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 INTERVIEW

CHOREOG RAPH IES

..........
.........

JACQUESDERRIDAand CHRISTIEV. MCDONALD

MEE-5_-

44~
-i~il"':?ii':iiiii
":-:--
-iii-i
Question I'

MCDONALD: EmmaGoldman,a maverickfeministfromthe late nine-

teenth century,once said of the feministmovement:"IfI can'tdance I don't
wantto be partof yourrevolution." JacquesDerrida,you havewrittenaboutthe
question of woman and what it is that constitutes 'the feminine.' In
Spurs/Eperons (Chicagoand London:The Universityof ChicagoPress,1978),a
textdevotedto Nietzsche,styleandwoman,you wrotethat"thatwhichwill not
be pinneddown by truth[truth?]is, in truth,feminine."And you warnedthat
such a proposition"shouldnot... be hastilymistakenfora woman'sfeminin-
. .
.
.
.
:-?i .l
ity, for femalesexuality,or for any otherof those essentializingfetisheswhich
mightstilltantalizethe dogmaticphilosopher,the impotentartistor the inexpe-
riencedseducerwho has not yet escaped his foolishhopes of capture."
Whatseems to be at playas you take up Heidegger'sreadingof Nietzsche
is whether or not sexual differenceis a "regionalquestionin a largerorder
.. 'ig
which would subordinateit firstto the domain of generalontology, subse-
quentlyto thatof a fundamental ontologyandfinallyto the questionof the truth
[whose?]of beingitself."Youtherebyquestionthe statusof the argumentand at
:I- :lii:~i -'i?i i i ~:~ i -i~li:ia rBMW :
the same time the questionitself.In this instance,if the questionof sexualdif-
ference is not a regionalone (in the sense of subsidiary),if indeed"itmay no
longereven be a question,"as you suggest,how wouldyou describe'woman's
place'?
DERRIDA: WillI be ableto writeimprovisingmy responsesas Igo along?It
would be moreworthwhile,wouldn'tit?Too premeditatedan interviewwould
be withoutinteresthere. Ido notsee the particular finalityof suchan endeavor,
its properend. Itwould be interminable, or, rather,with respectto these ques-
tions- which are muchtoo difficult-I would neverhaveeven daredto begin.
Thereare othertexts, otheroccasionsfor such verycalculatedpremeditation.
Let us play surprise.It will be our tributeto the dance [in Frenchthe word
dance, la danse, is a femininenoun requiringthe use of a femininepronoun,
elle]:it shouldhappenonlyonce, neithergrowheavynoreverplungetoo deep;
above all, it shouldnot lag or trailbehinditstime.We willthereforenot leave
time to come backto what is behindus, norto look attentively.We will only
take a glimpse.[InFrench,to takea glimpseis to look intothe spacesbetween
things,entrevoir,that is, inter-view.]

'The following text is the result of a written exchange carried on during the fall of 1981.
Jacques Derridawrote his responses in French, and I then translatedthem into Englishfor
publication. It should be noted that I do not ask the following questions in the name of any
specific feministgroup or ideology. I do nevertheless owe a debt to longstandingconversa-
tions on the subject of "Woman"and "Women"with, among others, A. Jardine, C.
Livesque, N. Miller, N. Schor and especially i. McDonald.

DIACRITICSVol. 12 Pp. 66-76

0300-7162/82/0122-0066 $01.00 ? 1982 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

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 Itwas a good idea to begin with a quotation, one by a feminist from the end of the nine-
teenth century maverick enough to ask of the feminist movement its questions and condi-
tions. Already, already a sign of life, a sign of the dance.
One can question the repetition. Was the matrix of what was to be the future of
feminism already there at the end of the last century? You smile, no doubt, as I do, at the
mention of this word. [The word matrix in English like matrice in French comes from the
Latinmatrixmeaning womb. In both languages it has taken on, among others, the following
two meanings: 1) a situation or surrounding substance within which something originates,
develops, or is contained; 2) in printingit means a metal plate used for casting typefaces.] Let
us make use of this figure from anatomy or printinga bit longer to ask whether a program,or
locus of begetting, was not already in place in the nineteenth century for all those configura-
tions to which the feminist struggle of the second half of the twentieth century was to com-
mit itself and then to develop. I refer here to their being in place at all levels - those of socio-
political demands, alliances with other forces, the alternatives of compromise or various
radicalisms, the strategies of discourses, various forms of writing, theory or literature, etc.
One is often tempted to think of this program- and to arrive by way of conclusion at the
stasis of a simple combinatory scheme - in terms of all that is interminable and exhausting in
it. Yes, it is exhausting (because it always draws on the same fund of possibilities)and tedious
because of the ensuing repetition.
This is only one of the paradoxes. The development of the present struggle (or struggles)
is extraordinarynot only in its quantitative extension within Europe- because of its progress
and the masses that have been slowly aroused - but also, and this is a much more important
phenomenon I believe, outside of Europe. And such progress brings with it new types of
historical research, other forms of reading, the discovery of new bodies of materialthat have
gone unrecognized or misunderstood up until now; that is to say, they have been exces-
sively [violemment] concealed or marginalized. The historyof different"feminisms"has often
been, of course, a past "passed-over-in-silence."Now here is the paradox: having made
possible the reawakening of this silent past, having reappropriateda history previously sti-
fled, feminist movements will perhaps have to renounce an all too easy kind of progressivism
in the evaluation of this history. Such progressivismis often taken as their axiomatic base: the
inevitable or ratheressential presupposition (dans les luttes, as we say in French)of what one
might call the ideological consensus of feminists, perhaps also their "dogmatics"or what your
"maverickfeminist"suspects to be their sluggishness. It is the image of a continuously accel-
erated "liberation"at once punctuated by determinable stages and commanded by an
ultimately thinkable telos, a truth of sexual difference and femininity, etc. And if there is no
doubt that this theatre, upon which the progress of feminist struggles is staged, exists, it is a
relatively short and very recent sequence within "extreme-Western"history. Certainly, it is
not timely politically, nor in any case is it possible, to neglect or renounce such a view of
"liberation."However, to credit this representation of progress and entrust everything to it
would be to surrenderto a sinister mystification:everything would collapse, flow, founder in
this same homogenized, sterilized riverof the historyof mankind [man'skind in the locution
I'histoiredes hommes]. This history carries along with it the age-old dream of reappropria-
tion, "liberation,"autonomy, mastery, in short the cortege of metaphysics and the tekhne.
The indications of this repetition are more and more numerous. The specular reversal of
masculine "subjectivity,"even in its most self-critical form-that is, where it is nervously
jealous both of itself and of its "proper"objects- probably represents only one necessary
phase. Yet it still belongs to the same program, a program whose exhaustion we were just
talking about. It is true that this is valid for the whole of our culture, our scholastics, and the
trouble may be found everywhere that this program is in command, or almost everywhere.
I have not begun as yet to answer your question, but, if you will forgive me, I am going
to try to approach it slowly. It was necessary to recall the fact that this "silent past"(as that
which was passed-over-in-silence) could still reserve some surprises, like the dance of your
"maverickfeminist."
MCDONALD:Yes, and in that respect, recognition of the paradox suggests that while
nineteenth century and late twentieth century feminism do resemble each other, it is less
because of their historical matrix than because of those characteristicswhich define them.

