, constabulary and army
detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a
necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in
connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have
then and there committed acts of murder, pillage,
looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of
private and public property to create and spread
chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as. follows,
to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen attacks on
government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6,
1946, August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947,
August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949, August
25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950,
September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29,
1950.)
II. That during the period of time and under the same
circumstances herein-above indicated the said
accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among
themselves and with several others as aforesaid,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized,
established, led and/or maintained the Congress of
Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the
Committee on Labor Organizations (CLO), with
central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated
or associated labor unions and other "mass
organizations" in different places in the Philippines,
as an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and as
such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully
cooperate in, and synchronize its activities as the
CLO thus organized, established, led and/or
maintained by the herein accused and their co-
conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and
synchronized its activities with the activities of the
"Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) and
other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to
thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and
permanent success of the above-mentioned armed
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
The information filed against the defendants in
Criminal Case No. 15479, Bayani Espiritu Andres
Baisa, Jr. and Teopista Valerio, alleges:
That on or about the 6th day of May, 1946, and for
sometime prior and subsequent thereto and
continuously up to the present time, in the City of
Manila, the seat of the government of the Republic of
the Philippines, which the herein accused have
intended to overthrow, and the place chosen for that
purpose as the nerve center of all their rebellious
atrocities in the different parts of the country, the said
accused being then high ranking officials and/or
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(P.K.P.) and/or of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan" (H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the
"Hukbalahaps" (HUKS), the latter being the armed
forces of said Communist Party of the Philippines;
having come to an agreement with the 29 of the 31
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 14071, 14082,
14270, 14315, 14344 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and decided to commit the crime of rebellion,
and therefore, conspiring and confederating with all
of the 29 accused in said criminal cases, acting in
accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance
thereof, together with many others whose
whereabouts and identities are still unknown up to
the filing of this information, and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously promote maintain, cause, direct and/or
command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan",
(HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) to rise publicly
and take Arms against the Government or otherwise
participate therein for the purpose of overthrowing
the same, as in fact, the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya
Ng Bayan" or Hukbalahap (HUKS) have risen
publicly and taken arms against the Government, by
then and there making armed raids, sorties and
ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and
army detachment, and as a necessary means to
commit the crime of rebellion, in connection
therewith and in furtherance thereof, by then and
there committing wanton acts of murder, spoilage,
looting, arson, kidnappings, planned destruction of
private and public buildings, to create and spread
terrorism in order to facilitate the accomplishment of
the aforesaid purpose, as follows to wit:
(Enumeration of thirteen attacks on Government
forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946. August
6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19,
1947, June 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950,
August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12,
1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950).
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the
court rendered the decision subject of the present
appeals.
APPEAL OF AMADO V. HERNANDEZ
After trial the Court of First Instance found, as
against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
following: (1) that he is a member of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases,
namely, Victor or Soliman; (2) that he was furnished
copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as
other publications of the Party; (3) that he held the
position of President of the Congress of Labor
Organizations; (4) that he had close connections with
the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held
continuous communications with its leaders and its
members; (5) that he furnished a mimeographing
machine used by the Communist Party, as well as
clothes and supplies for the military operations of the
Huks; (6) that he had contacted well-known
Communists coming to the Philippines and had gone
abroad to the WFTU conference Brussels, Belgium
as a delegate of the CLO, etc. Evidence was also
received by the court that Hernandez made various
speeches encouraging the people to join in the Huk
movement in the provinces.
The court also found that there was a close tie-up
between the Communist Party and the Congress of
Labor Organizations, of which Hernandez was the
President, and that this Congress was organized by
Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely:
Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos, Guillermo
Capadocia, etc.
We will now consider the nature and character of
both the testimonial as well as the documentary
evidence, independently of each other, to find out if
the said evidence supports the findings of the court.
Testimonial Evidence
Amado V. Hernandez took the oath as member of the
Communist Party in the month of October, 1947, at
the offices of the Congress of Labor Organizations at
2070 Azcarraga in the presence of Guillermo
Capadocia, Ramon Espiritu, Pedro Castro, Andres
Balsa, etc. As a Communist he was given the
pseudonyms of Victor and Soliman, and received
copies of the Communist paper "Titis". He made
various speeches on the following dates and
occasions:
(1) On August 29, 1948 before the Democratic Peace
Rally of the CLO at Plaza Miranda, in which he
announced that the people will soon meet their dear
comrade in the person of Comrade Luis Taruc.
(2) On September 4, 1948 he conferred with Hindu
Khomal Goufar at the Escolta, at which occasion
Balgos told Goufar that the PKM, CLO and the Huks
are in one effort that the PKM are the peasants in the
field and the Huks are the armed forces of the
Communist Party; and the CLO falls under the TUD
of the Communist Party. 1wph1.t
(3) On October 2, 1948 he went abroad to attend the
Second Annual Convention of the World Federation
of Trade Unions and after arrival from abroad a
dinner was given to him by the people of Gagalangin,
at which Hernandez delivered a speech and he said
that he preferred to go with the Huks because he felt
safer with them than with the authorities of the
Government.
(4) In April, 1949, he made a speech before a group
of tenants in Malabon attacking the frauds in the
1947 elections, graft and corruption in the elections
and that if improvement cannot be made by the
ballots, they could be made by bullets; and enjoined
the people to go to the hills and join Luis Taruc the
head of the dissidents in the Philippines.
(5) On October 2, 1949 he delivered a speech on the
occasion of the commemoration of the World Peace
at the CLO headquarters at 330 P. Campa. He
attacked the city mayor and incited the people to go
to Balintawak and see Bonifacio there and thereafter
join four comrades under the leadership of Luis
Taruc.
(6) On October 16, 1949 he delivered a speech before
a convention of the unemployed at 330 P. Campa. He
asked the unemployed to approve a resolution urging
the Government to give them jobs. In conclusion he
said that if the Government fails to give them jobs the
only way out was to join the revolutionary forces
fighting in the hills. He further said that Mao Tse
Tung, leader of the People's Army in China, drove
Chiang Kai Shek from his country, and that Luis
Taruc was also being chased by Government forces
run by puppets like Quirino, etc.
(7) On January 13, 1950 there was another meeting at
330 P. Campa. In his talk Hernandez expressed regret
that two foremost leaders of the CLO, Balgos and
Capadocia, had gone to the field to join the liberation
army of the HMB, justifying their going out and
becoming heroes by fighting in the fields against
Government forces until the ultimate goal is
achieved.
The above evidence was testified to by Florentino
Diolata who was the official photographer of the
CLO since August, 1948.
On the tie-up between the Communist Party and the
CLO Guillermo Calayag, a Communist and a Huk
from 1942 to 1950, explained:
(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to
overthrow the president government by force of aims
and violence; thru armed revolution and replace it
with the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat the
Communist Party carries its program of armed
overthrow of the present government by organizing
the HMB and other forms of organization's such as
the CLO, PKM, union organizations, and the
professional and intellectual group; the CLO was
organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the
Communist Party.
(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive
Committee and the Central Committee of the CLO
were also top ranking officials of the Communist
Party; activities undertaken by the TUD - the vital
undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives
coming from the organizational bureau of the
Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO
especially the Executive Committee. And it is a fact
that since a good majority of the members of the
Executive Committee are party members, there is no
time, there is no single time that those directives and
decisions of the organizational department, thru the
TUD are being objected to by the Executive
Committee of the CLO. These directives refer to how
the CLO will conduct its functions. The executive
committee is under the chairmanship of accused
Amado V. Hernandez.
(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist
program of armed overthrow of the present
government and its replacement by the dictatorship of
the proletariat by means of propaganda - by
propagating the principles of Communism, by giving
monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other forms of
material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in
the very constitution of the CLO itself which
expounded the theory of classless society and the
eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2,
page 18 of the CLO Constitution contained in the
Fourth Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the
CLO Exh. "V-1579"). Thru propaganda, the CLO
promoted the aims of Communist Party and
disseminated Communist ideas by:
(a) The conspicuous display of the portrait or,
pictures of Crisanto Evangelista (Exh. V-1662),
founder of Communism in the Philippines, in the
session hall of the CLO headquarters at 2070
Azcarraga and then at 330 P. Campa;
(b) The distribution of foreign communist reading
materials such as the World Federation of Trade
Union Magazine, International Union of Students
magazine, Voice magazine of the marine cooks of the
CLO, World Committee of the Defenders of the
Peace magazine, Free Bulgaria magazine, Soviet
Russia Today magazine and World Federation of
Democratic Youth magazine (Exhs. V-911, V-907,
V-910, V-899, V-912, V-853, W-996 and V-967);
(c) The publication and distribution of some local
subversive publications such as the "Titis", "Bisig",
Kidlat", which are Communist Party organs; "The
Philippine Labor Demands Justice" and "Hands Off
Korea" authored by accused Amado V. Hernandez;
(d) Principles of Communism were also propagated
thru lectures, meetings, and by means of organization
of committees in the educational department as well
as researches in the Worker's Institute of the CLO.
