You are on page 1of 20

HILLARY CLINTON

FULL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OPENED


GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIVE FILES (ANNOTATED)
ORIGIN OF FAKE RUSSIAN NARRATIVE

Last Updated: August 10, 2017, By:


https://twitter.com/trumpgenius (@trumpgenius); https://twitter.com/HandsandButtons (@handsandbuttons);
https://twitter.com/emanuelmccray (@emanuelmccray)

DATE EVENT/AGENCY
00/00/1973 Hillary Diane Rodham Clinton graduates from Yale Law School.
01/21/2009 Hillary Clinton assumes Office as the served as the 67th United States Secretary of State, under
U.S. President Barack Hussein Obama, from January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013.
01/21/2009 Hillary Clinton or a member of her Office must provide membership to the National
Counterintelligence Policy Board (NCIB) pursuant to Title 50 U.S.C. 3381(c)(2)(C).
12/29/2009 President Obama signs Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 (CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION), https://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/cnsi-eo.html
12/29/2009 Hillary Clinton becomes an Original Classification Authority pursuant E.O. 13526, Part 1 and
22 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 9.5 (ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY).
10/07/2010 Congress enacts Title 50 U.S.C. 3344, Pub. L. 111258, 7, 124 Stat. 2652.), which mandated
in part that: The head of each Executive agency, in accordance with Executive Order 13526,
shall require annual training for each employee who has original classification authority. Such
training shall(1) educate the employee(2) ensure such training is a prerequisite, once
completed successfully, as evidenced by an appropriate certificate or other record. The head of
each Executive agency shall ensure that the training required by subsection (a) is conducted
efficiently and in conjunction with any other required security, intelligence, or other training
programs to reduce the costs and administrative burdens associated with carrying out the training
required by subsection (a). https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2014-
title50/html/USCODE-2014-title50-chap45-subchapIII-sec3344.htm
11/00/2010 Civil Society 2.0, an initiative purporting to assist non-governmental (NGOs) and civil society
organizations (CSOs) in using new digital tools and technologies to increase the reach and impact
of their work, was introduced by Hillary Clinton, through the U.S. State Department. The first
application took place in Santiago, Chile by a Tech@State: Civil Society event called
TechCamp. In its training and operation, the program teaches journalists and activists how to
create and sustain fake news propaganda using fake/modified infographics. Climate change
propaganda is among the basic skills taught and financed by U.S. taxpayers. https://2009-
2017.state.gov/statecraft/cs20/index.htm
03/09/2012 A hot microphone picked up President Obama caught colluding on camera telling Russian
President Dmitri Medvedev he would have more flexibility to negotiate on issues like missile
defense after he wins reelection. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-summit-obama-
medvedev-idUSBRE82P0JI20120326
09/11/2012 Members of Ansar al-Sharia attacked the American diplomatic compound in Benghazi resulting
in the deaths of U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens and U.S. Foreign Service
Information Management Officer Sean Smith. Reportedly, at the behest of the CIA, top U.S.
officials, using Tech Camp, initially described the attacks as the results of a spontaneous protest
triggered by recently released anti-Muslim video, Innocence of Muslims.
09/16/2012 U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice used talking points from a CIA memo to state that:
Based on the best information we have to date, what our assessment is as of the present is in fact
what began spontaneously in Benghazi as a reaction to what had transpired some hours earlier in

1|
Cairo where, of course, as you know, there was a violent protest outside of our embassysparked
by this hateful video.
09/18/2012 White House Press Secretary Jay Carney explained that the Benghazi attack to reporters: Im
saying that based on informationwe saw no evidence to back up claims by others that this was a
preplanned or premeditated attackwe saw evidence that it was sparked by the reaction to this
video.
09/20/2012 During an appearance on Univision, a Spanish-language television network in the United States,
President Obama stated: What we do know is that the natural protests that arose because of the
outrage over the video were used as an excuse by extremists to see if they can also directly harm
U.S. interests.
07/06/2015 FBI HQ Receives Section 811(c) Referral From Inspector General Intelligence Community
(IGIC) Regarding Potential Compromise of Classified Information Involving Former
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clintons Emails Maintained on Private Server
07/10/2015 FBI HQ Initiates Full Criminal Investigation of Section 811(c) Referral From IGIC Related
to Clintons Emails
07/00/2015 FBI HQ Coordinates Evidence and Subpoenas With U.S. Attorney Eastern District of
Virginia (USAVAE)
07/23/2015 IGIC Issues Summary of ICIG support to State Department IG to members of Congress
wherein it was stated: My office discovered that an inadvertent release of classified national
security information had already occurred in the State FOIA process as a result of insufficient
coordination with Intelligence Community (I C) elements (State personnel continue to deny the
classified character of the released information despite a definitive determination from the IC
Interagency FOIA process).1
07/24/2015 IGIC and IG U.S. Department of State Issues joint Statement Describing Section 811(c) Referral
as a security referral: The main purpose of the referral was to notify security officials that
classified information may exist on at least one private server and thumb drive that are not in the
government's possession. An important distinction is that the IC IG did not make a criminal
referral-it was a security referral made for counterintelligence purposes.2
07/27/2015 In Support of its Full Criminal Investigation of Hillary Clintons Emails, FBI HQ Issues Request
for Preservation of Records to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) Associated with the Clinton
Emails Pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (SCA), Title 18 U.S. Code 2703(f), which
provides:
(f) Requirement To Preserve Evidence.
(1) In general.A provider of wire or electronic communication services or a
remote computing service, upon the request of a governmental entity, shall take all
necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending
the issuance of a court order or other process.
(2) Period of retention.Records referred to in paragraph (1) shall be retained for
a period of 90 days, which shall be extended for an additional 90-day period upon
a renewed request by the governmental entity. (FBI Vault, HRC-2646)
07/27/2015 FBI HQ Issues Second Request for Preservation of Records to an Internet Service Provider (ISP)
Associated with the Clinton Emails Pursuant to SCA. (FBI Vault, HRC-2660)
08/27/2015 Grand Jury (GJ) Subfile Opening Document Filed (GJ-1)/ FBI (LA-CI-7)
08/27/2015 USAVAE Subpoena Served (GJ-2)/ FBI (Washington Field Office (WFO))

1
Summary of ICIG support to State Department IG,
https://oig.state.gov/system/files/23_july_2015_cn_summary_of_ic_ig_support_to_state_department_ig.pdf
2
Statement from the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community and the Department of State Regarding the Review of Former
Secretary Clinton's Emails.
https://oig.state.gov/system/files/statement_of_the_icig_and_oig_regarding_review_of_clintons_emails_july_24_2015.pdf
2|
08/31/2015 Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued by U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia (USDC,
EDVA) By Email (GJ-5)/FBI (WFO)
09/01/2015 WFO (WF-CI 13) Opened 302 Subfile for Documents Associated with Interviews Related to
Full Criminal Investigation of Clintons Emails Derived from IGIC Section 811(c) Referral
(302-1)
09/03/2015 USAVAE Subpoenas Served (GJ-6)/ FBI (WFO)
09/04/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response (GJ-11)/USAVAE
09/08/2015 Subpoena Returned (GJ-4)/FBI (WFO)
09/08/2015 USAVAE Subpoenas Served (GJ-7)/FBI (WFO)
09/08/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response (GJ-8)/USAVAE
09/08/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response Via FedEx (GJ-10)/FBI (WFO)
09/09/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response (GJ-9)/FBI (WFO)
09/09/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Via Email Supplemental Response to Subpoena (GJ-12)
09/24/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response Via Email (GJ-13)
09/28/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Nonresponsive Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report
Returned to USAVAE (GJ-14)/WFO
09/29/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-15)/WFO
10/00/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Nonresponsive Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report
Returned to USAVAE (GJ-16)/WFO
10/02/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-18)/WFO
10/05/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-17)/WFO
10/06/2015 FBI HQ Receives from Day Pitney LLP Law Firm Copy of Letter from Chairman Ron Johnson
of U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Dated October 5,
2015 and Addressed AUSTIN MCCHORD, CEO of Datto, Inc. Regarding the Committees
Examination of Hillary Clintons use of a private email account and the Datto SIRIS S2000 server
which was purchased for Hillary Clinton in May 2013 to provide on-site, immediate recovery of
backup data in the event that the primary server failed. (FBI Vault HRC-2750 to 2757)
10/08/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-19)/WFO
10/14/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Nonresponsive Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report
Returned to USAVAE (GJ-20)/WFO
10/15/2015 FBI (HQ) Counterespionage Section Opens Full Investigation Based on Specific Articulated
Facts Provided By Section 811 Referral From IGIC Dated July 6, 2015 Regarding Potential
Compromise of Classified Information (Serial #1)/Computer Analysis Response Team
(CART)
10/15/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-21)
10/16/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-23)
10/19/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-24)
10/19/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-25)
10/20/2015 FBI (WFO) Requests Assistance from FBI Operational Technology Division (OTD) Investigative
Analysis Unit (IAU) in support Hillary Clinton case to conduct intrusion analysis and
malware/virus analysis on digital evidence on a Dell PowerEdge R620 server, two Blackberry
3|
cell phones and other digital equipment. (FBI Vault HRC-2985)
10/22/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-26)
10/23/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-27)
10/23/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-28)
11/03/2015 Benjamin G. Ziff, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, gave
testimony on State Departments Tech Camp counter-Russia propaganda in Ukraine before
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Shaheen and members of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, Europe Subcommittee. Ziff indicated in part that:
In the face of the Kremlins attack on the truth, the free flow of reliable, credible
information is the best defense. This is why the State Department has focused its
efforts on supporting independent media; improving access to high quality,
objective information; exposing false narratives; and building the capacity of civil
society. After all, truth should be discovered, not dictated. Strong independent
journalism is a key element in any democracy and will eventually prevail over
disinformation and propaganda.
In FY 2015, the State Department and USAID allocated $66 million dollars in
U.S. foreign assistance funding to sustain civil society and independent media in
the Eurasia and Southeast Europe region, of which more than $16 million supports
independent media. In addition to our foreign assistance funds, we have also
dedicated $4 million from the public diplomacy budget to bolster our staff and
programming. These funds help our partners who are susceptible to Russian
aggression build democratic principles, independent media, and a civil society
intolerant of corruption.
In FY 2016, President Obama is requesting a 26 percent increase to the State
Department and USAID foreign assistance budget in this sector, proposing $83
million to surge our support for civil society and independent media in countries
most vulnerable to Russian pressure. This increase is needed in countries that
continue to be under threat of democratic backsliding, especially where the
Kremlins influence is strong and growingnot just in Russian-speaking areas,
but also in the Western Balkans.
In Western and Central Europe, we work with our European partners to underscore
allied unity and bolster resolve to work together on global challenges. We also
offer Western journalists opportunities to view the realities on the ground in
countries, like Ukraine, where the Kremlin tries to distort the facts.
We are proud of the exchange programs and tech camps we sponsor to link and
train regional and transatlantic journalists and other opinion leaders. By
November, we will have trained 120 Tech Camp alumni60 in Prague and Riga
and 60 more in Kyiv (Kiev, Ukraine)who will go on to support strong
independent journalism by sharing best practices and resources.
We are also working with the EU to cooperate on supporting the creation of new
regional programs to support Russian-language media, based on the European
Endowment for Democracys (EED) Feasibility Study on Russian Language
Media Initiatives. Altogether, in FY15, the State Department and USAID allocated
approximately $16 million to support independent media.
https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/249141.htm
11/04/2015 FBI (WFO) Receives from ITS/FE Grand Jury Material consisting of copy of email dated

4|
11/04/2015 and CD containing spreadsheet with two tabs for analysts to query derived from the
datasets previously reviewed in Clinton Emails case. (302-29)
11/09/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-29)
11/12/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-30)
11/17/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-31)
11/23/2015 FBI (WFO) Received From Meeting In Bethesda, MD Supplemental Subpoena Response (GJ-32)
11/25/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-33)
12/08/2015 FBI (WFO) Received In FedEx Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report
Returned to USAVAE (GJ-34)
12/15/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Nonresponsive Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report
Returned to USAVAE (GJ-35)
12/21/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-36)
12/21/2015 FBI (WFO) Received Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-38)
12/22/2015 FBI (WFO) Received In UPS Nonresponsive Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum
Report Returned to USAVAE (GJ-37)
12/2/2015 FBI (WFO) Interviewed BRYAN PAGLIANO at the offices of the DOJs Counterintelligence
and Export Control Section (CES) (FBI Vault HRC-213 to 220.)
12/23/2015 FBI (WFO) Received In UPS Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned
to USAVAE (GJ-39)
12/23/2015 FBI (WFO) Received In UPS Supplemental Subpoena Response In Addition GJ-39. GJ Subpoena
Duces Tecum Report Returned to USAVAE (GJ-43)
01/07/2016 FBI (WFO) Interviews SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL at the law offices of his attorney in NW
Washington, D.C. regarding his friendship with Hillary Clinton and their emails while she was
Secretary of State. (FBI Vault HRC-188 to 190.)
01/12/2016 FBI (WFO) Received In Email Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned
to USAVAE (GJ-40)
01/12/2016 FBI (WFO) Received In Email Subpoena Response. GJ Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned
to USAVAE (GJ-41)
01/27/2016 FBI HQ Receives Complaint From Walk-In Informant (WII), who is Long-term
Government Employee who had Worked for many years at Department of State, Regarding
Criminal Investigation of Mrs. Clintons Misuse of Classified Information. WII Informed
FBI Special Agent He Had Sent Criminal Evidence of Hillary Clintons Misuse of Classified
Documents To FBI Director James Comey Earlier In January 2016, But When He Called To
Confirm Receipt He Could Not Do So and Therefore Wanted To Walk-In To Make Sure the
Criminal Information Was Received By The Right People at FBI HQ, Specifically The Task
Force Working On The Clinton E-Mail Scandal. He Offered to be further Interviewed in a
SCIF to further explain his other highly classified evidence. FBI Sends Copies of Interview To
Jonathan C. Moffa (Moffa) and Others. (Serial #142)
02/03/2016 FBI (WFO) Received In Email Subpoena Response. Subpoena Duces Tecum Report Returned to
USAVAE (GJ-44)
02/27/2016 FBI (WFO) Conducts Interview of JACOB SULLIVAN in Washington, D.C. Full FD-302a is
housed in the sub TS-SCI file due to the classification level of the content discussed in the
Interview. (302-65)
5|
03/03/2016 New York Times reports that the Governments criminal investigation of Clintons emails is
simply a security inquiry and that it will end by early May: A federal law enforcement
official said that barring any unforeseen changes, the F.B.I. investigation could conclude by early
May. Then the Justice Department will decide whether to file criminal charges and, if so, against
whom. As we have said since last summer, Secretary Clinton has been cooperating with the
Justice Departments security inquiry, including offering in August to meet with them to assist
their efforts if needed, said Brian Fallon, a campaign spokesman. In an interview on MSNBC
last Friday, Mrs. Clinton described the Judicial Watch case as a partisan one, too, and referred to
the F.B.I.s investigation as a security inquiry. She added that the two were often wrongly
conflated. I am personally not concerned about it, she said. I think there will be a resolution of
the security inquiry. The F.B.I.s case did begin as a security referral from the inspectors general
of the State Department and the nations intelligence agencies, who were concerned that
classified information might have been stored outside a secure government network. But multiple
law enforcement officials said the matter quickly became an investigation into whether anyone
had committed a crime in handling classified information.3
03/09/2016 Daily Beast reports Hillary Clinton gave a defiant answer during Wednesday nights
debate when moderator Jorge Ramos asked if she would leave the presidential race if
indicted as a result of the investigation into her private email server. Oh for goodness,
Clinton said getting frustrated. Its not going to happen. Im not going to answer that
question.4
03/09/2016 Washington Posts Erik Wemple published Hillary Clintons reassertion she wont be
indicted: After disclosing that his daughter, Paola Ramos, worked for the Clinton campaign,
moderator Jorge Ramos got right down to the business of declaring that this connection wouldnt
mellow his approach to the former secretary of state. A whopper of a multi-pronged question
about Clintons email use ensued: Ramos charged her with issuing one set of email rules for
herself and another for the rest of the State Department. He asked who specifically gave her
the permission to use a homebrew server for her work emails. And this one: Would you drop out
of the race if you get indicted? In her response, Clinton issued an immediate and full-throated
endorsement of talking-pointsism. Well, Jorge, theres a lot of questions in there, and Im going
to give the same answer Ive been giving for many months. As she talked about over-
classification, Ramos barged in, repeating his question about who authorized the setup.
There was no permission to be asked, quipped Clinton. Ramos repeated his question about
how shed respond to an indictment. Oh, for goodness and its not going to happen. Im not
even answering that question, responded the former secretary of state. That was enough for
Ramos, who turned to Sanders with a question about his position on Clintons emails. The
FBIs probe into Clintons email practices could conclude by early May, according to the New
York Times.5
03/17/2016 FBI (WFO) Conducts Interview of MICHAEL MORELL in Washington, D.C. Full FD-302a is
housed in the sub TS-SCI file due to the classification level of the content discussed in the
Interview. (302-64)
03/31/2016 FBI HQ, National Security Law Branch, Office of the General Counsel Requests Assistance
From U.S. Secret Service In Coordinating Interview With A Witness in Investigation of
Section 811(c) Referral Regarding Hillary Clinton emails.

3
As Campaign Unfolds, So Do Inquiries Into Hillary Clintons Emails, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/us/politics/as-
presidential-campaign-unfolds-so-do-inquiries-into-hillary-clintons-emails.html?_r=0
4
Clinton: I Wont Be Indicted for Emails, http://www.thedailybeast.com/clinton-i-wont-be-indicted-for-
emails?via=desktop&source=copyurl
5
Hillary Clinton to Jorge Ramos on email: Im not even answering that question, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-
wemple/wp/2016/03/09/hillary-clinton-to-jorge-ramos-on-email-im-not-even-answering-that-question/?utm_term=.5d0dc3f77399
6|
04/08/2016 Associated Press reported Hillary Clinton reaffirming why she wont be indicted:
Republicans are living in a world of fantasy and hope if they think shell be indicted over her
use of a private email server while serving as secretary of state. Clinton laughed at the
suggestion, saying the suggestion shows how desperate the GOP has become and that their
fondest wishes wont come true. Of the ongoing investigation, Clinton calls it a security
review that is conducted in our government all the time.6
04/09/2016 FBI (WFO) Conducts Interview of CHERYL MILLS in Washington, D.C. Full FD-302a is
housed in the sub TS-SCI file due to the classification level of the content discussed in the
Interview. (302-71) (FBI Vault HRC-162 to 168.)
05/13/2016 CART IT Specialist/Forensic Examiner (ITS/FE) (WFO) Submits Two CDs for Additional
Analysis (CART Serial # 17)/FBI (WFO)
04/04/2016 FBI (WFO) Interviews HUMA ABEDIN at FBI-WFO. (FBI Vault HRC-142 to 152.)
04/09/2016 FBI (WFO) Conducts Interview of CHERYL MILLS at the law offices of Wilkinson Walsh &
Eskovitz in Washington, D.C. (FBI Vault HRC-157 to 161.)
05/26/2016 FBI Interviews MARCEL LEHEL LAZAR a/k/a GUCCIFER in person at the office of the U.S.
Attorney in Alexandria, Virginia regarding his hacking activities and his access to the email
accounts of Hillary Clinton and SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL. (FBI Vault HRC-209 to 212.)
06/22/2016 FBI (WFO) ITS/FE Interviewed BRYAN PAGLIANO telephonically regarding the Apple email
server set up by JUSTIN COOPER. (FBI Vault HRC-221 to 223.)
06/30/2016 Investigation Conducted on June 2, 2016 At Washington, D.C. was Transcribed (GJ-64)/FBI
(WFO)
07/01/2016 Investigation Conducted on July 1, 2016 At Washington, D.C. was Transcribed (GJ-65)/FBI
(WFO)
07/02/2016 FBI (WFO) Conducts Interview of HILLARY CLINTON in Washington, D.C. Full FD-
302a is housed in the sub TS-SCI file due to the classification level of the content discussed
in the Interview. CLINTON stated the following relevant to the July 5, 2016 Statement by
COMEY ending the investigation:

