LORENZO M. TAADA, et. al v HON. JUAN C.

TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

Facts:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders. The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition, absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties." Petitioners maintain that since the subject
of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show
any specific interest for their petition to be given due course. Respondents further contend that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as
to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.

Issues:

Whether the petitioners have legal personality to bring the instant petition? Whether publication is

needed to make the law effective?

Held:

Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land. Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it
goes into effect. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Hon. Ruben

G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

Facts:

As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, then DOLE
Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No.16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by
private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took
over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum
Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. PASEI
filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their
implementation on the grounds that DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their
rule-making authority in issuing said
circulars;that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, areunreasonable, unfair
and oppressive; and that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative
Register were not complied with.

Issue:

Whether or not DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess in issuing circulars.

Held:

The second and first grounds are not meritorious. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to
restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. It reads: The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to
restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title[Regulation
of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory
authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 to take over the functions of the Overseas
Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of
Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau
of Employment Services was the power and duty to establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to
regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas; it assumed from
the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty to recruit and place workers for overseas
employment of Filipino contract workers on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as
policy may dictate; and from the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over to regulate and supervise the activities of
agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best
possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith.

Tayug Rural Bank vs. Central Bank of the Phils. (G.R. No. L-46158, Nov. 28, 1986)

Facts:
Tayug Rural is a bank in Pangasinan which took out 13 loans from Central Bank in 1962 and1963, all covered by
promissory notes, amounting to 813k. In late 1964, Central Bank released a circular; Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8
thru the Director of Loans and Credit. This circular all informed all rural banks that an additional 10% per annum penalty
interest would be assessed on all past due loans beginning 1965. This was enforced beginning July 1965.In 1969, the
outstanding balance of Tayug was at 444k. Tayug Rural filed a case in CFI Manila to recover the 10% penalty it paid up to
1968, amounting to about 16k, and to restrain Central bank from further imposing the penalty. Central Bank filed a
counterclaim for the outstanding balance includingthe10% penalty, stating that it was legally imposed under the Rules
and Regulations Governing Rural Banks promulgated by the Monetary Board on 1958, under RA 720.Tayugs defense
was that the counterclaim should be dismissed since the unpaid obligation of Tayug was due to Central Banks flexible
and double standard policy of its rediscounting privileges to Tayug Rural and its subsequent arbitrary and illegal
imposition of the 10% penalty. Tayug Rural contends that no such 10% penalty starting from 1965 was included in the
promissory notes covering the loans. A judgment was rendered by CFI Manila in favor of Central Bank ordering Tayug
Rural Bank to pay10% penalty in the amount of around 19k pesos for loans up to July 1969, and to pay nothing for the
next remaining loans. Tayugs claim in the case was however successful, and so Tayug was also ordered to pay 444k,
with interest to the Central Bank for the overdue accounts with respect to the promissory notes. Central Bank appealed
to the CA, but also lost on the ground that only a legal question had been raised in the pleadings. The case was then
raised to the SC, with each party arguing in the following manner: CFI rules that the circulars retroactive effect on past
due loans impairs the obligation of contracts and deprives Tayug Rural of property without due process of
law.Central Bank reasons that Tayug Rural, despite the loans, should have known that rules andregulationsauthorize the
Central Bank to impose additional reasonable penalties.

Issue:

Whether or not the Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty via Memorandum Circular No.

DLC-8

Held:

NO. A reading of the circular and pertinent provisions, including that of RA 720, shows that nowhere therein is the
authority given to the Monetary Board to mete out additional penalties to the rural banks on past due accounts with the
Central Bank. As said by the CFI, while the Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the
retroactive imposition of administrative penalties cannot be taken as a measure SUPERVISORY in
character. Administrative rules have the force and effect of law. All that is required of administrative rules and
regulations is to implement given legislation by not contradicting it and conform to the standards prescribed by law.
Rules and regulations cannot go beyond the basic law.. The law cannot be given retroactive effect. More to the point,
the Monetary Board revoked the additional penalty later in 1970, which clearly shows an admission that it had no power
to impose the same. The Central bank hoped to rectify the defect by revising the DLC Form later. However, Tayug Rural
must pay the additional 10% in case of suit, since in the promissory notes, 10% should be paid in attorneys fees and
costs of suit and collection.

FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

CARLOS LARIOSA and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,

GR No. 70479 February 27, 1987

FACTS:

Carlos Lariosa work in Firestone as factory worker. When he was about to leave the company premises, he was frisked
by security guard because while his personal bag was inspected, there were16 wool flannel swabs all belonging to the
company. As a result, he was terminated by firestone on the ground of stealing company property and loss of trust. The
company also files criminal complaint for attempted theft. Lariosa, on other hand, filed a case for illegal dismissal Labor
Arbiter found the dismissal just bust the NLRC reversed the decisionFirestone contends that NLRC erred in not dismissing
Lariosas appeal for being late.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appeal filed by Lariosa and NLRC was filed late.

HELD:

Lariosa filed his appeal on June 7, 1984 or after the lapse of 14 days from the notice of the decision of the labor arbiter.
Under the Labor Code, the reglementary period for which an appeal from decision of labor arbiter may be filed to NLRC
is within a period of ten days. The ten-day period has to be interpreted to mean as ten calendar days and not ten
working days.

MARIANO S. GONZAGA vs. AUGUSTO CE DAVID

GR No. L-14858 December 29, 1960

FACTS:

Mariano Gonzales, as owner of a cargo truck and passenger bus, registers the vehicles and pays
the first installment for registration fees due on 1957. To cover the second installment for registration fees, he remitted
to the provincial treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, the amount of P500.00, under postal money orders. The
postal cancellation mark on the envelope containing the remittance bears the date August 31, 1957. The registrar of the
Motor Vehicle Office ruled that pursuant to Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second installment for registration fees was
payable on or before the last working day of August. The last working day of August 1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957.
And consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga which bears cancellation mark dated August 31,1957was made beyond
time fixed by law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the remittance for second installment of registration fees was made beyond the time fixed by law.

RULING:

The Motor Vehicle Office in Cagayan had no office on Saturday, August 31, 1957.However,it was immaterial the
last working day contemplated in the Revised Motor Vehicle Law should not necessarily mean the last working day of
Motor Vehicle Office. The fact that August31, 1957 was declared a special public holiday did not have the effect of
making the preceding day, August 30, the last day for paying registration fees without penalty. Moreover, under the said
law, for payment of registration fees by mail, the date of cancellation of the postage stamps of the envelope containing
the remittance is considered the date of application.

RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN, INC. and JOSE O. DESIDERIO, JR. vs HE COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMA CASTRO

GR No. L-32116 April 21, 1981

FACTS:

Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to Rural Bank of Caloocan to apply for industrial loan. The loan
was secured by a real estate mortgage on Castors house, after that, the bank approved the loan of P3000. Valencia
obtained from the bank an equal amount of loan affixing Castros signature as co-maker without its knowledge. The
sheriff then sent a notice announcing the property would be sold at public auction to satisfy the obligation. Upon
request, the auction sale which was scheduled for March 10, 1961was postponed for April 10, 1961. But April 10 was
subsequently declared a special holiday so the sheriff sold the property on public auction on April 11, 1961 which was
the next succeeding business day following the special holiday. Castro prayed for the annulment of sale alleging that
there was fraud on the part of Valencia who induced her to sign as co-maker of a promissory note since she is a 70-year
old widow who cannot read and write and it was only when she receive the notice of sheriff, she learned that
the encumbrance on her property was P6000 and not for P3000.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the public auction sale was null and void for transferring the date already set by law.

RULING:

The sale is null and void for not having in accordance with Act 3135 which states that that a notice shall be given by
posting notices of sale for not less than 20 days in at least 3public places and if the property is worth more than P400
such notice shall also be published for in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city once a week for 3
consecutive weeks. The pretermission of a holiday applies only where the day, or the last day for doing any act required
or permitted by law falls on a holiday or when the last day of a given period for doing an act falls on holiday. It does not
apply to a day fixed by an office or officer of the government for an act to be done. Since April 10, 1961 was not the day
or the last day set by law for the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, nor the last day of a given period but a date fixed by
deputy sheriff, the sale cannot be legally made on the next succeeding business day without the notice of the sale in
accordance with Act no. 3135.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. L-7234 May 21, 1955

FACTS:

On July 27, 1953, an information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay City charging Paz M. del Rosario with slight
physical injuries committed on the 28th day of May, 1953. The accused thereupon presented a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with the provisions of Articles
90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed the case. Against the
order of dismissal appeal is made directly to this Court under the provisions of section 17, sub-paragraph 6 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 as only questions of law are involved in the appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

ISSUE:

Whether or not the term "month" in the Revised Penal Code should be understood to be a month of 30 days, instead of
the civil calendar or calendar month.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law

HELD:

Yes. The term "month" used in the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the sense that the new Civil Code
defines the said term, we find persuasive authority in a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain. In a case decided by it in
the year 1887 (S. de 30 de Marzo de 1887), prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, it had declared that when the
law spoke of months, it meant the natural month or the solar month, in the absence of express provisions to the
contrary. But after the promulgation of the Civil Code of Spain, which provided in its Article 7 a general rule for the
interpretation of the laws, and with particular respect to months, that a month shall be understood as a 30-day month,
said court held that the two months period for the prescription of a light offense should be understood to mean 60 days,
a month being a 30-day month. Similarly, we hold that in view of the express provisions of Article 13 of the new Civil
Code the term "month" used in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood to mean the 30-day month
and not the solar or civil month.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We hold, therefore, that the offense charged in the information prescribed in 60 days, said period to be counted by
excluding May 28, the commission of the offense, and we find that when the information was filed on July 27, 1953 the
offense had not yet been prescribed because July 27 is the sixtieth day from May
29.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The order of dismissal appealed from is hereby reversed and the case ordered reinstated. Without
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In Re: Filart 40 Phil 205

FACTS:

These proceedings were instituted at the instance of thirty-seven residents of Asingan, Pangasinan, who filed a
complaint against attorney Anacleto Filart for malpractice, alleging in substance:

1. That while Filart was deputy fiscal of Pangasinan he received of them the sum of P111 as fees for drafting a
memorandum in connection with Registration Case No. 3, Record No. 8540;

2. That Filart was guilty of fraud and negligence in prosecuting the appeal to the Supreme Court, he having practically
abandoned the case.

ISSUE:

Whether the facts presented are sufficient to support the allegation of fraud and negligence on part of the respondent.

HELD:

The court, having in mind the many appeals which have been dismissed because of the lack of diligence of counsel,
cannot let the occurrence pass without expressing a strong disapproval of such criminal carelessness. While we would
not wish to assume a harsh and uncompromising attitude towards attorneys-at-law, we would wish for them to know
that by indulging in such unprofessional tactics they become unworthy of the trust which the law reposes in them. The
lack of due care is a breach of the attorney's undertaking with his client, and is indicative of a disregard of the attorney's
duties to the court. We bring to the notice of clients whose rights have been prejudiced by the failure or by the delay of
an attorney in preparing or filing pleadings necessary in the proper conduct of a cause, and in taking such steps as may
be required in the progress of the case, that the client who has suffered damages as the result of his attorney's
negligence or misconduct may recover therefor.
Without, therefore, desiring especially to overemphasize the dereliction of Attorney Anacleto Filart for, sad to relate, he
is only one of a class, it does become our solemn duty to reprimand him for carelessness and misconduct in attending to
the cause of poor clients. Let a copy of this order be furnished to the respondent for his information with a warning that
a more severe punishment will be meted out to him in case of a repetition of similar acts and omissions; and let a copy
hereof be filed with his personal papers in this court. So ordered.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals

GR No. L-5230612 October 1981

FACTS:

During the period pertinent to this case, Petitioner Corporation was engaged in the business of telecasting local as well
as foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. For which
petitioner paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the film rentals. In implementing Section 4(b)
of the Tax Code, the Commissioner issued General Circular V-334. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp.
dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR 30% of of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged
in trade or business in the Philippines. The last year that the company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in
1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35% and
revising the tax basis from such amount referring to rents, etc. to gross income. In 1971, the Commissioner issued a
letter of assessment and demand for deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The company requested
for reconsideration; where the Commissioner did not act upon.

ISSUE:

Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V-334, may be retroactively applied.

HELD:

Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive application where to so apply them would be
prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein, the prejudice the company of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular 4-71
is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes
under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income
tax was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in a
position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no
longer control over them when the new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are concerned, the
company does not fall under any of them.

PABLO LORENZO VS. JUAN POSADAS, JR 64 Phil 353

G.R. No. L-43082 June 18, 1937

FACTS:

On 27 May 1922, Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal
properties. Hanleys will provides the following: his money will be given to his nephew, Matthew Hanley, as well as the
real estate owned by him. It further provided that the property will only be given ten years after Thomas Hanleys death.
Thus, in the testamentary proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga appointed P.J.M. Moore as trustee of
the estate. Moore took oath of office on March 10, 1924, and resigned on Feb. 29, 1932. Pablo Lorenzo was appointed in
his stead. Juan Posadas, Collector of Internal Revenue, assessed inheritance tax against the estate amounting to
P2,057.74 which includes penalty and surcharge. He filed a motion in the testamentary proceedings so that Lorenzo will
be ordered to pay the amount due. Lorenzo paid the amount in protest after CFI granted Posadas motion. He claimed
that the inheritance tax should have been assessed after 10 years. He asked for a refund but Posadas declined to do so.
The latter counterclaimed for the additional amount of P1,191.27 which represents interest due on the tax and which
was not included in the original assessment. However, CFI dismissed this counterclaim. It also denied Lorenzos claim for
refund against Posadas. Hence, both appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the estate was delinquent in paying the inheritance tax and therefore liable for the P1, 191.27 that Posadas is
asking for?

HELD:
Yes. It was delinquent because according to Sec. 1544 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code, payment of the
inheritance tax shall be made before delivering to each beneficiary his share. This payment should have been made
before March 10, 1924, the date when P.J.M. Moore formally assumed the function of trustee.Although the property
was only to be given after 10 years from the death of Hanley, the court considered that delivery to the trustee is delivery
to cestui que trust, the beneficiary within the meaning of Sec. 1544 (b).Even though there was no express mention of
the word trust in the will, the court of first instance was correct in appointing a trustee because no particular or
technical words are required to create a testamentary trust (69 C.J.,p. 711). The requisites of a valid testamentary trust
are: 1) sufficient words to raise a trust, 2) a definite subject, 3) a certain or ascertained object. There is no doubt that
Hanley intended to create a trust since he ordered in his will that certain of his properties be kept together u

LICHAUCO & COMPANY vs. SILVERIO APOSTOL and RAFAEL CORPUS

G.R. No. L-19628 December 4, 1922

FACTS:

Lichauco & Co. petitioned for the writs of mandamus and injunction against Silverio Apostol and Rafael Corpus allegedly
refusing Lichauco & Co to import from Pnom-Pehn, in French Indo-China, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for
the manufacture of serum except upon the condition, stated in AO No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture contending that
said cattle shall have been immunized from the rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn.

