Evidence

Gaanan v IAC
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebonoffered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault
they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a
telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement.
Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan
listened to the telephone conversation without complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico
with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

The lower courtfound both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to
overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two
parties using a telephone line.

Held:
No, An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or
cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened
to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of
the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favour of the accused. Thus, in
case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or
arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. The mere act of
listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or
others of similar nature.
The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200,
otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

G.R. No. 181672 September 20, 2010

SPS. ANTONIO & LETICIA VEGA, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) & PILAR DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,

Facts: Magdalena V. Reyes (Reyes) owned a piece of titled land in Pilar Village, LasPias City. On August 17, 1979
she got a housing loan from respondent SocialSecurity System (SSS) for which she mortgaged her land. In late
1979, however, sheasked the petitioner spouses Antonio and Leticia Vega (the Vegas) to assume the loan and buy
her house and lot since she wanted to emigrate. Upon inquiry with the SSS, an employee there told the Vegas that
the SSS did not approve of members transferring their mortgaged homes. The Vegas could, however, simply make
a private arrangement with Reyes provided they paid the monthly amortizations on time. This practice, said the
SSS employee, was commonplace. Armed with this information, the Vegas agreed for Reyes to execute in their
favor a deed of assignment of real property with assumption of mortgage and paid Reyes P20, 000.00 after she
undertook to update the amortizations before leaving the country. The Vegas then took possession of the house in
January 1981.But Reyes did not readily execute the deed of assignment. She left the country and gave her sister,
Julieta Reyes Ofilada (Ofilada), a special power of attorney to convey ownership of the property. Sometime
between 1983 and 1984,Ofilada finally executed the deed promised by her sister to the Vegas. Ofilada kept the
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original and gave the Vegas two copies. The latter gave one copy to the Home Development Mortgage Fund and
kept the other. Unfortunately, a storm in 1984resulted in a flood that destroyed the copy left with them. In 1992,
the Vegas learned that Reyes did not update the amortizations for they received a notice to Reyes from the SSS
concerning it. They told the SSS that they already gave the payment to Reyes but, since it appeared indifferent, on
January 6, 1992 the Vegas updated the amortization themselves and paid P115, 738.48 to the SSS, through
Antonio Vegas personal check. They negotiated seven additional remittances and the SSS accepted P8, 681.00
more from the Vegas. Meanwhile, on April 16, 1993 respondent Pillar Development Corporation (PDC) filed an
action for sum of money against Reyes before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case 93-6551. PDC
claimed that Reyes borrowed from Apex Mortgage and Loans Corporation (Apex) P46, 500.00 to buy the lot and
construct a house on it. Apex then assigned Reyes credit to the PDC on December29, 1992, hence, the suit by PDC
for the recovery of the unpaid debt. On August 26, 1993 the RTC rendered judgment, ordering Reyes to pay the
PDC the loan of P46, 398.00 plus interest and penalties beginning April 11, 1979 as well as attorneys fees and the
costs. Unable to do so, on January 5, 1994 the RTC issued a writ of execution against Reyes and its Sheriff levied on
the property in Pilar Village. On February 16, 1994 the Vegas requested the SSS to acknowledge their status as
subrogates and to give them an update of the account so they could settle it in full. The SSS did not reply.
Meantime, the RTC sheriff published a notice for the auction sale of the property on February 24, March 3 and 10,
1994. He also served on the Vegas notice of that sale on or about March 20, 1994. On April 5, 1994, the Vegas filed
an affidavit of third party claimant and a motion for leave to admit emotion in intervention to quash the levy on
the property. Still, stating that Vegas remedy lay elsewhere, the RTC directed the sheriff to proceed with the
execution. Meantime, the Vegas got a telegram dated August 29, 1994, informing them that the SSS intended to
foreclose on the property to satisfy the unpaid housing debt of P38, 789.58. On October 19, 1994 the Vegas
requested the SSS in writing for the exact computation of the indebtedness and for assurance that they would be
entitled to the discharge of the mortgage and delivery of the proper subrogation documents upon payment. They
also sent a P37, 521.95managers check that the SSS refused to accept. On November 8, 1994 the Vegas filed an
action for consignation, damages, and injunction with application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order against the SSS, the PDC, the sheriff of RTC Branch 19, and the Register of Deeds before the RTC
of Las Pines in Civil Case 94-2943. Still, while the case was pending, on December 27, 1994 the SSS released the
mortgage to the PDC. And on August 22, 1996 the Register of Deeds issued TCT T-56657 to the PDC. A writ of
possession subsequently evicted the Vegas from the property. On May 8, 2002 the RTC decided Civil Case 94-2943
in favor of the Vegas. It ruled that the SSS was barred from rejecting the Vegas final payment of P37, 521.95 and
denying their assumption of Reyes debt, given the SSS previous acceptance of payments directly from them. The
Vegas were subrogated to the rights of Reyes and substituted her in the SSS housing loan and mortgage contract.
That the Vegas had the receipts show that they were the ones who made those payments. The RTC ordered the
PDC to deliver to the Vegas the certificate of title covering the property. It also held the SSS and PDC solidarity
liable to the Vegas for P300, 000.00 in moral damages, P30, 000.00 in exemplary damages, and P50, 000.00 in
attorneys fees and for costs of the suit. The SSS appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV 77582. On
August 30, 2007 the latter court reversed the RTC decision for the reasons that the Vegas were unable to produce
the deed of assignment of the property in their favor and that such assignment was not valid as to PDC. Their
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the Vegas filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule45.

