Political Law: Chanrobles Internet Bar Review: Chanrobles Professional Review, Inc

ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

Survey of 2009-2010 SC Decisions in
Political Law
Dean Ed Vincent S. Albano
Article II
Declaration of Principles
Use of property bears a social function.
The concept of social function of private property which today is presented as one of the
possible justifications for agrarian and urban land reform has its roots in the cosmogenic and
philosophical concept which maintains that man must answer to the Creator for the use of the
resources entrusted to him. It is an old concept and is ultimately related to the genesis of society
itself. Hence, the use, enjoyment, occupation or disposition of private property is not absolute. It is
predicated on the social functions of property. It is restricted in a sense so as to bring about
maximum benefits to all and not to a few chosen individuals. (Ferrer vs. Carganillo, et.al., G.R. No.
170956, May 12, 2010).
Article III
BILL OF RIGHTS
Due Process
Essence of due process in

opportunity to be heard.
.
In Rep. Alvin Sandoval vs. HRET, et.al., G.R. No. 190067, March 9, 2010, the petitioner
contended that his right to due process was violated when the HRET denied his motion for additional
period to make a formal offer of evidence. On the contrary, he was given ample time to do so and
the HRET has been very lenient to him. In brushing aside his contention, the SC:
Held: The contention is not correct since he was given all the opportunities to make an offer of
evidence and to be heard. In Villarosa vs. HRET, G.R. Nos. 143351 and 144129, September 14,
2000, 340 SCRA 396, it was held that:
The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and

submit evidence in support of ones defense. To be heard does not mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
due process.
Note that the 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal provide for a
definite period of time within which a party should complete or terminate his presentation of
evidence which is 20 working days, preferably successive, including the form s offer of evidence.
(Sec.59)
He was warned that the extension granted would be the last but he chose not to heed such
warning and failed to use the additional time wisely. Only petitioner deserves to be blamed for the
woes that befell him.
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In Hofer v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 158833, May 12, 2004, 428
SCRA 383, the Court emphasized that procedural rules in election cases are designed to achieve not
only a correct but also an expeditious determination of the popular will of the electorate. Thus, the
time limit set by the rules is not something to be taken lightly, for it was stressed in the same case
that "the observance of the HRET Rules in conjunction with our own Rules of Court, must be taken
seriously." Quoting Baltazar v. Commission of Elections, the Court reiterated in Hofer, that:
By their very nature and given the public interest involved in the determination
of the results of an election, the controversies arising from the canvass must be
resolved speedily, otherwise the will of the electorate would be frustrated. And the
delay brought about by the tactics resorted to by petitioner is precisely the very evil
sought to be prevented by election statutes and controlling case law on the
matter.(G.R. No. 140158, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 518)
Due process not applicable to

internal affairs of political parties.
Mayor Atienza and others were expelled from the Liberal Party. They argued that their
expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involved a
violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claimed that they
should have been summoned to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. They
contended that the proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings
and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations. 69 Phil. 635 (1940)
Is the contention correct? Explain.
Answer: No. The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of
political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created
by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An
administrative agency or instrumentality "contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state function." (Luzon Development bank vs.
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employes, 319 Phil. 262 (1995). The constitutional
limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to
administrative bodies.
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary
between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The
discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within
the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be
accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members
may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely
agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party
members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to
courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the
government or any of its agencies. (Atienza, et.al. vs. Comelec, et.al., G.R. No. 188920, February
16, 2010, Abad, J.)
But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in
membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its
internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca v.
Mula, the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by
allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the
state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the
people. (Sec. 6, Art. IX-C, Constitution; Atienza, et. Al. vs. Comelec, et.al.)
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Out of court identification of accused; process
In People vs. Macapanas, G.R. No. 187049, May 4, 2010, the accused contended that his
identification in the hospital should not have been given consideration because the identification was
not made in a police line-up and that the procedure adopted constituted suggestive identification for
he alone was brought infront of the victim.
In brushing aside the contention, the SC held that here is no law or police regulation
requiring a police line-up for proper identification in every case. Even if there was no police line-up,
there could still be proper and reliable identification as long as such identification was not suggested
or instigated to the witness by the police. (People vs. Escote, Jr. 400 SCRA 603 (2003) What is
crucial is for the witness to positively declare during trial that the person charged was the
malefactor. (People vs. Martin, 567 SCRA 42 (2008) 249 SCRA 54 (1995).
Procedure for out-of-court identification.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr., the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to
determine the admissibility of such identification was explained, thus:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done

thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the
case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying
on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of
the identification procedure.
BILL OF RIGHTS
Due Process and Equal Protection
Due process applies to the power to tax.
The renowned genius Albert Einstein was once quoted as saying the hardest thing in the
world to understand is the income tax. When a party questions the constitutionality of an income
tax measure, it has to contend not only with Einsteins observation but also with the vast and well-
established jurisprudence in support of the plenary powers of Congress to impose taxes.
Petitioner assailed the validity of the imposition of minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on
corporations and creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as ordinary
assets. He argued that the MCIT violates the due process clause because it levies income tax even if
there is no realized gain.
He asserted that the enumerated provisions of the subject revenue regulations violate the
due process clause because, like the MCIT, the government collects income tax even when the net
income has not yet been determined.
Is the contention correct? Why?
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Held: No, because the CWT is creditable against the tax due from the seller of the property at the
end of the taxable year. The seller will be able to claim a tax refund if its net income is less than the
taxes withheld. Nothing is taken that is not due so there is no confiscation of property repugnant to
the constitutional guarantee of due process. More importantly, the due process requirement applies
to the power to tax. The CWT does not impose new taxes nor does it increase taxes. It relates
entirely to the method and time of payment. (Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association, Inc.
vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et. Al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010).
Not violative of equal protection clause.
Question: Petitioner claimed that the revenue regulations are violative of the equal protection
clause because the CWT is being levied only on real estate enterprises. Specifically, petitioner
pointed out that manufacturing enterprises are not similarly imposed a CWT on their sales, even if
their manner of doing business is not much different from that of a real estate enterprise. Like a
manufacturing concern, a real estate business is involved in a continuous process of production and
it incurs costs and expenditures on a regular basis. The only difference is that goods produced by
the real estate business are house and lot units.
Answer: No. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that no person or
class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons
or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances. Stated differently, all persons
belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. It follows that the guaranty of the equal protection
of the laws is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be
valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes of
taxation. Inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or
exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation. The real estate industry is, by itself, a class and can
be validly treated differently from other business enterprises. (Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association, Inc. vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et. Al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010).
Article III
Judiciary
A facial invalidation of a statute is

allowed only in free speech cases,
wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly
excepted
In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al.,

