Nestl Philippines, Inc. vs.

Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 , September 30, 1987

Courts; Supreme Court cannot be pressured to act one way or the other in any case pending before it; Apologies of respondents
acceptedWe accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted
by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of
AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721,
March 30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently
resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the
full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any
case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions,
motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to
"proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

Same; Same; Courts and juries immune from every extraneous influence.The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent
right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been
invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized
society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.''

Same; Same; Same; Abuse of rights of free speech and of assembly not within the ambit of constitutional protection; Counsel of
record and all members of the legal profession are reminded to apprise their clients on matters of docorum and proper attitude
toward courts of justiceWe realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in the
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are
protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts
to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to
influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest
primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this
Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a
reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on
matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing
educational program f or their members. [Nestl Philippines, Inc. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542(1987)]

G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF FILIPRO
EMPLOYEES, respondents.

No. 78791 September 30, 1987

KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISM-

OLALIA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA ALDAS, CAPT. REY L.
LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No.
78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets
they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up
pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the
Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set
up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They
waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud
speakers.

These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of
the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been
called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct
contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July
10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring
Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of
respondent Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs.
Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and
then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required
to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.

On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas,
in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an
operation.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-described acts,
together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the
picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under
the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the
leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about
seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly
Independent Labor Union. 2

Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cases is usually for
causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of
the Constitution.

To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they wig abide
by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to
this effect, which respondents complied with on July 17, 1987.

We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the
contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case
of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721,
March 30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently
resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the
full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any
case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions,
motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to
"proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice." 3

The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural
and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts.
For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." 4

Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by
publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have
justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The
aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of the
above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and
adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any
attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer
within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice
constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the
shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to
demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all
members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of
decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program
for their members.

WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets
intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the
vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959

TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G. H.
Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was
conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay
City. To better understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings and the
memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated.

Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and implicated in said crime.
After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido
Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the
sentence although without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed
automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and
his former conviction of sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.

It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. The purpose of said
reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of
Malacaang conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would
appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of
Manuel Monroy.

Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of the case
presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by those who had investigated the case at the instance of
Malacaang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the
Secretary of Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacaang
investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this Tribunal supporting the
same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio
Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal,
action on said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime, the
Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written
statements, of which the motion for new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation
designating for said purposes a committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A.
Avendaio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.

In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed
by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation
to be conducted at the time and place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957,
petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from September 21,
due to the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said
request for postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for
petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary
investigation in view of the fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court,
and on the same day filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for
certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping
the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva.

The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva and his
committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were being
investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy.

The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R.
No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva,
had any right or authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the
administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants had been found
guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.

Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of the latter's oral and personal
request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut
any evidence therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz
had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.

Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to appear at the investigation, we are
inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in
the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by Salva and his
committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even desirous of being present at that investigation so
that he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their affidavits or
confessions, either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed to respondent
Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be unable to
attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to appear
at the investigation.

As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his committee began ordinarily, when
a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for according to respondent, two government attorneys had been
designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided and
it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the
appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion
for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.

However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his reinvestigation because according
to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not
included for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against
the other accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to present its
evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at the instance of Realista, had
scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the
prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and
documentary, presented in the original case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions
sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by conducting an
investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were
other than those already tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador
Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the case against Realista.

In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as suggested by authorities, the duty and
role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.

We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the prosecuting officers of all cases
handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public
offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid
injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of
Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one. (69 United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarez vs. Platon,
69 Phil., 556)

With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the scheduled preliminary
investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that investigation since as was already stated, he was more or
less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and
testimonies respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at
said investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than a duty or legal obligation.
Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present
at the said investigation, if he latter changed his mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to
appear at said investigation, he could not be compelled to do so.

Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If, as contended by him, the purpose
of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of
Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation
in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.

However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was conducted not in respondent's
office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to
witness the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere
and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement by the
respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by
the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had
concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask
questions I am willing to let you do so and the question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose
Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the
press is free to ask questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make
and address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to
understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible.
Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and
prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions, this according to the transcript now before us.

But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the investigation, and this involved
headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid
descriptions of the incidents that took place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the
killing of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under appeal
and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent place and
complaisance of respondent.

Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and sensationalism, all of which may
properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for
which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of
prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by
the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when
the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and
this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by
meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.

Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored the imposition of a more or less
severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be
sufficient.

In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary investigation involved in this
case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said
preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view of petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation,
respondent may not compel him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against
petitioner is hereby set aside.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part. Considering the
conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for
and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider
and find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe
disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.

N THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT OF SANDIGANBAYAN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

ANACLETO D. BADOY, JR., TAKING AN AMBULANCE BUT PROCEEDING TO THE GMA TV
STATION FOR AN INTERVIEW INSTEAD OF PROCEEDING FORTHWITH TO THE HOSPITAL.

[A.M. NO. SB-02-10-J. January 16, 2003]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, JOSE JINGGOY ESTRADA, SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, JOSE B.
FLAMINIANO, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, FELIX D. CARAO, JR., CLEOFE V. VERZOLA, DELIA H.
HERMOSO AND RAYMUND P. FORTUN, complainants, vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ANACLETO D.
BADOY, JR., AND TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:

Judges, like ordinary mortals, are subject to human limitations. At times, the great tides of perturbing and overwhelming
emotions engulf them. Notwithstanding so, they are expected to be cerebral men [1] who can control their confounding emotions
and idiosyncratic inclinations. Otherwise, they will be held answerable for their conduct.
Haled in these two consolidated administrative cases, A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC and A.M No. SB-02-10-J, are Sandiganbayan
Justices Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. (Ret.) and Teresita Leonardo-De Castro.
The facts of A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC may be synthesized as follows:
On November 29, 2001, Justice Badoy, aboard an ambulance, whisked himself to the GMA Broadcast Station in Quezon
City for a live interview in the news program Saksi.There, he announced the loss of a Resolution he penned in connection with
the plunder case against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and others.
The media sarcastically referred to the event as a staged comedy[2] or a television tryst.[3] Leading newspapers contained
facetious headlines, such as Ambulance rushes Badoyto TV Station,[4] Whats with Justice Badoy?,[5] and Unorthodox Behavior
Analyze Badoy, Erap Lawyers ask SC.[6]
Acting on the media reports, this Court directed Justice Badoy to show cause why he should not be administratively
charged with conduct unbecoming a Justice of the Sandiganbayan. [7]
In his compliance,[8] Justice Badoy alleged that three days prior to the incident, he could not find his Resolution ordering
that former President Estrada be detained at Fort Sto. Domingo. So he requested the National Bureau of Investigation to conduct
an investigation, but to no avail. Thus, on November 29, 2001, agitated that someone might have stolen the Resolution and
claimed that he (Justice Badoy) sold it for a fee, he decided to go to the GMA-7 Broadcast Station and report its loss, in order
that the public may know he is honest. In going there, he chose to ride in an ambulance because he felt very sick and cold,
intending to proceed to a hospital after the interview.
A.M No. SB-02-10-J is set on a different factual milieu, to wit:
 Subsequent to the descent of former President Estrada from power, the Office of the Ombudsman filed several criminal
cases against him, his family, and friends. One of them is Criminal Case No. 26558 wherein he, his son Jose Jinggoy and Atty.
Edward Serapio stand accused for violation of Republic Act No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law. The case was raffled to the Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan composed of Justice Badoy, as Chairman, and Justices Teresita Leonardo-De Castro and Ricardo
M. Ilarde, now retired, as members.
On September 13, 2001, after the termination of a series of pre-trial conference between the parties, the Sandiganbayan
furnished them and their counsel with a copy of the Pre-trial Order for their signatures. The defense panel composed of Atty.
Rene A.V. Saguisag (lead counsel), Justice Serafin R. Cuevas, Attys. Jose B. Flaminiano, Felix D. Carao, Jr., Cleofe V. Verzola,
and Delia H. Hermoso, refused to sign it on the grounds that: 1) there is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requiring them to sign a Pre-trial Order; [9] 2) they were not given ample time to read it; [10] and 3) it incorporates a
statement that they admitted the existence of certain exhibits although there was no such admission. [11]
In the course of an argument between Sandiganbayan Justice De Castro and Justice Cuevas, Atty. Saguisag intervened. In
the process, he argued simultaneously with Justice Cuevas. [12] Despite Justice De Castros request to wait for his turn, Atty.
Saguisag persisted, prompting her to bang the gavel twice and order him to stop arguing. [13] This led Justice Badoy to order four
Sheriffs to take Atty. Saguisag out of the courtroom.[14]
Thereafter, Justice De Castro ruled in open court that the assailed portion of the Pre-trial Order could be deleted. [15]
The prosecution manifested its acquiescence. However, Atty. Flaminiano objected, insisting that the defense needs more
time to study the Pre-trial Order.[16]Notwithstanding the objection, Justice Badoy terminated the pre-trial and set the trial proper
on October 1, 3 and 4, 2001 and thereafter, every Monday, Wednesday and Thursday of the week, all at 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon.[17]
On October 1, 2001, the defense lawyers did not appear. Determined to proceed with the trial, Justice Badoy appointed
Atty. Sabino Acut, Jr. and Atty. Martin Pison, counsel for accused Atty. Serapio, to represent the Estradas. Former President
Estrada objected, insisting that he has the right to choose his counsel. Atty. Acut and Atty. Pison declined because of a possible
conflict between their clients interest and that of the Estradas. As a last recourse, Justice Badoy appointed lawyers from the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO) as counsel de officio for the Estradas.[18]
Feeling aggrieved, former President Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and all their counsel of record in Criminal Case No. 26558
filed the instant administrative complaint charging Justices Badoy and De Castro with:
1) dishonesty and misrepresentation for incorporating in the Pre-trial Order a statement that the defense admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit A up to Exhibit C-45 and its submarkings as to its existence notwithstanding the fact that they did not admit
the same;[19]
2) oppression and gross misconduct for throwing Atty. Saguisag out of the courtroom;[20]
3) violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars for setting the hearing of the plunder case three times a
week, at one oclock in the afternoon, without prior consultation with the defense counsel; [21]
4) denial of the accuseds right to counsel for appointing PAO lawyers as counsel de officio of the Estradas during the
hearing of October 1, 2001;[22] and
5) penchant for late rulings[23] as shown in the following instances:

1. The release of the Resolution denying complainant Jinggoy Estradas Motion to Quash (filed as early as April 2001) after
office hours and on the eve of the July 10, 2001 arraignment.

2. The release of the Resolution denying complainant Estradas Petition to Recuse on the scheduled date of the pre-trial or on
September 3, 2001.

3. Respondents failure to resolve complainants Motion to Cancel the October 1, 2001 hearing filed as early as September 19,
2001.

4. The release of the Resolution denying complainant Jinggoy Estradas Motion to be Allowed to Administer the Oath of
Office to Senator Luisa Loi Estrada, on June 29, 2001, past beyond the scheduled hour of oath-taking, thus, prompting
Justice Ricardo M. Ilarde (Ret.) to write the following annotations on the Resolution: What is there to deny? This
resolution was brought to us only at 4:45 p.m. The matter has been rendered moot and academic.

Respondents filed their separate comments.

Justice De Castro explains as follows:
First, in issuing the Pre-trial Order, the court merely relied on the parties Joint Stipulations of Facts and on the notes of
the five (5) stenographers recording the pre-trial conferences held before the Division Clerk of Court. Nonetheless, when
complainants called the courts attention regarding the assailed statement in the Pre-trial Order, she ordered its deletion.
[24]
Second, it was Atty. Saguisags contumacious conduct of loudly speaking simultaneously with Atty. Cuevas that prompted
respondent Justices to order him to leave the courtroom. [25] Third, they consulted the complainants before they set the hearing of
the plunder case three times a week, resulting in the revision of the trial settings embodied in the courts Order dated September
14, 2001.[26] Fourth, the appointment of three (3) PAO lawyers was intended to provide the accused with adequate legal
assistance during the hearing. And fifth, they resolved the accuseds three motions to quash only on July 9, 2001 because the
parties last pleading was filed only on July 5, 2001.[27]
For his part, Justice Badoy maintains that the Pre-trial Order has not prejudiced the accused since they were not obliged to
sign it and that they are free to object to the presentation of any evidence during trial. [28] He ordered Atty. Saguisag to leave the
courtroom because he ignored Justice De Castros repeated order to stop arguing. [29] On the setting of the hearing of the plunder
case three times a week, he stressed that the court was merely complying with the Speedy Trial Act. [30] And lastly, on the alleged
late rulings, he explains:

Regarding the release of the Resolution of the undersigned on the Motion for Recusation of the Estradas on the recusation
issue. At the time, the undersigned had no intention of releasing it yet in order to fine-tune the same further. However, he was
informed just before going out for the hearing that the Estradas were going to use the pendency of their Motion for Recusation
as a reason, again, to ask for the postponement of the setting for that day, one of their several motions for postponement.

As regards the delay in the Resolution of the undersigned on the permission to have Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada go to
San Juan City to administer the oath to both his mother as Senator and his brother as the new Mayor of San Juan City,
the reason was because the undersigned was looking hard for a justification to grant the request since the undersigned
sympathized with the same. The undersigned went to the extent of requesting a copy of the Rules and Regulations from
both the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) as well as the Bureau of Corrections (BOC). Hence, the
delay in the Resolution of the ponencia. But, even late, there was still a chance for then Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada to
administer the oaths of office.

xxxxxx

The undersigned stated that, with every Justice having 100% load and 100% staff, with the plunder case (equivalent
easily to 500%), the undersigned now had a load of 600% but with his support staff remaining in the same level. That is
why he asked for additional staff.[31] (Emphasis supplied)

At the outset, it must be stressed that the retirement [32] of Justice Badoy from the Judiciary does not divest this Court of its
jurisdiction over these cases. In Perez vs. Abiera,[33] this Court ruled:

X x x. In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost
by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court
retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty
thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what
remedy would the people have against a judge or any other public official who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his
last days in office? What would prevent some corrupt and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other
condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative
penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the
judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the
service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully; if guilty, he
deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.

We shall resolve A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC first.

An introspective appraisal of the ambulance incident yields reasons for this Court to adjudge Justice Badoy guilty of
conduct unbecoming a Justice.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. He should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.
[34]
Concomitant with this is the express mandate of the Canons of Judicial Ethics that justice should not be bounded by the
individual idiosyncrasies of those who administer it. A judge should adopt the usual and expected method of doing
justice, and not seek to be spectacular or sensational in the conduct of his court.
Justice Badoy tramples upon the foregoing judicial norms. We see no reason why he should rush to the GMA-7 Broadcast
Station just to inform the public about the loss of a Resolution. This is an internal office incident which should not be
reported to the whole nation. His claim that the Resolution might have been stolen and sold by someone (using his name) for a
fee is a wild conjecture. Not only did his conduct give an image that he could not manage his work effectively, but it also
indicated that he had corrupt personnel. Moreover, it dragged innocent parties as possible culprits.
Justice Badoys aberrant behavior deserves administrative sanction. As the Chairman of the Division hearing the plunder
case against the former President of the Philippines, he should have been more circumspect in his actuation. A short pause for
reflection might have yielded a better judgment. The loss of the Resolution, being an internal matter, could have been addressed
inside his own chamber. That he brought it to the arena of public opinion is pure vanity. It cannot be countenanced. If lawyers
are prohibited from making public statements in the media regarding a pending case to arouse public opinion for or
against a party,[35] with more reason should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity. Judges are not actors or
politicians who thrive by publicity. Publicity undermines the dignity and impartiality of a judge. [36]Thus, at no time
should he be moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the administration of justice. [37]
The fact that Justice Badoy, just three (3) weeks prior to the ambulance incident, was strictly ordered by Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., to cease and desist from holding press conferences, issuing press statements, or giving interviews to the
media on any matter or incident related to the issues subject of the controversy [38] all the more punctuates his indiscretion.
As we mentioned earlier, judges are subject to human limitations. Imbedded in their consciousness is the complex of
emotions, habits and convictions. Aware of this actuality, it behooves them to regulate these deflecting forces and not to let them
loose, either to their own detriment or to that of the courts they serve. This is the high price they have to pay as occupants of
their exalted positions.
We now resolve A.M No. SB-02-10-J.
At this juncture, let it be stressed that the administration of justice is primarily a joint responsibility of the judge and the
lawyer. The judge expects a lawyer to properly perform his role in this task in the same manner that the lawyer expects a judge
to do his part.[39] Their relation should be based on mutual respect and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of the
other. Only in this manner can each minimize occasions for delinquency and help attain effectively the ends of justice. [40]
The conflict between the herein parties could have been avoided if only they heeded the foregoing clarion call.