The petitioner asseted that under the first proviso to section 1762 of the Administrative Code (amended by Act no.
3052), the petitioner has an absolute and unrestricted right to import carabao and other draft animals and bovine
cattle for the manufacture of serum from phom-pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippin Islands and that the respondents
have no authority to impose upon the petitioner previous said restrictions. Respondents relied upon section 1770 of the
Administrative Code and AO no. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture in relation with Dept. Order No. 6

ISSUE:

Whether section 1770 has been repealed by implication, in so far as it relates to draft

animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum?

HELD:

Section 1762 is for the general rule, while section 1770 is for particular contingency and not inconsistent with Section
1762. Petition does not show sufficient ground for granting the writs of mandamus and injunction.
 We are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner is untenable, for the reason that section 1762, as amended,
is obviously of a general nature, while section 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of
legislation in section 1762. Section 1770 is therefore not to be considered as inconsistent with section 1762, as
amended; on the other hand, it must be treated as a special qualification of section 1762. Of course the two provisions
are different, in the sense that if section 1762, as amended, is considered alone, the cattle which the petitioner wishes
to bring in can be imported without restriction, while if section 1770 is still in force the cattle, under the conditions
stated in the petition, can be brought in only upon compliance with the requirements of Administrative Order No. 21.
But this difference between the practical effect of the two provisions does not make then inconsistent in the sense that
the earlier provision (sec. 1770) should be deemed repealed by the amendatory Act (3052).

That section 1770 is special, in the sense of dealing with a special contingency not dealt with in section 1762, is readily
apparent upon comparing the two provisions. Thus, we find that while section 1762 relates generally to the subject of
the bringing of animals into the Island at any time and from any place, section 1770 confers on the Department Head a
special power to deal with the situation which arises when a dangerous communicable disease prevails in some defined
foreign country, and the provision is intended to operate only so long as that situation continues.

U.S. vs Palacio 33 Phil 208

FACTS:

The undersigned charges Mateo P. Palacio with having violated section 87 of Act No. 82, in the following manner, to wit:
Said accused, on or about the 26th day of September, 1914, in the municipality of Tacloban, Province of Leyte, P.I., he
being then and there a deputy to the provincial assessor of Leyte, charged with the duty of assessing real property, did
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally upon revising the assessment and in reassessing the property of Francisco Madlonito,
situated in the barrio of Di-it, municipality of Tacloban, omit from the tax list certain real properties and improvements
belonging to said Francisco Madlonito, knowing that the properties omitted were lawfully taxable; in violation of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act committed by the defendant constitute an infraction provided for and punished by section 87 of
Act No. 82, known as the Municipal Code.

HELD:

Section 49 of the same Act, No. 82, provides that the real estate of the municipality shall be valued and assessed for
taxation by a board, to consist of the president, the municipal treasurer, and a specially authorized deputy of the
provincial treasurer, which board shall be known as the municipal board of assessors. On February 11, 1913, Act No.
2238 was passed, section 1 of which created the position of provincial assessor for each province containing
municipalities organized under the provisions of the Municipal Code. As may be seen, the purpose of Act No. 2238, in
creating the office of provincial assessor and allowing him such number of deputies and clerks as shall be fixed by the
provincial board with the approval of the Executive Secretary, was the same as that of Act No. 82, in creating, in section
49 thereof, the municipal board of assessors. Furthermore, one of the rules of interpretation, as very properly said by
defendants counsel in his brief, is that when there are two laws on the same subject enacted on different dates, and it
appears evidently by the form and essence of the later law that it was the intention of the legislator to cover therein the
whole of the subject, and that it is a complete and perfect system, or is in itself a provision, the latest law should be
considered as a legal declaration that all that is comprised therein shall continue in force and that all that is not shall
rejected and repealed. By reason of the foregoing, and the judgment appealed from being in accordance with the
merits of the case and the law, we hereby affirm the same, with the costs against appellant. So ordered.

Perfecto Floresca vs Philex Mining Corporation

GR 30642; April 30, 1985

FACTS:

Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation, who, while working at its copper
mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the
tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working
underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before the
Workmens Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional
damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under
the WCA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.

HELD:

Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be
estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts
then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are
excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed
of such a remedy. However, if in case theyll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given
to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case
then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being.
The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him.

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO

G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993

FACTS:

Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific BankingCorporation Check was paid and
drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check waslater dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Company
traced source of check and
laterdiscovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made anextrajudical demand upon Baltao
but latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for
violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business
establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed
complaint for damages against Albenson.

ISSUE:
Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.

RULING:

Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didnt have the intent to cause damageto the respondent or enrich
themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing
Baltao of BP 22. Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on the
following inquiries: SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao. Bank said signature belonged
to EB

EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III. There was no malicious prosecution on
the part of Albenson. A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the
debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof.
In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the
adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages,
for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

445 SCRA 500

FACTS:

Private respondent Emerald Resort Hotel Corporation (ERHC) obtained a loan from petitioner Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP). To secure the loan, ERHC mortgaged its personal and real properties to DBP. On 5 June 1986,
alleging that ERHC failed to pay its loan, DBP filed with the Office of the Sheriff, Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, an
Application for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgages. Sheriffs issued the required notices of
public auction sale of the personal and real properties. However, they failed to execute the corresponding certificates of
posting of the notices. The Office of the Sheriff scheduled on 12 August 1986 the public auction sale of the real
properties. The first scheduled public auction was published. However, the Office of the Sheriff postponed the auction
sale on 12 August 1986 to 11 September 1986 at the request of ERHC. DBP did not republish the notice of the
rescheduled auction sale because DBP and ERHC signed an agreement to postpone the 12 August 1986 auction sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extrajudicial foreclosre of real and chattel mortgage are valid.

RULING:
Valid as to chattel mortgage. Void as to real estate mortgage. There is no question that DBP published the notice of
auction sale scheduled on 12 August 1986. However, no auction sale took place on 12 August 1986 because DBP, at the
instance of ERHC, agreed to postpone the same to 11 September 1986.

Publication, therefore, is required to give the foreclosure sale a reasonably wide publicity such that those interested
might attend the public sale. To allow the parties to waive this jurisdictional requirement ought to result in converting
into a private sale what to be a public auction.

DBP, however, complied with the mandatory posting of the notices of the auction sale of the personal properties. Under
the Chattel Mortgage Law, the only requirement is posting of the notice of auction sale. There was no postponement of
the auction sale of the personal properties and the foreclosure took place as scheduled. Thus, the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage in the instant case suffers from no procedural infirmity.

WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 38569 and 38604 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage is valid whereas the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage is void. The award of moral damages is deleted for lack of basis. No costs.

ELADlA DE LIMA, vs.LAGUNA TAYABAS 160 SCRA70

G.R. No. L-35697-99 April 15, 1988

FACTS:

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this decision seeking its modification so that the legal interest awarded by
the Appellate, Court will start to run from the date of the decision of the trial court on December 27, 1963 instead of
January 31, 1972, the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Potenciano Requijo as heir of the
deceased Petra de la Cruz further sought an increase in the civil indemnity of P3,000.00 to P 12,000.00. The Appellate
Court denied the motion for reconsideration holding that since the plaintiffs did not appeal from the failure of the court
a quo to award interest on the damages and that the court on its own discretion awarded such interest in view of Art.
2210 of the Civil Code, the effectivity of the interest should not be rolled back to the time the decision of the court a quo
was rendered.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the Court of Appeal; erred in granting legal interest on damages to start only from the date of its
decision instead of from the date of the trial court's decision;

2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not increasing the indemnity for the death of Petra de La Cruz (in Civil
Case No. SP-240) from P3,000 to P12,000.00.

RULING:

Under the first issue, petitioners contend that the ruling of the Appellate Court departs from the consistent rulings of
this court that the award of the legal rate of interest should be computed from the promulgation of the decision of the
tonal court. Respondents counter that petitioner having failed to appeal from the lower court's decision they are
now precluded from questioning the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It is true that the rule is well-settled that a party
cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him, and while he may make counter assignment of
errors, he can do so only to sustain the judgment on other grounds but not to seek modification or reversal thereof, for
in such case he must appeal. A party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from
the appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on
appeal. Moreover, under the circumstances of this case where the heirs of the victim in the traffic accident chose not to
appeal in the hope that the transportation company will pay the damages awarded by the lower court but unfortunately
said company still appealed to the Court of Appeals, which step was obviously dilatory and oppressive of the rights of
the said claimants: that the case had been pending in court for about 30 years from the date of the accident in 1958 so
that as an exception to the general rule afore stated, the said heirs who did not appeal the judgment, should be afforded
equitable relief by the courts as it must be vigilant for their protection. The claim for legal interest and increase in the
indemnity should be entertained in spite of the failure of the claimants to appeal the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the subject decision is modified in that the legal interest on the damages
awarded to petitioners commences from the date of the decision of the court a quo until actual payment while the civil
indemnity for the death of Petra de la Cruz is increased to P 30,000.00.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. ALFONSO VERCHEZ

481 SCRA 384 (2006)

FACTS:

Respondent Grace Verchez-Infante hired the services of Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. to send a
telegram to her sister respondent Zenaida Verchez-Catibog asking her to send money for their mother Editha Verchez
who at that time was confined in a hospital in Sorsogon. But it took 25 days before such message was conveyed to
Zenaida. When Editha died, her husband, respondent Alfonso Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and
their respective spouses, filed an action for damages against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon. They
alleged that the delay in the delivery of the message contributed to the early death of Editha. RCPI argues that there is
no privity of contract between other respondents except with Grace, also the delay in the delivery is caused by force
majeure, maintaining further that they exercised due diligence in choosing their employees; hence they must be
released from any liability. The RTC rendered judgement against RCPI. RCPI appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the award of moral damages is proper despite the fact that there was no direct connection between the
injury and the alleged negligent acts

RULING:

RCPIs stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract with regard to
Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-plaintiffs-herein-co-respondents. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that
those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible time. It took 25 days, however,
for RCPI to deliver it. RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and interferences which adversely
affected the transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message. Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not
locate the address of Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the telegram.

For the defense of force majeure to prosper, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that
may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to
forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented
RCPI from delivering the telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of the non-
transmission and the non-delivery s that she could have taken steps to remedy the situation. But it did not. There lies
the fault or negligence.

RHODORA M. LEDESMAvs. COURT OF APPEALS 160 SCRA 449

[G.R. No. 113216. September 5, 1997]

FACTS:

Violeta Delmo was treasurer of an organization formed by students of the West Visayas College. She extended loans
from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school. As a result, the school president (petitioner) denied her
the right to graduate MAGNA CUM LAUDE despite the order of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools that she be
conferred such honor.

ISSUE:

Is the school president liable for damages?

RULING:

It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal, which was brought about by the petitioner's
neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. The Solicitor- General tried to cover-up the
petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her
a copy of the Director's decision.

Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have done so
considering that he received the decision XXX and even though he sent it back with the records of the case, he
undoubtedly read the whole of it, which consisted of only 3 pages. Moreover, the petitioner should have had the
decency to meet Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner
failed to do, and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its decision.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007

FACTS:

The petitioner, Rommel Jacinto Silverio filed a petition to change his first name from Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his
gender from male to female in his birth certificate so that he can marry as a woman to a man.

The petition is based on the ground that he has underwent sex re-assignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand a year
before the petition was filed. The petition was granted by the said court yet on August 18, 2003, the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed by
the appellate court. The latter ruled that the decision of the former lacked legal basis. Wherefore with the decision
rendered the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Should the court allow the change of name and gender based of the ground that petitioner is now physically a woman?

RULING:

No. The court denies the petition. The Supreme Court denies the motion on the ground that there is no law recognizing
sex re-assignment, the determination of a persons sex is at the time of birth, if it is not by error then it cannot be
changed.

Thus, the court explained that the change in gender sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences, for it will greatly affect the rules of marriage and family relations and affect public policy
considering laws governing women.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

FACTS:

Alicia Reyes (petitioner) is a Filipino citizen while the private respondent is an American citizen. The two were
married in Hongkong in 1972; then established their residence in the Philippines. The parties were divorced in Nevada,
USA in 1982. Alicia Reyes re-married in Nevada this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Private respondent filed suit against
Alicia Reyes Van Dorn stating that petitioner's business (Galleon Shop) in Ermita, Manila is a conjugal property of the
parties and asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business and that private respondent
be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property". The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree had no bearing in the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Galleon Shop is a conjugal property of the petitioner and the private respondent even after their
divorce obtained in USA.

RULING:

No. Pursuant to the national law of the private respondent, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is
bound by the decision of his county, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him.

He is also estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. To maintain that the private respondent is still married to the petitioner is unjust. Petitioner should not be
subject to a wife's obligation. The private respondent should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL vs.HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

FACTS:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen was married to private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national in the Federal Republic of Germany. After 3 and a half years, private respondent
initiated a divorce proceeding against the petitioner in Germany and promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed for two complains of adultery before the
City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with William Chia as
early as 1982 and with Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner.
The Secretary of Justice directed the respondent city fiscal to defer any arraignment proceedings if the accused has not
yet been arraigned and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. On October 21, 1987 this
Court issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from implementing the order of September 8, 1987 and from further
proceeding with the criminal case. On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. Petitioner argues that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private offense, since the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing of the criminal complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the filing of the criminal action.

RULING:

Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence an adultery case on
the ground that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The law specifically provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended
spouse, and nobody else. Thus, it follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action, and by this it meant that he is still married to the accused spouse at the
time of the time of the filing of the complaint.
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

FACTS:

Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together
and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto their intimacy developed
among them Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their
child, Chris Hermosisima, was born. However defendant married one Romanita Perez.

ISSUE:

Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.

RULING:

When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently delivers. Although she cannot recover moral damages for the
breach, nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical and hospitalization expenses as well as
attorneys fees.

Because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to
his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant
is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219,
paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ

G.R. No. L-2008 December 26, 1964

FACTS:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their promise to love, decided to get married. Two days before
their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage had to be postponed as his mother opposes it. A
day before his marriage he sent a telegram informing her nothing changed rest assured returning soon. Francisco was
never heard from again. Beatriz sued for damages for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE:

Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?

RULING:

The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of
the Civil Code provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.

This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But
to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.

When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article
2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven
that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

FELIA P. TY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and EDGARDO M. REYES

G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

FACTS:

Edgardo Reyes, private respondent, married to Anna Maria Villanueva both in a civil and church ceremony respectively.
However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for
lack of marriage of license.

Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of said spouses, private respondent wed Ofelia Ty, petitioner,
in the City Court of Pasay and thereafter in a church wedding in Makati. Out of their union bore two daughters. Until
private respondent petition that their marriage be declared null and void for lack of marriage of license and that at the
time they got married, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of
nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.

Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage is untrue. She submitted the marriage license in court and
private respondent did not question the evidence. However, RTC and CA affirmed their decision in favor of private
respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to comply with marital obligations of the respondent.

RULING:

There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of marital obligation. Supreme Court also viewed that
no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks
for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.

Should they grant her prayer, they would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or
common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against
such incongruity.

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR. vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ

GR 85140 17 May 1990

FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas cohabited with Tomas Eugenio. Unfortunately, Vargas died due to heart failure while giving birth. The
brothers and sisters of the former filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on 27 September 1988. They stated that Vitaliana
was forcibly taken from her residence and had resided her in the palacial residence in Misamis.

RTC issued the writ of Habeas Corpus but Eugenio refused to surrender the corpse to the sheriff due to the reason that a
corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus. The court consequently ordered that the corpse of Vitaliana Vargas be
delivered to the funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio stated that the court does not have jurisdiction. Eugenio insisted
that he has a right on Vargas corpse because he is her common law husband.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Eugenio can claim custody for the deceaseds body

RULING:

No, Eugenio cannot claim custody for the deceaseds body. The court ordered for the dead body of Vargas be awarded
to her brothers and sisters. As stated in the Revised Administrative code, the duty of burial of an unmarried person
should be left to any kin.

Even if the deceased and the petitioner cohabited, they are still not considered husband and wife as the Philippine law
does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman can cohabit for years even without marriage; however,
their legal status remains that of an unmarried person.

The petitioner has an existing marriage with another woman which serves as an impediment from marrying Vitaliana
when she was still living. Therefore in this case, the custody of Vargass dead body is with her relatives.

Navarro vs. Domagtoy (1996)

GR No. 961088

FACTS:

Dapa, Surigao del Norte Mayor Navarro filed a complaint against respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in office and ignorance of the law. As for the first act
complained, it was alleged that Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite the
lack of summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of Ida Pearanda, Tagadans first wife.
Respondent states that the joint affidavit presented by Tagadan stating the fact that he and his first wife have not seen
each other for almost seven (7) years is sufficient proof of Pearandas presumptive death, and therefore, he could
rightfully solemnize the marriage. Second, it was alleged that Judge Domagtoy performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction. The judge holds his office and therefore has
jurisdiction in Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge acted with gross misconduct and in gross ignorance of the law.

RULING:

Yes. As in the first issue, the respondent judge solemnized the wedding despite the declaration in the certified true copy
of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borga stating that Tagadans civil status is separated. Furthermore, he
also maintained that the joint affidavit stating that the first wife, Ida Penaranda, has not returned nor been heard of for
almost seven years thereby giving rise to her presumptive death, is enough reason to proceed with the marriage.

These of course are in disagreement with Art. 41 of the Family Code which provides that for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse, and therefore, by reason
that no such summary proceeding was made by Tagadan, made their marriage void. As for the second issue, it is covered
by Art. 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus Art. 7 could not justify the judges action for the reason that his jurisdiction
covers only the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, thus he is without authority to administer the wedding in
Dapa, Surigao Del Norte. Furthermore, the judge could not cite Art. 8 to validate his actions as this would only
demonstrate his lack of understanding of the basic principles of the civil law since the parties did not fall under any of
the exceptions aforementioned in the provision.

FABIAN PUGEDA vs. RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS

GR No. L-16925 March 31, 1962

FACTS:

The plaintiff claims participation in the said properties on the ground that the same were acquired by him and the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff contracted marriage in January, 1916 and who died on February 11, 1934.
The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda
are children of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer. The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the
marriage between himself and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos.
273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate with the following interest therein; 71% in lot
No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that
plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the aid interest in the lots above-mentioned; that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer
in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said properties and defendants managed the properties in trust
as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above described, acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff
and deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half thereof be given as share therein of plaintiff.

ISSUE:

The defendants questioned the marriage of the plaintiff, when they produced a photostatic copy of the record of
marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite or the month of January 1916, to show that there was no record of the
alleged marriage.

HELD:

Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a
marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took
place. Other evidence may be presented it to proof marriage.

Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be
admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as
an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ELIAS BORROMEO 133 SCRA 106

G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984

FACTS:

At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde Taborada (mother of
Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada told her to inform her son, Geronimo
Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together, they went to Susanas hut. There they found Susanas lifeless
body next to her crying infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-
appellant, Elias, said that because they were legally and validly married, he should only be liable for homicide and not
parricide. He thinks such because there was no marriage contract issued on their wedding day and after that.
However, in his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a priest.
ISSUE:

Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?

HELD:

In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are presumed married unless proven
otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society. Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the
fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage which are : legal capacity and consent. The absence of the
record of such marriage does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present.

Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. And, the
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in
the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to
the registry is not one of said requisites. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to
30,000.

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

FACTS:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the
Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in
1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina,
Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named
Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana.
Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Lupos descendants by his first and
second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the
Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of
the lot was issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased
father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:

Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no evidence was likewise offered
to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to
have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no
divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.

VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

FACTS:

Tenebro was married to Ancajas before a judge in a trial court in Lapu-lapu city. Thismarriage took place in 1990.
Eventually Tenebro showed Ancajas a marriage certificateinvolving him and a Villareyes, a marriage consummated in
1986. Tenebro left their home andsaid that he will cohabit with Villareyes. However, in 1993, he married another
woman namedVillegas. After discovering this, Ancajas corresponded with Villareyes asking her if their marriage did take
place and Villareyes answered in the affirmative. With this, Ancajas filed acase for bigamy. Tenebro claimed that he only
had children with Villareyes but there was noexisting valid marriage between them because there was no ceremony that
took place and alsothere is no record of their marriage in the civil registrar. The lower court found him guilty of bigamy
and said decision was later on affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner contestedthis by invoking psychological
incapacity in the second marriage.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Tenebros marriage to Villareyes was valid and whether he may invoke psychological incapacity in
the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on liability for bigamy?

HELD:

With regard to the first issue, the court ruled in the affirmative and ruled in the negativeon the latter. For the first issue,
Villareyes was able to present a valid marriage certificate and her handwritten statement. These were sufficient
documentary evidence that can prove that amarriage was solemnized since that is what is stated in the document and
signed by the parties.When a court declares a marriage null and void by reason of psychological incapacity itdoes not
declare the marriage non-existent from the very beginning. This means that a marriageis still considered to have taken
place. With this, the court ruled that a subsequent marriage wasconsidered contracted while another marriage subsists
thus constituting bigamy

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE A. DAYOT

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they
executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage
with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.
Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the
marriage license requirement.

HELD:

Court of Appeals indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or
barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are binding in the Supreme Court. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law
and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose
and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that
an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptibly. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised
any time.

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

FACTS:
 SPO4 Santiago Cario married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and
Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became
bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for
his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various
government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation,
NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December
14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against Nicdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-
half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted
that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous
marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted
that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.

HELD:

The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage
between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a
policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or
her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is
likewise void.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately
live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein
the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by
her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her
daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for
the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration
of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any
circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties.
Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition
because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the
proceedings, which he chose to ignore. Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
ENGRACE BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., vs.
NORMA BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid
and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the
children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years
exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was
void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?

HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though
they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and
his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after
the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.,

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the orders of the RTC.Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines
while private respondent is a citizen of the USA.They were married in Hongkong and established residence in the
Philippines and produced twochildren. They divorced in Nevada and it is also where petitioner remarried Theodore Van
Dorn.Private respondent filed a case against petitioner with regard to a business in Ermita, whichrespondent claims as
Conjugal property and he asks to be declared with right to manage.Petitioner claims that said act is barred by his
confirmation in their Nevada divorce that they hadno community property. The court denied dismissal because said
property is in the Philippinesand so the divorce has no bearing in the case. Hence, the certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether the Nevada divorce is to be given merit in the Philippines?

HELD:

The private respondent contends that the divorce cannot be held valid in the Philippines because it is against our laws.
However, the Philippines recognizes divorce by an alien in another country. The divorce that took place between private
respondent and petitioner received nocontention from private respondent. In fact he sent his lawyers on his behalf,
stating that theywish to get a divorce by reason of incompatibility and that there is no community property to
beadjudicated. With this, the court cannot rule in favor of private respondent because being acitizen of the United
States it was his own laws that made the divorce valid.DOCTRINE Article 15 of the Civil Code talks about laws on family
rights binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.
However, private respondent is a citizen of the USA and pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of
petitioner, and it being a valid divorce, is recognized here in the Philippines.

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653

GR No. 8011

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national
before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child
who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in
January 1983.

The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on
January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair
with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE:
Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer
husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued?

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is
the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.

Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court.Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
Myros Villanueva in Ozamis City in the year 1941.This relationship gave birth to a son and daughter. Said son was with
Lady when she left for the States in 1986. Cipriano knew eventually that his wife has become a naturalized citizen of the
States and learned that she has married another man after acquiring a divorce decree. Cipriano asked the declaration of
the court permitting him to remarry.
The Solicitor General as representative for the State contends that he cannot be granted permission to remarry because
Lady was not a foreign citizen specifically when he married her and the law only recognizes divorce acquired by the alien
spouse. Petition was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Code permits Cipriano to remarry after a divorce was acquired?

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative, however, it denied Cipriano permission to remarry. The court in answering in the
affirmative on the issue based their decision on paragraph 2of Section 26 of the Family Code which provides for the
recognition of a divorce decree validly acquired by the alien spouse in another country. This is to permit the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a matter of fairness because the foreign spouse ceased to be attached to the Filipino. What is
relevant here is that Lady was no longer a citizen of the Philippines when she acquired the divorce bringing her within
the purview of Section 26. She is considered an alien who obtained a divorce decree. This then capacitates Cipriano to
remarry.

Unfortunately, for his petition to be granted, he has to prove to the court that a divorce decree has been validly
acquired by his wife. However, he failed to do so, hence, the court cannot permit him to remarry.

PAULA T. LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE 345 G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000
FACTS:

Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed
for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the
liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and
was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente;
they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property
to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in
favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have
acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to inherit from the late
Lorenzo Llorente?

HELD:

In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court
held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos
will and determine the succession rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws
on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity since he was a foreigner.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals.Crasus Iyoy was married to Fely Iyoy in
1961 and this marriage gave birth to fivechildren. Fely Iyoy eventually left for the States to provide for their family in
1984 and in lessthan a year sent Crasus documents to sign with regard to a divorce that she applied for.
Crasuseventually found out that Fely married Stephen Micklus in 1985 and their relationship hasconceived of a child.
Crasus eventually questioned the validity of Felys subsequent marriage. The Court of Appeals in deciding this case sided
with Fely.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid and recognized in the Philippines?

HELD:

The court decided in the negative and reversed the Appellate Courts decision. Basing from the facts, Fely only
became a citizen in 1988 and acquired the divorce in 1984, marrying Micklus a year after. This means that paragraph
two of Article 26 cannot be applied in such a way that, Fely is not yet considered an alien at the time the divorce was
acquired and therefore she does not have the capacity to remarry and the marriage is still considered as subsisting.

The Civil Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with regard to family laws and status are governed by Philippine laws
regardless of where they are. Fely, being a Filipino Citizen then, is not permitted by our laws to acquire a divorce decree
since such is not recognized in the Philippines.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by a City Court
Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents.Defendant Cardenas personally
attended the procuring of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the
marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents.
They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways. Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order he marital
status before leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila. Respondent then filed a petition
with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage
license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of
a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the
certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. On
appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

ISSUE:

Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?

HELD:
 At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was
the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued
by the local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the
marriage void ab initio.

It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject
marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to
refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the
contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the
parents of the former.

ALFONSO LACSON vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON

and THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-23482 August 30, 1968

Facts:

Feb 14, 1953 when they got married. Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila
March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila. Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would go to
petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen. This was affirmed by the CFI. May 7, 1963, respondent
filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement to
gain custody of her younger children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7
years old.CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and void and
as such the execution of said judgment is void too.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife

HELD:

Yes, should have but was filed out of time. NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven
years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so
agreement should have been declared null and void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise. However the
children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court, as long as above ten) already 1968. Court may also award custody to who they deem fit through
evidence. Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:

(1) Is entitled to parental care;

(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;

(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;

(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.

However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the agreement is valid with respect to the
separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership since it had judicial sanction. (art
190/191 of NCC)

Corroborated by already 5-year separation

MARIANO B. ARROYO vs. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO

GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921

FACTS:

Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived together as manand wife until July
4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of livingseparate from her husband.
Marianos efforts to induce her to resume marital relations were all in vain.Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to
compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with himas a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and
cross-complaint that she had been compelled toleave because of the cruel treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed
that a decree of separation bedeclared and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate
maintenance.The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the
husbandwas more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justificationfor
her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other?
HELD:

NO.It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses tocohabit with,
and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclinedto sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by
process of contempt, may be entered to compelthe restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium . At best such
an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the
experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of marriedpeople
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable.We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo
in this case is entitled to the unconditionaland absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is
sought in the petitorypart of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife
haspresented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.Therefore, reversing the judgment
appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and thecross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo
has absented herself from the marital homewithout sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return.
The plaintiff is absolvedfrom the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance.

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916

FACTS:

Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of
Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month.
However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant,
one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked
to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile.

HELD:

Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest
not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and
obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that
defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit
the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode
because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for
separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

CARMEN QUIMIGUING ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN vs. FELIX ICAO

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and
confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff
several times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite
drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per
month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the
ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth
to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of
action.