(302-90) (FBI Vault HRC at 26.)


07/05/2016 FBI Director James B. Comey issues official Statement through FBI National Press Office,
(202) 324-3691, wherein he recommended to the U.S. Department of Justice that Hillary
Clinton not be prosecuted for mishandling classified information: After a tremendous
amount of work over the last year, the FBI is completing its investigation and referring the case to
the Department of Justice for a prosecutive decision. What I would like to do today is tell you
three things: what we did; what we found; and what we are recommending to the Department of

6
Clinton: I wont be indicted, Posted: Fri 9:47 AM, Apr 08, 2016, http://www.wymt.com/content/news/Clinton-I-wont-be-indicted-
375028301.html
7|
Justice. Although we did not find clear evidence that Secretary Clinton or her colleagues
intended to violate laws governing the handling of classified information, there is evidence that
they were extremely careless in their handling of very sensitive, highly classified information.
For example, seven e-mail chains concern matters that were classified at the Top Secret/Special
Access Program level when they were sent and received. These chains involved Secretary Clinton
both sending e-mails about those matters and receiving e-mails from others about the same
matters. There is evidence to support a conclusion that any reasonable person in Secretary
Clintons position, or in the position of those government employees with whom she was
corresponding about these matters, should have known that an unclassified system was no place
for that conversation. In addition to this highly sensitive information, we also found information
that was properly classified as Secret by the U.S. Intelligence Community at the time it was
discussed on e-mail (that is, excluding the later up-classified e-mails).
None of these e-mails should have been on any kind of unclassified system, but their presence is
especially concerning because all of these e-mails were housed on unclassified personal servers
not even supported by full-time security staff, like those found at Departments and Agencies of
the U.S. Governmentor even with a commercial service like Gmail. So thats what we found.
Finally, with respect to our recommendation to the Department of Justice: In our system, the
prosecutors make the decisions about whether charges are appropriate based on evidence the FBI
has helped collect. Although we dont normally make public our recommendations to the
prosecutors, we frequently make recommendations and engage in productive conversations with
prosecutors about what resolution may be appropriate, given the evidence. In this case, given the
importance of the matter, I think unusual transparency is in order.
Although there is evidence of potential violations of the statutes regarding the handling of
classified information, our judgment is that no reasonable prosecutor would bring such a case.
Prosecutors necessarily weigh a number of factors before bringing charges. There are obvious
considerations, like the strength of the evidence, especially regarding intent. Responsible
decisions also consider the context of a persons actions, and how similar situations have been
handled in the past.
In looking back at our investigations into mishandling or removal of classified information, we
cannot find a case that would support bringing criminal charges on these facts. All the cases
prosecuted involved some combination of: clearly intentional and willful mishandling of
classified information; or vast quantities of materials exposed in such a way as to support an
inference of intentional misconduct; or indications of disloyalty to the United States; or efforts to
obstruct justice. We do not see those things here.
To be clear, this is not to suggest that in similar circumstances, a person who engaged in this
activity would face no consequences. To the contrary, those individuals are often subject to
security or administrative sanctions. But that is not what we are deciding now.
As a result, although the Department of Justice makes final decisions on matters like this, we are
expressing to Justice our view that no charges are appropriate in this case.7
07/14/2016 FBI (WFO) Filed Huma Abedin Clinton E-mail (huma@clintonemail.com) Analysis (1-page)
(Serial #177)
07/15/2016 FBI (WFO, CI-13) Documents an analysis of email communications between email accounts of
Hillary Clinton, hdr22@clintonemail.com and Huma Abedin, huma@clintonemail.com. Analysis
of the emails provided to State Department by Hillary Clinton in December 2014 indicated
huma@clintonemail.com was party to 2,598 total emails in the dataset. 32 were direct
communications exclusively between Clinton and Abedin and contained references to

7
Statement by FBI Director James B. Comey on the Investigation of Secretary Hillary Clintons Use of a Personal E-Mail System,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/statement-by-fbi-director-james-b-comey-on-the-investigation-of-secretary-hillary-
clinton2019s-use-of-a-personal-e-mail-system
8|
Benghazi, Libya, or Tripoli which caused search to be flawed and incomplete.
08/10/2016 Moffa Visits White House Under Appointment No. U62262 To Meet With Denis
McDonough In White House West Wing and Included Group of Four People. Moffa made a
previous visit to the White House on Thursday, November 12, 2009 under appointment number
U55643. Moffa was to meet with Rouda Feghali in the White House West Wing and included
group of four people. At the time of this visit, Rouda Feghali was serving in an official capacity
as Director for Counterintelligence, National Security Council (NSC).
10/28/2016 Comey Notifies eight Members of Congress that previously he had stated in congressional
testimony that the FBI had completed its investigation ofClintons personal email server,
however the FBI has now learned from an unrelated case the existence of Clinton emails that
appear to be pertinent to the investigation.
10/30/2016 U.S.D.C. Southern District New York (S.D.N.Y.) Issues Search and Seizure Warrant for A
Laptop Computer In Case No. 16:-mc-00464-PKC/16 MAG 7063
11/06/2016 Comey Notifies eight Members of Congress that he was supplementing his October 28, 2016
Letter to inform these members that we reviewed all of the communications that were to or from
Hillary Clinton. Based on our review, we have not changed our conclusions that we expressed
in July with respect to Secretary Clinton.
11/19/2016 Tech Camp Warsaw, Poland announced Digital Communication Tech Camp and Conference
in Warsaw, Poland, 15-17 February 2017.

