Constructing Cantorian Counterexamples

Author(s): George Boolos

Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jun., 1997), pp. 237-239
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227093
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 tGEORGE BOOLOS

CONSTRUCTING CANTORIAN COUNTEREXAMPLES

ABSTRACT. Cantor's diagonal argument provides an indirect proof that there is no one-
one function from the power set of a set A into A. This paper provides a somewhat
more constructive proof of Cantor's theorem, showing how, given a function f from the
power set of A into A, one can explicitly define a counterexample to the thesis that f is
one-one.

KEY WORDS: Cantor, diagonal argument, set theory.

Cantor's theorem states that there is no one-to-one correspondenc

ween any set A and the power set 3TA of A, i.e., that there is no on
function mapping any set A onto T3A. Cantor's theorem is an imm
ate consequence of either of two propositions,
onto
one, "-g: A --+
to the effect that no function maps any set A onto q3A; the other,
"--f: q3A -+ A", stating that no one-one function maps q3A into A.
Let us call the former "Not Onto" and the latter "Not 1-1".
Not 1-1 follows directly from Not Onto: Suppose f: 3A -+ A.
For x in A, let g(x) = the unique B such that f(B) = z, if there
is such a B; and let g(x) = A otherwise. Then g: A -+ 3TA. By Not
Onto, some subset B of A is not in the range of g. But then for some
C 7 B, f(C) = f(B) [otherwise B = g(f(B))], and f is thus not
one-one.

Not Onto can, of course, be proved by the exceedingly familiar

onal argument: Suppose g: A -+ q3A. Let B = {z E A: xz
B c A. But B = g(x) for no x in A, and so g is not on
Note that this proof of Not Onto provides an explicit definition
{z E A: x V g(x)}, from g, of a subset of A that is not in the range
The derivation we gave of Not 1-1 from Not Onto does not, how
similarly provide an explicit definition from f of a pair B, C, o
such that B C C and f(B) = f(C). If we define g from f as
and take B = {x E A: x V g(x)}, we may conclude that for
C # B, f (C) = f (B), but the proof gives us no hint as to the id
of any such C.
There is a familiar direct proof of Not 1-1, again a diagonal argum
Suppose f: q3A - A. Let D = {x E A: 3E(f(E) = xzAx
D C A, so for some x E A, f(D) = x. If x V D, x E D
x E D and thus for some E, f(E) = x and x E, whence D

Journal of Philosophical Logic 26: 237-239, 1997.

@ 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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 238 G. BOOLOS

Since f(D) = x = f(E), f is not on

considers {x E A: VE(f (E) =
But again, this direct proof, alth
inition of D and show that
does not explicitly define any su
no better.)
Thus although we can, given g: A -+ q3A, explicitly define a coun-
terexample to the statement that g is onto q3A, it may well appear that
we cannot, analogously given f: q3A -+ A, explicitly define a coun-
terexample to the statement that f is one-one. Not Onto might seem to
be "constructively" provable in a way that Not 1-1 is not.
Not so.

Take f: T3A -+ A. For any relation r, let r = {y: yrx A y x}. Let
us call a relation r good iff r is a (reflexive) well-ordering of a subset
of A and for every x in the field a(r) of r, f(rz) = x.
Let R be the union of all good r. If r and r' are good, then one of r
and r' is an initial section of the other; therefore R is itself good.
Let C = (R). C C A. Let x = f(C), and let B = Rx. C, x, and
B are all explicitly defined from f.
If x V C, then R U {(y, x): y E C or y = x} is good, and therefore
x E C. Thus x E C.
Since xa {y: yRx A y # x} = B, B $ C. Since R is good,
x = f(Rx) = f (B). But x = f (C). Thus f is not one-one. So there is
a proof that defines a counterexample after all.
We note that since Rx C a(R), we have proved a nonobvious strength-
ening of Not 1-1: If f: V3A -+ A, then for some B, C, B $ C, B C C
and f (B) = f (C).

Editor's note:
This paper was written in the spring of 1996, shortly before the
author's death. In another version of the paper, Professor Boolos gave
a somewhat less direct proof that is interesting because it helps illumi-
nate the connection between Not 1-1 and the set-theoretic paradoxes.
(That there is such a connection is clear; Basic Law V, the source of all
Frege's woe, was the denial of an instance of the second-order version
of Not 1-1.) Here is a sketch of the alternative proof:
Given f: 93A -+ A, define a function H from the universe of hered-
itarily well-founded pure sets into A by setting H(x) equal to f((H(y):
y E x}). An induction shows that, if f is one-one, H is one-one, so that
H embeds the whole universe of hereditarily well-founded pure sets into
the set A. But this, as we shall see, is impossible.

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 CONSTRUCTING CANTORIAN COUNTEREXAMPLES 239

One way to see that H cannot be one-one is to observe that, if it

were, then applying replacement to H-1 would give us a set consist-
ing of all hereditarily well-founded pure sets, impossible on account of
Mirimanoff's paradox.
For present purposes, however, a more useful demonstration is to note
that, because {H(a): a a (von Neumann) ordinal} is a set (since it is
included in A), it follows by replacement that, if H is one-one, then the
image under H-' of {H(a): a an ordinal} is a set. But this gives us a
set of all ordinals, impossible on account of Burali-Forti's paradox.
Thus the restriction of H to the ordinals is not one-one, so that there
exists an ordinal 7 such that, for some / < 7, H(0) = H(7y). Finding the
least such 7 and setting B = {H(a): a < p} and C = {H(a): a < 7}
gives us our counterexample (the same one as before) to Not 1-1; B : C,
but f (B) = f (C).

Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

Department of Linguistics and Philosophy,
Cambridge, MA 02139,
U.S.A.

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