Professional Documents
Culture Documents
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Penn State University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Philosophy & Rhetoric
This content downloaded from 189.216.190.10 on Tue, 25 Apr 2017 21:45:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
The Logic and Rhetoric of John Stuart Mill
James P. Zappen
In this paper, I argue that the Logic and On Liberty are re-
lated as logicai and rhetorical counterparts of Mill's method of
induction and that thse works draw together not only Mill's
logic and rhetoric, but also his psychology and politics. In the
context of th body of his work, Mill identifies logic as a part of
psychology, psychology being concerned with thought generally,
logic with valid thought specifically.5 In the Logic , he recognizes
a problem in inductive logic that threatens its validity.6 He ex-
plains the method of induction as a process of reasoning from
particulars to a generalization, but he observes that this process
is problematic since we cannot reason from particulars to a gen-
eralization with any certainty in the validity of the generaliza-
tion. He therefore sets in place of the generalization our own
exprience, and he seeks to ensure the validity of our reasoning
by joining to our own exprience the cumulative exprience of
humanity. In what he regarded as his most mature politicai
work, Mill affirms the principles of participation and comp-
tence that underlie his theory of reprsentative government.7 In
On Liberty, he develops a rhetoric of public discussion as a corol-
lary to his politics, and he seeks to further ensure the validity of
our reasoning by engaging this rhetoric as a check upon our
Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1993. Copyright 1993 The Pennsylvania
State University, University Park PA
191
This content downloaded from 189.216.190.10 on Tue, 25 Apr 2017 21:45:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
192 JAMES P. ZAPPEN
II
This content downloaded from 189.216.190.10 on Tue, 25 Apr 2017 21:45:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
THE RHETORIC OF MILL 193
This content downloaded from 189.216.190.10 on Tue, 25 Apr 2017 21:45:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
194 JAMES P. ZAPPEN
This content downloaded from 189.216.190.10 on Tue, 25 Apr 2017 21:45:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
THE RHETORIC OF MILL 195
This content downloaded from 189.216.190.10 on Tue, 25 Apr 2017 21:45:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
196 JAMES P. ZAPPEN
III
This content downloaded from 189.216.190.10 on Tue, 25 Apr 2017 21:45:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
THE RHETORIC OF MILL 197
This content downloaded from 189.216.190.10 on Tue, 25 Apr 2017 21:45:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
198 JAMES P. ZAPPEN
IV
Notes
1. Rfrence is to Mill's Collected Works. Volume and page numbers are in-
cluded in the text.
2. Schollmeier 1984, 209.
3. Cherwitz and Hikins 1979, 12-15.
4. Cherwitz and Hikins 1982, 82.
5. On Mill's logic, see Nagel (1950), xxiii-xliii; Blake, Ducasse, and Madden
(1960), 218-32; Anschutz (1953), 61-145; McRae (1974); and Scarre (1989), 1-
170. On his "psychologism," see Nagel (1950), xxxi-xxxviii; Blake, Ducasse, and
Madden (1960), 223-27; McRae (1974), xxxix-xlviii; and Scarre (1989), 104-25.
6. The problem is usually referred to as Hume 's problem. Lowe (1987), 334-36,
illustrtes the problem when he observes that the process of reasoning "from 'This
is a raven' and 'Ravens are black' to This is black' " is not deductively valid since
th generai principle that serves as a major premise, "Ravens are black," expresses
only a normal or typical disposition or tendency, not a universal condition. Unlike
Hume (1854), 4:30-64, however, who sought to justify inductive logic, Mill as-
sumed its justification and sought rather to explain it. On Hume's problem, see also
Stove (1986), 30-43. On Mill's ignorance of Hume's problem, see McRae (1974),
xxxiv-xxxvi; and Scarre (1989), 80-103.
7. On Mills theory of reprsentative government, see Spitz (1962); Thompson
(1976), 3-135; and Brady (1977), xxxv-lxii.
. Un Mill s commitment to liberty of thought and discussion, see Spitz (1962),
190-94; Thompson (1976), 80-82; and Brady (1977), liv-lv.
9. McRae 1974, xlin-xliv.
10. Nagel 1950, xxiii-xxxi; Anschutz 1953, 61-77; McRae 1974, xxi-xxxix; and
Scarre 1989, 126-70.
This content downloaded from 189.216.190.10 on Tue, 25 Apr 2017 21:45:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
THE RHETORIC OF MILL 199
Rfrences
This content downloaded from 189.216.190.10 on Tue, 25 Apr 2017 21:45:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
200 JAMES P. ZAPPEN
This content downloaded from 189.216.190.10 on Tue, 25 Apr 2017 21:45:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms