Ramos vs.

Director of Land
Facts:
In 1882, Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a tract of land located in the municipality
of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija.
Ponce obtained a possessory information title of the land (by taking advantage of the Maura Law or Royal
Decree of Feb. 13, 1994) and registered the land in 1896.
In 1907, the part of the land (Parcel 1) was sold by Ponce to petitioner Ramos and to his wife Ambrosia
Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
The Director of Lands and Director of Forestry opposed the application on the following grounds: Ramos had
not acquired a good title from the Spanish government; The first parcel was forest land.
RTC and CA ruled against Ramos.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to Ramos at least held this tract of land under color
of title.

Issue: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give
title to the entire tract of land?

Held: YES.
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of
a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the
adverse possession of another.

Ramos has a color of title, is in good faith and had been in OPN possesion
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a
portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before
it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on
the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.
Important law: Act NO. 926
Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No. 1908, reads as
follows:

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of 10 years next preceding the
twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred and four (July 26, 1904), except when prevented by war or force majeure,
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.

There was no satisfactory evidence to support the claim that the land is a forest land
Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of
the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is
in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable
for agricultural than for forest purposes.

Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical
expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General
for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the
claimant.

Ruling:
Ramos proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked registration, under the provisions of
subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and Ponces possessory information.
RTC shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A.

SSUE: WheTher or noT The acTual occupancy of a parT of The land described in The insTrumenT giving color of tTle
sucienT To give tTle To The entre TracT of lan
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-21814. July 15, 1975.]

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. MELECIO ABANZADO, ET AL., claimants. THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY,
claimant-appellant, v. PERPETUO SILVA, ET AL., Claimants-Appellees.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Alicia V. Sempio-
Diy for claimant-appellant.

T. R. Reyes & Associates for Claimants-Appellees.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

The significant issues that have to be resolved in this appeal by the Director of Forestry from an order of the lower court
denying his amended petition to review a judgment in a land registration proceeding, no decree having been issued as yet,
arose from its failure to accord him the opportunity to present his evidence to show that the land in controversy is part of a
communal forest and is thus non-disposable. Reliance is primarily based on what is submitted to be the controlling doctrine
announced in 1960 in Adorable v. Director of Forestry. 1 It is pointed out that such a ruling is traceable to a number of
previous pronouncements that stretch quite a while back, and, what is more, indicative of fidelity to the basic policy of
conserving the national patrimony as ordained by the Constitution. 2 More specifically, what was sought by appellant public
official in his amended petition for review was the reconsideration of a previous decision, reached without his being heard,
adjudicating in favor of private respondents what was alleged to be a portion of the Bais Communal Forest, a non-disposable
public land. There was an opposition to such petition by private respondents, who argued that no extrinsic fraud was alleged
and that the Director of Forestry was barred by estoppel or laches. The appealed order was based on the absence of actual or
extrinsic fraud, thus resulting in the denial of the petition for review. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile,
the appeal was taken directly to this Court on a question of law raising the constitutional issues of absence of a hearing in
accordance with due process as well as the deviation from the fundamental principle that forest resources as part of the
national patrimony should be inalienable. 3 The appeal possesses merit. We have to reverse.

In the brief for the appellant Director of Forestry, mention is made that in a previous cadastral case, 4 "judgment was
rendered adjudicating Lot No. 6034 to the spouses Perpetuo Silva and Juana Divinagracia, and ordering its registration in
their names . . . On December 29, 1961, the Director of Forestry, through the Provincial fiscal, filed a Petition for Review of
Judgment . . ., later amended on January 17, 1962, alleging, inter alia, that Lot No. 6034 awarded to the respondents-
spouses Perpetuo Silva and Juana Divinagracia forms a major portion of Parcel No. 1 of the Bais Communal Forest situated at
Pamplona, Negros Oriental and under the administration of the Director of Forestry; that said lot also forms a portion of Lot
No. 5164, Gad. Case No. 8, L.R.C. Rec. 293, Tanjay Cadastre, declared public land in said proceedings on March 12, 1926,
which decision has never been revoked or set aside by any competent court and is, with respect to said Lot No. 6034, res
judicata in the present Cad. Case No. N-4; that sometime in 1959, the respondents-spouses, with the intention of defrauding
the government, filed an answer in Cad. Case No. N-4 claiming Lot No. 6034 as their property through long and adverse
possession; that on December 29, 1959, the Cadastral Court rendered judgment adjudicating said Lot No. 6034 to
respondents-spouses, but no decree of registration has as yet been entered by the Land Registration Commission pursuant
to said judgment; that the petitioner Director of Forestry was not duly notified of the hearing over said Lot 6034, and for this
reason was unable to oppose its registration in the name of respondents-spouses; and that Lot 6034 is non-disposable land,
the same being a part of the Bais Communal Forest, no portion of which has been released as disposable by the Bureau of
Forestry in favor of the Bureau of Lands or any other person or entity . . . 5 Respondents filed their opposition, and as noted,
they were sustained. The lower court disregarded the contention that at the very least, the Director of Forestry was entitled
to be heard on his petitionand was equally deaf to the plea that non-disposable timberland was involved.

To repeal, the order denying the petition for review should be reversed.

1. It is the contention of appellant Director, relying on due process, that instead of an outright denial of the petition for
review, the lower court should have set the matter for hearing to enable him to prove his claim. Adorable v. Director of
Forestry, 6 a 1960 decision, speaks quite plainly to that effect. Regrettably, its message failed to register. It was simply
ignored. In that case, this Court, with Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente, noted that the appellant, as here, was the Director of
Forestry. The similarity does not end there. There was a claim filed by private parties in a cadastral court over a certain lot
which, in the opinion of the appellant, was "permanent timberland." 7 He would seek reconsideration, therefore, on two
grounds: first, that he was entitled to a personal notice of the hearing, and second, that he was entitled to be heard. The
assertion as to the need for a personal notice to appellant presented no difficulty. It was disposed of easily. Then came this
relevant portion of the opinion of Justice J. B. L. Reyes: "But while the lower court was not legally bound to send personal
notice of the hearing to appellant, it does not mean, however, that it acted correctly and within legal bounds in summarily
dismissing appellants motion for reconsideration and new trial without any injury as to the truth of the facts alleged therein.
Appellant based his motion on the claim that a portion of the land in question either is needed for river bank protection or
forms part of permanent timberland. If this claim that any portion of the land in question still forms part of the public forests
is true, then possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property . . ., and such portion would fall within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register
under the torrens system . . . Hence, the lower court should have set appellants motion for hearing to receive evidence on
his allegations, in order that any portion or portions of the land in question that should form part of the forest or timber zone
may be excluded and segregated from the decree of registration in favor of appellees." 8

2. It should be quite apparent why no other decision except that of reversal of the appealed order is warranted. For in
addition to the lack of respect for the requirements of procedural due process, there was on the part of the lower court a
disregard of a basic state policy. The Constitution then in force, as is similarly the case with the present Charter, was quite
explicit on the point of forest resources-being inalienable. That is a paramount state objective. The fundamental law left no
doubt. It is not to be thwarted. A lower court that is not duly mindful of such grave responsibility is recreant to its trust.
Regrettably, that was what happened here.