(4) The CLO also helped carry out the program of the
Communist Party thru infiltration of party members
and selected leaders of the HMB within the trade
unions under the control of the CLO. The Communist
Party thru the CLO assigned Communist Party
leaders and organizers to different factories in order
to organize unions. After the organization of the
union, it will affiliate itself with the CLO thru the
Communist leaders and the CLO in turn, will register
said union with the Department of Labor; and the
orientation and indoctrination of the workers is
continued in the line of class struggle. After this
orientation and infiltration of the Communist Party
members and selected leaders of the HMB with the
trade unions under the control of the CLO is already
achieved and the group made strong enough to carry
out its aims, they will begin the sporadic strikes and
the liquidation of anti-labor elements and anti-
Communist elements and will create a so-called
revolutionary crisis. That revolutionary crisis will be
done for the party to give directives to the HMB who
are fighting in the countrysides and made them come
to the city gates. The entry of the HMB is being
paved by the simultaneous and sporadic strikes, by
ultimate general strikes thru the management of the
CLO.
Important Documents Submitted at Trial
1. Documents which proved that Amado V.
Hernandez used the aliases "Victor", or was referred
to as "Victor" or "Soliman".
(a) Letter dated April 23, 1950 (signed)
by Victor addressed to Julie telling the latter of his
sympathies for other communists, describing his
experiences with Communists abroad, telling Julie to
dispose of materials that may be sent by Victor. (Exh.
D-2001-2004)
(b) "Paano Maisasagawa, etc." mentions different
groups of labor unions of which Victor heads one
group, consisting of the MRRCO, PTLD, PGWU,
EMWU and IRWU (Exh. C-2001-2008) Cadres
assigned to different industries. (Exh. V-40-41)
(c) Handwritten certificate of Honofre Mangila states
that he knew Amado Hernandez as Victor from co-
party members Hugo and Ely. (Exh. LL)
(d) Letter of Elias to Ka Eto requesting the latter to
deliver attached letter to Victor. (Exh. 1103)
(e) Saulo's letter about his escape, asks Victor why
his press statement was not published in the
newspapers. (Exh. C-362) Letter was however
published by Hernandez in the Daily Mirror.
(f) Letter of Taruc to Maclang directing the latter to
give copy of Huk Story to Victor. (Exh. D-463-64)
(g) Notes of Salome Cruz, Huk courier, stating that
she went to Soliman at Pampanga St. to bring to the
latter communications from the Communist Party.
(Exh. D-1203) That Soliman was given copies of
"Titis". (Exh. D-1209)
(h) SEC directions to Politburo members, Soliman
not to be involved with Nacionalista Rebels. (Exh. F-
92-93. SEC)
(i) Letter of SEC to Politburo reporting that Saulo be
sent out and Soliman has "tendencies of careerism
and tendency to want to deal with leaders of the
party"; that he should be asked to choose to go
underground or fight legally. (Exh. F-562)
(j) Explanation given by Hernandez why he did not
join Saulo in going underground. (Exh. V-87) (1) His
election as councilor until December, 1951. (Exhs.
V-42, W-9) (2) His election as President of CLO
until August of following year. (Exhs. V-42, W-9)
2. Letters and Messages of Hernandez.
(a) To Lyden Henry and Harry Reich, tells Huks still
fighting. (Exh. V-80)
(b) To SOBSI Jakarta that Filipinos are joining
other communist countries of the East. (Exh. V-82)
(c) Press release on Saulo's disappearance published
by Amado Hernandez. (Exh. W-116-120)
(d) To Hugh and Eddie, July 8, 1949 Extends
greetings to National Union of Marine Cooks and
Stewards, states that labor has one common struggle
"the liberation of all the peoples from the chains
of tyranny, fascism and imperialism". (Exh. V-259)
(e) To Kas. Pablo and Estrada - talks of the fight -
fight of labor. (Exh. V-85-89)
(f) Appeal to the Women and Asia. (Exh. V-5-10)
(g) Letter to Julie (Exh. V-2001-2004)
(h) Letter to Chan Lieu - states that leaders during the
war are being persecuted, like Taruc. Tells of reward
of P100,000.00 on Taruc's head. (Exh. X-85-88)
(i) Letter to John Gates of the Daily Worker
condemns Wall Street maneuvers; corruption and
graft in Quirino administration, etc. (Exh. V-83)
(j) Cablegram: CLO join ILWU commends Harry
Bridges, US Communist. (Exh. V-79)
(k) Communication of Hernandez to CLO at
MRRCO Praises Balgos and Capadocia for
joining the Huks. (Exhs. V-12-22, V-289)
(l) "Philippine labor Demands Justice" Attacks
czars of Wall Street and U.S. Army and Government.
(Exh. V-94) .
(m) Letter to Taruc June 28, 1948.-States
solidarity among the CLO Huks and PKM. Attacks
North Atlantic Pact. Praises Mao Tse Tung
(contained in Exh. V-94)
(n) "Philippines Is Not A Paradise" States of a
delegation to Roxas attacking unemployment. (Exh.
V-90-93)
(o) Article "Progressive Philippines" (Exh. V-287)
(p) Article "Hands Off Korea" (Exhs. V-488-494,
495-501, 509-515, W-25-26)
(q) "Limang Buwang Balak Sa Pagpapalakas Ng
Organisasyon". (Exh. X-35-38)
(r) Press statement of Hernandez opposes
acceptance of decorations from Greece by Romulo.
(Exh. V-72)
3. Other Activities of Hernandez.
(a) Hernandez received clothes from Pres. Lines thru
P. Campa, which clothes he sent to the field. Letters
show of sending of supplies to Huks. (Exh. S-383)
(b) Hernandez was asked to furnish portable
typewriter, which he did furnish to Huks. (Exh. C-
364)
(c) Hernandez brought Taruc's letter about facts and
incidents about Huks to Bulosan for inclusion in
Bulosan's book. (Exh. FF-1)
(d) Had conference with Kumar Goshal a Hindu,
about the Huks and their armed forces. (Photographs,
Exhs. X-6 RR-54-55A)
(e) Supervised taking of pictures of sons of
Capadocia and Joven. (Photographs, Exhs. T-1, RR-
136-138A)
(f) Had knowledge of the going underground of
Capadocia and Balgos and issued press release about
their going underground. (Exh. F-91)
(g) Victor mentioned to continue as contact for
Chino. (Exh. C-362)
(h) Taruc's letter to Maclang shows that Soliman had
sent 7 lessons to Taruc. (Exh. D-451-451-A)
(i) Associated with fellow ranking Communist
leaders.
The Court upon consideration of the evidence
submitted, found (1) that the Communist Party was
fully organized as a party and in order to carry out its
aims and policies a established a National Congress,
a Central Committee (CC), Politburo PB, Secretariat
(SEC), Organization Bureau (OB), and National
Courier or Communication Division (NCD), each
body performing functions indicated in their
respective names; (2) that in a meeting held on
August 11, 1950 the SEC discussed the creation of a
Military Committee of the Party and a new GHQ,
under which on September 29, 1950 the SEC
organized a special warfare division, with a
technological division; (3) that on May 5, 1950 a
body known as the National Intelligence Division
was created, to gather essential military intelligence
and, in general, all information useful for the conduct
of the armed struggle (4) that a National Finance
Committee was also organized as a part of the
Politburo and answerable to it; (5) that the country
was divided into 10 Recos, the 10th Reco comprising
the Manila and suburbs command; (6) that since
November, 1949 the CPP had declared the existence
of a revolutionary situation and since then the Party
had gone underground and the CPP is leading the
armed struggle for national liberation, and called on
the people to organize guerrillas and coordinate with
the HMB on the decisive struggle and final
overthrow of the imperialist government; (7) that in
accordance with such plan the CPP prepared plans
for expansion and development not only of the Party
but also of the HMB; the expansion of the cadres
from 3,600 in July 1950 to 56,000 in September
1951, the HMB from 10,800 in July 1950 to 172,000
in September 1951, et seq.
Around the month of January, 1950 it was decided by
the CPP to intensify HMB military operations for
political purposes. The Politburo sanctioned the
attacks made by the Huks on the anniversary of the
HMB on March 25, 1950. The HMB attacks that
were reported to the PB were those made in May,
1946; June, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947;
August 19, 1947; August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950;
October 15 and 17, 1950; May 6, 1946; August 6,
1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947;
April 29, 1949; August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950;
September 12, 1950; March 26, 1950; March 29,
1950.
The theory of the prosecution, as stated in the lower
court's decision, is as follows:
The evidence does not show that the defendants in
these cases now before this Court had taken a direct
part in those raids and in the commission of the
crimes that had been committed. It is not, however,
the theory of the prosecution that they in fact had
direct participation in the commission of the same but
rather that the defendants in these cases have
cooperated, conspired and confederated with the
Communist Party in the prosecution and successful
accomplishment of the aims and purposes of the said
Party thru the organization called the CLO (Congress
of Labor Organizations).
