A.M. No.

133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,

vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J:

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."

The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma
of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on October
28, 1968 for investigation, thus:

Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa
R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes,
plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased
Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.

In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the
deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes
with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his second
marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the
latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by the deceased during his
second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made, those conjugal properties should first be
partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the
latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco
Reyes was to be divided equally among his children by his two marriages.

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a preponderance

of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs
Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as
the only children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to
Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate
child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803,
4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No.
3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common
partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the
deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola,
being the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner
of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the
remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581,
4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to the estate of
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half
(1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining
one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.
3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the division or
partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to
Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-
twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892,
par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided among the
plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the
extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not
 exceed the equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other
plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal
shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop
of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after this
judgment shall have become final to submit to this court, for approval a project of partition
of the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the
parties may, by agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into
consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and value of the properties involved; (10)
Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay
the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds
(2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other claims of the parties [pp 27-29
of Exh. C].

The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of
partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the
project of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of
plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for
convenience is quoted hereunder in full:

The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval the
following project of partition:

COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this
Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:

l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita
Reyes Macariola;

2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part
of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;

3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;

4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the western part
of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;

5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;

6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions
awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares,
provided, however that the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to
Priscilla Reyes.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above which
is made in accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court be approved.

Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.

(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City

(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City

While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this Project of
Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the respective parties to this
Court that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had been made after a conference
and agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant approving the above Project of
Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the Court that they are given full
 authority to sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the
above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby approves the
same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such papers, documents or
instrument sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of the rights, interests and
participations which were adjudicated to the respective parties, as outlined in the Project
of Partition and the delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to each one in view
of said Project of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal and necessary to
effectuate the said Project of Partition.

SO ORDERED.

Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge

EXH. B.

The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of
giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer
certificates of title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh. U).

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an
area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the
deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita
Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was
approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated
as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).

Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1
and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr.
Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of
the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around
1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion
was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and
interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the
time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan,
Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as
the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS"
were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp.
378-385, rec.].

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four
causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in
acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010
decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3,
paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely
fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when
in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4]
that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).

Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by
herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of
the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted
her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection
with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be warned in
case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action,
Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated.

The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an
action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et
al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made
pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as
well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, however, that some
defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he
was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a
portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she
was no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184
acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus,
Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P.
Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were
dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed and
authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan
Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits
"C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition;

(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;

(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,

(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages;

(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary
damages;

(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and

(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.

B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF

AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN

(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased
Gerardo Villasin;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost
of the suit.

C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO

WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010
 (1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis,
Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.

D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO

(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]

It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the
appeal on February 22, 1971.

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action,
that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article
provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either
in person or through the mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon
an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions;
this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession [emphasis supplied].

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of
litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or
assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The Director of
Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).

In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil
Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal
within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of
the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11,
1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become
final for there was no appeal from said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs,
namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It
may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes,
Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was
subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to
Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he
sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The
subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in
said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his
wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two
aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving
the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.

The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon;
hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned
orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the
aforesaid facts that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and
consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.

Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality
of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the
pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.

It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said
lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with
the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:

And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition by
respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of
which respondent was the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of
respondent approving the project of partition, Exh. A.

Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between the Reyeses and
the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that
Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of
Respondent's Memorandum).

xxx xxx xxx

On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio
Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon
appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I believe him when he
testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without
any intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).

On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition although
it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows:

1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the parties more
particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however,
whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to
Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That
he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20,
1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by respondent in
evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the
only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this
investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her
conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:

1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in
which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order
dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered and registered on
November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);

2) Exh. 7 Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola onOctober
22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot
 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share,
the same having been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as
per decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was
duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).

In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of partition dated
October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an amending
Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this
1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the
preparation of the project of partition.

Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154
by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such
contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154
belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was the share of
complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-
fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the owner of
the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs.
Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was wen aware of
the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this
point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in
connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can
deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the
project of partition.

Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties adjudicated to
her were insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any direct and
positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of the real
properties when she could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the
assessed and market value of said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the record to
show that there were inequalities in the distribution of the properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389,
rec.).

Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring
by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired
the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the
Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of
a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which
he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary
has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only
must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the
uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over
Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed
that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the
parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation
in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way
or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case
3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and
the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).

II

With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article
provides that:
 Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold
any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:

1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active
service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting
attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting
attorney.

xxx xxx xxx

5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate
territory.

It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of
the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship
between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the
governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs.
Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public
corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers
and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.

It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some
modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the
Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the
Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is
change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a
conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of
the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10,
1899).

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign
continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not.
(Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in
conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the
conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in
time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of
American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief
Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the
inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former
sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the
government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their
country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be
denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the
intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the
newly- created power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law
that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of
Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines.
Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent,
then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or
in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that respondent
participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no
relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent
intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the
application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or
indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to
be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said
contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his
office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino;
Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).

It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business
operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in
any case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled
"Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot
1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9
or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no
longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.

Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging
or having interest in any lawful business.

It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain
any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching
or other vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.

Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated,
deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature.

Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a property
in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge because
the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two
orders approving the project of partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959
prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of
department, the same, however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public
officer from having any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of
the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without a written
permission from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.

On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We
hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly
Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee
shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."

It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No.
296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.

Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines,
not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon
the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the
Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the
grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.

And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior
courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing
Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate
officer or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him
in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary
action against civil service officers and employees.

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department
to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief
Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution,
the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation
of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to recognize
the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section
67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.

Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and
exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all administrative cases
against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to have final
authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline,
and efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the
administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid
provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only
permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619
[1963]).

Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable
because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in
litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments
 previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It
is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally
tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial
attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ...

WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from
the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid
corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different
branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the
corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on
January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the
corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their
interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the
commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it became involved in any
court litigation

III

With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an
impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard
for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be
exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report
which reads as follows:

The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated and closely
fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising
attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in
the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.

The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all the
time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this
assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented
himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words
"Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for respondent and any
person for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face value. "Now with respect to the
allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent
of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true
did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations
with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his official actuations as a judge where said persons
were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges
in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law from his personal
relations with respondent, or that he used his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other
branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.

Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from
maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid
suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his
judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself
would not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be
clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private
corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more
discreet in his private and business activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be
characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916

E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.

Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.

Attorney-General Avancea for defendant..

TRENT, J.:

This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff
for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.

Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to
P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to
two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed
by plaintiff in his complaint."

The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between
the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in
holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment
against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.

The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:

It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going
toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve
miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said
streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after
passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance
and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street,
into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the
plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there.

By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who
examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a
depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood
issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.

The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain was had
suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for performing the
operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live. His
right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer skin in such manner that it might be
regarded as double and the would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.

At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a
contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The
patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter
weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted
to use his money for mathematical calculations.

According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to
the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical
condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had
constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not
now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his
 efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach
the highest parts of the building.

As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolved
the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making
mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up
a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."

We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.

The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the
award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the
plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing
the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a
contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which
the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established that
the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two
months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for
the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is
P18,075.

As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry
at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.

Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:

An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.

Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for
damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March
twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;

Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of
damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and

Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be passed by the
Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said
questions may be decided: Now, therefore,

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:

SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against
the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle
and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby
authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said
Government at the same.

SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

Enacted, February 3, 1915.

Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability
to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the
plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is also
admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the
plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render judgment
accordingly.

The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any,
to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court
for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the
accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we
have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to
hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.

The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and State Governments in the United
States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act
No. 2457.

In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs,
except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice Story, "does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in
all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest."
(Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs.
States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)

In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for personal injuries
received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by the legislature for
the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit
the industrial classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of the state, being objects similar to those
sought by the public school system. In passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers
or agents, the court said:

No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or
unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter vs.
State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs.
State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)

As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of
either fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:

By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.

In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the
bringing of this suit, read:

SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit, Waukesha County,
Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of
settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of Wisconsin, or its duly
authorized officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the
State of Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka
Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha,
Wisconsin.

In determining the scope of this act, the court said:

Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for the
acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see
how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives
 authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act
is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well
established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the
door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be
in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in
this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to
mere inference, but would have done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass.,
28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)

In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as follows:

All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the state not allowed
by the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to bring
suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same
to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits, except as herein otherwise
provided.

And the court said:

This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts, and in both it
was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed
before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have existed if the statute had not
been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)

A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the
commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing this
statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:

The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore unrecognized
class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities can
be adjudicated.

In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New York,
jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained, Chief
Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of
its agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability."

It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously
recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers,
agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been
caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable.

The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:

That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is
based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or
negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that
the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private
persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature
governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
 That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence;
and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person
who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the
damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain
fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in
consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal
presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for
acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and
not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners
or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of
a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this
kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.

That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for
all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made
by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an
external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in
the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the
exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of
the property which they hold in sublease.

That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his
own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)

That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among
others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to
the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in
not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second
class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil
Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above
quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as
special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the
Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has
sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient
funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
G.R. No. L-31635 August 31, 1971

ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCION SADAYA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Fourth Branch, Presided by the Honorable, Judge JOSE C.
BORROMEO, THE PUBLIC HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER, and THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.

Eriberto Seno for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting First Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor
Norberto P. Eduardo for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

What is before this Court for determination in this appeal by certiorari to review a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu is the question of whether or not plaintiffs, now petitioners, seeking the just compensation to which they are entitled
under the Constitution for the expropriation of their property necessary for the widening of a street, no condemnation
proceeding having been filed, could sue defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, in their
capacity as public officials without thereby violating the principle of government immunity from suit without its consent.
The lower court, relying on what it considered to be authoritative precedents, held that they could not and dismissed the
suit. The matter was then elevated to us. After a careful consideration and with a view to avoiding the grave
inconvenience, not to say possible injustice contrary to the constitutional mandate, that would be the result if no such suit
were permitted, this Court arrives at a different conclusion, and sustains the right of the plaintiff to file a suit of this
character. Accordingly, we reverse.

Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13, 1966, sought the
payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the
National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the
widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any
agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of
its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. It
was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90,
appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00.
Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June 30, 1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in the alternative,
either the restoration of possession or the payment of the just compensation.

In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P.
Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the government and therefore
should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11, 1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to
this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 647-B of the Banilad estate described in the Survey plan
RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an
area of 1,045 square meters; That the National Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and
used the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution No.
90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot No. 647-B is still in the
possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the
National Government has not as yet paid the value of the land which is being utilized for public use." 1

The lower court decision now under review was promulgated on January 30, 1969. As is evident from the excerpt to be
cited, the plea that the suit was against the government without its consent having been manifested met with a favorable
response. Thus: "It is uncontroverted that the land in question is used by the National Government for road purposes. No
evidence was presented whether or not there was an agreement or contract between the government and the original
owner and whether payment was paid or not to the original owner of the land. It may be presumed that when the land was
taken by the government the payment of its value was made thereafter and no satisfactory explanation was given why this
case was filed only in 1966. But granting that no compensation was given to the owner of the land, the case is
undoubtedly against the National Government and there is no showing that the government has consented to be sued in
this case. It may be contended that the present case is brought against the Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor
General and not against the National Government. Considering that the herein defendants are sued in their official
capacity the action is one against the National Government who should have been made a party in this case, but, as
stated before, with its consent." 2

Then came this petition for certiorari to review the above decision. The principal error assigned would impugn the holding
that the case being against the national government which was sued without its consent should be dismissed, as it was in
fact dismissed. As was indicated in the opening paragraph of this opinion, this assignment of error is justified. The
decision of the lower court cannot stand. We shall proceed to explain why.

1. The government is immune from suit without its consent. 3 Nor is it indispensable that it be the party proceeded against. If it
appears that the action, would in fact hold it liable, the doctrine calls for application. It follows then that even if the defendants named
were public officials, such a principle could still be an effective bar. This is clearly so where a litigation would result in a financial
responsibility for the government, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property. Under such circumstances, the liability of
the official sued is not personal. The party that could be adversely affected is government. Hence the defense of non-suability may be
interposed. 4

So it has been categorically set forth in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez: 5 "However, and this is important, where the judgment in such a
case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial
liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper
or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of said Government." 6

2. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and
injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications v. Aligean: 7 "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In
the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional
provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." 8

3. It would follow then that the prayer in the amended complaint of petitioners being in the alternative, the lower court,
instead of dismissing the same, could have passed upon the claim of plaintiffs there, now petitioners, for the recovery of
the possession of the disputed lot, since no proceeding for eminent domain, as required by the then Code of Civil
Procedure, was instituted. 9 However, as noted in Alfonso v. Pasay City, 10 this Court speaking through Justice Montemayor,
restoration would be "neither convenient nor feasible because it is now and has been used for road purposes." 11 The only relief, in the
opinion of this Court, would be for the government "to make due compensation, ..."12 It was made clear in such decision that
compensation should have been made "as far back as the date of the taking." Does it result, therefore, that petitioners would be
absolutely remediless since recovery of possession is in effect barred by the above decision? If the constitutional mandate that the
owner be compensated for property taken for public use 13 were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be
summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it,
and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount
fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the
judgment." 14If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is
unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It
is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.
It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that
the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked. 15

Accordingly, the lower court decision is reversed so that the court may proceed with the complaint and determine the
compensation to which petitioners are entitled, taking into account the ruling in the above Alfonso case: "As to the value of
the property, although the plaintiff claims the present market value thereof, the rule is that to determine due compensation
for lands appropriated by the Government, the basis should be the price or value at the time that it was taken from the
owner and appropriated by the Government." 16

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of January 30, 1969 dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case remanded
to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.
G.R. No. L-7708 May 30, 1955

JOSE MONDANO, petitioner,

vs.
FERNANDO SILVOSA, Provincial Governor of Surigao, JOSE ARREZA and OLIMPIO EPIS, Members of the
Provincial Board, respondents.

D. Avila and C. H. Lozada for petitioner.

Olimpio R. Epis in his own behalf and for his co-respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February
1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee
accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her
daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the
complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the
petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was served with a copy of the
complaint filed by the provincial governor with provincial board. On the same day, the provincial governor issued
Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the
charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection.

The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents from further proceeding
with the hearing of the administrative case against him and for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the
respondent provincial governor is illegal and without legal effect.

On 4 May 1954 the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued after filing and approval of a bond for P500.

The answer of the respondents admits the facts alleged in the petition except those that are inferences and conclusions of
law and invokes the provisions of section 79 (c)of the Revised Administrative Code which clothes the department head
with "direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . ." and to that end "may
order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and
in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations;
. . ."and the rule in the case of Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 452, which upheld "the power of the Secretary of
Interior to conduct at its own initiative investigation of charges against local elective municipal officials and to suspend
them preventively," on the board proposition "that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and
considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 11, Article VII, of
our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Departments, the heads of
the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive."

The executive departments of the Government of the Philippines created and organized before the approval of the
Constitution continued to exist as "authorized by law until the Congress shall provide otherwise." 1 Section 10, paragraph
1, Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws
be faithfully executed." Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the
power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct
control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus
and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in
the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does
not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may
be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as
conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments
and that for the reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. If "general
supervision over all local governments" is to be construedas the same power granted to the Department Head in section
79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of
control and that of supervision. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of the
Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration
of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." 2 And if the charges are serious, "he shall
submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either
personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending
action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." 3 Section 86
of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head
over the administration of . . . municipalities . . .. If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same
authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such
additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by section 10 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution.

In Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz. 93, this Court held that the power of the President to remove officials from office as
provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done "conformably to law;" and only for
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he "may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority
under the Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines." Again, this power of removal must be exercised
conformably to law.

In the indorsement to the provincial governor the Assistant Executive Secretary requested immediate investigation,
appropriate action and report on the complaint indorsed to him, and called his attention to section 2193 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides for the institution of judicial proceedings by the provincial fiscal upon direction of the
provincial governor. If the indorsement of the Assistant Executive Secretary be taken as a designation of the provincial
governor to investigate the petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent of the Executive, but the investigation to be
conducted by him would not be that which is provided for in sections 2188, 2189 and 2190 of the Revised Administrative
Code. The charges preferred against the respondent are not malfeasances or any of those enumerated or specified in
section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, because rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the
performance of his duties as mayor nor do they constitute or involve" neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other
form of maladministration of office." True, they may involve moral turpitude, but before the provincial governor and board
may act and proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by
final judgment must precede the filing by the provincial governor of charges and trial by the provincial board. Even the
provincial fiscal cannot file an information for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended party who is 28 years of age
and the crime of concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon sworn complaint of the offended spouse. 4 The charges
preferred against the petitioner, municipal mayor of Mainit, province of Surigao, not being those or any of those specified
in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board is
unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful
and without authority of law.

The writ of prohibition prayed for is granted, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-4221 August 30, 1952

MARCELO D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GEN. MARIANO CASTAEDA, and COLONEL EULOGIO BALAO, respondents-appellees.

Felixberto M. Serrano and Honorio Ilagan for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellees.

BENGZON, J.:

The purpose of this appeal from the Court of First Instance of Quezon City is to test the validity of Proclamation No. 210
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

A few months ago the same proclamation came up for discussion in connection with the request for bail of some prisoners
charged with rebellion.1 The divided opinion of this Court did not squarely pass on the validity of the proclamation; but,
assuming it was obligatory, both sides proceeds to determine its effect upon the right of which prisoners to go on bail.
This decision will now consider the points debated regarding the aforesaid residential order.

The facts are few and simple: About five o'clock in the morning of October 18, 1950, Maximino Montenegro was arrested
with others at the Samanillo Bldg. Manila, by agents of the Military Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection or sedition.
So far as the record discloses, he is still under arrest in the custody by respondents. On October 22, 1950, The President
issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. On October 21, 1950, Maximino's
father, the petitioner, submitted this application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking the release of his son.

Opposing the writ, respondents admitted having the body of Maximino, but questioned judicial authority to go further in the
matter, invoking the above-mentioned proclamation.

Petitioner replied that such proclamation was void, and that, anyway, it did not apply to his son, who had been
arrested before its promulgation. Heeding the suspension order, the court of first instance denied the release prayed for.
Hence this appeal, founded mainly on the petitioner's propositions:.

(a) The proclamation is unconstitutional "because it partakes of bill of attainder, or an ex post facto law; and unlawfully
includes sedition which under the Constitution is not a ground for suspension";

(b) Supposing the proclamation is valid, no prima facie.

(c) "There is no state of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof," the only situations permitting
discontinuance of the writ of habeas corpus; showing was made that the petitioner's son was included within the terms
thereof.

Proclamation No. 210 reads partly as follows:

WHEREAS, lawless elements of the country have committed overt acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion for
the purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted authorities and in pursuance thereof, have created a state of
lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the state;

WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection, and rebellion consisting of armed raids, sorties, and ambushes
and the wanton acts of murder, rape, spoilage, looting, arson, planned destruction of public and private buildings,
and attacks against police and constabulary detachments, as well as against civilian lives and properties as
reported by the Commanding General of the Armed Forces, have seriously endangered and still continue to
endanger the public safety;

WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion have been perpetrated by various groups well
organized for concerted actions and well armed with machine guns, rifles, pistols and other automatic weapons,
by reason whereof there is actual danger of rebellion which may extend throughout the country;

Whereas, 100 leading members of these lawless elements have been apprehended and the presently under
detentions, and strong and convincing evidence has been found in their possession to show that they are
engaged in the rebellious, seditious and otherwise subversive acts as above set forth; and

Whereas, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken to insure the peace and security of
the population and to maintain the authority of the government;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, ELPIDIO QUIRINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me
by article VII, section 10, paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the
crimes of sedition, insurrection or rebellion, and or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith.

A. It is first argued that the proclamation is invalid because it "partakes" of a bill of attainder or an ex post factolaw, and
violates the constitutional percept that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. The argument is devoid of
merit. The prohibition applies only to statutes. U.S. vs. Gen. El., 80 Fed. Supp. 989; De Pass vs. Bidwell, 24 Fed., 615.2 A
bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. (16 C.J.S. p. 902; U.S. vs. Lovett (1946)
328 U.S. 303). Anyway, if, as we find, the stay of the writ was ordered in accordance with the powers expressly vested in
the President by the Constitution, such order must be deemed an exception to the general prohibition against ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder supposing there is a conflict between the prohibition and the suspension.

On the other hand there is no doubt it was erroneous to include those accused of sedition among the persons as to whom
suspension of the writ is decreed. Under the Constitution the only grounds for suspension of the privilege of the writ are
"invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof." Obviously, however, the inclusion of sedition does not
invalidate the entire proclamation; and it is immaterial in this case, inasmuch as the petitioner's descendant is confined in
jail not only for sedition, but for the graver offense of rebellion and insurrection. Without doing violence to the presidential
directive, but in obedience to the supreme law of the land, the word "sedition" in Proclamation No. 210 should be deemed
a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole.

B. In his second proposition appellant insists there is no state of invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger
thereof. "There are" he admits "intermittent sorties and lightning attacks by organized bands in different places"; but, he
argues, "such sorties are occasional, localized and transitory. And the proclamation speaks no more than of overt of
insurrection and rebellion, not of cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof." On this subject it
is noted that the President concluded from the facts recited in the proclamation, and the other connected therewith, that
"there is actual danger rebellion which may extend throughout the country." Such official declaration implying much more
than imminent danger of rebellion amply justifies the suspension of the writ.

To the petitioner's unpracticed eye the repeated encounters between dissident elements and military troops may seem
sporadic, isolated, or casual. But the officers charged with the Nation's security, analyzed the extent and pattern of such
violent clashes and arrived at the conclusion that they are warp and woof of a general scheme to overthrow his
government vi et armis, by force and arms.

And we agree with the Solicitor General that in the light of the views of the United States Supreme Court thru, Marshall,
Taney and Story quoted with approval in Barcelon vs. Baker (5 Phil., 87, pp. 98 and 100) the authority to decide whenever
the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension belongs to the President and "his decision is final and conclusive" upon
the courts and upon all other persons.

Indeed as Justice Johnston said in that decision, whereas the Executive branch of the Government is enabled thru its civil
and military branches to obtain information about peace and order from every quarter and corner of the nation, the judicial
department, with its very limited machinery can not be in better position to ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing
in the Archipelago.

But even supposing the President's appraisal of the situation is merely prima facie, we see that petitioner in this litigation
has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness which the judiciary accords to acts of the Executive and Legislative
Departments of our Government.

C. The petitioner's last contention is that the respondents failed to establish that this son is included within the terms of the
proclamation.

On this topic, respondents' return officially informed the court that Maximino had been arrested and was under custody for
complicity in the commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection and sedition against the Republic of the Philippines. Not
having traversed that allegation in time, petitioner must be deemed to have conceded it.

. . . In the absence of a denial, or appropriate pleading avoiding their effect, averment of facts in the return will be
taken as true and conclusive, regardless of the allegations contained in the petition; and the only question for
determination is whether or not the facts stated in the return, as a matter of law, authorizes the restraint under
investigation. (39 C.J.S., 664-655.)

D. An interesting issue is posed by amici curiae. The Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus except when the public safety requires it, in cases of (1) invasion (2) insurrection or (3) rebellion.

Article VII Section 10 authorizes the President to suspend the privilege, when public safety requires it, in cases of (1)
invasion (2) insurrection or (3) rebellion or (4) imminent danger thereof.

"Imminent danger," is no cause for suspension under the Bill of Rights. It is under Article VII. To complicate matters,
during the debates of the Constitutional Convention on the Bill of Rights, particularly the suspension of the writ, the
Convention voted down an amendment adding a fourth cause of suspension: imminent danger of invasion, insurrection of
rebellion.
Professor Aruego a member of the Convention, describes the incident as follows:

During the debates on the first draft, Delegate Francisco proposed as an amendment inserting, as a fourth cause
for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus imminent danger of the three causes included herein. When
submitted to a vote for the first time, the amendment was carried.

After this motion for a reconsideration of the amendment was approved, Delegate Orense spoke against the
amendment alleging that it would be dangerous to make imminent danger a ground for the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. In part, he said:

"Gentlemen, this phrase is too ambigous, and in the hands of a President who believes himself more or less a
dictator, it is extremely dangerous, it would be a sword with which he would behead us.".

In defense of the amendment, Delegate Francisco pointed out that it was intended to make this part of the bill of
rights conform to that part of the draft giving the President the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus also in
the case of an imminent danger of invasion or rebellion. When asked by Delegate Rafols if the phrase, imminent
danger, might not be struck out from this corresponding provisions under the executive power instead, Delegate
Francisco answered:

"Outright, it is possible to eliminate the phrase, imminent danger thereof, in the page I have mentioned. But I say,
going to the essence of referring exclusively to the necessity of including the words, of imminent danger of one or
the other, I wish to say the following: that it should not be necessary that there exists a rebellion, insurrection or
invasion in order that habeas corpus may be suspended. It should be sufficient that there exists not a danger but
an imminent danger, and the word, imminent, should be maintained. When there exists an imminent danger, the
State requires for its protection and for that of all the citizens the suspension of habeas corpus."

When put to vote for the second time, the amendment was defeated with 72 votes against and 56 votes in favor of
the same. (I Aruego's Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 180-181)

Nevertheless when the President's specific powers under Article VII, were taken up there was no objection to his authority
to suspend in case of "imminent danger". (At least we are not informed of any debate thereon.) Now then, what is the
effect of the seeming discrepancy?

Is the prohibition of suspension in the bill of rights to be interpreted as limiting Legislative powers only not executive
measures under section VII? Has article VII (sec. 10) pro tanto modified the bill of rights in the same manner that a
subsequent section of a statue modifies a previous one?

The difference between the two constitutional provisions would seem to be: whereas the bill of rights impliedly
denies suspension in case of imminent dangers of invasion etc., article VII sec. 10 expressly authorizes the President to
suspend when there is imminent danger of invasion etc.

The following statements in a footnote in Cooley's Constitutional limitations (8th Ed.) p. 129, appear to be persuasive:

It is a general rule in the construction of writings, that, a general intent appearing, it shall control the particular
intent; but this rule must sometimes give way, and effect must be given to a particular intent plainly expressed in
one part of a constitution, though apparently opposed to a general intent deduced from other parts. Warren V.
Shuman, 5 Tex. 441. In Quick V. Whitewater Township, 7 Ind. 570, it was said that if two provisions of a written
constitutions are irreconcilably repugnant, that which is last in order of time and in local position is to be preferred.
In Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Rambolt, 67 tex. 654, 4 S.W. 356, this rule was recognized as a last resort, but if the
last provision is more comprehensive and specific, it was held that it should be given effect on that ground.

And in Hoag vs. Washington Oregon Corp. (1915) 147 Pac. Rep., 756 at p. 763 it was said:

It is a familiar rule of construction that, where two provisions of a written Constitution are repugnant to each other,
that which is last in order of time and in local position is to be preferred. Quick v. White Water Township, 7 Ind.,
570; G., C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Rambolt, 67 Tex. 654, 4 S.W. 356. So, even assuming the two clauses discuss are
repugnant, the latter must prevail.
Wherefore in the light of this precedents, the constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent
danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under article VII may not correctly be placed in doubt.

E. The petitioner insisted in the court below that the suspension should not apply to his son, because the latter had been
arrested and had filed the petition before the Executive proclamation. On this phase of the controversy, it is our opinion
that the order of suspension affects the power of the court's and operates immediately on all petitions therein pending at
the time of its promulgation.

A proclamation of the President suspending the writ of habeas corpus was held valid and efficient in law to
suspend all proceedings pending upon habeas corpus, which was issued and served prior to the date of the
proclamation. Matter of Dunn, D.C. N.Y. 1863, 25 How. Prac. 467, 8 Fed. Cas. 4,171.

F. Premises considered, the decision of the court a quo refusing to release the prisoner is affirmed, without costs.

G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin
respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the
Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to representations
that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench.
Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive as follows:

RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous and
standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the deduction of the
withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other
members of the judiciary.

That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has deemed it best to settle the
legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional
Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the
Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner
Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner
Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the
Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.

This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and ratified
in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General
Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from
payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from
the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The
Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that
declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment
as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices
and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of
such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries
during their continuance in office.

A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:

... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such compensation as may
be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied).

Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of inferior courts
shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their continuance in office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).

And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically stipulated:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be
exempt from payment of income tax. 3

The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts
shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied).

The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which
reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of
judicial officers.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention.

The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:

Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of judges of the
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished nor
subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an
annual salary of _____________ and each Associate Justice ______________ pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours)

During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners presented their objections to the
provision on tax exemption, thus:

MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices, does this not violate the
principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of the law? After all, tax is levied not on
the salary but on the combined income, such that when the judge receives a salary and it is comingled with the
other income, we tax the income, not the salary. Why do we have to give special privileges to the salary of
justices?

MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase or decrease of their salary
during their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary and affecting the independence of the judges.

MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but the special privilege on
taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in taxation and the equal protection clause. 6

xxx xxx xxx

MR. OPLE. x x x
 Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, for
whom we have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the judicial system as a whole with the
whole armor of defense against the executive and legislative invasion of their independence. But in so doing,
some of the citizens outside, especially the humble government employees, might say that in trying to erect a
bastion of justice, we might end up with the fortress of privileges, an island of extra territoriality under the Republic
of the Philippines, because a good number of powers and rights accorded to the Judiciary here may not be
enjoyed in the remotest degree by other employees of the government.

An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity, which is, of course, denied to
the entire executive department and the legislative. 7

And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that
the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to
"give substance to equality among the three branches in the government.

Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended the original draft and referred
to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any
revenue that could come from taxing their salaries." Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a vote.
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in support of an amendment to the amendment with the request for a
modification of the amendment," as follows:

FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying that it is not enough to drop
the phrase "shall not be subjected to income tax," because if that is all that the Gentleman will do, then he will just
fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David,
etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which excludes them from income tax, but rather I would propose that the statement will read:
"During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL
INCOME TAX."IN support of this position, I would say that the argument seems to be that the justice and judges
should not be subjected to income tax because they already gave up the income from their practice. That is true
also of Cabinet members and all other employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many people who
have accepted employment in the government involving a reduction of income and yet are still subject to income
tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting service in government.

Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr.
then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption, Commissioner Bernas announced:

During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent, Commissioner Rigos, that his
amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED."But this is on the understanding that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section
6 of Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers,
shall be exempt from payment of income tax.

So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax.

When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax of salaries of public officers,
Commissioner Bernas replied:

FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General Provisions. But at any rate, when
we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and
Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.

The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved without objection.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that there will be a provision under
the Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note that the salaries of officials
of the government including constitutional officers shall not be exempt from income tax? The amendment
proposed herein and accepted by the Committee now reads as follows: "During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to income tax" is deleted. 9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to
make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 12 1avv phi1

Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts
shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).

it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and
Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be
applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an
exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of
judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed inEndencia vs.
David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed
in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have
adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and
should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.

RESOLUTION

In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas
corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving
the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined
and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic:

(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this
absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in
return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or
sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the
United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);

Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of
their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in
the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which
governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights
inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended
because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the
possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise
of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory
occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from
exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th
Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague
Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists
during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign
subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric
of the petitioner's contention rests;

Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the
decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision
in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in
connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein and its
power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted
subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy territory does not
transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be
construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate
government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or
divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to
the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in
1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present case;

Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other
publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward
the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in
return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent
allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a
citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a
foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may
commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by
giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is
nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a
citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof
since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he
receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most
of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection
he is entitled to in his own;

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate
government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to
govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which
prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance
during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they
exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the
government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and
espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against
public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political
complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the
legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can
not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against
public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for
the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the
latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the
said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter
during the enemy occupation;

Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life
of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either
change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that
is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army,
subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized
nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra;
1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant
dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them,
and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though
continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or
not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or
subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or
forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a
corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere
and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the
military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and
because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular
government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by
the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully
resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;

Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of
the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted
for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy
forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own
independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free
and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and
independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political
suicide;

(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in
article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized
by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the
Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of
the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the
Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in
such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to
refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;

Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but
subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our
Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in
approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the
declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them" (section 1,
Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of
his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice
regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations in fact all the
 attributes of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it
is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of
Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely
political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.

Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final
and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe
allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained
by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same
way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the
United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the
Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the
Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the
Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does
not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth,
because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our
Constitution provides that "The government established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth
of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines";

This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition,
as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without
prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate
opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.

G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986

IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner.

R E S O L U T IO N

PER CURIAM:

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section
5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.

Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the
question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and
Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino
being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed
1986 Constitution refers to, . ...

The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.

Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is
elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition
amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally
elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted
provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional
Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no
other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of
elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992
of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the
legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it
was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held
that:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the
judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
(Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon
C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.];
and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])

For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no question
that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and
Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.or the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at
bar,

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed.

G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Suntay for petitioner.

Barrios and Fule for respondent.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another
province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer
is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.

On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The
body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:

Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated
from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be
known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality
shall be in Togaig.

Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen
hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.

Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon,Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in theProvince of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which are:

For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the Commission
RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios
of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in
the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of
Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.

Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to
the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive
Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting
legislation."

Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be
implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."

This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be
declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the
same for electoral purposes, be nullified.

1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."2

It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative
power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title
of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This
constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of
House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the
House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application, originated.5

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the
public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into
the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislators.6

In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement, the following,
we believe, may be taken as guidelines:

The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set
forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
 xxx xxx xxx

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the
purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the
court.7

With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao
del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur,"
read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a
two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two
municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members
of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato
and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were
actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act
4790.

Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of
territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the
municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be
expressed in the title of the law." This posture we must say but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in
writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity
involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is
as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.

Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case is not in
focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions
of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the
title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces must be
expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the
legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping together
of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation
of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily
creating a new municipality and vice versa.

As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649.
There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon."
The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the following described
territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby constituted a village
corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa
county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing his lands. Plaintiff
based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace more
than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant
appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well
apply to this case:

It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a sufficient title, and that the
words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the words last
quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.

. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the purpose of
saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
 A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its
provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.

The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the
restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is
misleading."9

Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the
title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10

We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the
municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away
the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated
is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.

We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of a statute is rendered
unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black,
however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:

. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently,
then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected,
must fall with them,11

In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is
valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid
portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have
enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must
remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language
used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what
remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate,
. . . .12

Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine barrios in
the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon
and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.

Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the
functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in
the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State. 13

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining
itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was apparently these same
factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the original twenty-one
barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:

The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is
sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.

This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings
of municipal autonomy.

When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios not nine
barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself,
thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of
Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to
progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality,
still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said
remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and
liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in
their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply
the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer them in the
negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the
known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate
population and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine of the
original twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial
interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the
judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, we may not now
melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios.
Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that
congressional will.

Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality. 14

3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal interest
adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is
not the real party in interest.

Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of
the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are
impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to
a different provincial hegemony.

The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the
law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this
jurisdiction.15

Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was
annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual
residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are fanned into the new
town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and
benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to
vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment.
Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the
community affected thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen
of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.

For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from
implementing the same for electoral purposes.

No costs allowed. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court, I find myself unable to give my assent. Hence
these few words to express my stand.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao
del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject matter of such an enactment. The mere fact that in the body of such
statute barrios found in two other municipalities of another province were included does not of itself suffice for a finding of
nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked. At the most, the statute to be free from the insubstantial doubts
about its validity must be construed as not including the barrios, located not in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon, Cotabato.

The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.1 This provision is similar to those found in the Constitution of many American
States. It is aimed against the evils, of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or
unconsidered enactments.2 Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the members of the legislature as
well as the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus
precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.

It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The construction must be reasonable
and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its
contents. The constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its subject find expression in its title. 3

The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in 1938, construing a
provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank,4 held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No.
4007, the Reorganization Law, providing for the mode in which the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking may
be reimbursed through assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner
was not violative of such a requirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act. Justice Laurel, however, vigorously
dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the act was reorganization, the provision assailed did not deal with
reorganization but with taxation. While the case ofGovernment vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare
majority of four justices against three, the present trend seems to be that the constitutional requirement is to be given the
liberal test as indicated in the majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos, and not the strict test as desired by the
majority headed by Justice Laurel.

Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions beginning with Sumulong v. Commission on Elections,5up to and
including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,6 the opinion coming from Justice Concepcion.

