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Figure 1: FTSE 100 price index and drawdowns Figure 2: FTSE 100 index
FTSE 100 price index Drawdown FTSE 100 index (May 2012 = 100)
7,500 0% 160
-2% 150
7,000 -4% Price
140
-6% Total return
6,500 -8% 130
-10% 120
6,000 -12% 110
-14%
100
5,500 -16%
-18% 90
5,000 -20% 80
May-12 May-14 May-16 May-12 May-13 May-14 May-15 May-16 May-17
Source: FactSet, Barclays Source: FactSet, Barclays
1. In reality this wouldnt have been possible, because the MSCI World index was launched in 1986; data prior to this are back-filled.
long periods of very large forfeit total returns, punctuated by times when waiting for a
sell-off has indeed dodged a pullback (Figure 4). Overall, the median forfeit total return
is 15.5%; the mean 28.9%; the probability of losing out 68.3%. But even at those
serendipitous moments when caution is flattered by the look of prescience, the strategy
is predicated on the ability to invest in the midst of market ructions and panicked
headlines if the aim is to avoid short term losses, a plan to jump headlong into a still-
Even when waiting for deepening abyss would be an odd way to go about it.
modest drops, youre Wait and see
more likely to miss out, Of course, the choice of 10% as the threshold was arbitrary but the same general
than miss a dip result holds for different amounts (Figure 5, left hand axis). The wait for larger
drawdowns is inevitably a longer one, and so the average forfeit is by turns even more
eye-watering. Even when waiting for modest drops, youre more likely to miss out, than
miss a dip (Figure 5, right hand axis).
One might argue that waiting for a drawdown before investing would only be sensible if
stock markets are reaching new highs. Does the wait and see approach fare any
better if we restrict our analysis to those occasions when prices hit asphyxiate
altitudes?
Not much. Returning to our example of delaying prospective investment until the MSCI
World records a drawdown of 10%, but this time only if prices are at the highest they
have been for the past year, the picture is still a gloomy one (Figure 6) the median
forfeit total return is 12.6%; the mean 25.6%; the probability of losing out 72.1%.
Looking at local highs over longer horizons seems to lessen the loss (Figure 7), but
never reverses the situation; the same is true regardless of drawdown threshold.
Figure 5: Opportunity cost of waiting Figure 6: MSCI World returns forfeited by waiting
Total return in Mean forfeit (lhs) Total return in MSCI World forfeited by waiting
MSCI World 200% until a price drawdown of 10% before investing if
Median forfeit (lhs) Prob. of losing
forfeited by at 12 month high
waiting out
Probability of losing out 150%
120% by waiting (rhs) 100%
100% 90% 100%
80% 80%
60% 70% 50%
40% 60%
20% 50% 0%
0% 40%
5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% -50%
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Wait of price drawdown of...
Source: FactSet, Barclays Source: FactSet, Barclays
5% 50%
0% 40%
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36
Only wait for drawdown of 10% if prices at high for past months...
William Morris
Quantitative Analyst
william.morris@barclays.com
For now, China remains lower down our global list of concerns. Tactically: we remain overweight equities
Authorities have been tightening monetary policy in order to contain Our current moderate pro risk tactical
systemic financial risks and asset bubbles. Chinas banking sector posture is consistent with our belief that the
remains well capitalised, and the states tight control over the financial world economy remains in good and
sector suggests that a 2008 Lehman-style crisis is unlikely. improving health, but likely entering the last,
More broadly, we believe the world economy will continue to grow and potentially multi-year, phase of this
still see the cycle end as a relatively distant prospect. We are elongated economic cycle.
nonetheless on the look out for signs of cyclical excess. In such a
context we welcome moves towards a more normal monetary
backdrop in the developed world.
The latest political controversy in Washington has further dimmed the likelihood of this
US administrations pro business agenda seeing the light of day. In the meantime,
leading indicators for the world economy continue to point to brighter times ahead,
Our favoured developed independent of those policy proposals. These firming prospects for global growth and
inflation are what matter for trends in corporate earnings and therefore prospective
equity regions remain the equity market returns. With stock market valuations much less remarkable than the
US and Europe ex-UK caricature, prospective returns are likely dominated by those aforementioned global
growth prospects rather than valuation multiple expansion. The current yield available
from developed world stocks (dividends plus net buybacks), allied to a conservative
assessment of prospective dividend growth suggests mid to high single digit
annualised returns are still well within reach from current levels.
The gradual reduction in domestic economic slack should lead to better pricing and
higher profit margins for continental European corporations, a key reason for our
continued overweight on the region.
While cash continues to play a pivotal portfolio insulation role, the rising appeal from
Emerging Market Equities has led the Tactical Allocation Committee to deploy our cash
holdings into the former, bringing our position in Cash & Short-Maturity Bonds from
neutral to underweight.
Nominal yields offered by large chunks of the government bond universe are still
negligible. Investors will likely have to work hard to make real returns from these levels
over the next several years. Our view remains that such valuations underestimate the
underlying inflationary pressures within the US economy in particular, something that
incoming labour market data pay some testament to. For us, the level of (returns
Some returning inflation is insensitive) central bank ownership probably suggests that the bond market will
central to our current remain more or less orderly and may lag a pick-up in inflation. Nonetheless, our
tactical posture continuing small strategic and tactical allocation to the area suggests that higher real
returns lie elsewhere.
The spread of investment grade credit over government bond yields has held more or
less firm. Nominal yields in high quality corporate credit remain low in absolute terms
and may make the job of those trying to make positive real returns difficult.
High Yield & Emerging Market Bonds: Overweight (decreased 23 March 2017)
High Yield spreads have compressed significantly relative to levels seen last year, and
we see further but limited upside for junk credit over coming quarters. As a result,
we recently took profit on our overweight position in High Yield Bonds, opting to use
those proceeds to close our underweight position in Developed Asia equities. Given our
more sanguine take on the various risks to global growth and inflation, yields on junk
credit and emerging market debt remain attractive on a risk-reward basis.
100
1970-'79 1980-'89 1990-'99 2000-'09
Source: Datastream, Barclays
Source: Datastream, Barclays. List of indices used: Equities MSCI World (USD) until 2001, MSCI AC World (USD) from 2001 onwards; Bonds Merrill Lynch US Treasury 7-10 years until 1980, Datastream
10 year US treasuries from 1980 onwards; Cash Federal Reserve US treasury bill 3 month
-50 -25 0 25 50
Source: Datastream, Barclays