Indias Strategic Nuclear and Missile

Programmes
A baseline study for non-proliferation compliance

Public Release
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Abstract
India is a de facto nuclear weapons power which has achieved its core aims of developing modern
strategic weapons technology. It also has a substantial civil nuclear and space enterprise. The
objective of this report is to examine the separation between civil and military activities in India,
highlighting areas of concern in Indias efforts to join nuclear governance measures.

The report utilises a wide range of open sources to examine the relationships and linkages between
entities and individuals in India. Open sources used include the full range of scientific research
literature, social media, legal tenders, regional traditional media sources, and defence journalism.

The main findings of this report are that beyond the narrow US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement and
subsequent Indian separation plan, there remains a high degree of connection between civil and
military activity, especially in nuclear and missile sectors. In the last decade, the US among other civil
nuclear providers have intensified efforts to resume trade in nuclear goods with India, and it is likely
that Indias strategic weapons programmes have benefitted from technology and assistance
acquired through civil trade channels. For a variety of reasons, India is likely to continue to resist
accepting additional non-proliferation commitments and obligations, including in relation to
safeguards and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In this context, there is a clear risk
that strategic trade with India will enhance its nuclear weapons latency and enable it to push for a
third breakout of nuclear weapons.

The Restricted version of the report includes the full range of entity profiles sorted by Governmental
department, major and minor industry suppliers, and entities conducted dual-use research of
concern. An accompanying data file in table format provides a collated record of identifying
information such as phone numbers, fax numbers, addresses and key individual names. To find out
more about the restricted version of this report, please contact the Project Alpha team (kcl-
alpha@emc.kcl.ac.uk)

The Public version of this report includes the key findings, contextual overview, and informational
charts.
Executive Summary
India has a mature but poorly separated civil and strategic space and nuclear programme. In the
context of Indias efforts to reengage with the international community, including nuclear
governance and markets, India has accepted limited non-proliferation commitments, including with
regards to export controls. However, Indias nuclear self-determination as well as its interests in
keeping its future options open will likely prevent the country from agreeing to other non-
proliferation commitments, such the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cut-
off Treaty (FMCT). With this context, this report highlights that international trade and other
cooperation with India is contributing to Indias strategic programmes both directly and indirectly.

Separation of civil and military activities

India has a substantial nuclear and space capability. This includes a mature space and
ballistic missile capability, a novel and ambitious nuclear fuel cycle, and a capable indigenous
industry to support both.
The weak separation of civil and strategic nuclear assets is of great concern. Indias three-
stage nuclear programme includes fast-breeder reactors, which are on paper at least,
capable of creating plutonium suitable for use in nuclear weapons (depending on the fissile
material loaded). Second stage Fast Breeder Reactors have not been submitted to IAEA
safeguards.
Furthermore, the supply of uranium from other countries allows India to burn this
safeguarded fuel in their safeguarded facilities whilst using their sizeable natural uranium
resources to breed plutonium and produce weapons-grade uranium for an expansion of
their nuclear arsenal.
It is difficult to assess the degree to which India has sought to separate its defence-specific
missile programme and space rocketry programme. It is the case that the defence-specific
missile programme is of maturity and no longer requires Indian Space Research Organisation
(ISRO) assistance, but basic and applied research continues, and Department of Space
operated space assets are used by the Indian Armed Forces for navigation, communications,
and reconnaissance. Military and space programmes also share indigenous supply chains.
Defence-relevant technology research, design and development are conducted by a range of
military and civil entities. A weak distinction between defence-related civil research and
genuine civilian-purpose only research complicates observation of Indian strategic entities.
For example, many private civil research institutions in India cooperate closely with strategic
weapons entities in the defence sector at the same time as cooperating internationally with
civil entities abroad on topics, research, and items that may have defence value.
This study especially highlights the use of informal forums such as the High Energy Materials
Society of India or Indian National Society for Aerospace and Related Mechanisms as
potential spaces for Indian strategic weapons scientists to meet and exchange ideas with
foreign scientists. It is important, however, to also note that the frequent meeting of ISRO
and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) scientists is typical of Indias
science and technology context which still relies on state vision.

Engagement with international actors committed to non-proliferation

India is attempting to join formal international nuclear governance arrangements.

Historically, its non-aligned stance has rendered it resistant to unconditional acceptance of
the international norms and rules for non-proliferation. Instead, as it approaches these non-
proliferation regime institutions it has opted for partial engagement, selectively choosing to
co-opt the rules of export control organisations, claiming to embrace the norms of
 prohibitory agreements (such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) by implementation its
measures (a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing), but not taking the legally binding
step of formally entering such arrangements.
This unclear separation should raise concerns about the unwitting/witting assistance of
foreign entities when engaging with Indian entities who are stakeholders in the strategic
weapons programme.
Illicit procurement of dual-use items intended for use in the Indian strategic weapons
programme is a dimension of activity difficult to assess. Nonetheless, this study confirms
that such behaviour has occurred in the past and may have waned in recent years as
indigenous capabilities increase and Indias ability to procure items from abroad has
increased

Future dimensions of Indias latent nuclear power

Continued modernization of nuclear weapons and development of technology

demonstrators will increase the number of policy options open to Indias leadership
regarding their nuclear weapons arsenal. Academic speculation that India is exploring a
nuclear counterforce strategy as part of a two-front grand strategy will be predicated on
future technologies. Indian advances in supersonic and hypersonic missiles, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and command and control (C2) assets enable a
conventional/nuclear counterforce option. One plausible explanation is that India is seeking
to develop its own tactical nuclear weapon arsenal to match Pakistans (and potentially
Chinas) tactical nuclear capabilities, but despite speculation there has been no public
confirmation.
India remains publicly committed to its original No First Use policy and massive retaliation
in response to any nuclear attack irrespective of yield, but technological advancements
made by Indian defence entities and by Indias neighbours might erode this commitment.
Air-launched supersonic dual-capable cruise missiles are of particular concern, as they might
be used to provide options for graduated escalation.
This report highlights that new nuclear weapons systems to be adopted by the Indian Armed
Forces will weaken the political control of the nuclear weapon. This will heighten nuclear risk
whilst simultaneously enhancing Indias credible deterrence. Systems that will do this are
the Agni V, and submarine-launched missiles, which necessitate the premating of the
nuclear warhead to delivery vehicle. Traditionally, these components have been kept
separately and under different agency control. This merits greater public attention.

Indias commitment to international non-proliferation

As part of the bargain to secure the US nuclear deal and subsequent Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) waiver, India has in the last decade changed its long-standing opposition to
many of the central elements of the non-proliferation regime
India has taken steps to improve its non-proliferation record. It has recently (April 2017)
synchronised its export control lists with that of the Wassenaar Agreement and the Australia
Group. Indian export controls are well grounded in domestic laws such as the WMD Act
2005 and Atomic Energy Act 1962 and have regulatory bodies for the issuance and denial
of licences. Indian controls have gradually adopted international recognised best practices
for sensitive items
India has not signed the CTBT and likely continues to produce fissile material for weapons
purposes. India is unlikely to accept any such restraint on its nuclear weapon program until
and unless it is linked to some regional agreement including China and Pakistan.
Table of Contents (Public Report)
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 3
Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 4
Scope of the Report .......................................................................................................... 7
Criteria for Inclusion ................................................................................................................. 8
Sources and Methods ............................................................................................................... 9
Caveat about dual-use research of concern ............................................................................... 10
Caveat about strategic weapons systems analysis ....................................................................... 11
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 12
Part 1: Indias Strategic Status ........................................................................................ 13
1. Overview of Indias Strategic Programmes .......................................................................... 13
Indias Nuclear Programme .......................................................................................................... 13
Table 1: Indian Missiles ................................................................................................................. 17
Indias Delivery Systems................................................................................................................ 19
Indias Air Defence and Ballistic Missile Defence Programme ..................................................... 22
Differences in Historical Entity Lists .............................................................................................. 22
Strategic Weapons Stakeholders .................................................................................................. 24
2. Separation of Civil and Strategic Nuclear Facilities in India ................................................... 26
India and Safeguards: A Difficult History ...................................................................................... 26
Table 4: UK-India Research Cooperation Involving BARC and IGCAR ........................................... 32
Facilities List........................................................................................................................... 34
Table 5: List of Indian Nuclear Facilities ........................................................................................ 35
3. Indias Engagement with Nuclear Governance ..................................................................... 38
Indias Nuclear Self Determination ............................................................................................... 38
India and Export Controls ............................................................................................................. 39
Outlook ......................................................................................................................................... 42
Key entities involved in Indias strategic nuclear and missile sectors ............................... 43

N.B. the restricted version of this report is around 250 pages in length and contains profiles of 243
entities.
Scope of the Report
Since the US lifted sanctions on India in 2001, and the gradual normalisation of relations, exhaustive
research on the full-scope of Indias strategic weapons ecosystem has waned. Scholarly work on
Indias unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle has continued1, especially in light of Indias bid to join the
Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG), but this remained disconnected from general defence affairs
commentary. This report revitalises research done on Indias strategic weapons complex, seeking to
update, expand and replace work done up to 2003.

This report is part of Project Alphas Alpha-in-Depth series. Alpha-in-Depth monographs produce
wide profiles of a countrys strategic weapons sector, defence establishments, dual-use civil science
and technology establishments, procurement apparatus, and identify key areas of concern. These
reports are intended to be used as baseline studies for future investigations, proliferation-sensitive
flagging, and to inform future efforts to engage proliferating countries.

The use of the term strategic is complicated by its use in Indian discourse to refer to national
programmes of importance, which include research items such as solar energy panels, in addition to
classical strategic weapons. For the purpose of this paper, the term strategic programme refers to
projects, entities, and suppliers involved in the development, production and operation of Indias
strategic weapon systems.

Indian strategic weapons systems are thought to comprise a full triad of delivery systems: air-
dropped, submarine-launched missiles, and ground-launched missiles. Due to rising concern that
India will seek to compete with Pakistans nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, the Indian cruise missile
programme has been included. Furthermore, a perceptible Indian drive to develop and deploy new
defence capabilities in reaction to advances in Pakistani and Chinese strategic weapons has
warranted the inclusion of anti-air missiles which can intercept cruise missiles, and general advances
in sonar and airspace detection systems.

It is worth mentioning a paper written by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
categorised Indian nuclear facilities as civilian (safeguarded), civilian (unsafeguarded) and military as
per the 2006 Separation Plan.2 This paper utilises strategic in the nuclear facility context to refer to
both civilian (unsafeguarded) and military nuclear facilities, which is also the definition used in
Indias separation plan.

A similar relationship between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and Defence Research
and Development Organisation (DRDO) on the separation of civil space rocket programmes and
military missile programmes can be observed. This paper seeks to explore the relationship and
provide information on the same.

The first sub-group of this broad effort are the Government of India entities, in particular the
Strategic Forces Command, Defence Research Development Organization, and Department of

1
Eg. Mansoor Ahmed, Indias Nuclear Exceptionalism: Fissile Materials, Fuel Cycles, and Safeguards, Project
on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (May
2017),
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/India%27s%20Nuclear%20Exceptionalism.p
df
2
Kalman Robertson and John Carlson, The Three Overlapping Streams of Indias Nuclear Program, Project on
Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (April 2016),
http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/thethreesoverlappingtreamsofindiasnuclearpowe
rprograms.pdf
Atomic Energy subsidiaries. Also included in this section, is the Department of Spaces list of entities
that are perceived as having contributed to the missile programme. The second sub-group consists
of the dual-use research organisations, primarily consisting of government and private initiative
universities and research institutes who contribute personnel to the strategic programme, both
through alumni and through on-going sustained research cooperation. The third sub-group consists
of public sector, public-private, or private sector industries who supply the strategic programme in
full. Entities in this category are listed public-sector undertakings, joint ventures or domestic
suppliers. Foreign suppliers are mentioned wherever their activity has concurred with Indian
strategic weapons programmes.

Criteria for Inclusion

Two indicators of complicity were used. First, entities were assessed based on publicly accessible
information on their activity. The content of their activity was then assessed on whether it fit Indian
national prerogatives about strategic priorities. Some of these have been outlined below. Second,
entities were assessed based on their relationships. Entities with strong, sustained and currently
active relationships with entities known to be directly involved in the design, development, or
operation of Indias strategic weapons belong to the highest category. On the other end of the scale,
are entities with context-specific relationships such as irregular contracts or relatively few people
with low degrees of connection. Entities with activity content that was entirely dual-use but with no
visible indicators of strategic activity or relationships were not included, but may have occasionally
been referenced.

Activity of a strategic nature

Defence
High explosives work suitable
for nuclear final package
Nuclear capable and dual-
capable missiles, including
missiles billed as conventional
platforms (eg. cruise missiles)
High specification defence
materials
Nuclear
Unsafeguarded nuclear
fuel cycle, inter alia:
Natural atomic minerals
extraction
Uranium enrichment
Dual-use
Special and exotic
steels, especially
maraging steel
Composite materials
Solid state electronics

Support systems (including Fuel fabrication Inertial sensors

ground transportation, road
and rail)
Ballistic missile defence Fuel reprocessing Satellites (especially
navigation, and
imaging)
Air defence (must be suitable Fissile material storage Solid propellant for
for countering cruise missiles) space programme
Preparation for nuclear Fissile material metallurgy Space science
warfighting (including of any kind education of use to a
EMI/EMP resistance) military missile
programme
Aircraft research and Associated physics package Space technology of
development, especially of components activity (eg. direct benefit to
subsystems related to missiles neutron initiator, beryllium missile programmes if
(eg. ring-laser gyroscopes) reflector) transferred
 Heavy water production,
especially when including
tritium extraction

Defence
Chemical/biological defence
Conventional weapons
DRDO research unrelated to
weapons (eg. food,
avalanches)
Deliberate exclusions
Nuclear
Theoretical physics,
cosmic physics
Fusion power projects
Nuclear/radiological
safety, environmental
safety studies
Dual-use
Advanced computing
(except where previous
allegations are known)
Liquid propellant
research for space
programme

Sources and Methods

This in-depth study draws on a range of publicly accessible information: academic publications,
internal newsletters, contracts and tenders, newspaper reports, press releases (especially
Memorandums of Understanding), and US and Japanese designated entity lists. This open-source
information has been collated to produce profile entries for entities identified as having contributed
to or constituent of the Indian strategic industry. Scholarly academic work such as Itty Abraham, The
Making of the Indian Bomb; George Perkovich, Indias Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global
Proliferation; and Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: Secret Story of Indias Quest to be a Nuclear
Power, offered background and contextual information. For scientific information, the US
Department of Defence produced Militarily Critical Technologies List and the Department of
Energys Annex 3 Handbook were also used for reference.

Key difficulties with producing this study were that Indias strategic weapons programme is
understandably shrouded in secrecy, incorporates and draws on the support of hundreds of entities,
and is the subject of intense foreign speculation. Nonetheless, it is a major source of national pride.
Disclosures by public sector personnel are typically forthright in their technological
accomplishments, and the key individuals and entities behind them. Generally, Indias strategic
programmes are demonstrably more transparent than other proliferation hard-cases, and as such
rendered so much detail that this studys chief difficulty was in processing data acquired and
determining entities of sufficient complicity as to be worth inclusion in this report.

The approach to identifying Indian entities was layered in three ways:

1) We intended to identify and highlight new entities in the strategic industries involved in research
using Elsevier, the academic journal indexer and search engine. To do so, we employed two
methods: content (based on what activities they were we first collected an initial list composed of
Indian entities of proliferation concern identified in the Federal Register 1998 (November 16) issue
on the Dual Use Export Control Sanctions imposing new sanctions on Indian and Pakistani entities;
and relationships (based on the frequency and strength of research cooperation made visible by
joint publications). The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) identified a total of 116 Indian entities
as part of the countrys strategic nuclear and missile programmes. From this, 40 of them were
identified as having an open research footprint on Elsevier.
Using keyword searches for key nuclear and missile technologies, Elsevier was queried to produce a
new list of entities with published research relating to strategic programme activity. Between the
years 1973 and 2016, the total number of entities was put at around 1000 entities, of whom around
100 were identified as being of higher concern. Many of the entities identified by publicly available
research footprints were also entities designated in the 1998 rule.

New entity nodes were identified using relationship analysis. Elseviers Scopus query engine
provided a large quantity of relational data which forms some of the content for entity profile
sections on Domestic and Foreign collaborations. For instance, new entities that had research
collaborations with designated entities were assessed by the content and included on those merits.

2) To substantiate and investigate these new connections, we drew on publicly accessible Defence
Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)
newsletters, contract and tender listings, DRDO science and technology publications (including
conference proceeding papers such as from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), and
Indian newspapers reporting on strategic issues to identify key technologies, investments and
interests for the Indian strategic establishment as a whole. In particular, research content and
relationship information was drawn from the personnel profiles given for recently
promoted/awarded DRDO staff in the DRDO monthly newsletter. This internal but publicly accessible
newsletter provided a rich source of insider-track information on DRDO projects, subsystems, and
component research/development and manufacturing. Additionally, the Technology Focus
bimonthly publication highlighted DRDO achievements and technologies indigenously developed.
This content highlighted R&D of high interest, and key technological challenges that the DRDO has
experienced. Where possible, keyword searching and indexing were automated.

The DRDOs Research Boards public information on contracts with research institutions also yielded
significant information about the direction and importance of certain technologies to DRDO
programmes. These have been included in entities profile content under Research Topics and
Domestic Collaborations.

3) Our information was then corroborated with secondary sources on Indias strategic industries. In
particular, IHS Janes CBRN Assessments Centre, the Federation of American Scientists, the Nuclear
Threat Initiative, Centre for Non-proliferation Studies, the Wisconsin Project, the World Nuclear
Association, and the Institute for Science and International Security, provided cues, leads, and
context for our work.

A list of key facilities was developed from their efforts and from older versions of the DRDO Address
Book, newspaper clippings, the US Bureau of Export Administration entity list, and commercial
satellite imagery.

Caveat about dual-use research of concern

This study acknowledges that practically almost every technology can be applied to weapons
purposes if chosen to do so. Inclusion of an institute in this report as conducting dual use research
of concern is based on three criteria: a) content (has research with a military application been done
there), b) relational data (how much do we know about that entitys relationships with the missile
and nuclear complexes? Are those relationships at an institutional level, or smaller down to
departments or individuals), c) explicit collaboration (do the missile and nuclear complexes openly
acknowledge collaboration?). It should nonetheless be noted that experts will have different views
about the level of concern with each aspect.
Caveat about strategic weapons systems analysis
This study acknowledges that there is considerable difficulty with analysing Indias nuclear force
capabilities and systems. Beyond the Sagarika, Prithvi, Agni and unspecified air-dropped nuclear
bombs, it is unknown as to what new platforms the Indian nuclear weapons programme may
choose. For instance, the BrahMos cruise missile, developed jointly between the DRDO and Russian
company NPO Mashinostroyenia, has come under speculation as being a potential tactical nuclear
weapon. Counter-claims to this speculation are based on two pillars. First, India would not violate
the Missile Technology Control Regime agreement3, of which it is a member (as is Russia). Second,
India would respond with massive retaliation irrespective of strategic or tactical yields4, negating
analysis suggesting India is shifting towards tactical nuclear weapons.

Nonetheless, this study opts to err on sceptical, and includes the Brahmos and Nirbhay as potential
delivery vehicles.

3
Argument made by Gurmeet Kanwal, Indias Nuclear Force Structure 2025, Carnegie Endowment (30 June
2016)
4
Massive retaliation first enunciated by the Government of India in January 2003. Statement by Shyam Saran,
convenor of the National Security Advisory Board: India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons but if it is
attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to
inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic
or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective., cited in, Strike by even a midget nuke will invite massive
response, India warns Pak, The Times of India (30 April 2013),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Strike-by-even-a-midget-nuke-will-invite-massive-response-India-
warns-Pak/articleshow/19793847.cms
Introduction
India is a unique case in the international governance of strategic weapons. It is one of four states
outside the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with other non-members being
Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and South Sudan. India is also an operational nuclear-weapons power
and has been subject to, sanctions and technology restrictions as a proliferator state. Indias long
pursuit of an indigenous civil nuclear programme gave rise to an indigenous military nuclear
capability. Yet despite being a non-NPT member, in 2008 India was granted a NSG clean waiver,
exempting India from the requirement to have full-scope international safeguards in order to receive
civil nuclear cooperation.

For this paper, strategic programmes have been demarcated as those involved in the research,
design, development, production, and operation of strategic-level weapons. Strategic weapons refer
to nuclear weapons that can be reliably delivered to targets of high value (usually population
centres). Because strategic weapons are complex scientific projects, they require a wide ecosystem
of dedicated defence entities, scientific laboratories, supporting industry, and civilian research.

This study has four objectives.

First, it seeks to identify and characterise the range of defence and dual-use entities involved
in Indias strategic nuclear and missile programmes.
Second, it seeks to identify relationships between Indian entities among themselves and
with international collaborators. Both the unwitting and knowing assistance of international
entities on strategic weapons-relevant research with Indian entities is of concern.
Third, this paper seeks to offer a baseline profile of Indian entities at risk of proliferating to
others.
In the context of these other objectives, this paper seeks to draw conclusions about Indias
desire to join nuclear governance mechanisms, including the NSG.

These objectives have policy relevance. As India seeks to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
international scrutiny will be directed to the intentions and capabilities of Indias strategic sectors.
The close entanglement of civil and military sector in India, complicates efforts to maintain a clear
distinction between civil and strategic weapons-related activity. For instance, opacity regarding
Indias nuclear programmes second stage of fast breeder reactors and their potential to breed
special fissionable plutonium for nuclear weapons is a clear and present proliferation danger.
Similarly, previous proliferation cooperation between Indian defence entities and the space
programme has evolved into an ambiguous separation between missile and civil space programmes.
The defence-related dimensions of the space programme, space research, and contributing entities
have not yet been clearly resolved. Given that the separation of civil and military nuclear facilities is
an unspoken criterion for the acceptance of a non-NPT member into the NSG, wide-reaching and
deep scrutiny is called for.
Part 1: Indias Strategic Status
1. Overview of Indias Strategic Programmes
Indias Nuclear Programme
India has a substantial nuclear infrastructure driven by the countrys need for nuclear energy and its
need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. Indias nuclear programme is semi-opaque with many
of its facilities dispersed across the country and closely guarded. The programme, however, also
employs a large number of scientists and engineers, many of whom operate the countrys civil
energy programme which has 21 operational reactors in 7 nuclear power plant sites. The civil energy
programme in early 2016 produced less than 7 GWe, compared to the countrys total capacity of
300GWe (210 GWe from fossil fuels, 40 GWe from hydro, and 43 GWe from renewables) with
nuclear accounting for approximately 2.3% of total.5 The proportion of energy generated by nuclear
means is projected to rise, with government plans intending to generate up to 9% of the countrys
power by nuclear power. Nonetheless, this figure remains a low contribution to the nations
increasing energy consumption requirements.

India has embraced the three-stage nuclear power programme, envisaged by Homi Bhabha. The first
stage utilises pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR) consuming natural uranium with heavy
water as a moderator and generating plutonium-239. The second stage utilises fast breeder reactors
(FBR) either consuming mixed oxide (MOX) fuel made from recovered plutonium-239 from the first
stage to breed additional plutonium-239 from uranium-238 in the MOX fuel load, or consuming a
thorium blanket-plutonium core to breed uranium-233.6 The third stage, still in the feasibility cycle,
utilises advanced heavy water reactors (AWHR) burning a mixed blanket of thorium-232 and
uranium-233. India also recently announced ambitious plans to build an additional 10 power
reactors as part of this fuel cycle by adding a further 7000 GW of electricity from PHWRs.7

Historical orientation

Indias nuclear programme has its origins in the heyday of the Atoms for Peace initiative of the
1950s, during which India received the CIRUS research reactor from Canada. Institutionally, the
Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) created by the Atomic Energy Act 1948 and envisioned by
PM Jawaharlal Nehru to explore scientific research in highly specialised ways. Most commentators
agree that the civil and defence aspects of the Indian nuclear programme cannot be disentangled. As
the CIRUS reactor deal was implemented before the existence of a formal international atomic
energy regime, little to no safeguards agreed informally (with an expectation of re-negotiation when
the IAEA was founded) by the bilateral partners were implemented. As a result, plutonium produced
as a by-product of the CIRUS reactor was unsafeguarded and could offer a technological option for a
nuclear explosive. One historical estimate places the requisite amount of plutonium accrued for one
weapon (5-10kg) to have been achieved by 1965, with a suitable stockpile amassed by 1967.8

5
Figures from, World Nuclear Association: Country Profiles, India, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-
library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx
6
Some commentators might describe the first plutonium-uranium-238 core as a military mode because it
produces additional plutonium-239, and the second thorium-plutonium core as a civilian mode; see:
Alexander Glaser and M.V. Ramana, Weapon-Grade Plutonium Production Potential in the Indian Prototype
Fast Breeder Reactor, Science and Global Security 15:85-105 (2007)
7
Narendra Modi ,Boost to transform domestic nuclear industry, 17 May 2017. Available online at:
http://www.narendramodi.in/boost-to-transform-domestic-nuclear-industry--535463 (Accessed 24/05/207)
8
Itty Abraham, The Making of Indian Atomic Bomb, p. 123
India tested its first nuclear explosive device in July 1974. The peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE)
Smiling Buddha was given the go ahead by PM Indira Gandhi. Preparation work in the Thar desert n
Rajasthan state, the Pokhran site, and metallurgical work was conducted by the Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre (BARC) with non-nuclear components of the nuclear device (such as conventional
explosive lens for implosion-style device ) completed by the Defence Research and Development
Organization (DRDO). Raja Ramanna, Director of BARC at the time, oversaw all necessary
weaponisation work.

India initiated a second series of five nuclear tests, Pokhran II, on the 11 May to 13 May 1998.
Government press at the time described the tests as overt weapons tests. It is purported that the
tests were two-stage thermonuclear weapons, with small yield experiments. The estimated yields
are purported to be Shakti I (45 kt), Shakti II (15 kt), Shakti III (0.3 kt), Shakti IV (0.5 kt), Shakti V (0.2
kt).9 It has also been purported that the tests established the viability of small physics package
designs to be mounted on aircraft-delivered bombs or missiles. Pokhran II was prepared by the 58
Engineering Regiment of the Indian Army, with DRDO engineering inputs. It was overseen by A.P.J. K.
Abdul Kalam (Director DRDO), R. Chidambaram (Head AEC/DAE), and Anil Kakodkar (Director BARC).

Sanctions had been imposed in 1997 by the United States, a year prior to the 1998 tests, and
included the designation onto the Bureau of Export Administrations Entity List of four Indian
organizations with "an unacceptable risk of diversion to developing weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs) or missiles used to deliver those weapons". Further sanctions following Pokhran II test
were levied on over 200 Indian entities, some of whom with no link to strategic weapons. Sanctions
were relaxed in 2000, with many of those entities with no links removed, leaving entities the US
Government believed to be linked to the nuclear and missile programmes in India. Those entities are
this studys baseline. Sanctions were again relieved in 2001 under the Bush administrations
rapprochement with India, leaving a core group of missile laboratories and their supporting entities,
core Department of Atomic Energy sub-entities, and some defence industries. In 2010, greater
rapprochement led to the removal of virtually all sanctions in 2011 as nine entities in DRDO, and
ISRO were removed.

On 18 July 2005, PM Manmohan Singh and US President George W Bush made a joint statement
signalling their willingness to cooperate on civil nuclear energy. Following the India-US Joint
Statement, PM Manmohan Singh announced the Separation Plan in 2006 outlining the
governments intention to declare separated civilian and military nuclear programmes. As a result,
the NSG issued the clean waiver for India permitting nuclear supply from foreign suppliers to India.
In 2009, India concluded a continuous safeguards agreement with the IAEA10, and submitting certain
facilities to international safeguards.11 This, however, excluded a large number of facilities and
implied a division of civilian and military-use facilities that was not originally written into the IAEA
agreement.12 The facilities in Indias completely indigenous nuclear fuel cycle are now described.

9
Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts, p. 226
10
Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities, IAEA INFCIRC/754 (29 May 2009)
11
Most up-to-date, Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency
for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities: Addition to the List of Facilities Subject to
Safeguards, IAEA INFCIRC/754/Add.7 (5 February 2015)
12
Kalman Robertson and John Carlson, The Three Overlapping Streams of Indias Nuclear Program, Project on
Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (April 2016),
http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/thethreesoverlappingtreamsofindiasnuclearpowe
rprograms.pdf
Uranium mining and milling

India operates a number of uranium mines and associated mills through the Uranium Corporation of
India (UCIL), mostly located in the Singhbun Thrust Belt area in Jharkhand state but with recent
expansion over the last ten years in Andhra Pradesh, Telengana, Karnataka, and Meghalaya states.
Indian uranium mines have operated since 1967, and according to collated open source data,
uranium mills may produce around 730 tonnes per year of uranium peroxide (yellowcake).13 New
uranium deposits, notably at Tumalpalle, offer India a potential pipeline of natural uranium supply
but extraction in the near term will not match current consumption.

Imports of foreign fissile material

While India does have vast uranium reserves, the deficit between potential natural resources to be
exploited and current extraction capacity has resulted in India seeking uranium imports from the
international market. Canada (April 2015) and Australia (November 2015) have concluded bilateral
agreements with India to supply uranium. Canada pledged for Cameco Corporation to supply 3,220
metric tonnes over five years. In January 2009, India concluded an agreement with Kazakhstan in
(expired 2014) for the joint extraction of uranium in Kazakhstan and the supply of outputs to India.
India concluded a contract with Russian company JSC TVEL in 2009 for the supply of uranium dioxide
and low-enriched uranium. In 2015, an agreement was made with Kazakhstan for the supply of
5,000 tonnes over five years. Between the years 2008-2014, foreign imports tallied as Kazakhstan
(2,100t), Russia (2,058t), and France (300t). In 2015-2016, the tallies were from Russian (345t) and
Canada (250t).14

Foreign fissile material is used in Indias safeguarded reactors and ease Indias energy consumption
burden. Alleviating the supply of uranium through foreign supply provides India with the flexibility to
use its naturally sourced uranium for military purposes as required. However, it is difficult to
ascertain how much locally sourced uranium is utilised in this manner. A December 2014 estimate
stated that 40% of safeguarded reactors operated on imported uranium, with the rest relying on
natural uranium reserves in India.15

Uranium conversion

India primarily undertakes work to convert uranium peroxide to the uranium hexafluoride at Nuclear
Fuel Complex, Hyderabad. Conversion is undertaken at the Uranium Oxide Plant, and the New
Enriched Uranium Oxide Plant. The Uranium Oxide Plant has an estimated output of 450t/yr.
Additional uranium conversion activity occurs at the Indian Rare Metals Plant (RMP; also known as:
Rattehali Rare Metals Plant) where uranium hexafluoride outputs are fed into nearby cascade halls
for enrichment

Uranium enrichment

Uranium hexafluoride feedstock is enriched at two key locations, with a future third potentially to
being construction in the near future. The two operational facilities at the Rare Metals Plant (RMP)
and a small pilot facility at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) give India a modest capability
to enrich uranium. The output capacity of these facilities are unknown. Construction at the RMP
facility for an alleged second cascade hall would potentially double Indias existing capacity. The

13
See Facilities list.
14
All data from IHS Janes CBRN Assessments, India: Production Capability; (25 April 2017)
15
World Nuclear Association, Country Profile: India, Nuclear reactors deployed in India, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx
RMP facility provides highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for use in the Arihant-class naval reactors but
has excess capacity after meeting naval reactor needs. Construction of a third facility, which has yet
to begin, at the Challakere complex in Karnataka will include a new Special Material Enrichment
Facility which will not be safeguarded and will produce enriched uranium for military and civilian
purposes. The Challakere complex also includes a variety of DRDO laboratories, including a large
airstrip for UAV research, and allotments for private research institutions such as the Indian Institute
of Science at Bangalore.

Fuel fabrication

Fuel fabrication primarily occurs at the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad at the following plants:
the Enriched Uranium Fuel Fabrication Plant (estimated 24t/yr of low-enriched uranium), the
Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (subdivided into Pelletizing and Assembly, output of 300t of heavy
metal for the PHWR), the PHWR Fuel Assembly (Block A) (300t/yr heavy metal), and the PHWR Fuel
Fabrication Facility at a new Kota complex.

Reactor operations

India operates 25 commercial power reactors, five research reactors, two scale-up reactors, and two
to three naval reactors. Future plans include up to six commercial power reactor expansions. Refer
to the Facilities List on page 38.

Reprocessing

Fuel reprocessing is carried out primarily at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre facilities. Thesea are the
Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Processing plant (PREFRE), the Kalpakkam Spent Fuel Reprocessing plant
(KARP) and the Plutonium Seperation Plant at the BARC Trombay complex. Two additional facilities
servicing the FBR projects are joint operated by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and the Indira
Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research. These are the pilot-scale CORAL Reprocessing Plant and the Fast
Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant.

Physics package preparation work

Physics package preparation work for Indias nuclear weapons occurs at the Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre. Plutonium and uranium metallurgy and other physics work, such as neutron
initiator production, occurs at the BARC Trombay complex. Special fissile material is obtained
through the unsafeguarded parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, using separated plutonium and highly
enriched uranium. Beryllium machining for the neutron reflectors/tampers occur at BARCs Vashi
complex.

Integration of the physics package with associated weapon components (the casing, fuze, and safety
mechanism) for the final package is conducted by joint BARC-DRDO teams responsible to Strategic
Forces Command in Jagdalpur. Some of the DRDO integration teams have been identified in this
report. Finally, final packages are mated with delivery vehicles under the Strategic Forces Command.

Since the early period, it has been reported that other weapons components, such as high explosive
lens, Permissive Action Link (PAL) safety mechanisms, warhead fuzes and casings are produced by
DRDO subsidiaries. It is likely that BARC research and development involvement in high energy
materials is directed towards improving the reliability and composition of high explosives utilised in
nuclear warheads.
Table 1: Indian Missiles
Reference Names Type Payload Propulsion Range category Range (km) Date of induction Principal Notes
(kg) laboratories
Project Devil Surface to air missile 1st solid, 2nd liquid Short range Research project DRDL Based off the SA-2 Guideline (Soviet
terminated in 1980 SAM), precursor for the Prithvi
Project Valiant Surface to surface missile Three-stage liquid Intercontinental Research project DRDL Precursor for the Prithvi
terminated in 1974
Prithvi I (SS-150) Surface to surface tactical missile 500 - 1st solid, 2nd liquid Short range 1994 DRDL, BDL
1000
Prithvi II (SS-250) Surface to surface tactical missile 500 - 1st solid, 2nd liquid Short range 2003 DRDL, BDL
1000
Prithvi III (SS-350), Sea-launched surface to surface 250 - 1st solid, 2nd liquid Short range 2004 DRDL, BDL
Dhanush tactical missile 1000
Agni-TD Surface to surface strategic 1000 1st solid, 2nd liquid Medium range 1500 First test May 1989 DRDL, BDL First stage solid fuel rocket motor is
missile taken from the SLV-3, 'Technology
Demonstrator'
Agni I Surface to surface strategic 1000 Single-stage solid Short range 700 2004 DRDL, BDL
missile
Agni II Surface to surface strategic 1000 Two-stage solid Medium range 2000 - 3000 1999 DRDL, RCI,
missile BDL
Agni III Surface to surface strategic 1000 Two-stage solid Intermediate range 3500 - 5000 2011 ASL, RCI, BDL
missile
Agni IV, Agni II Surface to surface strategic 1000 Two-stage solid Intermediate range 3000 - 4000 2014 ASL, RCI, BDL
Prime missile
Agni V Surface to surface strategic 1000 Three-stage solid Intercontinental 8000 - 1000 Undergoing pre- ASL, RCI, BDL
missile induction user trials
Agni VI Surface to surface strategic 1000 Three-stage/four-stage solid Intercontinental 8000 Under development ASL, RCI
missile
K-15 Sagarika Submarine launched ballistic 500 Two-stage solid Short range 750 Integrated with INS ASL, RCI, BDL
missile Arihant c. 2013
K-4 Submarine launched ballistic 2500 Two-stage solid Intermediate range 3500 Test fired March 2014 ASL, RCI
missile
K-5 Submarine launched ballistic Two-stage/three-stage Intermediate range Under development ASL, RCI
missile
Shaurya, Shourya Hypersonic surface to surface 1000 Two-stage solid Tactical 750 - 1900 September 2011 ASL, RCI
tactical missile
Pralay Surface to surface tactical missile Unknown Unknown Under development Unknown Approved in March 2015
Prahaar Surface to surface tactical missile 200 Single stage solid Tactical 150 - 350 Test fired July 2011 DRDL Export version called 'Pragati'
Nirbhay Subsonic cruise missile, land 1st solid, 2nd turbofan Long range cruise 1000 - 1500 Latest trial ADE, DRDL
attack (unsuccessful)
December 2016
BrahMos I Block I Supersonic cruise missile, anti- 200 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Short range cruise 290 December 2010 BAPL, DRDL
(PJ-10) ship
BrahMos I Block II Supersonic cruise missile, land 200 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Short range cruise 290 2010 BAPL, DRDL Both surface and ship launched
attack variants

NB: Date of induction has been used rather than date of first test because the date of induction reflects when the missile was
accepted into service, even though there is a considerable time difference between induction and operational deployment.
BrahMos I Block III Supersonic cruise missile, 200 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Short range cruise 290 April 2016 BAPL, DRDL
mountain warfare
BrahMos-S Supersonic cruise missile, 200 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Short range cruise 290 First test fire March BAPL, DRDL
submarine launch 2013
BrahMos-A Supersonic cruise missile, air- 300 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Short range cruise 290 Test fire March 2017 BAPL, DRDL
launch
BrahMos-NG, Supersonic cruise missile 200 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Short range cruise 290 BAPL, DRDL Next Generation' line of upgrades
BrahMos-M for all launch and target
configurations
BrahMos-ER Supersonic cruise missile 200 1st solid, 2nd ramjet Medium range 450 - 600 First test March 2017 BAPL, DRDL Extended Range'
cruise
BrahMos-II (K) Hypersonic cruise missile 1st solid, 2nd scramjet Unknown Under development BAPL, DRDL
LRCM Supersonic cruise missile 1st solid, 2nd turbofan, 3rd Long range cruise 1000 Under development ADE, DRDL
ramjet
Akash MRSAM Surface to air missile 60 Ramjet Medium range 25 Indian Army: May DRDL, BEL,
SAM 2015 BDL
Barak-8 LRSAM Surface to air missile 60 Two-stage pulse rocket Long range SAM 70 - 90 July 2016 IAI (Israel),
DRDO, BDL
Barak-8ER Surface to air missile 60 Two-stage pulse rocket Beyond visual 180 Under development IAI (Israel),
range SAm DRDO, BDL
Maitri Surface to air missile Unknown Short range SAM 15 - 30 Under development DRDL, MBDA
SRSAM/QRSAM (European)
SFDR, Akash-II Hypersonic surface to air missile Ramjet Unknown Under development Unknown Solid Fuel Ducted Ramjet'
Prithvi Air Defence Exo-atmospheric interceptor 1st solid, 2nd liquid Exo-atmospheric 50 - 80 First test November ASL, RCI,
(PAD), Praduyumma 2008 HEMRL
Prithvi Defence Exo-atmospheric interceptor Two-stage solid Exo-atmospheric First test April 2014 ASL, RCI,
Vehicle (PDV) HEMRL
Advanced Air Endo-atmospheric interceptor Single-stage solid Endo-atmospheric 150 - 200 First test December ASL, RCI,
Defence (AAD), 2007 HEMRL
Ashwin
Indias Delivery Systems
India operates a functional nuclear triad of air-delivered systems, ground-launched systems, and
submarine-launched systems. India maintains its nuclear deterrent in a credible deterrence posture
designed to deter neighbouring Pakistan and China. The submarine leg of the triad is designed to
deter China, as Pakistan is adequately covered by air-delivery assets and ground-launched missiles.

Nuclear weapons decision making

Indian nuclear weapons are kept under tight political control. The Nuclear Command Authority
(NCA) is the apex organization determining all priorities for budgets, resources, strategy, policy, and
operational command. The NCA) consists of a Political Council and an Executive Council. The Political
Council is chaired by the Prime Minister and is the only body in India capable of authorising weapons
release to operational commands. The Executive Council provides advice and implements decisions
taken by the Political Council. The Political Council consists of the Prime Minister and civilian
ministers in Defence, External Affairs, Home, and Finance. Clear division between political and
military control is entrenched into Indian nuclear decision making with civilian authorisation the only
acceptable recourse to launching nuclear weapons. The commands of the Nuclear Command
Authority are executed by Strategic Forces Command (SFC) a tri-service military command with HQ
Strategic Forces Command chaired by a commander-in-chief of three-star rank. Strategic Forces
Command was created in 2003. It has been traditionally thought that the nuclear warheads and
delivery systems are kept de-mated, and although components might be co-located the authorities
responsible for them are dispersed between Strategic Forces Command, DRDO and Department of
Atomic Energy sub-units. In this manner, civilian personnel would be embedded into the command
and control system of Indias nuclear weapons.

Emergency command in the event of NCA decapitation is unknown, and other delegatory
arrangements are not declared policy. Nonetheless, Strategic Forces Command is a well-resourced
nuclear command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.

Some significant developments in nuclear doctrine and policy are reflected in the most recent
doctrinal paper for the Indian Armed Forces, the 2nd Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces, from the
HQ Integrated Defence Staff at the Ministry of Defence.16 Notably, the nuclear deterrent was
described as credible deterrent with language excluding previous usage of minimum and stating
that the SFC controls all of Indias nuclear warheads and delivery systems. This may be indicative
of the necessity to keep warhead and delivery system mated in the Agni V, which is canister
launched. More broadly, this suggests that the successful development of technologies for the
nuclear triad will lead to an expansion in the arsenal of nuclear warheads in tandem with the
increase in delivery systems. The 2017 Joint Doctrine also reaffirms no first use, civilian
authorisation, and dispersed arsenal structure to ensure retaliation.17

Aircraft-delivery systems

Indias nuclear deterrent was technically possible by the late 1970s using air-dropped bombs.
However, it is unclear precisely when this technical capacity was rolled out as an operational
capability. As late as 1988, this air-delivery leg was the sole nuclear weapons delivery system after

16
Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff Ministry of Defence, 2nd Edition Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces
(April 2017)
17
Fn. 12, p. 37
which ground-launched missiles were technically feasible. The air-led is designed to be credible
through wide dispersal across the country, using rapidly assembled de-mated warheads and delivery
systems. In 1994, allegedly this system was tested for the first time using a specially designed gravity
bomb. Whilst the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre was responsible for the manufacture and
maintenance of the physics packages, DRDO scientists and engineers from Terminal Ballistics
Research Laboratory, Explosives Research and Development Laboratory (now High Energy Materials
Research Laboratory) and Armament Research and Development Establishment designed and
manufactured the bomb casing, implosion explosives and airburst fuse.

The initial delivery system was purported to be the SEPECAT Jaguar which India sought to acquire in
1978. As an interim measure, India borrowed 18 Jaguars from the UK Royal Air Force in 1979. The
first Indian-owned Jaguar was delivered in March 1981. It is unclear if the Jaguar was ever utilised as
a delivery vehicle in this period with a possible lack of political clearance.18 By the 1990s, the air
delivery leg also included the Mirage 2000 which, like the existing Jaguars, were modified to carry
the air-dropped weapon. Since then Indian Jaguars have undergone lethality, avionics and engine
upgrades, but they may have been surpassed by other nuclear-capable strike fighters. Upgrade work
is carried out by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.

Other nuclear-capable strike fighters in the Indian Air Force include the Mirage 2000H, first delivered
to India in 1985, and the Sukhoi 30 Mk1, delivered to India in 2002. In 2010, it was reported by local
media that Strategic Forces Command sought to acquire 40 Sukhoi 30 Mk1s for its own integrated
command. Other upgrades to the Sukhoi 30 Mk1 batch included weapons integration of the
supersonic BrahMos I. Upgrade work was carried out by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. It is likely that
the aircraft of choice for weapons delivery has shifted to the more able Sukhoi 30s.

Ground-launched systems

The Agni Technology Demonstrator (AGNI-TD) was tested in 1989 and subsequently led to the
development of the Agni I and Agni II medium range to intermediate range missiles. These were
inducted into Indian Army service post-1998 Pokhran II tests around 2002, with the Agni II being in
actual operational service around 2005. The Prithvi short range missile was inducted into Indian
Army service in 1994 but it is unknown if warhead design work had achieved a package small enough
to fit onto the Prithvi. The Prithvi was inducted into Strategic Forces Command in 2003 and is used
as a delivery system. During this time, survivability of ground systems was achieved by using road-
mobile and rail-mobile launchers but missiles and warheads were kept in de-mated states.

Currently, Agni I IV systems are deployed in service with future Agni V having been tested
successfully with developed integration systems. There is speculation at the Agni V has not been
tested to its maximum range; it is clearly an intermediate range capable missile but the Agni V also
has the ambiguous potential to be an intercontinental ballistic missile. The Agni IV was inducted into
Strategic Forces Command by at latest September 2016.19 It is unknown whether production
schedules for the Agni IV and Agni V are keeping up with operational demands. Notably, the Agni V
missile is designed to be launched from a canister-transport system necessitating the mating of the
warhead to the missile and storage of the complete system for up to ten years (so long as the
canister is in use). It is uncertain as to how this will affect political control of nuclear warheads via
the NCA and SFC.

18
Janes Strategic Weapons, Issue 54 (January 2011), p. 59
19
Assessment by IHS Janes CBRN Assessments Centre
Submarine-launched systems

The Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project initiated in 1990 came to fruition with the
completion of the first vessel, INS Arihant, in 2009. The Arihant-class nuclear power ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) is a 112m long underwater vessel armed with four vertical launch tubes, capable
of carrying 12 K-15 missiles or 4 K-4 missiles. The K-15 Sagarika missile is a submarine launched
cruise missile (SLCM) with a purported range of around 750km with a 500kg payload, subsequently
increasing range with lighter payloads. The K-4 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) will offer
a range of over 3,500km enabling Indias SSBNs to strike potentially Chinese targets from further out
at sea. The K-4 was successfully tested in April 2016 leaving production scale-up as the remaining
challenge to operationalisation.

At the time of publication, only one VLF communications facility supports the submarine leg of the
triad, located at INS Kattaboman. An additional VLF/ELF communications facility will be constructed
at the SSBN purpose-built naval base, INS Varsha, currently under construction.

Dual-capable cruise missiles

It is unclear whether India will seek to arm its cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. India has two
principal dual-capable cruise missiles, the Brahmos and the Nirbhay, which could be utilised as
delivery vehicles for nuclear payloads. The BrahMos was developed in a joint venture between
DRDO and NPO Mashinostroyenia originally as an anti-ship supersonic missile. It has been
reconfigured for ground launch anti-land and an air-launch version. The air-launch version, BrahMos-
A, is of concern as 40 of the Indian Air Force Sukhoi 30 Mk1s are to be modified to fire it. It is
plausible these are new delivery vehicles for tactical nuclear weapons, but equally plausible they
would be used as prompt conventional strike systems.

India defence laboratories are working on the Nirbhay which has suffered from flight malfunctions
during testing. The Nirbhay is designed to complement the BrahMos by offering a longer-range
capability, albeit at subsonic velocity. The BrahMos has a range of around 300km, whilst the Nirbhay
is within the range of 1000-1500km.

Future systems

Future developments for ground launch ballistic missiles include multiple re-entry vehicles
(MRV)/multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV); and longer range intercontinental
ballistic missiles (the Agni VI and Suryra projects).

The K-5 is a future SLBM touted to have a maximum range of 6,000 km, enabling Indias SSBNs to
launch from greater safety.

BrahMos Aerospace is building a new hypersonic missile, the Brahmos II, it will be built from a new
aeroframe but otherwise there are few solid details. There is speculation about a new cruise missile,
the long range cruise missile with three motor stages, including a supersonic boost phase for the
final attack path.
Indias Air Defence and Ballistic Missile Defence Programme

Indias air defence programme has been demarcated by this report as of interest because of
neighbouring China and Pakistans cruise missile inventory. Infrequent but notable mentions that
Indian air defence capabilities will counter the full range of air threats, including cruise missiles,
emphasise Indian strategic awareness of cruise missiles being used as nuclear delivery vehicles.
Indias air defence programme is layered with a range of surface-to-air missile systems (SAM) of
indigenous design, foreign joint venture effort, or foreign supply. The indigenous Akash SAM is a
medium range missile paired with the Rajendra 3D radar system capable of intercepting cruise
missiles. The MRSAM (Barak-8) is a joint Israel-India venture for a system out to 100km, with
potential range upgrades (Barak-8ER/LRSAM). Indias Armed Forces also have a variety of other SAM
assets, predominantly supplied from Russia.

