International Phenomenological Society

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

A Note on o in Platos' Republic

Author(s): Raphael Demos
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Mar., 1957), pp. 399-403
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2104144
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 DISCUSSION

A NOTE ON lcoqpoa6vN IN PLATOS' REPUBLIC

Imagine that a house is being built and focus attention on a particular

room. There are specialized craftsmen around; a carpenter is putting up
the door, another the windows, and still another is painting the walls.
In addition, there is a man different from all these; he is not a craftsman,
he is not engaged in any manual activity; he is the master builder or archi-
tect. His function is to provide a plan for the whole room. He must see to
it that the windows are suitably spaced, that the paint is adapted to the
color of the door and to the light that comes through the windows, and
that the door must fit into its proper place in the room. None of the crafts-
men are competent to decide such matters; this is the job of the architect
from whom they will take their orders. Nevertheless it is fair to say that
a craftsman is a good one insofar as, in addition to his expert performance,
he realizes that his work must fit into the total plan.
Come now to Plato's doctrine of the virtues. In some such way we may
distinguish the operations of the parts of the soul (or of the classes in the
city) on the one hand, from the architectonic function which consists in
viewing all the component specialized operations together. There is the
task of reason, of thumos, and of appetite, each one performing its special
function in a suitable fashion; in addition, there is the task of the architect
whose excellence is justice, and whose function is to view the whole and
to relate the specialized operations to the whole. In short, we have the
specialized functions and excellences on the one hand, and we have the
architectonic or holistic virtue of justice on the other.
Where does sophrosyne fit into this scheme? As we read Plato, we find
that first he considers reason (logistikon) whose excellence he defines as
wisdom, and then thumos whose virtue he says is courage. We already
know that there is a third part of the soul, namely appetite (e'mOvtLLo)
and we naturally expect him to define its virtue, in terms of its proper
functioning. To our surprise he does nothing of the kind. There is a third
virtue - sophrosyne - but it is not a virtue of the appetitive element.
On the contrary, sophrosyne is stated to be the excellence of the relation-
ship of the three parts of the soul. Does Plato, then, mean to deny that
there can be an excellence of appetite, as for instance there is an excel-
lence of the spirited element? If we recall the example of the house,
we will notice that besides the skilled craftsmen, there are apprentices
and assistants. For instance, there is the boy who hands up the pot of
paint to the man on the ladder. In short, there are the unskilled laborers,

399

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400 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

probably not belonging to any union. Does Plato mean that the appetites
are like unskilled labor, incapable of excellence?
There is a second, larger 'wave' threatening to engulf us. Like justice,
sophrosyne is an architectonic or holistic virtue. It seems odd that Plato
should find it necessary to hire two architects for his house or for his city.
How, then, does he distinguish the sphere of influence of the one from
that of the other? In other words, what is the difference between sophro-
syne and justice? If I am building a house, perhaps I do need a landscape
architect, in addition to the architect proper, because I must have
a garden and paths leading to the street. But sophrosyne cannot be our
landscape architect; for it is concerned exclusively with internal arrange-
ments - whether of the soul or of the city -just as justice is. Should the
two architects come in conflict, how is the difference of opinion to be
resolved? There must be a higher boss, yet Plato does not provide any
super-architect. In fact, Plato seems to regard justice as the superior of
the two, but it is not at all clear why he does so.
While Plato provides specialists charged with the specialized functions
- for instance, rulers, warriors, and producers, in the city - he fails to
provide anybody charged with what I have called the architectonic
functions. Thus, there is no group representing either sophrosyne or
justice. One might suppose that the soul as a unity, or the city as a unity,
embodies the architectonic virtues. Now, there is a unified soul, but it is
doubtful that the city has a personality of its own or that there is, so to
speak, the 'spirit' of the community. On this topic, more below.

The passages in which Plato explicitly comes to terms with sophro-

syne are Republic 430e, ff. (concerning the city) and R. 442d (concerning
the soul). The former is the more elaborate account; it is understood,
of course, that sophrysyne is one and the same virtue whether in the soul
or in the city.
Plato tells us that, unlike wisdom and courage - which reside in a
particular part (,tlpoq) of the soul - sophrosyne is spread throughout
the entire soul; it is the friendship, harmony, or concord among the three
parts or classes. For the city, it is that bond which transforms it into a
genuine community. I have said above that the specialists engaged in
building a room are expected to have also a sense of their relationship
to the total plan. Plato hints that the particular classes in the city will
have a sense of their obligation to the city as a whole; but he stresses
that sophrosyne is more like concord (sense of community) than are the
other two virtues (R. 430e). The sense of a common loyalty is of the
essence of sophrosyne while it is only a consequential attribute of wis-
dom and courage.
Now the bond which unites the parts of the soul or the classes in society

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 A NOTE ON IWpOC6tV- IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC 401

is a harmony of belief: belief as to who should rule and who should be

ruled. In the first place (we may suppose) such harmony is one not only
of belief but of will. It is the willingness of the rulers to exercise their
obligation of ruling, and it is the willing acceptance by the two lower
parts (or classes) of the authority of the ruler. Thus, sophrosyne is un-
animity of the will guided by thought. In the second place, the relation-
ship involved is a vertical one; from higher to lower and conversely. In
the third place, the virtue of sophrosyne exists in the soul (or in the city)
as a whole only insofar as) it exists severally in each individual part or
class. Sophrosyne is not an attitude or perfection of the soul (or the city)
as such; speaking of the city, it is an attitude existing in every individual
citizen to every other and to the city as a whole. Friendship and loyalty
are what the rulers feel, what the warriors feel, and what the producers
feel; analogously with the parts of the soul.
Compare now sophrosyne with justice and try to establish a difference.
Justice, too , is the virtue of a relationship, not of a part. As we all know,
justice consists in the fact that each part (or class) performs its function
without interfering with the tasks of the other parts (or classes); in short,
justice expresses the principle of the division of labor. Here we seem to
come upon a significant difference between the two virtues; justice is
differentiation of functions and sophrosyne is their harmonization. So
our problem seems to be solved. But now notice that Socrates, in the
course of his argument with Thrasymachus, maintains that justice entails
cooperation (,ttO' ocu'to3 7po'CrLv) while injustice means absence of
(R. 342a, 351d); and notice, furthermore, that OV6.vooc
6,t6ovotoc is one of
the terms which Plato employs in order to define sophrosyne (R. 432a).
The difference between the two virtues approaches the vanishing point
when we find that justice is stated to consist in the fact that each of the
principles in man performs its own task with respect to ruling and to
being ruled (R. 443d).
Let us not give up, however. If there is no difference in substance
between the two virtues, perhaps there is a difference in approach. Agreed
that both virtues are two sides of the same coin; both express a relational
or architectonic virtue. Still, justice attains the unity of the whole by
emphasizing the diversity of the parts, while sophrosyne attains the same
unity by emphasizing their harmony. Justice approaches the whole
through the parts; sophrosyne approaches the parts in terms of their
relationship to the whole.
Now, this is the best we can do, but it is not good enough. Our suggestion
makes justice and sophrosyne coordinate; but, in fact, Plato represents
justice as the more fundamental virtue. Justice is a quality which enables
the other virtues to become established and which preserves them, once
they are established (R. 433b). Justice, then, is a precondition of the other

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402 RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

virtues, inclusive of sophrosyne. In identifying justice with the health

of the soul, Plato seems to go further and to make justice the equivalent
of all virtue (R. 444d, e; 445b). Thus our attempt to represent justice
and sophrosyne as two different sides of a coin fails. Justice is the whole
coin inclusive of the two sides. My own lame answer to the question:
what is the difference between justice and sophrosyne, is that I have no
answer. I beg for an answer from my readers.

Our second puzzle offers greater hope of a solution. Why - we asked

- does not Plato recognize an excellence for appetite, why does he
not list a virtue for it? After all, the appetites are a part of the soul,
an organ with a specific function. What is more, Plato admits such a
thing as a norm for the functioning of appetite. Thus, the appetitive
part is behaving properly when it obeys both thumos and reason (R. 442b.
In contrast, sophrosyne means that appetite and thumos obey reason,
R. 442c, d). The philosopher, existing in the total human being, is urged
to be friendly to the beast in him and to foster its growth (R. 589b). Then
why should Plato not consider such an obedience of appetite to the higher
parts, such a fostering of it by reason, a virtue; and why should he not
name that virtue sophrosyne?
Plato uses the word eimOu~u'aambiguously; so let us make clear what
we are talking about. He says, for instance, that all three parts of the
soul have their peculiar eimOu~u'cxand its satisfaction (R. 580d). A good
example would be the desire for knowledge. Now, the kind of 67Ourutoc
here discussed is the one which belongs to the third and lowest part of
the soul - the black horse of the myth in the Phaedrus.
Reverting now to our question, the answer, I think, is this: Unlike
the other two parts of the soul, appetite is irrational (&?X6yLarov, R. 442a).
While thumos is distinct from reason, still it is its ally by nature (R. 441a).
Anger is rational, at the least, in the sense that we get angry for a reason.
A still better way of establishing the contrast is that appetite, so to speak,
is a part of the soul acting as a part, whereas both reason and thumos
act in behalf of the whole soul. I need not argue the point about reason;
reason is concerned not only for its own good, but also for that of the
other parts and of the whole. Reason, on the one hand, cares for know-
ledge; that is its own peculiar satisfaction. Reason also cares for the whole
'inner city' and its proper administration; reason is practical as well as
theoretical. Likewise, we are told that thumos gives battle in behalf
of the entire soul or city (R. 442b, c). Where thirst is provoked by lack of
water, anger is indignation, provoked by an insult to the self; it is not
stimulated by a privation. In some sense, of course, all three: reason,
thumos, and appetite, are operations of the entire soul. Also, all three
equally are only parts. But while reason and thumos are parts acting in

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 A NOTE ON XCtOpOG64V
IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC 403

behalf of the self and its integrity, appetite is a part acting for itself and
usurping the place of the total self.
Plato, then, has good reason for denying excellence or arete to appetite,
even when it functions properly. The black horse, rebelling against the
charioteer may, after many efforts by the latter, be brought to submission.
But such obedience reflects no credit on the horse; it only shows the
strength of its master (Phaedrus 254e).
RAPHAEL DEMOS.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

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