Delay in the delivery of detained persons

Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,[15] that

RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners, vs. HON.

ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of the
Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his capacity as
Deputy Ombudsman for Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE,
SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR.,
PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1
JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4
PEDRO PAREL, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 153524-25. January 31, 2005]

. . . The arresting officers duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper
judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that
he was not released. From the time of petitioners arrest at 12:00 oclock p.m. on
November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information against him for
murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.

But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8
was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official
holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for
his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to have him
act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and
have the order of commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty
of locating those officers and employees could very well compound the fiscals
difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that
Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first
office day following arrest.

Violently entered the house after being refused

Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. versus Bright Future Technologies, Inc. G.R. No. 169156 Feb 15, 2007
 As for the use of a bolt cutter to gain access to the premises of BFTI, it was,
under the circumstances, reasonable, contrary to the RTCs finding that it was
unnecessary. For, as the RTC itself found, after the members of the searching team
introduced themselves to the security guards of BFTI and showed them the search
warrants, the guards refused to receive the warrants and to open the premises, they
claiming that they are not in control of the case. The conditions required under
Section 7 of Rule 126 of the Criminal Procedure were thus complied with:

The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed

search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open
any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or
anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person
lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. (Underscoring
supplied)

[G.R. No. 141443. August 30, 2000]

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS :

AZUCENA L. GARCIA, petitioner.

However, it is equally well-settled that the writ will not issue where the person in whose
behalf the writ is sought is out on bail,i[9] or is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order.ii[10] In the case at bar, therefore, petitioner can no longer seek relief
via a petition for habeas corpus having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of
falsification of public document and use thereof. Said judgment is already final and
executory. Petitioner even discloses that entry of judgment was made on April 8, 1999,
or eight (8) months prior to the filing of this petition. The OSG has also pointed out that
petitioner is still out on bail. To this petitioner merely replied that: