Case: JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR 125865)Date: March 26, 2001Ponente:

J. Ynares- SantiagoFacts:
Two criminal informations for grave oral defamation were filed against Liang, a Chinese national who was employed asan
Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by his secretary Joyce Cabal, before the MeTC Mandaluyong City.The
MeTC, acting pursuant to an advice from the DFA that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed thecriminal
informations against him. The RTC Pasig City annulled and set aside the MeTC
s dismissal. Hence, Liang filed apetition for review before the SC which was denied ruling that the immunity granted to officers
and staff of the ADB is notabsolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Hence, the present MR.
Issue:WON Liang is immune from suit
Held:
No.
Ratio:
The Court found no reason to disturb the earlier decision.
The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot beconsidered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted
to ADB officers and personnel.
The issue of whether or not Liang
s utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine
J. Puno
s concurring opinion:
Liang contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic immunity by the DFA is a
political question
. It is solely within theprerogative of the executive department and is conclusive upon the courts. Furthermore, the immunity
conferred under the ADBCharter and the Headquarters Agreement is absolute. It is designed to safeguard the autonomy and
independence of international organizations against interference from any authority external to the organizations. It is
necessary to allow suchorganizations to discharge their entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity is
when there is an implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute. The exception allegedly has
no application to the case atbar."
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunityis essentially a political question
and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of thegovernment, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the governmentas in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by theprincipal law officer of the government, the
Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, inadherence to the settled principle that courts
may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as toembarrass the executive arm of the government
in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of the
government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming
anantagonistic jurisdiction."
Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and hence his immunity is not absolute.
Under theVienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
State for allacts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may
commit,unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional"
immunities,that is, only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes.
This is thereason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank
officers andemployees only with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives
immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private
acts, notwithstandingthe absence of a waiver of immunity.
Liang cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal process" accorded to ADB as
aninternational organization.
The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restrictedonly to official acts. He stands
charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks against his secretary.Considering that the immunity
accorded to petitioner is limited only to acts performed in his official capacity, it becomesnecessary to make a factual
determination of whether or not the defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in relation tohis official functions as a
senior economist

FACTS:
 2 criminal informations for for grave oral defamation were filed against Jeffrey Liang, a Chinese national who was employed as
an Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB
MTC: dismissed the complaint stating that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes
RTC: Upon a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People of the Philippines annulled and set aside the order of
MTC
SC: Denied petition for review on the ground that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute and is
limited on the official capacity and immunity CANNOT cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in
the name of official duty
A motion of reconsideration is filed

ISSUE: W/N the crime of oral deflamation enjoys immunity

HELD: NO

slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity

issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003]
FACTS: Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The maintenance agreement includes the
following specific equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps.
The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the
standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. The latter claim that it was
unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has
sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using
as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of
whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the
establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the
premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when
it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the
discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit

Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

DECISION
(En Banc)

BUENA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph
Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

II. THE ISSUE

 Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion,
and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following
conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the
Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article
XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not
required it.

xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts
or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to
submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be
understood in the sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

xxx xxx xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the
United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America
accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is
indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

FACTS:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the US forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of
installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship,
both countries entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. In view of the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement both countries negotiated for its possible extension. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the
extension of the US military bases which was now called RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security. During the term
of Pres. Ramos, he approved the VFA which was the result of a negotiation on the complementing strategic interests of the US
and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. On October 5, 1998, Pres. Joseph Estrada, through respondent Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Domingo Siazon, ratified the VFA. The Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA were
then transmitted to the Philippine Senate for concurrence pursuant to Sec 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The necessary
2/3 votes of the members of the Senate were gathered thus concurring with the ratification of the VFA under Resolution No. 18.
On June 1, 1999 the VFA officially entered into force. The petitioners argue that the VFA is governed by the provision of Sec. 25,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the
Philippines.

ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

HELD:
Sec. 25, Article XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities should apply in
the instant case. Being a special provision, Sec. 25, Article XVIII will prevail over the general provision of Sec 21, Article VII of
the Constitution. Also, the argument that Sec 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely
foreign troops and facilities are involved in the VFA is untenable. The clause found in Sec 25 does not refer to foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects as evidenced by the use of comma
and the disjunctive word or. This interpretation which contemplates three different situations a military treaty the subject of
which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities and any of the three standing alone places it
under the coverage of Sec 25 is also manifested in the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the said section.
Moreover, the establishment of military bases within the territory of another state is no longer viable because of the alternatives
offered by the new weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat
in the sea even for months and years without returning to their home country. Therefore first requisite of Sec 25, Art XVIII
already satisfied by considering the VFA as a treaty. The second condition of Sec 25 requires that the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate should be viewed in light of Sec 21 Art. VII of the Constitution requiring a 2/3 votes for treaties or
international agreements in general. The 2/3 votes is again satisfied after the approval of the VFA by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18. The third requisite of Sec 25, Art XVIII is that the other contracting party acknowledges the agreement as a
treaty. The records of the US Government, through the US Ambassador to the Philippines, show that the US government has fully
committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their
powers. Also, the deliberations of the Consitutional Commission show that,through the words of Fr. Bernas, ...we will accept
whatever they say.If they say that we have done everything to make it a treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we will accept it
as a treaty.. Also through Article 26 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International law
Commission in 1949 provides that Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith. This is also known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Therefore, the third requisite is also satisfied.

VINUYAVS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYFACTSPetitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered withthe SEC for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in
thePhilippines during the WWII. They claim that they were comfort women at that time and have greatlysuffered because of
that. In 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA,and OSG and requested assistance in filing
a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers whoordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in
the Philippines. However, the officialsdeclined on that ground that the individual claims had already been satisfied by Japans
compliance withthe San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956 between Japanand the
Philippines. The petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippinegovernment in the Treaty of Peace
with Japan is void because the comfort women system constituted acrime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. The same
was prohibited under the jus cogens normsfrom which no derogation is possible. Thus, such waiver was a breach against the
governments obligationnot to afford impunity for crimes against humanity. In addition, they claim that the Philippine
governmentsacceptance of the apologies made by Japan as well as funds for the AWF were contrary to
internationallaw.ISSUESWas the refusal of the Executive Department to espouse petitioners claims against Japan valid?
RULINGYes, it was valid. It has the exclusive prerogative for such determination. So much so, the Philippines is notunder any
international obligation to espouse petitioners claim. Given the extraordinary length of time thathas lapsed between the treatys
conclusion, the Executive Department had the ample time to assess theforeign policy considerations of espousing a claim against
Japan, from the standpoint of both the interestsof the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies
are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.Under international law, the only means available for
individuals to bring a claim within the internationallegal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to
bring a claim on theindividuals behalf. When this happens, in the eye of the international tribunal, the State is the
soleclaimant.Therefore, the State is the sole judge to decide whether its protection in favor of those petitioners will begranted, to
what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It is a discretionary power and the exercise of which may be determined by
consideration of a political or other nature.Moreover, in the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligation of the
Philippines, thepetitioners failed to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jis cogens prohibitionsat the
time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimesin an erga omnes obligation
or has attained the status of jus cogens.DISPOSITIONPetition is dismissed

United States v. The Amistad

The Amistad, also known as United States v. Libellants and Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841), was
a United States Supreme Court case resulting from the rebellion of Africans on board the Spanishschooner La Amistad in 1839.
[1]
It was an unusual freedom suit that involved international issues and parties, as well as United States law. The historianSamuel
Eliot Morison in 1965 described it as the most important court case involving slavery before being eclipsed by that of Dred Scott.
[2]

The schooner was traveling along the coast of Cuba on its way to a port for re-sale of the slaves. The African captives, who had
been kidnapped in Sierra Leone and illegally sold into slavery and shipped to Cuba, escaped their shackles and took over the
ship. They killed the captain and the cook; two other crew members escaped in a lifeboat. The Africans directed the survivors to
return them to Africa. The crew tricked them, sailing north at night. TheAmistad was later apprehended near Long Island, New
York, by the United States Revenue Cutter Service and taken into custody. The widely publicized court cases in the United States
federal district and Supreme Court, which addressed international issues, helped the abolitionist movement.
In 1840, a federal district court found that the transport of the kidnapped Africans across the Atlantic on the slave ship Tecora was
in violation of laws and treaties against the international slave trade by Great Britain, Spain and the United States. The captives
were ruled to have acted as free men when they fought to escape their illegal confinement. The Court ruled the Africans were
entitled to take whatever legal measures necessary to secure their freedom, including the use of force. Under international and
sectional pressure, U.S. President Martin Van Buren ordered the case appealed to the Supreme Court. It affirmed the lower court
ruling on March 9, 1841, and authorized the release of the Africans, but overturned the order of the lower court that they be
returned to Africa at government expense.
Supporters arranged for temporary housing of the Africans in Farmington, Connecticut as well as funds for travel. In 1842 they
transported by ship those who wanted to return to Africa, together with American missionaries.

Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) case brief

Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland)

Procedural History:
This case is a proceeding before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

FACTS:
-In 1961, the United Kingdom (Plaintiff) recognized Iceland's (D) claim to a 12-mile fisheries limit. This was in return for
Iceland's (D) agreement that any dispute concerning Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction beyond the 12-mile limit be referred to the
International Court of Justice.
-In 1972, Iceland proposed to extend its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from 12 to 50 miles around its shores.
-As a result, the United Kingdom (P) filed an application before the ICJ.
-Iceland (D) claimed that the agreement was no longer valid due to changed circumstances - being that the 12-mile limit was now
generally recognized and that there would be a failure of consideration for the 1961 agreement.

Issue:
Does there have to be a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations that need to be performed for there to be a "change
of circumstances" that give rise to a ground for invoking a termination of a treaty?

HOLDING: Yes.
-In order for a change of circumstances to give rise to a ground for invoking the termination of a treaty it is necessary that the
change has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still to be performed.
-The change must have increased the burden of the obligations yet to be executed to the extent of rendering the performance
something essentially different from that initially undertaken.
-The change of circumstances alleged by Iceland in this case cannot be said to have transformed radically the extent of the
jurisdictional obligation that was imposed in the 1961 Exchange of Notes.

Rule:
-In order for a change in circumstances to give rise to a ground for invoking the termination of a treaty, it is necessary that the
change has resulted in a radical transformation in regards to the obligations that are still to be performed.

Analysis:
The original agreement between the parties provided for recourse to the I.C.J. in the event of a dispute arising.
Icelands economy was highly dependent on fishing.
The Court did not reach the merits of Icelands argument here, but instead the court dealt with the jurisdictional issues at hand.
- See more at: http://www.lawschoolcasebriefs.net/2012/04/fisheries-jurisdiction-united-kingdom-
v.html#sthash.AB1qQX6w.dpuf

FRIVALDO VS COMELEC

In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of the League of Municipalities of Sorsogon,
filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation because apparently, Frivaldo, in 1983,
was naturalized as an American. In his defense, Frivaldo said that he was forced to be naturalized because the then President
Marcos was after him; but that participating in the Philippine elections, he has effectively lost his American citizenship pursuant
to American laws. He also assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the nature of a quo warranto which is already filed out of
time, the same not being filed ten days after his proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly serve as a governor.
HELD: No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not a Filipino. He lost his
citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. Even if he did lose his US citizenship, that did not restore his being
a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or repatriation proceedings. Neither did his participation in the 1988
elections restore his Philippine citizenship. At best, he is a stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he owes allegiance
to a foreign state. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot
be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe
his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994
Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of
March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in
a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in
writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. Petitioner contends that
the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?

HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which
affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling
of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming
into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the
extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or
consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs PURGANANIn extradition proceedings, are prospective
extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrantsfor their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to
the right to bail and provisionalliberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two
novelque
stions is No. The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are
laid out in this Decision.The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the
UnitedStates District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999 : (1) conspiracy to defraudthe United States
371; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud,; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 USCode Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal
campaign contributions,II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to goon provisional liberty
because:ISSUE: Is Respondent Entitled to Bail? Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or bereleased on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of allpersons, including those
sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the onescharged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua,
when evidence of guilt is strong. He alsoalleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4[59] of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court which,insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall alsoapply according
to Section 9 of PD 1069.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary hasthe constitutional duty to
curb grave abuse of discretion[68] and tyranny, as well as the power topromulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional
rights.[69] Furthermore, we believe that the rightto due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to
extraditees. Indeed, the right
to due process extends to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient,adaptable to every situation
calling for its application.[70]

HELD:
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is
determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutionalrights of the accused are
necessarily available. It
is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police
authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail.Having once escaped the
jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumptionis that the person would escape again if given the
opportunity

Gov. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia

FACTS:
Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the Hongkong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of accepting an
advantage as an agent, conspiracy to defraud, was penalized by a common law of Hongkong. A warrant of arrest was issued and
if convicted, he may face jail terms.

On September 23, 1999, He was arrested and detained.

On November 22, 1999, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for his extradition.

Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which Judge Felixberto Olalia granted.

Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a petition to vacate such order, but it was denied by the same judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail when there is nothing in the Constitution or Statutory law providing
a potential extradite a right to bail.

HELD:
The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person (Sec. 2
Art II 1987 Constitution) have the obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty.

The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in
favor of human liberty.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or
her from filing a motion for bail, aright to due process under the Constitution.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty
it entered into with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our
foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.

Govt of Hongkong vs Judge Olalia

Honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it
entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our
foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extradites rights to life, liberty, and due process. Where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party.
We should not deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extradite from fleeing our jurisdiction.
clear and convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in extradition cases

The potential extradite must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.