Issue: Whether or not the Vegas presented adequate proof of Reyes sale of the subject property to them

Held: One. The CA ruled that the Vegas were unable to prove that Reyes assigned the subject property to them,
given that they failed to present the deed of assignment in their favor upon a claim that they lost it. But the rule
requiring the presentation of the original of that deed of assignment is not absolute. Secondary evidence of the
contents of the original can be adduced, as in this case, when the original has been lost without bad faith on the
part of the party offering it.Here, not only did the Vegas prove the loss of the deed of assignment in their favor and
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what the same contained, they offered strong corroboration of the fact of Reyes sale of the property to them.
They took possession of the house and lot after they bought it. Indeed, they lived on it and held it in the concept of
an owner for 13years before PDC came into the picture. They also paid all the amortizations to these with Antonio
Vegas personal check, even those that Reyes promised to settle but did not. And when the SSS wanted to
foreclose the property, the Vegas sent managers check to it for the balance of the loan. Neither Reyes nor any of
her relatives came forward to claim the property. The Vegas amply proved the sale totem. Two. Reyes acquired the
property in this case through a loan from the SSS in whose favor she executed a mortgage as collateral for the
loan. Although the loan was still unpaid, she assigned the property to the Vegas without notice to or the consent of
the SSS. The Vegas continued to pay the amortizations apparently in Reyes name. Meantime, Reyes apparently
got a cash loan from Apex, which assigned the credit to PDC. This loan was not secured by a mortgage on the
property but PDC succeeded in getting a money judgment against Reyes and had it executed on the property. Such
property was still in Reyes name but, as pointed out above, the latter had disposed of it in favor of the Vegas more
than 10 years before PDC executed on it. The question is: was Reyes disposal of the property in favor of the Vegas
valid given a provision in the mortgage agreement that she could not do so without the written consent of the
SSS? The CA ruled that, under Article 1237 of the Civil Code, the Vegas who paid the SSS amortizations except the
last on behalf of Reyes, without the latters knowledge or against her consent, cannot compel the SSS to subrogate
them in her rights arising from the mortgage. Further, said the CA, the Vegas claim of subrogation was invalid
because it was done without the knowledge and consent of the SSS as required under the mortgage agreement.
But Article 1237 cannot apply in this case since Reyes consented to the transfer of ownership of the mortgaged
property to the Vegas. Reyes also agreed for the Vegas to assume the mortgage and pay the balance of her
obligation to scoff course, paragraph 4 of the mortgage contract covering the property required Reyes to secure
SSS consent before selling the property. But, although such a stipulation is valid and binding, in the sense that the
SSS cannot be compelled while the loan was unpaid to recognize the sale, it cannot be interpreted as absolutely
forbidding her, as owner of the mortgaged property, from selling the same while her loan remained unpaid. Such
stipulation contravenes public policy, being an undue impediment or interference on the transmission of property.
Besides, when a mortgagor sells the mortgaged property to a third person, the creditor may demand from such
third person the payment of the principal obligation. The reason for this is that the mortgage credit is a real right,
which follows the property wherever it goes, even if its ownership changes. Article 2129 of the Civil Code gives the
mortgagee, here the SSS, the option of collecting from thethird person in possession of the mortgaged property in
the concept of owner. More,the mortgagor-owners sale of the property does not affect the right of theregistered
mortgagee to foreclose on the same even if its ownership had beentransferred to another person. The latter is
bound by the registered mortgage onthe title he acquired.After the mortgage debt to SSS had been paid, however,
the latter had nofurther justification for withholding the release of the collateral and the registeredtitle to the
party to whom Reyes had transferred her right as owner. Under thecircumstance, the Vegas had the right to sue
for the conveyance to them of thattitle, having been validly subrogated to Reyes rights. Three. The next question
is: was Reyes sale of the property to the Vegasbinding on PDC which tried to enforce the judgment credit in its
favor on theproperty that was then still mortgaged to the SSS? The CA ruled that Reyes assignment of the
property to the Vegas did notbind PDC, which had a judgment credit against Reyes, since such assignmentneither
appeared in a public document nor was registered with the register of deedsas Article 1625 of the Civil Code
required. Article 1625 reads:Art. 1625. An assignment of a credit, right or action shall produce no effect asagainst
third persons, unless it appears in a public instrument, or the instrument isrecorded in the Registry of Property in
case the assignment involves real property.(1526)But Article 1625 referred to assignment of credits and other
incorporealrights. Reyes did not assign any credit or incorporeal right to the Vegas. She soldthe Vegas her house
and lot. They became owner of the property from the time sheexecuted the deed of assignment covering the same
in their favor. PDC had a judgment for money against Reyes only. A courts power to enforce its judgmentapplies
only to the properties that are indisputably owned by the judgment obligor. Here, the property had long ceased to
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belong to Reyes when she sold it tothe Vegas in 1981. The PDC cannot take comfort in the fact that the property
remained in Reyes name when it bought the same at the sheriff sale. The PDC cannot assert that it was a buyer in
good faith since it had notice of the Vegas claim on the property prior to such sale. Under the circumstances, the
PDC must reconvey the subject property to the Vegas or, if this is no longer possible, pay them its current market
value as the trial court may determine with interest of 12 percent per annum from the date of the determination
of such value until it is fully paid. Further, considering the distress to which the Vegas were subjected after the
unlawful levy on their property, aggravated by their subsequent ouster from it through a writ of possession
secured by PDC, the RTC was correct in awarding the Vegas moral damages of P300, 000.00, exemplary damages of
P30, 000.00 and attorneys fees of P50, 000.00 plus costs of the suit. But these are to be borne solely by PDC
considering that the SSS had nothing to do with the sheriffs levy on the property. It released the title to the PDC
simply because it had a sheriffs sale in its favor. The PDC is, however, entitled to reimbursement from the Vegas of
the sum of P37, 820.15 that it paid to the SSS for the release of the mortgaged title.