diacritics/ summer 1982 67

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 True, the program was in place.2 The resurgence in the United States during the nineteen
sixties of anarchist-likeattitudes, particularlywithin the feminist movement, attests to that.
But Goldman was not before or behind the times. An admirer of Nietzsche as "rebel and
innovator,"she proclaimed that "revolutionis but thought carried into action." She was an
activist unable to support those forms of organized feminism that focused on merely contest-
ing the institutionalizingof inequalities for women. Her stance was more radical- one that
called for the restructuringof society as a whole. If she refused the vote, for example, it was
because she deemed that behind standardforms of political action there lay coercion. As an
anarchist-feministshe had no truck with statism.
DERRIDA:Perhapswoman does not have a history, not so much because of any notion
of the "EternalFeminine"but because all alone she can resist and step back from a certain
history (precisely in order to dance) in which revolution, or at least the "concept"of revolu-
tion, is generally inscribed. That history is one of continuous progress, despite the revolu-
tionary break- oriented in the case of the women's movement towards the reappropriation
of woman's own essence, her own specific difference, oriented in short towards a notion of
woman's "truth."Your "maverick feminist" showed herself ready to break with the most
authorized, the most dogmatic form of consensus, one that claims (and this is the most
serious aspect of it) to speak out in the name of revolution and history. Perhaps she was
thinking of a completely other history: a history of paradoxical laws and non-dialectical
discontinuities, a history of absolutely heterogeneous pockets, irreducible particularities,of
unheard of and incalculable sexual differences; a history of women who have-centuries
ago- "gone further"by stepping back with their lone dance, or who are today inventing sex-
ual idioms at a distance from the main forum of feminist activity with a kind of reserve that
does not necessarily prevent them from subscribing to the movement and even, occasion-
ally, from becoming a militant for it.
But I am speculating. It would be better to come back to your question. Having passed
through several detours or stages you wonder how I would describe what is called "woman's
place";the expression recalls, if I am not mistaken, "inthe home"or "inthe kitchen."Frankly,
I do not know. I believe that I would not describe that place. In fact, I would be wary of such
a description. Do you not fear that having once become committed to the path of this
topography, we would inevitably find ourselves back "athome"or "inthe kitchen"?Or under
house arrest, assignation a residence as they say in French penitentiary language, which
would amount to the same thing? Why must there be a place for woman? And why only
one, a single, completely essential place?
This is a question that you could translate ironically by saying that in my view there is no
one place for woman. That was indeed clearly set forth during the 1972 Cerisy Colloquium
devoted to Nietzsche in the lecture to which you referred entitled Spurs/Eperons.It is
without a doubt risky to say that there is no place for woman, but this idea is not anti-
feminist, far from it; true, it is not feminist either. But it appears to me to be faithfulin its way
both to a certain assertion of women and to what is most affirmativeand "dancing,"as the
maverick feminist says, in the displacement of women. Can one not say, in Nietzsche's
language, that there is a "reactive"feminism, and that a certain historicalnecessity often puts
this form of feminism in power in today's organized struggles? It is this kind of "reactive"
feminism that Nietzsche mocks, and not woman or women. Perhaps one should not so
much combat it head on-other interests would be at stake in such a move-as prevent its
occupying the entire terrain. And why for that matter should one rush into answering a
topological question (what is the place of woman [quelle est la place de la femme])? Or an
economical question (because it all comes back to I'oikos as home, maison, chez-soi [at
home in this sense also means in French within the selfJ,the law of the proper place, etc. in
the preoccupation with a woman's place)?Why should a new "idea"of woman or a new step
taken by her necessarily be subjected to the urgency of this topo-economical concern
(essential, it is true, and ineradicably philosophical)?This step only constitutes a step on the

20n August 26, 1970, a group of women calling themselves the Emma Goldman Brigade marched
down FifthAvenue in New YorkCity with many other feminists, chanting: "Emmasaid it in 1910 / Now
we're going to say it again."

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 conditionthat it challengea certainidea of the locus [lieu]and the place [place](theentire
historyof the Westandof itsmetaphysics)andthatitdanceotherwise.Thisis veryrare,if it is
not impossible,and presentsitselfonly in the formof the mostunforeseeableand mostinno-
cent of chances. The most innocentof dances would thwartthe assignationa residence,
escape those residencesundersurveillance;the dancechangesplaceand aboveall changes
places. In its wake they can no longer be recognized.The joyous disturbanceof certain
women's movements,and of some women in particular,has actuallybroughtwith it the
chance for a certainriskyturbulencein the assigningof placeswithinour small European
space (Iam not speakingof a moreample upheavalen routeto world-wideapplication).Is
one then goingto startall over againmakingmaps,topographics,etc.?distributing sexual
identity cards?
The mostseriouspartof the difficultyis the necessityto bringthe dance and itstempo
into tune with the "revolution." The lack of place for [I'atopie]or the madnessof the
dance-this bit of luckcan also compromisethe politicalchancesof feminismand serveas
an alibi for desertingorganized,patient,laborious"feminist" struggleswhen broughtinto
contactwith all the formsof resistancethata dance movementcannotdispel,even though
the dance is not synonymouswith either powerlessnessor fragility.I will not insiston this
point, but you can surelysee the kindof impossibleand necessarycompromisethat I am
alludingto: an incessant,daily negotiation- individualor not-sometimes microscopic,
sometimespunctuatedby a poker-likegamble;alwaysdeprivedof insurance,whetherit be
in privatelifeor withininstitutions.Eachmanand each womanmustcommithisor herown
singularity,the untranslatable factorof his or her lifeand death.
Nietzschemakesa scene beforewomen, feministsin particular-aspectaclewhich is
overdetermined,divided,apparentlycontradictory. Thisis justwhat has interestedme; this
scene hasinterestedme becauseof allthe paradigms thatit exhibitsand multiplies,and inso-
faras it oftenstruggles,sometimesdances,alwaystakeschancesin a historicalspacewhose
essentialtraits,those of the matrix,have perhapsnot changedsince then in Europe(I mean
specificallyin Europe,and that perhaps makes all the differencealthoughwe cannot
separateworld-widefeminismfroma certainfundamentaleuropeanization of worldculture;
this is an enormousproblemthat I mustleave aside here). InSpurs/Eperons I havetriedto
formalizethe movementsand typicalmomentsof the scene thatNietzschecreatesthrough-
out a very broadand diversebodyof texts. I have done this up to a certainlimit,one that I
also indicate,wherethe decisionto formalizefailsfor reasonsthatareabsolutelystructural.
Since these typicalfeaturesare and mustbe unstable,sometimescontradictory, and finally
"undecidable," any break in the movement of the readingwould settlein a counter-meaning,
in the meaningwhich becomescounter-meaning. Thiscounter-meaning can be moreor less
naiveor complacent.One could cite countlessexamplesof it. In the most perfunctoryof
cases, the simplificationreverts to the isolation of Nietzsche'sviolently anti-feminist
statements(directedfirstagainstreactive,specularfeminismas a figurebothof the dogmatic
philosopherand a certainrelationship of manto truth),pullingthemout (andpossiblyattrib-
uting them to me though that is of littleimportance)of the movementand systemthatItryto
reconstitute.Some have reactedat timeseven moreperfunctorily, unableto see beyondthe
end of phallicformsprojectingintothe text;beginningwith style,the spuror the umbrella,
they take no accountof what I have saidaboutthe differencebetween styleand writingor
the bisexualcomplicationof those and otherforms.Generallyspeaking,thiscannotbe con-
sideredreading,and I will go so faras to saythatit is to not readthe syntaxand punctuation
of a given sentencewhen one arreststhe text in a certainposition,thus settlingon a thesis,
meaningor truth.Thismistakeof hermeneutics,this mistakingof hermeneutics-it is this
thatthe finalmessage[envoi]of"lforgotmy umbrella" shouldchallenge.Butlet us leavethat.
The truthvalue (thatis, Womanas the majorallegoryof truthin Westerndiscourse)and its
correlative,Femininity(the essence or truth of Woman), are there to assuage such
hermeneuticanxiety.These are the placesthat one shouldacknowledge,at leastthat is if
one is interestedin doing so; they are the foundationsor anchoringsof Westernrationality
(of what I have called "phallogocentrism" [asthe complicityof Westernmetaphysicswith a
notion of male firstness]).Such recognitionshould not make of eitherthe truthvalue or
femininityan objectof knowledge(atstakeare the normsof knowledgeand knowledgeas

diacritics/ summer 1982 69

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norm);stilllessshouldit makeof thema placeto inhabit,a home. Itshouldratherpermitthe
inventionof an otherinscription,one veryold and very new, a displacementof bodiesand
placesthat is quite different.
You recalledthe expression"essentializing fetishes"(truth,femininity,the essentialityof
woman or femininesexualityas fetishes).It is difficultto improvisebrieflyhere. ButI will
pointout thatone can avoida trapby beingpreciseaboutthe conceptof fetishismand the
contextto which one refers,even if only to displaceit. (Onthis point, I take the libertyof
alludingto the discussionsof fetishismand femininesexualityin Spurs,Glasor Lacarte
postale,specificallyin Lefacteurde la v6rite.)Anothertrapis morepoliticaland can only be
avoidedby takingaccountof the realconditionsin whichwomen'sstrugglesdevelopon all
fronts (economic, ideological,political).These conditionsoften requirethe preservation
(withinlongeror shorterphases)of metaphysicalpresuppositions thatone must(andknows
already that one must)question in a laterphase - or an otherplace- becausethey belongto
the dominantsystemthat one is deconstructingon a practicallevel. This multiplicityof
places,moments,formsandforcesdoes not alwaysmeangivingway eitherto empiricismor
to contradiction.How can one breathewithoutsuch punctuationand withoutthe multi-
plicitiesof rhythmand steps?How can one dance, your"maverick feminist"mightsay?
MCDONALD:This raises an importantquestion that should not be overlooked,
althoughwe haven'tthe spaceto develop it to anyextenthere:the complicatedrelationship
of a practicalpoliticsto the kindsof analysisthatwe have been considering(specificallythe
"deconstructive" analysisimplicitin yourdiscussion).Thatthis relationship cannotsimplybe
translatedinto an opposition between the empiricaland the non-empiricalhas been
touchedon in an entirelydifferentcontext.3Justhow one is to dealwiththe interrelationship
of these forces and necessitiesin the context of femininestrugglesshould be more fully
exploredon some otheroccasion. Butlet'sgo on to Heidegger'sontology.
DERRIDA: To answeryourquestionaboutHeidegger,andwithoutbeingableto review
here the itineraryof a readingin Spurs/Eperons clearlydividedinto two moments,I must
limitmyselfto a piece of information, or ratherto an open question.Thequestionproceeds,
so to speak,fromthe end; it proceedsfromthe pointwherethe thoughtof the gift[le don]4
and thatof "propriation" disturbswithoutsimplyreversingthe orderof ontology,the author-
ity of the question "what is it,"the subordination of regionalontologiesto one fundamental
ontology. I am moving much too rapidly, but how can I do otherwisehere?Fromthispoint,
which is not a point,one wonderswhetherthisextremelydifficult,perhapsimpossibleidea
of the gift can still maintainan essentialrelationshipto sexual difference.One wonders
whethersexual difference,femininityfor example-however irreducibleit may be-does
not remainderived from and subordinatedto either the question of destinationor the
thoughtof the gift(I say "thought" becauseone cannotsay philosophy,theory,logic, struc-
ture, scene or anythingelse; when one can no longeruse any word of this sort,when one
can say almostnothingelse, one says"thought," but one could show thatthistoo is exces-
sive). I do not know. Mustone think"difference" "before"sexual differenceor takingoff
"from" it?Hasthisquestion,if not a meaning(we are at the originof meaninghere, andthe
origincannot"havemeaning'lat leastsomethingof a chance of openingup anythingat all,
howeverim-pertinentit may appear?

Question II

MCDONALD: Youputintoquestionthe characteristic formof women'sprotest,namely

the subordinationof woman to man. I shallattempthere to describethe directionof your
argument,as I understandit, and then commenton it.
The new sense of writing(6criture)withwhich one associatesthe termdeconstruction
has emergedfromthe close readingsthat you have given to texts as divergentas those of
Plato,Rousseau,Mallarm6and others.It is one in whichtraditionalbinarypairing(asin the

3See Rodolphe Gasche, "Labordure interne," and the response by Jacques Derrida, in L'oreillede
I'autre:textes et d6bats avec Jacques Derrida,ed. C. Levesque and C. McDonald, VLB,Montreal, 1982.
4The gift is a topic that occurs in a number of recent texts, among others: Glas, Eperons, La carte
postale. TN.

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oppositionof spiritto matteror manto woman)no longerfunctionsbythe privilegegivento
the firsttermoverthe second. Ina seriesof interviewspublishedunderthe titlePositionsin
1972,you spokeof a two-phaseprogram(phasebeingunderstoodas a structural ratherthan
a chronologicalterm)necessaryfor the act of deconstruction.
In the firstphasea reversalwas to take place in which the opposed termswould be
inverted.Thuswoman, as a previouslysubordinateterm,mightbecome the dominantone
in relationto man. Yet becausesuch a scheme of reversalcould only repeatthe traditional
scheme (inwhich the hierarchyof dualityis alwaysreconstituted), it alone could not effect
any significantchange. Changewould only occur throughthe 'second'and more radical
phase of deconstructionin which a 'new'concept would be forgedsimultaneously.The
motifof diffirance,as neithera simple'concept'nora mere'word,'has broughtus the now
familiarconstellationof attendantterms:trace,supplement,pharmakonand others.Among
the others,two are markedsexuallyand intheirmostwidelyrecognizedsense pertainto the
woman'sbody:hymen (the logic of which is developed in Ladouble seance)and double
invagination (a leitmotif in LivingOn/Borderlines).
Takeonly the term hymen in which there is a confusionor continuationof the term
coitus,and fromwhich it gets itsdouble meaning:1) "amembranousfold of tissuepartlyor
completelyoccludingthe vaginalexternalorifice"[fromthe Greekfor membrane]and 2)

marriage[fromGreekmythology;the god of marriage].Inthe firstsense the hymenis that

which protectsvirginity,and is in frontof the uterus.Thatis, it lies betweenthe insideand
the outsideof the woman, betweendesireand itsfulfillment.So thatalthough(male)desire
dreamsof violentlypiercingor breakingthe hymen(consummationin the second sense of
the term),if that happensthere is no hymen.
It seems to me that while the extensiveplay on etymologies(in which unconscious
motivationsaretracedthroughthe transformations and historicalexcessesof usage)effectsa
displacementof these terms, it also poses a problemfor those who would seek to define
whatis specificallyfeminine.Thatcomes aboutnot so muchbecausethese termsareeither
underor over-valuedas partsbelongingto woman'sbody.Itis ratherthat,inthe economyof
a movementof writingthat is alwayselusive,one can neverdecide properlywhetherthe
particularterm impliescomplicitywith or a breakfromexistentideology. Perhapsthis is
because,as Adamsaysof Evein MarkTwain'ssatire,TheDiaryof Adamand Eve,not only
does the "newcreaturename . . . everything" because"itlookslikethe thing,"but- andthis
is the cruxof the matter-"hermindis disordered[or, if you like, Nietzschean]- everything
shows it."
Inthisregardtherecomes to minda footnoteto p. 207 of Ladoubleseance,concerning
the displacementof writing,itstransformation and generalization. Theexamplecited is that
of a surgeonwho, upon learningof Freud'sown difficultyin admittingto the possibilityof
masculinehysteria,exclaimsto him:"But,mydearcolleague,how can you statesuchabsur-
dities?Hysteronmeansuterus.How thereforecould a man be a hysteric?"
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 How can we changethe representation of woman?Canwe move fromthe ribwhere
womanis wife ("Shewas calledWomanbecauseshe wastakenfromman"-Genesis2:23)to
the womb where she is mother("manis bornof woman"-Job14:13)withoutessentialloss?
Do we have in yourview the beginningof phasetwo, a 'new'concept of woman?
DERRIDA: No, Ido not believethatwe haveone, if indeedit is possibleto havesuch a
thing or if such thingcouldexistor show promiseof existing.Personally,Iam notsurethatI
a
feel the lackof it. Beforehavingone thatis new, arewe certainof havinghadan old one? Itis
the word "concept"or "conception" that I would in turnquestionin its relationshipto any
essence which is rigorouslyor properlyidentifiable.This would bring us back to the
precedingquestions.The concept of the concept, alongwiththe entiresystemthatattends
it, belongsto a prescriptive order.It is thatorderthata problematicsof womanand a prob-
lematicsof difference,as sexualdifference,shoulddisruptalong the way. Moreover,I am
not surethat"phasetwo"marksa splitwith "phaseone,"a splitwhose formwould be a cut
along an indivisibleline. The relationshipbetweenthese two phasesdoubtlesshas another
structure.I spoke of two distinctphasesfor the sake of clarity,but the relationshipof one
phaseto anotheris markedless by conceptualdeterminations (thatis, wherea new concept
follows an archaicone) than by a transformation or generaldeformationof logic; such
transformations or deformationsmarkthe "logical" elementor environmentitselfby moving,
for example, beyondthe "positional" (difference determined as opposition,whetheror not
dialectically). Thismovement is of greatconsequence for the discussion here,even if myfor-
mulationis apparentlyabstractand disembodied.One could, I think, demonstratethis:
when sexualdifferenceis determinedbyoppositionin the dialecticalsense (accordingto the
Hegelian movement of speculativedialecticswhich remainsso powerfuleven beyond
Hegel'stext),one appearsto set off"thewarbetweenthe sexes";butone precipitatesthe end
withvictorygoingto the masculinesex. Thedetermination of sexualdifferencein opposition
is destined,designed,in truth,fortruth;it is so in orderto erasesexualdifference.Thedialec-
tical oppositionneutralizesor supersedes[Hegel'stermAufhebungcarrieswith it both the
sense of conservingand negating.No adequatetranslationof the term in Englishhas yet
been found]the difference.However,accordingto a surreptitious operationthat must be
flushedout, one insuresphallocentricmasteryunderthe coverof neutralization everytime.
Theseare now well knownparadoxes.Andsuch phallocentrism adornsitselfnow andthen,
here and there, with an appendix:a certain kind of feminism. In the same manner,
phallocentrism and homosexuality can go, so to speak,handin hand,and Itaketheseterms,
whetherit is a questionof feminineor masculinehomosexuality,in a verybroadand radical
sense.
And what if the "wife"or the "mother"-whomyou seem sure of being able to
dissociate- were figuresforthis homosexualdialectics?Iam referringnow to yourquestion
on the "representation" of woman and such "loss"as mightoccur in the passagefromman's
ribto the womb of woman,the passagefromthe spouse, you say,to the mother.Why is it
necessaryto choose, and why only these two possibilities,these two "places," assumingthat
one can reallydissociatethem?
MCDONALD: The ironyof my initialuse of the cliche"woman'splace"whichin the old
saw is followedby "inthe home"or "inthe kitchen"leavesthe whole wide worldforother
placesforthe same intent.Asforthe "place" of womanin Genesis,andJob,as rib(spouse)or
womb (mother),these are morebasicfunctionaldifferences.Nevertheless,withinthesetwo
traditionalroles,to choose one impliesloss of the other.Youare correctin observingthat
such a choice is not necessary;there could be juxtaposition,substitutionor other possible
combinations.Butthese biblicaltexts are not frivolousin seeing the functionaldistinction
which also has distinguished"woman'splace"in Westernculture.
DERRIDA: Sinceyou quote Genesis,I would liketo evoke the marvelousreadingthat
Levinashasproposedof itwithoutbeingclearas to whetherhe assumesitas hisown orwhat
the actualstatusof the "commentary" that he devotesto it is.sTherewould, of course,be a

s5acques Derridarefershere to the text Ence moment meme dans cet ouvrage me voici in Textes pour
Emmanuel Levinas (I. M. Place, Paris, 1980). Derrida interprets two texts in particular by Levinas (Le
judaisme et le f6minin, in Difficile libertY,and Et Dieu cr'a la femme, in Du sacre au saint). In order to
clarify this part of the discussion, I am translatingthe following passage from Derrida'stext in which he

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certainsecondarinessof woman, Ischa.The man, Isch, would come first;he would be
numberone; he would be at the beginning.Secondariness,however,would not be thatof
woman or femininity,but the divisionbetween masculineand feminine.It is not feminine
sexualitythatwould be second but only the relationshipto sexualdifference.Atthe origin,
on this side of and thereforebeyond any sexualmark,therewas humanityin general,and
this is what is important.Thusthe possibilityof ethicscould be saved, if one takesethicsto
mean that relationshipto the otheras otherwhich accountsfor no otherdeterminationor
sexualcharacteristic in particular.
Whatkindof an ethicswouldtherebe if belongingto one
sex or anotherbecame its law or privilege?What if the universalityof moral laws were
modelledon or limitedaccordingto the sexes?Whatif theiruniversality were not uncondi-
tional,withoutsexualconditionin particular?
Whateverthe force, seductivenessor necessityof this reading,does it not riskrestor-
ing-in the name of ethics as that which is irreproachable-aclassicalinterpretation, and
therebyenrichingwhat I wouldcall its panoplyin a mannersurelyas subtleas it is sublime?
Once again, the classical interpretationgives a masculine sexual markingto what is
presentedeitheras a neutraloriginariness or, at least,as priorandsuperiorto allsexualmark-
ings. Levinasindeed senses the riskfactorinvolvedin the erasureof sexualdifference.He
thereforemaintainssexualdifference:the humanin generalremainsa sexualbeing.Buthe
can only do so, it would seem, by placing(differentiated) sexualitybeneathhumanitywhich
sustainsitselfat the level of the Spirit.Thatis, he simultaneouslyplaces,and this is what is
important,masculinity[le masculin]in commandand at the beginning(thearkhb),on a par
with the Spirit.Thisgesturecarrieswith it the most self-interestedof contradictions;it has
repeated itself, let us say, since "Adamand Eve,"and persists- in analogousform- into
"modernity," despite all the differencesof style and treatment.Isn'tthat a featureof the
"matrix," as we were sayingbefore?or the "patrix" if you prefer,but it amountsto the same
thing, does it not?Whateverthe complexityof the itineraryand whateverthe knots of
rhetoric,don'tyou thinkthatthe movementof Freudianthoughtrepeatsthis"logic"? Isit not
also the riskthat Heideggerruns?One should perhapssay, rather,the riskthat is avoided
because phallogocentrism is insuranceagainstthe returnof what certainlyhas been feared
as the most agonizingriskof all. Since I have named Heideggerin a context where the
referenceis quite rareand may even appearstrange,I would like to dwell on this for a
moment,if you don'tmind,concernedthat I will be both too lengthyand too brief.

quotes from and then comments upon Levinas'commentary: ". .. The meaning of the 'feminine'will be
clarified in this manner by beginning with the human essence; the female Ishafla Isha]begins with ish:
not that the feminine originates in the masculine, but rather the division into masculine and feminine -
the dichotomy- starts with what is human. [. .] Beyond the personal relationship established between
two beings, each born of a discrete creative act, the specificity of the feminine is a secondary matter. It is
not woman who is secondary; it is the relationship with woman as woman, and that does not belong to
the primordial level of the human element. The first level consists of those tasks that man and woman
each accomplishes as a human being. [. . .] In each of the passages that we are commenting upon right
now, the problem lies in the reconciliation of men's and women's humanity with the hypothesis of
masculine spirituality;the feminine is not the correlative of the masculine but its corollary; feminine
specificity, as the difference between the sexes that it indicates, is not situated straightawayat the level of
those opposites which constitute the Spirit. An audacious question, this one: how can equality of the
sexes come from masculine "ownership"[la propriktedu masculin]?[ . . A difference was necessary that
would not compromise equity: a difference of sex; and from then on, a certain pre-eminence of man, a
woman whose arrivalcomes later and who is, as woman, the appendix of the human element. Now we
understand the lesson. The idea of humanity is not thinkable from two entirely differentprinciples. There
must be a sameness [le meme] common to others: woman was taken from man, but came after him: the
very feminity of woman is in this inauguralafter-thought."(EtDieu cr6a la femme, in Du sacr6 au saint).
And Derrida follows up, commenting: "Itis a strange logic, this 'audaciousquestion.'"One would have to
comment each step of the way and verify that the secondariness of sexual difference signifies the second-
ariness of the feminine in every case (but why indeed?). One would have to verify that the initialnessof
what is pre-differentialis always marked by the masculine; the masculine should come, like all sexual
marks, only afterward. Such a commentary would be necessary, but I prefer to first underscore the
following, in the name of protocol: he himself is commenting and says that he is commenting; one must
bear in mind that this is not literallythe discourse of E.L.He says, as he is discoursing,that he is comment-
ing on doctors, at this very moment ("thepassages upon which we are commenting at this moment,"and
furtheralong: "Iam not takingsides; today I am commenting").However, the distance of the commentary
is not neuter. What he comments upon is consonant with a whole network of his own assertions,or those
by him, "him"[pp. 53-4] TN.