G.R. No. 178552, October 10, 2010, petitioners assailed for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like
"widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to
measure the prohibited acts, hence, void for non-vagueness and overbreadth.
Respondents, countered that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no

application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA
9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
Is the contention of the petitioners correct?
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Held: No, because the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application only to free
speech cases. They cannot be resorted to invalidate a penal statute.
In Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, the Court stated that a facial invalidation of

criminal statutes is not appropriate. (Estrada vs. SB, 421 Phil. 290, 2001)
The doctrine of vagueness and the

doctrine of overbreadth do not
operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle. (People vs. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988).
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. (Blo Umpar Adiong vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712)
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior,
even though some of it is protected.
Facial challenge vs. As-applied challenge.
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts

affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws
and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption
or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May
3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160)
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a
criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
Justification for facial challenge in free speech; to avert chilling effect on protected
speech.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the
"chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. This
rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in
deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights. (People vs. Siton, G.R. No. 109364, September 18,
2009, 600 SCRA 476).
An on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes may not be allowed;
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Reasons:
The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong
criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed,
would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal
statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third
parties who are not before it. The allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test
will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder
an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to
third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as
applied to him. (Romualdez vs. Comelec, supra.)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a
facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free
speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in
order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the
court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a
statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only
to facts as applied to the litigants.
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent
an actual or imminent charge against them.
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause
has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases
People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, August 31, 1988, 165 SCRA 186; People v. Dela Piedra, G.R. No.
121777, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 163; People v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009,
600 SCRA 476. the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the
non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article
132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez
and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the
present case.
There is no merit in the claim that

RA 9372 regulates speech so as to
permit a facial analysis of its
validity.
Question: In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
petitioners contended that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. Is
the contention correct? Why?
Held: The contention is not correct. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements
may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the
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predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to
an unlawful demand.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate
crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements
of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter
neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as
conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the expression figures
only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion perceptible.
Freedom of Expression
Effect if mayor modifies the place

where demonstration shall take
place without notice
In IBP vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010, Morales, J., there was an
application for permit to hold a demonstration at the foot of Mendiola Bridge. When it was issued, it
was indicated therein that the venue would be Plaza Miranda. Mayor Atienza failed to indicate how
he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present
danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in
the issued permit adverted to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank
denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render
illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
Is the modification proper? Why?
Held: No. In modifying the permit outright, Mayor Atienza gravely abused his discretion when he
did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to
court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
It is true that the licensing official, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a
permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that
there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given
all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled
for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The
exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme
Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place. (Reyes vs.
Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553)
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita, the Court

reiterated:
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation
and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and
respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom
of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a
necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To
paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme
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Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of
speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably
to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not
identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise
of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental
actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
(G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 226)
The public official concerned shall appraise whether there may be valid objections to the
grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have
recourse to the proper judicial authority. (G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 533)
Freedom of Religion
Sanction on program is not

restraint on freedom of religion.
Question: In his Motion for Reconsideration on the decision of the SC dated April 29, 2006,
imposing the penalty of three-month suspension on the television show, Ang Dating Daan, the
petitioner alleged as grounds, the following:
(1) the suspension thus meted out to the program constitutes prior restraint; (2) the Court
erred in ruling that his utterances did not constitute exercise of religion; (3) the Court erred in
finding the language used as offensive and obscene; (4) the Court should have applied its policy of
non-interference in cases of conflict between religious groups.
The SC ruled:
(1) The sanction imposed on the TV program in question does not constitute prior restraint,
but partakes of the nature of subsequent punishment for past violation committed by petitioner in
the course of the broadcast. To be sure, petitioner has not contested the fact of his having made
statements on the air that were contextually violative of the programs "G" rating. To merit a "G"
rating, the program must be "suitable for all ages," which, in turn, means that the "material for
television [does not], in the judgment of the MTRCB, contain anything unsuitable for children and
minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision." The vulgar language petitioner
used on prime-time television can in no way be characterized as suitable for all ages, and is wholly
inappropriate for children. (Eliseo Soriano vs. Ma. Consoliza Laguardia, et.al., G.R. No. 164785, and
other cases, March 15, 2010)
(2) Petitioner next harps on the primacy of his freedoms, referring particularly to the
exercise of his religious beliefs and profession, as presiding minister of his flock, over the right and
duty of the state as parens patriae. Petitioners position may be accorded some cogency, but for the
fact that it fails to consider that the medium he used to make his statements was a television
broadcast, which is accessible to children of virtually all ages. The interest of the government in
protecting children who may be subjected to petitioners invectives must take precedence over his
desire to air publicly his dirty laundry. The public soapbox that is television must be guarded by the
state, which purpose the MTRCB serves, and has served, in suspending Ang Dating Daan for
petitioners statements. As emphasized in Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, (137 SCRA 717 (1985), the
freedom of broadcast media is, in terms of degree of protection it deserves, lesser in scope,
especially as regards television, which reaches every home where there is a set, and where children
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will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs shown. The same case also laid the basis for
the classification system of the MTRCB when it stated, "It cannot be denied though that the State as
parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young."
Right of Information
The right of information on

matters of public concern is not
absolute.
Question: A person took the CPA Examination but failed. Convinced that she passed the
examination, she wrote the Chairman of the Board of Acountancy and requested that her answer
sheets be re-corrected. It was denied, hence, she filed a petition for mandamus for the re-checking
of her examination.
Answer: No. Any claim for re-correction or revision of her examination cannot be compelled by
mandamus. This much was made evident in Agustin-Ramos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 84470, February
2, 1989, it was said that:
For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain
legal right to the thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required
act must be equally clear.
Like the claimants in Agustin, the remedy of petitioner from the refusal of the Board to
release the Examination Papers should have been through an appeal to the PRC. (Antolin v.
Domondon, G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010, Del Castillo,J).
She contended that she may compel access to the Examination Documents thru mandamus,
invoking her right to be informed. Is the contention correct? Why?
Held: No. The contention is not correct. Section 7, Article III provides:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The right to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It is limited to matters
of public concern and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
There is a need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on matters such as natonal security,

trade secrets, banking transactions, criminal and confidential matters.
For this purpose, the CPA Board Examination is a matter of public concern.
As observed in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, in determining whether a particular

information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like
"public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of
interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
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There is also a need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as

national security, trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential
matters.(Chavez vs. PCGG, 360 Phil. 133 (1998).
The National Board Examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public
concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be
interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only
those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical,
these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to
further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting.(Antolin vs.
Domondon, et al., G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010, Del Castillo, J.)
Right to Speedy Trial
In Monico Jacob, et.al. vs. SB, et.al., G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2000, Criminal cases
were filed against the acused on April 10, 2010. They were arraigned on June 1, 2000 and May 18,
2001; with both accused pleading not guilty. Since then, there had been no other significant
development in the cases since the prosecution repeatedly requested for deferment or
postponement of the scheduled hearings while awaiting the result of the reinvestigation of the Office
of the Ombudsman. Judge Nario verbally ordered the dismissal of said cases during the hearing on
August 20, 2001. Thus, the criminal cases had been pending for about a year and four months by
the time they were dismissed by Justice Nario.
The accused had consistently asked in open court that the criminal cases be dismissed every
time the prosecution moved for a deferment or postponement of the hearings.
The prosecution attributed the delay in the criminal proceedings to: 1) the 23 motions for
reinvestigation or reconsideration filed by the accused, which was granted by the Sandiganbayan in
its April 17, 2000 Order; and 2) the failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to terminate its
reinvestigation and submit its report within the 60-day period fixed by the said graft court.
Is the order of dismissal proper? Why?
Answer: No, because it deprived the State of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply
because of the ineptitude of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In Corpuz vs. SB, G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2000 442 SCRA 294, the SC warned
against the overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a case that may enable the defendant, who may
be guilty, to go free without having been tried, thereby infringing the societal interest in trying
people accused of crimes rather than granting them immunization because of legal error. Likewise in
People v. Leviste, it was stressed that:
The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable
opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal such as the one in question, instead of unclogging
dockets, has actually increased the workload of the justice system as a whole and caused uncalled-
for delays in the final resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly, the precipitate action of the
respondent court, instead of easing the burden of the accused, merely prolonged the litigation and
ironically enough, unnecessarily delayed the case in the process, causing the very evil it
apparently sought to avoid. Such action does not inspire public confidence in the administration of
justice.
The SC in Corpuz further ruled on the societal interest involved in the cases and the need to
give substance to the petitioners constitutional rights and their quest for justice must be balanced.
The dismissal of the cases is too drastic a remedy to be accorded to the petitioners. The cloud of
suspicion may still linger over the heads of the petitioners by the precipitate dismissal of the cases.
We repeat -- the cases involve the so-called tax credit certificates scam and hundreds of millions of
10


pesos allegedly perpetrated by government officials in connivance with private individuals. The
People has yet to prove the guilt of the petitioners of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Double Jeopardy
Oral order of dismissal of a

criminal case; no double jeopardy;
void
In Monico Jacob, et.al. vs. SB, et.al., G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010, there was an
order of dismissal of an information issued by a Justice of the Sandiganbayan due to delay. Is the
dismissal valid? Why?
Answer: No, because it was a void order. In Corpuz vs. SB, G.R. No. 162214, November 11,
2004, 442 SCRA 294, it was said that the dismissal made in open court by the Chairman, which was
not reduced in writing, is not a valid dismissal or termination of the cases. This is because the
Chairman cannot unilaterally dismiss the same without the approval or consent of the other
members of the Division. The Sandiganbayan is a collegiate court and under its internal rules
Section 1(b) of the 1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan, which is now Section 1(b), Rule VIII
of the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, an order, resolution or judgment, in order
to be valid or considered as an official action of the Court itself - must bear the unanimous approval
of the members of the division, or in case of lack thereof, by the majority vote of the members of a
special division of five.
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandates that a judgment
must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is
based. The rule applies to a final order dismissing a criminal case grounded on the violation of the
rights of the accused to a speedy trial. A verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of the
provision; hence, such order is, in contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore, ineffective.
Void order, not basis of double jeopardy.
Question: Considering that the verbal order of dismissal is void, can the accused invoke
double jeopardy if he would be tried again? Why?
Answer: No. Legal Jeopardy has not yet attached since there was no valid dismissal or termination
of the criminal case against the accused.
To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:
(1) first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
11


CITIZENSHIP
Failure to register oath of

citizenship and election of the
same does not mean that a
person is undocumented citizen
Question: Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father,
who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the
government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of
election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as
undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?
The question is translated into the inquiry whether or not the omission negates their rights to
Filipino citizenship as children of a Filipino mother, and erase the years lived and spent as Filipinos.
Held: No. The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.(Art.IV,
Sec.1(4), 1935 Constitution)
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election
under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3)
registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.(CA No. 625,
Sec.1)
In Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching (375 Phil. 342,
(1999), the meaning of the period of election described by phrase upon reaching the age of
majority, was determined. The references were the Civil Code of the Philippines, the opinions of
the Secretary of Justice, and the case of Cueco v. Secretary of Justice. (115 Phil. 90, (1962)
The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made upon reaching the age of majority. The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on
the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made
within a reasonable time after attaining the age of majority. The phrase reasonable time has been
interpreted to mean that the elections should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age
of majority. However, in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule. He elected Philippine citizenship when he was 28 years old, hence, the election has
not been made upon reaching the age of majority.
The SC reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v. Ramos,G.R. No. 167569, Septemebr 4, 2009,
598 SCRA 266, a case in which the Court adopted the findings of the appellate court that the father
of the petitioner, whose citizenship was in question, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the
reasonable period of three (3) years upon reaching the age of majority; and that the belated
submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance was defective
because the affidavit of election was executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several
years before their filing with the proper office was not satisfactorily explained.
In both cases, the SC ruled against the petitioners because they belatedly complied with all
the requirements. The acts of election and their registration with the nearest civil registry were all
done beyond the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age of majority.
12


Present case is not similar to Go.
The instant case is different from the Go, Sr. case because they complied with the first and
second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the
documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done.
The right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to
complete the statutory requirements for such election.
Such conclusion is in line with the decisions in In Re:Florencio Mallare Co v. Electoral Tribunal
of the House of Representatives, 158 Phil. 50 (1974) and Re:Application for Admission to the
Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, 374 Phil. 342 (1999)
In Mallare, Estebans exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age was deemed to be
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than exercise his right of suffrage, as he established
his life here in the Philippines. Again, such circumstance, while similar to that of herein petitioners,
was not appreciated because it was ruled that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of
Ong would have resulted in absurdity, because the law itself had already elected Philippine
citizenship for him as, apparently, while he was still a minor, a certificate of naturalization was
issued to his father.
In Ching, the SC denied his application for admission to the Philippine Bar because, in his
case, all the requirements, to wit: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of
election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry were complied with only fourteen (14) years
after he reached the age of majority. Ching offered no reason for the late election of Philippine
citizenship.
Mere exercise of suffrage etc.,

cannot take the place of election
of citizenship.
The mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay
in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the
place of election of citizenship. However, where, as in petitioners case, the election of citizenship
has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the
registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile
positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual
exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to
the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
Registration of election of
citizenship does not confer
citizenship; mere confirmation of
a fact.
Registration is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is
the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election,
although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine
citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been
claimed.
13


Article VII
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Whether the incumbent President

may appoint the Chief Justice
during the 60-day ban
Arturo M. De Castro vs. JBC, et.al., G.R. No. 191002 and companion cases, March 17, 2010,
Bersamin, J.
Facts:
A petition for mandamus was filed to compel the JBC to submit to the incumbent President
the list of at least three (3) nominees for the position of Chief Justice. Others intervened and all the
consolidated petitions pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent President can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. That question is undoubtedly
impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation, because the appointment of the Chief
Justice is any Presidents most important appointment.
It was contended that the conflicting opinions on the issue expressed by legal luminaries
one side holds that the incumbent President is prohibited from making appointments within two
months immediately before the coming presidential elections and until the end of her term of office
as President on June 30, 2010, while the other insists that the prohibition applies only to
appointments to executive positions that may influence the election and, anyway, paramount
national interest justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice during the election ban has impelled
the JBC to defer the decision to whom to send its list of at least three nominees, whether to the
incumbent President or to her successor. They opined that the JBC is thereby arrogating unto itself
"the judicial function that is not conferred upon it by the Constitution," which has limited it to the
task of recommending appointees to the Judiciary, but has not empowered it to "finally resolve
constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in the Supreme Court under the
Constitution." As such, it was contended that the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
deferring the submission of the list of nominees to the President; and that a "final and definitive
resolution of the constitutional questions raised above would diffuse the tension in the legal
community that would go a long way to keep and maintain stability in the judiciary and the political
system.
There were oppositions mainly anchored on the 60-day ban on appointments by the
incumbent President citing the Valenzuela and Ballarta cases. The Philconsa, however, contended
that the Valenzuela and Ballarta cases should be revisited due to the unorthodox and exceptional
circumstances spawned by the discordant interpretation of Sec.15, Art. VII in relation to Secs. 4 (1),
8(5) and 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution which has caused dimensional impact on the nation and
the people. The basic question is whether the incumbent President may appoint the Chief Justice.
Held: Yes. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy
in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions are
seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
14


The prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not
extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers
devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness
indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not
arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and
manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.
The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome
powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the
Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true
recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure
The political part of this Constitution opted for the separation of powers in government
because the only way to protect freedom and liberty is to separate and divide the awesome powers
of government.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it
lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is
dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of
Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the
provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular,
Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President
upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article
mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. ch
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written
the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of the President's or Acting President's term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme
Court.
Valenzuela dictum did not firmly

rest on the deliberations of the
ConCom; 90-day period to fill up
vacancy is mandatory.
Records of the ConCom disclose the express intent of the framers to enshrine in the
Constitution a command to the President to fill up any vacancy within 90 days from its occurrence
which is even conceded in Valenzuela as shown by the deliberations at the ConCom.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall - an imperative, operating
to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes
on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a
clear disobedience to the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in
the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the
15


President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in
Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was "couched in stronger
negative language."
Court shall seek to avoid conflict

in the provisions of statutes.
How Valenzuela justified its pronouncement and result is hardly warranted. According to an
authority on statutory construction the court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of
the statute by endeavoring to harmonize and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective. It
is not easy to draft a statute, or any other writing for that matter, which may not in some manner
contain conflicting provisions. But what appears to the reader to be a conflict may not have seemed
so to the drafter. Undoubtedly, each provision was inserted for a definite reason. Often by
considering the enactment in its entirety, what appears to be on its face a conflict may be cleared up
and the provisions reconciled.
Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have
Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand independently of any other provision, least of all one found in Article
VII. It further ignored that the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15,
Article VII being couched in the negative. As judges, we are not to unduly interpret, and should not
accept an interpretation that defeats the intent of the framers.
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the
premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A
misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false premises have been
exposed. It will not do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be
reached herein is entirely incompatible with what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now
deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and forgettable.
Section 15, Article VII does not

apply as well to all other
appointments in the Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of
Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive
in the mold of the appointments dealt with in the leading case of Aytona v. Castillo. In fact, in
Valenzuela, the Court so observed, stating that:
It appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan
considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code:
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-
called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of
Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his
bid for reelection, became no more than a "caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for
the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President." Said the Court:
"The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to

afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the
issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of
them in a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some
reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps
16


taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of
fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of an
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
Not all midnight appointments are void.
There may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the
proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to
afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment
and the appointee's qualifications," can be made by the outgoing President. Accordingly, several
appointments made by President Garcia, which were shown to have been well considered, were
upheld.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not unreasonably
be deemed to contemplate not only "midnight" appointments - those made obviously for partisan
reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making - but also appointments presumed
made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential election.
On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII - allowing
appointments to be made during the period of the ban therein provided - is much narrower than that
recognized in Aytona. The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period
of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and
the restriction on the President's power of appointment, as a general proposition, in case of conflict,
the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils
outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some
cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier
pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower
courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and
permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, in fact influence the results of elections
and, for that reason, their making is considered an election offense.
Prohibition is confined to those in the Executive Department. Creation of JBC ensures proper
processing of appointments to judiciary.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no
doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the
Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the
Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening
of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured
that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in
the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief
Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming
President or for partisanship, the appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the
JBC would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBC's prior processing of candidates.
Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the
enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because
the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on "the law of the statute,"
i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be construed with reference to its intended scope and
purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it.
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can
be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan
17


considerations. The experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even
candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with the President could not
always be assured of being recommended for the consideration of the President, because they first
had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was
precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the
Commission on Appointments. This insulating process was absent from the Aytona midnight
appointment.
Election ban has no application to

appointments to CA.
The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to the
confirmation of Justice Regalado that the election ban had no application to appointments to the CA.
Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the framers
rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Much of the unfounded doubt
about the President's power to appoint during the period of prohibition in Section 15, Article VII
could have been dispelled since its promulgation on November 9, 1998, had Valenzuela properly
acknowledged and relied on the confirmation of a distinguished member of the Constitutional
Commission like Justice Regalado.
No revocation of appointment to Judiciary.
Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern
the appointing powers of the President.
Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by
an Acting President, and evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive Department. It has
no application to appointments in the Judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments can only
undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will. The letter and
spirit of the Constitution safeguard that independence. Also, there is no law in the books that
authorizes the revocation of appointments in the Judiciary. Prior to their mandatory retirement or
resignation, judges of the first and second level courts and the Justices of the third level courts may
only be removed for cause, but the Members of the Supreme Court may be removed only by
impeachment.
Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Thereby, the Constitutional Commission restored the requirement of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments after the requirement was removed from the 1973
Constitution. Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored requirement did not include
appointments to the Judiciary.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only
to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It
is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and
Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would
have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.
To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the
Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the
Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the
18


Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the
Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead
of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot
ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing
authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of
compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.
Article VI
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Parliamentary Immunity; rationale for privilege.
In Antero Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, a
complaint for disbarment was filed against Senator Santiago based on her speech delivered in the
Senate after she was not considered in her application for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
She uttered the following:
I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker
towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted
direct contempt of court. Accordingly, he asked that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, did not deny making the aforequoted
statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her
duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to
bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial
legislation.
Held: The immunity Senator Santiago claimed is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v.
Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental

privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the
English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense.
Reason behind legislative privelege; public good
This legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary
19


immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating
forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value
if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion
of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to
the motives.
Role of the court in upholding immunity
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the
institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight
of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce
anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere
with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor
or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the
statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary
authority of the assembly[4] and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such
abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
PARTY LIST
Grounds for delisting of Party-List
PGBI, a party-list organization failed to participate in one (1) election and failed to garner,
the 2% threshold vote in another.
It was delisted based on the ruling in Phil. Mines Safety Environment Assn. (MINERO vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 177548, May 10, 2007, where it was ruled that if a party-list organization fails to
participate in one election and fails to garner 2% threshold vote in another, the Comelec is not duty
bound to certify it or it can be delisted. Can it be delisted? Why?
Held: No. Under the law, there are two grounds for the delisting of a party-list organization; thus:
(1) failure to participate in two elections; or (2) failure to garner at least 2% if the votes cast under
the party-list system in the last 2 preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
The MINERO doctrine which is relied upon is an erroneous application of Sec. 6(8) of R.A.
7941.
First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections; (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one
thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. (The Heirs of George Poe vs. Malayan Insurance Company,
Inc. G.R. No, 156302, April 7, 2009.) Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941,
as PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show.
20


Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization
in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list
vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an
election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a
confused interpretation of the law, given the laws clear and categorical language and the legislative
intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two
different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law in
jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and
hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.
This ruling is in consonance with Barangay Association for Advancement and National
Transparency v. COMELEC (Banat) where the Court invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement
provided in RA 7941 as follows:
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued

operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This
Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives. (G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009)
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should
therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering
less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.
In accordance with the Banat ruling, a party-list group or organization which qualified in
the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it
garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the application of this
disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list votes garnered by
the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a percentage
that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily
be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered. (Phil. Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
(PGBI), et.al. vs. Commision on Elections G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010).
Registration of Ang Ladlad as

Party-List Organization
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party List sought accreditation as a party-list organization under RA 7941,
otherwise known as Party-List System Act.
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, which filed a
Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
It argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are
21


victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs
are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that it complied with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.(412
Phil.308 (2001). Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members
and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
The Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds as it advocates sexual immorality; it
promotes intimate and sexual relations with individuals of a different gender, of the same gender or
more than one gender; and LGBT sector tolerates immorality whinch offends religious beliefs. A
motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied, hence, it filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court. The Commission on Human Rights intervened and alleged that the denial on moral
grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
It argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion; its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as
well as violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying
petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of
immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should
have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the
purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned,
the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.
The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds.
It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Rule on the contentions.
Held: The Comelec is not correct.
Compliance with the

Requirements of the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT
sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to
any of the sectors in the enumeration such as labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal

to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition
for Registration; not valid.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-
22


establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.(Estrada vs. Escritor
455 Phil. 422 (2003). It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny

Ang Ladlads Petition for
Registration
The COMELEC argued that its accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group
consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is
recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual
relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of
morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of
losing its own existence. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have
borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure
religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even
dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. But the Philippines has
not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted
public morals have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law. (In Anonymous vs.
Radam, A.M. No, P-07-2333, December 19, 2007)
The Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position
that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage
the moral fabric of society.
Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion
of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration
on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals,
rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give
rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not
because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our
equal protection clause.
Equal Protection Clause violated

by the denial of registration
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as
an absolute prohibition on classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment
of similar persons. The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall
be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place and in like circumstances.(Abakada Guro Party vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. no.
168056, September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1)
If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification is
upheld as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end. In Central
Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, it was declared that in our
jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges have followed the rational basis
test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a
23


law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.(487 Phil.
531(2004)
That the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable is not quite correct. The Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law
exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual
behavior. Even if we assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state
interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest
that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs
differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of
legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval
of or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have
the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties
similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public
square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated
upon. As held in Estrada v. Escritor:
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is

distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice,
every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where
people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion,
including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have
equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is
prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed
for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people
deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic
governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized
into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e.,
the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and
accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of religious
freedom "not only for a minority, however small not only for a majority, however
large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying
ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over
the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society,

and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or the Court to impose its
views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech
for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in
this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of
forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
24


Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise,
international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a
more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural
and governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should
be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather
than ideal, standards of conduct.
This decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote
human rights, particularly the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to

elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual
orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the
ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to sex in Article 26
should be construed to include sexual orientation. Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies
have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements.
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by

universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free
expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his

country.
25


Yogyakarta Principles.
The petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International

Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner declares
to reflect binding principles of international law.
Note: The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity is a set of international principles relating to sexual
orientation and gender identity, intended to address documented evidence of abuse of rights
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals. It contains 29 Principles adopted by
human rights practitioners and experts, together with recommendations to governments, regional
intergovernmental institutions, civil society, and the United Nations.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms
that are obligatory on thePhilippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of
these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not
constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law
is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that
promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to
no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.
250,000 population requirement

is necessary only in a city; not in a
district.
Facts:
RA 9716 was enacted resulting in the reconfiguration of the second and first districts of
Camarines Sur in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Senator Aquino
(now President) and Mayor Robredo filed a petition to declare the law unconstitutional alleging that
the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The
petitioners claimed that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population
of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
They relied on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000
minimum population standard which states that each city with a population of at least 250,000 or
each province, shall have at least on representative.
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district.
The respondents contended that such provision has no application with respect to the
creation of legislative districts in provinces. Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
Is the contention of Aquino correct? Why?
26


Held: No. The 250,000 minimum population is required of a city, but not for a district. This question
has already been resolved in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 312 Phil. 259 (1995) where issue presented
was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality
of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative
district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that
the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering
that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of
the Constitutional phrase each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in

Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census
stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be
increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for
cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to
anadditional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of
an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed,
if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at
least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a
province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its
creation and regardless of its population. (Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 2, 2010,
Perez, J).
Population not an indispensable

requirement; merely alternative.
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average

annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the
following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square

kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely

an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
The Constitutional Commission likewise made determination of the districts within the
province based on other circumstances determinants, other than population.
27


