G.R. No. L-12541 March 30, 1960
Yulo
ROSARIO U. YULO, assisted by her husband Jose C. Yulo,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
YANG CHIAO SENG, defendant-appellee.
Punzalan, Yabut and Eusebio for appellants.
A. Francisco and J. T. Ocampo for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
This concerns a "Petition to Reopen Case," dated
December 14, 1959, presented by attorneys for
plaintiffs-appellants, alleging that the relationship
between Rosario U. Yulo, plaintiff-appellant and Yang
Chiao Seng, defendant-appellee, as lessor and lessee,
has already been definitely decided by the Court of
Appeals in the case of Sta. Marina, et al., and Rosario U.
Yulo and Yang Chiao Seng, C. A. G. R. No. 8143-R. We
have gone out of our way to review our conclusion that
no relation of partnership existed between said parties
because we had denied the motion for reconsideration
of plaintiff-appellant questioning the conclusion of this
Court without explanation.
The claim of plaintiff-appellant Rosario U. Yulo is that
the relationship between her and defendant-appellee
Yang Chiao Seng as partners had already been passed
upon by the Court of Appeals in the above-indicated
decision. The portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals is contained on page 8 of the motion for
reconsideration in which it held that articles of
partnership of Young & Co., Ltd. show that the parties
to this case are partners in the construction of the Astor
Theatre. It is to be noted, however, that the decision of
the Court of Appeals was one in which Emilia and Maria
Carrion Sta. Marina are plaintiffs and the defendants
are Rosario Yulo and Yang Chiao Seng; the action was
one to eject the defendants from the land occupied by
them; the issue was the reasonable value for the use
and occupation of the land. The Court of Appeals said
that the plaintiffs in that case had claimed that the
reasonable value was P3,000, while the defendants
claimed that it was only P1,000, and the Court of
Appeals held that in view of the partnership papers
P3,000 represent the share of Rosario U. Yulo in the
profits of the partnership and not the reasonable rent
of the property.
It is evident that no res judicata can be claimed for the
previous judgment of the Court of Appeals. In the first
place, the parties in that case were Emilia and Maria
Carrion Sta. Marina and the defendants, Rosaria U.
and Yang Chiao Seng; in the second place, the issue
decided by the Court of Appeals was the rental value of
the property in question; that the cause of action was
for ejectment of Rosario U. Yulo and Yang Chiao Seng. In
the case at bar, the action is between Rosario U. Yulo as
plaintiff and Yang Chiao Seng as defendant; the issue is
whether or not the plaintiff is partner in the
cinematograph business, as claimed by plaintiff, or said
plaintiff is merely a sublessee, as claimed by the
defendant. There is, therefore, no identity of parties nor
identity of issue, nor identity of cause of action. We call
attention to the very citation contained in appellant's
motion for reconsideration, which reads as follows:
Parties to a judgment are not bound by it, in a
subsequent controversy between each other unless
they were adversary parties in the original action. There
must have been an issue or controversy between them.
The reason for this rule obviously is the same as that
which underlies the whole doctrine of res judicata,
namely, that a person should not be bound by a
judgment except to the extent that he, or someone
representing him, had an adequate opportunity not
only to litigate the matters adjudicated, but to litigate
them against the party (or his prodecessor in interest)
who seeks to use the judgment against him. (Sec. 422, 1
Freeman on Judgments, 5th ed., p. 918).
Without going further, we are fully satisfied of the
correctness of our conclusion that the relationship
between plaintiff-appellant Rosario U. Yulo and Yang
Chiao Seng is merely that of sublessor and sublessee,
and not that of partners. The motion to reopen the case
is hereby denied and considering that judgment had
become final since October 29, 1959, order is hereby
given to remand the record to the court below.