Chritopher Pincock. (2002) Russell's Influence On Carnap's 'Aufbau' PDF

Russell's Influence on Carnap's "Aufbau"
Author(s): Christopher Pincock

Source: Synthese, Vol. 131, No. 1 (Apr., 2002), pp. 1-37
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117232
Accessed: 09-05-2017 05:38 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese
This content downloaded from 163.178.101.228 on Tue, 09 May 2017 05:38:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
CHRISTOPHER PINCOCK
RUSSELL'S INFLUENCE ON CARNAP'S AUFBAU
ABSTRACT. This paper concerns the debate on the nature of Rudolf Carnap's project in
his 1928 book The Logical Structure of the World or Aufbau. Michael Friedman and Alan
Richardson have initiated much of this debate. They claim that the Aufbau is best under
stood as a work that is firmly grounded in neo-Kantian philosophy. They have made these
claims in opposition to Quine and Goodman's "received view" of the Aufbau. The received
view sees the Aufbau as an attempt to carry out in detail Russell's external world program.
I argue that both sides of this debate have made errors in their interpretation of Russell.
These errors have led these interpreters to misunderstand the connection between Russell's
project and Carnap's project. Russell in fact exerted a crucial influence on Carnap in the
1920s. This influence is complicated, however, due to the fact that Russell and Carnap
disagreed on many philosophical issues. I conclude that interpretations of the Aufbau that
ignore Russell's influence are incomplete.
1. A HISTORICAL DEBATE
In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine claims that Carnap's project in

Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Carnap 1928, 1967) is empiricist and
reductionist:1
Radical reductionism, conceived now with statements as units, set itself the task of specify
ing a sense-datum language and showing how to translate the rest of significant discourse,
statement by statement, into it. Carnap embarked on this project in the Aufbau ... He was
the first empiricist who, not content with asserting the reducibility of science to terms of
immediate experience, took serious steps toward carrying out the reduction (Quine 1961,
39).
In a similar way, Nelson Goodman has claimed that the Aufbau is phenom
enalist in nature. His description of the goals of a phenomenalist project in
general is that
A phenomenal system is thus held to constitute a kind of epistemological reduction of the
predicates it defines; the definitions indicate the testable, empirical, pragmatic significance
of these predicates; and definability in the system provides a criterion of meaningfulness.
To the phenomenalist, what cannot be explained in terms of phenomena is unknowable,
and words purporting to refer to it are vacuous (Goodman 1966, 137).2
Both Quine and Goodman see an epistemological and a semantic aspect

in the empiricism of the Aufbau. If the sentences of science that express
t4 Synthese 131: 1-37,2002.

WP ? 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
2 CHRISTOPHER PINCOCK
our scientific knowledge can be reduced to statements about sense-data

and their relations, then our knowledge will be justified. Furthermore, the
empiricist view of language, according to which all we can talk about must
have been experienced, will also be vindicated.
A number of philosophers have contested this characterization of the
Aufbau.3 Here I will focus on the closely related views of Michael Fried
man and Alan Richardson. Both argue that the Aufbau is not concerned
with phenomenalistic reductionism and that the Aufbau's main concern
is objectivity. As Friedman puts it, "the most fundamental aim of the
Aufbau ... [is] the articulation and defense of a radically new conception
of objectivity" (Friedman 1999, 95). Richardson echoes this view when
he says that "for Carnap the problem is how we achieve objective know
ledge in the sciences despite the subjective origin of empirical knowledge
in private sensation" (Richardson 1998, 28).4 They emphasize the neo
Kantian nature of this project and attempt to distance the Aufbau from
British empiricism.
The extent of Russell's influence on Carnap in this period is a central
part of this disagreement. Quine and Goodman see in Carnap's many ref
erences to Russell a sign that he is continuing the traditional project of
British empiricism. For example, Quine claims that "To account for the
external world as a logical construct of sense-data - such, in Russell's
terms, was the program. It was Carnap, in his Der logische Aufbau der
Welt of 1928, who came nearest to executing it" (Quine 1969, 74, quoted
in Friedman 1999, 117). Friedman and Richardson contend that Carnap is
not concerned with this project, and so they argue that Carnap could not
have been seriously influenced by Russell. Friedman, for example, claims
that "when we turn to the text of the Aufbau itself, such an epistemological
conception is hardly in evidence. First, Carnap, as a matter of fact, devotes
very little space to the problem of the external world ... [and] In the second
place, Carnap nowhere employs the traditional epistemological vocabulary
of 'certainty', 'justification', 'doubt', and so on in the Aufbau" (Friedman
1999, 118-9).
Here, then, we have a historical question concerning the influence of
Russell on Carnap. I want to argue that Russell did in fact exert a crucial
influence on Carnap's project in the Aufbau. In doing so I will show that
both sides in this debate have misunderstood Russell's aims in this period.
Richardson explicitly agrees with Quine's interpretation of Russell that
I wish to contest (Richardson 1998, 21). Both Russell and Carnap were
engaged in reconstructive projects that had as their primary goals the or
ganization and clarification of our scientific knowledge. I do not wish to
suggest that these were the only goals of their respective projects. In par
RUSSELL'S INFLUENCE ON CARNAP'S AUFBAU 3
ticular, the account of Carnap that I develop is compatible with Friedman's

and Richardson's neo-Kantian interpretations of Carnap. My conclusion
will be that their accounts are incomplete. However, before this conclusion
can be presented a number of preliminary issues need to be discussed.
My argument will be based as much as possible on a review of Carnap's
published and unpublished writings from 1920 until 1928 and on his un
published letters to Russell in this period.51 begin by discussing Carnap's
philosophical development before the Aufbau. This background helps to
put the project of the Aufbau itself in a clearer light. I then turn to Russell's
work in this period, and distinguish three projects that he was engaged
in at this time. My discussion of Russell centers on the relation between
the so-called 'supreme maxim' concerning constructions and the so-called
'fundamental principle' concerning acquaintance. I argue that these two
statements belong to different projects and that they are quite independent
of one another for Russell. More importantly, Carnap was engaged in a
reconstructive project that drew on Russell's constructions, but that was
separate from Russell's views on acquaintance. I end with a discussion of
the similarities and the differences between Carnap and Russell. One of the
main differences is that Carnap wants to occupy a neutral philosophical po
sition, whereas Russell does not. My final conclusion will have two parts.
First, it is incorrect to claim that the Aufbau is a Russellian project without
specifying which Russellian project. Second, one of Russell's projects in
this period is similar to Carnap's project in the Aufbau and this project
influenced Carnap to a significant extent.
2. FROM Der Raum TO Die Welt
In this section I want to present an outline of Carnap's development from

1920 until the publication of the Aufbau in 1928. This period has received
relatively little attention.6 I will focus on Carnap's connections with Rus
sell in this period, but also hope to give a fair account of the main aspects of
Carnap's philosophical outlook. However, I will not be able to investigate
the origins of this outlook in general or the reasons for its changes in this
period.7
A reasonable starting point is Carnap's doctoral dissertation Space: A
Contribution to the Theory of Science [Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wis
senschaftslehre] (Carnap 1922).8 Der Raum was completed late in 1921
and published in 1922. Carnap sets himself a variety of tasks, but the
overriding point of the essay is that disagreements over the nature of space
have their origin in the various senses that people have attached to the
term "space". Carnap distinguishes three kinds of space. First, there is
formal space [der formale Raum]. The study of formal space is the lo
gical study of axioms that are formulated in completely general or formal
terms. Instead of the axioms being interpreted with geometrical terms such
as "point" and "line", axiom systems based on such axioms as "There is
always one and only one element of the class L bearing the relation / to
any two things of class P" (Carnap 1922, 7) are studied. Drawing heavily
on logicist terminology and techniques Carnap develops axiom systems
for ft-dimensional spaces of various kinds. He arranges these spaces into a
hierarchy, with spaces possessing only topological properties as the most
general, and various projective and metrical spaces following from these
as a result of further specifications. Throughout Carnap seems to see no
problems with such constructions, and claims that they can be carried out
completely a priori.
The second sense of space discussed is intuitive space [der An
schauungsraum]. Intuitive space is the space of our intuition, where this
is understood in a neo-Kantian sense. It is the space that we experience.
Carnap also refers to Husserl's claims about our "essential intuition [We
senserschauung]". He introduces this term in order to motivate the claim
that certain properties of intuitive space are prior to any experience. For
Carnap it is clear that such properties will pertain only to limited spa
tial regions. These properties are the topological properties of intuitive
space. Intuitive space itself cannot be defined, as "we cannot conceptu
ally grasp its particular mode of being" (Carnap 1922, 22). What Carnap
does do, however, is determine which of Hubert's axioms of geometry
can be grounded in essential intuition. Further "regulative requirements
[Forderungen]" are used in order to obtain those axioms that are needed for
consistency and completeness that are not grounded in intuition (Carnap
1922, 26). These requirements serve to construct an intuitive space with
metrical properties. Just as in the formal case, a variety of such intu
itive spaces can be constructed. Spaces of any finite dimension and of
topological, projective and metric character are studied.
Finally, and at greatest length, Carnap considers physical space [der
physische Raum]. Physical space is the space of physics and physical
interactions. In its construction we make use of the already determined
properties of experience. These are the topological properties of intuitive
space indicated above, such as the incidence of points and lines. Carnap
maintains that a wide variety of the remaining properties of physical
space are determined by convention alone. Conventions determine, for ex
ample, the number of dimensions of physical space, as well as its metrical
structure. From the topological basis conventions are adopted in order to
produce a physical space that is the easiest to work with. Thus, while the
choice is "not arbitrary" (Carnap 1922, 36), certain questions asked inde
pendently of adopted conventions are senseless [sinnloss] (Carnap 1922,
37).
Carnap concludes the essay with a brief consideration of the relev
ance of his earlier discussions for the traditional philosophical debates
connected with space. While being critical of the vagueness associated
with traditional Kantian terminology, Carnap is convinced that only the
topological relations of our experience "are declared to be conditions of
the possibility of any object of experience whatsoever" (Carnap 1922, 67).
This leads to the claim that "The relation of R' [intuitive space] to R"
[physical space] is that of a form of intuition to a structure with this form
made up of real objects of experience" (Carnap 1922, 61). Whatever dif
ferences arise between these two spaces are due to the adoption of different
conventions. The study of formal space is a priori and analytic, and that of
intuitive space is synthetic a priori. Carnap concludes with a diagnosis of
what type of space various authors such as Couturat, Riemann, Helmholtz
and Poincar? were concerned with.
Two facts are of special importance for determining the nature of
Carnap's relationship with Russell during this period. The first is the pres
ence of a number of references to Russell's works in the endnotes of Der
Raum and the second concerns what Carnap wrote in a letter to Russell
late in 1921 that accompanied a copy of Der Raum. Throughout the end
notes of the essay Carnap makes a number of comparisons between his
project and various positions that Russell had taken. It is not surprising, of
course, to find references to Whitehead and Russell's Principia, the work
that Carnap appeals to in support of his logicist constructions of formal
space. It is more interesting to note the references that Carnap makes to
other works by Russell. These references extend from Russell's fellowship
essay of 1897 An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, through The
Principles of Mathematics of 1903, The Problems of Philosophy of 1912,
and Our Knowledge of the External World of 1914. The references in some
cases include precise page numbers that suggest a careful reading of Rus
sell's various proposals. Carnap notes that Russell had also distinguished
between various kinds of space (Carnap 1922, 82, 85) and that Russell
agrees that formal space is analytic and a priori (Carnap 1922, 86). If
he had studied the essay The Foundations of Geometry (Russell 1897),
Carnap would have recognized that Russell held there a view similar to
Carnap's about the necessary properties of any possible outer experience.
Russell argues, in that early essay, that space must have certain projective
properties, while as we have seen Carnap argues that such properties are
merely topological.
Carnap's two references to Russell's Our Knowledge (Carnap 1922,

79, 82) are of more interest for our understanding of Carnap's future de
velopment. The first reference is to Russell's discussion of relations in the
lecture "Logic as the Essence of Philosophy". The second reference is to
the section where Russell provides an outline of how the space of physics
could be constructed out of sense-data. The reference is labelled "On the
logical construction of R" [physical space] from the elements of sense
perceptions".9 In the text of this section Carnap is engaged in determining
"which of these [physical-spatial] relations hold for particular things lying
before us in experience" (Carnap 1922, 32).10 As we have seen Carnap
here does not pursue Russell's solution to the problem. Instead he uses a
combination of necessary topological relations between intuitive and phys
ical space and conventions in order to bridge the gap between the space of
intuition and of physics.
Of more significance is Carnap's first letter to Russell, dated Nov. 17,
1921. There Carnap begins by thanking Russell "for the rich stimulation
that I have experienced through your work in my study of the theory of
the exact sciences".11 He mentions only Frege, Couturat and Russell as
influences. Carnap goes on to give a summary of Der Raum and a com
parison of the terms that he uses there with the terms that Russell had
used in Problems of Philosophy and Foundations of Geometry. The letter
concludes with some general political remarks about the need for closer
international relations between scholars. The letter is further evidence of
Carnap's careful reading of Russell's writings. It is perhaps worth noting
that Carnap does not mention Our Knowledge in this letter. This suggests
either that he did not see Russell's remarks there as being of particular
relevance to his concerns, or that he had not yet studied it in much detail.
In any case, it is clear that during this period Carnap saw Russell as a
major figure in philosophy, not only with respect to his philosophy of
mathematics, but also on more general epistemological questions. There
is no evidence from this period that Carnap identified Russell's approach
with traditional empiricism or any other, to his mind, outdated approach to
issues connected with space. On the contrary, Carnap's comments suggest
that he saw Russell as an ally in the sense that both of them advocated
a new approach to traditional philosophical questions based on careful
analysis and the logic of Principia.
From 1922 until 1928 Carnap produced four published papers (Carnap
1923),12 (Carnap 1924, 1925, 1927), one monograph (Carnap 1926),13 and
a sizeable collection of unpublished material as well as the Aufbau. These
writings mark two major changes from Carnap's doctoral dissertation.
First, Carnap seeks to generalize his dissertation project by extending some
of its main ideas about physical space to physics generally. Second, he

comes to abandon the belief that the properties of intuitive space are given
by anything like essential intuition. This leads to a more thoroughgoing
construction of the space of our experience, or what will eventually be
come the "perceptual world" [der Wahrnehmungswelt, see, e.g., (Carnap
1928, ?135)]. An aspect of this change that comes to the fore in the Aufbau
is the need for a new account of the connection between the perceptual
world and the physical world.
2.1. Towards a Structural Conception of Physics
I have separated these two developments because they express themselves

quite differently in Carnap's writings. The first development can be traced
to his interest in an axiomatization of physics. This interest preceded his
dissertation. Writing to Dingier in November of 1920 Carnap listed in ad
dition to the "axiomatic construction of kinematics [axiomatischen Aufbau
der Bewegungslehre]" (of which he had already made an outline), the ideas
for various topics relating to issues arising from physics.14 It appears that
Carnap returned to these questions shortly after finishing his dissertation.
Carnap investigates a number of subjects in these writings, but I shall focus
on the one that seems most significant for the Aufbau. This is the notion of
a topological or structural construction of physics.
Carnap's goal was to show how all structural physical properties could
be constructed using the purely structural properties of two basic relations.
In light of the additional thesis that all physical properties are structural,
his goal became the purely structural construction of all of physics. That
all physical properties are structural is something that Carnap will em
phasize later in the Aufbau (?16). Even in his early writings, however, this
is suggested by the combination of Carnap's logicism and his belief in a
purely quantitative physics. His logicism amounts to the belief that all of
mathematics can be derived from logic alone, where this is understood to
include the theory of relations. Carnap's belief in a purely quantitive phys
ics finds expression in the 1926 monograph on physical concept formation.
There he envisions a complete description of the world as being a list of
14-tuples, where the first four numbers are the space-time coordinates of
a worldpoint and the remaining ten are the assignments of various state
magnitudes to these points (Carnap 1926, 58-9). Thus, for Carnap there
was no barrier in principle to the construction of a purely structural phys
ics because quantitative assignments are complicated logical or structural
claims. It remains unclear, though, exactly when Carnap concluded that a
purely structural construction of physics was possible.
Carnap actually attempted such a structural construction of a small

number of physical relations using only two relations on worldpoints.
This attempt is preserved in the 1924 manuscript "Topology of the Space
Time-World [Topologie der Raum-Zeit-Welt]".15 The relations chosen are
coincidence, K, and the time-order of worldpoints on the same worldline,
Z. The primary thesis of this work is that all topological facts about the
space-time world are derivable from the topological properties of these
two relations. A second thesis is that the metrical properties of the space
time world are also derivable from the topological properties of these two
relations.16 These ideas receive their most detailed published treatment in
the 1925 paper "The Dependence of the Properties of Space on Those of
Time" (Carnap 1925).17 There Carnap claims that
the topological properties of the spatial order can be derived from the topological properties
of the temporal order and coincidence. (The stronger thesis that from such definitions all
properties of the spatial order, including the metrical, can be derived, can be here only
mentioned without justification or further discussion.) (Carnap 1925, 334)18
The suggestion that all metrical physical properties can be derived from
the topological properties of two time relations may seem bizarre. Carnap
clearly thinks it is permissible to use conventions in these derivations as
well as the two topological relations. It is difficult to determine exactly
what sort of construction of physics Carnap envisaged. The "Physical
Concept Formation" monograph of 1926 suggests how Carnap might have
thought he could extend these ideas. There he claims that each magnitude
is based on two relations and conventions concerning the assignment of
numbers to magnitudes. These relations, in turn, are all based on spatial
relations. Carnap concludes that "Any measurement of a magnitude in
physics reduces to a measurement of spatial length" (Carnap 1926, 16).19
If Carnap thought that all of physics could be reduced to the assignment
of magnitudes to worldpoints, and that these assignments were all based
on spatial magnitudes, then it is clear that spatial magnitudes such as dis
tance become central to his project. He went some way towards showing
how the topological properties of these magnitudes could be understood
structurally in the "Dependence" paper. The addition of conventions allows
such magnitudes to be fully determined. So, Carnap, at least in outline,
had a fully structural construction of physics by around 1926 and he had
conceived of the project by 1924.20
That Carnap saw a connection between this project and Russell is re
vealed in a letter written to Reichenbach on June 20th, 1923. Discussing
the project that was to lead to the 1924 manuscript discussed above, Carnap
writes that
It concerns a structural theory of worldlines, or in your terms: an axiomatic of the topology

of time ... It relates to your work say as Russell's logic relates to mathematics, e.g., to
arithmetic. While arithmetic takes its start from numbers and the axioms holding among
them, Russell begins earlier: starting from purely logical basic concepts and axioms one
comes to complex concepts and theorems which represent the basic concepts and basic
propositions of arithmetic. So, I start from a considerably large number of axioms, which
contain only concepts of logic (in particular the theory of relations), and end up finally with
71
the complex derived propositions, which correspond (partly) to your axioms.
Here Carnap seems to have in mind the way Russell motivates his logicist
project in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. Russell begins with a
criticism of the view that Peano's axioms constitute a sufficient foundation
for the natural numbers. After noting that Peano's axioms can be satisfied
by any progression, Russell concludes that a merely axiomatic procedure
"fails to give an adequate basis for arithmetic" (Russell 1919, 10). One
problem is that "we want our numbers to be such as can be used for count
ing common objects, and this requires that our numbers should have a
definite meaning" which the axiomatic procedure does not establish (Rus
sell 1919, 10).22 Carnap seems to understand his project for a structural
physics in a similar way. It is a necessary supplement to an axiomatization
of physics and serves to make more determinate the content of our phys
ical statements. The reference to Reichenbach's work is to Reichenbach's
axiomatic presentation of general and special relativity that he had dis
cussed with Carnap at the 1923 Erlangen conference.23 The results of this
project are presented in Reichenbach's 1924 book Axiomatics ofRelativ
istic Space-Time-Theory [Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre]
(Reichenbach 1924). This project is partly inspired by Hubert's axio
matization of geometry. However, Reichenbach's project also requires a
coordination between the axiomatic structure and our experience. For ex
ample, physical definitions are different from mathematical definitions due
to the fact that only the former involve a connection with physical ob
jects: "Physical definitions ... consist in the coordination of a mathematical
definition to a 'piece of reality'; one might call them real definitions"
(Reichenbach 1969, 8).24 Carnap seems to be raising the objection that
such an axiomatization is incomplete or unsatisfactory.
Exactly what bothered Carnap about Reichenbach's procedure is un
clear. One view of the disagreement is suggested by a remark in another
letter from Carnap to Reichenbach. Writing in April of 1924, Carnap
claims to find their main difference in "that [while] you [Reichenbach]
proceed 'upwards' from the unifying axioms to the physical, I, on the other
hand, [proceed] downwards to the logical in order to arrive at still more
primitive concepts and axioms, from which yours arise deductively".25
Carnap's hope seems to have been to provide a true foundation for our
physical concepts by showing how they can be constructed in purely lo

gical or structural terms. From Carnap's perspective, Reichenbach was
starting in the middle precisely because he was relying on a primitive
relation of coordination between concepts and the physical world.26 This
is in fact quite similar to how Russell viewed his logicist construction of
mathematics. Russell also constructed all mathematical concepts in a way
that showed that an appeal to a certain suspect relation, i.e., mathematical
intuition, was superfluous. So, while Carnap's objection cannot be exactly
the same as Russell's it is significant that Carnap would mention Russell's
name in this context.27
On September 9, 1923, Carnap wrote to Russell and mentioned the
preliminary parts of the project of providing a structural construction of
physics. He describes his project as "an axiomatics of the non-metrical pro
positions about time with the help of symbolic logic". He later continues
"In addition to the topology of time, which I have put just in rough form,
I am interested also in the transition to the topology of space". Carnap
is eager to note the aid that he has received from Russell's work in this
and other projects: "For this and other works (e.g., a still very preliminary
axiomatics of causality) I have come to appreciate symbolic logic as a tool
of highest usefulness and sharpness, which is for exact logical analysis of
this type extremely indispensable".28 Carnap mentions in this context not
only Principia, but also Our Knowledge of the External World. This letter
shows, then, that Carnap wanted to communicate to Russell the connection
between his work and Russell's own work. The emphasis at this point is
clearly on Russell's logical work, but as we will see later, Carnap also came
to incorporate Russell's ideas into other projects.
2.2. Connecting Two Worlds
At the same time that Carnap was developing his structural conception
of physics he was also working on another closely related project. This
was to account for the relation between the world that we perceive and
the increasingly quantitative and structural world of physics. In the 1922
manuscript "From Chaos to Reality [Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit]" Carnap
begins with the epistemologist's claim that reality is erected on the basis of
instinctive principles of ordering from the chaos of experience. Noting that
such a view must be false because such a chaos is a fiction, he concedes
that it will be useful to investigate on what basis such a construction could
be effected:
In order to complete the return to the starting point of the construction of reality, we
must remove from reality everything that denotes an already complete order and indi
vidual determination: The distinction between mental and physical, the arrangement of the
latter in space, the subsumption of both realms in the time-series, the distinction of the
different sensory qualities, the conceptual determination of the individual sense-qualities
on the basis of the qualitative relationships of bodies, so for example the determination of
the single colours on the basis of their position in the colour-solid [Farbk?rper] [and] the
individual tones on the basis on their position in the tone-series.29
What such an analysis ends with are the experiences and relations between
the experiences that are sufficient to reconstruct the reality that we began
with. In this manuscript Carnap chooses different relations between exper
iences than he will later choose in the Aufbau, but the similarities should
be clear. The challenge is to see on what basis reality can be reconstructed.
A similar move from the world of experience to the physical world is
discussed in the 1924 paper "Three-dimensionality of Space and Caus
ality: An Examination of the Logical Connection between Two Fictions
[Dreidimensionalit?t des Raumes und Kausalit?t: Eine Untersuchung ?ber
den logischen Zusammenhang zweier Fiktionen]" (Carnap 1924). Carnap
there discusses the connection between the primary world of experience
and the secondary world of physics. The primary world is said not to obey
laws and to have two spatial dimensions. The secondary world does obey
laws and has three spatial dimensions. The central claim of the paper is
that the secondary world is constructed on the basis of the primary world
precisely so that it will obey laws (Carnap 1924, 106). There is a further
claim concerning the relation of the dimensions of the two worlds that I
will not pursue. Here again Carnap investigates the relationship between
our experience and the physical world.
In both the "Reality" manuscript and the "Three-dimensionality" paper
Carnap is careful to leave open the question of which of these two worlds
is metaphysically more real.
Which is now the "real" world, the primary or the secondary? ... We leave this question,
which is properly speaking a transcendent one, to metaphysics; our immanent discussion
has to do only with the character [Beschaffenheit] of experience itself, especially with the
distinction of its formal factors into necessary and conventional, which we call primary
and secondary, and with the relations of both types. Also the expression "fiction" carries
here no negative metaphysical value ... (Carnap 1924, 109-10).30
This non-metaphysical perspective is, of course, developed further in the

Aufbau. I mention it here precisely because it pertains to the relationship
between the world of experience and the world of physics. Neither world
is privileged, and Carnap explicitly states that he is merely investigating
the relationship between these two worlds.
3. Aufbau AS RECONSTRUCTION
Both developments delineated above appear in the Aufbau. The first, con
cerning the structural conception of physics, is reflected in the construction
of the world of physics in ?136 and the remarks at the end of ?62. In "the
world of physics ... physical magnitudes are assigned to the points of the
four-dimensional space. This construction has the purpose of formulating
a domain which is determined through mathematically expressible laws"
(Carnap 1928, ?136). The second development, concerning the connection
between the perceptual world and the physical world, is that Carnap now
sees the need to construct the perceptual world out of the basic relation of
recollected similarity between elementary experiences. This task occupies
most of the Aufbau. I want to argue here that the goal of this construction
is simply to reconstruct the perceptual world on as philosophically neutral
a basis as possible. In particular, I want to emphasize that Carnap is neutral
on the question of what components of the perceptual world are "real" and
which are mere "fictions". This neutrality is central to his project.
It is important to recognize that no part of this project depends on there
being just one basic relation. In the "Reality" manuscript more than one ba
sic relation is used, and in two manuscripts from 1925 Carnap employs five
basic relations: central identity of type, similarity, intensity, recollection
and proximity in the sensory field.31 Even in the Aufbau Carnap only tent
atively suggests that one basic relation is sufficient (Carnap 1928, ?156).
If more than one basic relation is required in order to construct all of our
concepts, then this is not presented as a problem. It is, of course, preferable
to have only one relation, but this is only an ideal that is preferred for
reasons of simplicity and not a requirement.32
This reconstructive interpretation is supported by Carnap's explicit
description of the aim of the Aufbau:
The present investigations aim to establish a "constructional system", that is, an epistemic
logical system of objects or concepts ... Unlike other conceptual systems, a constructional
system undertakes more than the division of concepts into various kinds and the investig
ation of the differences and mutual relations between these kinds. In addition, it attempts
a step-by-step derivation or "construction" of all concepts from certain fundamental con
cepts, so that a genealogy of concepts results in which each one has its definite place. It is
the main thesis of construction theory that all concepts can in this way be derived from a
few fundamental concepts, and it is in this respect that it differs from most other ontologies
(Carnap 1928, ?1).
Here Carnap is quite clear that we begin with a certain set of concepts
that we wish to reconstruct in terms of a few basic concepts. The result of
such a project is a reorganization of our concepts into a unified structure.
It might initially seem peculiar that Carnap should focus on concepts and
not on propositions. However, in the next section, Carnap explains why he

wants first to reconstruct our concepts:
So far, much more attention has been paid to the first task, namely, the deduction of state
ments from axioms, than to the methodology of the systematic construction of concepts.
The latter is to be our present concern and is to be applied to the conceptual system of
unified science. Only if we succeed in producing such a unified system of all concepts will
it be possible to overcome the separation of unified science into unrelated special sciences
(Carnap 1928, ?2).
These remarks are readily intelligible in light of Carnap's 1923 letter to

Reichenbach that was discussed above. The claim is that any axiomatic
development, even one involving coordination, of a scientific theory is not
enough. It must be supplemented with the construction of the concepts that
such a theory employs. Only then will we have a clear understanding of the
theory and will a unified science be possible.
Carnap distinguishes between two kinds of constructional systems:
those that respect the epistemic order and those that do not. He requires
a system that respects epistemic order. Such a system provides not only
a reorganization of our concepts into a structure, but also indicates which
concepts are prior in the order of justification. That is, the constructions
must reflect how it is possible to recognize that an object is of a certain
sort: "An object (or an object type) is called epistemically primary relative
to another one, which we call epistemically secondary, if the second one is
recognized through the mediation of the first and thus presupposes, for its
recognition, the recognition of the first" (Carnap 1928, ?54). In defending
the choice of an autopsychological or solipsistic basis Carnap points out
that this is the only basis that respects the epistemic order of our know
ledge: "The most important reason for this [choice] lies in our intention to
have the constructional system reflect not only the logical-constructional
order of the objects, but also their epistemic order (?54). It is for the same
reason that we excluded the system form with physical basis, various ver
sions of which were logically possible" (Carnap 1928, ?64). The choice
of an autopsychological basis is required, then, because we can recognize
facts only with reference to our own experience. If the system is to reflect
the epistemic order, then it must have an autopsychological basis.
This leads to a concern about objectivity that Carnap considers two sec
tions later: "If the basis of the constructional system is autopsychological,
then the danger of subjectivism seems to arise. Thus, we are confronted
with the problem of how we can achieve objectivity of knowledge with
such a system form" (Carnap 1928, ?66). Objectivity must be recovered by
Carnap's reconstructive project just as it must construct all of our concepts.
Carnap's solution to this problem is a structural conception of objectivity:
even though the material of the individual streams of experience is completely different,
or rather altogether incomparable, since a comparison of two sensations or two feelings
of different subjects, as far as their immediately given qualities are concerned, is absurd,
certain structural properties are analogous for all streams of experience (Carnap 1928,
?66).
We have already seen how Carnap's purely quantitative conception of

physics is connected with a structural view of scientific knowledge. Now
this point of view is extended into a structural account of the objectivity of
our knowledge of the qualitative perceptual world as well. This approach
may seem strange, but it is not that distant from our own practices. We do
not accept in science any appeal to the intrinsic character of an individual's
experience. We require that a reason for accepting a scientific belief be
accessible to any competent investigator. In particular, when Carnap says
earlier in the Aufbau that "a definite description through pure structure
statements is generally possible to the extent in which scientific discrimin
ation is possible at all" (Carnap 1928, ?15), he is saying that if we could
have a reason to accept a statement then it must be a structural statement.
And this means that it cannot make reference to the intrinsic character of
experience.
I do not mean to suggest that this is an entirely benign conception of
objectivity. However, understood in this light I do not think it leads to the
problems that writers such as Friedman and Richardson have described.33
This understanding of Carnap's view of objectivity also goes some way
towards showing that it need not be viewed as a form of latent neo
Kantianism. For example, Russell, who certainly was not a neo-Kantian,
makes several remarks in this vein and Carnap refers to one of them quite
approvingly. In The Problems of Philosophy Russell notes in discussing
the relation between the space of our sense-data and physical space that
"although the relations of physical objects have all sorts of knowable
properties, derived from their correspondence with the relations of sense
data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown in their intrinsic
nature, so far at least as can be discovered by the senses" (Russell 1982,
17). Here the claim is that the intrinsic properties of physical objects are
unknowable. Later in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy Russell
goes somewhat further. Discussing the relation between the phenomenal
world and its purportedly more objective counterpart, Russell claims that
"every proposition having communicable significance must be true of both
worlds or of neither: the only difference must lie in just that essence of in
dividuality which always eludes words and baffles description, but which,
for that very reason, is irrelevant to science" (Russell 1919, 61). When
referring to this passage at the end of ?16 Carnap claims that "It was not
until Russell ([Math. Phil.] 62 f.)34 that the importance of structure for
the achievement of objectivity was pointed out" (Carnap 1928, ?16). My

suggestion is, then, that Carnap's. concern with objectivity is a product of
his reconstructive project, and that it is not an exclusively neo-Kantian
thesis.
I have emphasized the merely reconstructive nature of Carnap's project
for two reasons. First, it is what Carnap considers the main goal of the
work. Second, it is the aspect of the Aufbau that Carnap explicitly com
pares with Russell's own work. In ?3, when referring to others who had
developed the applied theory of relations Carnap notes that
In questions of detail, construction theory diverges very considerably from Russell, but it,
too is based on his methodological principle: "The supreme maxim in scientific philosophy
is this: Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities"
[Sense Data] 155.36 We shall, however, employ this principle in an even more radical
way than Russell (for example, through the choice of an autopsychological basis [?64],
in the construction of that which is not seen from that which is seen [?124], and in the
construction of the heteropsychological objects [?140]) (Carnap 1928, ?3).
Here it is important to note the distinction between construction theory and

construction systems. Construction theory is the theory that studies vari
ous construction systems. Carnap emphasizes several times in the Aufbau
that he is only offering one construction system, but that he will use such
a system to support particular theses of construction theory. The above
quotation does not claim that Russell is engaged in construction theory.
The next part of the references in ?3 discusses previous attempts at a con
struction theory.37 The claim is made, though, that both Russell's project
and Carnap's are based on the same methodological principle. As I will
try to show in the next section this is a correct interpretation of Russell's
project in the paper referred to and in the book Our Knowledge of the
External World. Both Carnap and Russell were engaged in reconstructive
projects with the goal of reordering our scientific knowledge. Both took
this scientific knowledge as given and sought to clarify it through the use of
mathematical logic. There is no evidence that either project was motivated
by skeptical doubts.
That Carnap saw the Aufbau in this Russellian light is made clearer
by two letters that Carnap wrote to Russell. The first letter, dated Feb
ruary 27, 1926, begins "I enclose the contents and some pages of a new
manuscript, in which I trie [sic] to make an application of your logic
for the construction of an epistemological system" and concludes with a
reservation
Two years before you helped me kindly in getting a copy of the Principia Mathematica. I
wish to say [to] you my best thanks for the great help I received by this work especially
in the mentioned manuscript, although I am not sure that you will be agreed with [sic] my
proceeding in applying your logic.38
The manuscript is without question an earlier version of the Aufbau.