Respondents are not guilty of the charges of dishonesty and misrepresentation. Dishonesty connotes a disposition to
deceive,[41] while misrepresentation means a statement made to deceive or mislead. [42] Obviously, both imply an intention to
deceive. Complainants failed to prove that respondents acted with deceit or with malice or bad faith in stating in the Pre-trial
Order that the defense admitted the existence of certain exhibits. Other than their bare allegation, no sufficient evidence was
adduced to support the charge. [43] That respondents did not intend to deceive complainants is clear from the fact that the Pre-trial
Order states verbatim the Joint Stipulations of Facts submitted by both parties. Furthermore, when complainants expressed their
objection to the inclusion of the assailed statement, respondents immediately ordered its deletion. The transcript of stenographic
notes is revealing, thus:
AJ BADOY:
The Court would appreciate if you can point out some grammatical errors.
Atty. Flaminiano:
Yes, Your Honor. I am going to do that.
On page 20, the last paragraph states: The defense admitted exhibit A up to exhibit C-45 and its sub
markings as to its existence but not as to the truth of the content.In the very first place there never was
any admission made by the defense as even to the existence of the document. And the sentence also we
believe not grammatically appropriate. It should be their sub markings or as to their existence because
this involved several documents, Your Honors.
AJ DE CASTRO:
That portion may be deleted.
Atty. Flaminiano:
Well, Im not sure about it. Your Honor. I only pointed that there is a need for us to go over page by page
because we got a copy only after there was an incident
xxxxxx
OMB Desierto:
We can have this deleted.
Atty. Flaminiano:
But there are several others.
AJ DE CASTRO:
What are those?
OMB Desierto:
After one (1) hour they should be able to determine that. After all Your Honor, I would like to emphasize the
fact that the Joint Stipulation of Facts were signedstipulations which we had a week ago were signed by the
parties, by the counsels for the accused. And now, the things that are reflected here, are found in this Pre-
trial Order. If there is any delineation from what stipulated then and were signed by the counsels for
the defense and also the prosecution, then we can correct that, but it cannot be possible major changes
will have to be made in the Pre-trial Order since this is only copied anyway from the Joint Stipulation
of Facts. If there are such thing as that particular sentence which should be objectionable to the
defense, the prosecution is ready to agree to its deletion.
xxxxxx
AJ DE CASTRO:
You know what we did here is simply copy verbatim every document that we found on record pertaining to
the Pre-trial conference. We did not add. We did not subtract. So, anything that you will state now will simply
be corrections of some clerical errors, that is all. Giving you enough time to go over.[44] (Emphasis supplied)
On complainants refusal to sign the Pre-trial Order, Section 2, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing
and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused.Considering that the Pre-trial
Order contains the recital of the actions taken by the parties, agreements and admissions, the facts stipulated, and the evidence
marked,[45] the parties must sign it. A party who participates in the pre-trial conference and who signs the Joint Stipulation of
Facts is expected to sign the Pre-trial Order. If a party believes that the Pre-trial Order is not an honest representation of what
transpired in the pre-trial conference, then he must specify his objections thereto and the court may modify it to prevent
injustice. This was what respondents exactly did when complainants pointed out the assailed statement in the Pre-trial Order.
 II

We now come to complainants allegation of oppression and gross misconduct. Oppression is a misdemeanor committed
by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other
injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. [46] Upon the other hand, the word misconduct implies
wrongful intention. For gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to
violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. [47] We find no evidence to prove complainants charges of
oppression and misconduct.
Records show that Atty. Saguisag was asking the court for a copy of the Pre-trial Order so that he could follow up the
courts discussion. He did not utter any disrespectful remark against respondents nor attack their integrity or authority. However,
he kept on speaking simultaneously with Justice Cuevas and refused to yield to the courts repeated order to stop. Such actuation
must have constrained respondents to lose their cool and order the sheriffs to take him out of the courtroom. At that point, what
respondents should have done was to cite him in direct contempt of court pursuant to Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.[48] In Romero vs. Valle, Jr.,[49] this Court ruled:

Precisely, judicial officers are given contempt powers in order that without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust, they may
endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court. Respondent judge could very well have cited
complainant in contempt of court instead of indulging in tantrums by banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and
unceremoniously walking out of the courtroom.

It has been consistently stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of
temperance, patience and courtesy. In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: A judge should be patient,
attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the
court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of
the courts for the litigants.
In Echano vs. Sunga,[50] respondent judge, during the course of an argument in his sala, lost his cool and called the sheriff
to take away the arguing attorney. And when the attorney kept on talking, respondent judge countered, Submitted, Buntalin kita
dian. This Court admonished him to be more prudent and restrained in his behavior.
For his part, pursuant to Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Saguisag should have observed the
respect due to respondent magistrates for the maintenance of the courts supreme importance. Upon being ordered to stop
arguing simultaneously with Justice Cuevas, he should have complied and behaved accordingly.Had he done so, he would not
have been ordered to leave the courtroom. Indeed, he failed to comport himself in a manner required of an officer of the court.
III
The setting of the hearing of the plunder case three times a week is in order, not only because the case is of national
concern, but more importantly, because the accused are presently detained. [51] Contrary to complainants assertions, the
continuous trial is in accordance with the mandate of the law. This Court, in Administrative Circular No. 3-90 dated January 31,
1990, ordered all trial courts to adopt the mandatory continuous trial system in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 4
dated September 22, 1988 and Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989. It was adopted precisely to minimize delay in the
processing of cases. This delay was attributed to the common practice of piecemeal trial wherein cases are set for trial one day
at a time and thereafter the hearing is postponed to another date or dates until all the parties have finished their presentation of
evidence.[52] Section 2 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 2 Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as
practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultations with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on weekly or other
short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire period exceed one
hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Corolarilly, the consultations referred to in the foregoing provisions does not necessarily mean that the court has to
secure first from the prosecution and defense their approval before it can set the date of hearing. To rule otherwise is to
subject our trial system to the control of the parties and their counsel.
Complainants also assail respondents act of setting the hearing at one oclock in the afternoon. Again, there is nothing
irregular in it. The schedule of hearing is regarded as a matter necessarily at the discretion of the trial judge. As a matter of fact,
a court may even hold night sessions, and a court of review will not interfere unless it clearly appears that there has been an
abuse of the power of the judge and that injustice has been done. [53] This is because the good of the service demands more toil
and less idleness, and the limitations imposed by law are aimed to cut indolence and not the other way around. [54]

IV

Our minds cannot sit easy with regard to the charge of violation of the accuseds right to counsel. A PAO lawyer is
considered as independent counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution considering that he is not a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the
accused. In People vs. Bacor,[55] we ruled that the assistance of a PAO lawyer satisfies the constitutional requirement of a
competent and independent counsel for the accused.
 V

Finally, we find that Justice Badoy incurred delay in resolving Jinggoy Estradas motion to be allowed to administer the
oath of his mother, a newly elected Senator. Every judge is required, at all times, to be alert in his rulings and in the
conduct of the business of the court, so far as he can make it useful to litigants and to the community. Rule 3.05, Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods. A judge must cultivate a capacity for quick decision and habits of indecision must be sedulously
overcome.
While we commend Justice Badoys persistence in searching for precedents that would help him resolve Jinggoy Estradas
motion to be allowed to administer the oath of office of his mother, nonetheless, he should not have delayed resolving the
same. As a result, the members of his Division failed to vote on his Resolution. He knew very well that the oath taking was to
be held at 2:00 P.M. of June 29, 2001. Even if he had to deny the motion, he should have consulted his members before 2:00
P.M. so as to give them the opportunity to consider Jinggoy Estradas arguments. When he submitted the Resolution to his
members at 4:45 P.M., he rendered their votes inconsequential. Even Justices De Castro and Ilarde made notes in the same
Resolution to the effect that the matter subject of the Resolution had become moot before it reached them. Justice De Castro
stated: The matter is now moot and academic; while Justice Ilarde wrote: What is there to deny? This resolution was
brought to us only on 4:45 P.M. The matter has been rendered moot and academic. Clearly, Justice Badoy should be held
liable for such delay.
In sum, we find Justice Badoy guilty of the following administrative offenses:
1) conduct unbecoming a Justice for going to GMA-7 Broadcast Station aboard an ambulance and reporting the loss of a
Resolution, classified as a light charge under Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended; [56] and
2) undue delay in resolving Jinggoy Estradas motion to be allowed to administer his mothers oath of office, a less serious
charge under Section 9 of the same Rule.[57]
Likewise, we find that both Justice Badoy and Justice De Castro failed to exhibit judicial temperament. Such conduct
deserves admonition.
One last word. The members of the bench and the bar ought to be reminded that the people expect from them a sense of
shared responsibility in the administration of justice a crucial factor in the speedy and fair disposition of cases. Each of them
must do his share for in the last analysis the quality of justice meted out by the courts cannot be higher than the quality of the
lawyers practicing in the courts and of the judges who have been selected from among them.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. (Retired), is hereby FINED in the sum of P13,000.00
for conduct unbecoming a Justice and for delay in issuing an Order, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro is hereby ADMONISHED to be more tolerant of counsels demeanors which do not
detract from the dignity and solemnity of the court proceedings.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents records with this Court.
SO ORDERED.

.M. No. 188 November 29, 1976

RICARDA GABRIEL DE BUMANGLAG, complainant,

vs.
ESTEBAN T. BUMANGLAG, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

In the Court's decision of September 24, 1973, the Court found respondent guilty of gross immoral
conduct and ordered his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Respondent filed several motions for reconsideration, all of which were denied per the Court's
Resolutions of November 20, 1973, December 19, 1973, January 9, 1974 and October 30, 1974.

On March 31, 1975, the Clerk of Court received a 1st Indorsement dated February 21, 1975 from
then Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora "requesting comment and/or appropriate
action" on the therewith enclosed petition of respondent to the President of the Philippines that he
"promulgate(s) a decree that the order of suspension by the Supreme Court be set aside and that
your humble self be allowed to become an active member of the New Society".

The Court per its Resolution of June 16, 1975 directed the Clerk of Court "to furnish the Office of
the President through Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora with copies of the Court's decision of
September 24, 1973 wherein the Court in a spirit of liberality by majority vote imposed a lesser
penalty of two-year suspension instead of disbarment (as voted by a minority composed of Justices
Castro and Makasiar) and of the Court's resolutions of November 20, 1973 and December 19, 1973
denying for lack of merit respondent's two motions for reconsideration dated October 18, 1973 and
December 12, 1973"; and further resolved "to require respondent to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why he should not be subjected to further disciplinary action for making false
statements and misrepresentations in his petition to the President that he has been allegedly
deprived of due process of law contrary to the facts of record as stated in the Court's decision, and
for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in asking the President to set aside by decree
this Court's decision imposing upon him two-year suspension from the practice of law".

In a 2nd Indorserment of June 18, 1975 and received by the Clerk of Court on the same day, then
Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora forwarded respondent's letter of the same date to the
President stating that "(T)he undersigned by now (has) come to realize that I made a big mistake by
making said letter to you, Your Excellency, because the Honorable Supreme Court may believe that
I may be challenging the decision which is already final and executory and as such do not observe
the doctrine of protocol of separation of power(s)", and withdrawing and asking the President to
disregard his first letter.

Respondent in his Explanation of July 23, 1975 cited the fact that he had "immediately" withdrawn
his letter asking for the President's intervention and that "lately, however, he has fully realized that
the Chief Executive is bereft (of) any authority to set aside or modify the decision of this Honorable
Supreme Court" and "with folded hands begs and asks an apology from the members of this
Honorable Court, with the full assurance that nothing of this sort will be repeated by him in the
future."

Respondent served his two-year suspension, as duly noted in the Court's Resolution of November
7, 1975. Since respondent has apologized for his "big mistake" and now appreciates that under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, a
decision of this Court may not be set aside by the President, the Court is disposed to view his
misconduct and/or ignorance with liberality and will administer a reprimand with warning of severe
action on any future transgressions, considering respondent's unenviable record.

A final word is called for on respondent's statement in his Explanation inferring that he was led to
file his petition with the President by the fact that his motions for reconsideration "were only denied
by the Clerk of Court without any comment whatsoever". As the Court has had occasion to state
in People vs. Catolico * and earlier cases, this remark of respondent exposes his lack of appreciation or disregard of the time-
honored usage of the Court that minute resolutions, summons and processes of the Court, upon being duly adopted and recorded are
transmitted to the interested parties by and upon the signature of the Clerk of Court who is duly authorized to do so. With the thousands of
resolutions approved monthly by the Court, it would unduly tax the time and attention of the Chief Justice and members of the Court to the
prejudice of the administration of justice if all such papers, other than decisions, could be released only upon their own signatures.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of the law and
of the Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's decision which
suspended him for two years from the practice of law, with warning that the commission of any
transgression in the future of his oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt with.

SO ORDERED.

Facts: Esteban T. Bumanglad, the respondent, was found by theCourt in its decision of September 24, 1973 guilty of gross
immoral conduct and ordered his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years;

Respondent filed several motions for reconsideration but the same were denied;

As a result of such denial, the respondent wrote a petition to the President of the Philippines that he promulgate(s) a decree that
the order of suspension by the Supreme Court be set aside and that your humble self be allowed to become an active member of
the New Society.

The respondent alleged in the same petition that he was deprived of due process of law;

The Clerk of Court, by way of an indorsement from the AssistantExecutive Secretary, received a copy of the petition and was
requested to comment and/or appropriate action on the subject matter;

However, in a subsequent letter to the President the respondent retracted and acknowledged his non observance of protocol of
separation of powers;

In the end, the respondent asked for an apology from the members of the Honorable Court.
Issues:

(1) Whether or not respondent may be disciplined for grossignorance of the law and of the Constitution in not observing the
protocol of separation of power by asking the President to set aside by decree the decision of the Court imposing suspension
upon the respondent

(2) Whether or not a decision duly promulgated by the SupremeCourt may be set aside by a Presidential Decree

Held:

(1) Respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for grossignorance of the law and of the Constitution in having asked the
President to set aside by decree the Court's decision which suspended him for two years from the practice of law, with warning
that the commission of any transgression in the future of his oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt with.

(2) Since respondent has apologized for his "big mistake" and now appreciates that under the fundamental principle of
separation of powers enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, a decision of this Court may not be set aside by the
President, theCourt is disposed to view his misconduct and/or

LEGARDA VS CA

FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land and the improvements located at
123 West Avenue, Quezon City. On January 11, 1985 respondent New Cathay House, Inc. filed a
complaint against the petitioner for specific performance with preliminary injunction and damages in
RTC alleging that petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the private respondent through its
representative, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated property of petitioner. Respondent drew up
the written contract and sent it to petitioner, that petitioner failed and refused to execute and sign the
same despite demands of respondent.

Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his appearance with an
urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days from February 26, 1985.
However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the extended period prayed for. Counsel for
private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial
court on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter,
on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision.

Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same set
aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. The property of
petitioner was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of private respondent. The property
was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of private respondent, and a certificate of sale was
issued in his favor. The redemption period expired after one year so a final deed of sale was issued by
the sheriff in favor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to have transferred the same to private respondent.

During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her great shock,
what happened to her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel. She still
asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possible under the circumstances.

As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in the
Court of Appeals. But that was all he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against petitioner, of
which counsel was duly notified, said counsel did not inform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask
for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review before this Court. Thus, the judgment became
final. It was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from the secretary of
her counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.

HELD: A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can
be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy
or defense authorized by the law in support of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views.
In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he
may displease the judge or the general public. 12

Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to exercise his
utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause. 13 It is not only a case of simple negligence
as found by the appellate court, but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that his client was
deprived of her property without due process of law.
The Court finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross and inexcusable. This
was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel another chance to make up for his
omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment of the judgment in the appellate court, again
counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that after he received a copy of the adverse judgment of
the appellate court, he did not do anything to save the situation or inform his client of the judgment. He
allowed the judgment to lapse and become final. Such reckless and gross negligence should not be
allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.

Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforce an alleged lease agreement of the property of
petitioner, private respondent went to court, and that because of the gross negligence of the counsel for
the petitioner, she lost the case as well as the title and ownership of the property, which is worth
millions. The mere lessee then now became the owner of the property. Its true owner then, the
petitioner, now is consigned to penury all because her lawyer appear to have abandoned her case not
once but repeatedly.

People v. Rio

Facts:

1. Rio was convicted of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for having carnal knowledge with Wilma Phua. He interposed
his appeal and as a consequence, it was forwarded to the CA which in turn forwarded the records of the case to the SC.

2. Court denied motion. Instead, it appointed a counsel de oficio for the accused Rio for, as correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, all of Rios letter pertain that he is unable to retain services of counsel de parte on account of his poverty.

Ruling:

1. Accused was unaware that Court can appoint a counsel de oficio to prosecute his appeal pursuant to Section13, Rule 122 of
Rules of Court and Article III, Sec. 11 of the Constitution.

2. The constitutional provision imposes a duty on the judicial branch.

3. In criminal cases, there can be no fair hearing unless the accused by given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to
be heard would be of little meaning if it does not include right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educate man
may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons
who are ignorant or uneducated.

4. Right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon conviction of accused by a trial court. It continues even during appeal such
that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes anintent to appeal. Even in a case,
where the accused signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal.
If the reason is poverty, court must assign a counsel de oficio.

In the matter of JOSE ROBLES LAHESA

Jose Maria Marcaida, for Jose Robles Lahesa.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEY AT LAW; NEGLIGENCE. The Supreme Court exacts, and should exact, from its officers and
subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the
performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases and the
detention of accused persons pending appeal.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

Jose Robles Lahesa, a lawyer practicing before this court, as duly appointed counsel for the appellants in
the case of the United States v. Julian Tulagan Et. Al. on February 5, 1904, and on February 12, 1905, the
Solicitor-General gave notice of motion to dismiss the appeal in said case on the ground of abandonment
and failure to prosecute the same. The said Lahesa was also appointed counsel for the appellant in the case
of the United States v. Julio Liuag, on the 12th of August, 1904, and on February 11, 1905, this court, on
its own motion, issued a rule to the said Lahesa to show cause of why the appeal in that case should not be
dismissed on like grounds, and further, to show cause, if any he had, why this court should not impose
disciplinary punishment for grave neglect in the performance of his duty as a lawyer and officer of this
court.

