1

Death from the Above The Impact of British Air Control

 2

The First World War was a calamitous and historically profound event that impacted both

the countries that participated in it and those that didnt. While the war ultimately ended in

victory for the Allied powers, the settlement that concluded the war created fresh problems for

both victors and vanquished alike. Of particular interest is the wars effect on the most expansive

and influential of the allied powers, the British Empire. While the Empire emerged from the war

both victorious and at its peak expanse, the strains of the conflict and the settlement that emerged

at its close created a series of crises. Indeed, the Empires absorption of new responsibilities in

Africa and the Middle East coupled with new strains of nationalistic fervor in both its new and

old territories, created serious unrest in the immediate aftermath of the war. These complications

stretched thin the already strained financial and manpower resources of the British Empire. As a

result, British colonial administrators frantically searched for more efficient and cost effective

solutions for policing the Empire. What emerged from this process was a strengthened fixation

on utilizing technology developed during the war as a solution. In particular, the airplane came to

represent the new possibilities for maintaining order and control in the Empire. This fixation on

air power soon developed into a doctrine known as air control. This was essentially a method

that utilized aerial bombardment as a means of pacification in the edges and frontiers of the

Empire. The success of such methods ultimately led to a series of often intertwined results. For

one, the strategy of air control quickly became a formalized method of colonial control. This

development brought about an unprecedented degree of militarization with regard to colonial

policing. The successes of air control also led British military planners and politicians alike to

give greater credence to theories of bombing that were designed for application in European

continental wars. Of particular interest is the theory of strategic bombing. While this theory has

certainly been subject to variation by the diverse group of interwar air advocates who espoused
 3

it, strategic bombings core tenets remained consistent regardless of the theorist. The doctrine in

its most general form asserts that an enemy may be crippled or defeated through aerial attacks

that target either key political-economic resources or morale or both1. While the credibility of

such theories would ultimately be questioned during the early years of World War II, it is clear

that air control tactics of the 1920s and 30s played an important role in their formulation. This

interplay is not surprising as many strategic bombing theorists had also been advocates of air

control in colonial territories. However, the connection between the two clearly distinct strategies

and contexts reveals much about how air power advocates and the British military in general,

perceived their roles within the scheme of empire. British civilian and military officials

conducted their affairs with the clear understanding that they were inherently superior to their

colonial subjects, particularly those who were not white. While this racist belief was not always

explicit by this time, it was certainly inherent in the way these military officials created and

sanctioned strategies including iterations of air control and strategic bombing.

The settlements that ended the First World War granted the Allies a number of new

territories, many of which were formerly under German or Ottoman ownership. For Britain,

these territories ranged from parts of Eastern and Southwestern Africa to islands in the Pacific.

Most relevant to this discussion however, are those territories in the Middle East granted to the

British Empire, specifically the new mandates of Iraq and Palestine. These territories in

particular, contained a number of diverse and disparate ethnic groups ranging from Arab and

Kurdish Muslims to newly arriving Jewish immigrants. This immediate state of affairs in itself

already made for a volatile situation for the newly arriving British administrators. In addition, it

is necessary to consider the birth and strengthening of nationalistic movements around the world

1
J.E. Johnson, Full Circle, The Story of Air Fighting (London: Ghatto and Windus, 1964), 99.
 4

and throughout the British Empire and their impact on colonial order. While nationalism had

been a dominant force in European politics and social life throughout the 19th century, its

presence outside of the continent developed at a much slower pace. The events of the First World

War however, served to galvanize many of these movements, especially the collapse of a number

of multiethnic empires such as the Russian and Ottoman Empires. The end of the unifying force

of Ottoman rule in the Middle East fostered an increasing sense of Arab identity in regions such

as Palestine, Lebanon and Arabia. This effect would lay the foundations for a series of violent

uprisings and conflicts in the region during the interwar period. A parallel process occurred in

Europe with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Balkans. Furthermore, the

dissemination of nationalist principles during the war, such as U.S. President Woodrow Wilsons

Thirteen Points further encouraged the growth of nationalistic movements around the world. A

final general factor influencing nationalistic movements was the experience of the war itself. The

participation of the various colonies and realms of the British Empire in the conflict created

experiences of national unity. Such was the case with Australian participation in the Gallipoli

Campaign and with Indian participation in the Middle Eastern campaign. Both events were

considered baptisms of fire that created a unique identity for each respective group. While

dominions of the British Empire such as Australia and Canada were allowed to accelerate their

bids for greater independence, other colonies such as India and Britains new Middle Eastern

mandates were denied access to such a process. As such, energized nationalistic sentiment in

these areas often took the form of increased unrest and outright violence against the

government2.