FOR: Digital Journalists, bloggers, and CSO activists from Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland,
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Ukraine.

TOPICS:
1. Critical Media Literacy:
How to differentiate propaganda and manipulation from reliable content in the deluge of
24/7 information coming from digital sources? Inspiring examples of educational
activities from experts in the field.
2. Entrepreneurship for independent and sustainable journalism:
How to reach financial self-sufficiency for truly independent reporting? Business models
that work for contemporary media: start-ups thinking plus fundraising.
3. Responsible data visualization:
Using digital tools to support public understanding of complex social, economic and
political issues, without their undue simplifiation. Presentations and workshops by
practitioners who turn massives of data into amazing infographics.
4. Professional standards and ICT tools in civic journalism:
Meeting professional journalism standards VS bringing the news to recipients
immediately - possibilities and challenges of digital tools from successful journalists.At
Tech Camp participants will attend workshops of international trainers, meet leading
professionals in the field from Poland, work in teams to develop joint projects. The best
projects will be awarded with mini-grants.

ORGANIZERS: US State Department, US Embassy in Poland, FRSI (Poland), and Digital


Communication Network. http://www.iacbg.org/en/vesti/digital-communication-tech-camp-in-
warsaw

9|
01/09/2017 FBI HQ Uploads8 to FBI Vault, Hillary R. Clinton, ten (10) files related to its criminal
investigation with the following statement: Hillary Rodham Clinton served as U.S. Secretary of
State from January 21, 2009 to February 1, 2013. The FBI conducted an investigation into
allegations that classified information was improperly stored or transmitted on a personal e-mail
server she used during her tenure. https://vault.fbi.gov/hillary-r.-clinton The 10 files contained the
following page numbers: Part 01 of 10: HRC- 1-47; Part 02 of 10: HRC- 48-58; Part 03 of 10:
HRC- 59-247; Part 04 of 10: HRC- 301-347; Part 05 of 10: HRC- 348-851; Part 06 of 10: HRC-
854-1323; Part 07 of 10: HRC- 1434-1788; Part 08 of 10: HRC- 2222-2330; Part 09 of 10: HRC-
2384-2859; and Part 10 of 10: HRC- 2974-3360.
01/11/2017 Kenneth P. Vogel and David Stern of Politico explained the connection between ALEXANDRA
CHALUPA, a Ukrainian-American lawyer, daughter of Ukrainian immigrants and a Democratic
Party operative who, while consulting for the Democratic National Committee (DNC), met with
top officials in the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington in an effort to expose ties between
President Trump and his top campaign aide Paul Manafort and Russia. Reportedly, CHALUPA
maintained strong ties to the Ukrainian-American diaspora and the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine. In
2014, CHALUPA performed pro bono legal work for another client interested in the Ukrainian
crisis and began researching Manaforts role in Viktor Yanukovychs rise, as well as Manaforts
ties to the pro-Russian oligarchs who funded Yanukovychs political party. CHALUPA told
Politico she had developed a network of sources in Kiev, Ukraine and Washington, including
investigative journalists, government officials and private intelligence operatives, that her
consulting work at the DNC this past election cycle centered on mobilizing ethnic communities,
including Ukrainian-Americans and that President Trumps unlikely presidential campaign began
surging in late 2015, she began focusing more on the research, and expanded it to include
Trumps ties to Russia, as well. Further, CHALUPA said she occasionally shared her findings
with officials from the DNC and Hillary Clintons campaign. In January 2016 months before
Manafort had taken any role in Trumps campaign CHALUPA told a senior DNC official
that, when it came to Trumps campaign, I felt there was a Russia connection.9
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/ukraine-sabotage-trump-backfire-233446
05/09/2017 President Donald J. Trump informed FBI Director James Comey that he has been terminated and
removed from office. President Trump acted based on the recommendations of both Attorney
General Jeff Sessions and Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, who wrote in part that: I
cannot defend the Directors handling of the conclusion of the investigation of Secretary Clinton's
emails, and I do not understand his refusal to accept the nearly universal judgment that he was
mistaken.The Director was wrong to usurp the Attorney Generals authority on July 5, 2016,
and announce his conclusion that the case should be closed without prosecution. It is not the
function of the Director to make such an announcement. At most, the Director should have said
the FBI had completed its investigation and presented its findings to federal prosecutors. The
Director now defends his decision by asserting that he believed attorney General Loretta Lynch
had a conflict. But the FBI Director is never empowered to supplant federal prosecutors and
assume command of the Justice Department. There is a well-established process for other
officials to step in when a conflict requires the recusal of the Attorney General. On July 5,
however, the Director announced his own conclusions about the nations most sensitive criminal

8
It is believed the release was authorized pursuant to E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.7. Classification Prohibitions and Limitations: (a) In no case
shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in order to: (1) conceal violations of
law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; (3) restrain competition; or
(4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of the national security.
https://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/cnsi-eo.html
9
It appears from this Politico report that CHALUPA and her ties to the State Departments Tech Camp formed the basis for the fake
Russian Narrative. It also appears the U.S. Intelligence Community concealed this fake Russian Narrative connection from the
American public.
10 |
investigation, without the authorization of duly appointed Justice Department leaders.
Compounding the error, the Director ignored another longstanding principle: we do not hold press
conferences to release derogatory information about the subject of a declined criminal
investigation. His decision to announce the results of the investigation was made before the
uproar over Ms. [Loretta] Lynchs meeting with Mr. Clinton, according to a law enforcement
official. He decided to make his findings public, the official said, because he wanted to make the
F.B.I.s position clear before referring the case to the Justice Department.
Derogatory information sometimes is disclosed in the course of criminal investigations and
prosecutions, but we never release it gratuitously. The Director laid out his version of the facts for
the news media as if it were a closing argument, but without a trial. It is a textbook example of
what federal prosecutors and agents are taught not to do. The goal is to determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to justify a federal criminal prosecution, then allow a federal prosecutor
who exercises authority delegated by the Attorney General to make a prosecutorial decision, and
then - if prosecution is warranted - let the judge and jury determine the facts. Concerning his
letter to the Congress on October 28, 2016, the Director cast his decision as a choice between
whether he would "speak" about the decision to investigate the newly-discovered email messages
or "conceal" it. Comeys comments come from an exchange with California Senator Dianne
Fernstein during his May 3 testimony in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Conceal is a
loaded term that misstates the issue. When federal agents and prosecutors quietly open a criminal
investigation, we are not concealing anything; we are simply following the longstanding policy
that we refrain from publicizing non-public information. In that context, silence is not
concealment.... We should reject the departure and return to the traditions. The way the
Director handled the conclusion of the email investigation was wrong. As a result, the FBI is
unlikely to regain public and congressional trust until it has a Director who understands the
gravity of the mistakes and pledges never to repeat them. Having refused to admit his errors, the
Director cannot be expected to implement the necessary corrective actions.
06/18/2017 Investigative Journalist Lee Stranahan explains the connection between ALEXANDRA
CHALUPA, the DNC, Crowdstrike, Hillary Clinton, Ukraine and the fake Russian Narrative
all have ties to George Soros, the Atlantic Council, Susan Rice and others:

UNREAL: The real election interference scandal HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT, Published by Lee
Stranahan on June 22, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEjZ5gI9GaM;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q9W3QsO75mM

11 |
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q9W3QsO75mM;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ge3fYXXX_k;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ3Ssm3fonw

12 |
Published by Lee Stranahan on Jun 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rDoSxp4Oxss;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q9W3QsO75mM;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NaXEGn4sVno

Viktor Pinchuk, shown above, was born in Kiev, Ukraine and is on Forbess list of the wealthiest
persons in the world. Pinchuk reportedly donated $10-25 million dollars to the Clinton
Foundation between 1994 and 2005. Emails released by Judicial Watch showed that Pinchuk had
been invited to dine at Hillary Clintons home during her tenure at the State Department, despite
Clinton spokesmans previous denial that they had met during that time. Pinchuk is the second
son-in-law of former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Pinchuk. From 1960 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, Leonid Kuchma was a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). At
age 38, Kuchma became the Communist Party Chief at Yuzhny Machine-building Plant and a
member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He was a delegate of the
27th and 28th Congresses of the Communist Party of Soviet Union. Kuchma later became the
second President of independent Ukraine from July 19, 1994 to January 23, 2005.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonid_Kuchma

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or Soviet Union was a socialist state in
Eurasia that existed from 1922 to 1991. Prior to 1991, the Soviet economy was the second largest
in the world. By 1991, economic and political turmoil began to boil over, as the Baltic Republics
chose to secede from the Soviet Union. On March 17, 1991 a referendum was held, in which the
vast majority of participating citizens voted in favor of changing the Soviet Union into a renewed
federation. In August 1991, a coup dtat attempt by members of Mikhail Gorbachevs
government, directed against Gorbachev and aimed at preserving the Soviet Union, instead led to
the end of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. On December 25, 1991, the USSR was
dissolved into 15 post-Soviet States, creating the Russian Federation or Russia. On December
31, 1999, President Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned, handing the post to the recently appointed
Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, who then won the 2000 presidential election. Putins leadership
over the return of order, stability, and progress reportedly won him widespread admiration in
Russia.

13 |
On March 2, 2008, Dmitry Medvedev10 was elected President of Russia while Putin became
Prime Minister. Putin returned to the Presidency following the 2012 presidential elections held on
March 12, where his Party, United Russia, received 63.6% of the votes (46,602,075 votes),
while his closest competitor, the Communist Party, received 17.2% of the votes (12,318,353).
In 2014, after President Viktor Yanukovych of Ukraine fled as a result of a revolution, Putin
requested and received authorization from the Russian Parliament to deploy Russian troops to
Ukraine. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia

HELPFUL NOTES

1. GRAND JURY, Section 9-11.000, U.S. Attorneys Manual, Title 9: Criminal Resource Manual (CRM),
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-11000-grand-jury

A. 9-11.101 - Powers and Limitations of Grand JuriesThe Functions of a Grand


Jury.

While grand juries are sometimes described as performing accusatory and investigatory
functions, the grand jury's principal function is to determine whether or not there is probable
cause to believe that one or more persons committed a certain Federal offense within the venue
of the district court. Thus, it has been said that a grand jury has but two functionsto indict or,
in the alternative, to return a "no-bill." See Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal
Section 110.
At common law, a grand jury enjoyed a certain power to issue reports alleging non-criminal
misconduct. A special grand jury impaneled under Title 18 U.S.C. 3331 is authorized, on the
basis of a criminal investigation (but not otherwise), to fashion a report, potentially for public
release, concerning either organized crime conditions in the district or the non-criminal
misconduct in office of appointed public officers or employees. This is discussed at USAM 9-
11.300 and USAM 9-11.330, and the Criminal Resource Manual at 158-59. See Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 430 (1969); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). Whether a
regular grand jury enjoys a comparable authority to issue a report is a difficult and complex
question. Cf. United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975). The Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice should be consulte d before any grand jury report is initiated, whether by a
regular or special grand jury. See also USAM 9-11.330. https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-
11000-grand-jury#9-11.101

B. 9-11.120 - Power of a Grand Jury Limited by Its Function.


The grand jurys power, although expansive, is limited by its function toward possible return of
an indictment. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956). Accordingly, the grand jury
cannot be used solely to obtain additional evidence against a defendant who has already been
indicted. United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 250 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., Hurt
v. United States, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977). Nor can the grand jury be used solely for pre-trial
discovery or trial preparation. United States v. Star, 470 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1972). After
indictment, the grand jury may be used if its investigation is related to a superseding indictment
of additional defendants or additional crimes by an indicted defendant. In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, Dated January 2, 1985, 767 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Grand

10
Medvedev was a member of the Soviet Communist Party (before 1991); Independent (19912011); and United Russia (2011
present).
14 |
Jury Proceedings, 586 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1978). https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-11000-
grand-jury#9-11.120

2. NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.


https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2015-title50/html/USCODE-2015-title50-chap45-subchapV.htm

A. 50 U.S.C. 3381. Coordination of Counterintelligence Activities.

(a) Establishment of Counterintelligence Policy Board


There is established within the executive branch of Government a National Counterintelligence
Policy Board (in this section referred to as the Board). The Board shall report to the President
through the National Security Council.

(b) Chairperson
The National Counterintelligence Executive under section 902 of the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002 [50 U.S.C. 3382] shall serve as the chairperson of the Board.

(c) Membership
The membership of the National Counterintelligence Policy Board shall consist of the following:
(1) The National Counterintelligence Executive.
(2) Senior personnel of departments and elements of the United States Government, appointed by
the head of the department or element concerned, as follows:
(A) The Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(B) The Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(C) The Department of State.11
(D) The Department of Energy.
(E) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(F) Any other department, agency, or element of the United States Government specified by
the President.

(d) Functions and discharge of functions


(1) The Board shall
(A) serve as the principal mechanism for
(i) developing policies and procedures for the approval of the President to govern the conduct of
counterintelligence activities; and
(ii) upon the direction of the President, resolving conflicts that arise between elements of the
Government conducting such activities; and

(B) act as an interagency working group to

11
Hillary Clinton served as the 67th United States Secretary of State, under President Barack Obama, from January 21, 2009 to
February 1, 2013. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Secretaries_of_State_of_the_United_States On 07/06/2015, FBI HQ Receives
Section 811(c) Referral From Inspector General Intelligence Community (IGIC) Regarding Potential Compromise of Classified
Information Involving Former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clintons Emails Maintained on Private Server. On 07/15/2016, FBI
(WFO, CI-13) Documents an analysis of email communications between email accounts of Hillary Clinton, hdr22@clintonemail.com
and Huma Abedin, huma@clintonemail.com. Analysis of the emails provided to State Department by Hillary Clinton in December
2014 indicated huma@clintonemail.com was party to 2,598 total emails in the dataset. 32 were direct communications exclusively
between Clinton and Abedin and contained references to Benghazi, Libya, or Tripoli. (Authors Note: President Obama and
Hillary Clinton, by this law (50 U.S.C. 3381, et seq.), were mandatory participants in the National Counterintelligence Apparatus of
the United States. Was Hillary fired by President Obama in 2013 after they both learned she was the target of a criminal investigation
regarding her mishandling of classified information through her use of a private server?
15 |
(i) ensure the discussion and review of matters relating to the implementation of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002; and
(ii) provide advice to the National Counterintelligence Executive on priorities in the
implementation of the National Counterintelligence Strategy produced by the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive under section 904(e)(2) of that Act.1

(2) The Board may, for purposes of carrying out its functions under this section, establish such
interagency boards and working groups as the Board considers appropriate.

(e) Coordination of counterintelligence matters with Federal Bureau of Investigation


(1) Except as provided in paragraph (5), the head of each department or agency within the
executive branch shall ensure that

(A) the Federal Bureau of Investigation is advised immediately of any information, regardless of
its origin, which indicates that classified information is being, or may have been, disclosed in an
unauthorized manner to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) following a report made pursuant to subparagraph (A), the Federal Bureau of Investigation is
consulted with respect to all subsequent actions which may be undertaken by the department or
agency concerned to determine the source of such loss or compromise; and
(C) where, after appropriate consultation with the department or agency concerned, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation undertakes investigative activities to determine the source of the loss or
compromise, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is given complete and timely access to the
employees and records of the department or agency concerned for purposes of such investigative
activities.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (5), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
ensure that espionage information obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation pertaining to
the personnel, operations, or information of departments or agencies of the executive branch, is
provided through appropriate channels in a timely manner to the department or agency
concerned, and that such departments or agencies are consulted in a timely manner with respect
to espionage investigations undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation which involve the
personnel, operations, or information of such department or agency.
(3)(A) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the head of the
department or agency concerned a written assessment of the potential impact of the actions of the
department or agency on a counterintelligence investigation.

(B) The head of the department or agency concerned shall


(i) use an assessment under subparagraph (A) as an aid in determining whether, and under what
circumstances, the subject of an investigation under paragraph (1) should be left in place for
investigative purposes; and
(ii) notify in writing the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of such determination.

(C) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the head of the department or agency
concerned shall continue to consult, as appropriate, to review the status of an investigation
covered by this paragraph, and to reassess, as appropriate, a determination of the head of the
department or agency concerned to leave a subject in place for investigative purposes.
(4)(A) The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify appropriate officials within the executive
branch, including the head of the department or agency concerned, of the commencement of a
full field espionage investigation with respect to an employee within the executive branch.

16 |
(B) A department or agency may not conduct a polygraph examination, interrogate, or otherwise
take any action that is likely to alert an employee covered by a notice under subparagraph (A) of
an investigation described in that subparagraph without prior coordination and consultation with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(5) Where essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital national security interests
of the United States, the President may on a case-by-case basis waive the requirements of
paragraph (1), (2), or (3), as they apply to the head of a particular department or agency, or the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such waiver shall be in writing and shall fully
state the justification for such waiver. Within thirty days, the President shall notify the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives that such waiver has been issued, and at that time or as soon as
national security considerations permit, provide these committees with a complete explanation of
the circumstances which necessitated such waiver.
(6) Nothing in this section may be construed to alter the existing jurisdictional arrangements
between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Defense with respect to
investigations of persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, nor to impose
additional reporting requirements upon the Department of Defense with respect to such
investigations beyond those required by existing law and executive branch policy.
(7) As used in this section, the terms foreign power and agent of a foreign power have the
same meanings as set forth in sections 2 1801(a) and (b), respectively, of this title.
(Pub. L. 103359, title VIII, 811, Oct. 14, 1994, 108 Stat. 3455; Pub. L. 106120, title VI,
602, Dec. 3, 1999, 113 Stat. 1620; Pub. L. 106567, title VI, 605, Dec. 27, 2000, 114 Stat.
2853; Pub. L. 107306, title VIII, 811(b)(5)(B), title IX, 903, Nov. 27, 2002, 116 Stat. 2424,
2433; Pub. L. 108177, title III, 361(g), Dec. 13, 2003, 117 Stat. 2625; Pub. L. 108458, title I,
1071(g)(1), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3691.)

Codification. Section was formerly classified to section 402b of this title prior to editorial
reclassification and renumbering as this section.

B. 50 U.S.C. 3382. National Counterintelligence Executive.


(a) Establishment
(1) There shall be a National Counterintelligence Executive, who shall be appointed by the
Director of National Intelligence.
(2) It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should seek the views of
the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in
selecting an individual for appointment as the Executive.

(b) Mission
The mission of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be to serve as the head of
national counterintelligence for the United States Government.

(c) Duties
Subject to the direction and control of the Director of National Intelligence, the duties of the
National Counterintelligence Executive are as follows:
(1) To carry out the mission referred to in subsection (b) of this section.
(2) To act as chairperson of the National Counterintelligence Policy Board under section 3381 of
this title.
(3) To act as head of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under section
3383 of this title.