It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,7 one of the grounds on which the invalidity of Republic Act No. 3836 was
predicated was the violation of the above constitutional provision. This Retirement Act for senators and representatives
was entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-SECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As
we noted, the paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed objectionable "refers to members of Congress and to elective
officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits,
therefore, for these officials, would relate to a subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In
other words, this portion of the amendment ( re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and appointive officers, such
as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act
No. 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and insurance
benefits to its members." Nonetheless our opinion was careful to note that there was no abandonment of the principle of
liberality. Thus: "we are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the
constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally."

It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. 4790 is not susceptible to the indictment that the
constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one subject which should be expressed in his title was not met.
The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. That was embodied in the title.

It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court, some of the opinions coming from jurists illustrious
for their mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged erudition, that, with all due respect, I find the citation
from Corpus Juris Secundum, unnecessary and far from persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not deem controlling,
as the freedom of this Court to accept or reject doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted.

Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several barrios of two municipalities outside Lanao del Sur
were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that province. That itself would not have given rise to a constitutional
question considering the broad, well-high plenary powers possessed by Congress to alter provincial and municipal
boundaries. What justified resort to this Court was the congressional failure to make explicit that such barrios in two
municipalities located in Cotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur.

To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios
mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can
meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a new
municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely that.

This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in basic principles underlying precedents, which if not
precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealth v. Agregado,8 certain provisions of the Administrative Code
were interpreted and given a "construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law."
In Sanchez v. Lyon Construction,9 this Court had a similar ruling: "Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied in
consonance with [the relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above principle gained acceptance at a much earlier
period in our constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re Guaria:10 "In construing a statute enacted by the
Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress,
if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we
think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator which would lead to
the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress. However specious the
argument may be in favor of one of two possible constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it is found to rest
on the contention that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and that his
apparent intention was to enact an invalid law."

American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone, construed statutes
"with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to [their] validity."11 From the pen of the
articulate jurist, Frankfurter:12 "Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying activities" in the resolution must be given the meaning
that may fairly be attributed to it, having special regard for the principle of constitutional adjudication which makes it
decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional questions avoided by
another." His opinion in the Rumely case continues with the above pronouncement of Stone and two other former Chief
Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, '(i)t is our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach conclusion
which will avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality', Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 US 331, 346,
48 S. Ct. 194, 198, 72 L. ed. 303. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 L. ed. 598, and cases cited." The prevailing doctrine
then as set forth by Justice Clark in a 1963 decision,13 is that courts "have consistently sought an interpretation which
supports the constitutionality of legislation." Phrased differently by Justice Douglas, the judiciary favors "that interpretation
of legislation which gives it the greater change of surviving the test of constitutionality."14

It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that a legislative measure, in the
language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction which will imperil its validity where it is reasonably open to
construction free from such peril."15 Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such risk and is free from the
peril of nullity.

So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the practical considerations clearly brought to light in the
opinion of the Court.
G.R. No. L-28790 April 29, 1968

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner,

vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as Executive Secretary,respondents.

Leandro Sevilla, Ramon C. Aquino and Lino M. Patajo for petitioner.

Claudio Teehankee for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from investigating the official
actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the Executive
Secretary pending investigation.

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner
of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the said
Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the
Court of First Instance." The appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of
said officer, use the following expression:

1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges of district judge P19,000.00.

On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to explain in writing not
later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending
approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas
covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank,
privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and
investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case
should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No.
296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the
President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct
prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the
above charges."

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of
Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents
admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the
petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court
140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the
Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the
Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and
Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation,
suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by
the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is
nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member
of the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the
right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would
necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had
indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These favoured officers include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the
Department of Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (Rep. Act No. 4360);
(c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila (R. A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities and
Exchange Commissioner (R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the
Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the
consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove
administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed under the President's
supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).

Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of the
President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and
privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the
process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive
officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength when account is taken of the
fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic
statutes of said bodies (Republic Act 1267, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125) expressly provide that they are
to be removed from office for the same causes and in the same mannerprovided by law for Judges of First Instance", or
"members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true of Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act
No. 103) and of the Commissioner of Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that where the
legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to
other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had really intended to
include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be
investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such
grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by
charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously
reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N. Y. 401, 160 N. E. 655), saying:

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions
except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.

The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric Co., et al., 281 U.S. 469, 74
Law. Ed., 972,

But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It
was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only and can have
no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot
give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are
essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736,
43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445) and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig Nut Co. supra (272 U.S. 700, 701,
71 L. ed. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47
Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep.
507; Ex parte Bakelite Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. (Federal Radio
Commission v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S. 469, 74 L. ed. 972.) (Emphasis supplied.)

In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannotbe
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities
was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600). 1w ph1.t

Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by claiming that under Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 1151, he is endowed with judicial functions. The section invoked runs as follows:

Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the Register of Deeds is in
doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with
the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of
 Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in
doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after
consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to
the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His
decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That, when
a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of
law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice
thereof.

Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial
function, as contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision of
the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon
other parties. This limitation1 in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any
other bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's resolutions are
appealable does not prove that they are not administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the
corresponding department head.

But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial (or more
properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner under Republic
Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or
executive functions and merely incidental to the latter.

Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given, whenever possible, a
meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, 2 We are constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act
1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance"
did not include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be
suspended or removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would be
violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of the aforenamed
Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor
acts in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is ordered dismissed. No
costs.