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 Heideggerseems almostneverto speak about sexualityor sexualdifference.And he
seems almostneverto speakaboutpsychoanalysis, give or takean occasionalnegativeallu-
sion. Thisis neithernegligencenoromission.The pausescomingfromhis silenceon these
questionspunctuateor create the spacingout of a powerfuldiscourse.And one of the
strengthsof thisdiscoursemay be stated(thoughI am goingmuchtoo quicklyand schema-
tizingexcessively)likethis:it beginsby denyingitselfall acceptedformsof security,all the
sedimented presuppositionsof classical ontology, anthropology,the naturalor human
sciences, untilit fallsbackthisside of such valuesas the oppositionbetweensubject/object,
conscious/unconscious,mind/body,and manyothersas well. Theexistentialanalyticof the
Daseinopens the road,so to speak, leadingto the questionof being;the Daseinis neither
the humanbeing (a thoughtrecalledearlierby Levinas)northe subject,neitherconscious-
ness northe self [le moi] (whetherconsciousor unconscious).Theseare all determinations
thatarederivedfromand occurafterthe Dasein.Now-and here is what I wantedto get to
afterthis inadmissibleacceleration- in a coursegiven in 1928, Heideggerjustifiesto some
degree the silence of Sein und Zeit on the questionof sexuality[Gesamtausgabe, Band26,
No. 10, p. 171 ff.]. In a paragraph from the course devoted to the "Problem of the Seinund
Zeit,"Heideggerreminds us that the analytic of the Dasein is neither an anthropology,an
ethics nor a metaphysics.With respectto any definition,positionor evaluationof these
fields,the Daseinis neuter.Heideggerinsistsuponand makesclearthisoriginalandessential
"neutrality" of the Dasein:"Thisneutralitymeans also that the Daseinis neitherof the two
sexes. Butthisa-sexuality(Geschlechtlosigkeit) is notthe indifferenceof emptyinvalidity,the
annulingnegativity of an indifferent ontic nothingness.Inits neutrality, the Daseinis notthe
indifferentperson-and-everyone (Niemand und Jeder), but it is originarypositivityand the
of
power being or of the essence, M~chtigkeit des Wesen. One would have to read the
analysis that follows veryclosely; I will tryto do that another time in relationto some of his
latertexts.The analysisemphasizesthe positivecharacter,as it were, of this originaryand
powerfula-sexualneutrality which is notthe neither-nor(Weder-noch) of onticabstraction.It
is originaryand ontological.Moreprecisely,the a-sexualitydoes not signifyin this instance
the absence of sexuality-one could call it the instinct,desireor even the libido- but the
absence of any markbelongingto one of the two sexes. Not thatthe Daseindoes not onti-
callyor in fact belongto a sex; not that it is deprivedof sexuality;butthe Daseinas Dasein
does not carrywith it the markof this opposition(or alternative)between the two sexes.
Insofaras these marksare opposableand binary,they are not existentialstructures.Nordo
they allude in this respectto any primitiveor subsequentbi-sexuality.Such an allusion
wouldfallonce againintoanatomical,biologicalor anthropological determinations. Andthe
Dasein, in the structures and "power" that are to
originary it, would come "prior" these
to
determinations.I am puttingquotationmarksaroundthe word "prior" because it has no
literal,chronological,historicalor logical meaning.Now, as of 1928, the analyticof the
Daseinwas the thoughtof ontologicaldifferenceand the repetitionof the questionof being;
it opened up a problematicsthat subjected all the concepts of traditionalWestern
philosophyto a radicalelucidationand interpretation. Thisgivesan ideaof whatstakeswere
involvedin a neutralization thatfell backthis side of both sexualdifferenceand its binary
marking,if not this side of sexualityitself.Thiswould be the titleof the enormousproblem
that in this context I must limitmyselfto merelynaming:ontologicaldifferenceand sexual
difference.
Andsince yourquestionevokedthe "motifof difference," Iwouldsaythatit hasmoved,
by displacement, in the vicinityof this very obscure area. What is also beingsoughtin this
zone is the passagebetweenontologicaldifferenceand sexualdifference;it is a passagethat
may no longerbe thought,punctuatedor opened up accordingto those polaritiesto which
we have been referringfor some time (originary/derived, ontological/ontic,ontology/
anthropology,the thoughtof being/metaphysics or ethics, etc.). The constellationof terms
that you have cited could perhapsbe considered(fornothingis ever takenfor grantedor
guaranteedin these matters)a kind of transformation of deformationof space; such a
transformation would tend to extend beyond these poles and reinscribethem within it.
Some of these terms, "hymen"or "invagination," you were saying,"pertainin their most
widely recognizedsense to the woman'sbody.. " Are you sure?I am gratefulfor your
havingused such a carefulformulation.Thatthese wordssignify"intheirmostwidelyrecog-
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 nized sense"had, of course, not escaped me, and the emphasisthat I have put on re-
sexualizinga philosophicalor theoreticaldiscourse,which hasbeen too "neutralizing" in this
respect,was dictatedbythoseveryreservations thatIjustmentionedconcerningthe strategy
(whetheror not it is deliberate).Suchre-sexualizing
of neutralization mustbe done without
facilenessof any kindand, above all, withoutregressionin relationto what mightjustify,as
we saw, the procedures-or necessarysteps-of Levinasor Heidegger,for example.That
being said,"hymen" and "invagination," at leastin the contextintowhich these wordshave
been swept, no longersimplydesignatefiguresforthe femininebody.Theyno longerdo so,
that is, assumingthat one knows for certainwhat a feminineor masculinebody is, and
assumingthatanatomyis in thisinstancethe finalrecourse.Whatremainsundecidablecon-
cerns not only but also the line of cleavagebetweenthe two sexes. As you recalled,such a
movementrevertsneitherto wordsnorto concepts.Andwhat remainsof languagewithinit
cannotbe abstractedfromthe "performativity" (whichmarksand is marked)thatconcernsus
here, beginning-for the examplesthat you have chosen-with the texts of Mallarm6and
Blanchot,and with the laborof readingor writingwhich evoked them and which they in
turnevoked. One could say quite accuratelythatthe hymendoes not exist.Anythingcon-
stitutingthe valueof existenceis foreignto the "hymen." Andiftherewere hymen- I am not
sayingifthe hymenexisted- propertyvaluewould be no moreappropriate to it for reasons
that I havestressedin the textsto which you refer.Howcan one then attributethe existence
of the hymenproperlyto woman?Not that it is any morethe distinguishing featureof man
or, forthat matter,of the humancreature.I would say the same forthe term"invagination"
which has, moreover,alwaysbeen reinscribedin a chiasmus,one doublyfolded,redoubled
and inversed,6etc. Fromthen on, is it not difficultto recognizeinthe movementof thisterm
a "representationof woman"?Furthermore, I do not know if it is to a change in representa-
tion thatwe shouldentrustthe future.As withall the questionsthatwe are presentlydiscus-
sing,thisone, and above allwhen it is putas a questionof representation, seems at once too
old and as yet to be born:a kindof old parchmentcrossedevery which way, overloaded
with hieroglyphsand still as virginas the origin,like the early morningin the Eastfrom
whence it comes. And you know that the word for parchmentdoes not come from any
"road" leadingfromPergamusin Asia.Ido not knowhow you willtranslatethislastsentence.
MCDONALD:It is a problem.In modern Englishusage the word for parchmentno
longercarrieswith it the sense of the Frenchparchemin,on or by the road,as the Middle
Englishperchement or parchemindid. The American Heritage Dictionarytraces the
etymologythus:"Parthian(leather)from pergamina,parchment,from Greekpergamene,
from Pergamenos, or Pergamun, from Pergamon, . . ." Lempriere'sClassical Dictionary says
furtherthatthe town of Pergamuswas founded by Philaeterus,a eunuch, and that parch-
ment has been called the charta pergamena.
DERRIDA: The Littr6Dictionarywhich gives the etymologyfor Frenchmakes war
responsibleforthe appearanceof "pergamena" or"Pergamina."
Itis therebya productof war:
one beganto writeon bodies and animalskinsbecause papyruswas becomingvery rare.
They say too that parchmentwas occasionallypreparedfromthe skin of still-bornlambs.
And accordingto Pliny,it was out of jealousythat Eumenes,kingof Pergamus,turnedto
parchment.His rival,Ptolemies,the kingof Egypt,was so proudof his librarythat he had
only books writtenon paper.Itwas necessaryto find new bodies of or for writing.
MCDONALD: I would liketo come backto the writingof the dance,the choreography
that you mentioneda while back. If we do not yet have a "new""concept"of woman,
because the radicalization of the problemgoes beyondthe "thought" or the concept, what
areour chancesof "thinking 'difference'not so muchbeforesexualdifference,as you say, as
takingoff 'from'"it?Whatwould you say is our chance and "who"are we sexually?
DERRIDA: At the approachof this shadowyarea it has alwaysseemed to me thatthe
voice itselfhad to be dividedin orderto say thatwhich is givento thoughtor speech. No