ISSUE:

Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child
may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born
as prescribed in Article 742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate
children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned. Another reason for
reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes
a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

CONSTANZA YAEZ DE BARNUEVO vs. GABRIEL FUSTER

G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913

FACTS:
On 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Contanza Barnuevo, both citizens of Spain, got married in a Catholic ceremony in Malaga,
Spain. On 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippines and acquired real and personal property. Towards the middle of
1896, Contanza came to Manila and lived with her husband in conjugal relations until April 1899. On April 4, 1899, they
made an agreement in a public document by which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such
separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the
said lady pleases". Fuster undertook in the same document to send his wife a sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her
support, payable in Madrid from June 1899, but he only complied until August 1899. Contanza Barnuevo returned to
Manila in 1909 to file a divorce against her husband on the ground of adultery committed by Fuster. Fuster denied that
either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila. He argued that they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain and
he alleged that both of them were natives and subjects of Spain. Fuster denied Barnuevo's statements concerning the
possession of real and personal property of the conjugal partnership, the statement of their amount, and their
qualification as being all conjugal property. The Court of First Instance of Manila decreed the suspension of life-in-
common between Barnuevo and Fuster and directed the communal property to be divided between the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction over the divorce filed by Barnuevo against Fuster who are citizens of
Spain and W/N the the Philippine courts has jurisdiction over the partition of properties of a Spanish couple who were
married in Spain obtained their divorce in the Philippines

HELD:

Yes. The CFI did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were
residents of Manila and had their domicile herein. The defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile
other than which he manifestly had in the Philippines during the 17 years preceding the date of the complaint. He had
kept open house and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property which is not the object of conjugal
society. The plaintiff is without proof to the contrary that his wife resided in Manila from middle of 1896 until April 1899.

Article 36 of the Civil Code: "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country, where they may be considered as
natives without other conditions than that of residents therein, shall be required in order to preserve the Spanish
nationality, to state that such is their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must record them in
the registry of Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married, and any children they may have."

FELISA S. MARCELO vs. DANIEL ESTACIO

G.R. No. L-46626 November 7, 1939

FACTS:

This is an appeal taken by the defendant Daniel V. Estacio from the orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal of
November 18 and 28 respectively, the first of which denied his motion to reconsider the order of August 23, 1938
directing his arrest, and the second of which denied his motion of November 7, 1938, for the same purpose. It appears
from the record that the plaintiff-appellee, Felisa S. Marcelo, married the defendant-appellant, Daniel V. Estacio, on
April 24, 1921, but she separated from him after a year of marital life. On May 17, 1937, when she learned that the
defendant had been named justice of the peace of the municipalities of Moncada and San Manuel, Province of Tarlac,
said plaintiff-appellee brought suit for support. In its judgment of October 25, 1937, the court ordered the said
defendant-appellant to pay to the plaintiff-appellee a monthly allowance of P30 from May 18, 1937. On November 18,
1937, the defendant-appellant filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the court in its order of December 7,
1937. On January 8, 1938, the said defendant-appellant announced his exception and intention to appeal. On February
5, 1938, the said defendant-appellant filed his bill of exceptions. On February 8th of the same year, the attorney for the
plaintiff-appellee filed in the Court of First Instance of origin a motion asking that the said defendant-appellant be
ordered to pay her the allowance awarded to her in the decision, or to post a bond of P2,000 notwithstanding the
appeal taken by him to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in not affording the defendant an opportunity to prove his poverty and his inability
to pay his wife, the plaintiff-appellee, the allowance for support to which he was sentenced.

HELD:

In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in
ordering the execution of the judgment, rendered by it against the defendant-appellant Daniel V. Estacio, sentencing
him to pay an allowance to his wife, and the issuance of an order of arrest in case of non-compliance with said
judgment, after the approval of the bill of exceptions, acted without jurisdiction, wherefore, said order of execution of
the judgment is illegal and void. Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed insofar as it orders the defendant Daniel
V. Estacio to pay an allowance for support to his wife, Felisa S. Marcelo, and the arrest of the defendant for non-
compliance therewith, issued after the approval of the bill of exceptions and the elevation thereof to the appellate
court, is reversed, without special pronouncement as to the costs.

Canonizado vs. Almeda-Lopez109 Phil 1177

FACTS
Petitioner and her husband, Cesar Canonizado lived together until February 18, 1956. The latter left the conjugal home
for reason of insufferable conduct of the herin wife/petitioner. He left with him his child named Chrisitina Beatriz who is
now 13 years old and since then, remained under the custody and care of wife/petitioner. In order to assert support for
her and daughter, petitioner filed a petition to ask for support from Cesar Canonizado. In resolving the case, the
respondent judge rendered decision denying the petition of support pendente lite by reason that herein petitioner is
engaged in gainful occupation.

ISSUE

Whether or not the court erred in its ruling denying the petition for support pendente lite for the by reason that herein
petitioner is engaged in gainful occupation.

HELD

Yes, court erred in its ruling when it denied the petition for support. The law expressly provides for the properties to be
exempt from attachment and executions; courts cannot provide for the other exemptions. Cost against respondent
ENRIQUE T. JOCSON and JESUS T. JOCSON vs. THE EMPIRE INSURANCE COMPANY

G.R. No. L-10792 April 30, 1958

FACTS:

Agustin Jocson, who was appointed guardian of the persons and properties of his minor children Carlos, Rodolfo, Perla,
Enrique and Jesus, had a bond filed with Empire Insurance Co. for surety and managed his childrens properties that
included war damage payments, which formed part of their inheritance from their mother.

In the course of the guardianship, Agustin submitted periodic accounts to the court for expenses for education and
clothing of the children.

After his death, Perla, who had already reached age of majority and thereafter appointed guardian of her still minor
brothers Enrique and Jesus, filed a petition for the reopening of Agustins accounts, claiming that illegal disbursements
were made from the guardianship funds for education and clothing. Upon reaching age of majority, Enrique and Jesus
adopted the petition and moved for declaration of illegality of disbursementswhich Empire Insurance Co. and
Agustins administratrix appealed fromon the ground that these should have come instead from the support, which
they were entitled to receive from their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners-appellants contention their fathers disbursements from their guardianship funds are
illegal are valid

HELD:
No. The Court ruled that right to support (which includes education and clothing) must be demanded and established
before it becomes payable. It does not arise from the petitioners mere relationship with their father. The need for
support, as already stated, cannot be presumed and especially must this be true in the present case where it appears
that the minors had means of their own. Therefore, the disbursements made by Agustin, which were even sanctioned
by the lower court, are not illegal. Claim for support should also be done in a separate action, not in guardianship
proceedings. Judgment affirmed; without costs since (case) is a paupers appeal.

SYBIL SAMSON vs. HON. NICASIO YATCO RSENIO SAMSON and DOROTEA ANGELES VDA. DE SAMSON

G.R. No. L-15952 April 28, 1961

FACTS:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court to set aside an order entered on 1958 by the
CFI of Rizal, Quezon city that dismissed with prejudiced a petition for support (Civil Case no. Q-2620). That among the
facts of the case are as follows: Sybil Samson, a minor is legitimate child of Consuelo Enriquez (petitioner/plaintiff) and
Arsenio Samson (respondent) whom after years of living in the maternal house of the latter, Consuelo Enriquez, ,
decided to leave the house of her mother-in-law bringing with her their child Sybil Samson for the reason that she had
been maltreated in the said house. Subsequently said spouse filed a petition for support for her and her child. In one of
the hearings, petitioners failed to appear before the court and reasoned-out that said minor child is sick. Upon
verification by the court, said child was found to be only experiencing a slight fever and that said minor can still walk.
That the following circumstances led to the dismissal of the petition for support upon failure to appear in court on the
part of the petitioner/plaintiff.

ISSUE.

Whether or not said CFI erred in dismissing said petition for mere reason of failure to appear in court on the part of the
petitioner/plaintiff.

HELD:
Yes. The writ of certiorari prayed for is granted. The petitoners right to support from the respondent, under article 301
of Civil Code cannot be renounced, and they should not be deprived of their right to present and future support. With
cost against the respondent.

Leouel Santos and Rosario Bedia Santos

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in
1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was
released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents,
private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the
temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the
hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so. The boy's
mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her
whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private respondents claim that although
abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son. On September 2, 1990, petitioner
along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private
respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited
him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

ISSUE:

Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.

HELD:

Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his minor son to his
parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of
the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. The Court of Appeals held that
although there is no evidence to show that petitioner (Santos Sr.) is "depraved, a habitual drunkard or poor, he may
nevertheless be considered, as he is in fact so considered, to be unsuitable to be allowed to have custody of the minor.
The respondent appeal to court. His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many
men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural
guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their children merely
because of the normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as temporary separation from their families.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1992 as well as
its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr.
is awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr. SO ORDERED.

Flores Vs. Esteban 97 Phil 439

FACTS:

Eduardo Flores (petitioner) is married to Adoracion Esteban and that they had a son named Reynaldo Cenon E. Flores
born on Dec 22, 1946. That her wife died on Dec 27, 1953 and since then, their son lived with her mother in law named
Maria De leon Vda. De Esteban, herein referred as respondent. That said respondent alleged that said child was under
her custody since he was twenty days old up until now that said child is already aged eight years old, and that she is
paying for all the expenses of said minor and never restrains the minor of his liberty but the latter refuses to go with his
father whom he hardly knows due to the fact that herein petitioner has been away from this country, and since then the
respondent has been supporting the child and is sending him in a primary school in Norzagaray, Bulacan. The petitioner
prayed that custody of the child be granted to him being the biological of said child.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for the custody of the child be granted to the father being the biological father.

HELD:

For the sake of the welfare of the child, we are of the opinion that the respondent grandmother should have the legal
custody over him, without prejudice to the obligation of the father to contribute to his maintenance. In view of the
foregoing, it is decreed that the respondent Maria de Leon Vda. de Esteban have custody of the child. The petition is
dismissed.

Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus of Minor Angelie C. Cervantes

GR 79555 Jan. 27, 1989

FACTS:

This is a petition for habeas corpus filed with this court over the persons of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Among the
facts of the case are as follow: said minor was born on 14 february 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and gina
Carreon who are common-law husband and wife. Said respondents offered the child for adoption to Zenaida Carreon-
Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes (petitoners). Said adoption wasgranted by the RTC of Rizal in favor of the respondents
with all the vested rights inherent to the adoption of the child, hence, the child was known as Angelie Anne Cervantes.
Sometime March or April of 1987, said petioners received a demand letter from herein respondents asking for P150, 000
otherwise they would get back their child. Petioneers refused to yield on the demand which prompted said respondent
to took the child from her yaya under the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Despite demand for
the respondent to return the child, same proved futile as the herein respondent reasoned-out that she has no plan of
returning the child, and that the consent of adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. That she will only
return if she were paid the amount she had earlier demanded. That said respondent is now cohabiting with other man
other than the natural father of the minor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the custody of the child rightfully belongs to the respondents or the otherwise, to the adopting parents.

HELD:

The custody of the child rightfully belongs to the petitioners. It was held time and again by this court that in cases
involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latters welfare is paramount. The provision that no
child under five years of age shall be separated from her mother cannot be applied in this case where the court finds
compelling reason to rule otherwise.

MARIA QUINTANA vs. GELASIO LERMA

G.R. No. L-7426 February 5, 1913

FACTS:
In the case at bar, defendant-appellant Gelasio Lerma appeals from the judgment of the lower court granting his wife,
the plaintiff-appellee Maria Quintana, a sum of money allegedly due her based on a contract they made for support. As
shown in the evidence, the two were married in 1901 and entered, in February 1905, into a written agreement of
separation, renouncing certain rights as against each other, dividing the conjugal property between them and the
defendant undertaking the duty to provide plaintiff P20-worth of monthly support and maintenance to be given within
the first three days of each month. In his original answer to the action, Lerma claimed that Quintana forfeited her right
to support by committing adultery. However, this special defense was stricken out by the court on the ground that
under Art. 152 of the Civil Code, adultery is not a recognized ground upon which obligation to support ceases. The lower
court refused to recognize the same defense when defendant reentered it in his amended complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the written agreement made by parties is void and whether or not adultery may be permitted as a
special defense against action for support

HELD:

Yes. The agreement is void because Art. 1432 of the Civil Code provides that in default of express declarations in the
marriage contract, the separation of the property of the consorts, during marriage, shall only take place by virtue of a
judicial decree, except in the case provided by article 50. However, the wife has a right of action against defendant
under the Code.

Yes. While the plaintiff wife has the right of action, the Court ruled that the defendant may also set up adultery as a
special defense, which if properly proved and sustain will defeat the wifes action. Judgment reversed.

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 March 31, 1971

FACTS:

In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein Petronila
Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five
months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter ,appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only
sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-
adjudication executed by her in1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance
taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time
when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.

HELD:

While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy
consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should
apply to a common-law relationship. As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law
is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to
appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As
a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half. Article 1001, Civil
Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower ,the latter shall be entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

JOSE L. PONCE DE LEON vs. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION,

GR. No. L-24571 December 18, 1970

FACTS:

On August 14, 1945, herein plaintiff Jose L. Ponce de Leon and Francisco Soriano, father of third-party plaintiffs Teofila
Soriano del Rosario, Rosalina Soriano and Rev. Fr. Eugenio Soriano, obtained a loan for P10,000.00 from the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), Manila, mortgaging a parcel of land in the name of Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa
Rodriguez, as security for the loan. Jose L. Ponce de Leon filed with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), Manila,
his loan application for an industrial loan, for putting up a sawmill. The application was approved for P495,000.00 and
the mortgage contract was executed on October 8, 1951 by Jose L. Ponce de Leon, his wife Carmelina Russel, and
Francisco Soriano.

At the time that Francisco Soriano signed the mortgage deed, his spouse Tomasa Rodriguez was already dead leaving as
her heirs, her children namely, Rosalina, Teofila and Rev. Fr. Eugenio Soriano, none of whom signed the said mortgage
deed or the promissory note. The Sheriff sold the land covered by original certificate of Title No. 8094 in the name of
Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez, on June 15, 1954 and the deed of sale, dated April 19, 1955 was
executed by the sheriff in favor of the purchaser thereof, the RFC, including all the other properties sold.

The Sorianos contend that the lot covered by original certificate of title No. 8094 in the name of Francisco Soriano
belonged to the conjugal partnership of the latter and his wife, Tomasa Rodriguez, now deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said property, registered in the name of "Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez, is presumed
belonging to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Francisco Soriano.

HELD:

The Court ruled that the property was registered in the name of "Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez," and
that based upon this fact alone without any proof establishing satisfactorily that the property had been acquired
during coverture the lower court presumed that it belongs to the conjugal partnership of said spouses. We agree with
the RFC that the lower court has erred in applying said presumption.

Needless to say, had the property been acquired by them during coverture, it would have been registered, in the name
not of "Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez," but of the spouses "Francisco Soriano and Tomasa Rodriguez."

It is thus clear that the lower court erred in annulling the RFC mortgage on the Paraaque property and its sale to the
RFC as regards one-half of said property, and that the decision appealed from should, accordingly, be modified.

MOISES JOCSON,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ

G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete
predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on
April 1, 1972. The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his
lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all
of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these
documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned
between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents. In his Second Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58,
Record on Appeal), herein petitioner assailed the evidence documents for being null and void. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and reversed that of the trial court's.

Issue:

Whether or not the assailed properties are part of the conjugal partnership of property of their parents.

Held:

NO. It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first present
proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete.
The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were
registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired
during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.It may be that the properties under dispute
were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra
Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter. There being no such
proof, the condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We rule that the
properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.

NATIVIDAD SIDECO VS ANGELA AZNAR

G.R. No. L-4831 April 24, 1953

FACTS:

This is an action for partition and for the recovery of plaintiff and appellants share in the produce of the land sought to
be partitioned. The defendant and appellee is the judicial administration of the estate of the deceased Crispulo Sideco,
who died on the 26th of May, 1942. She is the decedents widow by his third marriage, which took place on January 26,
1912. The plaintiffs and appellants are his (Crispulo Sidecos) children and grandchildren by his wife Matilde Jimenez,
who died on March 14, 1906. The subject of the action is a parcel of riceland 134.6671 hectares in area, situated in
the Sitio of Pulong Pandan, Barrio Sangitan, Municipality of Cabanatuan, surveyed on May 21, 1908, and registered in
the name of Crispulo Sideco, widower, on March 12, 1909, under certificate of title No. 77 (Exhibit 6). The land was
declared for the land tax in the year 1906 in Crispulo Sidecos name (Exhibit 5). The land was mortgaged to the
Philippines National Bank on May 10, 1912, for P8,000, on July 30, 1917, for P6,400, and on September 28, 1922, for
P5,800. In June, 1923, the loan with the Philippine National Bank was paid, but the land was sold with pacto de retro to
Margarita David for P16,000 redeemable in two years, this period extendible for one year. In 1928 Margarita David
resold the property to Crispulo Sideco, but the same was again mortgaged to her for P6,000 (Exhibit 6). In 1933
certificate of title No. 77 was cancelled, and No. 7631 issued in lieu thereof in the name of Margarita David (Exhibit D).
The land, however, was reconveyed to the estate of Crispulo Sideco on August 31, 1946 (Ibid). The land is now covered
by transfer certificate of title No. T-303 in the name of his estate (Exhibit 21-A).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the finding of the trial court that the land is not conjugal property of the spouses Crispulo Sideco and
Matilde Jimenez, but the exclusive property of Crispulo Sideco.

HELD:

It is well-settled that land already decreed and registered in an ordinary land registration proceeding can not again be
subject of adjudication or settlement in a subsequent cadastral proceeding. (Timbol vs. Diaz, 44 Phil. 587; Pamintuan vs.
San Agustin, 43 Phil. 588; Addison vs. Payotas, 60 Phil. 673). This does not mean, however that in proper cases and upon
proper application or the consent of the registered owners, or of the person in whose name the decree is issued, the
court may not order a change in the names of the owners by inclusion or exclusion of some, or in the rights or
participation of each in the land registered.

ROSARIO OAS vs. CONSOLACION JAVILLO, ET AL

G.R. No. L-39670 March 20, 1934

Facts:

Crispulo Javillo died intestate on the 18th of May, 1927, in the municipality of Sigma, Province of Capiz, Philippine
Islands. On the 25th day of July, 1927, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of that province praying that an
administrator of this estate be appointed, and after hearing Santiago Andrada was named administrator. He submitted
two projects of partition. The first was disapproved by the lower court and from that order some of the heirs appealed
to this court which appeal was dismissed. 1The second project of partition dated September 9, 1931, is the one now on
appeal in this case. Crispulo Javillo contracted two marriages. The first, with Ramona Levis. To this marriage five children
were born, to wit, Consolacion, Mercedes, Caridad, Soledad and Jose Javillo, the appellees in this case. After the death
of Ramona Levis, Crispulo Javillo married Rosario Oas. To this marriage four children were born, to wit, Joaquin, Ana,
Bernardo and Porillana. Rosario Oas the appellant in this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court committed errors in deciding the case:

Held:

The project of partition approved by the lower court is based on the above-mentioned absurd claim and furthermore is
not in conformity to law. One-half of all the conjugal property of both marriages corresponds to the deceased Crispulo
Javillo and must be divided share and share alike among all the children of both marriages. One-half of the conjugal
property pertaining to the first marriage should be divided share and share alike among the five children of that
marriage. One-half of the conjugal property of the second marriage must be adjudicated to the widow Rosario Oas and
furthermore she has a right of usufruct over the property of her deceased husband equal to one-ninth of the two thirds
of that property which constitutes the legitime of the children of both marriages which is two-twenty-sevenths of the
property corresponding to her husband. The property of the second marriage consists of parcels 12 to 31, inclusive, and
the remainder of the carabaos and large cattle mentioned in the agreement copied above.If it is true as alleged by the
appellant that there are houses on any of these parcels of land, it is to be presumed that they were included in the
valuation made by the committee on claims and appraisal and therefore they would belong to the person to whom the
land, upon which they are built, is adjudicated. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and this case is remanded
for further proceedings in conformity with this decision without pronouncements as to costs.

DOROTEA DE OCAMPO vs URBANA DELIZO

G.R. No. L-32820-21 January 30, 1976

Facts:
These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages contracted by Nicolas
Delizo. The first, was with Rosa Villasfer, which lasted from April 20, 1891 until Rows death on December 7, 1909, or a
period of eighteen (18) years; and the second, with Dorotea de Ocampo, which existed for a period of forty-six (46)
years, or from October, 1911 until the death of Nicolas Delizo on May 3, 1957 at the age of ninety (90) years. The action
for partition was instituted on April 15, 1957 by a daughter and a son of the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo and
Severino Delizo, and the heirs of Francisco Delizo, another son, who died in 1943, specifically, Rancivillano Soltrifilo
Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita, and Fe, all surnamed Delizo (the last three being minors were represented by their
mother, Rosenda Genove) all against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and their
nine (9) children, the herein petitioners-appellants, namely Regino, Crispina, Carmen, Basilio, Hilario, Macario, Sendon,
Marciano, and Hermogenes, all surnamed Delizo.

Issue:

Whether or not the aforesaid defendants opposed the partition, claiming that the properties described in the complaint
were those of the second marriage.

Held:

Since these properties were acquired from the produce of the Caanawan properties although such produce is the result
of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said
properties acquired during the second marriage should appertain to the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per
cent (20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs MARGARITA QUINTOS E YPARRAGUIRRE and ANGEL A. ANSALSO

G.R. No. L-22383 October 6, 1924

FACTS:

The appellants pray for the dismissal of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff, alleging that the judgment
appealed from is erroneous: (1) Because it holds that the document Exhibit A does not contain anything that makes the
plaintiff agent of the defendants; (2) because it finds without any ground that the defendant were husband and wife
when they executed said document; (3) because upon this finding, it considers unnecessary to discuss whether or not
the obligation evidence by said document is solidary between the defendants (4) because to maintain such opinion
amounts to compelling the defendants to comply with said obligation in a manner distinct from that stipulated in the
contract; and (5) because it sanctions an arbitrary, unjust and illegal procedure.

ISSUE:

whether or not appellants executed the aforesaid document Exhibit A as husband and wife was decided by the trial
court in the sense that the defendant appellant Mr. Ansaldo is the husband of the other defendant Doa Margarita Q. e
Iparraugirre

HELD:

We agree with the appellants that, according to the contract of pledge Exhibit A, attached to the complaint, the
defendants authorized the plaintiff to act as their agent with full power and authority to dispose of the effects pledged
in the manner stipulated in said contract; but it appears that the plaintiff had also an option, not an obligation precisely,
to enforce the securities given. For the reason above given we cannot alter this finding of the trial court and
consequently if the defendants are husband and wife, it is immaterial whether the debt was contracted by one or the
other, for in either case as the debt was contracted during the marriage of the defendants it must be paid for the
account of the conjugal partnership in accordance with article 1408 of the Civil Code. 1awph!l.net
 After a thorough study of the judgment appealed from, we do not find therein any substantial error that justifies
the reversal thereof and therefore the same must be, as is hereby, affirmed with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.

MARGARITA QUINTOS DE ANSALDO and ANGEL A. ANSALDO

vs.
THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FIDELITY & SURETY COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and LUZON SURETY
COMPANY

G.R. No. L-43257 February 19, 1937

FACTS:

Upon the express guaranty of the appellant Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine Islands, the Philippine Trust
Company granted Romarico Agcaoilia credit in current account not to exceed at any one time P20,000. Appellee Angel
Ansaldo, in turn, agreed to indemnify the surety company for any and all losses and damages that it might sustain by
reason of having guaranteed Agcaoili's obligations. Agcaoili defaulted, and the surety company, as hisguarantor, paid the
Philippine Trust Company. Thereafter, the surety company brought an action against the appellee Angel Ansaldo for
recovery of sum of money, and after obtaining a judgment on its favor, caused the sheriff of the City of Manila to levy on
the joint savings account of Spouses Angel and Margarita Ansaldo. Appellees instituted an action against the appellants
in the CFI to have theexecution levied by the sheriff declared null and void. The court below granted the relief prayed for
and sentenced the appellants, jointly and severally, to pay the appellees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the obligation of Angel Agcaoli may be enforced by the Sheriff against the joint savings account of the
spouses.

RULING:

NO. Since there is a failure to prove that the obligation of the husband was produced benefit to the family, it cannot be
charged against the conjugal partnership.T he sum in controversy was derived from the paraphernal property of the
appellee, Margarita hence it forms part of the conjugal partnership
under Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code. Construing the two relevant provisionstogether, it seems clear that the fruits of
the paraphernal property which become part of the assets of the conjugal partnership are not liable for the payment of
personal obligations of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit to
the family. No attempt has been made to prove that the obligations contracted by the appellee, Angel, were productive
of some benefit to his family. It is, however, claimed that, as the sum of P636.80 has become the property of the
conjugal partnership, at least one-half thereof was property levied on execution, as the share of the appellee Angel
Ansaldo. This contention is without merit. Theright of the husband to one-half of the property of the conjugal
partnership does not vest until the dissolution of the marriage when the conjugal partnership is also dissolved. (Civil
Code, arts. 1392 and 1426.)

RAFAEL ZULUETA, ET AL, vs PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC

G.R. No. L-28589 January 8, 1973

Facts:

Plaintiff Zulueta, his wife and daughter were passengers aboarddefendants plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon
reaching Wake Island thepassengers were advised that they could disembark for a stopover for about30 minutes.
Plaintiff went to the toilet at the terminal building but finding it full walked 200 yards away.
Upon returning he told an employee of the defendant that they almost made him miss the flight because of a defective
announcing system. He had a discussion with either the plan captain or the terminal manager. He was told that
they would open his bags which herefused and he warned them of the consequences. Just the same theyopened his
bags and found nothing prohibited. They forced him to go out of the plane and left him at Wake Island. His wife had to
send him money and he was able to leave Wake Island and return to Manila thru Honolulu and Tokyo after two days.
This action was to recover damages from the defendant.

Issue:

Whether or not moral damages may be recovered.

Held:

The records amply establish plaintiffs right to recover both moral and exemplary damages. Indeed, the rude and rough
reception plaintiff received at the hands of Sitton or Captain Zentner when the latter met him at theramp (What in the
hell do you think you are? Get on that plane); themenacing attitude of Zentner or Sitton and the supercilious manner in
which he had asked plaintiff to open his bags (open your bag, and when told that a fourth bag was missing, I dont give
a damn); will you pull these three monkeys out of here?); the unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares and unkind remarks
to which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being cordoned by men in uniform as if they were criminals,
Mrs. Zuluetas having suffered a nervousbreakdown for which she was hospitalized as a result of the embarrassment,
insults and humiliations to which plaintiffs were exposed by the conduct of PAN AMs employees; Mrs. Zulueta having
suffered shame, humiliation andembarrassment for the treatment received by her parents at the airport allthese
justify an award for moral damages resulting from mental anguish,serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
social humiliationthereby suffered by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were awarded Pesos 500,000.00
andmoral damages, Pesos 200,000.00 exemplary damages, Pesos 75,000.00attorneys fees and Pesos 5,502.85 actual
damages.

JOVELLANOS vs. CA 210 SCRA 126 (Art. 1164)

Facts:

Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale agreement over a house and lot. At that
time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners. Leonor Dizon
died consequently. Then Daniel married private respondent Annette with whom he begot two children. The daughter
from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, Philamlife executed
to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights,
title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died. Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos
claimed in the lower court that the aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage
was still subsisting and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners contend that
the property, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and conditional
sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.

Issue:

Whether or not the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES

Held:

In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full
payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership
may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is
usually known as a pactum reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the
installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of which prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof
only upon full payment of the said amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since September
2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor. Daniel
Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the deed of sale in his favor. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by
law. Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. NB: But since it
pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners who helped
pay for the amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on property bought on
installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage, such property shall belong to the conjugal partnership.

ELISEO SANTOS, as administrator of Estanislao Santos, vs. PABLO BARTOLOME

G.R. No. 18032 November 23, 1922

FACTS:

Estanislao Santos and Marcela Tizon were united in marriage many years ago and lived together as man and wife in the
Province of Pampanga until in the year 1914, when Estanislao Santos died. The widow, Da. Marcela Tizon, survived
until December, 1917, when she also died. No children appear to have been born to the pair, and the persons now
interested in their properties are the collateral heirs of the two spouses respectively. After the death of Estanislao
Santos the community property pertaining to the two spouses came into the possession and under the control of his
administrator, Eliseo Santos, with corresponding duty to collect assets, pay off the debts, and liquidate the estate
according to law. In connection with the discharge of these duties, said administrator also came into the possession of
certain property pertaining to the widow in her own right, which he managed to the same extent as the community
property itself.

ISSUE:

The liquidation of the community estate pertaining to the spouses Estanislao Santos and Marcela Tizon, both of whom
are now deceased, and whose respective estates are now represented before the court by Eliseo Santos, as
administrator of Estanislao Santos, and Pablo Bartolome, as administrator of Marcela Tizon

HELD:

` Assuming the facts as to this items to be as thus suggested, there can be no doubt that the amount thus paid
out to effect the redemption of the property should be deducted from the community assets in liquidation, thereby in
effect charging one-half thereof against the portion pertaining to Marcela Tizon. It is undeniable that when the property
to which reference is here made was redeemed, it remained, as it had been before, the particular property of Marcela
Tizon, for if the right of redemption pertained to her, so also must the property belong to her after redemption. From an
observation contained in the appealed decision we infer that the action of the trial judge in rejecting the various claims
to which reference has been made was based in part on the idea that said claims should have been submitted to the
committed appointed to appraise the property and allow claims against the estate of Marcela Tizon in administration, in
conformity with the requirements of section 695, and related provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. From what has
been said it results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the clause will be remanded for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered, without express pronouncement as to costs.
AGAPITO LORENZO, ET AL vs FLORENCIO NICOLAS ET AL.

G.R. No. L-4085 July 30, 1952

FACTS:

Prior to 1910, Magdalena Clemente was the surviving widow of the deceased Gregorio Nicolas, Manuel Lorenzo, former
husband of the deceased Carlosa Santamaria, was also at that time a widower. On January 16, 1910, Magdalena
Clemente and Manuel Lorenzo contracted marriage. Manuel Lorenzo died on January 7, 1929, while Magdalena died on
January 31, 1934. During their coverture, the two had no children. In his first marriage, however, Manuel Lorenzo left, as
heirs, the plaintiffs Agapito and Marcela Lorenzo and Policarpio Lorenzo, deceased, who had been succeeded by his
children, the plaintiffs Faustina, Federico, Guillermo and Manuel all surnamed Lorenzo; while Magdalena Clemente, in
her first marriage, left as heirs, the deceased Gerardo Nicholas, father of the defendants Florencio, Elena, Felix, Trinidad,
Cecilia and Basilisa, all surnamed Nicolas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the two parcels of land are part of the Friar Lands as provided in Act No. 1120.

HELD:

From the provisions of sections 11, 12 and 16 of Act No. 1120 it is apparent that the pervading legislative intent is to sell
the friar lands acquired by the Government to actual settlers and occupants of the same. In case of death of a holder of
a certificate which is only an agreement to sell it is not the heirs but the widow who succeeds in the parcels of land to be
sold by the Government. Only do the heirs succeed in the rights of the deceased holder of a certificate if no widow
survives him. The fact that all receipts for installments paid even during the lifetime of the late husband Manuel Lorenzo
were issued in the name of Magdalena Clemente and that the deed of sale or conveyance of parcel No. 6 was made in
her name in spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was still alive shows that the two parcels of land belonged to
Magdalena Clemente. The petitioners, the heirs of the late Manuel Lorenzo, are not entitled to one-half of the two
parcels of land. But the installments paid during covertures are deemed conjugal, there being no evidence that they
were paid out of funds belonging exclusively to the late Magdalena Clemente. Upon these grounds and reasons the
judgment of the Court of Appeals under review is affirmed, without cost.
PEOPLES BANK & TRUST CO. v

REGISTER OF DEEDS 60 Phil 167

FACTS:

Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying registration of instrument entitled Agreement and Declaration of Trust in
which Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval living in Palawan, conveyed in trust her paraphernal property,
trustee was to redeem mortgage constituted on such property with funds derived from the rents or sale thereof, grant a
loan of P10,000.00 with which to redeem mortgage and collect the rents to be derived from said property while
remained unsold.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the rents collected are fruits of the wifes property which therefore belongs to CPG,

whether or not management belongs to husband

whether or not contract is null and void since husband did not give consent.

HELD:

Wife, as owner and administratrix of her paraphernal property, may appoint trustee to collect the fruits of her property.
The fruits are not yet conjugal property since they still have to answer to expenses in the administration and
preservation of the paraphernal property. She may likewise do such without consent of the husband, subject to recourse
by husband or his heirs, thus rendering such contract merely voidable or void.
ANTONIO PEREZ vs ANGELA TUASON de PEREZ 109 Phil 64

FACTS:

Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son, filed a civil case against defendant Angela Tuason de Perez at the CFI
Manila. He wants to declare his wife as prodigal and place under guardianship based on the following allegations:
she was squandering her estate on a young man named Jose Boloix, she was spending the conjugal partnership of gain
and defendant has expressed her desire to marry and have children with Jose Boloix, if only to embarrass her husband.
CFI dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

whether or not the case falls under the jurisdiction of the CFI or the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court.

HELD:

Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court which has jurisdiction. Material
injury pertains to personal injury (personal relations between man and wife) and not patrimonial or financial.
MATEA RODRIGUEZ vs SUSANA DE LA CRUZ, ESCOLASTICO DE LA CRUZ, AND PROCESA DE LA CRUZ

G.R. No. L-3629 September 28, 1907

FACTS:

Plaintiff Matea Rodriguez (married to Hilarion de la Cruz) both their second marriages - filed in CFI Albay a complaint
for the purpose of recovering certain parcels of lands from the defendants (children of Hilarion dela Cruz). Plaintiff
alleges that she had acquired said lands during her first marriage from deceased father and that she had permission
from Hilarion to commence this action in her own name against Hilarions children. She claims that Hilarion had been
administering the said lands during the entire period of his marriage to her. However, CFI Albay dismissed the case in
favour Hilarions children through his first marriage and found as a fact, from evidence during trials, that the lands
described in the complaint were acquired by Hilarion during his marriage to his first wife, one Andrea de Leon. And thus,
granted the land in question to the children of Hilarion from his first marriage. Rodriguez appealed to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Hilarion was the owner of said lands since he had been administering the land in question during
the entire period of his marriage to Matea and did the CFI Albay err in finding that Hilarion acquired the land in question
during his marriage to Andrea de Leon.
HELD:

No. There is no provision in the Civil Code which prohibits a husband from administering the property of his wife, as her
representative, and certainly it cannot be concluded that the property which he administers for his wife is his for the
mere reason that he has administered the same for a long time.the mere fact that she has permitted her husband to
administer her property does not mean that she has thereby lost her property and that the same has become the
property of her husband.SC examined the evidence adduced during the lower court trials second marriages - filed in CFI
Albay a complaint for the purpose of recovering certain parcels of lands and found that the lands in question were
acquired by Matea from her deceased father through inheritance.

MOORE and SONS MERCANTILE CO v WAGNER 50 Phil 128

FACTS:

Widow of the deceased Samuel William Allen in the settlement proceedings petitioned the court to require the
administrator of the estate to give her and her daughter Avelina Allen an allowance of P80. The special administrator
appointed in the case objected to the allowance of the widow upon the ground that the estate is insolvent, in view of
the claims presented and approved by the committee on appraisal and claims. Attorney P. J. Moore, in behalf of several
creditors also entered his opposition to said order. Notwithstanding this insolvent condition of the estate, the lower
court entered the order referred to of March 5, 1925, citing in its support article 1430 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether the order granting the allowance to the widow and daughter valid?

HELD:

NO. Article 1430 of the Civil Code provides that the surviving spouse and his or her children shall be given an
allowance for their support out of the general estate, pending the liquidation of the inventoried estate, and until their
share has been delivered to them, but it shall be deducted from their portion in so far as it exceeds what they may have
been entitled to as fruits or income. Mr. Manresa, commenting on said article 1430 relative to the said judgment of May
28, 1896, wisely observes "That the support does not encumber the property of the deceased spouse, but the general
estate, and that by the general estate or the inventoried estate is meant the dowry or capital of the wife; wherefore,
even if the indebtedness exceed the residue of the estate, the wife can always be allowed support as part payment of
the income of her property. In any case, the support is given prior to the termination of the liquidation of the
partnership, and it does not seem logical to deny the same before knowing exactly the result of the liquidation, just
because of the fear that the liabilities will exceed the estate, or on the ground of estimates more or less uncertain, and
without any sufficient proof of its reality.In this case, it appears from the record that the liabilities exceed the assets of
the estate of Samuel William Allen and that his widow, by her own admission, had not contributed any property to the
marriage. Wherefore, it is unlawful, in the present case, to grant the support, having the character of an advance
payment to be deducted from the respective share of each partner, when there is no property to be partitioned, lacks
the legal basis provided by article 1430.

IN RE: JOSE BERNAS & PILAR BERNAS 14 SCRA 327

G.R. No. L-20379 June 22, 1965

FACTS:

In May 1962, petitioner-sps Jose Bermas, Sr. & Pilar Manuel Bernas executed an Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership & Sep of Property. It states that during their marriage, they acquired 12 parcels of land and 2 buildings. The
purpose of this Agreement is to prevent friction, dissension and confusion among their respective heirs in the future,
particulary because petitioner Jose has 2 sets of children: 1 by former marriage, another by his present. The petition
was filed stating the above mentioned facts and that this voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage is allowed, under Art 191 of CC, subject to judicial approval. Moreover, the sps have no outstanding
debts/obligations and the sep of properties would not prejudice any creditor or 3rd

However, after the hearing, the court denied the petition on the ground that under CC Art 192, a conjugal partnership
shall only be dissolved once legal separation has been ordered and exceptions, under Art 191, are civil interdiction,
declaration of absence or abandonment . And upon approval of the petition for dissolution, the court shall take
such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.

ISSUE:

Whether or not conjugal partnership may be dissolved without notification of children of the parties
previous marriages.

HELD:

No, in a proceeding for dissolution of a conjugal partnership under Art 191CC, it is essential that children of previous
marriages shall be personally notified of said proceeding. In this case, the names and addresses of children by previous
marriage of Jose Bernas, Sr. have not been given and it appears that they have not been notified personally of the filing
of the petition and of the date of its hearing even though the danger of substantial injury to their rights would seem to
be remote. At any rate, the rights of the children by the first marriage are still affected in the event that when
there is doubt, the partnership property shall be divided between different conjugal partnerships in proportion to the
duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective sps. Decision appealed set aside. Case remanded to
lower court for further proceedings

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG

GR 82606 December 18, 1992

FACTS:

The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have
cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of
conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite
disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property.The complaint
on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was
not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.

HELD:

Supreme court is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of
dismissing the case filed. For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and
rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no
intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to
Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support
to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal property of
the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike.

GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ

GR 137650 12 April 2000

FACTS:

Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumulos, Toto Tumulos, and Gina Tumulos.
In their complaint, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through
tolerance they had allowed the defendants to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without the payment of
any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, they will pay rental but which agreement was not complied
with by the said defendants. They have demanded several times that the defendants vacate the premises. Guillerma
Tumulos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no
cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it
was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the
dismissal of the complaint. Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their
memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in
question as their "love nest." It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their
2 children for around 10 years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of
the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the property In litis.

RULING:

Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Her
claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself
does not justify her claim for nothing in Article 148 of the family code provides that the administration of the property
amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property
in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents.
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971 and later had 5 kids. On June 22, 1992,
Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC. The RTC of Quezon City rendered
judgment and declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 of the FC on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations and ordered the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Art.147 of the FC and to comply with the provisions of Art. 50, 51and 52 of the FC. Consuelo sought
a clarification of the order of the court and asserted that the FC did not have provisions for the liquidation of common
property in unions without marriage. The court explained in an order dated May 5, 1995 that the property including
the family home acquired during their union are presumed to have been obtained through joined efforts and the
property would be owned by them in equal shares and the liquidation and partition of property would be governed
by the regime of co-ownership. The court also explained that Art 102 does not apply since it refers to the procedure for
liquidation of conjugal partnership property. Antonio moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Art 147 is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the

case at bar

Whether or not Art 147 applies to marriages declared null and void pursuant to Art. 36.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. In void
marriages, the property relations of the parties during the cohabitation period is governed by the provisions of Art. 147
or Art. 1482. In the case at bar, Art. 147 applies because there was no legal impediment to their marriage and they were
capacitated wherein the word capacitated refers to legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY vs. CARLINA V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. Out their
union was born Herminia Palang, respondent. He left to work in Hawaii and when he returned for good, he refused to
live with his wife and child and also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. Miguel then contracted his second marriage
with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. Both jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land and a house and
lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel
and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land
to

their only child. Two years later, Miguel died and thereafter, Carlina filed a complaint of concubinage on the previous
party. Respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner

contended that she had already given her half of the riceland property to their son and that the house and lot is her sole
property having bought with her own money. RTC affirmed in favor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel
Palang.
RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was not by way of sale but was a donation and therefore
void. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent
because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.

USAN NICDAO CARIO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969 without a license and without obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of their marriage - he married Susan Yee on November 10, 1992. Cario died due to diabetes on
November 23, 1992 under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both spouses of Cario
claimed and collected monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies as death benefits.
Susan Yee filed a case to collect one half of the sum of the death benefits received by Susan Nicdao. At the time she
married Cario, Susan Yee claimed that she had no knowledge of Carios marriage with Susan Nicdao.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the first marriage contracted by Cario is void ab initio.

RULING:

YES. The first marriage contracted by Cario is void ab initio. The marriage of Cario and Susan Nicdao is void since it
was solemnized without the required marriage license. Under the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must
be a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage.

Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola vs.

JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA

GR 177703, 28 January 2008

FACTS:

John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed a Special Civil Action with the RTC against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald
G. Arriola (petitioners) for the judicial partition of the properties left by the deceased Fidel Arriola. Respondent is
the son of Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony Ronald is the son of Fidel with his second
wife, petitioner Vilma. The RTC ordered the partition and public auction of the subject land covered by TCT No. 383714.
The public auction was scheduled on May 31,2003 but was rescheduled when the petitioners refused
to include the subject house standing on the land. This prompted the respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, praying that petitioners be declared in contempt but was denied.
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari where the decision of the RTC was reversed and set aside, and the
sheriff is ordered to proceed with the public auction sale of the subject land and, constructed

thereon. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but

the CA denied the same resolution. The petitioners filed Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject house is part of the judgment of co- ownership and partition.

RULING:

The subject house is deemed part of the judgment of partition for two compelling reasons: first, under the provisions of
the Civil Code (Articles 440, 445,and 446. Following the Principle of Accession, improvements including the house even
not included in the alleged complaint of partition are deemed included in the lot in which they stand. Second, the
subject house was part of the estate of the deceased, as such it is owned by the heirs, the parties herein, any one of
whom, under Article 494 of Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject house. Therefore, the
respondents recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered.

JOSE E. HONRADO vs COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROGELIO M. PIZARRO

Facts:

On December 11, 1997, Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. (Premium) filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for
sum of money against Jose Honrado, who was doing business under the name and style of J.E. Honrado Enterprises. For
failure of Honrado, as well as his counsel, to appear at the pre-trial conference, he was declared in default. It turned out
that the Spouses Jose and Andrerita Honrado had filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba City for the judicial
constitution of the parcel of land registered in Honrados name under Transfer Certificate of Title T-143175 located in
Calamba, Laguna, and the house thereon, as their family house.