The Court found that the CLO is independent and
separate from the CPP, organized under the same
pattern as the CPP, having its own National
Congress, a Central Committee (which acts in the
absence of and in representation of the National
Congress), an Executive Committee (which acts
when the National Congress and the Executive
Committee are not in session), and seven permanent
Committees, namely, of Organization,
Unemployment and Public Relations, Different
Strikes and Pickets, Finance, Auditing, Legislation
and Political Action. Members of the Communist
Party dominate the committees of the CLO. The
supposed tie-up between CPP and the CLO of which
Hernandez was the President, is described by the
court below in finding, thus:
Just how the CLO coordinates its functions with the
Communist Party organ under which it operates was
explained by witness Guillermo S. Calayag, one-time
ranking member of the Communist Party and the
CLO who typewrites the "Patnubay sa Education"
from a handwritten draft of Capadocia, which is one
of the texts used in the Worker's institute of the CLO.
According to him, the CLO plays its role by means of
propaganda, giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine
and other material forms of help to the HMB, which
constitutes the armed forces of the Communist Party.
Propaganda is done by lectures, meetings, and the
organization of committees of the educational
department as well as researches at the CLO
Worker's Institute.
Another way of helping the Communist Party of the
Philippines is by allowing the Communist Party
leaders to act as organizers in the different factories
in forming a union. These Party Members help
workers in the factories to agitate for the eradication
of social classes and ultimately effect the total
emancipation of the working classes thru the
establishment of the so-called dictatorship of the
proletariat. It is the duty of these Communist Party
members to indoctrinate uninitiated workers in the
union to become proselytes of the Communist Party
ideology. After the right number is secured and a
union is formed under a communist leader, this union
is affiliated with the CLO and this in turn registers
the same with the Department of Labor. The
orientation and indoctrination of the masses is
continued with the help of the CLO. The primary
objective of the CLO is to create what is called a
revolutionary crisis. It seeks to attain this objective
by first making demands from the employers for
concessions which become more and more
unreasonable until the employers would find it
difficult to grant the same. Then a strike is declared.
But the strikes are only preparation for the ultimate
attainment of the Communist goal of armed
overthrow of the government. After the workers in
the factories have already struck in general at the
behest of the Communist Party thru the CLO a
critical point is reached when a signal is given for the
armed forces of the Communist Party, the HMB, to
intervene and carry the revolution now being
conducted outside to within the city.
On the basis of the above findings, the court below
found Hernandez guilty as principal of the crime
charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories
provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount
of the costs.
Our study of the testimonial and documentary
evidence, especially those cited by the Court in its
decision and by the Solicitor General in his brief,
discloses that defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, as a Communist, was an active advocate
of the principles of Communism, frequently
exhorting his hearers to follow the footsteps of Taruc
and join the uprising of the laboring classes against
capitalism and more specifically against America and
the Quirino administration, which he dubbed as a
regime of puppets of American imperialism. But
beyond the open advocacy of Communistic Theory
there appears no evidence that he actually
participated in the actual conspiracy to overthrow by
force the constituted authority.
Hernandez is the founder and head of the CLO. As
such, what was his relation to the rebellion? If, as
testified to by Guillermo S. Calayag, the CLO plays
merely the role of propagation by lectures, meetings
and organization of committees of education by
Communists; if, as stated, the CLO merely allowed
Communist Party leaders to act as organizers in the
different factories, to indoctrinate the CLO members
into the Communist Party and proselytize them to the
Communist ideology; if, as also indicated by
Calayag, the CLO purports to attain the ultimate
overthrow of the Government first by making
demands from employers for concessions until the
employers find it difficult to grant the same, at which
time a strike is declared; if it is only after the various
strikes have been carried out and a crisis is thereby
developed among the laboring class, that the
Communist forces would intervene and carry the
revolution it is apparent that the CLO was merely
a stepping stone in the preparation of the laborers for
the Communist' ultimate revolution. In other words,
the CLO had no function but that of indoctrination
and preparation of the members for the uprising that
would come. It was only a preparatory organization
prior to revolution, not the revolution itself. The
leader of the CLO therefore, namely Hernandez,
cannot be considered as a leader in actual rebellion or
of the actual uprising subject of the accusation.
Hernandez, as President of the CLO therefore, by his
presidency and leadership of the CLO cannot be
considered as having actually risen up in arms in
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines,
or taken part in the conspiracy to commit the
rebellion as charged against him in the present case;
he was merely a propagandist and indoctrinator of
Communism, he was not a Communist conspiring to
commit the actual rebellion by the mere fact of his
presidency of the CLO.
The court below declares that since November 1949
the Communist Party of the Philippines had declared
the existence of the revolutionary situation and since
then the Party had gone underground, with the CPP
leading the struggle for national integration and that
in the month of January 1950, it was decided by the
said Party to intensify the HMB military operations
for political purposes. The court implicates the
appellant Hernandez as a co-conspirator in this
resolution or acts of the Communist Party by his
mere membership thereto. We find this conclusion
unwarranted. The seditious speeches of Hernandez
took place before November, 1949 when the CPP
went underground. The court below has not been able
to point out, nor have We been able to find among all
acts attributed to Hernandez, any single fact or act of
his from which it may be inferred that he took part in
the deliberations declaring the existence of a
revolutionary situation, or that he had gone
underground. As a matter of fact the prosecution's
evidence is to the effect that Hernandez refused to go
underground preferring to engage in what they
consider the legal battle for the cause.
We have also looked into the different documents
which have been presented at the time of the trial and
which were confiscated from the office of the
Politburo of the Communist Party. The speeches of
Hernandez were delivered before the declaration by
the Communist Party of a state of revolutionary
situation in 1949. Neither was it shown that
Hernandez was a member of the Executive
Committee, or of the SEC, or of the Politburo of the
Communist Party; so NO presumption can arise that
he had taken part in the accord or conspiracy
declaring a revolution. In short, there has been no
evidence, direct or indirect, to relate or connect the
appellant Hernandez with the uprising or the
resolution to continue or maintain said uprising, his
participation in the deliberations leading to the
uprising being inferred only from the fact that he was
a communist.
The practice among the top Communists, as declared
by the trial court appears to have been for important
members, if they intend actually to join the
rebellion, to go underground, which meant leaving
the city, disappearing from sight and/or secretly
joining the forces in the field.
The document, Exhibit F-562, which is quoted in the
decision, contains the directive of the SEC of
September 1, 1950, to Saulo and Hernandez, which
reads:
11. In view of the new developments in the city, send
out Elias who prefers to work outside. Present
problem of fighting legally to Com. Soliman. If
Soliman is prepared for martyrdom, retain him to
fight legally. If not, send him out with Elias. Same
goes with Com. Mino and other relatively exposed
mass leaders.
And the lower court itself found that whereas Saulo
went underground and joined the underground forces
outside the City, Hernandez remained in the City,
engaged in the work of propaganda, making speeches
and causing the publication of such matters as the
Communist Party leaders directed him to publish.
That Hernandez refused to go underground is a fact
which is further corroborated by the following
reasons (excuses) given by him for not going
underground, namely (1) that his term of councilor of
the City of Manila was to extend to December, 1951;
and (2) that he was elected President of the CLO for a
term which was to end the year 1951.
As a matter of fact the SEC gave instructions to
Hernandez not to be involved with Nacionalista
Rebels, and reported to the Politburo that Hernandez
"has tendencies of careerism, and tending to want to
deal with leaders of the Nacionalista Party instead of
following CPP organizational procedures."
The court below further found that Hernandez had
been furnishing supplies for the Huks in the field. But
the very document dated December 3, 1949, Exhibit
D-420422, cited in the decision (printed, p. 49), is to
the effect that clothes and shoes that Hernandez was
supposed to have sent have not been received. It is
true that some clothes had been sent thru him to the
field, but these clothes had come from a crew
member of a ship of the American President Lines.
He also, upon request, sent a portable typewriter to
the SEC or Politburo. Furthermore, a certain Niagara
Duplicating machine received by Hernandez from
one Rolland Scott Bullard a crew member of the SS
President Cleveland, appease later to have been
forwarded by him to the officers of the SEC or the
Politburo.
Lastly, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP
leaders used to send notes to appellant Hernandez,
who in turn issued press releases for which he found
space in the local papers. His acts in this respect
belong to the category of propaganda, to which he
appears to have limited his actions as a Communist.
The acts of the appellant as thus explained and
analyzed fall under the category of acts of
propaganda, but do not prove that he actually and in
fact conspired with the leaders of the Communist
Party in the uprising or in the actual rebellion, for
which acts he is charged in the information. And his
refusal to go underground because of his political
commitments occasioned by his term of election as
president of the CLO and the impressions caused by
his acts on the Communist leaders, to the effect that
he was in direct communication or understanding
with the Nacionalista Party to which he was
affiliated, creates in Us the reasonable doubt that it
was not his Communistic leanings but his political
ambitions, that motivated his speeches sympathizing
with the Huks. For which reason We hold that the
evidence submitted fails to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that he has conspired in the instigation of the
rebellion for which he is held to account in this
criminal case.