3. There is more to be said about the excerpt from Adorable, Two cases were cited, Nicolas v. Jose, 9 decided in 1906, and
Vao v. Government of the Philippines, 10 promulgated in 1920. Outside of Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 11 the Nicolas
doctrine was cited with approval in Municipality of Luzuriaga v. Director of Lands, 12 Municipality of Hagonoy v. Archbishop of
Manila, 13 Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 14 Director of Lands v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga, 15 and Unson v.
Lacson. 16 The Vao opinion penned by Justice Malcolm insofar as relevant states: "To prove title, open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious occupation of the land by the applicant and his predecessors in interest since 1882, interrupted by
the revolution, is relied upon. Included within the perimeter of the tract are approximately 685 hectares of forest land and
four logging trails in the nature of highways. These portions should, without question, be eliminated from the claim. The
Government concedes, however, that approximately 1,060 hectares are under cultivation and that certain other portions
have been used by the claimant for pasturage. But the doctrine of constructive possession announced in Ramos v. Director of
Lands . . . cannot be successfully advanced, for the claimant is not holding the land under color of title. To the tracts, of
which applicant is in actual possession, he can secure title, on submission of proper plans." 17 The reference to Ramos v.
Director of Lands, 18 decided two years previously with the same jurist as ponente, is understandable. It is a leading case. It
was Justice Malcolm who, by reference to the first Organic Act, the Philippine Bill of 1902, stressed the significance of
timberlands for the national economy thus: "Indubitably, there should be conservation of the natural resources of the
Philippines. The prodigality of the spendthrift who squanders his substance for the pleasure of the fleeting moment must be
restrained for the less spectacular but surer policy which protects Natures wealth for future generations. Such is the wise
stand of our Government as represented by the Director of Forestry who, with the Forester for the Government of the United
States, believes in `the control of natures powers by man for his own good." 19 Such an observation has not lost pertinence
with the passage of time as shown by reference to Ramos in subsequent cases. 20

4. To complete the picture, reference may be made to the learned and scholarly opinion of Justice Sanchez in Director of
Forestry v. Muoz, 21 a 1968 decision. After a review of Spanish legislation, he summarized the present state of the law
thus: "If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest land, is part of the public domain,
and cannot be appropriated. Before private interests have intervened, the government may decide for itself what portions of
the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forest land. Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. 22 Nor is this all. He reiterated the basic state objective on the matter in clear and penetrating language:
"The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to
forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest
preservation, conservation, protection development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital
segment of any countrys natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover
on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers
and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As
waterfalls cease to function, so hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion
results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses and
highways not to mention precious human lives. . . ." 23

WHEREFORE, the order denying the petition for review of appellant Director of Forestry dated November 15, 1962 is reversed
and set aside, and the case is remanded to the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental of the 12th Judicial
District, to enable appellant Director of Forestry to present evidence on his allegation that the land in question forms part of
the Bais Communal Forest, which is not disposable public land, after which a decision on the merits of the petition for review
may be promulgated in accordance with law and the controlling decisions of this Honorable Tribunal. Costs against private
respondents.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. 107 Phil. 401.

2. The Preamble of the 1935 Constitution in force at the time the petition for review was filed and denied speaks of "a
government that shall . . . conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation . . ." The identical language is found in the
present Constitution.

3. Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution insofar as pertinent reads: "Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization
of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, in whichcases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." As now found in Article XIV, Section 8 of
the present Constitution, it is worded thus: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development exploitation,
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

4. Cadastral Case No. N-4, L.R.C. Cad. Rec. No. N-266 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental.
 Lt. Col. PACIFICO G. ALEJO, G.R. No. 173360
Petitioner,
Present:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,*
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent. March 28, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision[1] dated 31 January 2006 of the Sandiganbayan,
Fifth Division in A/R No. 064 which affirmed the Decision[2] dated 26 July 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palayan City, Branch 40, finding
petitioner Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Pacifico G. Alejo guilty of Malversation of Public Property punishable under paragraph 4, Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code.
On 29 December 1994, petitioner was charged before the RTC with the crime of Malversation of Public Property, allegedly committed as
follows:

That on or about June 8, 1992, in Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a public officer,
being then the Commanding Officer of the Real Estate Preservation Economic Welfare Center, and accountable for confiscated illegal logs he
received by reason of his position and office, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with grave abuse of confidence,
misappropriate, embezzle and take away 1,000 board feet of logs confiscated by elements of the 56th IB, 7th ID, PA, valued at P20,000.00 Philippine
Currency and converted for his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government.[3]

When arraigned on 22 November 1995, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

It appears that petitioner was also charged with two different crimes, namely, Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Direct Bribery,
which were allegedly interrelated with the malversation case. Thus, during the hearing on 6 June 1996, petitioners counsel moved that the two
other cases filed against him, i.e., for direct bribery and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, be jointly tried with
the malversation case. The RTC granted the motion for joint trial.

At trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Deputy Chief of Office, Office of Ethical Standards and
Public Accountability, Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), who received the complaint against petitioner, had the said complaint investigated,
and was the one who prepared the Affidavit-Complaint against petitioner after the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army recommended the
elevation of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation; (2) Lieutenant Rodolfo Estremos, then a master sergeant and a
subordinate of petitioner, who testified that he loaded and brought the 1,000 board feet of confiscated logs to the house of petitioner upon the
latters instruction; (3) Sergeant Nelson Flores, who was the driver of the truck used in transporting the confiscated logs to petitioners house; and
(4) Amrodin Sultan, then the Commander of Atate Detachment where the logs were stored, testified that Estremos took the logs from the
detachment after Sultan gave his consent upon being informed that such was upon the order of petitioner who was a superior officer.
As gathered from the combined testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the prosecution was able to establish that at the time of the commission
of the crime, petitioner was the Commanding Officer of the Real Estate Preservation Economic Welfare Center (REPEWC), 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, Palayan City. As a higher unit, REPEWC controls smaller units, one of which is Task Force Sagip Likas Yaman (TFSLY). TFSLY is
composed of the military, as the armed component, and the Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resource of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resouces (DENR), as the civilian element, in the drive against illegal logging. Petitioner was the Task Force Commander
of the TFSLY. Being the commanding officer of the REPEWC and the task force commander of the TFSLY, petitioner was involved in the anti-illegal
logging campaign. Witnesses Rodolfo Estremos, Amrodin Sultan, and Nelson Flores were among his subordinates.

To further strengthen the anti-illegal campaign, the DENR- Region III Office and the 7th Infantry Division (7th ID) of the Philippine Army entered into
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on 23 September 1991, wherein it was agreed upon,inter alia, that the 7th ID would accept custody of
confiscated mineral and forest products, tools, equipment and conveyances for safekeeping. [4]
On 8 June 1992, there were 46 logs, measuring about 10 to 12 meters, stockpiled at Atate Detachment, the detachment which was primarily
created to confiscate illegally-transported logs. The confiscated logs were valued at P20,000.00 per stipulation of the counsel of the accused.[5] On
the same day, Amrodin Sultan, the Detachment Commander thereof, was notified by Rodolfo Estremos that petitioner instructed him to load
the confiscated lumber into a 6x6 truck driven by Nelson Flores. When the confiscated logs were loaded, Flores and Estremos drove to
petitioners house at Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, and unloaded the said logs in the presence of the petitioner, his wife and mother-in-law.
Rodolfo Estremos executed an Affidavit against petitioner dated 15 July 1992, while Amrodin Sultan and Nelson Flores executed their
respective affidavits on 16 July 1992 before Captain Simeon T. Infante of the Division Headquarters, 7th ID,Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City. The
affidavits contained declarations that they delivered the confiscated lumber to the residence of the petitioner.

The defense, on the other hand, presented petitioner and Romeo Buenaventura, the then Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer. Petitioner denied the allegations against him. He declared that he knew the prosecution witnesses who were his subordinates. He asserted
that prosecution witnesses Rodolfo Estremos and Amrodin Sultan testified against him because they were intimidated by people in the
militarys higher echelon, one of whom was a certain General Soriano. He claimed that these witnesses executed affidavits sometime in July of
1993 repudiating their earlier affidavits accusing him of taking the confiscated logs for his benefit.

Romeo Buenaventura testified that on 7 December 1992, he executed a citation of commendation for petitioner for the latters support in the
campaign against illegal logging.

On 26 July 2002, the RTC rendered a decision acquitting petitioner of the crimes of direct bribery and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, but convicting him of the crime of Malversation of Public Property. The relevant decretalportion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

xxxx

2.) Finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Property corresponding to Criminal Case No. 0639-
P. Considering that the subject lumber is valued at TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), the imposable penalty under Article 217 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code is Reclusion Temporal in its medium period which is 14 yrs., 8 months and 1 day to 17 yrs. and 4 mos. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the Court hereby sentences the accused, LTC. PACIFICO
G. ALEJO, to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) days as minimum to seventeen (17) years as maximum. The accused is furthermore
ordered to pay the State the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) representing the value of the lumber misappropriated as well as
the costs of suit.[6]

On 4 September 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Reopen the Proceedings. Petitioner contended that the evidence for
the prosecution failed to show that he was an accountable officer of the subject lumber; thus, he could not be liable for the crime
of malversation of public property.

The RTC, without the objection of the prosecution, ordered the reopening of the case for the presentation of additional evidence.

On 31 July 2003, the defense presented witness Atty. Hermilo Barrios, the Deputy JAGO of the 7th ID in 1991-1993. He testified that he prepared
the 23 September 1991 MOA entered into by the 7th ID of the Philippine Army and DENR, Region III. According to him, it was the DENR that gave
the orders to the military component to confiscate and seize illegal logs. The military component had no authority and accountability with respect
to the confiscated vehicles and forest products that were being seized. He said that the military compound was used only as impounding area,
inasmuch as the DENR was ill-equipped to accommodate the numerous logs seized during the anti-illegal logging campaign.[7] He stated further
that it was the DENR that had total control of the impounding area.[8]

On 25 September 2003, the prosecution presented Atty. Salome Cansino, Chief Legal Counsel of the DENR when the MOA was executed. She
testified that based on the MOA, whenever apprehension or confiscation was made by the TFSLY, the forest products or equipment would be
placed in the custody of the REPEWC or the 7th ID depot. She stressed that the disposition of these forest products lies with the DENR which would
evaluate and determine the legality of said products.[9] The military component of the task force, therefore, cannot release the confiscated
products without the authority from the DENR.[10]

In an order dated 2 October 2003, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed its decision dated 26 July 2002, convicting
petitioner of the crime of malversation.

Dissatisfied by the ruling of the RTC, petitioner elevated the case to the Sandiganbayan.

In a decision dated 31 January 2006, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the decision of the RTC convicting petitioner of the crime
of malversation, viz:

In view of all the foregoing, we hereby affirm the decision of the lower court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of malversation. However, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the absence of any aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the
penalty imposed by it should be modified to TEN (10) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY prision mayor as minimum, to SIXTEEN (16) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS
AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of Php20,000.00 equal to the
amount malversed, and the costs of the suit.[11]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its resolution dated 26 June 2006.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner asserts that the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Rodolfo Estremos, Amrodin Sultan and Nelson Flores should be appreciated with careful scrutiny since
these witnesses were pressured or intimidated by General Soriano to testify against him and considering that before they took the witness stand,
they had already executed their respective affidavits recanting their accusations against petitioner. Their act of taking the witness stand and
reviving the accusations against petitioner become suspect in view of the fact that they are being used by General Soriano to pin him down.

Aside from the bare testimonies of Estremos, Sultan and Flores, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to present any documentary
evidence showing that the confiscated logs actually existed and were included in the inventory of the DENR as confiscated logs, which were turned
over to the custody of the TFSLY and which were subsequently lost. Petitioner insists that the audit or inventory of confiscated logs under the
possession and custody of the TFSLY is crucial to the case and in the absence thereof, the charge of malversation must fail. He adds that the
prosecutions failure to establish that there were indeed confiscated logs could mean acquittal. If indeed these logs exist, it cannot be considered
vested with public character absent proper documentation of confiscation pursuant to the MOA. Since the logs were not vested with public
character, he said he cannot be considered as an accountable officer within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, he
avers that the prosecution failed to prove the actual value of the confiscated logs.

Petitioner also capitalizes on the inconsistencies of the prosecution witnesses on the quantity of the lumber or logs that were misappropriated. He
points out that witness Estremoss testimony conflicts with that of witness Flores because the former said the logs were unloaded in the
presence of the wife of the petitioner and his mother-in-law, while the latter stated that unloading was done in the presence of the accused
only. This glaring inconsistency, petitioner stresses, shatters the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

In the main, petitioner wants this Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witnesses vis-a-vis that of the defense witnesses. It has often
been said, however, that credibility of witnesses is a matter best examined by, and left to, the trial courts. [12] When the factual findings of the trial
court are affirmed by the appellate court, the general rule applies. [13] This Court will not consider factual issues and evidentiary matters already
passed upon. The petitioner raises the same issues he brought before the appellate court which gave credence to the findings and decision of the
trial court.

Factual findings of the trial court are entitled to respect and are not to be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance, having been overlooked or misinterpreted, might materially affect the disposition of the case.[14] The assessment by the trial court of
the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence.

In the case under consideration, we find that the trial court did not overlook, misapprehend, or misapply any fact of value for us to overturn the
findings of the trial court.

The prosecution, through the testimonies of the key witnesses Rodolfo Estremos, Nelson Flores, and Amrodin Sultan, was able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the elements of the crime hurled against petitioner.

Malversation of public property is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent provisions of which read:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

xxxx

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less
than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the
funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The elements of malversation of public property, essential to the conviction of an accused under the above penal provision, are:

1. That the offender is a public officer;

2. That he has the custody or control of the property by reason of the duties of his office;
3. That the property is a public property for which he is accountable; and
4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take
them.[15]

It is beyond dispute that petitioner, during the time relative to the case, was a public officer, as he was then the Commanding Officer of the
REPEWC, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army and the Task Force Commander of the TFSLY.

The evidence of the prosecution had sufficiently shown that TFSLY was created pursuant to the 23 September 1991 MOA between the 7th ID of the
Philippine Army and the DENR, Region III. Under the MOA, it is the 7th ID of the Philippine Army, specifically the Task Force Commander of the
TFSLY, which has the duty to accept custody of confiscated logs and other forest mineral products, viz:
WHEREAS, The DENR-3 and the 7 ID, PA agree and cooperate in curbing the pernicious illegal logging and mining activities through closer
coordination in the strict enforcement of forestry and mining laws, rules and regulations;

Now, therefore, for and in consideration of the foregoing promises, and the mutual covenants hereinafter set forth, the parties agree on the
following:

xxxx

II. That the 7ID, PA, thru its authorized representative(s) shall have the following functions and duties:

xxxx

2.8 To accept custody of confiscated mineral and forest products, tools equipment and conveyances for safekeeping;

2.9 To be responsible for the loss of any of the said items under its custody;

xxxx

III. That DENR-3 and the 7ID, PA shall organize a Task Force to be named Task Force Sagip Likas Yaman composed of selected officials and personnel
to implement this Memorandum of Agreement.[16]

Being the Commanding Officer of the REPEWC, which is the higher unit, he was also the Task Force Commander of the TFSLY; hence, petitioner had
control and custody over the confiscated forest products that were placed within the AtateDetachment.

Prosecution witness Atty. Salome Cansino, Chief Legal Counsel of the DENR when the MOA was entered into, affirmed that it was the military
component of the TFSLY, specifically the task force commander, in this case petitioner, who had supervision and control of the confiscated forest
products, viz:

Q: In other words, Atty. Cansino, who is accountable for these confiscated logs?

A: Based on our agreement, whenever apprehension or confiscation are made by the Joint Task Force, the DENR has no compound or place where
they can store the forest products. Based on our agreement, the forest products or equipments or vehicles shall be placed at the 7thID depot for
custody and security.[17]

Although the DENR had concurrent supervision over the confiscated forest products, as the release of the same cannot be done without the
authority of the DENR representative, this does not diminish the fact that these forest products - after their confiscation and inventory - were
deposited in the military depot, over which petitioner had power and control as the commanding officer.

