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Citations http://ejc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/21/2/189
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Censorship in Contemporary Russian Journalism
in the Age of the War Against Terrorism
A Historical Perspective
Greg Simons and Dmitry Strovsky
A B S T R A C T
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been involved in talks with the authorities on the issue and in drawing up
industry guidelines for reporting on a terrorist act.
Key Words censorship, journalism, President Putin, Russian media,
terrorism
Introduction
Since the Soviet period, the Russian mass media system has undergone,
and is still undergoing, tremendous change. Some academics have argued
that there are still similarities and continuities between the old Soviet
system and the new post-Soviet media. Since the late Yeltsin era, there
has been mounting pressure on the level of editorial freedom the mass
media enjoy. A mixture or interplay between censorship and the cultural
traditions of society have become imprinted in real politics. The main
problem for the Russian press has always been that its content is affected
by certain cultural traditions.
Journalistic censorship and self-censorship can be regarded as an
embodiment of these traditions. Although censorship can be mostly
understood as a political phenomenon, it also has cultural origins and can
be traced back through the history of the country. Both censorship and
self-censorship are the reflections of the morality of a country elaborated
historically over a long period of time. This aspect is examined in this
article because it leads to a more precise understanding of the relationship
between real politics and the media.
One contemporary influence constraining and shaping media devel-
opment is Russias war on terrorism. In the aftermath of the infamous
apartment bombings in August 1999 over 1000 people have been killed
and many more physically and emotionally scarred by the spectre of
terrorism on Russian soil, not to mention the destruction of property and
the disruption caused to the normal functioning of society. The political,
social and economic costs have been considerable so far.
Russias war on terrorism has provided the authorities with ample
excuse to limit what is reported; such excuses though not necessarily an
exhaustive list include: protecting the work of the security forces in
combating terrorist activity, prohibiting the spread of terrorist propa-
ganda and protecting the victims of terrorist acts (and their families).
Numerous bills have been debated in the Duma on the issue of limiting
the activities of and the reporting by the mass media during an incident.
Senior representatives from the mass media have joined in talks with the
authorities on the issue and have been involved in drawing up industry
guidelines for reporting on a terrorist act.
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showing what you think or telling what you know (pers. comm., 12
October 2005). Dmitry identified three forms of censorship. The first
type is the classical form, where someone from outside your newspaper or
electronic media reviews your text before publication [this practice] was
dead in Russia long before the Soviet times ended, although officially
Glavlit1 was only shut down in 1990. . . . It is impossible to check the
80100 pages of every modern newspaper before it goes to print. No
office in the world can do it, so this censorship was only effective until the
middle of the 20th century.
The second type Dmitry referred to is editor censorship:
Some authors might argue this is the most common and sometimes the
worst kind of censorship, because it is active. Not only can you not write
what you think or what you know, you HAVE to write what your editor
wants. Your professional achievement is measured by your ability to satisfy
the editors tastes and sometimes preconceived notions. For example, in one
of the newspapers where I worked once we had to drop all work and write
nasty things about an airport where our editor-in-chief did not like the
service. When the newspaper is bought by some company, the editor
usually comes to his senses, but then their kind of censorship sets in.
The third type of censorship he coined institutionalized indirect
censorship:
If you write a certain thing, you wont be put in jail, but you will be
expelled from the Union of Journalists (Soviet or western), or you will be
denied accreditation at the presidents office. You may have problems
keeping your job or finding another one. This kind of censorship I
remember in Soviet times and see a lot of it in the West now. When two
German journalists were castigated by their colleagues for calling the
bombing of Yugoslavia a senseless crime, that was a good example. What
remain are difficulties getting accredited and problems for the publisher.
Under Putin, this third kind of censorship has become more widespread in
Russia, but it has not got any worse than in most western countries.
Self-censorship in the mass media, as a result of the threat of state
intervention, is neither a new nor solely Russian problem. Elliott et al.
(1983) noted that the constant threat of state intervention has realised
within the BBC an internal form of self-censorship, which acts as a
deterrent to the production of critical perspectives on Northern Ireland.
On 19 October 1988, the then home secretary, Douglas Hurd, announced
that the direct broadcasting of terrorist groups was to be prohibited; this
ban was lifted in 1994 (Elliott et al., 1983, cited in Stevenson, 1997: 61).
Scottish academic Brian McNair (1998) refers to this form of censorship
as moral-political censorship: it occurs when a government bans the
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SIMONS AND STROVSKY: CENSORSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
Pre-revolutionary development
An examination of Russian media history shows that journalistic
censorship and self-censorship have always existed. Compared to other
European countries, one peculiarity of Russia is its deep rooted
authoritarian tradition, which permeated all strata of the Russian
population through different customs and everyday routines. The
authoritarian tradition evolved, partly at least, as a consequence of the
extremely harsh living conditions people had to endure, which meant
that rather than survive independently, they had to rely upon a strong
leader. Furthermore, Russias immense territory, historically forced to
defend itself from incessant attacks from its numerous enemies, inevitably
led to a hierarchical political structure. The superior being at the apex of
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199
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indicate that the mass media are now being viewed as a potential threat
to the authorities.
To return to the subject of this article, how would this relate to mass
media reporting during Russias war on terrorism? Is it a case of the
authorities being worried about reports frightening or panicking the
Russian public? Could such reporting be construed as being provoca-
tion? Or is it, as some say, an attempt by the authorities to accumulate
further power via a legitimate excuse? Do these statements signify that
the state considers the pen to be mightier than the sword, or is it a case
of creating a legitimate pretext to crack down on the mass media
in Russia?
The Doctrine of Information Security was passed in 2000 and is an
important indication of how the new regime viewed information.
Although it was not a law, its importance lay in the fact that it hinted to
the public and the media industry the probable direction relations were
taking between the government and the mass media. It outlines the new
state thinking concerning the problem of information security from the
states point of view. In the preamble to the document, it states: The
doctrine of information security of the Russian Federation is the sum
total of official views concerning goals, tasks, principles and guidelines
for ensuring the information security of the Russian Federation (cited in
Nordenstreng et al., 2001: 251). These words, together with statements
on issues such as the preservation of spiritual values and patriotism, sent
a very clear message to the media industry. And the message seemed to be
that the state was going to be calling the shots in a new relationship
that demanded a media that would bend to the will of the authorities in
order to preserve Russias informational integrity.
Another incident had occurred, which also sent a clear signal to the
mass media as to the expectations of the authorities towards media
coverage of key events or issues. Putin appointed a key and trusted
Yeltsin aid to a critical PR post: Sergei Yastrzhembsky was put in charge
of managing all government information regarding the Chechen cam-
paign. Upon taking up his position, Yastrzhembsky made his expecta-
tions of the media very clear. In an interview he stated: when the nation
mobilises its forces to solve some task, [this] imposes obligations on
everyone, including the media (Belin, 2001: 336).
These two different approaches to the informational problem faced
by the authorities represent the dual aspects that exist in Russian society
the official and the unofficial sides. The official side is represented by
the Doctrine of Information Security: it offers a certain legitimacy as a
policy document, written down for all to see. It requires no special skills
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to interpret the meaning; it is implied that laws will be made on the basis
of its observations and assumptions. On the other hand, Yastrzhembskys
implied threat is representative of the unofficial aspect that exists. His
threat is levelled at uncooperative journalists, hinting that they will face
consequences, although there is no legal basis to impose such sanctions.
These two events signalled the beginning of a new approach to the
relationship between the mass media and the authorities.
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SIMONS AND STROVSKY: CENSORSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
Th re-emergence of self-censorship
A new age of self-censorship in Russian journalism has been gradually
emerging. The traditional form of self-censorship in the early post-
Soviet era was often founded upon journalists motivation to avoid
negative physical repercussions of their professional activities, such as
beatings and death threats (not to mention the cultural constraints). On
26 June 2001, the president of the International Press Institute, Johann
Fritz, spoke at the World Congress for Information Cooperation in
Moscow. In the course of his speech, Fritz raised the issue of self-
censorship in the Russian media. Self-censorship is widespread in the
regions as a result of physical attacks and threats against journalists, this
is an intolerable situation, and one that needs to be addressed in a serious
and constructive manner (International Press Institute, 2001).
A relatively new threat to the freedom of speech in the media has
appeared in Russia as a result of the so-called rule of law. A raft of legal
proposals and laws has been appearing in the Duma and Federation
Council, aimed at regulating news content. This has had a knock-on
effect and there is growing discussion of drawing up self-imposed
industry guidelines for the mass media on how to cover stories concerning
terrorism in a responsible manner. This may stem from a belief that it
is better to relinquish some rights voluntarily than to have them ripped
from your hands by someone else. The underlying reason may be a case of
damage control and survival on the part of the journalists, who may at
least have some measure of control over the process.