The question that next comes up for resolution is:
Does his or anyone's membership in the Communist
Party per se render Hernandez or any Communist
guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion under the
provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code?
The pertinent provision reads:
ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion or insurrection. The conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be
punished, respectively, by prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed
5,000 pesos, and by prision correccional in its
medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic
theory and principle is not to be considered as a
criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or
converted into an advocacy of action. In the very
nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or
principle is insufficient unless the communist
advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual
agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an
agreement forged to use force and violence in an
uprising of the working class to overthrow
constituted authority and seize the reins of
Government itself. Unless action is actually
advocated or intended or contemplated, the
Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief
in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does
not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of
Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not
yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal
field subject to punishment. Only when the
Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war
or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion. Borrowing the language of the
Supreme Court of the United States:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the
imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct
can only be justified by reference to the relationship
of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal
activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that
relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy
the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand
attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Membership, without more, in an
organization engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now
said, has not heretofore been recognized by this Court
to be such a relationship. ... .
What must be met, then, is the argument that
membership, even when accompanied by the
elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an
insufficient quantum of participation in the
organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an
insufficiently significant form of aid and
encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal
sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be recognized
that a person who merely becomes a member of an
illegal organization, by that "act" alone need be doing
nothing more than signifying his assent to its
purposes and activities on one hand, and providing,
on the other, only the sort of moral encouragement
which comes from the knowledge that others believe
in what the organization is doing. It may indeed be
argued that such assent and encouragement do fall
short of the concrete, practical impetus given to a
criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a
commitment on the part of the conspirator to act in
furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as
distinguished from a conspirator, may indicate his
approval of a criminal enterprise by the very fact of
his membership without thereby necessarily
committing himself to further it by any act or course
of conduct whatever. (Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)
The most important activity of appellant Hernandez
appears to be the propagation of improvement of
conditions of labor through his organization, the
CLO. While the CLO of which he is the founder and
active president, has communistic tendencies, its
activity refers to the strengthening of the unity and
cooperation between labor elements and preparing
them for struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated in
the need of an actual war with or against Capitalism.
The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and
it is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor
activities especially in connection with the CLO and
other trade unions, were impelled and fostered by the
desire to secure the labor vote to support his political
ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster
the labor union of which he was the head was
impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of
Communism, not merely to advance his political
aspirations.
Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a
Communist are concerned, We have not found, nor
has any particular act on his part been pointed to Us,
which would indicate that he had advocated action or
the use of force in securing the ends of Communism.
True it is, he had friends among the leaders of the
Communist Party, and especially the heads of the
rebellion, but this notwithstanding, evidence is
wanting to show that he ever attended their meetings,
or collaborated and conspired with said leaders in
planning and encouraging the acts of rebellion, or
advancing the cause thereof. Insofar as the furnishing
of the mimeograph machine and clothes is concerned,
it appears that he acted merely as an intermediary,
who passed said machine and clothes on to others. It
does not appear that he himself furnished funds or
material help of his own to the members of the
rebellion or to the forces of the rebellion in the field.
But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go
underground, in spite of the apparent desire of the
chief of the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-
participation in the conspiracy to engage in or to
foster the rebellion or the uprising.
We next consider the question as to whether the fact
that Hernandez delivered speeches of propaganda in
favor of Communism and in favor of rebellion can be
considered as a criminal act of conspiracy to commit
rebellion as defined in the law. In this respect, the
mere fact of his giving and rendering speeches
favoring Communism would not make him guilty of
conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the
hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there
agreed to rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining
the overthrow of the democratic government as
envisaged by the principles of Communism. To this
effect is the following comment of Viada:
CUESTION 10. El que hace propaganda entre sus
convecinos, induciendoles a que el dia que se
anunciara la subasta de consumes se echaran a la
calle para conseguir aunque fuera preciso acudir a la
fuerza el reparto entre los vecinos ricos solamente,
sera responsable de un delito de conspiracion para la
sedicion? El Tribunal Supreme ha resuelto la
negative al casar cierta sentencia de la Audiencia de
Valencia, que entendio lo contrario: "Considerando
que, con areglo a lo que dispone el art. 4. del Codigo
Penal, hay conspiracion cuando dos o mas personas
se conciertan para la execution de un delito y
resuelven cmeterlo; y no constando que existiera ese
concierto en cuanto a los hechos que se refieren en la
tercera pregunta del veredicto, pues en ella solo se
habla de los actos de induccion que el procesado
realizo, sin expresar el efecto que la mismo produjo
en el animo de las personas a quienes se dirigian, ni
si estas aceptaron o no lo que se las propuso, resulta
evidence que faltan los clementos integrantes de la
conspiracion, etc." (Se. de 5 de Julio de 1907, Gaceta
de 7 de Enero de 1909.) (Viada, Tomo I, Codigo
Penal, p. 152)
In view of all the above circumstances We find that
there is no concrete evidence proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant (Hernandez)
actually participated in the rebellion or in any act of
conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the
rebellion. We are constrained, in view of these
circumstances, to absolve, as We hereby absolve, the
appellant Amado V. Hernandez from the crime
charged, with a proportionate share of the costs de
oficio.
APPEAL OF OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
All the other defendants were found guilty as
accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in
the information and were each sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, with
the accessories provided by law, and to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.
Legal Considerations. Before proceeding to
consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is
believed useful if not necessary to lay dawn the
circumstances or facts that may be determinative of
their criminal responsibility or the existence or nature
thereof. To begin with, as We have exhaustively
discussed in relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we
do not believe that mere membership in the
Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member
liable, either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit
rebellion, because mere membership and nothing
more merely implies advocacy of abstract theory or
principle without any action being induced thereby;
and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is
coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely,
actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or
acts conducive thereto or evincing the same.
On the other hand, membership in the HMB
(Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual
uprising or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend,
the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from
thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already
advocates uprising and the use of force, and by such
membership he agrees or conspires that force be used
to secure the ends of the party. Such membership,
therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the
member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion
punishable by law.
And when a Huk member, not content with his
membership, does anything to promote the ends of
the rebellion like soliciting contributions, or acting as
courier, he thereby becomes guilty of conspiracy,
unless he takes to the field and joins in the rebellion
or uprising, in which latter case he commits rebellion.
In U.S. v. Vergara, infra, the defendants organized a
secret society commonly known as the "Katipunan",
the purpose of which was to overthrow the
government by force. Each of the defendants on
various times solicited funds from the people of
Mexico, Pampanga. The Court held that the
defendants were guilty of conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion or insurrection and not of rebellion
or insurrection itself. Thus, the Court ruled that:
From the evidence adduced in this case we are of the
opinion that the said defendants are guilty, not of
inciting, setting or foot, or assisting or engaging in
rebellion, but rather of the crime of conspiring to
overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the
Government of the United States in the Philippine
Islands, and therefore we find that said defendants,
and each of them, did, together with others, in the
months of February and March, 1903, in the Province
of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, conspire to
overthrow, put down, and to destroy by force the
Government of the United States in the Philippine
Islands. (U.S. v. Vergara, et al., 3 Phil. 432, 434.)
JUAN J. CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist with various
aliases, a member of the Central Committee of the
CLO member of the Central Committee of the CPP
and as such committed to the establishment of the
dictatorship of the proletariat To the same effect is
the testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
There is no evidence to connect him with the
rebellion or to the conspiracy to commit rebellion. He
should therefore be absolved of the charges contained
in the information.
AMADO RACANDAY
The trial court found him guilty as a Communist, a
Secretary and Executive Committee member of the
CLO a communications center of the Communist
Party, having been found in possession of letters from
Federico Maclang to Salome Cruz, and solicitor of
contributions for the Huks.
Racanday admits being a member of the Executive
Committee of the CLO Editor of the Kidlat of the
Government Workers Union, receiving copies of the
Titis. Calayag testified that he was a member of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party entrusted
with the duty of receiving directives of the Regional
Committee of the Communist Party.
The letters found in his possession are dated February
14, 1950, before the Communist Party went
underground. We have been unable to find the
evidence upon which the court bases its conclusion
that he received contributions for the Huks. With
these circumstances in mind, We are not convinced
beyond reasonable doubt that as a Communist he
took part in the conspiracy among the officials of the
Communist Party to take part and support the
rebellion of the Huks.
We are, therefore, constrained to absolve him of the
charges filed against him.
GENARO DE LA CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist since 1945,
an officer of an organized Communist branch in
Pasay City, a member of the Central Committee and
Treasurer of the CLO. He admitted his membership
and his position as member of the executive
committee and treasurer of the CLO these facts being
corroborated by the witness Guillermo Calayag.