G.R. No. 173540, 22 January 22 2014.

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, vs. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

Facts: This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same
man, now deceased. Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the lawful
wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized
on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. While the a
marriage certificate was recorded with the local civil registrar, the records of the LCR were destroyed during World
War II. Tecla and Eustaquio begot four children, but Eustaquio left his family in 1954.

In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage
she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla presented
eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth certificate of their children and certificates to the fact that the marriage
certificate/records were destroyed. Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of
Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 and showed
the marriage contract between her and Eustaquio. RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Teclas failure to
present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the
certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records.

The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and
Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four children. Such presumption,
supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the RTC, and testimonial
evidence created sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. The CA found that its appreciation of the evidence
presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of Eustaquio?

RULING: The Court finds that Tecla is the legal wife of Eustaquio. While a marriage certificate is considered the
primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth
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certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the marriage certificate, no other proof can be accepted.

The execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who
saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated
the execution thereof.

In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as a party to the
event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the officiating priest. Since the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidencetestimonial and
documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.

People vs Ibanez
Facts: Ibanez was charged with three counts of raping his own daughter under three pieces of information before
the RTC of Cavite. When arraigned he plead not guilty. On the 1st charge, AAA testified she was at their home in
Cavite and did not inform anyone of the incident (June 1997). On the 2nd charge, AAA testified being raped 8 times
from January to December 1998. The 3rd rape happened sometime in April 1999 while her mother was at work.
After which, she told her cousin who brought her to the NBI, where complaint affidavit was executed.

Ibanez denied having raped his daughter with an alibi of being always away from home.

Issue: Whether or not the precise dates of the commission of the rape be alleged in the information

Held: NO. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of the
crime charged. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the
occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a
woman. The precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential
that it be alleged in the information with ultimate precision.

The allegation in the pieces of information that the appellant committed the rape "sometime in June 1997 and
"sometime in April 1999 was sufficient to inform appellant that he was being charged of qualified
rape committed against his daughter. The allegation adequately afforded appellant an opportunity to prepare his
defense. Thus, appellant cannot complain that he was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.

It was also too late for appellant to question the sufficiency of the criminal pieces of information since he had
himself arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the crime of rape which is equivalent to waiving his right to
object to the pieces of information on the ground of an error as to the time of the alleged rape.
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Appellant could have filed a motion for a bill of particulars before his arraignment or a motion to quash on the
ground that the pieces of information alleged erroneous dates prior to his entry of plea.

G.R. No. 185008 September 22, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MAXIMO OLIMBA alias "JONNY,"

(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3)the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.

Due to the nature of the commission of the crime of rape, the testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict
the accused, provided that such testimony is "credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things."

Thus, in People v. Leonardo, we stated the evidentiary value of the testimony of the rape victim: Credible witness
and credible testimony are the two essential elements for the determination of the weight of a particular
testimony. This principle could not ring any truer where the prosecution relies mainly on the testimony of the
complainant, corroborated by the medico-legal findings of a physician. Be that as it may, the accused may be
convicted on the basis of the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is
clear, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature.

Moral character of the victim is immaterial Motive vis-a-vis credible testimony Once more, we apply the settled
rule that "alibi is an inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate."

Alibi and denial must be strongly supported by corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility.

Appellants alibi is, simply, uncorroborated. In his Supplemental Brief dated 5 March 2009, appellant points out
that there were material inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA that cannot be considered insignificant.

Specifically, it was revealed on cross examination that her grandmother was also staying in the house and sleeping
thereat at the time of the rape incident. This, he argues, affects the likelihood of the consummation of rape
because AAAs grandmother would definitely have noticed the untoward incident.

We are not convinced. Time and again, we reiterate that lust is no respecter of time and place. Thus, in People v.
Anguac, we rejected appellants claim that it is impossible for the victims siblings, who were sleeping with her, not
to be awakened during the rape incident because, in numerous cases, this Court has found that rape could indeed
be committed in the same room where other family members are sleeping.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the prosecution failed to reconcile AAAs statements as to the dates
when her grandmother lived with them, we consider such to be trivial a matter to impair AAAs credibility. Such
would not diminish the value of the testimony.

On the contrary, it would strengthen the credibility of the testimony because it erases any suspicion of a coached
or rehearsed witness. Appellant further contends that the inconsistent testimony on AAAs attempt to wake
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BBB up is likewise material because the act could not have been consummated if, indeed, BBB was roused from
her sleep.

This is likewise unmeritorious. It should be noted that BBB, the supposed witness to the incident, is a mere child,
who could be cowed into silence by a person exercising moral ascendancy and influence over her. Granting that
appellant could have discontinued his bestial act, if and when there was a witness to the commission of the crime,
it was clear in the testimony of AAA that appellant was not aware that BBB was then already awake.

Neither can we sustain the appellants contention that AAA was in Manila when some of the rape incidents were
allegedly committed. The source of the information is a third person who was not presented in court. Sans any
validation, the allegation remains to be hearsay. Further, a thorough examination of the testimony of AAA would
show that she left for Manila only once sometime after 19 April 2003after the last rape incident.

We confirm the observation of the trial court that her entire testimony was clear, consistent, and convincing.

Failure to immediately report the rape incidents was reasonable Applying People v. Romero, Jr., where this Court
doubted the credibility of the seventeen-year-old complainant because she failed to "come out in the open and
bring her abuser [-compadre of her aunt] to justice" in a span of eight months, appellant argues that the failure of
AAA and BBB to immediately report the rape incidents significantly affects their credibility.

Romero, however, is not on all fours with the prevailing circumstances of this case. The flaws and inconsistencies
in the testimony of the complaining witness in that case were so material that it seriously impaired the witness
credibility. Neither can we sustain appellants argument that the credibility of BBBs testimony is compromised by
her "apparent exposure xxx to the ways of the world at an early ageof seven (7)" because she and her friends
frequent the poblacion. BBB has satisfactorily explained the reason why she sometimes passed the night in the
poblacion with her friends. She was afraid that her father would rape her again. Assuming for the sake of argument
that BBB is a woman of loose morals, she is not precluded from being a victim of rape. Even prostitutes can be
victims of rape. It bears stressing that in rape, the moral character of the victim is immaterial, the essence of rape
being the act of having carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent. We cannot give weight to the self-
serving alibi and denial of the appellant over the positive and straight forward testimony of AAA and BBB.