Said motion and rule on for hearing Monday, February 20, 1905, when Jose Maria Marcaida appeared on
behalf of said Lahesa, and said he had been instructed by said Lahesa to inform the court that he could not
appear personally in response to its rule, because he found it necessary to go elsewhere on the day and at
the hour fixed for the hearing, that he had no ground on which to oppose the dismissal of the appeals in
said cases, and further, that he had taken no action in the said cases because, in his opinion, "there was no
defense to be made on behalf of any of the defendants for whom he had been assigned as counsel." cralaw virtua1aw library

An examination of the record in the case of the United States v. Julian Tulagan Et. Al. shows that the
appellants were sentenced in the trial court to long terms of imprisonment for the crime of robo en
cuadrilla, from which sentence they appealed, and it appearing that they were too poor to employ a lawyer,
this court, in accordance with the law provided in such cases, assigned the said Lahesa as counsel de oficio,
yet the said Lahesa has utterly failed to take any action whatever in behalf of the defendants in said case,
though more than a year has elapsed since the date of said assignment. An examination of the record in
the case of the United States v. Julio Liuag shows that the defendant was sentenced to seventeen years
and four months imprisonment for the crime of homicide, from which sentence he appealed, and it
appearing that he was too poor to employ a lawyer, this court assigned the said Lahesa as counsel de
oficio, yet the said Lahesa has utterly failed to take any action whatever on behalf of the defendant in that
case, though more than six months have elapsed since the date of his assignment.

Upon this statement of facts it can not be doubted that the said Jose Robles Lahesa has been guilty of
grave negligence in the performance of his duties as counsel, and as an officer of the court.

This court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official
duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the
prosecution of criminal cases and the detention of accused persons pending appeal. We are of opinion,
therefore, that a fine of 200 pesos, Philippine currency, should be imposed upon the said Jose Robles
Lahesa, said fine to be paid to the clerk of this court within ten days of receipt of notice of this order. So
ordered.

People vs Ricardo Rio

GR No. 90294, 24 September 1991

201 SCRA 702

FACTS

Accussed-appellant Ricardo Rio was charged and convicted of the crime of rape before the RTC of Makati City and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He filed an appeal and as a consequence, the branch clerk of court
forwarded the records to the CA. the appellate court, however, forwarded the records to the SC in view of the penalty imposed
upon the accused.

However, accused-appellant, in his two letters addressed to the clerk of court, manifested his intention to withdraw the
appeal due to his poverty. Upon inquiry of the clerk of court of the trial court, through the recommendation of the SolGen, the
accused-appellant submits that he was no longer interested in pursuing his appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn his appeal. The
Court denied his motion to withdraw and appointed a counsel de oficio for him. All the letters reveal that the only reason he
offered for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the services of a counsel de oficio on account of his poverty.

ISSUE

Whether or not the right to counsel of accused-appellant ceased upon his conviction by the trial court.

HELD

The Supreme Court held in the negative. This right to counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an
accused by the trial court. It continues, even during appeal, such duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an
accused interposes intent to appeal. Even in a case, where the accused has signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court
is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, the
court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and
perhaps, with greater reason. After all, those who have less in life must have more in law.
 The Court admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as advocates of their clients causes
whether acting de parte or de oficio for public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the
prosecution or defense of his clients cause.

Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. And a lawyer who
performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests if his client; he also serve the ends of justice, does
honor to th Bar and helds maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. This is because the entrusted privilege
to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

People vs Simeon, et al

GR No. L-33730, 28 September 1972

47 SCRA 129

FACTS

On 17 October 1970, the nine accused (herein defendants-appellants), in conspiracy with each other, killed one Pedro
Langaoen while they were confined in the New Bilid Prison, Muntinglupa, Rizal. The Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal sentenced
them to death plus indemnity, jointly and severally upon their alleged plea of guilty. The trial judge stated that all the defendants
were assisted by de oficio counsel and were all apprised of the consequences of their plea of guilty, who also explained to them
the provisions of Article 160 in relation to Article 248 of the RPC. Atty. Joaquin L. Misa in his brief, as counsel de oficio on
appeal, regrets with justification the omissions of the trial judge and challenges the validty of the decisions impugning the
constitutionality of the death penalty. He points out that the record does not show when the two counsels de oficio were
appointed and how much time they had to aquaint themselves with the case. The counsels de oficio had virtually only minutes
to advise appellants. Atty Misa prays that the accused-appellants be acquitted or at least their cases be remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings.

ISSUE

Whether or not the prayer of Atty Misa should be granted.

HELD

The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. Because it is apparent that the trial judge did not accord full recognition to
the constitutional rights of the accused to be fully informed of the charge against them and of the consequence of their plea of
guilty the Court vacated the three sentences rendered by the trial court and ordered the remand of the case for further
proceedings.

The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused.
The age, education or lack thereof of the accused are factors to determine his ability to understand the information against him,
the import of his plea of guilty and the proper penalty to be imposed. Trial judges should exercise patience and circumspection
in explaining the meaning of the accusation and the full import of the plea of guilty to the accused, who should likewise be
granted all the chances to acquaint his counsel de oficio with his version of the incident and to conduct his own investigation at
the local of the crime as much as practicable, more than just examining the records of the case.

filart_1919 September 27, 1919

In re the complaint against Attorney ANACLETO FILART.

Acting Attorney-General Feria for the Government.
The respondent in his own behalf.

MALCOLM, J.:

These proceedings were instituted at the instance of thirty-seven residents of Asingan, Pangasinan, who filed a complaint
against attorney Anacleto Filart for malpractice, alleging in substance:

1. That while Filart was deputy fiscal of Pangasinan he received of them the sum of P111 as fees for drafting a memorandum in
connection with Registration Case No. 3, Record No. 8540;

2. That Filart was guilty of fraud and negligence in prosecuting the appeal to the Supreme Court, he having practically
abandoned the case.