His membership in the Communist Party dates as far
back as the year 1945. As a communist, Genaro de la
Cruz received quotas and monetary contributions
coming from the areas under his jurisdiction, and one
time he made a receipt from a member from
Caloocan at the CLO headquarters at Azcarraga
signing the receipt as "Gonzalo" which is one of his
aliases. He also distributed copies of the "Titis"
magazine. `
While his membership in the Communist Party plus
his having received contributions for the party
indicate that he is an active member, it was not
shown that the contributions that he received from
Communist Party members were received around the
year 1950 when the Central Committee of the
Communist Party had already agreed to conspire and
go underground and support the Huk rebellion. Under
these circumstances We cannot find him guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion because of the lack of
evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
JULIAN LUMANOG
The court found him to be an organizer of HMB
among the mill workers, solicited contributions for
the HMB and Central Committee member of the
CLO as per Testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
He admitted that he joined the Communist Party
because he was made to believe that the Party is for
the welfare of the laborers. He also admitted being a
member of the Central Committee of the CLO
Calayag testified that Lumanog organized the HMB
units of the Communist Party in the Lumber Unions
and attended a Communist meeting held by Maclang.
Domingo Clarin testified that he (Julian Lumanog)
used to give the money collected by him to one
Nicasio Pamintuan, one of the members of the HMB
Special Unit Trigger Squad) in Manila for the use of
the said unit.
Considering that the HMB was engaged in a rebellion
to overthrow the government, it is evident that by
giving his contributions he actually participated in the
conspiracy to overthrow the government and should,
therefore, be held liable for such conspiracy, and
should be sentenced accordingly.
FERMIN RODILLAS
The trial court found that Fermin Rodillas was a
member of the CPP and the CLO that his activities
consisted in soliciting contributions, in cash and in
kind, from city residents for the use of the HMB,
turning over said collections to the Party; that he has
given asylum to a wanted Hukbalahap at his house at
Juan Luna St., Gagalangin, which house was used as
Military post. The above findings of the court are
fully supported by the testimony of Domingo Clarin.
Considering that while he has not actually taken part
in the rebellion, he has shown sympathy with the
cause by soliciting contributions for it and had given
shelter to the Huks. We feel that the court was fully
justified in finding him guilty, but We hold that he
should be declared liable merely as a co-conspirator
in the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, and
should be sentenced accordingly.
BAYANI ESPIRITU
This appellant was found by the court to be a
Communist, he having admitted membership in the
Communist Party since 1945; that his duties as a
Communist was to help in the office of the National
Finance Committee, assorting papers and written
documents; that sometimes he accompanied the
purchaser of medicines, shoes, papers, foodstuffs and
clothing to be given to the Huks; that he is a member
of the Communication Division of the CPP in
Manila, in charge of distribution of letters or
communications; that he admits having written to
Salome Cruz, courier of the Communist Party, when
he asked for his necessities, such as money and
shoes, etc.
The facts found by the court are sufficiently
supported by the communications and evidence
submitted by the prosecution. The exhibits show that
he was in constant communication with the
communists; serving them as courier. His oath as a
member of the Communist Party was submitted in
court and in it he admits obedience to all orders of the
Party and to propagate the stability of the PKP.
Considering that the PKP was engaged in an actual
uprising against the constituted Government and that
Bayani Espiritu was in constant communication with
the Communist Party and served it as courier, We
believe that the court was fully justified in finding
him guilty. However, We believe that not having
actually taken up arms in the uprising he may only be
declared guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
TEOPISTA VALERIO
The court below found that this appellant joined the
Communists in 1938 in San Luis, Pampanga, under
Casto Alejandrino, who later became her common-
law husband; that her aliases are "Estrella" and
"Star"; that she was found in possession of various
documents written to top Communists like
Alejandrino, Lava and Romy, as well as a letter from
Taruc congratulating her for the delivers, of a son.
Jose Taguiang testified that she was a member of the
Provincial Committee of the CPP in Nueva Ecija,
later Chairman of the Finance Department, and then
promoted to Finance Officer of the Central Luzon
Committee. Alicia Vergara, a Huk courier, testified
that she delivered letter from the mountains to
Teopista Valerie, who was in turn also a courier.
Without considering the close relationship that she
had with top Communist Casto Alejandrino, We are
satisfied that she herself was, aside from being a Huk
courier, also a Huk, a member of the HMB from
1942 to 1951. As she was a Communist and at the
same time a member of the HMB, and considering
that the HMB was engaged in an uprising to uproot
the legitimate government, there cannot be any
question that she was in conspiracy with the other
members of her Party against the constituted
government. We hold, therefore, that the evidence
proves beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion.
DEFENDANTS NOT INCLUDED IN DECISION
In Crim. Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) the
charge against Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P.
Balgos, Alfredo B. Saulo and Jacobo Espino was
dismissed because they have not been apprehended at
the time of the trial.
PEOPLE VS. EVANGELISTA, 57 PHIL. 354 AND
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700, DISTINGUISHED
In the case at bar the prosecution is for actual
rebellion which consists in rising publicly and taking
aims against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or
its laws, the territory of the Philippines, or any part
thereof, etc., a crime defined in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code; whereas Evangelista was
charged and convicted for inciting to rebellion under
Art. 138, Revised Penal Code (formerly Sec. 2, Act
No. 292). As the specific charge against appellants is
that of rising up in arms in actual rebellion against
the Government, they cannot be held guilty of
inciting the people to arms under Article 138, which
is a different offense.
On the other hand, Rep. Act 1700, known as the
Anti-subversion Act, which penalizes membership in
any organization or association committed to subvert
the Government, cannot be applied to the appellants
because said Act was approved on June 20, 1957 and
was not in force at the time of the commission of the
acts charged against appellants (committed 1945-
1950) ; the Anti-Subversion Act punishes
participation or membership in an organization
committed to overthrow the duly constituted
Government, a crime district from that of actual
rebellion with which appellants are charged.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R.
No. L-6025) defendants-appellants Amado V.
Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and
Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges
contained in the information, with their proportionate
share of the costs de oficio. The defendants-
appellants Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas in
Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) and the
defendants-appellants Bayani Espiritu and Teopista
Valerio in Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-
6026) are hereby found guilty of the crime of
conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and
punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code,
and each and everyone of them is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and
twenty-one days of prision correccional, and to pay a
fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay their proportional share
of the costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE vs APOLINARIO ADRIANO
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for
treason by the People's Court sentencing the accused
to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The information charged:
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout,
during the occupation of the Philippines by the
Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva
Ecija and in the mountains in the Island of Luzon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano, who
is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing
allegiance to the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of
said allegiance, did then and there willfully,
criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military
Forces of Japan in the Philippines, against which the
Philippines and the United States were then at war,
giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the manner
as follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military
organization established and designed to assist and
aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the
Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and
operations against the United States and the
Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined
and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the
Makapili Army in armed conflicts and engagements
against the United States armed forces and the
Guerrillas of the Philippine Commonwealth in the
Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Province
of Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon,
Philippines, sometime between January and April,
1945. Contrary to Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to
substantiate any of the facts alleged except that of
defendant's having joined the Makapili organization.
What the People's Court found is that the accused
participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids
and in confiscation of personal property. The court
below, however, said these acts had not been
established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so
regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the
enemy. But the court did find established under the
two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and
other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy
garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the accused was
in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed with
rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a
Japanese instructor; . . . that during the same period,
the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a
rifle, performed duties as sentry at the Japanese
garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva
Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other
Makapilis retreated to the mountains with the
enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later
surrendered to the Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in
quotations are not borne out by the proof of two
witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses
testified to a single one of the various acts of treason
imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave
evidence that the accused took part in raids and
seizure of personal property, and performed sentry
duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly
committed on different dates without any two
witnesses coinciding in any one specified deed. There
is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is
that the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by
them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again,
on this point it cannot be said that one witness is
corroborated by another if corroboration means that
two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least
one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just
walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a
Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence
to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless
forced upon one against his will, membership in the
Makapili organization imports treasonable intent,
considering the purposes for which the organization
was created, which, according to the evidence, were
"to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations
assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance
with the Empire of Japan;" "to shed blood and
sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate
Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate
unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial
Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to
fight the common enemies." Adherence, unlike overt
acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two
witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be
gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the
nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances
surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct.,
918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself
constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except
for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the
defendant actually went to battle or committed
nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The
crime of treason was committed if he placed himself
at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him
when the opportune time came even though an
opportunity never presented itself. Such membership
by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort.
The enemy derived psychological comfort in the
knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the
country with which his was at war. It furnished the
enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces
augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the
knowledge that he could count on men such as the
accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their
own people. The principal effect of it was no
difference from that of enlisting in the invader's
army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must
be established by the deposition of two witnesses.
Does the evidence in the present case meet this
statutory test? Is two-witness requirement fulfilled by
the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant
in Makapili uniform bearing a gun one day, another
witness another day, and so forth?
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American
origin and so we have to look for guidance from
American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial
interpretation has been placed on the two-witness
principle by American courts, and authoritative text
writers have commented on it. We cull from
American materials the following excerpts which
appear to carry the stamp of authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396,
p. 2282, says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although
requiring both witnesses to be to the same overt act,
was held to mean that there might be one witness to
an overt act and another witness to another overt act
of the same species of treason; and, in one case it has
been intimated that the same construction might
apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so
succinctly observes: "The opportunity of detecting
the falsity of the testimony, by sequestering the two
witnesses and exposing their variance in details, is
wholly destroyed by permitting them to speak to
different acts." The rule as adopted in this country by
all the constitutional provisions, both state and
Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall
testify to the same overt act. This also is now the rule
in England.
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore
on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the
overt act; or, if it is separable, there must be two
witnesses to each part of the overt act.
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson
(D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the same
idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses
to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits
together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must
have the support of two oaths; . . .." (Copied as
footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the
recent case of Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct.,
918), decide during the recent World War, the
Federal Supreme Court lays down this doctrine: "The
very minimum function that an overt act must
perform in a treason prosecution is that it shows
sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to
sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid
and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement,
deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute
treason must be supported by the testimony of two
witnesses."
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have
to set aside the judgment of the trial court. To the
possible objection that the reasoning by which we
have reached this conclusion savors of sophism, we
have only to say that the authors of the constitutional
provision of which our treason law is a copy
purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the
rule "severely restrictive." This provision is so
exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the
amount of evidence that where two or more witnesses
give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is
believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has
been said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless
of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as
gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural
methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the
truth. Natural inferences, however strong or
conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most
trustworthy witness or from other sources are
unavailing as a substitute for the needed
corroboration in the form of direct testimony of
another eyewitness to the same overt act.
The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles
placed in the path of the prosecution by a literal
interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said
that the founders of the American government fully
realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in
spite but because of the objections.
(Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is
said, attracted the members of the Constitutional
Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence
entitled to be guaranteed against legislative change."
(Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272,
citing Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention,
Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who
delivered the majority opinion in the celebrated
Cramer case, said: "It is not difficult to find grounds
upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional
provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more
reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers
in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that
such a quantitative measure of proof, such a
mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device
at best or that its protection of innocence is too
fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to
conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely
or not, is severely restrictive." It must be
remembered, however, that the Constitutional
Convention was warned by James Wilson that
"'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a
manner, as to render proof extremely difficult as
in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The
provision was adopted not merely in spite of the
difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but
because of them. And it was not by whim or by
accident, but because one of the most venerated of
that venerated group considered that "prosecutions
for treason were generally virulent.'"
Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness
provision of the American Constitution. By
extension, the lawmakers who introduced that
provision into the Philippine statute books must be
understood to have intended that the law should
operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the
American forefathers meant.
The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted
with costs charged de oficio.
G.R. No. L-14752 April 30, 1963
FRANCISCO R. CARIO,
vs.
PEOPLE and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal by way of certiorari from the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 18,
1958 in the above entitled case, affirming the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
finding the accused Francisco Cario guilty as
accomplice in the crime of rebellion, and sentencing
him to suffer two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prison correccional and to pay a fine in the
sum of P2,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
In an information dated April 28, 1952, filed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, the accused was
charged with the crime of rebellion with murders,
arsons, robberies and kidnappings, for having, as a
high ranking officer and/or member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and of the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan otherwise known
as the Hukbalahaps (Huks), agreed in conspiracy
with 31 others who were charged with the same
crime in other criminal cases then pending in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government and disrupting its
activities.
The specific acts of rebellion which the accused is
alleged to have committed in conspiracy with other
members of the Communist Party, between the
period from May 6, 1946 to September 12, 1950, are:
1. The ambush on May 6, 1946 of the 10th MPC
Company in Barrio Sta. Monica, Aliaga, Nueva
Ecija; resulting in the death of 10 enlisted men;
2. The raid on August 6, 1946 of the Municipal
Building of Majayjay, Laguna;
3. The ambush on April 10, 1947 of 14 enlisted men
in Barrio San Miguel na Munti, Talavera, Nueva
Ecija, during which Lt. Pablo Cruz and Pvt. Santiago
Mercado were killed;
4. The raid on the poblacion of Laur, Nueva Ecija, of
May 9, 1947;
5. The ambush on August 19, 1947 of a detachment
of the 155th Co., in San Miguel, Bulacan, killing two
officers thereof;
6. The raid on Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, of June
1946;
7. The ambush on April 25, 1947 of Mrs. Aurora
Aragon Quezon and party at Barrio Salubsub,
Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, resulting in the death of said
Mrs. Quezon and other members of her party;
8. The raid on Camp Macabulos, Tarlac, Tarlac, of
August 25, 1950;
9. The raid on Sta. Cruz, Laguna, of August 26, 1950;
10. The raid on Arayat, Pampanga, of August 25,
1950;
11. The seizure on September 12, 1950 of an army
scout car in Barrio Mapalad, Arayat, Pampanga and
the murder of two TPs on the said occasion;
12. The attack on the headquarters of a PC
detachment of March 28, 1950, at Montalban, Rizal;
and
13. The raid on San Pablo, Laguna, of March 29,
1950, resulting in the death of Major Alikbusan of
the government armed forces.
Although the defendant-appellant expressly admitted
the truth of the allegations of the commission of
robberies, murders, arsons, kidnappings, etc., in the
manner and from alleged and on the dates stated in
the information, he vigorously denied any
participation therein.
It appears from the evidence, as found by the Court
of Appeals, that the accused is a close friend of Dr.
Jesus Lava (a top leader of the Communists and a
wanted man with a price on his head) who was his
classmate in the high school, and who later on
became the godfather of the first child of the accused.
Appellant's wife and children were treated
successfully by Dr. Lava in 1939 and 1943 for
various illnesses free of charge, and appellant
believed that his wife and children owe their lives to
Dr. Lava. One night in the year 1946, Dr. Lava
arrived in the house of the accused asking for shelter,
stating that he was being persecuted by certain
politicians from Bulacan, on suspicion that he had
something to do with the killing of Mayor Roxas of
Bulacan, Bulacan. Appellant gave Lava
accommodation for the night, and early the following
morning Lava left. The next time that the appellant
heard from Lava was in May, 1949, when he received
a note from the latter asking for some cigarettes,
powdered milk and canned goods. The note was
brought by a boy of 12 or 15 years, named Totoy, and
through him the accused sent the needed supplies.
Thereafter, every now and then, the same boy
brought to appellant similar notes from Dr. Lava,
requesting for food and supplies, which the accused
furnished in as small amounts as he could send.
In the first note of Dr. Lava, appellant was instructed
to sign "Turko" all notes to be sent by him to the
former and to address them to "Pinang" in order to
conceal their respective identities. This exchange of
notes between them and the furnishing of supplies
and foodstuffs by appellant to Dr. Lava lasted from
1949 until April, 1952, when the accused was
arrested and detained.
The Court of Appeals also found that appellant, as a
ranking employee of the National City Bank of New
York, was approached by a prominent member of a
special unit of the Communist Party, entrusted with
the carrying out of raids, hold-ups, etc. for the
purpose of raising funds, and through his assistance
the amount of $6,000, part of the proceeds or loot of
said special unit, was changed into pesos and then
delivered to the treasurer of the communists; that
appellant also assisted on or about October 12, 1950,
two top-level communists in opening current
accounts in the National City Bank of New York
although their initial deposit was below P2,000, the
minimum required by the bank. (However it was not
shown that the persons helped were known by
appellant to be communists and the funds intended to
carry out the rebellion.)
Sometime in 1949, appellant was present at a banquet
given by the Communists in honor of Amado V.
Hernandez, one of the supposed top-level members
of the organization, on which occasion he was
introduced as a communist to Florentino Diolata,
who posed as a communist but who, in reality, was a
person secretly planted by the Constabulary as a spy;
that while being introduced the accused stated that he
was at the command of his comrades for any
assistance for the advancement and promotion of
their common purpose.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their
case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t Appeals:
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines
accomplices, thus:
ART. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are those
persons who, not being included in article 17,
cooperatein the execution of the offense by previous
or simultaneous acts.
In the case of People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, 49, we
held as an essential condition to the existence of
complicity that there be not only a relation between
the acts done by the principal and these attributed to
the person charged as an accomplice, but that the
latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent,
cooperated with the intention of supplying material or
moral aid in the execution of the crime in an
efficacious way.
So that there are two elements required, in
accordance with the definition of the term accomplice
given in the Penal Code, in order that a person may
be considered an accomplice to a criminal act,
namely, that he take part in the execution of the crime
by previous and simultaneous acts and that he intend
by said acts to commit or take part in the execution of
the crime.
The crime of rebellion or insurrection has been
defined as follows:
ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection How
committed. The crime of rebellion or insurrection
is committed by rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,
the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed
forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers, or prerogatives. (Revised Penal Code)
In the case at bar the appellant did not take up arms
against the Government. Neither was he a member of
the Hukbalahap organization. The Court of Appeals
also found that he did not openly take part in the
commission of the crime above defined by any other
act without which said crime would not have been
committed. (Decision, p. 7) Said the Court of
There is no clear and conclusive evidence that the
accused is a member of the Communist Party or of its
sister organization, the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan', but there can be no doubt that he is a
sympathizer of the communists and helped them by
giving supplies to Dr. Jesus Lava, and by sending
notes to him, knowing that he is a top-level
communist with a high price on his head. And not
only that. The accused also helped a top-level
communist in changing six thousand dollars ($6,000)
into pesos in the National City Bank of New York, of
which he was a ranking official with the designation
of Pro Manager. He also introduced to the bank two
top-level communists and helped them in opening
checking accounts in the bank where they deposited
money used in the activities of the Communist Party.
By extending such help to well-known members of
the Communist Party and knowing that the avowed
purpose of said party is to overthrow the government,
the accused, by means of overt acts gave them aid,
comfort, and assistance, and indirectly helped them in
their fight against the Government. Of course the
accused did not take direct participation in the acts
alleged in the information, nor did he directly force
or induce the communists to commit such acts;
neither did he openly take part in the commission of
the acts of rebellion by another act without which the
act of rebellion would not have been accomplished.
However, the acts done by him as above stated
constitute acts of cooperation with the communists in
their primordial purpose of overthrowing the
government, and such acts naturally have contributed
to some extent in the advancement and promotion of
their purpose. By such cooperation knowingly
extended by him, he is liable as an accomplice in the
crime of rebellion as found by the trial court.
We cannot agree to the above conclusion of the Court
of Appeals that the above-mentioned acts of appellant
constitute acts of cooperation in the execution of the
act of overthrowing the government. If appellant's
acts may be considered an indirect help or aid in the
rebellion, which we positively doubt, the same cannot
constitute previous or simultaneous acts of uprising
or rebellion. In the crime of treason any act of
giving comfort or moralaid may be criminal, but such
is not the case with rebellion or insurrection where
the Code expressly declares that there must be a
public uprising and the taking up of arms in rebellion
or insurrection. The act of sending or furnishing
cigarettes and food supplies to a famous Huk does
not prove intention to help him in committing
rebellion or insurrection. Neither is the act of having
$6,000 changed to Philippine money or in helping
Huks to open accounts, by themselves show an intent
or desire to participate or help in an uprising or
rebellion. Appellant's work was as a public relations
officer of the bank of which he was an employee, and
the work above indicated performed by him was a
part of his functions as an employee of the bank.
These acts by themselves do not and cannot carry or
prove any criminal intent of helping the Huks in
committing the crime of insurrection or rebellion.
The law is to the effect that good faith is to be
presumed. No presumption of the existence of a
criminal intent can arise from the above acts which
are in themselves legitimate and legal. Said acts are
by law presumed to be innocent acts while the
opposite has not been proved.
But granting, for the sake of argument, that appellant
had the criminal intent of aiding the communists in
their unlawful designs to overthrow the Government,
the assistance thus extended by him may not be
considered efficacious enough to help in the
successful prosecution of the crime of insurrection or
rebellion so as to make him an accomplice therein.
(People vs. Tamayo, supra.) We, therefore, find that
the supposed acts found by the Court of Appeals to
have been committed by the appellant do not
necessarily and legitimately lead to the conclusion
that he performed said acts precisely with the
criminal intent of helping in the execution or the
carrying out of the rebellion or insurrection.
For the foregoing considerations, we declare that the
guilt of appellant as an accomplice in the crime of
rebellion or insurrection as charged in the
information has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, his supposed acts not having been shown to be
acts of direct cooperation in the execution of the
crime, nor have they been introduced by a criminal
intent, nor were they shown to be sufficiently
efficacious to make appellant guilty as accomplice in
the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
hereby reversed and the
[G.R. No. 126252. August 30, 1999]
PEOPLE vs. JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT
PUNO, J.:
For review is the conviction of accused-
appellant JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT for illegal
possession of five (5) kilos of marijuana for which he
was initially sentenced to death. The
Information[1] against him reads:
That on or about the 28th day of November, 1994, in
the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control five (5) kilos of compressed
marijuana dried leaves, without the authority of law
to do so, in violation of the abovecited provision of
the law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pled not guilty.
The prosecutions case hinges on the testimony
of Senior Inspector OLIVER ENMODIAS. He
recounted that on November 28, 1994, he and SPO3
JOSE PANGANIBAN boarded a passenger jeepney
from their office in Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet, en route to Baguio City. He took the seat
behind the jeepney driver while SPO3 Panganiban sat
opposite him. They were in civilian attire. When the
jeepney reached km. 4 or 5, accused JESUS
GARCIA boarded the jeepney carrying a plastic
bag. He occupied the front seat, beside the driver and
placed the plastic bag on his lap. After a couple of
minutes, the policemen smelled marijuana which
seemed to emanate from accuseds bag. To confirm
their suspicion, they decided to follow accused when
he gets off the jeepney.[2]
The accused alighted at the Baguio City hall and the
police officers trailed him. The accused proceeded to
Rizal Park and sat by the monument. Half a meter
away, the police officers saw the accused retrieve a
green travelling bag from the back pocket of his
pants. He then transferred five (5) packages wrapped
in newspaper from the plastic bag to the green
bag. As the newspaper wrapper of one of the
packages was partially torn, the police officers saw
the content of the package. It appeared to be
marijuana.[3] Forthwith, the policemen approached
the accused and identified themselves. The accused
appeared to be nervous and did not immediately
respond. The policemen then asked the accused if
they could inspect his travelling bag. The accused
surrendered his bag and the inspection revealed that it
contained five (5) bricks of what appeared to be dried
marijuana leaves. The police officers then arrested
the accused and seized his bag.The accused was
turned over to the CIS office at the Baguio Water
District Compound for further investigation. He
was appraised of his custodial rights. At about 5 p.m.,
the arresting officers left for the crime laboratory at
Camp Dangwa, Benguet, for chemical analysis of the
items seized from the accused. The next day, the
policemen executed their joint affidavit of arrest
and transferred the accused to the Baguio city
jail. Verification by the arresting officers of the
records at the Narcotics Command revealed that the
accuseds name was in the list of drug dealers.[4] The
result of chemical analysis of the five (5) items seized
from the accused confirmed that they were dried
marijuana fruiting tops, weighing a total of five (5)
kilos.[5]
For his part, the accused admitted being at the locus
criminis but denied possessing marijuana or carrying
any bag on November 28, 1994. He alleged that on
said day, at about 8:00 a.m., he left his residence in
Angeles City to visit his brother, NICK GARCIA,
whom he had not seen for ten (10) years. He
arrived in Baguio City at 12:30 p.m. Before
proceeding to his brothers house, he took a stroll at
the Rizal Park. At about 2:00 p.m., two (2) men
accosted him at the park. They did not identify
themselves as police officers. They held his hands
and ordered him to go with them. Despite his
protestations, he was forcibly taken to a waiting
car[6] and brought to a safehouse. There, he was asked
about the source of his supply of illicit drugs. When
he denied knowledge of the crime imputed to him, he
was brought to a dark room where his hands were
tied, his feet bound to a chair, his mouth covered by
tape and his eyes blindfolded. They started mauling
him. Initially, he claimed he was kicked and
punched on the chest and thighs. When asked further
whether he suffered bruises and broken ribs, he
answered in the negative. Thereafter, he explained
that there were no visible signs of physical abuse on
his body as he was only punched, not
kicked. Notwithstanding the maltreatment he
suffered, the accused claimed he stood firm on his
denial that he was dealing with illicit drugs.[7]
To corroborate accuseds testimony, the defense
presented MANUEL DE GUZMAN, a resident of
Baguio City and a neighbor of accuseds brother Nick
Garcia. He came to know the accused in 1994 when
accused visited his brother Nick, a few months
before accused was arrested in November that
same year. He recounted that in the afternoon of
November 28, 1994, while he was walking along
Rizal Park, he noticed two (2) men holding the
accuseds hands and forcing him to a car. He was then
about 8-10 meters away. He did not see the accused
or any of the two men carrying a bag.[8]
In a Decision, dated January 29, 1996, RTC Judge
Pastor de Guzman, Jr.[9] found the accused guilty of
illegal possession of prohibited drugs and sentenced
him to suffer the maximum penalty of death. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds
the accused Jesus Garcia y Manabat guilty of the
violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425 as
amended by R.A. 7659, involving possession of
marijuana weighing 5 kilograms, beyond reasonable
doubt.
The penalty for the possession of marijuana weighing
5 kilograms as provided under R.A. 6425 as amended
by R.A. 7659 is Death. The Court has no recourse but
to sentence the accused Jesus Garcia y Manabat to
suffer the death penalty. The law is harsh but it must
be followed and obeyed, dura lex sed lex.
SO ORDERED.
The decision was promulgated on February 20,
1996.
On February 26, 1996, the accused moved for
reconsideration.[10] He reiterated his position that the
uncorroborated testimony of prosecution witness
Inspector Enmodias was insufficient to establish his
guilt. He further contended that he should only be
punished with reclusion perpetua.
On April 12, 1996, Judge de Guzman, Jr. filed
an application for disability retirement. This Court,
in its en banc Resolution,[11] dated June 18, 1996,
approved his application. Theeffectivity of his
retirement was made retroactive to February 16,
1996.
On August 6, 1996, Acting Presiding Judge Eulogio
Juan R. Bautista issued an Order[12] granting in part
accuseds Motion for Reconsideration. For lack of
aggravating circumstance, the accuseds penalty for
illegal possession of marijuana was reduced from
death to reclusion perpetua.
In the case at bar, appellant impugns his conviction
on the following grounds: (a) the decision convicting
him of the crime charged was not validly
promulgated as the promulgation was made (4) days
after the retirement of the judge who penned the
decision; (b) the uncorroborated testimony of
prosecution witness Senior Inspector Enmodias is
insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
First, we shall thresh out the procedural matter raised
by appellant.
In his Motion for Clarification,[13] appellant
contends that since the decision under review was
promulgated on February 20, 1996, four (4)
days after the approved retirement of Judge de
Guzman, Jr., his decision is void and has no binding
effect.[14]
We reject this contention. Undisputably, a decision
promulgated after the retirement of the judge who
signed it is null and void. Under the Rules on
Criminal Procedure,[15] a decision is valid and
binding only if penned and promulgated by the
judge during his incumbency. To be precise, a
judgment has legal effect only when it is
rendered: (a) by a court legally constituted and in
the actual exercise of judicial powers, and (b) by a
judge legally appointed, duly qualified and actually
acting either de jure or de facto.[16] A judge de
jure is one who exercises the office of a judge as a
matter of right, fully invested with all the powers and
functions conceded to him under the law. A judge de
facto is one who exercises the office of judge under
some color of right. He has the reputation of the
officer he assumes to be, yet he has some defect in
his right to exercise judicial functions at the
particular time.[17]
In the case at bar, the decision under review
was validly promulgated. Although the effectivity
of Judge de Guzman, Jr.s disability retirement was
made retroactive to February 16, 1996, it cannot be
denied that at the time his subject decision was
promulgated on February 20, 1996, he was still
the incumbent judge of the RTC, Branch LX of
Baguio City, and has in fact continued to hold said
office and act as judge thereof until his application
for retirement was approved in June 1996. Thus, as
of February 20, 1996 when the decision convicting
appellant was promulgated, Judge de Guzman, Jr.
was actually discharging his duties as a de
facto judge. In fact, as of that time, he has yet to file
his application for disability retirement. To be
sure, as early as 1918, we laid down the principle that
where the term of the judge has terminated and he
has ceased to act as judge, his subsequent acts in
attempting to dispose of business he left unfinished
before the expiration of his term are
void.[18] However, in the present case, as Judge de
Guzman, Jr. was a de facto judge in the actual
exercise of his office at the time the decision under
review was promulgated on February 20, 1996, said
decision is legal and has a valid and binding effect on
appellant.[19]
On the merits, we likewise affirm appellants
conviction.
In his Memorandum[20] before the trial court,
appellant insisted that the prosecution was unable to
discharge its onus of establishing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He maintained that
the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutions
main witness, Senior Inspector Enmodias, is
incredible and unreliable. Firstly, appellant pointed
out that if the police officers indeed smell and the
marijuana he was allegedly carrying while they were
all on board the jeepney, they should have
immediately arrested him instead of waiting for him
to alight and stroll at the Rizal Park.Secondly,
appellant faulted the procedure adopted by the
arresting officers who, after the arrest, took him to
the CIS Office at the Baguio Water District
Compound for investigation instead of bringing him
to the nearest police station, as mandated under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Finally, appellant theorized that the
prosecutions omission or failure to present the other
arresting officer, SPO3 Panganiban, to corroborate
the testimony of its witness Senior Inspector
Enmodias was fatal to the prosecutions case as the
lone testimony of Enmodias failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
These contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The
prosecution was able to prove appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. There is nothing irregular in the
manner appellant was apprehended by the police
authorities. On the contrary, we find that, without
compromising their sworn duty to enforce the law,
the police officers exercised reasonable prudence
and cautionin desisting to apprehend appellant
inside the jeepney when they initially suspected he
was in possession of marijuana. They sought to verify
further their suspicion and decided to trail appellant
when the latter alighted from the jeepney. It was only
after they saw that one of the packages with the torn
wrapper contained what looked like marijuana
fruiting tops did they accost appellant and make the
arrest. At that precise time, they had obtained
personal knowledge of circumstances indicating that
appellant had illicit drugs in his possession. They had
reasonable ground upon which to base a lawful arrest
without a warrant.
Neither do we find anything irregular with the turn
over of appellant to the CIS Office. At the trial, it was
sufficiently clarified that this has been the practice of
the arresting officers as their office had previously
arranged with the CIS for assistance with respect to
investigations of suspected criminals, the CIS office
being more specialized in the area of
investigation.[21] Neither can the police officers be
held liable for arbitrarily detaining appellant at the
CIS office. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, penalizes a public officer who shall detain
another for some legal ground and fail to deliver
him to the proper authorities for 36 hours for
crimes punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties. In the present case, the record bears that
appellant was arrested for possession of five (5)
kilos of marijuana on November 28, 1994 at 2
p.m., a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death. He was detained for further investigation
anddelivered by the arresting officers to the court
in the afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the
detention of appellant for purposes of investigation
did not exceed the duration allowed by law, i.e., 36
hours from the time of his arrest.
Coming now to appellants defense, we find that his
simplistic version of what transpired that fateful day
utterly failed to rebut the overwhelming evidence
presented by the prosecution. His testimony is not
worthy of credence. Firstly, appellant insists he did
not bring any travelling bag or personal items with
him.[22] However, we find it baffling that one would
visit a relative in a distant province and fail to bring
clothes and other personal belongings for the duration
of his stay. Secondly, while
appellant repeatedly emphasized that he went to
Baguio City to visit his brother whom he had not
seen for ten years,[23] his corroborating witness, de
Guzman, adamantly insisted that the first time he
met appellant was only months before the
arrest.[24]Thirdly, we find it altogether disturbing
that appellant, without compunction,
acknowledged in open court that he lied when he
initially claimed he was kicked by the police officers
while under their custody. After testifying that he
was kicked and punched on the chest and thighs,
appellant unwittingly declared that he suffered no
broken ribs or internal injury as a result of the alleged
mauling. Realizing the improbability of his claim of
maltreatment, he promptly altered his previous
testimony. He sought to explain the lack of visible
signs of physical abuse on his body by clarifying that
he was only punched, not kicked, by the police
authorities.[25] Lastly, it runs counter to common
experience that an innocent person, wrongly accused
of a crime and subjected to alleged physical abuse by
the authorities would keep mum about his plight. Yet,
appellant, through all the sufferings he supposedly
underwent, would have us believe that he has not
confided to anyone, not even to his brother, his
version of the incident, not to mention the
maltreatment he supposedly endured in the hands of
the police authorities.[26] In sum, appellants defense
lacks the ring of truth.
Neither did the testimony of appellants corroborating
witness aid the defense as it is equally flawed. De
Guzman testified that he saw appellant being held by
two men and being forced into a car, yet he never
revealed what he saw to appellants brother Nick. No
explanation was offered for this omission. Although
de Guzman thought that the two men harbored ill
intentions in abducting appellant, he never reported
the incident to the police nor told Nick, appellants
brother, about what he witnessed. In fact, it was when
Nick told him that appellant was in jail that de
Guzman allegedly mentioned to Nick what he saw
days earlier.[27]
remain unsatisfactorily explained by the defense and
unrebutted on record.
In sum, we find the testimony of Senior Inspector
Enmodias credible to sustain a judgment of
conviction. We reiterate the familiar rule that the
testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible,
is enough to convict an accused. For indeed,
criminals are convicted not on the number of
witnesses presented against them, but on the
credibility of the testimony of even one witness.[28] It
bears stress that it is the quality, not the quantity, of
testimony that counts.[29] To be sure, a corroborative
testimony is not necessary where the details of the
crime have been testified to with sufficient
clarity.[30] As there was nothing to indicate in this
case that police officer Enmodias was inspired by ill-
motive to testify mendaciously against appellant, the
trial court had every reason to accord full faith and
credit to his testimony.[31]
On a final note: The death sentence originally
imposed on appellant was correctly modified by the
trial court and reduced to reclusion perpetua as there
was no aggravating circumstance present in the
commission of the crime. However, both the
Decision and Order of the trial court omitted to
impose the penalty of fine.[32]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Order, dated August 6,
1996, affirming the conviction of appellant JESUS
GARCIA y MANABAT for violation of Section 8,
Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659,
but reducing his penalty to reclusion perpetua is
AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that
additional penalty of fine in the amount of ten million
(P10,000,000.00) pesos is likewise imposed on
him. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Treated separately, the incongruent details in the

defense theory may appear innocuous at first
blush. However, the inconsistencies eventually add
up, striking at the very core of appellants defense --
the real purpose of his presence at the crime
scene. The contradictions become disturbing as they