17 |
(4) To participate as an observer on such boards, committees, and entities of the executive
branch as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate for the discharge of the
mission and functions of the Executive and the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive under section 3383 of this title.
(Pub. L. 107306, title IX, 902, Nov. 27, 2002, 116 Stat. 2432; Pub. L. 108458, title I,
1072(d)(1)(B), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3693; Pub. L. 114113, div. M, title IV, 401(a), Dec.
18, 2015, 129 Stat. 2920.)
Codification. Section was formerly classified to section 402b of this title prior to editorial
reclassification and renumbering as this section.

C. 50 U.S.C. 3383. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.

(a) Establishment
There shall be an Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.

(b) Head of Office


The National Counterintelligence Executive shall be the head of the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive.

(c) Location of Office


The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be located in the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.

(d) Functions
Subject to the direction and control of the National Counterintelligence Executive, the functions
of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be as follows:

(1) National threat identification and prioritization assessment


Subject to subsection (e), in consultation with appropriate department and agencies of the United
States Government, and private sector entities, to produce a strategic planning assessment of the
counterintelligence requirements of the United States to be known as the National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment.
(2) National Counterintelligence Strategy
(A) Requirement to produce
Subject to subsection (e), in consultation with appropriate department and agencies of the United
States Government, and private sector entities, and based on the most current National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment under paragraph (1), to produce a strategy for the
counterintelligence programs and activities of the United States Government to be known as the
National Counterintelligence Strategy.
(B) Revision and requirement
The National Counterintelligence Strategy shall be revised or updated at least once every three
years and shall be aligned with the strategy and policies of the Director of National Intelligence.
(3) Implementation of National Counterintelligence Strategy
To evaluate on an ongoing basis the implementation of the National Counterintelligence Strategy
and to submit to the President periodic reports on such evaluation, including a discussion of any
shortfalls in the implementation of the Strategy and recommendations for remedies for such
shortfalls.
(4) National counterintelligence strategic analyses
As directed by the Director of National Intelligence and in consultation with appropriate
elements of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, to oversee and
18 |
coordinate the production of strategic analyses of counterintelligence matters, including the
production of counterintelligence damage assessments and assessments of lessons learned from
counterintelligence activities.
(5) National counterintelligence program budget
In consultation with the Director of National Intelligence
(A) to coordinate the development of budgets and resource allocation plans for the
counterintelligence programs and activities of the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other appropriate elements of the United
States Government;
(B) to ensure that the budgets and resource allocation plans developed under subparagraph (A)
address the objectives and priorities for counterintelligence under the National
Counterintelligence Strategy; and
(C) to submit to the National Security Council periodic reports on the activities undertaken by
the Office under subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(6) National counterintelligence collection and targeting coordination
To develop priorities for counterintelligence investigations and operations, and for collection of
counterintelligence, for purposes of the National Counterintelligence Strategy, except that the
Office may not
(A) carry out any counterintelligence investigations or operations; or
(B) establish its own contacts, or carry out its own activities, with foreign intelligence services.
(7) National counterintelligence outreach, watch, and warning
(A) Counterintelligence vulnerability surveys
To carry out and coordinate surveys of the vulnerability of the United States Government, and
the private sector, to intelligence threats in order to identify the areas, programs, and activities
that require protection from such threats.
(B) Outreach
To carry out and coordinate outreach programs and activities on counterintelligence to other
elements of the United States Government, and the private sector, and to coordinate the
dissemination to the public of warnings on intelligence threats to the United States.
(C) Research and development
To ensure that research and development programs and activities of the United States
Government, and the private sector, direct attention to the needs of the counterintelligence
community for technologies, products, and services.
(D) Training and professional development
To develop policies and standards for training and professional development of individuals
engaged in counterintelligence activities and to manage the conduct of joint training exercises for
such personnel.

(e) Additional requirements regarding National Threat Identification and Prioritization


Assessment and National Counterintelligence Strategy
(1) A National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment under subsection (d)(1), and
any modification of such assessment, shall not go into effect until approved by the President.
(2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under subsection (d)(2), and any modification of
such strategy, shall not go into effect until approved by the President.
(3) The National Counterintelligence Executive shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees each National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment, or modification
thereof, and each National Counterintelligence Strategy, or modification thereof, approved under
this section.
(4) In this subsection, the term "congressional intelligence committees" means
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
19 |
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(f) Personnel
(1) Personnel of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive may consist of
personnel employed by the Office or personnel on detail from any other department, agency, or
element of the Federal Government. Any such detail may be on a reimbursable or
nonreimbursable basis, at the election of the head of the agency detailing such personnel.
(2) Notwithstanding section 104(d) 1 or any other provision of law limiting the period of the
detail of personnel on a nonreimbursable basis, the detail of an officer or employee of United
States or a member of the Armed Forces under paragraph (1) on a nonreimbursable basis may be
for any period in excess of one year that the National Counterintelligence Executive and the head
of the department, agency, or element concerned consider appropriate.

(g) Treatment of activities under certain administrative laws


The files of the Office shall be treated as operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency for
purposes of section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431) [now 50 U.S.C.
3141] to the extent such files meet criteria under subsection (b) of that section for treatment of
files as operational files of an element of the Agency.

(h) Oversight by Congress


The location of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence shall not be construed as affecting access by Congress, or any
committee of Congress, to
(1) any information, document, record, or paper in the possession of the Office; or
(2) any personnel of the Office.

(i) Construction
Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the authority of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, or the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as provided or specified under the National
Security Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law.
(Pub. L. 107306, title IX, 904, Nov. 27, 2002, 116 Stat. 2434; Pub. L. 108458, title I,
1071(g)(2)(B), 1072(d)(1)(C), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3691, 3693; Pub. L. 111259, title IV,
412, Oct. 7, 2010, 124 Stat. 2725; Pub. L. 11218, title IV, 401, June 8, 2011, 125 Stat. 227;
Pub. L. 11287, title III, 311(b), Jan. 3, 2012, 125 Stat. 1886.)

References in Text. Section 104(d), referred to in subsec. (f)(2), is section 104(d) of Pub. L.
107306, title I, Nov. 27, 2002, 116 Stat. 2387, which is not classified to the Code.
The National Security Act of 1947, referred to in subsec. (i), is act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, 61
Stat. 495, which is classified principally to chapter 44 (3001 et seq.) of this title. For complete
classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.

Codification. Section was formerly classified to section 402c of this title prior to editorial
reclassification and renumbering as this section.

3. SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM. A subpoena duces tecum is a court summons ordering the recipient to
appear before the court and produce documents or other tangible evidence for use at a hearing or trial.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subpoena_duces_tecum
//////LAST ENTRY OF THIS REPORT///////////////////////////////////////

20 |