In connection with point No. 1, even admitting that Filart while deputy fiscal received such a sum of complainants, which
respondent denies, Filart seems to have had a legal right to receive compensation as an attorney, the office of deputy provincial
fiscal not being specifically included in section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 1702, as an official
who shall not engage in private practice. It is also to be noted that Filart did not take up the case of his own volition but was
ordered by the court to defend the rights of petitioners because the attorney they formerly retained was almost always in a state
of intoxication.

In connection with point No. 2, the following facts are important:

1. That having resigned as deputy fiscal, and having engaged in the practice of law, complainants asked Filart to prosecute the
appeal of their case;

2. That Filart received from complainants sums of money, P780 according to complainants, and P160 according to respondent;

3. That the complainants were driven from their lands, and their houses were destroyed, by order of the court.

The facts which support the allegation of fraud and negligence on the part of respondent are:

1. The lapse of fifty-one days between the receipt of notice of denial of motion for a new trial (March 7, 1917) until the filing of
the bill of exceptions (April 27, 1917) when the statutory period is only thirty days (Act No. 2347), sec. 26);

2. Failure to perfect a satisfactory bill of exceptions after repeated amendments and re-amendments;

3. Failure to file a bond in order to prevent execution;

4. Assurances made by respondent that all was right.

1. This is explained by the fact that the record was not in the clerk's office. The date when the answers to Filart's questions from
the Land Registration Office reached Filart, which were to be made a part of the bill of exceptions, does not appear in the
record. Filart also alleges he made an oral motion to extend the period fixed by law for the filing of the bill of exceptions, but
that motion appears to have been overlooked by the judge;

2. The parties are agreed that the bills of exceptions are voluminous. Respondent further pleads pressure of work in his law
office;

3. Respondent says that he believed execution would not be valid until after certiorari proceedings were decided;

4. The exact nature of the assurances do not clearly appear in the record possibly they are no more than what an attorney
fairly confident of success would make to a client.

The Acting Attorney-General believes that the facts are not sufficient to support the complaint, and recommends dismissal of the
case. We agree to the extent that such gross misconduct or negligence has not been shown as warrants disbarment or suspension
pursuant to sections 21 and 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. "That part of the profession," said Lord Mansfield in Pitt vs.
Yalden, ([1767], 4 Burr., 2060), "which is carried on by attorneys is liberal and reputable, as well as useful to the public, when
they conduct themselves with honor and integrity; and they ought to be protected when they act to the best of their skill and
knowledge. But every man is liable to error; and I should be very sorry that it should be taken for granted that an attorney is
answerable for every error or mistake. . . . A counsel may mistake as well as an attorney. . . . Yet no one will say that a counsel
who has been mistaken shall be charged. . . . Not only counsel but judges may differ, or doubt, or take time to consider.
Therefore, an attorney ought not to be liable in case of reasonable doubt." "No attorney," said Chief Justice Abbott, "is bound to
know all the law; God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the
law." (Montorious vs. Jeffreys, 2 Car. & P., 113.)

The court, having in mind the many appeals which have been dismissed because of the lack of diligence of counsel, cannot let
the occurrence pass without expressing a strong disapproval of such criminal carelessness. While we would not wish to assume
a harsh and uncompromising attitude towards attorneys-at-law, we would wish for them to know that by indulging in such
unprofessional tactics they become unworthy of the trust which the law reposes in them. The lack of due care is a breach of the
attorney's undertaking with his client, and is indicative of a disregard of the attorney's duties to the court. We bring to the notice
of clients whose rights have been prejudiced by the failure or by the delay of an attorney in preparing or filing pleadings
necessary in the proper conduct of a cause, and in taking such steps as may be required in the progress of the case, that the client
who has suffered damages as the result of his attorney's negligence or misconduct may recover therefor. In Drais vs.
Hoggan ([1875], 50 Cal., 121), although many other cases might be cited, it was held that "if a judgment is obtained against a
party upon a complaint which is radically defective, and he desires to appeal, and procures bondsmen, but his attorney neglects
to do so until the time for appeal expires, the attorney is guilty of gross negligence, and is liable for the loss sustained by the
client."

Without, therefore, desiring especially to overemphasize the dereliction of Attorney Anacleto Filart for, sad to relate, he is only
one of a class, it does become our solemn duty to reprimand him for carelessness and misconduct in attending to the cause of
poor clients. Let a copy of this order be furnished to the respondent for his information with a warning that a more severe
punishment will be meted out to him in case of a repetition of similar acts and omissions; and let a copy hereof be filed with his
personal papers in this court. So ordered.

Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco

G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)
Legal Ethics : Definition

Facts:

Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the
respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of
Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his
position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel
de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari
proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a grave abuse
of discretion?

Holding:

No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the
legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The
legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to
act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such
services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

Ratio:

The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other officials or
employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of
Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them,
remained as counsel of record since he did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellants counsel
after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the
new counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be
required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of an accused in a criminal
case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the highest importance, and there can be no
fair hearing with due process of law unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard and
given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a counsel de officio for
such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge
Muoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)
http://cofeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/ledesma-vs-climaco.html
Facts: Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala
of the respondent judge.

On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz,
Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his
position as counsel de parte.

The respondent Judge not only denied the motion but also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two
defendants.

On November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de

oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as
on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense.

On November 6, Judge denied the motion. Hence, Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue: Whether or not a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to appointment
as
Election Registrar.

Held: The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio because:
the case has been postponed at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was no
incompatibility between duty of petitioner to defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar. There
is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time.

Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the legal
profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The
legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to
act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such
services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

In People v. Holgado: In criminal cases there can be no fair hearingunless the accused be given
an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted
by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that
under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the
court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own.

The present Constitution provides not only that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel but further provides that Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
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shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. This made manifest the
indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of the accused.
Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member
of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that
there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-
interest.

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