On May 3, 2002, Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution under Article 155 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. It was alleged therein that the property is exempt from execution because it is a family home
which had been constituted as such before he incurred his indebtedness with Premium. He also alleged that he and his
family had no other real property except the land which was levied upon and sold on execution It further averred that
the law does not automatically exempt a family home from levy or execution and there was no showing that its present
value does not exceed the amount allowed by law under Article 157 of the Family Code

Issue:

Whether or not finding and concluding that failure to assert his claim for exemption of his family home from
execution at the time of the levy or within a reasonable time is fatal to his claim.

Ruling:

Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as the family residence. The family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment, except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by Law. It is a real right, which
is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person
constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. Such provision finds no
application in this case.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES EDUARDO and ELSA VERSOLA vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 164740 July 31, 2006

Facts:

This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses Eduardo and Elsa
Versola, seeks to nullify and set aside the 28 April 2004 Decision and 28 July 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Orders dated 6 January 2003 and 14 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 217, in Civil Case No. Q-93-16003. This case has its genesis from a loan transaction entered into by private
respondent Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh and a certain Dolores Ledesma, wherein the former granted a P1,000,000.00 loan to
the latter. As a security for said loan, Ledesma issued to private respondent a check for the same amount dated 10
February 1993 and promised to execute a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot located at Tandang Sora,
Quezon City. The execution of the deed of real estate mortgage did not materialize, but Ledesma delivered the owner's
duplicate copy of the TCT No. RT-51142 to private respondent. With the dishonor of the checks and with Asiatrust's
refusal to release the P2,000,000.00 loan of petitioners, private respondent came away empty-handed as she did not
receive payment for the P1,500,000.00 loan she granted to Ledesma that was assumed by petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is

exempt from execution.

Ruling:

Under Article 153 of the Family Code provides:The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as the family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries resides therein,
the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
79300, for lack of merit, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC

[G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997]

Facts:

Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-square-meter residential lot
with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. The property, located in Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 174180.
On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop
Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness
of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with
private respondent, the salient portion of which provides: c. That defendants will undertake to pay the amount
of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit, but expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be collected.

Petitioner and his company filed a motion for reconsideration of this Decision on the ground that the property covered
was exempt from execution. On March 21, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Resolution denying the
motion. It anchored its ruling on Modequillo v. Breva which held that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether a final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family
Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the said Code.

Ruling:

We answer the question in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. On the contrary, its
Decision and Resolution are supported by law and applicable jurisprudence. Under the Family Code, a family home is
deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. If the family actually resides in
the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.

JOSE MODEQUILLO vs HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-
CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

Facts:
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose
Modequillo, et al. The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC
of Davao City to satisfy the said judgmenton the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito
Malubay at Davao del Sur. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Davao del Sur registered in the
name of defendant and a parcel of agricultural land located at Malalag, Davao del Sur. A motion to quash and/or to set
aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at
Oblation Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is
exempt from execution forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the family Code except for the liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 therof, and that the judgment debt sought to sought to be enforced against the family home of
defendant is not of those enumerated under Article 155 of the family code. The opposition was filed by the plaintiffs.

Issue:

Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of ex

ecution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.

Ruling:

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the
creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head
of the family who owns the home. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as
a family home whether judicially or extra judicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law
only under Article 153 of the Family Code.

Antonio Valdes vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996

Facts:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In
a petition, dated June 22, 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void on the ground of mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin were placed in the custody of their mother and the older children chose
which parent they want to stay with. The petitioner and respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the
liquidation of their property as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
same code.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common
property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
desire to stay with their father.

Issue:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership (Art 147 Family Code). Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family.
MANUEL G. ALMELOS vs. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

GR 179620 August 26, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor and respondent Leonida Trinidad were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila
Cathedral. Their union bore three children.
Leonida averred that Manuels kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture
of a perfect husband and father. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably
meticulous, easily angered. Manuels unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their
frequent fights as a couple. Manuels deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were
incomprehensible to Leonida. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his
affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. Her worse fears
were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips.

Issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the trial court as regards the order declaring the marriage as
null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or conjugal property and
both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime jointly. The RTC decreed dissolution of the
community property of Manuel and Leonida and forfeited Manuels share in favor of the children. Considering that the
marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuels share in the property regime is
unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community property.

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

FACTS:

Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then
filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the
ground of latters former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contends that the first
marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void.

HELD:

It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void but
merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she
married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there
is no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law.

PEDRO Odayat vs DEMETRIO Amante 77 SCRA 338

A.M. No. 58 June 2, 1977

FACTS:

Pedro Odayat charged Atty. Demetrio Z. Amante, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance, Branch IX, Basey, Samar, with
oppression, immorality and falsification of a public document.

Briefly stated, complainant's basic allegations are: (1) that respondent grabbed a portion of complainant's land, and,
when this latter resented, the former arrogantly challenged the complainant to bring the matter to court; (2) that
respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena
Abella is still alive; and (3) that respondent, although married, falsely represented his status as single in the information
sheet be submitted in connection with his appointment to his present position as Clerk of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the recommendation of the Investigator is in accordance with law and the evidence in record.

HELD:

The charges were investigated by District Judge Segundo M. Zosa of said Court. The accusations of Odayat against Atty.
Amante regarding oppression, immorality and falsification of a public document was not proved and supported by
proper evidence. The Investigator found that the complainant failed to prove this charge. In the course of formal
investigation on August 26, 1974 before Judge Zosa, complainant acquiesced to the dropping of this charge of
oppression against respondent, inasmuch as the issue involved therein refers to a boundary dispute between the
complainant and the respondent and admittedly being more properly a cause for a civil action. 6 Hence, the scope of the
investigation by Judge Zosa is limited to the other two charges. Contrary to the allegation of the complainant the
document in question, shows that the respondent actually placed in "Civil Status" therein the word "Married". In view of
the foregoing, we find that the recommendation of the Investigator is in accordance with law and the evidence on
record.

WHEREFORE, respondent Demetrio Amante is hereby exonerated from the charges filed against him by complainant.
Agueda Benedicto vs Esteban De La Rama 3 Phil 341

G.R. No. 1056 March 13, 1907

FACTS:

This is an action for divorce. The complaint, which was filed on October 29, 1901, alleged, as the grounds therefor,
abandonment and adultery. The answer charged the plaintiff with adultery, denied the adultery imputed to the
defendant, and asked for a divorce. Judgment was rendered on July 5, 1902, in favor of the plaintiff, granting her divorce
and 81,042.76 pesos as her share of the conjugal property. The defendant excepted to the judgment and moved for a
new trial on the ground that the facts were not justified by the evidence. This motion was denied, and the defendant
excepted. The record before us contains all the evidence received at the trial.

ISSUE:

Whether the parties are entitled for a divorce.

HELD:

Neither one of the parties is entitled to a divorce. The result makes it unnecessary to consider that part of the judgment
which relates to the settlement of the conjugal partnership. Section 497 1 authorizes us in cases of this kind "to make
such findings upon the facts and render such final judgment as justice and equity require.

The judgment below is reversed, and we find from the evidence the following facts:

(1) The allegations of the complaint as to the marriage of the parties and as to the acts of adultery committed by the
defendant are true as therein stated except as to the date of the adultery committed with Gregoria Bermejo.

(2) The plaintiff, in the summer of 1892, at Talisay, in the Province of Occidental Negros, committed adultery with one
Zabal, a corporal of the civil guard.
As conclusion of law from the foregoing facts we hold that neither party is entitled to judgment of divorce against the
other; that judgment be entered that the plaintiff take nothing by her action or the defendant by his cross demand, and
that neither party recover of the other any costs either in this court or the Court of First Instance.

Judgment will be entered accordingly forty days from the filing of this decision, and the case remanded to the court
below for execution. So ordered.

Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

Facts:

Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City and they got married on September 20,
1986. Leouel and Julia lived with the latters parents. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound
to happen, Leouel averredbecauseof thefrequent interference byJulias parentsinto theyoungspouses family affairs. Occ
asionally, the couple would also start a quarrel over a number of things like when and where the couple should start
living independently from Julias parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouels spending a few days
with his own parents. On May 18, 1988, Julia finally left for the U.S. to work as a nurse despite his husbands pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, Julia called Leouel for the first time. She promised to return home upon
the expiration of her contract but she never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the U.S he desperately tried to locate,
or to somehow get in touch with Julia, but all his efforts were of no avail. Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return
home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years clearly
show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter intomarried life.

Issue:

Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article36 of the

Famliy Code.

Ruling:

The use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be construed independently
of but must stand in conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus, correlated
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated.

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI

GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997

FACTS:
Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila Cathedral on May 22,
1988. Contrary to Ginas expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with
each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual
intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third and fourth night.

From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed but during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he
did not show him his penis (clinically found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no
sexual contact was ever made and according to him every time he wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she
always avoided him and whenever he caressed her private parts she always removed his hands.

ISSUE:
Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with

petitioner a psychological incapacity

HELD:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations,
and the refusal is senseless and constant. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo
manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with
friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not
mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit
inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness.
Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along
with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In
addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not
considered as psychological incapacity.

LEONILO ANTONIO VS. MARIE IVONNE REYES

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006

Facts:

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first
meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child
was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she
represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for
reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage
with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for

declaring their marriage null and void.

Ruling:
 Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical
psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic
ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that
made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
The root causes of Reyes psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that
petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.

BRENDA B. MARCO vs. WILSON G. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000

FACTS:

Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide
material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity
of the marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos has Psychological Incapacity. The Regional Trial Court declared the
marriage null and void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:

1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for
determining of Psychological Incapacity.

2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case determines Psychological Incapacity.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of the
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a condition since qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of a state of Psychological Incapacity. There is absolutely no evidence
that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behaviour of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed
for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material
and moral support and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period
and not to the inception of the marriage. Significantly, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged Psychological Incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines presented in the Molina Case.

LEONILO ANTONIO V MARIE YVONNE F. REYES

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS:

In 1990, Leo married Marie, the latter being ten years his senior. In 1993, Leo filed to annul the marriage due to Maries
Psychological Incapacity. Leo claimed that Marie persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. She claims that she is a psychologist but in reality she is not.
She claims to be a singer for the Blackgold Company and its number one money maker, apparently she is not. She also
spends lavishly as opposed to her monthly income. Leo presented an expert that proved Maries Psychological
Incapacity. Marie denied all Leos allegations and also presented an expert to prove her case. The Regional Trial Court
ruled against Marie and annulled the marriage. The Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also annulled the marriage and
was affirmed by the Vaticans Roman Rata. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Psychological Incapacity is attendant to the case.

HELD:

Yes, Psychological Incapacity is attendant. The guidelines established in the Molina case is properly established in the
case at bar. The Supreme Court also emphasized what fraud means as contemplated in Art 45 (3) and Art 46 of the
Family Code. In Psychological Incapacity, the misrepresentation done by Marie points to her inadequacy to cope with
her marital obligations, kindred to Psychological Incapacity.

In Art 45 (3), marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that no other misrepresentation
or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage. These provisions of Art 45 (3) and Art 46 cannot be applied in the case at bar because the
misrepresentations done by Marie is not considered as fraud but rather such misrepresentations constitute her odd
behaviour which further constitutes Psychological Incapacity. Her misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate Leos
consent to marry her. Her misrepresentations are evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish fantasy from reality and
falls under the fourth guideline laid down in the Molina Case.

Imelda Marbella-Bobis vs. Isagani D. Bobis

G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000

Facts:

Respondent was married to the petitioner on January 25, 1996. Unknown to the petitioner, her other half has
contracted his first marriage with a Maria Dulce B. Javier on October 21, 1985 and has not been nullified. The
respondent once again entered into marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. A case of bigamy was filed against
the respondent on the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, consequently he initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a license. Respondent has filed a motion to
suspend the trial and has been granted. Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but has been denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a question to a criminal
case for bigamy

RULING:
No, respondents subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a question to a criminal case for
bigamy. During the time when he contracted his second marriage, he was considered already considered as a married
man even if it was a marriage without a marriage license. Article 40 of the Family Code, which has already been
promulgateSd on his second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before the
respondent could have married for the second time. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a
matter of defense because there is still no declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It is
not for the parties, especially the accused to determine if his first marriage was null or void, but of a court. The
respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage in order to escape the bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is also void due to the
absence of judicial declaration of nullity of the first. Thus, the decision in the civil action has been reversed and may
proceed with the criminal case.

ROLANDO LANDICHO vs. HON. LORENZO RELOVA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-22579 February 23, 1968

Facts:

Elvira Makatangay was married to Rolando Landicho (Petitioner). Petitioner then contracted a 2nd marriage to Fe Pasia
w/o dissolving his 1st marriage. Landicho was charged w/ Bigamy by his 1st wife Elvira. Fe then sought to declare her
marriage to Petitioner void due to alleged threats & force. Petitioner then sought to declare his 1st marriage void on the
ground that he contracted it under duress. Petitioner moved to suspend his criminal case for bigamy pending the result
on the validity of his marriage on the grounds that the validity of his marriage was a prejudicial question

Issue:

Whether or not the validity of his marriage is a prejudicial question to warrant a suspension of petitioners
bigamy charge.
Ruling:

The validity of the marriage is NOT a prejudicial question and thus may not suspend the bigamy case.

Parties to a marriage cannot determine its nullity. Only competent courts may decide on the validity of a
marriage. Prior to a declaration of nullity by a court, a party who contracts a 2nd marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO

GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately
live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein
the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by
her brother with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital
status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then
found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any
circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties.
Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition
because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the
proceedings, which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent
Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

SOLEDAD DOMINGO vs COURT of APPEALS 226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She
came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came
home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman
and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their
marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand,
Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a
basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.

HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary
for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married
marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy.When a marriage is declared void
ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property will
simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the
petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that
purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

FACTS:

Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with
Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in
Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco
received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went
home and cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by securing another seamans contract going to
London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for
a declaration of presumptive death of Janet.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?
HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded
belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy,
he even secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities
to find his wife.

PRESUMPTIVE DEATH

Republic of the Philippines VS. Bermudez Lorino

G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005

Facts:

Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in June 1987. The wife was unaware that her husband was a
habitual drinker with violent attitude and character and had the propensity to go out with his friends to the point of
being unable to work. In 1991 she left him and returned to her parents together with her three children. She went
abroad to work for her support her children. From the time she left him, she had no communication with him or his
relatives.
In 2000, nine years after leaving her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the RTC under the rules on Summary
Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. The lower court issued an order for the publication of the petition in a newspaper
of general circulation. In November 7, 2001, the RTC granted the summary petition. Although the judgment was final
and executors under the provisions of Act. 247 of the Family Code, the OSG for the Republic of the Philippines filed a
notice of appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the factual and legal basis for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the family
code were duly established.

Held:
 Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family Law, sets the tenor for cases
scoured by these rules, to wit:
Art238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this
Code requiring summary court proceeding. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditions manner without regards
technical rules.
The judge of the RTC fully complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rending judgment within ninety (90)
days after the formal offer of evidence by the petitioner.

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO vs. CONSUELO TAN

G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000

FACTS:

Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan
in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and
Oliva null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage.
HELD:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy
case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial
declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

THE UNITED STATES vs. VICTORIANO JOANINO

G.R. No. L-9762 August 3, 1914

From the evidence it appears that on or about the 22d day of May, 1890, the defendant was joined in the bonds of holy
matrimony to one Hipolita Rosario; that he continued to live with the said Rosario as her husband until the year 1896, or
1897, when he was deported by the Spanish Government from the Philippine Islands to the island of Guam; that he
remained in the island of Guam until the year 1901 or 1902, when he returned to the Philippine Islands; that while he
remained in the island of Guam he acted as a clerk in the court of first instance in said island; that when he returned to
the Philippine Islands he found that his wife, Hipolita Rosario, had been living and cohabiting with one Gregorio Malinit,
and that as a result of such illicit cohabitation the said Hipolita Rosario had given birth to two children during the
absence of the defendant; that within a short period after the return of the defendant from the island of Guam, he,
being informed of the illicit relations of his wife with the said Gregorio Malinit, commenced proceedings to be divorced
from his wife, Hipolita Rosario, in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan; that after the trial of the said
divorce proceedings, the court found that the facts justified the petition of the plaintiff (the defendant, Victoriano
Joanino) and granted the divorce prayed for; that thereafter, on the 9th day of May, 1908, he was joined in wedlock with
one Maria Roque; that at the time of the second marriage the said Hipolita Rosario was still living.

During the trial of the cause the defendant admitted all of the foregoing facts. He attempted, however to justify his
second marriage upon the ground that he believed that when a divorce had been granted him he had a right to remarry.
He alleged that while he was in the island of Guam he had known some cases in which a divorce had been granted and
the where the parties had remarried. He admitted, however, that at the time he was granted a divorce from his wife,
Hipolita Rosario, he had been informed by the court that the divorce which he had been granted him did not permit him
to remarry. In this court the defendant, through his attorney, has filed every interesting brief, in which he attempts to
justify his second marriage upon the ground of his belief of the fact that when a divorce had been granted to parties
under the laws of the Philippine Islands they were permitted to remarry during the life of the former spouse.

Under the laws in force of the Philippine Islands, the granting of a divorce does in no way annul the marriage. The
divorce does not destroy the marriage vinculum. (Law 3, Title 2, Partida 4.)

ELISEA LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962

FACTS:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939.
However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with
Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume
in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates
Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her
finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

ISSUE:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the
Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband.

HELD:

In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. The
finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without
basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal
partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more
occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise
would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

Petition was dismissed.

Hatima C. Yasin vs. Sharia District Court

G.R. No. 94986 (February 23, 1995)

Facts:

The summary case filed by the petitioner, a divorcee, to resume the use of her maiden name was denied by the Sharia
Court, holding that said petition needed to go through a judicial process under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change
of name.

ISSUE:

Under Article 16 (1)(g) of the CEDAW, as a wife, a woman has the right to choose a family name, and the right to enjoy
the same personal rights as the husband. In this instance, the Court ruled that a women need not undergo a special
proceeding to change her name back to her maiden name after a divorce.
Held:

Rule 103 of the Rules of Court should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorcee woman to reuse
her maiden name and surname.

A woman marrying a man is not required to seek judicial authority to use her husbands name. In the same way, when
the marriage ties no longer exists, in case of death or divorce, as authorized in the Muslim Code, the widow/divorcee
need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to reuse her maiden name.

Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husbands surname during the marriage (Art. 370), after annulment of the
marriage (Art 371), and after the death of the husband (Art. 373), is permissive and not obligatory, except in the case of
legal separation (Art. 372).

* Concurring Opinion, Justice Flerida Ruth Romero

Sec. 14. The state recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men.

If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights accorded by law and this
includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage.

MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010

The case is about a petition for review of the decision of the Office of the President dated May 27, 2005 and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 87710. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of
the President and in turn affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying the petitioners request to
revert to the use of her maiden name in the issuance of a renewed passport.

Statement of Facts

The petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipina whose passport was expiring on October 27, 2000.
The following entries appear in her passport: Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia as her given name and Remo
as her middle name. Petitioner who at that time her marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with
the Department of Foreign Affairs in Chicago, Illinois.

On August 28, 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota denied the request to revert the use of her
maiden name, thus stating; that the Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a woman applicant may
revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos case does
not meet any of these conditions. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied in a
letter dated 13 October 2000. The Office of the President also dismissed the appeal on July 27, 2004.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use
of her maiden name in the replacement passport.

Held

The court denied the petition due to unjustified changes in ones name and identity in a passport. Since petitioners
marriage to her husband subsists, she should not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise
stated, a married womans reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the
marriage

PAULA T. LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE

G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000

FACTS:

Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed
for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the
liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and
was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente;
they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property
to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in
favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have
acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to inherit from the late
Lorenzo Llorente?

HELD:

In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court
held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos
will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws
on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity since he was a foreigner.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the
wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce
decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage.
REYNALDO ESPIRITU vs COURT OF APPEALS

GR 115640, March 15, 1995

FACTS:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband while in US.
Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a
temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief
vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to
separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and
went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister. When Teresita
returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his
sister to gain custody of the children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

HELD:

In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be the paramount concern and
that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The
presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At
the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his
father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mothers infidelity. Furthermore, there
was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the
kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the mothers
conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality
conflicts at least with the daughter.

Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 156254. June 28, 2005

Facts:

Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo
Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the child, for
brevity), whom Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his school when she decided to
abandon Crisanto. One Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he was commissioned by
Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn and came up with the conclusion that she is having lesbian relations. The
findings of Renato Santos were corroborated by a house helper of the spouses who stated that the mother does not
care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and on one occasion, she saw Joycelyn slapping the child.

Issue:

Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals, when it awarded the custody of the child to the father, violated Art.
213 of the Family Code, which mandates that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Ruling:

It should be noted that the Family Code has reverted to the Civil Code provision mandating that a child below
seven years should not be separated from the mother. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the
mothers immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody. But sexual preference or moral
laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has
been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of
custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child
or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

Facts:

The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio
Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson for damages due to uncollected rentals on a land located at Jamindan, Capiz.

Petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private respondents answer did not tender an
issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint. Private respondents opposed the motion
alleging that they had denied petitioners claims and thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only be resolved
after trial.

The trial court denied petitioners motion. After an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both
parties, pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that the defendants in their answer specifically denied the claim
of damages against them, but also because the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof,
however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegations refer to the amount of damages, the allegations must still
be proved. The court dismissed the case and petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their
motion was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath that earnest efforts toward compromise
were made prior to filing thereof.

Ruling:

Petition was granted. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as
plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the
same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and
sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this
jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent
Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are
considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL

G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and
Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner alleges that the minor
Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now
married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.

Issue:

Who Should Have Custody of the Child?

Ruling:

Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and
Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall
use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.

David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering
the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental
authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over
the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be
considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.

REYNALDO ESPIRITU VS CA and TERESITA MASAUDING

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

FACTS:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband while in US.
Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a
temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief
vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to
separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and
went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister. When Teresita
returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his
sister to gain custody of the children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

HELD:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be the paramount concern and
that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The
presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At
the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his
father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mothers infidelity. Furthermore, there
was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the
kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the mothers
conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality
conflicts at least with the daughter.

Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

IN THE MATTER OF STEPHANIE GARCIA, (ADOPTION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILD)

GR NO. 148311

Facts:

Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that
he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name be changed to
Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor shall
be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname
of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.

Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father.

Held:

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for all intents and
purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.

Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino
custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

Lahom vs. Sibulo

G.R. No. 153989 July 14, 2003

Facts:

Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption in which she averred, that, despite the
proddings and pleadings of the petitioner and her husband, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to
Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had
made known his desire to revoke respondents adoption, but was prevented by petitioners supplication, however with
his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the
future.

Issue:

May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 8552?
Ruling:

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of
adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the
Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court
should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No.
8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued. Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action
to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter
would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must
also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred
to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely
created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the states determination on what it may deem to be for the best
interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to
nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may
be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Hon. Ruben

G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

Tayug Rural Bank vs. Central Bank of the Phils. (G.R. No. L-46158, Nov. 28, 1986)

FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

CARLOS LARIOSA and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,

GR No. 70479 February 27, 1987

MARIANO S. GONZAGA vs. AUGUSTO CE DAVID

GR No. L-14858 December 29, 1960

RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN, INC. and JOSE O. DESIDERIO, JR. vs HE COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMA CASTRO

GR No. L-32116 April 21, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. L-7234 May 21, 1955

In Re: Filart 40 Phil 205

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals

GR No. L-5230612 October 1981

PABLO LORENZO VS. JUAN POSADAS, JR 64 Phil 353

G.R. No. L-43082 June 18, 1937

LICHAUCO & COMPANY vs. SILVERIO APOSTOL and RAFAEL CORPUS

G.R. No. L-19628 December 4, 1922

U.S. vs Palacio 33 Phil 208

Perfecto Floresca vs Philex Mining Corporation

GR 30642; April 30, 1985

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO

G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

445 SCRA 500

ELADlA DE LIMA, vs.LAGUNA TAYABAS 160 SCRA70

G.R. No. L-35697-99 April 15, 1988

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. ALFONSO VERCHEZ

RHODORA M. LEDESMAvs. COURT OF APPEALS 160 SCRA 449

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL vs.HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ

G.R. No. L-2008 December 26, 1964

FELIA P. TY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and EDGARDO M. REYES

G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR. vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ

GR 85140 17 May 1990

Navarro vs. Domagtoy (1996)

GR No. 961088

FABIAN PUGEDA vs. RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS

GR No. L-16925 March 31, 1962

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ELIAS BORROMEO 133 SCRA 106

G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE A. DAYOT

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

ENGRACE BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., vs.
NORMA BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.,

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653

GR No. 8011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380

PAULA T. LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE 345

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CRASUS L. IYOY

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M.

ALFONSO LACSON vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT OF

MARIANO B. ARROYO vs. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO

CARMEN QUIMIGUING ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN vs. FELIX ICAO

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA

CONSTANZA YAEZ DE BARNUEVO vs. GABRIEL FUSTER

FELISA S. MARCELO vs. DANIEL ESTACIO

Canonizado vs. Almeda-Lopez109 Phil 1177

ENRIQUE T. JOCSON and JESUS T. JOCSON vs. THE EMPIRE INSURANCE

SYBIL SAMSON vs. HON. NICASIO YATCO RSENIO SAMSON and DOROTEA

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

Leouel Santos and Rosario Bedia Santos

Flores Vs. Esteban 97 Phil 439

Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus of Minor Angelie C. Cervantes

MARIA QUINTANA vs. GELASIO LERMA

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

JOSE L. PONCE DE LEON vs. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION,

vs.

MOISES JOCSON,

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs MARGARITA QUINTOS E YPARRAGUIRRE and ANGEL A. ANSALSO

G.R. No. L-22383 October 6, 1924

MARGARITA QUINTOS DE ANSALDO and ANGEL A. ANSALDO

vs.
THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FIDELITY & SURETY COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and LUZON SURETY
COMPANY

G.R. No. L-43257 February 19, 1937

RAFAEL ZULUETA, ET AL, vs PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC

G.R. No. L-28589 January 8, 1973

JOVELLANOS vs. CA 210 SCRA 126 (Art. 1164)

ELISEO SANTOS, as administrator of Estanislao Santos, vs. PABLO BARTOLOME

G.R. No. 18032 November 23, 1922

AGAPITO LORENZO, ET AL vs FLORENCIO NICOLAS ET AL.

PEOPLES BANK & TRUST CO. v

REGISTER OF DEEDS 60 Phil 167

ANTONIO PEREZ vs ANGELA TUASON de PEREZ 109 Phil 64

MATEA RODRIGUEZ vs SUSANA DE LA CRUZ, ESCOLASTICO DE LA CRUZ, AND PROCESA DE LA CRUZ

G.R. No. L-3629 September 28, 1907

MOORE and SONS MERCANTILE CO v WAGNER 50 Phil 128

IN RE: JOSE BERNAS & PILAR BERNAS 14 SCRA 327

G.R. No. L-20379 June 22, 1965

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG

GR 82606 December 18, 1992

GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ

ANTONIO A. S. VALDES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY vs. CARLINA V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997

USAN NICDAO CARIO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola vs.

JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA

GR 177703, 28 January 2008

JOSE E. HONRADO vs COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROGELIO M. PIZARRO

SPOUSES EDUARDO and ELSA VERSOLA vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 164740 July 31, 2006

FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC

[G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997]

JOSE MODEQUILLO vs HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-
CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

Antonio Valdes vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996

MANUEL G. ALMELOS vs. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

GR 179620 August 26, 2008

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL

PEDRO Odayat vs DEMETRIO Amante 77 SCRA 338

A.M. No. 58 June 2, 1977

Agueda Benedicto vs Esteban De La Rama 3 Phil 341

G.R. No. 1056 March 13, 1907

Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI

GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997

Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

LEONILO ANTONIO VS. MARIE IVONNE REYES

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006

BRENDA B. MARCO vs. WILSON G. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000

LEONILO ANTONIO V MARIE YVONNE F. REYES

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006

Imelda Marbella-Bobis vs. Isagani D. Bobis

G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000

ROLANDO LANDICHO vs. HON. LORENZO RELOVA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO

SOLEDAD DOMINGO vs COURT of APPEALS 226 SCRA 572

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

PRESUMPTIVE DEATH

Republic of the Philippines VS. Bermudez Lorino

G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO vs. CONSUELO TAN

G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000

THE UNITED STATES vs. VICTORIANO JOANINO

G.R. No. L-9762 August 3, 1914

ELISEA LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962

Hatima C. Yasin vs. Sharia District Court

G.R. No. 94986 (February 23, 1995)

MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010

PAULA T. LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE

G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

REYNALDO ESPIRITU vs COURT OF APPEALS

GR 115640, March 15, 1995

CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 156254. June 28, 2005

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL

G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004

REYNALDO ESPIRITU VS CA and TERESITA MASAUDING

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF STEPHANIE GARCIA, (ADOPTION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILD)

GR NO. 148311

Lahom vs. Sibulo

G.R. No. 153989 July 14, 2003