Carnap completed a version of the Aufbau in 1926 and submitted it as
his Habilitationsschrift to the University of Vienna. Here Carnap is quite
tentative about making too close an identification between the Aufbau and
Russell's own epistemological work. Russell is equally tentative in his
reply, dated April 7,1926: "The pages you sent me are very interesting, and
suggest a most valuable book. I cannot venture on comments from an ab
stract and an introduction, but it is evident that your work is important".39
It is significant, however, that Carnap would send Russell such a draft. It
indicates both how important he thought Russell's opinions of his work
were, and that he believed that Russell's interests might overlap with his
own.
Carnap gives more details in his letter to Russell of August 11th, 1928
which apparently accompanied a copy of the newly published Aufbau: "I
believe [myself] to have made here a step towards the goal that you also
bear in mind: clarification of epistemological problems (and the removal
of metaphysical problems) with the aid that the new logic, particularly
through your own works, provides".40 Carnap goes on to note two points
of disagreement:
I would like already here to indicate two points on which I had to depart from your view.
These points of difference do not rest on differences in basic attitude, which appears to
me thoroughly in agreement. The differences arise rather just because I have attempted to
carry out your basic view in a more consistent way than has happened before. I believe I
am here "more Russellian than Russell".41
The first point of difference is that Carnap applies the "construction prin
ciple" or supreme maxim to the construction of other minds, whereas
Russell does not. The second difference centers on the question of realism.
In ?176 Carnap claims that Russell contradicts himself on the question of
the validity of metaphysical realism.42 In the letter Carnap describes the
situation in more delicate terms:
Also here I believe myself to have carried out more consistently your basic attitude, in
that I reject the (metaphysical) concept of reality. I believe that the question of reality
[Realit?t] and with it in general the entire philosophical realism debate, in general has no
sense (?175-178, and the second part of the brochure "Pseudo-problems", which is sent to
you as well).43
Given these friendly overtures, Russell's curt response is somewhat disap

pointing. Writing to Carnap eight months later on April 26th, 1929, Russell
notes that "I have not had time to read it [the Aufbau] as it deserves, but
from looking into it, I feel inclined to suppose that its views are those
which I ought to hold, in the sense that they are the logical working out of
premises which I accept".44
In the next two sections I will examine the extent to which this exchange
accurately reflects the views of Russell and Carnap during this period.
It should be clear, though, that these letters show that Carnap saw close
affinities between his and Russell's philosophical work. Interestingly, the
differences between them are taken by Carnap to be a consequence of his
applying Russellian principles more consistently than Russell himself did.
4. RUSSELL'S RECONSTRUCTIVE PROJECT
Russell had three different projects in the period between 1909 and 1926.
The first of these was to articulate and defend his preferred metaphys
ics. The second project concerned the development and application of a
scientific methodology to philosophical problems. This method was used
in Russell's reconstruction of our scientific knowledge. The third was to
develop an adequate account of certain philosophical concepts such as
knowledge, judgment and other propositional attitudes. I will refer to this
project as the development of a theory of knowledge.
These projects were of course interconnected in Russell's mind, but as I
hope to show in this section, it is a mistake to view any one of these projects
as the motivation for another. In particular, I want to argue that Russell's
views on acquaintance were not the motivation for his logical construc
tion of physical concepts such as space and matter. Russell's claims about
acquaintance are one phase in the development of the third project. His
constructions, however, are properly seen in light of the second project.
Thus, I will show how Russell's constructions are reconstructive in nature,
and that they were not motivated by claims about acquaintance. I can only
indicate in outline what I take to be Russell's understanding of these three
projects and their connection in this period. My task is complicated by the
fact that Russell scholars have often failed to distinguish these projects.45
This seems to have led writers such as Quine, Friedman and Richardson to
conflate Russell's different projects.46 The result of this is that the debate
about Russell's influence on Carnap is based on a faulty assumption. Both
sides assume that if Carnap did not accept Russell's views on acquaintance
then Carnap was not seriously influenced by Russell. Quine seems to as
sume that because Carnap says he was influenced by Russell, he must have
accepted Russell's views on acquaintance. Friedman and Richardson argue
that because Carnap clearly did not accept Russell's views on acquaint
ance, Carnap could not have been influenced by Russell. Distinguishing
these three Russellian projects will undermine this common assumption
and allow us to isolate exactly what aspects of Russell's thought Carnap
was influenced by.
Between 1909 and 1926 Russell produced an impressive amount of

philosophical work. In addition to completing and reading the proofs for
the first edition of Principia Mathematica, Russell published four books
(The Problems of Philosophy, Our Knowledge of the External World, In
troduction to Mathematical Philosophy, and The Analysis of Mind) and
wrote the introduction to the second edition of Principia. His philosoph
ical papers, both published and unpublished, comprise an additional 1300
pages of material.47 Carnap does not refer to all of Russell's publications.
My rough estimate is that Carnap failed to read around 1000 pages of
what Russell wrote between 1909 and 1926. These omissions include such
important texts as "Analytic Realism" (1911), the unpublished 1913 ma
nuscript The Theory of Knowledge, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism"
(1918) and "Logical Atomism" (1924). This suggests that Carnap failed
to understand what Russell was trying to do in the writings that he did
read. For a summary of Carnap's references to Russell see the appendix
(p. 29). As I will show below, Carnap's confusion can be traced to Russell's
practice of discussing different projects in different places. Furthermore,
Russell often changed his views on an issue without alerting the reader or
providing the reason for the change. In fact, it seems clear that Carnap did
not appreciate the significance of the first and third of Russell's projects
that I have listed above. That is, Carnap saw Russell as being engaged in a
merely reconstructive project, and this caused him to misunderstand Rus
sell's views on metaphysics. Carnap also did not adequately take account
of Russell's changing views on the theory of knowledge.
Russell's metaphysical program is set out in his 1911 paper "Analytic
Realism". This short address to La soci?t? fran?aise de philosophie offers
a clear statement of his metaphysical views at the time:
The philosophy which seems to me closest to the truth can be called 'analytic realism'. It is
realist, because it claims that there are non-mental entities and that the cognitive relations
are external relations, which establish a direct link between the subject and a possibly non
mental object. It is analytic, because it claims that the existence of the complex depends
on the existence of the simple, and not vice versa, and that the constituent of a complex,
taken as a constituent, is absolutely identical with itself as it is when we do not consider its
relations (Russell 1992b, 133).
The ultimate simples of this theory come in two kinds: universals and
particulars. In the discussion appended to the address Russell also labels
his view 'logical atomism': "this philosophy is the philosophy of logical
atomism. Every simple entity is an atom. One must not suppose that atoms
need persist in time, or that they need occupy space: these atoms are purely
logical" (Russell 1992b, 135).48 It is clear that Russell's chief opponent is
the monist, e.g., Bradley, who argues that actually there is only one thing,
and that all relations are internal. It is worth keeping his ontology in mind,
however, for at least two reasons. First, it remains more or less constant
for the rest of the period we are considering, i.e., until 1926. The changes
that do occur pertain to what sorts of particulars are said to exist, and their
relations to one another, and not to Russell's basic metaphysical outlook.49
Second, it is a very minimal ontology in the sense that it rules out very few
positions in other areas of philosophy.
Despite the fact that Russell's core metaphysical beliefs remained con
stant in this period, his two other projects developed in quite a radical
way. The 1911 paper contains a brief description of the correct method
that philosophy should employ: "The true method, in philosophy as in
science, should be inductive, meticulous, respectful of detail, and should
reject the belief that it is the duty of each philosopher to solve all problems
by himself" (Russell 1992b, 139). The presence of the word 'inductive' is
significant. It indicates that even in 1911 Russell viewed philosophy as a
fallible enterprise that cannot attain certainty in its fundamental principles.
By the time Russell came to write the 1914 lectures that were later pub
lished as Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific
Method in Philosophy, the method had become a central aspect of his
presentation. He opens the preface with:
The following lectures are an attempt to show, by means of examples, the nature, capacity,
and limitations of the logical-analytic method in philosophy. This method, of which the first
complete example is to be found in the writings of Frege, has gradually, in the course of
actual research, increasingly forced itself upon me as something perfectly definite, capable
of embodiment in maxims, and adequate, in all branches of philosophy, to yield whatever
objective scientific knowledge it is possible to obtain (Russell 1915, v).
The examples that Russell uses to show the effectiveness of the method are
first of all our knowledge of the external world, but also the problems of
continuity and cause. Russell places at the center of his method a somewhat
peculiar version of Occam's razor. Discussing the definition of a thing as
the series of its aspects, Russell notes
The above extrusion of permanent things affords an example of the maxim which inspires
all scientific philosophising, namely "Occam's razor": Entities are not to be multiplied
without necessity. In other words, in dealing with any subject-matter, find out what entities
are undeniably involved, and state everything in terms of these entities (Russell 1915, 107).
This maxim is presented in the 1914 paper "The Relation of Sense-Data

to Physics" in the form in which Carnap was later to adopt it as the motto
of the Aufbau: "The supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing is this:
Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred
entities" (Russell 1986, 11).
The supreme maxim is presented as a completely general maxim that
is to be used to resolve all rationally resolvable philosophical problems. It
remains unclear exactly what sort of project Russell is engaged in, though,
and how he determines when entities are 'undeniably' involved and when
they can be replaced by logical constructions. The final lecture of Our
Knowledge contains a clear statement of his project:
We start from a body of common knowledge, which constitutes our data. On examination,
the data are found to be complex, rather vague, and largely interdependent logically. By
analysis we reduce them to propositions which are as nearly as possible simple and precise,
and we arrange them in deductive chains, in which a certain number of initial propositions
form a logical guarantee for all the rest. These initial propositions are premisses for the
body of knowledge in question (Russell 1915, 211).
The chief benefit of this procedure is that logical economy is achieved,

but it also allows an assignment of degrees of certainty to a belief based
on what premises are used in the derivation of the belief.50 There is no
requirement that the premises of such an analysis be certain or self-evident.
In fact, Russell explicitly acknowledges that his constructions rely on the
existence of perspectives with no subject (Russell 1915, 88). This in itself
should make it clear that Russell is not concerned with philosophical skep
ticism. Russell's remark in Our Knowledge that "Universal skepticism,
though logically irrefutable, is practically barren" (Russell 1915, 67) also
shows that he thought it was impossible to refute scepticism, and that there
was no need to.
It is the application of this scientific method to the specific problem
of our knowledge of the external world that is usually described as Rus
sell's 'external world program'. The program is reconstructive in nature.
We begin with the results of science, including physics and psychology,
and attempt to interpret these results in terms of entities that are necessar
ily involved.51 Precisely because the project is one of reconstructing our
knowledge, Russell argues that the entities that are fundamental are our
sense-data: "I think it may be laid down quite generally that, in so far as
physics or common sense is verifiable, it must be capable of interpretation
in terms of actual sense-data. The reason for this is simple. Verification
consists always in the occurrence of an expected sense-datum" (Russell
1915, 81). There is no requirement here that physics be in fact verifiable
in terms of the sense-data of an individual, and Russell later introduces
not only the sense-data of others, but also the potential sense-data of sub
jectless 'perspectives'. The reason for this is that only these additional
premises allow the complete reconstruction of our scientific knowledge.52
Russell adopts these extra premises, and does not consider the option of
the rejection of purported 'knowledge' due to some philosophical standard.
Furthermore, these constructions have no metaphysical implications. They
concern merely what we have a reason to believe to exist, and not what
exists.53
I have referred to Russell's third project as the development of a theory
of knowledge. Here the problem was not to determine what we know, but
what knowledge and other cognitive relations are. The project involved
the attempt to explain a whole range of philosophical concepts such as
judgment, knowledge, proposition, truth and even the nature of logic it
self. Not surprisingly, completing this project proved problematic. The
project may be divided into two periods. The first period extends until
the beginning of World War I and includes the 1911 paper "Knowledge
by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", the 1912 popular book
The Problems of Philosophy and the Theory of Knowledge manuscript of
1913. In the face of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the manuscript Russell set
this project aside. He did not return to it until 1917 due to his activities
in opposition to World War I. In the second period, from 1917 onwards,
Russell pursued a new, and very different, solution to the problems that
he had earlier encountered. These changes are reflected in his 1919 paper
"On Propositions" and the 1921 book The Analysis of Mind. I can only give
the barest outline of these changes, but even this outline should make two
things clear. First, Russell's views on acquaintance belong to this project,
and not to his reconstructive project discussed above. Second, Carnap is
not very interested in this aspect of Russell's thought.
In "Knowledge by Acquaintance" Russell puts forward a principle that
will be important for him in his forthcoming epistemological investiga
tions:
The fundamental epistemological principle in the analysis of propositions is this: Every

proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which
we are acquainted (Russell 1992b, 154).
Acquaintance is here a primitive relation between a subject and a particular

such as a sense-datum or a universal. According to the fundamental prin
ciple, even a proposition that does not appear to be made up of things with
which we are acquainted must be analysed into constituents with which we
are acquainted. For example, in the proposition "Julius Caesar was assas
sinated" the term "Julius Caesar" seems to be an initial counter-example to
the fundamental principle. Russell proposes, though, that we read "Julius
Caesar" as "the man whose name was 'Julius Caesar' ". Now we have a
definite description that can be further analysed into logical concepts and
universals using Russell's theory of descriptions.
The fundamental principle has far-reaching consequences for Russell's
theory of knowledge and judgment. It concerns what is required not only
for knowledge, but even for a judgment to occur. We will shortly see where
it led Russell in his doomed Theory of Knowledge manuscript. It is worth

noting, though, that Russell conceived the principle as an epistemological
principle. It is not a logical principle that we could know with certainty, and
seems to be exactly the kind of principle that - so he argues - philosophers
should be willing to give up if it does not fit the facts. I will argue later that
Russell gave up this principle in light of the problems that it led to in The
ory of Knowledge. Russell worked on the Theory of Knowledge manuscript
from April 1913 until June 1913.54 In order to understand these criticisms,
we must first understand Russell's project. The project was extremely am
bitious. Two main sections with three parts each were envisioned (Russell
1983, 201-202). Part A, the analytic portion of the book, was to have parts
entitled 'On the Nature of Acquaintance', 'Atomic Propositional Thought'
and 'Molecular Propositional Thought'. Part B, the constructive portion,
was to have parts on the 'Knowledge of Logic', 'Knowledge of Sense'
and 'Knowledge of Science'.55 Only the first two parts of Part A were
completed.
Russell begins with a discussion of the relation of acquaintance, what
we are acquainted with, and how acquaintance with particulars and uni
versals could be used to explain belief or judgment. Acquaintance is
introduced as
a dual relation between a subject and an object which need not have any community of
nature. The subject is "mental", the object is not known to be mental except by intro
spection ... All cognitive relations - attention, sensation, memory, imagination, believing,
disbelieving, etc. -presuppose acquaintance (Russell 1983, 5).
The claim that belief presupposes acquaintance is a clear indication that

the fundamental principle is still in force. For this principle claims that
all propositions that are believed must be analysed into constituents that
we are acquainted with. And in fact we find that arguments assuming the
fundamental principle are made throughout Theory of Knowledge.56
A discussion of the sorts of things with which we are acquainted takes
up all of the part 'On the Nature of Acquaintance'. In the second part,
'Atomic Propositional Thought', various atomic propositional thoughts
are built up on the basis of the relation of acquaintance. Russell first at
tempts to describe what is involved in the understanding of a proposition.
It is precisely here that Russell's project met with debilitating objections
from Wittgenstein. Russell's view here is that understanding is a multiple
relation between the subject and the constituents of the proposition un
derstood. A preliminary representation of this complex of relations for
the proposition 'A and B are similar' is 'U(S, A, B, similarity, R(x, y))9
where 'R(x, y)' indicates the form that all two-place relational propos
itions share and 'S" stands for the subject (Russell 1983, 117). This
representation does not capture all the complexity of what is required

for understanding because it does not indicate what relations must exist
between the constituents. At a minimum S must be acquainted with A, B,
similarity and the form, but various considerations force Russell to require
further that the constituents themselves be "united with the subject in one
complex" (Russell 1983, 117). This leads Russell to a rather elaborate
diagram depicting the logical relations required for understanding. Russell
was led into these epicycles by the requirement that the understanding of
a complex be possible only when the complex forms a proposition. The
requirements that a form be part of the complex and that the constituents
be related to this form by the subject were introduced to rule out the
understanding of nonsensical strings of words.
These innovations were not sufficient to wholly remove this problem,
however. As Wittgenstein complained in his "Notes on Logic", "Every
right theory of judgment must make it impossible for me to judge that this
table penholders the book. Russell's theory does not satisfy this require
ment" (Wittgenstein 1979, 103).57 The details of Wittgenstein's criticisms
remain debatable and need not detain us. It suffices to note that the addition
of a form to the complex does not seem to preclude nonsensical judgment.
Wittgenstein became convinced, and he in turn convinced Russell, that the
mere addition of new components to the complex could not rescue Rus
sell's approach to judgment.58 For some time Russell remained satisfied
with the part of the manuscript on acquaintance and even published the
first six chapters in The Monist.59 The core of Russell's project, however,
i.e., his theory of understanding and consequently of judgment, seemed
damaged beyond repair.
An obvious way of proceeding in light of this failure would have been
for Russell to reconsider the principle that led to this theory of judgment
in the first place, the fundamental principle. Russell had already admitted
that "It is not necessary to assume that acquaintance is unanalyzable, or
that subjects must be simple; it may be found that a further analysis of
both is possible" (Russell 1983, 45). Given the failure of the theory of
judgment it now seemed necessary to attempt a further analysis of the
relation of acquaintance and the subject if further progress is to be made.
This is precisely what Russell did when he returned to philosophy towards
to end of World War I. The basis for these changes is Russell's strange
combination of a concern with symbolism derived from Wittgenstein and
his reading of behaviourist psychology. The paper "On Propositions", writ
ten early in 1919 and published later in that year, exemplifies his new
approach. At the heart of the new approach is the rejection of the act-object
conception of belief.60 The act-object approach maintains that belief is a
relation between the subject and an object such as a proposition. Russell

had already attempted, in Theory of Knowledge, to dispense with the object
of a belief in favour of a relational complex involving the subject and the
relation of acquaintance. Now Russell goes further and dispenses with the
subject (Russell 1986, 294). The consequences of this change are signific
ant. Sensations cannot be conceived any longer as made up of a relation of
a subject to a sense-datum: "accordingly the distinction between sensation
and sense-datum lapses, and it becomes impossible to regard a sensation as
in any sense cognitive" (Russell 1986, 295). All that prevents Russell from
completely embracing the neutral monism of someone like James at this
point is his insistence on the importance of mental images and their irredu
cibility to sensations. On the new theory propositions become collections
of images or words that can be objects of belief, and belief is understood
as the conjunction of such a collection and a feeling of assent.61
It should be clear that Russell can no longer subscribe to the funda
mental principle concerning acquaintance. One of the relata of the relation
of acquaintance, i.e., the subject, has been analyzed away.62 Also, Rus
sell has replaced the earlier simple theory of understanding and judgment
connected with acquaintance with a theory of judgment involving image
propositions, sensations and feelings of assent.63 That the supreme maxim
remains in place should also be clear. Russell continues to prefer construc
tions over inferences, and now applies this maxim to objects such as the
subject that were previously not constructed.64
By separating out Russell's reconstructive project and his concern with
judgment I hope to have made it clearer how the supreme maxim is
independent of the fundamental principle. This interpretation is further
supported by the fact that Russell does not discuss the fundamental prin
ciple at all in Our Knowledge, and he barely even mentions the term
"acquaintance".65 Russell also claimed that he gave up the fundamental
principle as a result of more thorough application of the supreme maxim. In
a forward written in 1924 for the 1926 German edition of The Problems of
Philosophy Russell notes that Occam's Razor, and the method that results
from taking it seriously, caused two major changes in the epistemolo
gical topics covered in Problems.66 First, this method suggests alternative
constructions of physical objects and matter. Second, Russell claims that
The same method and the same principle have led me to a further change. In the discus
sion in The Problems of Philosophy I assumed the existence of the subject and treated
acquaintance as a relation between a subject and object. Now I regard the subject also as
a logical construction. The consequence is that one must give up the distinction between
sensations and sense-data; on this question I now agree with William James and the school
of American realists. The changes which as a result need to be made in my theory of
knowledge are to be found in my Analysis of Mind (Russell 1982, 98).
One could not hope for a clearer statement of the structure of Russell's
changing views. Russell claims explicitly that the supreme maxim was ap
plied in a way that dislodged the subject and acquaintance from his theory
of knowledge.
As we saw in the preceding section, Carnap expresses no interest in
Russell's project centered on judgment and is openly critical of Russell's
attitude towards metaphysical questions. Russell's reconstructive project
has clear affinities with Carnap's Aufbau, however, and Carnap not only
recognized these similarities, but sought to explicitly tie his project to
Russell's. Thus, while it would be misleading to call the Aufbau a Russel
lian project, there is a substantial overlap between Russell's and Carnap's
reconstructive projects. In the final section of this paper I want to consider
this overlap in more detail.
5. SCIENCE, METAPHYSICS AND NEUTRALITY
Both Carnap and Russell set themselves the task of reconstructing our sci
entific knowledge. The reconstruction is made in terms of our experiences
due to the focus on our knowledge and the belief that all verification of
our knowledge must be in terms of these experiences. At the center of
this project is the shared belief that science is a rational activity that can
achieve definite answers to its questions. As Carnap puts this requirement
in one of the concluding sections of the Aufbau, "the truth or falsity of
each statement which is formed from scientific concepts can in principle
be ascertained' (Carnap 1928, ?180). This follows directly from the thesis
that all scientific concepts are defined in terms of characteristics that are
in principle ascertainable through experience. We have seen that Russell
expressed similar views, with the added qualification "m so far as physics
or common sense is verifiable, it must be capable of interpretation in terms
of actual sense-data" (p. 20). Due to the fact that the intrinsic character of
our experience is private or subjective, both Carnap and Russell point out
that it is only the relations between these experiences that are the primary
objects of knowledge.
This core agreement goes some way towards explaining what appeared
to Carnap and others to be the main point of disagreement between Russell
and Carnap, i.e., their views on metaphysics.67 Metaphysics plays a central
role in Russell's philosophy (p. 18). Even in Our Knowledge Russell notes
that "ultimate metaphysical truth, though less all-embracing and harder of
attainment than it appeared to some philosophers in the past, can, I believe,
be discovered" (Russell 1915, 29). Carnap would, of course, have none
of this. When discussing the concept of reality that identifies reality with
independence from cognition, Carnap claims that this "concept of reality

cannot be constructed in an experiential constructional system; this char
acterizes it as a nonrational, metaphysical concept" (Carnap 1928, ?176).
The essence of this disagreement is to be found in Carnap's juxtaposition
of 'nonrationaP and 'metaphysical'. For Carnap a concept's extension can
not, even in principle, be determined by rational means precisely because
it cannot be constructed in experiential terms. Metaphysics, for Carnap,
is occupied with debates concerning concepts that have no rational res
olution. Russell clearly has a different view. While he accepts that all
scientific claims can be verified only by experience, he allows for other
means of support for metaphysical claims. In particular, when we examine
what Russell says in support of his metaphysical views he usually simply
opposes them to monism. Since monism can be shown to be unable to
account for a variety of phenomena, such as the very existence of mathem
atics, Russell believes some sort of pluralism is required.68 Similar reasons
are given for the sort of metaphysics set out in the lectures "The Philosophy
of Logical Atomism" (Russell 1986). Thus, while Carnap and Russell
agree on scientific matters, Russell allows for a wider variety of means of
resolving metaphysical questions. Carnap expands the scope of science to
include all rationally resolvable questions, whereas Russell limits science
to its more traditional spheres.69 This is a significant disagreement, but it
does not call into question their agreement concerning scientific questions
as traditionally understood.
A second significant difference concerns the fact that Carnap is able to
complete his constructions from an autopsychological or solipsistic basis,
whereas Russell is not. We could consider this difference to be merely
a reflection of Carnap's greater technical ingenuity and care for detail.
A more plausible interpretation would focus on the different constraints
that Russell and Carnap place on their constructions. Carnap is clear
that his constructions need only preserve logical value: "A constructional
transformation of a statement (or a propositional function) always leaves
the logical value, but not necessarily the epistemic value, unchanged."
(Carnap 1928, ?50). The logical value of a propositional function is its ex
tension and the logical value of a statement is its truth-value. Russell is not
as explicit about exactly what needs to be preserved by his constructions.
It seems clear, though, that he wants to preserve not only the truth-values
of statements, but also what these statements were originally about. If we
begin with a statement about a table, then after the construction of the table
we are left with a statement about some part of the series of the table's
aspects. Similarly, a piece of matter is constructed out of what we would
usually say were our experiences of that piece of matter. This constraint is
not that clear, but it does suggest that Russell would have been unhappy
with some of Carnap's constructions.
To see this consider what Carnap says about the mental states of oth
ers, or the heteropsychological objects: "the entire experience sequence
of the other person consists of nothing but a rearrangement of my own
experiences and their constituents ... (in constructional language) there
is nothing to be assigned except the elementary experiences and what is
constructed from them, i.e., their quasi constituents (in the widest sense,
including components, etc.); (in realistic language): as I observe express
ive events in another person, I cannot infer from them something that is
unknown to me in kind" (Carnap 1928, ?140). Russell would no doubt
accept the second, realist, version of this claim, but not the first version.
My experiences are my experiences and the other person's experiences
are her experiences. Russell would want the reinterpreted statements about
the other person's experiences to still be connected with the other person
in a more tight way than Carnap seems to require.70 Thus, while neither
Russell nor Carnap would require an analysis of ordinary language in
our sense, they place different sorts of constraints on constructions of a
concept. Russell would not see Carnap's constructional and realistic lan
guages as merely "nothing but translations from ... [the] basic language
of logistics" (Carnap 1928, ?95). It is, then, no surprise that Carnap could
apply the supreme maxim in a more thorough way than Russell could. He
was not operating under the same constraints. Carnap had a wider variety
of possible constructions that he could employ. Russell, on the other hand,
was often restricted to constructions that used as materials experiences that
we would ordinarily say were of the object constructed.
This disagreement can be traced further to the philosophical motiva
tions of their respective philosophical work as a whole in this period. We
have seen that Russell is concerned with metaphysics and the theory of
knowledge as well as with his reconstructive project. Carnap's overriding
concern appears, however, to be neutrality. When discussing G?tschenber
ger's claim that philosophers would realize that they all agreed if only they
could find a common language,71 Carnap claims that the development of
"This neutral language is the goal of construction theory" (Carnap 1928,
?178). In the same section he is at pains to emphasize the shared character
of his assumptions and the neutral character of his conclusions:
the so-called epistemological schools of realism, idealism, and phenomenalism agree

within the field of epistemology. Construction theory represents the neutral foundation
which they have in common. They diverge only in the field of metaphysics, that is to say (if
they are meant to be epistemological schools of thought), only because of a transgression
of their proper boundaries (Carnap 1928, ?178).
The rational core of all disciplines is captured by an adequate construc

tion system and so all points of view that fall outside of this system are
metaphysical in character. Carnap wants to avoid these sorts of questions
by occupying a neutral position that is acceptable to everyone. Russell was
not motivated by any desire for neutrality. As we saw (p. 18), in particu
lar, his metaphysical views led him to see in mathematical and scientific
knowledge clear counterexamples to certain metaphysical views.
Thus, I conclude that Russell did exert a crucial influence on Carnap,
but that this influence was quite complicated. Due to the fact that Carnap
disagreed with Russell on a variety of philosophical questions, Carnap's
application of the supreme maxim went much further than Russell could
have taken it. Their agreement on the need to reconstruct our scientific
knowledge in terms of experience hid larger disagreements. This does not
detract from my thesis that Carnap saw the Aufbau in a Russellian light.
He thought that he was doing what Russell was trying to do. We cannot
ignore this when we look at the Aufbau today, even though we realize that
Carnap had a different outlook than Russell on many issues.
My earlier emphasis on neutrality allows further insight into the in
terpretative difficulties associated with the Aufbau. The book was meant
to be neutral between philosophical positions, and to this end it contains
components that appeal to whichever position a reader of the book may
subscribe to. As a consequence of his neutrality, however, Carnap did not
identify his own project with any particular philosophical position. Instead,
he hoped to capture the neutral overlap of various philosophical schools.
This neutrality is, of course, impossible to achieve. Friedman and Richard
son have performed a valuable service by attempting to locate Carnap's
work in its proper context. I have drawn different conclusions from their
requirement that we look at the work in its own context, however. Both
Friedman and Richardson have put forward incomplete interpretations of
Russell and so have missed the fact that Russell was part of Carnap's
philosophical context. He influenced Carnap's Aufbau in a crucial way.
This influence is not in conflict with other sorts of influences, but it shows
that the Aufbau is a complex work whose true character is only beginning
to be uncovered.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Versions of this paper were presented to the Institut Wiener Kreis and the
U.C. Berkeley Working Group on the History and Philosophy of Logic
and Mathematics. I would like to thank both audiences for their com
ments. I am particularly indebted to Paolo Mancosu and Tom Ryckman.
Without their encouragement and constant help with this material, this
paper would not have been possible. I would also like to thank Jake Bassett,
William Demopoulos, Eckehart K?hler, Hans Sluga, Friedrich Stadler and
the anonymous reviewer for Synthese for their helpful suggestions. The
support of a Humanties Research Grant from U.C. Berkeley is gratefully
acknowledged.
APPENDIX
What follows is a list of Carnap's references to Russell in the period ending

with the publication of the Aufbau.
1. An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry: (Carnap 1922).

2. The Principles of Mathematics: (Carnap 1922, 1923)?72, (Carnap
1928, 1929).
3. "Mathematical Logic as based on a Theory of Types": (Carnap 1922,
1928).
4. Principia Mathematica (either edition): (Carnap 1922, 1925, 1927,
1928, 1929).
5. The Problems of Philosophy: (Carnap 1922).
6. Our Knowledge of the External World: (Carnap 1922, 1928).
7. Mysticism and Logic collection including "On Scientific Method in
Philosophy", "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter", "The Relation of
Sense-Data to Physics", "On the Notion of Cause", "Knowledge by
Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description": (Carnap 1928).
8. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, German translation:
(Carnap 1925, 1927, 1928, 1929).
9. The Analysis of Mind: (Carnap 1928).
10. "Introduction" to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:
(Carnap 1928).
NOTES
All unpublished material is drawn from either the Archives for Scientific Philosophy,
University of Pittsburgh (ASP) or the Russell Archives, McMaster University (RA). All
ASP material is quoted by permission of the University of Pittsburgh. All RA material is
quoted by permission of McMaster University. All rights reserved. I would like to thank
G. Piccinini and B. Arden of ASP and C. Spadoni of RA for their help in obtaining these
documents.
2 See Goodman ( 1966, 151 ) for Goodman's classification of the Aufbau as phenomenalist.
3 See Moulines' article for a brief survey of different interpretations of the Aufbau (Mou
lines 1991, 264). For reasons of space I cannot deal with his approach to the connection
between the Aufbau and Russell and its relation to my own views (Moulines 1991, 270).
4 For two reviews of this book see Ryckman (1999) and Sauer (1999).
5 For reasons of space I will not be able to discuss three important aspects of this cor
respondence. First, in 1922 Russell sent to Carnap a handwritten summary of the main
theorems of Principia Mathematica. Carnap was very grateful for this gesture and refers
to it throughout his life. Second, Carnap invited Russell to a conference held in 1923 in
Erlangen and at this conference Carnap presented papers whose titles suggest a Russellian
agenda. See Thiel (1993) and Schilpp (1963, 14) for discussion of this conference. Third,
Russell was asked in 1923 by Reichenbach and Schlick to be an editor of their proposed
journal Zeitschrift f?r Exacte Philosophic Carnap approved of such an invitation. This
journal never materialized.
6 Only Runggaldier (1984), Coffa (1991), Friedman (1999) and Richardson (1998) offer
extended discussions of this period.
7 I do not wish to argue here in support of Grattan-Guinness' or Coffa's claims that Russell
was the principal cause of these changes (Grattan-Guinness 1997, 408), (Coffa 1991, 208).
In fact, this appears to me to be an oversimplication of what happened. This claim cannot
be justified here. However, it seems clear that the arguments that Grattan-Guinness and
Coffa provide do not explain why Carnap's views changed the way that they did.
8 I have greatly benefited from Michael Friedman's unpublished translation of Der Raum.
All translations are his, but the page numbers are to the original.
9 "Ueber den logischen Aufbau des R" aus den Elementen der Sinneswahrnehmungen"
(Carnap 1922, 82). Carnap also refers the reader to Hugo Bergmann's review of Russell's
book. The review (Bergmann 1920) offers an intriguing example of how a neo-Kantian
might have reacted to Russell's Our Knowledge. My conjecture is that Carnap read this
review before carefully studying the book, and that only after completing the dissertation
did he study the book further.
10 "Die Lehre vom physischen Raum hat also die Aufgabe, festzustellen, welche dieser
Beziehungen f?r die bestimmten, in der Erfahrung vorliegen Dinge gelten".
11 RA 1027 Box 1. "...f?r die reiche F?rderung, die ich durch Ihre Werke in meinem
Studium der Wissenschaftslehre der exakten Wissenschaften erfahren habe".
12 An unpublished translation of this essay, made by T. Ryckman with the assistance of J.
Hafner, P. Mancosu, H. Treuper, H. Wilson and R. Zach was extremely helpful.
13 I have greatly benefited from Alan Richardson's unpublished translation of this work.
All translations of this text are his, but page references are to the original text.
14 Wolters discusses the important influence of Dingier on Carnap. See Wolters (1985).
Coffa discusses some parts of these letters in Coffa (1991, 207-8).
15 ASP 081-02-07.
16 Tom Ryckman has drawn my attention to the epigram of the manuscript. It is taken from
Eddington's Space Time and Gravitation: "... if we could draw all the world-lines so as to
show all the intersections in their proper order, but otherwise arbitrary [Carnap omits this
clause], this would contain a complete history of the world, and nothing within reach of
observation would be omitted" (Eddington 1921, 87).
17 See also (Carnap 1929, 80-87) for the remnants of this project in a more modest context.
18 "aus den topologischen Eigenschaften der Zeitordnung und der Koinzidenz k?nnen die
topologischen Eigenschaften der Raumordnung abgeleitet werden. (Die weitergehende
These, da? aus denselben Bestimmungen alle Eigenschaften der Raumordnung, also
auch die metrischen, abgeleitet werden k?nnen, sei hier ohne Begr?ndung oder weitere
Er?rterung nur vermerkt.)"
19 "Alle Messung irgend einer Gr??e wird in der Physik auf Messung r?umlicher L?nge
zur?ckgef?hrt..."
20 His hopes had apparently not diminished by the time the Aufbau was published. See
(Carnap 1928, ?62), example 3.
ASP 016-28-11. "Es handelt sich um eine Strukturlehre der Weltlinien, oder in Ihrer
Sprache: Axiomatik der Topologie der Zeit ... Er verh?lt sich zu Ihrer Arbeit etwa, wie
Russells Logik zur Mathematik, z.B. zur Arithmetik. W?hrend die Ar. von Zahlen u.
zwischen ihnen bestehenden Axiomen ausgeht, f?ngt R. weiter vor an: von rein log.
Grundbegriffen und Axiomen ausgehend kommt man zu komplizierten Begriffen u. Lehr
s?tzen, die die Grundbegr. u. -s?tze der Ar. bilden. So gehe ich von Axiomen (in zieml.
grosser Zahl) aus, die nur Begriffe der Logik (besonders der Beziehungslehre) enthalten, u.
gelange schliesslich zu komplizierten, abgeleiteten S?tzen, die (teilweise) Ihren Axiomen
entsprechen".
22 Carnap always refers to the 1923 German edition of Introduction (Russell 1930). My
conjecture is that he read it shortly after its publication.
3 This conference was held in March 1923. For further discussion of its importance see
Thiel's (1993) and Carnap's remarks in Schilpp (1963, 14). Reichenbach presented a talk
there "On Causality". His remarks in the preface to Reichenbach (1924, vii) leave little
doubt that this was connected to his 1924 book.
2 "Das physikalische Definieren besteht also der Zuordnung einer mathematischen
Definition zu einem 'St?ck Realit?t'; man kann auch von Realdefinitionen sprechen"
(Reichenbach 1924, 5).
25 ASP 016-28-07. "dass Sie von einigen Axiomen aus "aufw?rts" ins Physikalische ge
hen, ich dagegen abw?rts ins Logische, um zu noch primitiveren Begriffen u. Axiomen zu
kommen, aus denen sich Ihre deduktiv ergeben".
26 This interpretation is supported by the third example of a physical constitutional system
mentioned in the Aufbau, ?62. There Carnap suggests that a system with two basic rela
tions, in conjunction with Reichenbach's 1924 axiomatization, is sufficient to constitute
the space-time world.
27 Here I am indebted to conversations with Tom Ryckman. See his (Ryckman 1996, 2001)
for further discussion of Reichenbach's work in this period.
28 RA 710-048. "eine Axiomatik der nicht-metrischen Aussagen ueber die Zeit, mit den
Mitteln der symbolischen Logik ... Ausser der Topologie der Zeit, die ich im Groben
schon fertig gestellt habe, interessiert mich besonders die Ueberleitung zur Topologie des
Raumes.... Fuer diese und andre Arbeiten (z.B. eine erst in den Anfaengen befindliche Ax
iomatik der Kausalitaet) habe ich die symbolische Logik als ein Werkzeug von hoechster
Brauchbarkeit und Schaerfe schaetzen gelernt, das fuer exakte logische Analysen dieser
Art ganz unentbehrlich ist".
29 ASP 081-05-01. "Um den R?ckgang zum Ausgangspunkt des Wirklichkeitsaufbaus zu
vollziehen, haben wir aus der Wirklichkeit alles zu streichen, was schon fertige Ordnung
und Einzelbestimmbarkeit bedeutet: Die Unterscheidung zwischen Psychischem und Phys
ischem, die Anordnung des letzteren in den Raum, die Einordnung beider Bereiche in die
Zeitreihe, die Unterscheidung der verschiedenen Sinnesqualit?ten, die begriffliche Bestim
mtheit der einzelnen Sinnesqualit?ten auf Grund des Qualit?tsverwandschaftsk?rpers, also
z.B. die Bestimmtheit der einzelnen Farbe auf Grund ihrer Stellung im Farbk?rper, die das
einzelnen Tones auf Grund seiner Stellung in der Tonreihe".
30 "Welches ist nun die "wirkliche" Welt, die prim?re oder die sekund?re? ... Wir ?ber
lassen diese im eigenlichen Sinne transzendente Frage der Metaphysik; unsere immanente
Er?rterung hat es nur mit der Beschaffenheit der Erfahrung selbst zu tun, insbesondere
mit Unterscheidung ihrer Formfaktoren in notwendige und wahlfreie, die wir prim?re
und sekund?re nennen, und mit den Beziehungen zwischen beiden Arten. Auch tr?gt der
Ausdruck "Fiktion" hier keinen metaphysisch[ ]negativen Wertcharakter ..." See also
the last paragraph of the "Reality" manuscript for a similar claim. It is worth noting
Carnap's critique of certain neo-Kantians in this paper: "Die neukantische Philosophie
kennt die prim?re Welt nicht, da ihre Auffassung, die Formen der Erfahrung zweiter
Stufe seien notwendig eindeutig, sie verhindert, den Unterschied zwischen der prim?ren
und der sekund?ren Welt zu erkennen" (Carnap 1924, 108). Friedman discusses both of
these passages and draws a somewhat different conclusion (Friedman 1999, 133fn., 143
4). Friedman takes the next sentence from this paper to show a continuing neo-Kantian
influence: "Ihre eigentliche Leistung, n?mlich der Nachweis der gegenstanderzeugenden
Funktion des Denkens, bleibt jedoch bestehen und liegt auch unserer Auffassung von der
sekund?ren Welt zugrundge" (Carnap 1924, 108).
31 "die zentrale Gleichartigkeit", "die Aehnlichkeit", "die Intensit?tsrelation", "die Erin
nerung" and "die Nachbarschaft im Sinnesfeld". These relations are mentioned in "Entwurf
einer Konstitutionstheorie der Erkenntnisgegenst?nde" (ASP 081-05-02) and "Gedanken
zum Katagorien Problem. Prolegomena zu einer Konstitutionstheorie" (ASP 081-05-03).
In the latter manuscript, "series of intensionality" [Intensionalit?treihe] is used instead of
intensity. This appears to be a typo or perhaps an error in transcription.
32 The same points clearly apply to Carnap's attempt to eliminate the basic relation in
??153-5.
33 See, e.g., Friedman (1999, 101-108).
34 '[Math. Phil.] 62f.' refers to page 62 of the 1923 German translation of Introduction to
Mathematical Philosophy (Russell 1930).
35 The other person referred to in this context is Poincar?. Carnap notes of Poincar?'s
remark that "only the relations between the sensations have an objective value" that "This
obviously is a move in the right direction, but does not go far enough" (Carnap 1928, ?16).
36 '[Sense Data]' here refers to Russell's paper "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics"
(Russell 1986). '155' refers to the page number of the quotation in Carnap's 1921 version
of the collection Mysticism and Logic in which this paper was reprinted.
37 Mach, Avenarius, Ziehen, Driesch, Dubislav, Husserl and Meinong are mentioned here.
38 ASP 102-68-21.
39 ASP 102-68-29.
40 ASP 102-68-24. "Ich glaube hier einen Schritt auf das Ziel zu getan zu haben, das
auch Ihnen vorschwebt: Klarstellung erkenntnistheoretischer Probleme (und Beseitigung
metaphysischer Probleme) mit den Hilfsmitteln, die die neue Logik, besonders durch Ihre
Arbeiten, liefert".
41 ASP 102-68-24. "Ich m?chte hier gleich auf zwei Punkte hinweisen, in denen ich von
Ihren Auffassungen habe abweichen m?ssen. Diese Differenzpunkte beruhen aber nicht
auf Differenzen in der Grundeinstellung, die mir durchaus gemeinsam zu sein scheint.
Die Differenzen ergeben sich vielmehr gerade dadurch, dass ich versucht habe, diese Ihre
Grundauffassung konsequenter durchzuf?hren, als es bisher geschehen ist. Ich glaube hier
also "russellischer als Russell" zu sein".
42 "It seems that we agree with Russell ... in the indicated conception that the concept of
nonempirical reality cannot be constructed. However, this does not seem to be consistent
with the fact that, in Russell, questions of the following kind are frequently posed, which
(independently of how they are answered) imply a realistic persuasion: whether physical
things exist when they are not observed; whether other persons exist; whether classes exist;
etc." (Carnap 1928, ?176).
43 ASP 102-68-24. "Auch hier glaube ich Ihre Grundeinstellung konsequenter durchge
f?hrt zu haben, indem ich den (metaphysischen) Wirklichkeitsbegriff ablehne. Ich glaube,
dass jene Realit?tsfragen und damit ?berhaupt der ganze philosophische Realismusstreit,
?berhaupt keinen Sinn haben (?175-178, und 2.Teil der Brosch?re "Scheinprobleme", die
Ihnen ebenfalls zugeht)."
ASP 102-68-18. An evaluation of the accuracy of this remark would need to discuss
the development of Russell's philosophy up to 1929.1 cannot discuss these changes in this
paper. The 1927 book The Analysis of Matter (Russell 1954) marks a further change in
Russell's views from the views that I will discuss below.
5 The introductions to Russell's Collected Papers by Slater and Eames have been most
helpful. I also find myself in agreement with Eames' study of Russell's theory of know
ledge (Eames 1969). I am unable to agree with Fritz (1974), Pears (1967) or Ayer (1971),
however. All three place an undue emphasis on Russell's concern with skepticism.
46 Richardson seems to rely almost entirely on Hylton's recent study of Russell's early
philosophy (Hylton 1990). This is problematic, though, as Hylton's book does not deal
with this period of Russell's work.
47 These papers are collected in Russell (1992b, 1983, 1986, 1988). Russell's voluminous
political writings during this period are included in other volumes.
48 Slater claims that this is Russell's first use of the term 'logical atomism' (Russell 1992b).
49 See the final pages of the 1924 essay "Logical Atomism" for a survey of what has
changed and what remains the same (Russell 1988, 176-178).
50 Eames also calls attention to this passage and draws similar conclusions (Eames 1969,
83-4).
51 At times Russell presents his project as a reconciliation of the apparently different
results of psychology and physics: "It is this hypothetical construction [of the physical
world], with its reconciliation of psychology and physics, which is the chief outcome of
our discussion" (Russell 1915, 97). This attitude becomes more central in Russell's later
book The Analysis of Matter.
52 The procedure is clearly analogous to Russell's introduction of the axiom of infinity in
his logicist program. There, too, extra and somewhat undesirable premises are required to
recover the body of knowledge which we wish to reconstruct.
53 "No harm is done if there are such common properties as language assumes, since we
do not deny them, but merely abstain from asserting them" (Russell 1915, 126).
54 Eames' introduction to Volume 7 contains a detailed discussion of the composition of
the manuscript. I draw most of my discussion from points that she makes there (Russell
1983, xv ff.).
55 Here I follow Eames' tentative reconstruction of the second part. See Russell (1983,
18Iff.) for details.
56 See, for example, (Russell 1983, 10, 29, 34, 35, 45, 72).
These notes were dictated in Russell's presence in October 1913. Russell studied them
very seriously and took the notes to Harvard for his use in his seminars in the spring of
1914 (Russell 1986, xx). For a report on these classes see Lenzen (1971).
58 For one interpretation of the problems that Russell ran into see Pears' discussion
(Russell 1967, 212-241).
59 They were subsequently published in the collection Logic and Knowledge (Russell
1956).
60 See endnote 1 of "On Propositions" for the claim that a concern with meaning and a
new approach to the subject led to the new proposals of the paper (Russell 1986, 278).
6 These ideas were further pursued in Russell's The Analysis of Mind (Russell 1992a).
62 In The Analysis of Mind, Russell explicitly claims that sensations are not epistemic
ally prior. That is, psychology is needed to determine what part of any mental event is a
sensation and what part is due to past experience (Russell 1992a, 140).
63 See Russell (1986, 262) for Russell's claim that he has now "extruded "acquaintance"
as an ultimate relation".
6 The exact dating of Russell's rejection of the fundamental principle is difficult to de
termine. It must have been after the Mysticism and Logic collection was published, as
"Knowledge by Acquaintance" is reprinted there. Russell's preface is dated September
1917, but the book itself did not appear until January 1918. Changes made between the
1911 version and the 1917 version suggest, however, that Russell had already decided to
eliminate the subject. See the list of changes collated in Russell (1992b, 519-520). The
principle is incompatible with the view that Russell took in "On Propositions", however,
which was composed between February 23 and March 4, 1919 (Russell 1986, 276).
65 Acquaintance is mentioned in passing in the discussion of continuity in order to re
mind the reader that acquaintance with a thing does not imply any knowledge about that
thing (Russell 1915, 144). A related independence is seen if we accept what Russell says
in the later "Reply to Criticisms". There he claims that his concern with constructions
predates his views on acquaintance: "All these antedated the theory of descriptions, and
were dictated by dislike of postulation where it can be avoided. This motive remains, quite
independently of my later introduction of acquaintance" (Schilpp 1951, 692).
66 It is not clear whether or not Carnap read this edition of Problems. He does not refer to
it in the Aufbau, while he does mention the English edition in Der Raum. It is of course
possible that this note itself caused him not to refer to it in the Aufbau, but this is only a
speculation.
67 Werner Sauer has emphasized this point in Saur (1993).
68 This strategy goes back to Russell's Principles of Mathematics. See, e.g., Russell (1903,
??212-216).
69 In Our Knowledge Russell claims that "if it [philosophy] is to be a genuine study, it must
have a province of its own, and aim at results which the other sciences can neither prove
nor disprove" (Russell 1915, 17).
70 In the section of Our Knowledge where Russell attempts to dispense with other minds,
he does not even consider the radical sorts of constructions that Carnap was later to employ.
See Russell (1915, 67-87).
7 Richard G?tschenberger's Symbola. Anfangsgr?nde einer Erkenntnistheorie is referred
to five times throughout the Aufbau. Carnap here approves of G?tschenberger's claim
that "All philosophers are correct, but they cannot help this, since they use the available
language and consequently speak in a hundred sublanguages, instead of inventing one
pasigraphy". G?tschenberger (1865-1936) proposed that the study of language be a uni
versal and neutral scientific discipline that should be used to resolve various philosophical
disputes. For a summary of G?tschenberger (1920a) see G?tschenberger (1920b) and for
a general discussion of G?tschenberger's views and further references see A. Eschbach's