6This is an allusion to, among other things, all the passages on the so-called "argumentof the gaine"
["sheath,""girdle"cognate with "vagina'7,in particularpp. 232 ff. 250 ff. Furthermore,the word "invagina-
tion"is always taken within the syntax of the expression "doubleinvagination chiasmatique des bords,"in
LivingOn (Deconstruction and Criticism,The Seabury Press,New York, 1979) and The Lawof Genre (in
Glyph 7). TN.

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 monological discourse-and by that I mean here mono-sexual discourse-can dominate
with a single voice, a single tone, the space of this half-light,even if the "proffereddiscourse"
is then signed by a sexually marked patronymic. Thus, to limit myself to one account, and
not to propose an example, I have felt the necessity for a chorus, for a choreographic text
with polysexual signatures.7I felt this every time that a legitimacy of the neuter, the appar-
ently least suspect sexual neutralityof "phallocentricor gynocentric"mastery, threatened to
immobilize (in silence), colonize, stop or unilateralize in a subtle or sublime manner what
remains no doubt irreducibly dissymmetrical. More directly: a certain dissymmetry is no
doubt the law both of sexual difference and the relationshipto the other in general (I say this
in opposition to a certain kind of violence within the language of "democratic"platitudes, in
any case in opposition to a certain democratic ideology), yet the dissymmetry to which I
refer is still let us not say symmetrical in turn (which might seem absurd), but doubly,
unilaterallyinordinate, like a kind of reciprocal, respective and respectfulexcessiveness. This
double dissymmetryperhaps goes beyond known or coded marks, beyond the grammarand
spelling, shall we say (metaphorically),of sexuality. This indeed revives the following ques-
tion: what if we were to reach, what if we were to approach here (forone does not arriveat
this as one would at a determined location) the area of a relationshipto the other where the
code of sexual marks would no longer be discriminating?The relationship would not be
a-sexual, far from it, but would be sexual otherwise: beyond the binary difference that
governs the decorum of all codes, beyond the opposition feminine/masculine, beyond bi-
sexuality as well, beyond homosexuality and heterosexuality which come to the same thing.
As I dream of saving the chance that this question offers I would like to believe in the
multiplicity of sexually marked voices. I would like to believe in the masses, this indeter-
minable number of blended voices, this mobile of non-identified sexual marks whose
choreography can carry, divide, multiply the body of each "individual,"whether he be
classified as "man"or as "woman"according to the criteria of usage. Of course, it is not
impossible that desire for a sexuality without number can still protect us, like a dream, from
an implacable destiny which immures everything for life in the figure 2. And should this
merciless closure arrestdesire at the wall of opposition, we would struggle in vain: there will
never be but two sexes, neither one more nor one less. Tragedy would leave this strange
sense, a contingent one finally, that we must affirmand learn to love instead of dreaming of
the innumerable. Yes, perhaps; why not? But where would the "dream"of the innumerable
come from, if it is indeed a dream? Does the dream itself not prove that what is dreamt of
must be there in order for it to provide the dream?Then too, I ask you, what kind of a dance
would there be, or would there be one at all, if the sexes were not exchanged according to
rhythmsthat vary considerably? In a quite rigoroussense, the exchange alone could not suf-
fice either, however, because the desire to escape the combinatory itself, to invent incal-
culable choreographies, would remain.

7Thisis an allusion to Pas, in Gramma 3/4, 1976, La v6rite en peinture, 1978, En ce moment meme
dans cet ouvrage me voici in Textes pour Emmanuel Levinas, 1980, Feu la cendre, to appear. TN.

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