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ANTAMOK GOLDFIELDS MINING COMPANY

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC

GR No. L-46892 June 28, 1940

FACTS:

This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the appellant against the order issued by the
Industrial Relations Tribunal on May 6, 1939, which obliged it to replace in its previous
work or in others substantially equivalent to the 45 workers listed in the petition
March 31, 1939 and the 10 workers headed by A. Haber who were excluded
indefinitely, within 10 days of receiving a copy of the order; To pay to these 55
workers the wages they should have received from the date of their suspension or
separation until their replacement; And that pending other issues that the parties
have submitted, the appellant refrains, on pain of contempt, from dismissing or
excluding, without prior permission from the court
On December 12, 1938, the defendant National Labor Union, Inc., representing the
workers and employees of the appellant who were members of the labor union,
addressed a letter to the appellant requesting 21 claims in favor of its members. The
letter was received by the appellant's office in Manila in a letter stamped by Baguio's
correspondent on the 30th of the same month.
the workers and employees of the appellant went on strike and abandoned their
work. The appellant immediately reported this strike to the Department of Labor and
requested its intervention in order to solve it.
As a result of the conference the parties agreed on the following friendly arrangement
the condition that all laborers will be readmitted upon the Execution of this
agreement; Provided, that all laborers whose services should be dispensed with due
to lack of work in those tunnels where they are no longer needed will be less than
fifteen days employment from the date of this settlement or resumption of work, and
provided, further, that as soon as the stops in 1360 and 1460 levels are opened and
the services of men are needed
The agreement was signed by the parties on January 4, 1939, but the workers did not
appear until 9 am on the 6th of the same month. The appellant's management did
not, however, allow any worker to enter the underground section known as "830
level" because of the fact that the air had been vitiated by the strike and it was
necessary to renew it with pure air with the to avoid personal misfortune.
they went on strike again. The workers who worked in the mine called "680 division,"
which is another separate mine located 3 kilometers from the factory, joined the
strikers sympathetically. Once again, the Department of Labor and the mediation of
Eladio C.
On January 9, 1939, the Department of Labor endorsed the dispute to the Industrial
Relations Tribunal in accordance with Article 4 of Commonwealth Law No. 103
In this view, the 21 claims of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. were
discussed one by one, and the parties reached agreement on some of them, others
were submitted to the Tribunals decision and the others were left pending Be seen
and resolved later.
The court designated one of its special agents to be constituted in the mines of the
appellant and to conduct an investigation in order to supplement the facts that are
proved during the hearing. After considering the evidence presented to him and the
facts found by the appointed commissioner, the court in its order of May 6, 1939,
declared the following facts proven:

1. The discharges and indefinite suspensions alleged in the motion were made by the
respondent without first securing the consent of the Court in violation of the order of
this Court of January 23, 1939.

2. The discharges and indefinite suspensions were made by the respondent without
just cause.

ISSUE:

WON, Commonwealth Law No. 103, as amended by Acts Nos. 254 and 355, is
unconstitutional because;

1. the judicial powers conferred by the law on the Industrial Relations Tribunal,
considered separately, are arbitrary and unreasonable and permit the deprivation
of liberty and property without due process of law; And
2. assuming that the law is valid and constitutional in its entirety, the at least part of
Article 20, which provides that the Industrial Relations Court "adopt its procedural
regulations" Should be declared null and void because it violates Article 13 of Title
VIII of the Philippine Constitution which obliges the Industrial Relations Tribunal to
observe the general rules of procedure applicable to the courts of justice.

RULING:

1. No, Law No. 103 which creates a special tribunal called the Industrial Relations
Tribunal with the power to issue its own regulations and to resolve and decide
agrarian and industrial disputes in accordance with the dictates of justice and
equity, cannot be challenged on the grounds that it Deprivation of liberty and
property without due process of law; Nor does it conflict with the precept of
Article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution because the Industrial Relations Court is
not of the same category as the municipal courts, courts of justice and courts of
first instance for which the regulations of the Courts by the Supreme Court.
2. In Commonwealth Act No. 103, and it, our Government no longer performs the
role of a mere mediator or intervenor but that of the supreme arbiter. Article 10
of Commonwealth Law No. 103 and the inspection and hearings held by the
commissioner and the court, respectively, the parties were properly represented,
heard and presented evidence that Had available and believed it convenient to
offer Such inspections and views had the character of an impartial and fair judicial
hearing and constitute the due process of law that guarantees the Constitution.
MAXIMO CALALANG
vs.
A. D. WILLIAMS

G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940

FACTS:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila,


brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of
July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30
p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of
the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic
a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only
of their owners but of the riding public as well.