preface to (G?tschenberger, 1987).
72 On p. 101 of this paper Carnap makes the following remark: "Um berechnen zu k?nnen,
was zu irgendeiner Zeit an irgendeinem Orte geschieht, gen?gt nicht die Angabe des
Zustandes f?r nur einen Zeitpunkt. Wenigstens dann nicht, wenn nur die Zustandsgr??en
selbst angegeben werden, nicht aber ihre zeitlichen Differentialquotienten. Diese geh?ren,
wie die logische Analyse zeigt (Russell, Mongr?-Hausdorff), nicht zu den Momentanei
genschaften, obwohl die mathematisch-formal als solche behandelt werden k?nnen". This
appears to be a reference to chapter 54 of Principles, although no explicit reference is
given. There Russell speaks of "The rejection of velocity and acceleration as physical facts
(i.e., as properties belonging at each instant to a moving point, and not merely real numbers
expressing limits of certain rations)... "; (Russell 1903, 473).
REFERENCES
Ayer, A. J.: 1971, Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage, Macmillan and Co.
Bergmann, H.: 1920, 'Bertrand Russells "Erkenntnis der Au?enwelt" ', Kant-Studien 25,
50-56.
Carnap, R.: 1922, 'Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre', Erg?nzungshefte d.
Kant-Studien 56, 4-87.
Carnap, R.: 1923, '?ber die Aufgabe der Physik und die Anwendung des Grundsatzes der
Einfachstheit', Kant-Studien 28, 90-107.
Carnap, R.: 1924, 'Dreidimensionalit?t des Raumes und Kausalit?t: Eine Untersuchung
?ber den logischen Zussammenhang zweier Fiktionen', Annalen der Philosophie 4,105?
130.
Carnap, R.: 1925, '?ber die Abh?ngigkeit der Eigenschaften des Raumes von denen der
Zeit', Kant-Studien 30, 331-345.
Carnap, R.: 1926, Physikalische Begriffsbildung, G. Braun.
Carnap, R.: 1927, 'Eigentliche und uneigentlich Begriffe', Symposion 1, 355-374.
Carnap, R.: 1928, Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Felix Meiner.
Carnap, R.: 1929, Abriss der Logistik, Springer, Wien.
Carnap, R.: 1967, The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy,
R.A. George (trans.), University of California Press.
Coffa, J. A.: 1991, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, L. Wessels (ed.),
Cambridge University Press.
Eames, E. R.: 1969, Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge, Allen and Unwin.
Eddington, A. S.: 1921, Space Time and Gravitation: An Outline of the General Relativity
Theory, Cambridge University Press.
Friedman, M.: 1999, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge University Press.
Fritz, Jr., C. A.: [1952] 1974, Bertrand Russell's Construction of the External World,
Greenwood Press.
G?tschenberger, R.: 1901 [1987], Grundz?ge einer Psychologie des Zeichens, Foundations
of Semiotics, John Benjamins.
G?tschenberger, R.: 1920a, Symbola: Anfangsgr?nde einer Erkenntnistheorie, G. Braun
schen Hofbuchdruckerei und Verlag.
G?tschenberger, R.: 1920b, 'Symbola: Anfangsgr?nde einer Erkenntnistheorie', Kant
Studien 25, 453-454.
Goodman, N.: 1966, The Structure of Appearance, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, second
edition.
Grattan-Guinness, I.: 1997, 'A Retreat from Holisms: Carnap's Logical Course, 1921-43'.
Annals of Science 54, 407^121.
Haller, R. and F. Stadler (eds): 1993, Wien-Berlin-Prag: Der Aufstieg der Wissenschaft
lichen Philosophie, H?lder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Hylton, R: 1990, Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, Clarendon
Press.
Lenzen, V.: 1971, 'Bertrand Russell at Harvard, 1914', Russell: Journal of the Bertrand
Russell Archives 3, 4-6.
Moulines, C. U.: 1991, 'Making Sense of Carnap's "Aufbau" ', Erkenntnis 35, 263-286.
Pears, D.: 1967, Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy, Collins.
Quine, W.: 1961, From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, second edition.
Quine, W.: 1969, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press.
Reichenbach, H.: 1924, Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre, Vieweg and Sohn.
Reichenbach, H.: 1969, Axiomatization of the Theory of Relativity, M. Reichenbach (ed.
and trans.), University of California Press.
Richardson, A.: 1998, Carnap's Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence
of Logical Empiricism, Cambridge University Press.
Runggaldier, E.: 1984, Carnap's Early Conventionalism: An Inquiry into the Historical
Background of the Vienna Circle, Rodopi.
Russell, B.: 1897, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, Cambridge University Press.
Russell, B.: 1903, The Principles of Mathematics, Norton.
Russell, B.: [1912] 1982, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press.
Russell, B.: 1915, Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method
in Philosophy, Open Court.
Russell, B.: 1919, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Routledge.
Russell, B.: [1921] 1992a, The Analysis of Mind, Routledge.
Russell, B.: [1923] 1930, Einf?hrung in die mathematische Philosophie, E. J. Gumbel and
W. Gordon (trans.), Drei-Masken-Verlag.
Russell, B.: [1927] 1954, The Analysis of Matter, Dover.
Russell, B.: 1956, Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950, R. Marsh (ed.), Routledge.
Russell, B.: 1983, Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript, Collected Papers Volume
7, E. R. Eames (ed.), Allen and Unwin.
Russell, B.: 1986, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays: 1914-19,
Collected Papers Volume 8, J. G. Slater (ed.), Allen and Unwin.
Russell, B.: 1988, Essays on Language, Mind and Matter: 1919-26, Collected Papers
Volume 9, J. G. Slater (ed.), Unwin Hyman.
Russell, B.: 1992b, Logical and Philosophical Papers: 1909-1913, Collected Papers
Volume 6, J. G. Slater (ed.), Routledge.
Ryckman, T. A.: 1996, 'Einstein Agonists: Weyl and Reichenbach on Geometry and the
General Theory of Relativity', in R. Giere and A. Richardson (eds), Origins of Logical
Empiricism, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 165-209.
Ryckman, T. A.: 1999, 'Review of Richardson's Carnap's Construction of the World',
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50, 497-500.
Ryckman, T. A.: forthcoming, 2001, 'Two Roads from Kant: Cassirer, Reichenbach and
General Relativity', in W. Salmon and P. Parrini (eds), Analytical and Continental
Aspects of Logical Empiricism, University of Pittsburgh Press.
Sauer, W.: 1993, '?ber das Verh?ltnis des Aufbau zu Russells Au?enwelt-Programm', in
Haller and Stadler, 1993, pp. 98-119.
Sauer, W.: 1999, 'Review of Alan Richardson's Carnap's Construction of the World. The
Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism", in D. Greenberger, W. L. Reiter,
and A. Zeilinger (eds.), Epistemological and Experimental Perspectives on Quantum
Physics, Kluwer, pp. 347-350.
Schilpp, P. (ed.): [1944] 1951, The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. Tudor Publishing, third
edition.
Schilpp, P. (ed.): 1963, The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Cambridge University Press.
Thiel, C: 1993, 'Carnap und die wissenschaftliche Philosophie der Erlanger Tagung 1923',
in Haller and Stadler, 1993, pp. 175-187.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1979, Notebooks: 1914-1916, G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe
(eds), University of Chicago Press, second edition.
Wolters, G.: 1985, ' "The First Man Who Almost Wholly Understands Me": Carnap, Din
gier, and Conventionalism', in N. Rescher (ed.), The Heritage of Logical Positivism,
University Press of America.
Department of Philosophy
U.C. Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720
U.S.A.

Chritopher Pincock. (2002) Russell's Influence On Carnap's 'Aufbau' PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Chritopher Pincock. (2002) Russell's Influence On Carnap's 'Aufbau' PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Russell's Influence on Carnap's "Aufbau"

Author(s): Christopher Pincock

RUSSELL'S INFLUENCE ON CARNAP'S AUFBAU

In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine claims that Carnap's project in

Both Quine and Goodman see an epistemological and a semantic aspect

t4 Synthese 131: 1-37,2002.

our scientific knowledge can be reduced to statements about sense-data

ticular, the account of Carnap that I develop is compatible with Friedman's

2. FROM Der Raum TO Die Welt

In this section I want to present an outline of Carnap's development from

Carnap's two references to Russell's Our Knowledge (Carnap 1922,

of its main ideas about physical space to physics generally. Second, he

2.1. Towards a Structural Conception of Physics

I have separated these two developments because they express themselves

Carnap actually attempted such a structural construction of a small

It concerns a structural theory of worldlines, or in your terms: an axiomatic of the topology

physical concepts by showing how they can be constructed in purely lo

2.2. Connecting Two Worlds

This non-metaphysical perspective is, of course, developed further in the

not on propositions. However, in the next section, Carnap explains why he

These remarks are readily intelligible in light of Carnap's 1923 letter to

We have already seen how Carnap's purely quantitative conception of

the achievement of objectivity was pointed out" (Carnap 1928, ?16). My

Here it is important to note the distinction between construction theory and

The manuscript is without question an earlier version of the Aufbau.

Given these friendly overtures, Russell's curt response is somewhat disap

4. RUSSELL'S RECONSTRUCTIVE PROJECT

Between 1909 and 1926 Russell produced an impressive amount of

This maxim is presented in the 1914 paper "The Relation of Sense-Data

The chief benefit of this procedure is that logical economy is achieved,

The fundamental epistemological principle in the analysis of propositions is this: Every

Acquaintance is here a primitive relation between a subject and a particular

it led Russell in his doomed Theory of Knowledge manuscript. It is worth

The claim that belief presupposes acquaintance is a clear indication that

representation does not capture all the complexity of what is required

relation between the subject and an object such as a proposition. Russell

5. SCIENCE, METAPHYSICS AND NEUTRALITY

independence from cognition, Carnap claims that this "concept of reality

the so-called epistemological schools of realism, idealism, and phenomenalism agree

The rational core of all disciplines is captured by an adequate construc

What follows is a list of Carnap's references to Russell in the period ending

1. An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry: (Carnap 1922).

a general discussion of G?tschenberger's views and further references see A. Eschbach's

You might also like