Indias ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme has been tested several times since the
Programme AD had been announced in 2006 but has yet to be inducted into service. Indias BMD
system consists of a long-range tracking radar (the Swordfish LRTR derived from Israeli Green Pine
radar), an exo-atmospheric interceptor (the Prithvi Air Defence Vehicle (PAD)/Prithvi Defence
Vehicle (PDV) also known as Praduyumna) and an endo-atmospheric interceptor (the Advanced Air
Defence (AAD) also known as Ashwin). Phase 1 of the system has been developed pending further
user trials, and Phase 2 has been initiated consisting of high-velocity interceptors designed to
counter intermediate ballistic missiles. The missile interceptors are codenamed AD-1 and AD-2.

In addition to the long-range radar system (an indigenous recreation of Israels Elta GreenPine
radar), the BMD will be linked into geo-stationary satellites operated by the Indian Space Research
Organization.

Differences in Historical Entity Lists

Indian entities have been designated at various times under differing conditions. India was first
internationally sanctioned in 1974 following the Smiling Buddha test, causing a break in Soviet and
Canadian nuclear cooperation. US cessation of economic aid was then followed by the US passage of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), a key piece of legislation that grounded sanctions in
1998. Because the 1974 sanctions did not entail targeted sanctions against entities, this period is not
covered here. Instead, this section will aim to outline the differences in entity listings between 1997
and 2017. Differences in entity listings are indicative of which entities were considered key actors,
auxiliary, or unrelated to Indias nuclear and missile programme. These differences are useful for
establishing a baseline of complicity for this study.

1997
Beginning in May-June 1997, the US Bureau for Export Administration began placing entities deemed
to have "an unacceptable risk of diversion to developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) or
missiles used to deliver those weapons" to the Supplement No.4 to Part 744 of the Export
Administration Regulations (the Entity List). Four Indian entities were specifically named: the Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre, Bharat Electronics Ltd, Indian Rare Earth, and Indira Gandhi Centre for
Advanced Research.20

20
Bureau of Export Administration, Revisions to Export Administration Regulations: Additions to the Entity
List, Federal Register 62:125 (30 June 1997), 62 FR 35334, pp. 35334-35335; Bureau of Export Administration,
Revisions to Export Administration Regulations: Addition of Bharat Electronics, Ltd. (aka Baharat Electronics,
Ltd.) India, to Entity List, Federal Register 62:95 (16 May 1997), 62 FR 26922, pp. 26922-26923; Bureau of
1998
Following the Pokhran II tests, in November 1998 Indian entities were designated en masse under
Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (Glenn Amendment) which prohibited all US
Economic and military assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state (as defined by the Treat y for the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) that carries out a nuclear explosion. The Bureau of Export
Administration added certain Indian and Pakistani government, parastatal, and private entities
determined to be involved in nuclear or missile activities. In addition, Indian and Pakistani military
entities are added to the Entity List in order to supplement the list.21 Three files added in a 16
November revision clarified the entity list subdividing Indian and Pakistani entities among the
governmental, parastatal, and private distinctions and delineating between entities believed to be
related to nuclear and missile activities, or military activities. However, many of the 116 entities
listed as engaged in nuclear or missile activities were clearly engaged in other defence research (ie.
the Defence Food Research Laboratory).

2000
In late 1999, the Clinton administration made a decision to more tightly focus the sanctions on those
Indian entities which make direct and material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and
missile programs and items that can contribute to such programs removing 51 entities thought to
be sufficiently unrelated.22 Entities which remained on this list form the baseline of this report. In
this period, Indian and Pakistani entities were moved from the entity list to Appendix A and
Appendix B respectively.

2001
Opting to strengthen strategic relations, the Bush administration moved to reconcile with India over
sanctions. Sanctions were lifted on the vast majority of remaining entities by August 2001, leaving a
small number of entities related to guided missile development, unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle,
and a number of ISRO entities involved with propulsion and launch vehicle research.23

Export Administration, Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: Additions to Entity List: National
Development Centre, Pakistan; and Indian Rare Earths, Ltd., India, Federal Register 62:125 (30 June 1997), 62
FR 35335, pp. 35335
21
Bureau of Export Administration, Revisions to Export Administration Regulations: Additions to the Entity
List, Federal Register 63:233 (19 November 1998), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1998-11-19/pdf/98-
30877.pdf
22
Bureau of Export Administration, Export Administration Regulations Entity List: Removal of Entities, Revision
in License Policy, and Reformat of List, Federal Register 65:53 (17 March 2000) 65 FR 14444, pp. 14444
14452, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2000/03/17/00-6653/export-administration-regulations-
entity-list-removal-of-entities-revision-in-license-policy-and
23
Executive Office of the President, Waiver of Nuclear-Related Sanctions on India and Pakistan,
Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Federal Register 66:191 (2 October 2001),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-10-02/pdf/01-24721.pdf; Bureau of Export Administration, India
and Pakistan: Lifting of Sanctions, Removal of Indian and Pakistani Entities, and Revision in License Review
Policy, Federal Register 66:190 (1 October 2001) 66 FR 500089, pp. 50089-50093,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-10-01/pdf/01-24648.pdf
2005
As part of the July 2005 Next Steps in Strategic Partnership between the US and India, the US de-
listed six entities, three of which were safeguarded nuclear power generating plants, and the othet
three were ISRO entities pertaining to civil space research.24

2011
Following complete rapprochement with India, the US de-listed DRDO missile-related entities and
ISRO propulsion and launch vehicle entities. These holdouts were public sector undertaking Bharat
Dynamics Ltd, DRDO Armament Research and Development Organisation (ARDE), Defence Research
and Development Laboratory (DRDL), the Missile Research and Development Complex (MC), and
Solid State Physics Laboratory (SSPL). On the ISRO side, these were the Liquid Propulsion Systems
Centre (LPSC), Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant (SPROB), Sriharikota Space Centre [now Satish
Dhawan Space Centre], and Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (VSSC).25

Presently, only three Department of Atomic Energy entities, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Indira
Gandhi Atomic Research Centre and Indian Rare Earths, pertaining to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel
cycle activities, nuclear reactors not under safeguards, and related fuel reprocessing, enrichment,
heavy water production and ammonia plant facilities, are maintained on the entity list.

Strategic Weapons Stakeholders

This studys primary objective is to detail the extent of the strategic weapons programme, and to
identify the range of stakeholders in it. One extract from the profile of a recently promoted DRDO
scientist is revealing26:

As project director, he led a team towards successful development of missile launch

platforms for Agni 1, 2, and 3. He has been instrumental in devising innovative
schemes/solutions and establishing effective interfaces among all stakeholders through
continuous interaction with various organisations like Indian Railways, ISRO, CSIR, leading
industry partners, academia, and users for development of various critical ground support
systems required for operationalisation and development of long-range strategic missile
weapon systems.

This study found that the core entities involved in the operation of strategic weapons, the fissile
material pits, final packages, and/or delivery systems were the lowest category of entity in this
study. Entities involved in the development of missiles were likewise fairly low. The second largest
section comprised of dual-use research entities in materials, electronics, aerospace, vehicular
engineering, propulsion, etc, which were typically found to have made contributions in some
manner to Indias strategic weapons. The next category were laboratories involved in the
development of auxiliary systems/technologies, typically including vehicles; and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Suppliers were sorted as major or minor contributors,
resulting in relatively few key Indian domestic industry actors who were core major suppliers
generally trusted with the high specification engineering required. Minor suppliers to strategic

24
Bureau of Industry and Security, Removal of License Requirements for Exports and Reexports to India of
Items Controlled Unilaterally for Nuclear Non-proliferation Reasons and Removal of Certain Indian Entities
From the Entity List, Federal Register 70:167 (30 August 2005) 70 FR 51251, pp. 51251-51252,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2005-08-30/pdf/05-17241.pdf
25
Industry and Security Bureau, U.S.-India Bilateral Understanding: Revisions to U.S. Export and Reexport
Controls Under the Export Administration Regulations, Federal Register 76:16 (25 January 2011) 76 FR 4228,
pp. 4228-4231, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2011/01/25/2011-1471/us-india-bilateral-
understanding-revisions-to-us-export-and-reexport-controls-under-the-export
26
DRDO Newsletter (December 2014), p. 18
programmes were the largest category, and given the paucity of information on their contributions
and the infrequency of their supply, the scale of their input was difficult to assess. Finally, operation
of the countrys unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle was restricted to Department of Atomic Energy
entities.

This Alpha in Depth tallies:

6 entities as directly operating strategic weapons (not including separately Army, Navy and
Air Force units, instead counting them as one entity under Strategic Forces Command)
16 entities as directly responsible for strategic weapons development
33 entities as contributing to auxiliary systems/technologies for strategic weapons
13 entities as participating in an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle
57 entities as contributing dual-use research of concern
18 entities as major suppliers of strategic weapons entities and projects, largely with direct
military use items
99 entities as minor suppliers to strategic weapons entities and projects, often with dual-use
items
Bringing to a total of 243 entities examined for this report.

These entities are examined in turn in part 2 of this report. Before examining these it is helpful to
examine two issues in greater depth. The first relates to the separation of the civil and military
aspects of Indias strategic programs. The second is Indias efforts to join the nuclear governance
regimes.
2. Separation of Civil and Strategic Nuclear Facilities in India
Following the 2007 US/India nuclear deal, India submitted to the IAEA a separation plan to split its
civil and strategic nuclear facilities. This could have brought to an end five decades of difficulty
regarding the safeguards status of India nuclear facilities. However, in practice, separation between
Indias civil and strategic programmes is limited. The purpose of this section is to track the history of
Indias separation of civil and military nuclear facilities and to provide insight into the separation of
Indias facilities as it is formalised today.

India and Safeguards: A Difficult History

The safeguards status of Indias nuclear fuel cycle has been a contentious issue for at least six
decades. Following Eisenhowers Atoms for Peace speech at the United Nations in 1953,
Canada proceeded to offer to India a research reactor before international safeguards had been
designed. While the reactor was subject to a peaceful uses pledge, no arrangements were put in
place to ensure that fissile material from the reactor was not diverted. This was partly because the
fuel for the reactor was to be produced in India. However, after it became apparent that Indian-
produced fuel of suitable quality would not be ready in time for use in the reactor, Canada stepped
in to provide the first fuel load.

Soon after this, India sought tenders for construction of a power reactor. Part of the terms and
conditions was that India should be allowed to construct indigenous clones of the facility. By this
point, supplier states had coordinated to include safeguards on supplied facilities. However, the
safeguards would be applicable only to the Canadian-constructed reactor and not to any future
indigenously produced facilities.

Despite being involved in its design, India opted not to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and
later conducted a so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. It used indigenously-produced
uranium fuel that had been irradiated at the CIRUS reactor and reprocessed. The reactor also used
heavy water produced in the United States as a moderator. Following press reports ahead of the
explosion, both the US and Canada wrote to India to indicate that they would view the use of
material from CIRUS in an explosion as a non-peaceful end use that would thus violate the terms of
sale. India, for its part, held the line that the test was peaceful in nature.

As could be expected, the explosive test resulted in international tensions and helped to generate
momentum in the refinement of non-proliferation controls. The United States conducted a review of
its non-proliferation policy and devised a non-proliferation strategy that would, among other
actions, see the US try to coordinate with other suppliers to strengthen rules on nuclear supply
(what would become the Nuclear Suppliers Group). Other states were sympathetic to the need to
restrain supply. Canada immediately suspended nuclear cooperation and in 1976 adopted a policy
requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. Primarily because of French objections, the
NSG would not adopt such a condition until the 1990s because, the French believed, such a criterion
imposed a de facto NPT requirement of nuclear cooperation at a time when the French view was
that the NPT was a discriminatory instrument.

US nuclear cooperation with India could not be so easily halted. The US had supplied the Tarapur
reactor on the basis of 25 years of assured fuel supply. The US would thus have to breach its contract
to if it was to suspend the supply. Instead, the US sought to leverage the supply of fuel for Tarapur
to persuade India not to conduct further nuclear explosions. By 1978, however, the US congress had
taken up the issue of nuclear cooperation with non-NPT states and had adopted the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act. This act would require the United States to suspend cooperation with states not
accepting full-scope safeguards. President Carter, who campaigned on the issue of nuclear non-
proliferation signed the act in 1978.

The Soviet Union stepped in to provide fuel for the reactor in the 1980s. However, after the Nuclear
Suppliers Group agreed to the requirement for full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply
in the early 1990s after discovery of Iraqs clandestine nuclear programme, this cooperation also
ended. Indias own supplies of uranium are limited and thus, by the mid-1990s, Indias nuclear
program was already substantially isolated from the international marketplace no doubt partly
driving Indias exploration of novel nuclear technology. India could still procure dual-use items. After
India conducted further nuclear tests in 1998, even this ability to acquire dual-use items eroded.

Novel fuel cycles

India is a country rich in thorium but not uranium. Thorium is not in itself fissile but it is fertile, which
means it can be made fissile through bombardment of neutrons. Throughout the nuclear age there
has been interest in thorium, particularly for the day when uranium runs out. While the rest of the
international community have considered this a longer-term concern, for India it has been a key
driving factor because of its international isolation and limited indigenous uranium.
As a result of this, and in order to take advantage of the resources it has to hand, Indian scientists
have long purposed a three-phase fuel cycle. This fuel cycle is summarised in the diagram below. The
three phases are as follows:

1. Transformation of natural uranium from plutonium239 in Pressurised Heavy Water

Reactors (PHWR)
2. Transformation of thorium to uranium233 in Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) fuelled by
plutonium239
3. Burn up of uranium233 using Advanced Heavy Water Reactors (AHWR)

India has substantial experience with construction and operation of pressurised heavy water
reactors having constructed a fleet of such reactors after Canada supplied the RAPPs reactor in
1960x. However, India, like most other countries in the world, has little experience of operating a
thorium fuel cycle. As such Indias pursuit of the thorium fuel cycle must be considered highly
ambitious and highly risky. Nonetheless, the benefits of success in this endeavour could be
significant. Not only would India be able to utilise its rich resources of thorium to satisfy its energy
needs, but it would secure a first-movers advantage should the world eventually begin to shift
towards use of thorium in the nuclear fuel cycle.

The US/India deal and Indias Separation Plan

In July 2005, following years of nuclear isolation, the US Bush administration and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh reached an agreement on the resumption of civil nuclear cooperation.
The motivations of each side varied with India desiring civil nuclear cooperation to meet its energy
needs and the United States seeking to strengthen its relationship with India. An agreement
between the two parties was reached necessitating India embark on a programme to separate its
civil and strategic nuclear programme in exchange for the US easing export control requirements
and championing an exemption at the NSG for a waiver to the requirement for full-scope
safeguards.

In order to fulfil the agreement, the United States embarked upon a programme of diplomatic
outreach and engagement. In parallel, India prepared a plan to separate its civil and strategic
programme.
The provisions for the separation plan as submitted to the IAEA on 25 July 2008 included the
following: India would make subject to safeguards the following 14 of the 22 facilities that it had at
the time; India would not offer its Fast Breeder Reactors for safeguards; all future thermal reactors
would be put under safeguards; India would shut down the CIRUS reactor; and India would offer
certain other fuel cycle facilities for safeguards.

Table 2: Indias Thermal Reactor Safeguards Status as Detailed in INFCIRC/73127

No Facility Year offered for

safeguards
1 TAPS 1 2006
2 TAPS 2 2006
3 RAPS 1 2006
4 RAPS 2 2006
5 KK 1 2006
6 KK 2 2006
7 RAPS 5 2007
8 RAPS 6 2008
9 RAPS 3 2010
10 RAPS 4 2010
11 KAPS 1 2012
12 KAPS 2 2012

13 NAPS 1 2014

14 NAPS 2 2014

The other fuel cycle facilities to be placed under safeguards included:

Uranium Oxide Plant (Block A)
Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (Palletizing) Block A
Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (Assembly) Block A
Enriched Uranium Oxide Plant
Enriched Fuel Fabrication Plant
Gadolinia Facility
Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (for certain campaigns)
Tarapur and Rajashtan Away from Reactors spent fuel storage pools

Additionally, the following research facilities were declared as civil:

Tata Institute of Fundamental research
Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre
Sara Institute of Nuclear Physics
Institute of Plasma Research
Institute of Mathematics Science

27
INFCIRC731 Communication dated 25 July 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of India concerning a
document entitled "Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's
separation Plan"
 Institute of Physics
Tata Memorial Centre
Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology
Harish Chandra Research Institute

In defining the scope of safeguards, the overarching criterion would be a judgement whether
subjecting a facility to IAEA safeguards would impact adversely on Indias national security. Facilities
included on civilian list were those that, after separation, would no longer be engaged in activities of
strategic significance. However, a facility would be excluded from the civilian list if it was located in a
larger hub of strategic significance, notwithstanding the fact that it may not be normally engaged in
activities of strategic significance. A civilian facility would therefore, be on that India has determined
to have no bearing to the strategic programme.

The separation plan also expressly recognises that India has a military nuclear programme that
would not be hampered by the provision of IAEA controls. A large number of facilities remain
outside of safeguards. These facilities have enabled modest Indian expansion of the nuclear arsenal
over the last decade. While not directly affected by the separation plan, it is likely that Indias
weapons programme has benefited from the NSG exemption in a number of ways. First, it is likely
that India has been able to utilise indigenous uranium for military purposes that would otherwise
have been required to satisfy Indias civil nuclear needs. Second, it is likely that Indias military
programme has been able to acquire dual-use goods and other assistance from the international
marketplace which would hitherto have been prohibited. Third, as set out later in the report, India
strategic research institutes most notably the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the
Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) have benefited from civil nuclear cooperation
despite the fact that these facilities were not declared as civil under the separation plan like other
Indian research facilities. It is likely that indirect contributions have supported auxiliary processes of
strategic weapons development and production. This report observes a divide between civil and
military nuclear scientists, typically meaning that nuclear scientists in BARC restricted to the civil
programme rarely cross over to military affairs. However, this is difficult to quantify, and as such an
entity-level of analysis, laxity regarding nuclear cooperation should raise concerns.

The separation plan also makes no mention of Indias uranium enrichment programme, which
officials in New Delhi have hitherto not formally acknowledged. India is thought to have a modest
enrichment capability possibly intended to supply its submarine reactor programme as well as
contribute to the nuclear weapons programme, which is thought to be principally plutonium based.

India has also resisted calls for it to subject its thorium fuel cycle to safeguards and three-phase fuel
cycle. Firstly, this bars any nuclear cooperation on the thorium aspects of the nuclear programme.
However, it also meant that India could, if it so desired, use material from the thorium fuel cycle for
military purposes. Indias primary rationale for not offering this programme for safeguards is that it
wishes to protect the commercial confidentialities of what could be a unique nuclear fuel cycle
technology. However, India might have another vested interest: its likely that some quantity of
natural or depleted uranium could be placed in the breeder blanket of the fast reactors in place of
thorium with the objective of quickly producing large quantities of weapons-usable plutonium.
Coming from the breeder blanket rather than the reactor fuel, such plutonium would have a
relatively low level of fission products and would thus be relatively easy to handle. Indias three
phase fuel cycle could thus provide India a substantial surge capability to produce fissile material for
weapons purposes.

Implications of Indias separation of nuclear facilities

Indias separation plan resulted in a nominal separation of its civil and military nuclear
programme. However, the true degree of separation is somewhat limited and it is likely that Indias
military programs have benefited as a result. Perhaps the most significant contribution to Indias
military programme has been through what can be considered an offset that is, uranium mined in
India has been freed up for use in Indias military programs where it would hitherto have been
required for Indias civil power programme. However, the potential contribution of internationally-
acquired dual-use goods as well as research cooperation should be understated.

The offset problem is particularly problematic because India is thought to continue to produce fissile
material for military purposes. Under the separation plan, India expressed its willingness to work
with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).
However, negotiations over such a treaty continue to be blocked in the Conference on
Disarmament. Additionally, Pakistan, which is blocking the negotiations points to the fact that Indias
programme, can benefit from the offset issue introduced through the NSG exemption an
exemption which has not been made for Pakistan.

Whether or not one accepts Pakistans arguments that the NSG exemption is destabilising, a fissile
material production race in South Asia is underway. Both Pakistan and India will seek to maximise
production of fissile material to fulfil their burgeoning civil power programmes, although more so on
the Indian side, and produce sufficient special fissile material to satisfy the expansion of their
strategic weapons programmes. Racing for fissile material surplus now is desirable as it hedges
against the future possibility that restraint is imposed, possibly through the Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty.

This leads to the question of whether the carrot of civil nuclear cooperation could be used as a lever
to secure a moratorium on production of military-related fissile material in South Asia. It seems likely
that this is one of the outcomes that Pakistan desires. It is not clear, however, whether both states
are ready to reach such an agreement. Moreover, India would doubtless feel that it has no incentive
to agree to such a moratorium given that it already has its NSG exemption.

Overall, while the waiver does offer benefits to numerous parties and to Indias population, it might
ultimately be concluded that the waiver is contributing Indias military programs and to the
destabilising situation in South Asia.

Managing the risks of trading with India

Given the relatively poor delineation between civil and military activities in India, there is a clear risk
that trade and research cooperation could directly or indirectly aid Indias military programs. The
various lists of designated entities have in the past provided industry with a way of ensuring that
exports were not directly intended for military activities. However, in recent years these sanctions
have been removed whilst the range of entities involved in strategic weapons activity has grown.

The primary approach for risk management would be for potential exporters to rely on the
judgement of export control authorities. However, given that export licence issuance for India is
generally perceived as permissive, this would not fully avoid the potential risk that goods supplied
would contribute to nuclear weapons programmes. Table 3 below shows US export licence refusals
per year for items controlled by the MTCR or NSG and other regimes. It is clear that there has been a
substantial decline in denied licences suggesting either greater laxity in approach on the part of the
issuing authorities or a decline in strategic weapons entities seeking goods from abroad.
 This report found signs that scientific cooperation between Western institutions and Indian strategic
entities has steadily risen since 2008. For example, the UK government has sponsored a dozen
research projects with the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), a pivotal player in the
development and continued operation of Indias nuclear weapons. BARC has previously been subject
to multilateral sanctions over a sustained period. This cooperation has occurred after the 2008
normalisation process and has focused on civil power topics of nuclear safety, proliferation-
resistance and waste disposal. Nonetheless, the findings of this report should raise concerns about
the longer-term risks of nuclear assistance to strategic weapons entities. UK-India research projects
involving BARC are detailed in the table overleaf.

Given the tight entanglement of civil and military entities in Indias defence, space and nuclear
sectors, it is likely that exports of dual-use and strategic items, and research cooperation with Indian
entities is indirectly aiding the countrys nuclear weapon programme.

Table 3: US Export Licence Denials to India

 Table 4: UK-India Research Cooperation Involving BARC and IGCAR
Number Title
1 Sustainability and proliferation
resistance assessment of open
cycle thorium-fuelled nuclear
energy (University of Cambridge
and Bhabha Atomic Research
Centre (BARC)
2 Irradiation effects on flow
localisation in zirconium alloys
3 Indo-UK civil nuclear
collaboration on damage and
radiation effects in amorphous
material
4 Characterisation of the atomic-
scale structure of yttria-based
particles in strengthened steels
5 Validation and verification for
critical heat flux and CFD
6 Thermal hydraulics for boiling
and passive systems
7 Transferability of small-scale
specimen data to large-scale
component fracture assessment
28
http://gow.epSource.ac.uk/NGBOViewGrant.aspx?GrantRef=EP/I018425/1
29
http://gow.epSource.ac.uk/NGBOViewGrant.aspx?GrantRef=EP/I012346/1
Description
This project sought to characterize the nuclear sustainability and proliferation resistance of a once through thorium nuclear fuel cycle
and to devise an assessment criteria for this purpose. A three-stage approach would be taken: 1) review of proliferation resistance and
sustainability assessment methodologies, 2) review of proposed open cycle thorium fuelled nuclear reactor designs, including review of
fuel composition and design, and 3) assessment of designs against a newly developed sustainability and proliferation resistance criteria.
The results would be published.28
This project sought to understand the damage caused by radiation to nuclear fuel cladding which can limit fuel burn up. The research was
designed to take advantage of the fact that the UK and India each had facilities that could use different mechanisms to model such
damage. Comparative analysis of the results could then take place. The proposal noted that Indian scientists would also learn how to
undertake advanced electron back scatter diffraction (EBSD) and synchrotron x-ray diffraction experiments.29
This project sought to develop collaboration around the study of radiation damage processes in nuclear waste glasses and glass composite
materials. UK collaborators will contribute in two principal areas: provision of expertise in application of X-ray spectroscopy methods to
radiation damaged materials and application of advanced analytical electron microscopy to glass and glass composite characterisation.
Indian collaborators will bring many years of expertise in preparation and characterisation of radionuclide-containing nuclear glasses by
electron spin and positron annihilation spectroscopies.
The project sought to study the potential of utilising Oxide Dispersion Strengthened alloys in place of structural steels in the construction
of high temperature (Gen IV) reactors. The proposal noted that: These alloys offer much improved performance than more conventional
structural steels at the temperatures above 600 C that will be experienced in these new reactor designs. However, there are a number of
issues that are very poorly understood in these alloys.
This project sought to validate computational fluid dynamics (CFD) codes, used to simulate fluid flows in nuclear reactors, against good
measurements made in suitable experimental rigs. The experiments were conducted at BARC which has excellent experimental facilities.
The results are intended to help provide better validated CFD models to improve the ability to assess new nuclear reactors abilities to
meet ever higher economic and safety criteria.
This project sought to develop a better understanding of where the transition between water coolant and steam occurs in water-cooled
nuclear reactor operations, and developing better techniques to predict this. New nuclear power reactors for energy generation will
almost certainly be water-cooled. The project used experimental measurements of boiling systems conducted at BARC in India.
This project sought to assess tests that had been performed on reactor grade piping components of the Indian Pressurized Heavy Water
Reactor (PHWR) to examine their structural integrity. One of the inputs to demonstrating structural integrity is a fracture mechanics
assessment to demonstrate defect tolerance. The R6 procedure, which contains a hierarchy of assessment approaches, is the UK nuclear
industry standard. However, a difficulty in using the higher level methods is demonstrating transferability of fracture parameters
determined from specimens to application at component level. A large number of tests of PHWR piping components had been performed

8 Fundamental properties of
thoria-based mixed oxides
9 Management of nuclear risk
issues: environmental, financial on post-accident contamination and doses from the Chernobyl accident and hew data from the Fukushima incident. Mitigation was then
and safety (NREFS)
10 Atomistic modelling and
experimental verification of
vitrified matrices for waste
encapsulation
11 11. DMW-Creep: Influence This project sought to improve understanding of the characteristics of welded joints between austenitic stainless steels and ferrtic steels
of Inhomogeneity on Creep of
Dissimilar Metal Welds
on straight pipes and elbows, with a variety of cracks and loadings. These tests were assessed using a range of defect assessment
approaches to demonstrate transferability for practical piping components.
This project sought to use advanced materials simulation techniques to investigate the behaviour of thorium dioxide based materials
when irradiated in a nuclear reactor. Comparison with experimental data was also performed, both using pre-existing data and new data
being developed by collaborators in India. This work will aid development of better predictive capability to establish that fuel being
irradiated in a civil reactor will behave in a manner consistent with its design criteria, which is required to rapidly develop experience in
the use of thorium based fuels for civil power generation. There is an interest in using a thorium dioxide fuel approach as there are
concerns that uranium reserves are not sufficient to facilitate a large scale international nuclear new build.
This project sought to evaluate mitigation options following a possible large-scale nuclear accident in the future. The research used data
considered in four national contexts: Ukraine/Belarus, Japan, India and the UK using a variety of decision-making techniques.
Subsequently scenario-based multi-criteria decision analysis was used to investigate differences between recommendations from the
objective methods and decisions taken on the ground. Recommendations were developed from the various methods.
This project sought to develop computer models of the radiation induced structural changes in the encapsulation materials over long time
scales. Principal materials investigated were borosilicate and iron phosphate glasses, for which experimental verification of the computer
models were performed. The outcomes from this work were to be used to make predictions to enable engineers to choose the best
materials for long time structural integrity of encapsulated spent nuclear waste.
that are widely used in many nuclear power plants. In the steam generator circuit of sodium cooled fast breeder reactors stainless steel
pipes are required to join with ferritic steel pipes. The welds are dissimilar metal welds and incorporate a nickel alloy pipe insertion .
Premature creep failure is encountered in such joints. This project aimed to model and test the effects of metallurgical and structural
aspects of welds, develop material models and develop reliable methods to monitor the material, in order to improve understanding of
the operating life of the weld.
Facilities List

India operates a full independent nuclear fuel cycle. These facilities are listed below with their
general locations and operating entities where possible.

Data has been collated from the IAEA Power Reactor Information System; IAEA Research Reactor
Database; IAEA Integrated Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System; List of Facilities Subject to
Safeguards Under Indias Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/754/Add.7 (February 2015); Separation
Plan INFCIRC/731 (July 2008); David Albright and Susan Basu, Separating Indian Military and Civilian
Nuclear Facilities, Institute for Science and International Security (19 December 2005); and IHS
Janes CBRN Assessments Centre.
Table 5: List of Indian Nuclear Facilities

Facilities State Facility Type Operator Output Status Year Operational Safeguards Notes
Jaduguda Jharkhand U Mining UCIL 2500t/day Active 1967 No
Bhatin Jharkhand U Mining UCIL Active 1967 No
Narwapahar Jharkhand U Mining UCIL Active 1995 No
Bagjata Jharkhand U Mining UCIL Active 2008 No
Turamdih Jharkhand U Mining UCIL 3000-4500t/day Active 2003 No
Baduhurang Jharkhand U Mining UCIL Active 2007 No
Mohuldih Jharkhand U Mining UCIL Active 2012 No
Tummalapalle 1 Andhra Pradesh U Mining UCIL Active 2012 No
Tummalapalle 2 Andhra Pradesh U Mining UCIL Active 2017 (projected) No
Lambapur-Peddagattu Telengana U Mining UCIL 130t/yr (U) Future 2024 No
Gogi Karnataka U Mining UCIL 130t/yr (U) Future 2020 No
KPM Meghalaya U Mining UCIL 340t/yr (U) Future 2022 No
Jaduguda Jharkhand U Milling UCIL 200t/yr (U) Active 1968 No
Turamdih Jharkhand U Milling UCIL 190t/yr (U) Active 2008 No
Tumalpalle Andhra Pradesh U Milling UCIL 220-330t/yr (U) Active 2015 No
Kanampalle Andhra Pradesh U Milling UCIL Future 2017 No
Seripally/Mallapuram Telengana U Milling UCIL Future 2024 No
Diggi/Sadiapur Karnataka U Milling UCIL Future 2020 No
Mawthabah Meghalaya U Milling UCIL Future 2022 No
Uranium Oxide Plant Hyderabad U Conversion NFC 450t/yr Active Yes
Uranium Fuel Assembly Plant ("New") Hyderabad Fuel NFC Active No
Fabrication
Enriched Uranium Oxide Plant ("New") Hyderabad U Conversion NFC 24t/yr (LEU) Active Yes
Enriched Fuel Fabrication Plant Hyderabad Fuel NFC Active Yes
Fabrication
Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (Pelletizing) Hyderabad Fuel NFC 335t/yr Active Yes
Fabrication
Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (Assembly) Hyderabad Fuel NFC 300t/yr Active Yes
Fabrication
PHWR Fuel Assembly (Block A) Hyderabad Fuel NFC 300t/yr (HM) Active Yes
Fabrication
Gadolina Facility Hyderabad Zirconium NFC Active Yes
New Zirconium Fabrication Plant (NZFP) Hyderabad Zirconium NFC Active No
New Zirconium Sponge Plant (NZSP) Hyderabad Zirconium NFC Active No
Zirconium Fabrication Plant (ZFP) Hyderabad Zirconium NFC Active No
Zirconium Sponge Plant, Palaykayal (NFC-II) Tamilnadu Zirconium NFC Active No
PHWR Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF) Kota Fuel NFC Active No
Fabrication
Zirconium Fabrication Facility (ZFF) Kota Zirconium NFC Active No
Trombay Fuel Fabrication Maharashtra Fuel -- Active No
Fabrication
Uranium Metals Plant, Trombay Maharashtra Fuel -- Active No
Fabrication
Tarapur Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facility Maharashtra Fuel BARC MOX Active No
Fabrication
Rare Materials Plant (RMP) Site 1 Karnataka U Enrichment BARC/IREL 60-100kg/yr Active No
(WGU)
Rare Materials Plant (RMP) Site 2 Karnataka U Enrichment BARC/IREL Future No
Special Material Enrichment Facility (SMEF), Karnataka U Enrichment BARC Future No
Challakere
Uranium Enrichment Plant, Trombay Maharashtra U Enrichment BARC Active No
TAPS-1 Tarapur Maharashtra BWR NPCIL 160 MWe Active 1969 Yes General Electric built
TAPS-2 Tarapur Maharashtra BWR NPCIL 160 MWe Active 1969 Yes General Electric built
TAPS-3 Tarapur Maharashtra PHWR NPCIL 540 MWe Active August 2006 No General Electric built
TAPS-4 Tarapur Maharashtra PHWR NPCIL 540 MWe Active September 2005 No General Electric built
MAPS-1 Madras, Kalpakkam Tamilnadu PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1983 No General Electric built
MAPS-2 Madras, Kalpakkam Tamilnadu PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1985 No
NAPS-1 Narora Uttar Pradesh PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1991 Yes
NAPS-2 Narora Uttar Pradesh PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1992 Yes
KAPS-1 Kakrapur Gujarat PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1993 Yes
KAPS-2 Kakrapur Gujarat PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1995 Yes
KAPS-3 Kakrapur Gujarat PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Future November 2017 No
KAPS-4 Kakrapur Gujarat PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Future 2018 No
KAIGA-1 Kaiga Karnataka PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1999 No
KAIGA-2 Kaiga Karnataka PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 2000 No
KAIGA-3 Kaiga Karnataka PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active February 2007 No
KAIGA-4 Kaiga Karnataka PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active November 2010 No
RAPS-1 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 100 MWe Active 1973 Yes
RAPS-2 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 200 MWe Active 1981 Yes
RAPS-3 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 1999 Yes
RAPS-4 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active 2000 Yes
RAPS-5 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active November 2009 Yes
RAPS-6 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 220 MWe Active January 2010 Yes
RAPS-7 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 700 MWe Future No
RAPS-8 Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 700 MWe Future No
KK-1 Kundankulam Tamilnadu PWR NPCIL 1000 MWe Active December 2014 Yes VVER built
KK-2 Kundankulam Tamilnadu PWR NPCIL 1000 MWe Active April 2017 Yes VVER built
KK-3 Kundankulam Tamilnadu PWR NPCIL 1000 MWe Future Future No VVER built
KK-4 Kundankulam Tamilnadu PWR NPCIL 1000 MWe Future Future No VVER built
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), Tamilnadu FBR BHAVINI 500 MWe Future May 2017 No Scale-up reactor
Kalpakkam
Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) Maharashtra HWR BARC 300 MWe Future 2017 No Scale-up reactor
INS Arihant Reactor Naval Reactor PWR BARC 80-100 MWt Active August 2013 No HEU
INS Aridhaman Reactor Naval Reactor PWR BARC 80-100 MWt Future No HEU
3rd SSBN Reactor Naval Reactor PWR BARC 80-100 MWt Future No HEU
Kalpakkam Spent Fuel Reprocessing (KARP) Tamilnadu Reprocessing BARC PUREX Active 1997 No
Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Maharashtra Reprocessing BARC PUREX Active 1977 No
(PREFRE-1)
Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Maharashtra Reprocessing BARC PUREX Active No
(PREFRE-2)
CORAL Reprocessing Plant, Kalpakkam Tamilnadu Reprocessing IGCAR 12kg/yr Active No
Plutonium Seperation Plant, BARC Maharashtra Reprocessing BARC 400-700kg total Active No
(PUREX)
Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant Tamilnadu Reprocessing IGCAR Active No
(FRFRP), Kalpakkam
Rajasthan Away from Reactor Dry Spent Rajasthan Fuel storage NPCIL Active No
Fuel Storage
Tarapur Away from Reactor Wet Spent Fuel Tarapur Fuel storage -- 275t spent fuel Active Yes
Storage total
Tarapur Dry Spent Fuel Storage Tarapur Fuel storage -- 20t total Active Yes
Unspecified PHWR Fuel Storage Fuel storage -- 2500-3600t spent Active No
fuel total
CIRUS Maharashtra HWR BARC Inactive July 1960 No Research reactor, original source of
plutonium
DHRUVA Maharashtra HWR BARC Active August 1985 No Research reactor
PURNIMA Maharashtra LWR (U-233) BARC Inactive May 19782 No Three variants of research reactor,
PURNIMA-I was a pulsed fast reactor
KAMINI Tamilnadu LWR (U-233) BARC/IGCAR Active May 1972 No Research reactor
ASPARA Maharashtra LWR (U-233) BARC Inactive 1956 No Undergoing conversion
Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) Tamilnadu FBR IGCAR Active October 1985 No Research reactor
Compact High Temperature Reactor (CHTR), Maharashtra HTR BARC Active No Research reactor utilising U-233 + Th
Trombay fuel
Indian High Temperature Reactor (IHTR) Maharashtra HTR BARC Future No Research reactor
Accelerator Driven Subcritical System (ADSS) Maharashtra ADS (Thorium) BARC Future No Research reactor for R&D for thorium
fuel
PRP-1 Reactor, Kalpakkam Tamilnadu PWR BARC 80-100 MWt Active September 2006 No Land-based reactor for training and
orientation
HWP Hazira Gujarat D2O2 Plant HWB 80t/yr Active February 1991 Yes
HWP Thal-Vaishet Maharashtra D2O2 Plant HWB 78t/yr Active 1985 Yes
HWP Tuticorin Tamilnadu D2O2 Plant HWB 49t/yr Active 1978 Yes
HWP Baroda Gujarat D2O2 Plant HWB 17t/yr Active 1975 No
HWP Kota Rajasthan D2O2 Plant HWB 85t/yr Active April 1985 No
HWP Manuguru Telangana D2O2 Plant HWB 185t/yr Active December 1991 No
HWP Talcher Odisha D2O2 Plant HWB 62t/yr Active March 1985 No
Pokhran test range Rajasthan Test range BARC/Indian Army Inactive 1974 No
3. Indias Engagement with Nuclear Governance
Indias interactions with international export control regimes and nuclear governance agreements
are best characterised as partial engagement. India has traditionally opposed the NPT and perceived
it as inadequate, citing non-proliferation and disarmament sequencing issues, and has sought to
pursue its own brand of self-determination and proliferation management. Since the US-India
nuclear deal, this has changed. India is now a participating member of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), and remains an outlier to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT). India has applied to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an export control regime
that some claim include the criterion, that all NSG members must also be adherents to the NPT.30
India has not engaged with either Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) or Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT). Given that native Indian strategic discourse appears to focus on Indian freedom of
nuclear decision making, Indian accession to either of those agreements remains unlikely. This mixed
bag of partial engagement has complicated international efforts to work with India on non-
proliferation, and will continue to plague Indian ambitions for international recognition and
acceptance.

As a result, the outlook for Indian integration into formal agreements appears to remain contingent
on the strategic priorities of constituent members rather than Indias unconditional adoption of
nuclear non-proliferation agreements. This renders Indias future in international nuclear
governance as uncertain, and warranting close attention in the short-to-medium term.

Indias Nuclear Self Determination

Since 2007, Indias role in nuclear governance evolved substantially. This was instigated by the
US/India nuclear agreement and the 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group exemption to the requirement of
full-scope safeguards as previous sections outlined. In the decade that has followed, India has taken
a number of steps to engage in global nuclear commerce and governance. In addition to separating
its civil and strategic nuclear programs as set out in Part 1 Section 2, this includes:

Concluding nuclear cooperation agreements with 10 states and agreements for the supply of
uranium and technology. It is notable that despite this, construction of foreign supplied
reactors in India is at considerable risk. This was first partly a result of Indias uncertain
nuclear liability laws but more recently is a result of the financial difficulties of Toshiba.
Aligning its lists to those of the export control regimes. However, consistent with the
concept of Indian nuclear self-determination, India has opted to align its lists while using an
entirely different approach to export control lists than any other state. The list, known as
SCOMET is a unique Indian instrument. SCOMET has evolved over time and where it has
been previously out of sync with the lists of the export control regimes, it has taken positive
steps towards alignment.
India applied and was accepted into the Missile Technology Control Regime and applied to
join the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It took part in the Obama Administrations Nuclear
Security Summit Process.

30
There is some ambiguity about whether there is a formal criteria for membership. INFCIRC 539 Rev 6 state
that factors taken into account for participation include adherence to one or more treaties, such as the
NPT. However, the phrase taken into account implies that the listed criteria are not absolute. In practice,
the NSG membership can choose to interpret or change its criteria however it wishes. INFCIRC 539 Rev 6.
Available online at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc539r6.pdf (accessed 16 June 2017)
However, there are significant steps that India has not taken nor has been required to take to
receive the concessions made to it:

India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India is currently
implementing a moratorium on nuclear testing. However, it is far from clear whether this
moratorium will be observed in the medium-to long term if the strategic environment shifts
drastically.
India has not committed to end production of fissile material for use in weapons programs.
Indeed, it is possible that India has been able to take advantage of the civil nuclear
agreement with the US to expand its production of fissile material for weapons purposes.
This is evidently undesirable given the difficult regional issues that India faces.

India and Export Controls

Given Indias substantial nuclear strategic capability, it is important for India to implement strong
export controls. In addition to being a de-facto nuclear weapons state, India is a capable producer of
dual-use goods and there have been instances where India-produced goods have reached
programmes of proliferation concern.31 The extent of Indias production of dual-use goods is
demonstrated in Table 6 (overleaf) which is based on research undertaken by Project Alpha into the
global manufacturing base for many dual-use goods.

Indias approach is based upon the SCOMET List. The SCOMET list structure has in the past been
different from that of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which is used as the structure of the control lists
of the majority of other countries that implement export controls, including those of the EU. In April
2017, the SCOMET list was synchronised with Wassenaar Agreement and the Australia Group lists.

As suggested in the previous section, this unusual alignment is likely to make lives difficult for
multinational corporations which often must classify their products against the control lists in all
relevant territories.

31
For example, see Valves to Arak, Proliferation Case Study Series, Project Alpha. Available online at:
http://projectalpha.eu/proliferation-case-study-series-valves-for-arak/ (Accessed 16 June 2017)
Table 6: Commercial Dual-use manufacturers outside of the NSG
Table 7: Comparison of SCOMET and EU Control List

Category SCOMET Categories EU Categories

0 Nuclear materials, nuclear- Nuclear materials, facilities
related other materials, and equipment
equipment and technology
1 Toxic chemical agents and Special materials and related
other chemicals equipment
2 Micro-organisms, toxins Materials processing
3 Materials, Materials Electronics
Processing Equipment and
related technologies
4 Nuclear-related other Computers
equipment and technology,
not controlled under
Category 0
5 Aerospace systems, Telecommunications and
equipment, including information security
production and test
equipment, related
technology and specially
designed components and
accessories therefore.
6 Munitions List Sensors and lasers
7 Electronics, computers, and Navigation and avionics
information technology
including information security
8 Special Materials and Related Marine
Equipment, Material
Processing, Electronics,
Computers,
Telecommunications,
Information Security, Sensors
and Lasers,
Navigation and Avionics,
Marine, Aerospace and
Propulsion
9 Aerospace and propulsion
Outlook
Indias participation in trade of nuclear goods is set to increase, but its future role in the
international nuclear governance, or its degree of involvement remains uncertain. Certain
sequencing conditions exist:

First, India will seek to join nuclear governance arrangements as though it was a party to the NPT. As
India is a nuclear possessor state from outside the Treaty, and it remains highly unlikely it will accede
to the Treaty through nuclear rollback, the admission of India to nuclear governance institutions
would certainly include concessions on this criterion.

Second, Indias selective engagement with non-proliferation agreements might indicate the
Government of Indias priorities to fulfil its nuclear supply needs whilst maintaining relatively
unhindered nuclear decision making freedom. Indias non-engagement with the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty is indicative of this strategic priority. Selective engagement with nuclear governance
institutions and agreements, such as the NPT and CTBT, should cast doubt on the sincerity of Indias
commitment to non-proliferation. An Indian commitment to non-proliferation should be consistent
and impartial. The danger of normalising Indias de facto military nuclear power is undermining
international agreements that have sought wide bases of support from Member States and as a
result obtained substantive legitimacy. Nonetheless, the potential inclusion of India into the Nuclear
Suppliers Group for the purposes of securing its nuclear goods supply line may in turn also secure
Indias industrial base from export of sensitive nuclear and missile goods to other countries.

Third, with a view to commercial risk, foreign investment in Indias nuclear power infrastructure is
likely to have uncertain yields. Tracing the history of US nuclear trade with India since NSG
exemption in 2008 does not readily indicate profit, suggesting a strategic calculation as the
underpinning factor. This does not bode well for future foreign investment in Indias nuclear power
infrastructure, especially considering the relatively small national share of power production that is
expected to be derived from nuclear power (as of 2016, it has been 2.3% of the countrys net power
generation). Obstacles such as Indias civil nuclear liability laws have been partly resolved, but a
long-term view of risk in the region suggests that any reorientation of Indias strategic nuclear
apparatus to a more aggressive posture, such as the significant expansion of the nuclear weapons
arsenal, will endanger commercial cooperation. As such, near term analysis of profit must be wary of
longer term risks.

Fourth, Indias application to the NSG has drawn sharp opposition from Pakistan and China, and the
rebuff of Indias bid will constitute a set-back for Indian aims at international acceptance of its
nuclear programme. For future US administrations, balance will have to be struck between strategic
priorities to enhance Indias position as a partner, whilst respecting the criteria of non-proliferation
arrangements. This will become increasingly difficult in the face of regional antagonisms between
India and Pakistan, and China.
Key entities involved in Indias strategic nuclear and missile sectors
Prime Minister's Office
Department of Atomic Department of Space
Energy (DAE)
Atomic Energy Indian Space Research
Commission (AEC) Organization (ISRO)
Atomic Minerals
Directorate for
Antrix Corporation
Exploration and
Research (AMD)
Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre Complex Laboratory
(BARC)
Indira Gandhi Centre
for Atomic Research
(IGCAR)
Raja Ramanna Centre
for Advanced
Technology (RRCAT)
Nuclear Fuel Complex
(NFC)
Nuclear Power
Corporation of India
(NPCIL)
Bharatiya Nabhikiya
Vidyut Nigam Ltd
(BHAVINI)
Indian Rare Earths Ltd
(IREL
Uranium Corporation
of India Ltd (UCIL)
Electronics Corporation
of India Ltd (ECIL)
Government of India
(GOI)
Ministry of Electronics
Ministry of Defence Ministry of Science and
and Information Ministry of Railways
(MOD) Technology (MST)
Technology(MEITY)
International Advanced
Department of Department of Council for Scientific
Nuclear Command Research Centre for
Defence Research and Defence Production Indian Navy (IN) and Industrial Research Indian Railways
(DS) Authority (NCA) Powder Metallurgy and
Development (DDR&D) (DDPMOD) (CSIR)
New Materials (ARCI)
Directorate of Naval
Defence Research and
Strategic Forces Hindustan Aeronautics Design (Submarine National Aerospace
Development
Command (SFC) Ltd (HAL) Design Group) (DND- Laboratory (NAL)
Organization (DRDO)
SDG)
Advanced Technology
Defence Instute of
Indian Army Missile Bharat Electronics Ltd Vessel Management National Chemical
Advanced Technology
Troops (BEL) Boards (joint with Laboratory (NCL)
(DIAT-DU)
BARC)
Semiconductor
Bharat Dynamics Ltd National Metallurgical
Indian Air Force INS Varsha Naval Base
(BDL) Laboratory (NML)
(SCL)
Indian Navy Central Glass and
Eastern Naval BEML Ltd (BEML) INS Kattabomman Ceramic Research
Command Institute (CGCRI)
Central Manufacturing
Hindustan Shipyard Ltd
Technology Institute
(HSL)
(CMTI)
Mishra Dhatu Nigam
Ltd (MIDHANI)
Government entity involved in
strategic weapons activity
Dual-use research entity of
Indian Institute of Indian Institutes of National Institutes University of
University of Delhi
University of concern
Science (IISc) Technology (IIT) of Technology (NIT) Hyderabad Mumbai
State owned public sector
High Energy undertaking
Jadavpur University BIT Mesra
Society of India Other dual-use research entities
Dual-use research civil
institute
Larsen and Godrej and Walchandnagar Bharat Heavy BrahMos Aerospace Pvt
Toubro
Tata Group
Boyce Industries Electricals Ltd Ltd (BAPL) Private sector entity
BrahMos Aerospace
Domestic dual-use industry Thiruvananthapuram Ltd (BATL) Government joint venture
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