An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office. To be liable for malversation, an accountable officer need not be a bonded official. The name or
relative importance of the office or employment is not the controlling factor. What is decisive is the nature of the duties that he performs and that
as part of, and by reason of, said duties, he receives public money or property, which he is bound to account for.[18] In this case, the confiscated
logs were delivered for safekeeping at the Atate Detachment over which petitioner had control. He had the obligation to safeguard and account
for the same.

The confiscated logs are considered public property since the same were impressed with public attributes or character for which the public officer
was accountable. While these logs were not strictly government property, they partook of the nature of public property. Article 222 of the Revised
Penal Code states that private property seized or deposited by public authority may be the object of malversation.

Although the prosecution failed to present any documentary evidence showing that the confiscated logs existed and that the same were turned
over to the custody of TFSLY, there was, however, an admission or a stipulation as to the existence of such logs on the part of the defense, as
evidenced by the 5 August 1998 Order of the RTC, which states: The Public Prosecutor dispensed with the presentation of prosecution
witness Leoncio Alvaran, the counsel for the accused having admitted the valuation of the lumber subject matter of Crim. Case No. 0639-P in
the amount of P20,000.00 (1,000.00 bd. ft.), with a qualification that the valuation was at the time the lumber were confiscated and not while in
the possession of accused.[19]Furthermore, the prosecution, through the testimony of Detachment Commander Amrodin Sultan, was able to
present testimonial evidence as to the existence of the confiscated logs, which were stored in the Atate Detachment:

Q: What were those logs which according to you were confiscated all about?

A: When I was assigned here in Atate, those logs were already stocked, sir.

Q: As a Detachment Commander, have you actually seen those logs?

A: Yes, sir.[20]

Anent the last element, this Court has held that to justify conviction for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution has only to
prove that the accused received public funds or property, and that he could not account for them or did not have them in his possession and could
not give a reasonable excuse for their disappearance.[21] An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no
direct evidence of misappropriation, and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain
satisfactorily.[22] Here, the prosecution was able to muster direct evidence that petitioner had misappropriated the subject confiscated logs. Three
prosecution witnesses, RodolfoEstremos, Nelson Flores and Amrodin Sultan, all of whom were petitioners subordinates, corroborated each
other in declaring categorically that it was petitioner who ordered them to pick up the confiscated lumber and to deliver the same to his residence.

Estremos, during the direct examination, declared that petitioner instructed him to get the confiscated logs and bring the same to petitioners
residence:

Q. x x x Noong June 8, 1992 ay sinundo ako ng 6x6 truck ng 525 EBM, na hiniram ni Lt. Col. Alejo sa REPEWC, Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City
at inutusan ako na pumunta sa Atate Detachment, Palayan City at isakay sa truck ang nakaimbak na mga kahoy doon nanakakumpiska at iti-turned
over ng 56 IB. Pagkakuha ko ng mga nasabing kahoy ay dinala ko sa kanyang bahay sa Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija x x x.

xxxx

Q: You said that you were ordered by Col. Alejo to proceed to Atate Detachment and load the lumber therein to be taken to his house. How were
you ordered by Col. Alejo?

A: Verbal, sir.

Court: Tinawag ka?

A: Opo.[23]

Estremos likewise testified that the one who drove the truck was witness Flores:

Q: You said that you were fetched by six by six truck on the said date which was borrowed by Col. Alejo. Who was then driving the said six by six
truck?

A: I remember sir, Sgt. Flores.[24]

Flores confirmed the testimony of Estremos that he was the driver of the vehicle that brought the confiscated logs to petitioners house, thus:

Q: And during that time and date, do you remember having met Lt. Col. Alejo?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What transpired or what happened when you met Col. Alejo on that time and date?

xxxx

A: x x x We are instructed to unload the lumber beside his house after that we left.

xxxx

Court: What is the participation of this witness here in that particular incident of loading and unloading the lumber, are you the driver?

A: Yes, Your Honor.[25]

Witness Sultan, the Detachment Commander of the Atate Detachment, also testified that Estremos and Flores went to Atate Detachment and
informed him they were there upon the order of petitioner to take the confiscated lumber to the petitioners house:

Q: So, upon being told by Estremos that he was ordered by Col. Alejo to take those lumber stock filed in the building you were then referred to,
what did you tell him or what did you do?

A: When the lumber was already loaded, they asked permission from me that they are going to bring the logs to the house of Col. Alejo, sir.[26]

Against these damning pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution, all that petitioner could interpose as defense are mere denials and finger-
pointing. He claimed that it was General Soriano who was behind the plot to indict him of the crime.Sadly, petitioner did not substantiate such
defense and he merely said that it was based on his gut feeling. Under settled jurisprudence, denial could not prevail over the positive testimony of
witnesses.[27] Denial is intrinsically a weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[28]

Contrary to petitioners postulation, it is sufficient that the prosecution established by competent evidence that there existed confiscated logs
under the control and custody of petitioner and that he misappropriated the same. Inventory or audit of the confiscated logs under the custody of
the TFSLY is not necessary, since the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime charged. There is no requirement under the law
that for one to be convicted of malversation of public property, such property must first be inventoried or audited.
Petitioner cannot utilize the testimonial inconsistencies committed by the prosecution witnesses. They clearly and affirmatively gave a full account
of what actually transpired on 8 June 1992. They were consistent in their respective narrations on the witness stand, except as to the number of
logs unloaded and the number of persons present during the unloading. It is understandable that witnesses varied in their estimates of the logs,
since it was unlikely for them to bother counting said logs as their instruction from their superior officer was not to count said logs, but to deliver
them to his residence. Besides, such minor inconsistencies on insignificant details cannot diminish their credibility. We have held that
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant details cannot destroy their credibility.[29] Minor
inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor.[30]

The affidavits of recantation executed by witnesses Estremos, Flores and Sultan prior to the trial cannot prevail over their testimonies made
before the trial court. Their testimonies effectively repudiated the contents of the affidavits of recantation. The recantation could hardly suffice to
overturn the finding of guilt by the trial court which was based on their clear and convincing testimonies, given during a full-blown trial. As held by
this Court, an affidavit of recantation, being usually taken exparte, would be considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.[31]

This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that there is no need for the prosecution to present evidence as to the value of the confiscated logs,
which, in turn, is the basis for determining the period of imprisonment of petitioner. Petitioners counsel stipulated the quantity and the valuation
of the confiscated logs as evidenced by the RTC Order dated 5 August 1998 which reads:

The Public Prosecutor dispensed with the presentation of prosecution witness Leoncio Alvaran, the counsel for the accused having admitted the
valuation of the lumber subject matter of Crim. Case No. 0639-P in the amount of P20,000.00 (1,000.00 bd. ft.), with a qualification that the
valuation was at the time the lumber were confiscated and not while in the possession of accused. [32]

It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the
possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. The prosecution sufficiently established that petitioner had custody of the subject logs of which he is accountable and he
appropriated the same for his own benefit. Unmistakably, petitionermalversed public property.

The Sandiganbayan imposed upon petitioner the penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 16 years, 5 months
and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
for malversation is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than P12,000.00 but less
than P22,000.00. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum imposable
penalty shall be within the range of 16 years, 5 months and 11 days to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days, while the minimum shall be within the
range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months.[33] Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan is proper.

Under the second paragraph of Article 217, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a
fine equal to the amount of funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled, which in this case is P20,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the 31 January 2006 Decision of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, in A/R No. 064 finding Lieutenant
Colonel Pacifico G. Alejo guilty of Malversation of Public Property and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the accessories of the
law, with the additional penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine of P20,000.00 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.