ISSUE:

WON, Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic
on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power?

RULING:

No, the above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority
therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act,
to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of
the President of the Philippines. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC
vs.
ALBERTO SANTOS, JR., HOUDIEL MAGADIA, GILBERT ANTONIO, REGINO DURAN, PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 77875 February 4, 1993

FACTS:

The instant petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of The National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 4-1206-85
declaring the suspension of complainants to be illegal and consequently

ISSUE:

WON, NLRC acted with grave abuse when it decided a case without prior investigation
held?

RULING:

No, evidently basic and firmly settled is the rule that judicial review by this Court in
labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which
the labor officer or office based his or its determination, but is limited to issues of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. 4 It has not been shown that respondent NLRC
has unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins it
to perform as a duty or has otherwise unlawfully excluded petitioner from the exercise
of a right to which it is entitled.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO,
as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

FACTS:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No.
1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO
DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that
it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not
executive, in character.

ISSUE:

WON, Department Order No. 1 in the nature of a police power measure valid under the
Constitution?

RULING:

Yes, the concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been
defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of
(1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common
good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect
victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's
efforts.

Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an
invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the
legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated.
As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and
Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof
DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC.
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CONGRESS OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (CLO),
KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS and JULIAN LUMANOG AND HIS
WORK-CONTRACT LABORERS

G.R. No. L-2216 January 31, 1950

FACTS:

Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. assails the validity of an order of the Court of Industrial
Relations. The order made upon petitioner's request for authority to hire" about twelve
(12) more laborers from time to time and on a temporary basis," contains the proviso
that "the majority of the laborers to be employed should be native." The petition was
filed pending settlement by the court of a labor dispute between the petitioner and
Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas.

ISSUE:

WON, Commonwealth Act No.3 restrains the liberty of an employer in ordering it that
it should at least hire twelve (12) more laborers from time to time and on a temporary
basis and requiring them that majority of its laborers should be of native decent?

RULING:

No, the court's action falls within the legitimate scope of its jurisdiction. In the second
place, the order does not formulate a policy and is not political in character. It is not a
permanent, all-embracing regulation. It is a compromise and emergency measure
applicable only in this case and calculated to bridge a temporary gap and to adjust
conflicting interests in an existing and menacing controversy. The hiring of Chinese
laborers by the petitioner was rightly considered by the court likely to lead the parties
away from the reconciliation which it was the function of the court to effectuate.
PAGPALAIN HAULERS, INC
vs.
The HONORABLE CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, in his official capacity as Secretary of Labor and
Employment, the HONORABLE RENATO D. PARUNGO, in his official capacity as the Med-Arbiter
in DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-M-9705-006, and the INTEGRATED LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO-
PHILS) PAGPALAIN WORKERS UNION-ILO-PHILS.

G.R. No. 133215. July 15, 1999

FACTS:

On May 14, 1997, respondent Integrated Labor Organization-Pagpalain Haulers Workers


Union (hereafter referred to as ILO-PHILS), in a bid to represent the rank-and-file drivers
and helpers of petitioner Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Pagpalain),
filed a petition for certification election with the Department of Labor and Employment.
On July 10, 1997, Pagpalain filed a motion to dismiss the petition, alleging that ILO-PHILS
was not a legitimate labor organization due to its failure to comply with the requirements
for registration under the Labor Code. Specifically, it claimed that the books of account
submitted by ILO-PHILS were not verified under oath by its treasurer and attested to by
its president, a required by Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code.
Finding in favor of ILO-PHILS, the Med-Arbiter, on August 27, 1997, ordered the holding
of certification elections among the rank-and-file of Pagpalain Haulers. Pagpalain
promptly appealed the decision to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. It claimed
that the Med-Arbiter had gravely abused his discretion in allowing Department Order No.
9 to take precedence over a ruling of the Supreme Court.Pagpalain cited Protection
Technology v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment[1] and Progressive
Development Corporation v. Secretary of Labor[2] in support of its contention.
Aggrieved by said resolution, Pagpalain now comes to this Court for relief claiming that
the Secretary of Labor acted without jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolution.

ISSUE:

WON, 1. Department order no. 9 is an invalid exercise of rule-making power by


the secretary of labor?
2. Department order no. 9, series of 1997, issued by public respondent secretary
of labor is null and void for being contrary to public policy laid down by the
supreme court in protection technology, Inc. v. secretary of labor (g.r. no.
117211, 1 march 1995) and progressive development corp. v. secretary of
labor (g.r. no. 96425, 4 February 1992); and for altering the requirements of
articles 241(h) and (j) of the labor code of the Philippines?
RULING:

1. No, for an administrative order to be valid, it must (i) be issued on the authority of
law and (ii) it must not be contrary to the law and Constitution. Department Order
No. 9 has been issued on authority of law. Under the law, the Secretary is authorized
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement the Labor Code. Specifically,
Article 5 of the Labor Code provides that [t]he Department of Labor and other
government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code
or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations. Consonant with this article, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
promulgated the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. By virtue of this self-
same authority, the Secretary amended the above-mentioned omnibus rules by
issuing Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997.
2.The Labor Code does not require the submission of books of account in order for a
labor organization to be registered as a legitimate labor organization. The
requirement that books of account be submitted as a requisite for a registration can
be found only in Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, prior to
its amendment by Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997. Specifically, the old
Section 3(e), Rule II, of Book V provided that [t]he local or chapter of a labor
federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set
of officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing
the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall
be observed.
In Progressive Development Corporation, cited by Pagpalain, this Court held that the
above-mentioned procedure governing the reporting of independently registered
unions refers to the certification and attestation requirements contained in Article
235, paragraph 2. Article 235, paragraph 2 provides that [a]ll requisite documents
and papers shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the
organization, as the case may be, and attested to by its president; hence, in the
above-mentioned case, we ruled that in applications for registration by a local or
chapter of a federation or national union, the constitution and by-laws, set of officers
and books of account submitted by said local or chapter must be certified under oath
by the secretary or treasurer and attested to by its president.
Three years later, in Protection Technology v. Secretary of Labor, we amplified our
ruling in Progressive, saying that the non-submission of books of account certified by
and attested to by the appropriate officer is a ground for an employer to legitimately
oppose a petition for certification election filed by a local or chapter of a national
union.
Since Book V of the Omnibus Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9, no
longer requires a local or chapter to submit books of accounts as a prerequisite for
registration, the doctrines enunciated in the above-mentioned cases, with respect to
books of account, are already passe and therefore, no longer applicable. Hence,
Pagpalain cannot insist that ILO-PHILS comply with the requirements prescribed in
said rulings, for the current implementing rules have deleted the same.

By virtue of Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997, however, the documents


needed to be submitted by a local or chapter have been reduced to the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the
creation or establishment of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapters officers, their addresses, and the principal office
of the local/chapter;
(c) The local/chapters constitution and by-laws; provided that where the
local/chapters constitution and by-laws is the same as that of the federation or
national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
Furthermore, Article 274 of the Labor Code empowers the Secretary of Labor or his
duly authorized representative to inquire into the financial activities of legitimate
labor organizations upon the filing of a complaint under oath duly supported by the
written consent of 20% of the total membership of the labor organization concerned,
as well as to examine their books of accounts and other records to determine
compliance or non-compliance with the law. All of these provisions are designed to
safeguard the funds of a labor organization that they may not be squandered or
frittered away by its officers or by third persons to the detriment of its members.
Department Order No. 9 only dispenses with books of account as a requirement for
registrationof a local or chapter of a national union or federation.As provided by
Article 241 (h) and (j), a labor organization must still maintain books of account, but
it need not submit the same as a requirement for registration. Given the foregoing
disquisition, we find no cogent reason to declare Department Order No. 9 null and
void, as well as to reverse the assailed resolution of the Secretary of Labor.

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