A good example is Palawan where the districting disregarded the 250,000 population figure.
It was decided by the importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed it. Puerto
Princesa was put in the Second District as it was nearer the southern towns comprising the Second
District to satisfy the contiguity requirement. The town of Cuyo in the North is a very important town
as it used to be the capital of Palawan until it was transferred to Puerto Princesa. There are also
more people in the north as potential candidates than in the South who are not interested in politics,
so that if Cuyo, Coron and Puerto Princesa would be lumped together in the North, there would less
candidates in the South.
Benguet and Baguio are another examples where population was not a determinant.
Tuba and Baguio City were divorced to give Baguio its own constituency and Tuba would be
put in the Second District. The reason for the move was because Baguio is the summer capital,
hence, it was given a special consideration with a population of only 141,149. While it was admitted
that the regular population may be lower at certain times of the year, the transient population would
increase the population substantially due to business and professional transactions, hence, it would
more than qualify as a legislative district.
In the case of Baguio, population was removed as a factor.
Additionally, Cavite is a good example where population was not the sole determinant in the
districting. It was divided based on the distribution of its three (3) cities with each district having a
city: one district supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a
rice growing area, because such consideration fosters common interests in line with the standard
of compactness. In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were political
stability and common interest among the people in the area and the possibility of chaos and
disunity considering the accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders. For Laguna,
it was mentioned that municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the
lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should balance the area and
population.
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, it was
said in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the

districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical
exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality of
interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the
Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (G.R. No. 176970, December
8, 2008, 573 SCRA 290).
Based on the foregoing, population is not the only factor but is just one of several factors in
the composition of the additional district of Camarines Sur. Other factors like:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;

(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped
municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the
reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of
Districts One and Two, were considered.
28


EMINENT DOMAIN
Right of landowner to withdraw

deposited compensation even if
he protested it; reason.
Q Is it proper to allow the landowner whose property has been covered by the CARP to withdraw
the compensation for his land although it is protested? Explain.
Answer: Yes. it is but just and proper to allow, with becoming dispatch, withdrawal of the revised
compensation amount, albeit protested. The concept of just compensation contemplates of just and
timely payment; it embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
landowner, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. (Apo Fruits
Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 164195, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 537). Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot, as Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118712, July 5,
1996, 258 SCRA 404, instructs, be considered just, for the owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for years before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. (Land Bank of the Phils. v. DAR
Adjudication Board, et al., G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010, Velasco, J).
Q May it be argued that by allowing withdrawal of the incremental amount, the government may
be placed at a losing end, citing the possibility that the recomputed amount may be more than the
just compensable value? Why?
Answer: No. For one, as an exercise of police power to complement eminent domain, the forced
taking of private property under the CARP puts the landowners, and not the government, in a
situation where the odds are already stacked against them. One thing going for the landowners,
though, is that they cannot, as a matter of law, be compelled to accept the LBPs valuation of their
expropriated land and/or accept DARs offer by way of compensation.
And for another, the stated risk which the DAR or the government will allegedly be exposed
to if immediate withdrawal of the rejected compensation is allowed is at the moment pure
speculation. The DARAB, with its presumptive expertise in agrarian land valuation, even dismissed
as very remote the possibility of the LBP-amended valuation exceeding the value of the subject
landholding using the valuation criteria and formulae prescribed under the law. (Land Bank of the
Phils. v. DAR Adjudication Board, et al., G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010).
Q State the rationale for allowing immediate withdrawal of the compensation. Explain.
Answer: In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court stressed the need to allow
the landowners to withdraw immediately the amount deposited in their behalf, pending final
determination of what is just compensation for their land, thus:
To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts

already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply
because they rejected the DARs valuation, and notwithstanding that they
have already been deprived of the possession of such properties is an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private
respondents properties was painful enough. But DAR rubbed it in all the more by
withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the
taking x x x. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court
must rectify.
Hence, there is not distinction between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and
final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners right to appropriate
the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use
and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. (G.R.
29


No. 118712, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 149; Land Bank v. DAR Adjudication Board, et al., G.R. No.
183279, January 25, 2010).
TAXATION
Exemption from taxation of

cooperatives and their members;
reason.
Q Cooperatives, under RA 6938 as amended by RA 9520 enjoy preferential tax treatment. Does
the tax preferential treatment include the members? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Under Article 2 of RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520, it is a declared policy of the State
to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives as a practical vehicle for promoting self-reliance
and harnessing people power towards the attainment of economic development and social justice.
Thus, to encourage the formation of cooperatives and to create an atmosphere conducive to their
growth and development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them, one of which is
providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.
Cooperatives, including their members, deserve a preferential tax treatment because of the
vital role they play in the attainment of economic development and social justice. Thus, although
taxes are the lifeblood of the government, the States power to tax must give way to foster the
creation and growth of cooperatives. To borrow the words of Justice Isagani A. Cruz: The power of
taxation, while indispensable, is not absolute and may be subordinated to the demands of social
justice. (Dumaguete Credit Cooperative v. Com. Of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 182722, January 22,
2010, Del Castillo, J; Rep. v. Judge Peralta, 234 Phil. 40 (1987).
Taxation of taxations power to tax.
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government. Without taxes, the government can neither exist
nor endure. The exercise of taxing power derives its source from the very existence of the State
whose social contract with its citizens obliges it to promote public interest and the common good.
Taxation is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It is a power that is purely

legislative. Essentially, this means that in the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine
the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of
taxation. It has the authority to prescribe a certain tax at a specific rate for a particular public
purpose on persons or things within its jurisdiction. In other words, the legislature wields the power
to define what tax shall be imposed, why it should be imposed, how much tax shall be imposed,
against whom (or what) it shall be imposed and where it shall be imposed.
As a general rule, the power to tax is plenary and unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its
very nature no limits, so that the principal check against its abuse is to be found only in the
responsibility of the legislature (which imposes the tax) to its constituency who are to pay
it. Nevertheless, it is circumscribed by constitutional limitations. At the same time, like any other
statute, tax legislation carries a presumption of constitutionality.
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat [no] person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. In Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, et al., it
was held that the due process clause may properly be invoked to invalidate, in appropriate cases, a
revenue measure when it amounts to a confiscation of property. But in the same case, we also
explained that we will not strike down a revenue measure as unconstitutional (for being violative of
the due process clause) on the mere allegation of arbitrariness by the taxpayer. There must be a
factual foundation to such an unconstitutional taint. This merely adheres to the authoritative
doctrine that, where the due process clause is invoked, considering that it is not a fixed rule but
rather a broad standard, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character. (Chamber of Real
30


Estate & Builders Asso., Inc. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9,
2010).
POLICE POWER
Power of LGU to reclassify

properties; police power.
In the case of the Learning Child, Inc., et al. v. Ayala Alabang Village Asso., et al., G.R. No.
134269, and other companion cases, July 7, 2010, there was a deed of restriction on the property of
a homeowner that it can be used for educational purposes up to nursery only. Subsequently, the
City of Muntinlupa passed an ordinance re-classifying the area as institutional, hence, the owner
expanded the school. The neighborhood objected, hence, the suit. Which shall prevail, the restriction
in the title and the ordinance? Explain.
Answer: The ordinance as it is an exercise of police power. As early as Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership
v. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 183 Phil. 176 (1979), the SC upheld the validity of an ordinance declaring
the residential area in Mandaluyong as industrial and commercial zone as it was passed in the
exercise of police power.
Since the motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution is reasonable, and it being
a legitime response to a felt public need, not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of
contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipalitys exercise of police power.
Regulation of charges of public utilities.
In Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Suneco) v. ERC, G.R. No. 183623, October 4,
2010, Nachura, J, the SC had the occasion to say that when ERC directed SURNECO to refund its
over-recoveries based on PPA policies, which only ensured that the PPA mechanism remains a purely
cost-recovery mechanism and not a revenue-generating scheme for the electric cooperatives, the
ERC merely exercised its authority to regulate and approve the rates imposed by the electric
cooperatives on their consumers. The ERC simply performed its mandate to protect the public
interest imbued in those rates.
It is beyond cavil that the State, in the exercise of police power, can regulate the rates
imposed by a public utility such as SURNECO. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Manila
Electric Company[20]
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the

police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation
of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a
public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and
becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common
good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use;
but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public
regulation. (440 Phil. 389).
No violation of non-impairment of contract

clause.
It also contended that it violated the non-impairment of contract clause as it traversed the
loan agreement between NEA & ADB.
Even assuming, merely for arguments sake, that the ERC issuances violated the NEA and
ADB covenant, the contract had to yield to the greater authority of the States exercise of police
power. It has long been settled that police power legislation, adopted by the State to promote the
31


health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people prevail not
only over future contracts but even over those already in existence, for all private contracts
must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.
(Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2006; 582 SCRA 254;
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. CA, 400 Phil. 615 (2000).
Article IX
Constitutional Commission
Power to register political parties

or coalitions; condition must
register.
In Liberal Party vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010, the COMELEC in
granting the petition for registration of the NP-NPC coalition ruled that since they have decided to
coalesce, the same was an operative fact that the COMELEC en banc could note and recognize
implying that there is no need for the coalition to register separately if the component parties are
already registered.
In brushing aside such ruling, the SC
Held: Whether one party would coalesce or work together in partnership, or in close collaboration
with another party for purposes of an electoral exercise, is a matter that the law as a rule does not
and cannot regulate. This is a part of the freedom of choice derived from the freedom of individuals
constituting the political parties to choose their elected leaders, as well as from the concepts of
democracy and sovereignty enshrined in our Constitution. This is a freedom, too, that cannot but be
related to individuals associational rights under the Bill of Rights. We mention this freedom, as it
was apparently the basis for the operative fact that the assailed COMELEC Resolution spoke of. In
effect, the assailed Resolution implied that registered political parties are well within their right to
coalesce; and that this coalition, once proven, should already bind the COMELEC, rendering
registration a mere recognition of an operative fact, i.e., a mere ministerial formality.
The freedom to coalesce or to work together in an election to secure the vote for chosen
candidates is different from the formal recognition the Constitution requires for a political party,
organization or coalition to be entitled to full and meaningful participation in the elections and to the
benefits that proceed from formal recognition. Registration and the formal recognition that
accompanies it are required, as the words of the Constitution themselves show, because of the
Constitutions concern about the character of the organizations officially participating in the
elections. Thus, the Constitution specifies religious and ideological limitations, and in clear terms
bars alien participation and influence in our elections. This constitutional concern, among others,
serves as a reason why registration is not simply a checklist exercise, but one that requires the
exercise of profound discretion and quasi-judicial adjudication by the COMELEC. Registration must
be undertaken, too, under the strict formalities of the law, including the time limits and deadlines set
by the proper authorities.
To sum up, political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and
procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to
registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal personality from that of the
coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly registered parties. If they want to coalesce
with one another without the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the
exercise of their and their members democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot receive official
recognition for their coalition. Or they can choose to secure the registration of their coalition in
order to be accorded the privileges accruing to registered coalitions, including the right to be
accredited as a dominant majority or minority party. There are no ifs and buts about these
constitutional terms.
32


DOMICILE/ELECTION LAW
Effect of misrepresentation that a

candidate is a resident in a non-
existent address.
Asistio has been a member of Congress for four terms. He sought for the Mayorship in 2007
and has always voted in Caloocan City. In fact, his family is a known political family in Caloocan City.
He has always been a resident in Caloocan City since birth or for more than 72 years.
The fact that a candidate indicated in his CoC a non-existent or false address, or that he
could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a voter, should not
exclude him as a voter. If at all, it is a basis for him to be charged under the Omnibus Election Code
or an action to deny due course to his CoC.
From these provisions of BP No. 881 and RA 8189 or the Voters Registration Act of 1996, the
residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six
(6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. Residence, as used in the
law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean
domicile, importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a persons acts, activities,
and utterances. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining
in each particular case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and
(3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate:
(1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that
purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual. (Asistio v. Hon. Aguirre, et al., G.R. No. 191124, April 24, 2010).
LGU CREATION
Creation of legislative district in Malolos City.
In Aldaba, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010, Carpio, J, RA 9591 created
a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan. It was questioned as unconstitutional as it did
not meet the population requirement of 250,000. House Bill No. 3693 which initiated the creation
merely cited the undated Certification of Regional Director AlbertoMiranda of Region III of the NSO
as authority that the population of Malolos City will be 254,030 by the year 2010.
In declaring the law unconstitutional, the SC
Held: The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. (Sec. 5(3), Art. VI, Constitution).
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. (Sec. 5(3), Art. VI, Constitution).
33


The Certification of the Director is without basis because of the following reasons:
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are
declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based
on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying
officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year. (See: Sec.
6, E.O. No. 135).
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be
based on an official and credible source, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or
speculative.
There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will
attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010
elections.
Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at
least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately
following election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not
qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION
Effect of re-election on an
administrative case of public
officer.
Petitioners sought to expand the doctrine of condonation to coterminous appointive officials

who were administratively charged along with re-elected official/appointing authority with infractions
allegedly committed during their preceding term. Is the contention correct? Why?
Held: No. In Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 406 (1959), the SC issued the
landmark ruling that prohibits the disciplining of an elective official for a wrongful act committed
during his immediately preceding term of office. The underlying theory is that each term is separate
from other terms, and that the re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers. When the people elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court,
by reason of such faults or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
(See: Lizares v. Hechanova, et al., 123 Phil. 916 (1966).
Ingco v. Sanchez, et al., 1929 Phil. 559 (1967) clarified that the condonation doctrine
does not apply to a criminal case. Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al., 138 Phil. 546
(1969); Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz, 156 Phil. 137 (1974) and Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115,
August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 765) echoed the qualified rule that re-election of a public official does
not bar prosecution for crimes committed by him prior thereto.
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 326 Phil. 847 (1996) and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica, 372 Phil. 892
(1999) reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative
complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct
occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of
34


filing of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the
prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the
wrongdoing that gave rise to the public officials culpability was committed prior to the date of
reelection. (Atty. Vicente Salumbides, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 180917,
April 23, 2010, Morales, J).
Doctrine of condonation does not

apply to appointive.
A parallel question was involved in Civil Service Commission v. Sojor, G.R. No. 168766, May
22, 2008, 554 SCRA 160, where the Court found no basis to broaden the scope of the doctrine of
condonation:
Election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox
populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed,
supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-
appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to
speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university
president.
The non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the
right to equal protection of the law.
The electorates condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the re-elected

official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis
of the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there
is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in
the case of reappointed coterminous employees.
It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing
authority, that could extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive
positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the
presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of the
elective official ahead of the latters actual reelection.
Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous
precedent as it would, provide civil servants, particularly local government employees, with blanket
immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse in the
bureaucracy. (Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra.).
ARTICLE X-B
Civil Service Commission
In NEA v. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 149497, January 25, 2010, the SC ruled as void the
designation of NEA personnel to electric cooperatives with compensation allowances and other
benefits on top of their regular salaries from petitioner becomes violative of their own charter which
does no provide for such payment and, thus, inimical to the best interest of public service. It also
violates the first paragraph of Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution, which proscribes additional,
double, or indirect compensation, to wit:
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,

double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law. Xxx
35


Reorganization must be done in good faith.
In Bautista v. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010, Del Castillo, J, the SC once again
said that a reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the test of
good faith lies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the
bureaucracy more efficient. Removal from office as a result of reorganization must, thus, pass the
test of good faith. A demotion in office, i.e., the movement from one position to another involving
the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may
or may not involve a reduction in salary, is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for
it. (Gayatano v. CSC, G.R. No. 93064, June 27, 1992, 210 SCRA 183). Consequently, before a
demotion may be effected pursuant to a reorganization, the observance of the rules on bona
fide abolition of public office is essential.
In this case, there was no demotion because petitioner was appointed to a position
comparable to the one she previously occupied. There was even an increase in her rank and salary.
There is demotion when an employee is appointed to a position resulting to a diminution in

duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a reduction in salary. Where an
employee is appointed to a position with the same duties and responsibilities but a rank and salary
higher than those enjoyed in his previous position, there is no demotion and the appointment is
valid.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Action for damages against a

school for refusal to release
transcript of records is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Exhaustion of administrative
remedy to CHED, not necessary.
In UST, et al. v. Danes Sanchez, G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010, Del Castillo, J, a school
refused to release the transcript of records of a student. The school contended that the student
failed to enroll during the second semester of the school year 2000-2001, hence, the school
contended that the complaint failed to state a cause of no action, hence, a motion to dismiss was
filed. It was further contended that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedy to CHED.
Rule on the contention.
Held: The contention is not correct as the action essentially is one for mandamus and damages.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before
an administrative agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned must be given the
opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought before the
courts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal of the action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of numerous exceptions, one of

which is where the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial
court. Petitioners liability if any for damages will have to be decided by the courts, since any
judgment inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code. As such,
exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with. As held in Regino v. Pangasinan
Colleges of Science and Technology:
x x x exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is

competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained
of. Administrative agencies are not courts; x x x neither are they part of the judicial
system, or deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the
36


power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case
before the Commission. (485 Phil. 446 [2004]).
In addition, the rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Thus, an essential requisite for this doctrine to
apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However, petitioners have not shown that the
CHED possesses any such power to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions.
WRIT OF AMPARO
In Gen. Alexander Yano, et al. v. Cleofas Sanchez, et al., G.R. No. 186640, February 11,
2010, Morales, J, a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production &
Inspection was filed alleging that the husbands of the petitioners were taken into custody of the
military in Tarlac. They contented that the victims life, liberty and security had been and continued
to be violated on account of their enforced disappearances, hence, they prayed for a Writ of Amparo
and the inspection of certain camps of the military, issuance of temporary protection order and the
rendition of judgment under Rule 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The return of the military in general showed that the victims are not in their custody. In fact,
it was contended that the remedy should be a petition for Habeas Corpus as they were allegedly
abducted and illegally detained and that the petition was deficient and incomplete as it failed to
indicate the matters required by paragraphs c, d & e of Section 5 of the Rule. It also failed to allege
any action or inaction attributable to the military with respect to their duties and that they failed to
allege any action that they undertook to look for the victims and verify whether a witness saw them
at the camp or not.
In opposing the request for issuance of inspection and production orders, the military officers
posited that apart from compromising national security should entry into these military camps/bases
be allowed, these orders partook of the nature of a search warrant, such that the requisites for the
issuance thereof must be complied with prior to their issuance.
The military officers were absolved by the CA ruling that petitioners have not adequately and
convincingly established any direct or indirect link on the disappearances of the victims. But while
absolving them, the CA granted the prayer for Inspection Order and ordered the military to conduct
thorough and impartial investigation pertaining to the disappearances of the victims. MR was filed,
but it was denied hence, the military officers appealed to the SC contending that it was an error for
the CA to absolve them, yet the Inspection Order was issued and that they were still ordered to
investigate. Is the ruling of the CA correct? Why?
Held: No. The provisional reliefs provided for by the rule on amparo are intended to assist the court
before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to still
order the inspection of the military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into
the disappearance of the alleged victims after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs
granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could
not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims.
37


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Survey of 2009-2010 SC Decisions in

Use of property bears a social function.

Essence of due process in

The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and

Due process not applicable to

Is the contention correct? Explain.

Out of court identification of accused; process

Procedure for out-of-court identification.

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done

Due process applies to the power to tax.

Is the contention correct? Why?

Not violative of equal protection clause.

Is the contention correct? Why?

A facial invalidation of a statute is

In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al.,

Respondents, countered that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no

Is the contention of the petitioners correct?

In Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, the Court stated that a facial invalidation of

The doctrine of vagueness and the

Facial challenge vs. As-applied challenge.

A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts

An on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes may not be allowed;

There is no merit in the claim that

Effect if mayor modifies the place

In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita, the Court

Sanction on program is not

The right of information on

Is the contention correct? Why?

There is a need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on matters such as natonal security,

As observed in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, in determining whether a particular

There is also a need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as

Right to Speedy Trial

Is the order of dismissal proper? Why?

Oral order of dismissal of a

Void order, not basis of double jeopardy.

To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:

Failure to register oath of

Present case is not similar to Go.

Mere exercise of suffrage etc.,

Whether the incumbent President

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:

Valenzuela dictum did not firmly

Court shall seek to avoid conflict

Section 15, Article VII does not

"The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to

Not all midnight appointments are void.

Election ban has no application to

No revocation of appointment to Judiciary.

Parliamentary Immunity; rationale for privilege.

I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental

Reason behind legislative privelege; public good

Role of the court in upholding immunity

Grounds for delisting of Party-List

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued

Registration of Ang Ladlad as

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

Rule on the contentions.

Held: The Comelec is not correct.

Compliance with the

Religion as the Basis for Refusal