Some six months after the hostage taking at the Dubrovka Theatre,
the Convention on Counter-Terrorism appeared. The basis of this
convention was to lay down rules of conduct for journalists covering acts
of terrorism. It was a compromise, forced in an effort to prevent some
proposed harsh amendments to the Mass Media Law. An article from the
Convention on Counter-Terrorism asks journalists to pledge to be:
Mindful of the danger of terrorism and aware of the responsibility of
handling information in these conditions, [to] thereby voluntarily adopt
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the following set of rules of conduct and pledge to follow them in [their]
work. The document also states: The mass media must be aware that
hostages taken by terrorists are also hostages to the situation, which at a
certain stage turns into an instrument of pressure on public opinion
(Vyzhutovich, 2005).
During the Beslan siege, on 2 September 2004 members of the
Industrial Committee (which includes managers from 24 media outlets,
many of which are closely tied to the government) issued a press release
that reminded the media of their obligations under the Convention on
Counter-Terrorism. Many journalists did not agree or support the
agreement as they believed it to be a way to curtail the medias freedom
of speech. The address from the Industrial Committee read thus:
While elaborating and discussing this document, we proceeded from our
belief that the threat of terrorism should be used as grounds and
justification for imposing limits with regards to freedom of opinion and
freedom of the media. At the same time, being aware of the measure of
responsibility in working with information in these conditions, we propose
a range of acceptable restrictions and rules that we would willingly accept
stipulating that in extreme situations the rescue of people and the human
right to live are primary and take precedence over any other rights and
freedoms. (Haraszti, 2004: 5)
During his speech to a congress of information agencies in Moscow
on 24 September 2004, Putin endorsed the concept of self-regulation in
the media covering acts of terrorism: The information community itself
should develop such a model of work that will make the media an
effective instrument in the fight against terrorism and will rule out any,
even unintentional forms of assistance to terrorism. Information provided
by journalists should by no means harm victims of terrorist acts (Centre
for Journalism in Extreme Situations, 2004c). The notion of protecting
the rights and the psychological and physical welfare of the victims of
terrorism becomes linked to the idea that the media should become
actively involved in the fight against terrorism. Putin suggests that the
participation of the mass media be partly guided by and embodied in
the concept of self-regulation.
The state channels TV 1 and RTR followed a strict routine of self-
imposed guidelines in their coverage of the events at Beslan and the
aftermath. The explosions signalling the beginning of the battle in which
over 300 people were to die happened at 13:00 hours on 3 September
2004. NTV was the first channel, at 13:30, to start broadcasting events
live as they unfolded. TV 1 and RTR began to broadcast from 14:00.
Viktoria Arutyunova, adviser to the chairman of the All-Russian State
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Conclusion
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would clearly define and set out each partys obligations and responsibil-
ities (both the mass media industry and the authorities). Ideological
guidance is very much open to interpretation and abuse and under such
an administrative regime the media industry become responsible, but
only to the authorities. Under such uncertain circumstances, it is very
difficult for the mass media to achieve independent reporting. It
demands a certain level of self-censorship to ensure the survival of both
the individual journalist (for fear of their job security and to avoid
economic sanctions or physical punishment) and the media organization
(who wants to avoid being closed down for violation of the regulations or
being heavily fined).
Initially, stories that were fed to the media by the security services
seem to serve to create moral panic in Russian society. The enemy was
defined as being ruthless, Islamic and probably originating somewhere
from the Caucasus region. The enemy could strike anywhere and at any
time against any target, civilian or military. This strategy seemed to
create more harm than good for the authorities: it created the desired fear
factor in society against the terrorist threat, but introduced the
unpredictable element of human behaviour that is induced in a situation
when one has nothing to lose. Now stories seem to be more oriented to
settling societys frayed nerves with good news stories that give the
impression of progress in winning the war against terror.
The politics of self-censorship in the contemporary Russian mass
media seem to be closely aligned with the politics of ownership. Mass
media outlets have been considered more as a vehicle through which to
acquire political capital rather than a profit-making enterprise in its own
right. What appears and does not appear in the various mass media
outlets is an extension of this philosophy. Editorial loyalty of the
media staff to their owner is expected, and when it is not followed staff
can be forced to resign or accept the new rules. Media outlets that are
owned or under the influence of the state accept that there some issues
and subject matter that cannot be reported on. On the other hand, media
outlets that are positioned in the opposition camp (to the government)
will tackle issues that are potentially damaging for the governments
credibility and legitimacy. This is evident at times in the Moscow News,
which is owned by the besieged Yukos chief Mikhail Khodorkovsky and
where, unlike media under the sway of the state, he can make his voice
heard, and in newspapers that are still under the control of the oligarch
in exile Boris Berezovsky, such as Noviye Izvestia, Kommersant and
Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
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Notes
References
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