2
Timothy Parsons, The Second British Empire: in the Crucible of the Twentieth Century (London: Rowan &
Littlefield, 2014), 37-38.
 5

While British administrators were fully aware of the adverse consequences that resulted

from their new territories and rejuvenated nationalism, they also understood the financial and

logistical constraints that limited their ability to respond to these new threats. The war had cost

Britain dearly; by its end, Britains role as the worlds leading investor had been reversed as the

country now become the worlds biggest debtor. Furthermore, by 1919 the British government

had accumulated a debt of 7.4 billion, a massive increase from the 1914 national debt of 650

million. A 1921 treasury report titled Reduction of Public Expenditure illustrates Britains dire

financial situation with the following:

So far as can be seen at present the ordinary revenue of the State in 1922-23 even if no

taxation is remitted in that year, is not likely to exceed 950,000,000. Against this sum

there must be set in the first place not less than 365,000,000 for Debt (interest only)

and other Consolidated Fund Services, and in the second place a substantial sum, not

less than 100,000,000 to meet already existing contractual liabilities to holders of

particular War Loans and some part of the debt maturing for payment in 1922-23. These

amounts contain no provision for reducing the Floating Debt maturing from day to day,

or for a proper sinking fund for War Loans generally; but it will be seen that even on the

minimum provision, 465,000,000 out of the ordinary revenue of 950,000,000 is

accounted forIt is therefore, clear that very drastic steps must be taken to reduce

expenditure by 1922-23.3

These newly recognized financial constraints forced the British government to do everything it

could to reduce costs, including the initiation of speedy demobilization. This process led to a

3
Reduction of Public Expenditure, May 13th, 1921, Churchill College, Colonial Office Correspondence, CHAR
2017/23, 17-5
 6

reduction in British military strength from a wartime high of 3.5 million men to 370,000 men by

19214. While this demobilization did much to ease the aforementioned financial constraints, the

process ultimately clashed with the new responsibilities of the Empire. With uprisings erupting

in the Middle East and nationalistic tensions flaring in Ireland and India, Britain could scarcely

afford to reduce its military forces. The Empire was also committed to territories outside of its

jurisdiction including garrisons on the Rhine and deployments in the former Ottoman capital of

Constantinople. These burdens were exacerbated by the refusal of the dominions to provide

military forces for purposes of colonial policing, especially in light of the heavy sacrifices they

made during the war5. The instability that followed the war and the Empires financial and

logistical constraints in dealing with this issue was a crossroads in terms of its military and

colonial strategy. This postwar period can be characterized as the convergence of the problems

of nationalism, newly acquired territories and wartime debt with its accompanying logistical

constraints. While Britains overseas responsibilities increased considerably, its means of

sustainment had clearly declined by a large degree. This convergence forced the administrators

and leaders of the Empire to conduct a comprehensive consideration of their options for

maintaining order.

Discussion of Britains perilous post war situation allows us to contextualize the

Empires rapid adoption of a completely novel method of colonial control. One must consider

that most high ranking British military commanders of the period had reached middle age well

before the first airplane took to the air. Indeed, the Royal Air Force itself had only just been

established in 1918, although its predecessor, the Royal Flying Corps had been active since

4
Parsons, The Second British Empire, 64.
5
Parsons, The Second British Empire, 64.
 7

1912. Considering the precarious financial and logistical situation of the Empire and the recent

debut of large scale air warfare, it was almost inevitable that aircraft would become part of

postwar debates on the Empires new commitments. Airpower had early on been considered a

cost effective alternative for imperial defense and colonial policing. Indeed, their successful

deployment during the Third Anglo Afghan War, less than a year after the end of the Great War,

indicated to many the potential of this new weapon6. Author Keith Jeffery summarizes this cost

and efficiency appeal with a particular focus on the thoughts of then colonial secretary Winston

Churchill: Churchill seems quickly to have been persuaded that the use of the RAF for imperial

policing might both promote strategic efficiency and provide much needed relief on his

departmental estimatesin reply to a plea for economy from the Chancellor of the Exchequer,

he bluntly asserted that he was going to consider the broad problem of military spending in India

so as to make the air play its true part in relieving the expensive men we shall have in the future

to keep across the seas.7 Furthermore, air advocates often translated the efficiency of air power

into a variety of other theories. Most notable was the idea that air control could be a clean or

even humane option of policing, one that didnt require deploying ground troops. Author

Michelle Haapamaki summarizes this view with the following:

Not only was air power viewed as a budgetary panacea, but from the British

perspective it was envisioned as a means of achieving war objectives with as few

warriors as possible, and those far removed from their targets. At least in theory, it

promised to be a cleaner option than putting boots on the ground in modern

6
Andrew M. Roe, Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden, 1849-1947 (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2010), 5.
7
Keith Jeffrey, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, 1918-1922 (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1984), 68.
 8

parlanceit was the ideal solution for the prodigious military requirements of a nation

still shocked by the infantry losses of the First World WarIn fact, bombing could

actually be construed as the most humane method of policing due to the grave

terrorizing of civilian populations8

We see from such analyses that the origins of air control were painted not just by potential

economy and efficiency but also by the understanding of fear and the belief in the demoralizing

effects of air attack. Such fears had materialized well before the First World War in books such

as R.P Hearnes Airships in War and Peace, published in 19109 as well as H.G Wells 1908

publication The War in the Air10. These postulations of fear and morale would continue to be

discussed well after air control had been effectively implemented. As noted, discussions on the

potential of air control ultimately encompassed a wide variety of often interconnected motives

and reasons. These varied motives are best summarized by Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, a figure

who is more or less considered the father of the Royal Air Force. In a memo written in 1932

describing his first ideas on air control, Trenchard states the following:

When I came to study the application of Air to the defense of this Empire and the

dangers it brought to this country in its defense I had to consider how it would be

financially possible to meet these new dangers without adding an impossible burden

over and above the cost of the Navy and Army. I asked myself whether we could not

8
Michelle Haapamaki, The Coming of the Aerial War: Culture and the Fear of Airborne Attack in Inter-War Britain
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 41.
9
R.P Hearne, Airships in Peace and War (London: John Lane Company, 1910), 3-205.
10
H.G Wells, The War in the Air and Particularly How Mr. Bert Smallways Fared While it Lasted (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1907), 1-179.
 9

utilize the Air in the humane and economical control of the wild and semi-civilized

tribes on whom as a last resort we have from time to time had to apply force.11

Trenchards characterization of policing through aerial bombardment as humane is

interesting when juxtaposed with his depiction of its targets as wild and semi-civilized.

Discourse on bombing strategy would increasingly make an unspoken distinction between

those foes who were civilized and uncivilized, in other words, European and non-

European.

One of the first applications of air control was initiated in 1916 in the Northwestern

frontier region of British India. This region, now known as the Federally Administered Tribal

Areas of Pakistan and also known as Waziristan, was and still is occupied by a number of

Pashtun tribes. These tribes had been a nuisance to the British since at least the mid-19th century;

tribes such as the Wazirs, and Mahsuds had harassed the British by stealing cattle, looting, and

kidnapping and ransoming British citizens. Punitive expeditions to suppress the tribes had

always run into challenges including the rough, mountainous terrain and the use of hit and run

guerilla tactics by the tribesmen of the region. These expeditions were also costly and drained

significant resources from the British Indian army12. In summarizing these problems, Trenchard

notes that the tribesmen live in a country full of caves and natural cover in which they can with

little difficulty secrete both themselves and their flocks. Many of them also are nomadic and

even to those who are not, a temporary move of themselves and their belongings is not a very

11
Hugh Trenchard to Maurice Hankey, August 1932, Hugh Trenchard Papers, Churchill Archives Center, Churchill
College, GBR/0014/TREN
12
Roe, Waging War in Waziristan, 15-60.
 10

serious undertaking.13 As such, airpower was seen early on as a potential method through which

this problem could be dealt with.

Air control in India was for the most part, successful in achieving its goals. Air Marshal

Trenchard, summarizes the application of aircraft in this Northwestern Frontier with the

following:

I would ask you to remember that these large column operations on the frontier of

India only came to an end after the Third Afghan War in 1919 and that the reason was

that the use of air forces took their place. In no single case since the Air was first

successfully used have warlike operations on any but the smallest scale taken place

beyond the administered frontier except by air. During the Northwest Frontier

operations in 1897 to 1898, to punish the Afridis and Orakzais cost us over 300 lives

besides many thousands of cases of sickness. In 1930, when from all accounts the

disturbances were far more widespread and potentially serious, during six months of

operations only two lives were lost among all the air squadrons engaged. In 1908 we

had to send a Division against the Mohmand tribes and we lost over 50 killed and 200

woundedin a month of operations and at a cost of over 140,000. In 1927 against the

same tribes we achieved our object by air operations in two days at a cost of 1,700 and

without the loss of a single British life. These are only two instances of the revolution

which aircraft have brought about in the methods of policing the Empire.14

13
Hugh Trenchard, Employment of Aircraft on the North-West Frontier of India (1924), 2.
14
Hugh Trenchard to Maurice Hankey, August 1932, Hugh Trenchard Papers, Churchill Archives Center, Churchill
College, GBR/0014/TREN.
 11

As noted by Trenchard, the speed and firepower that air control applied in this region was

unprecedented for both the tribesmen and colonial administration. The formalization of this new

form of policing is evident in a number of documents, most comprehensive of which is a 1924

directive, authored by Trenchard himself, titled Employment of Aircraft on the North-West

Frontier of India. In describing the initial attacks to be launched on hostile tribesmen, it states

that

The first attack should be made with the maximum available strength and at the most

favorable and unexpected moment. Early dawn or late evening will probably ensure the

greatest concentration of animals in and around the villages, and it is on this first attack

and those which immediately follow it that the greatest hope of inflicting casualties is

centered. The bombs used therefore should be man killing and machine guns should

be used against any movement. Incendiary bombs may also be used with good effect at

this stage against villages and ripe crops in order that maximum damage may be

doneThe height from which bombardment is carried out will vary with the types of

aircraft, and the scheme of attack must provide for the safety from bombardment by

higher flying aircraft of those aeroplanes which are attacking from a low height with

machine gun fire.15

The use of words such as bombardment, man killing, and the referencing of specialized

military weapons such as incendiary bombs does well to demonstrate the inherently militarized

nature of air policing. Furthermore, the mere presence of such formal documents indicates that

air control in India, having been initiated in 1916, was well established and grounded as official

policy by the early 1920s. As such, the speedy formalization of bombing as a peacetime security

15
Trenchard, Employment of Aircraft on the North-West Frontier of India, 5.
 12

measure can be understood as an unprecedented militarization of colonial policing. While air

control in India was at least somewhat successful, its rapid adoption was influenced by factors

that went beyond tangible results.

Despite the air forces significant role in the suppression of border revolts, its established

niche in frontier warfare was almost always at odds with the Indian Army. Indeed, Indian Army

commanders made consistent and considerable attempts to diminish the role of the air force in

policing operations. In understanding the role of air control in the greater scheme of interwar

bombing, it is necessary therefore to analyze a scenario where the air force was not only

prioritized over ground forces but also considered as a wholesome substitute. Of particular

importance to our analysis is the early establishment of an air control scheme in the British

Mandate of Iraq. Discussions on the use of air control in Iraq had been conducted well before the

end of the First World War, particularly once victory over the Ottoman forces was seen as

inevitable. Influential figures such as Air marshal Trenchard and colonial secretary Churchill

were in agreement that the RAF could serve as a cost effective means of policing the new

Mesopotamian mandate and its restive population. The most substantive discussion regarding air

control in Iraq, and the one that ultimately formalized it, can be pinpointed to the Cairo

Conference of March 1921. This conference was a series of meetings by British officials that

aimed to formalize policy in the new mandates. The problem of establishing order at as low of a

cost as possible was the centerpiece of this discussion. Author Christopher Catherwood describes

the Conference with the following: What we now call the Cairo Conference opened on 12

March 1921, presided over by Churchill himself. He had arrived in Egypt two days earlier and

had already had talks with both T.E. Lawrence and two leading members of the RAF: Lord

Trenchard and Sir John Salmond, the Air Officer Commanding in the Middle East; for without
 13

the assurance of airpower that could transform the military situation in Mesopotamia, Churchills

desire to save Lloyd George serious millions would not be possibleThe assembly was divided

into two committees one to discuss the political issues, the other the militaryThe main aim of

both committees was to figure out how to save as much money as possible.16 Catherwood

further emphasizes this motive by citing the following discussion at the Conference between

Daily Mail editor Thomas Marlowe and Churchill:

At lunch, Winston was asked by Mr. Marlowe what was his objection to us clearing

out of Mesopotamia altogetherChurchill replied that it was only because it would be

disgraceful for us to do so. We have undertaken liabilities, turned out the Turks, and we

cannot turn our backs on it all. All we can do is to reduce the cost of our liabilities to the

lowest possible point.17

Correspondence from the British colonial office, specifically letters from Churchill,

evidences the origins of Iraqi air control as a means of substituting ground troops and

reducing costs. These letters demonstrate the central role that aerial policing held in the

minds of those at the Conference. In a letter written just after the Cairo Conference,

Churchill states that

This (air force scheme) should become effective as from October 1st, 1922, when an

Air Officer will be appointed C-in-C under the Colonial Office in Mesopotamia. During

this interim period the 8 battalion scheme will continue: but it is necessary that all staffs

should be cut down. (I wonder if you realize the extraordinary scales which are now

16
Christopher Catherwood, Churchill's Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq (New York: Carroll &
Graf, 2004), 128.
17
Catherwood, Churchills Folly, 163.
 14

contemplated by the War Office, i.e. a 12 battalion scheme to cost 10 millions, nearly a

million a year per battalion, nearly 1000 a year per infantry solider irrespective of

color!) On the introduction of the Air Force regime in October 1922 four battalions only

of infantry will be required.18

In addition, evidence appears to indicate that formal air control policies in Iraq were initiated by

both the belief that the region would serve as an excellent training ground for the new RAF and

by the pressures of finding deployments to keep the newly created service alive. Catherwood

notes that Iraq was an ideal training area for the new Royal Air Force nurtured since its birth

and consistently supported by Churchill and, as the committee concurred, RAF control in Iraq

would provide the means of fulfilling the vital necessity of preparing and training an Air Force

adequate to Britains needs in war, the importance of testing the potentialities of the Air Force,

the need for giving its superior officers and staffs the experience of independent command and

responsibility, and the provision of an All Red military and commercial air route to India.19

The fact that British officials intended to use a colonial environment to test and develop

bombing strategies and doctrines for a European war makes for an interesting connection

between the two rather different contexts; this is a link that we will return to shortly. A final

factor that influenced the decision to install an air control regime in Iraq was topography.

Author Priya Satia notes that

experts deemed Mesopotamia particularly suitable for air operations, better than

Europe, for aesthetic as much as topographical reasons: its presumed flatness promised

many landing grounds, little cover to insurgents, and the possibility of radiating
18
Winston Churchill to Geoffrey Salmond, August 2, 1921, Colonial Office Correspondence, Churchill Archives
Center, Churchill College, CHAR 2017/23, 17-8.
19
Catherwood, Churchills Folly, 137.
 15

British power throughout the country from a handful of fittingly spartan bases, while the

reality of its varied and protean topography, when acknowledged, was held to offer

ideal training for the RAF, exposing it to every sort of terrain mountains in Kurdistan,

marshes in the South, riverain territory in between, and so forth.20

It didnt take long for British officials to realize that air control was as predicted, a

particularly effective scheme in Iraq. A letter from Trenchard to the 1st Baron Maurice Hankey

which refers to the suppression of Kurdish rebels states the following: Operations were carried

out in Iraq a year ago which were brilliantly successful and saved a very dangerous situation, and

it was owing to the way in which they were carried out and the effort of the Air arm that serious

losses were avoided.21 The success of the scheme could be attributed to a number of factors

including the speed and flexibility of aircraft and the terrain of Iraq. Author Malcolm Smith

states that The success of Air Control lay in the fact that retaliation was virtually impossible.

The natural shelter of deserts and mountains, which had made the operations of the Army

punitive column so costly and drawn-out, no longer provided safety for rebels. Punishment, by

the new method, could be meted out speedily and the trouble thus kept localizedit was indeed

speed and unpredictability of attack which was the key to the success of Air Control.22

General Aylmer Haldane, an officer of the British garrison in Iraq, corroborates this assertion

with the following excerpt from a letter: I heard from Sir Percy Cox this morning that the

Muntefiq sheiks, who were defying the Government, had come to their senses after the bombing

20
Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britains Covert Empire in the
Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 241.
21
Hugh Trenchard to Maurice Hankey, May 18, 1924, Hugh Trenchard Papers, Churchill Archives Center,
Churchill College, GBR/0014/TREN.

22
Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 29.
 16

they have received. This is satisfactory as they are impossible to reach on land except with forces

stronger than I have available.23 As was the case in the Northwestern Frontier, the success of air

control in Iraq led to its continued usage right into the Second World War. The rapid

formalization and continued usage of this scheme, coupled with a parallel arrangement in India,

could be seen as a significant step in the militarization of British colonial policing Satia explains

this with the following: What was permissible only in wartime in advanced countries turned out

to be always permissible in Iraq. In his description of the admittedly appalling bombing in Iraq,

Thomson acknowledged that there things happened which, if they happened before the World

War, would have been undoubtedly acts of war. It was thus that the RAF alone among the

armed services maintained its war-time spirit in this periodMilitarism was thus being

perpetuated at precisely the moment that it had become marginalized as a political program and

the myth of Britain as a uniquely peaceable kingdom had taken root.24

The formalized strategy of air control did much to change the nature of colonial policing. Its

wholehearted implementation thoroughly militarized policing which now could be conducted

with unprecedented speed and firepower. As one of the few instances of air warfare during the

interwar period, it is interesting to see how this policy impacted air theory for an all-out war

between other industrialized powers. While the experiences of the First World War did much to

paint the perceptions of interwar air power advocates, it is highly likely that the actual experience

gained from air control played a significant role in influencing such theories including early

conceptions of strategic bombing. A particular aspect of strategic bombing that bears striking

resemblance to policies of air control is the assumption that air warfare can be conducted in a

23
Aylmer Haldane to Winston Churchill, Colonial Office Correspondence, Churchill Archives Center, Churchill
College, CHAR 2017/23, 17-5

24
Satia, Spies in Arabia, 248.
 17

precise and limited manner. One can see the parallels between precision bombing of specific

dwellings and economic resources in air control and precision bombing of munitions factories in

strategic bombing theory. Successful surgical strikes in territories policed by air control were

very much the exception, especially considering the typically adverse conditions of these

regions. Despite this, their inclusion in official policing doctrine and the fact that they were

consistently attempted seems to indicate that they were very much a part of the strategy of air

control. The RAFs first doctrine manual, produced in 1922 and known as CD 22 noted that In

operations against fanatical tribes the commander should bear in mind that a single attack on a

sacred town or shrine will probably have the desired effect without further action In these

attacks, endeavour should be made to spare the women and children as far as possible, and for

this purpose a warning should be given, whenever practicable.25 In describing precision

bombing in the policing of Waziristan, former Air Marshal and air control veteran John Slessor,

states that

in point of fact bombing was never indiscriminate; even with the relatively primitive

equipment of the nineteen twenties and early thirties it was surprisingly accurate.

Thanks to vertical and oblique aerial photography, it was theoretically possible for

pilots to identify not only each village and hamlet but also an individual dwelling for

attack...For example during an operation in March 1932 it was considered necessary to

destroy the house of one of these priestly fire-brands, the Haji of Turangzai. It was a

particularly difficult target, lying as it did at the foot of a very steep hill...Selected crews

dived down the hill-side and bombed from about a hundred feet, the gunners firing the

25
Air Ministry, Operations Manual, Royal Air Force (provisional) (1922), 128.
 18

while to keep down the heads of enemy sharp-shooters. Eighteen 230 lb bombs were

dropped scoring ten direct hits on the Hajis house, and no other damage was done.26

The similarities between this sort of precision bombing in frontier regions and surgical strikes in

a European context can be seen in Trenchards correspondence regarding theories of strategic

bombing. In describing the role of the air force during a European war, Hugh Trenchard notes

the following:

I suggest it would be possible to arrange that on the outbreak of war we should ask for,

and ourselves give in return, an undertaking that only the great munitions factories and

the controlling centers of military operations would be attacked; and then we could see

that these were cleared out from the great towns or, at the least, that the people living

near them were moved. I see no reason why the attacks on these great munition works

should result in loss of life to civilians in the future. Greater accuracy with bombing is

being achieved from year to year and it should be possible to arrange protection for the

workpeople in the docks and arsenals.27

For Trenchard and others, strategic bombing had the potential to be not only precise and surgical

but also humane. In another letter, Trenchard notes that

No one knows more than I how necessary it is to prevent, if we can, the bombing of

London or Paris, or other big cities in the interest of civilization, but as one who has

26
John Slessor, The Central Blue The Autobiography of Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the RAF (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), 66.

27 Hugh Trenchard to Maurice Hankey, August 1932, Hugh Trenchard Papers, Churchill Archives Center, Churchill
College, GBR/0014/TREN.
 19

helped build up the Air Force I would say that I cannot pass by the implication that I

have been building up a more inhumane weapon of war than others. I, on the contrary,

can sincerely claim that in the past all my efforts have been to reduce the expenditure of

life and money on war.28

Trenchards depiction of precise strategic bombing as a method to reduce death and destruction

bear interesting parallels to his previously noted description of air control as humane and

economical control of the wild and semi-civilized tribes.29 Evidence indicates that the advocates

of air control did indeed aim to be as humane as possible. Roe notes the following with regard to

air control in Waziristan, again citing Slessor:

Although offensive action, like punitive expeditions, was criticized by some senior

British officials in India as being brutal and indiscriminate, Sir John Slessor, marshal of

the royal Air Force, argued that its routine employment was carefully controlled and

more restricted than other forms of punishment.villages were not allowed by the

regulations to be bombed without special permission and the usual period of

warning.despite poor levels of literacy, tribes were warned of an impending

operation by a colored leaflet, written in Pushtu.30

In his autobiography, Slessor clarifies this with the following:

The Air Method was often criticized on the score that it was brutal and caused

particular resentment on the part of its victims.That meaningless phrase

indiscriminate bombing was constantly deployedThere was no truth whatever in

28 Hugh Trenchard to Maurice Hankey, August 1932, Hugh Trenchard Papers, Churchill Archives Center, Churchill
College, GBR/0014/TREN.
29 Hugh Trenchard to Maurice Hankey, August 1932, Hugh Trenchard Papers, Churchill Archives Center, Churchill
College, GBR/0014/TREN.

30
Roe, Waging War in Waziristan, 131.
 20

the charges of brutality or of special suffering imposed on women and children, and

there is no evidence that air action created special resentment or rancor - indeed the

reverse was the truth. We went out of our way to minimize the loss of life and human

suffering that is inevitable in any form of warfare.31

Indeed, for most military and government officials, attacks on non-combatants were generally

seen as inhumane or at the very least, unappealing towards public opinion. In a letter to

Trenchard discussing an alleged aerial attack on women and children, Winston Churchill states

that:

I cannot refrain from saying, however, that I am extremely shocked at the reference to

the bombing which I have marked in red. If it were published it would be regarded as

most dishonouring to the Air Force and prejudicial to our work and use of them. To fire

willfully on women and children taking refuge in a lake is a disgraceful act, and I am

surprised you do not order the officers responsible for it to be tried by court martial. If

such a thing became public it would ruin the air project which you have in view. By

doing such things we put ourselves on the lowest level. Combatants are fair game and

sometimes non-combatants get injured through their proximity to fighting troops, but

this seems to be quite a different matter.32

The uncanny parallels between air control and strategic bombing considerations indicate

some degree of continuity between the two. It appears that the belief in bombing as a precise

31
Slessor, The Central Blue, 67.

32
Winston Churchill to Hugh Trenchard, July 22, 1922, Hugh Trenchard Papers, Churchill Archives Center,
Churchill College, GBR/0014/TREN.
 21

and humane way to wage war carried over from air control doctrine to strategic bombing

theory.

As noted in the past sections, air control had already been established as an effective and

decisive means of inducing surrender and submission through rapid applications of firepower.

While a significant degree of interwar strategic bombing rhetoric focused on the ability of

aircraft to humanely launch precise attacks at specific and key military targets, this focus was

quickly overshadowed by another key aspect: fear. As previously mentioned, the potential ability

of aerial warfare to inspire fear and civil collapse amongst a civilian population was well

established even before the First World War. The experiences of bombing during the Great War

no doubt strengthened belief in this aspect of strategic bombing. Evidence from the interwar

period indicates that colonial air control likely had the same effect, perhaps even a bigger one

because of its concurrence with the development of formal strategic bombing doctrine. For one,

observers of air control made clear that deterrence through fear was one of the main reasons for

the success of the tactic. Indeed, General Haldane, commander of British forces in Mesopotamia

noted in a 1921 memo to colonial secretary Winston Churchill that:

The sheikhs and their followers, they seem to think will more likely become passive

resisters as regards payment of taxes than actually take up arms as they did last year.

The leading men to whom I spoke appreciate the fact that they gained nothing and lost a

good deal in last years risingThey dread aeroplanes but do not seem to resent the fact

that women and children are accidently killed by bombsI am inclined to think that a
 22

few visits by Air Force if they take place promptly will bring passive register to his

senses33

Air control manuals also seem to have embodied the belief that fear was the principal

instrument through which the method garnered success. The previously mentioned CD 22,

stated the following in a chapter titled Aircraft in Warfare Against an Uncivilised Enemy:

In the case of certain nomadic tribes the force in the field and the home town or camp

maybe synonymous. This will present an easy victory to the commander, the destruction

of both at the same time creating a moral effect which should result in the almost

immediate collapse of the enemyThe susceptibility of a savage enemy to moral

influences is an important factor in the campaign.34

As with Trenchards discussion of air control, CD22 readily describes the targeted tribesmen

with pejorative terms, in this case depicting them as savage. There exists a clear distinction

between these foes and those on the European continent. Interestingly enough, these discussions

of morale in a colonial context closely mirror contemporary discussion on bombing strategies in

a European war. During the interwar period and at the beginning of the Second World War,

strategic bombing advocates placed heavy emphasis on the morale effect of heavy bomber raids.

In a 1941 paper titled The Development and Employment of the Heavy Bomber Force, Lord

Charles Portal, the commander in chief of Britains bomber command, stated that

33
Aylmer Haldane to Winston Churchill, November 24, 1921, Colonial Office Correspondence, Churchill Archives
Center, Churchill College, CHAR 2017/23, 17-5

34
Air Ministry, Operations Manual, Royal Air Force, 129.
 23

With regard to the employment of the heavy bomber force, the Chiefs of Staff have

further agreed that the weakest point in the German war machine is the morale of the

civil population and in particular of the industrial workersIn highly industrial

countries such as Germany and England it is in thickly populated towns that the morale

effect of bombing will be chiefly feltThe conclusion is that the morale of the country

as a whole will crack provided that a high enough proportion of town dwellers is

affected by the general dislocation produced by bombing.35

As demonstrated, the impact of morale was clearly understood as a critical factor in strategic

bombing. Trenchard himself, as a proponent of both air control and strategic bombing, famously

asserted that the morale effect of bombing was twenty times that of its physical effects.36 Such an

estimate begs the question of how Trenchard and other air power advocates were formulating

their understandings of strategic bombing and morale. Indeed, with the exception of the early

experience of World War I and the later experience of the Spanish Civil War, the only major

bombing operations that these theorists could look towards for tangible evidence were in a

colonial setting. While this particular link between air control and strategic bombing might seem

rather speculative, there exists tangible evidence that asserts a clear connection between the two.

In the same 1941 report by Lord Portal, the section concerning the morale effect of strategic

bombing notes that:

It must be realized that attack on morale is not a matter of pure killing, although the

fear of death is unquestionably an important factor. It is rather the general dislocation of

industrial and social life arising from damage to industrial plant, dwelling, houses,

shops, utility and transportation services, from resultant absenteeism and, in fact, from

35
Development and Employment of the Heavy Bomber Force, 1941, Christ Church Library, Papers of Lord
Portal, folder 2c.
36
John Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War (London: UCL Press, 1999), 116.
 24

interference with all that goes to make up the general activity of a community. In short,

it is an adaptation, though on a greatly magnified scale, of the policy of air control

which has proven so outstandingly successful in recent years in the small wars in which

the Air Force has been continuously engaged.37

Despite a number of discussions which clearly connect colonial air control with European

strategic bombing, much of the link that Ive established between the two can be categorized as

extrapolation, albeit strongly supported inference. The great majority of existing primary source

correspondence and documentation that focuses on strategic bombing neglects any mention of air

control or colonial air policing in general. This absence is indeed peculiar, especially considering

the similarities between the two concurrent dialogues as well as the fact that air control stood as

one of the few applications of air power that interwar theorists could look towards for

contemporary inspiration. A plausible explanation can be found in the prejudices held by many

senior military and political administrators of the British Empire. Such prejudices towards

uncivilized and savage colonial subjects were rampant among all levels of European society.

Evidence of this prejudice on bombing discussions can be seen in a number of forms. One may

look first at the rapid adoption of air control by the British military, which began as early as 1916

in India and 1921 in Mesopotamia, in comparison to the great degree of trepidation which

accompanied the espousal of European strategic bombing. This trepidation took the form of

numerous disarmament conferences, most of which made concerted attempts to limit or

completely ban bombing and which were almost always in response to European fears of

bombing.38 In fact, conversations at these disarmament conferences demonstrate clear attempts at

37
Development and Employment of the Heavy Bomber Force, 1941, Christ Church Library, Papers of Lord
Portal, folder 2c.
38
Carolyn J. Kitching, Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference - A Study in International History (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 92.
 25

regulating bombing in a European context while making exceptions in colonial circumstances.

Author Carolyn Kitching discusses these attempts with the following:

public opinion took a greater interest in this question of bombing, and could become

restive if a purely negative attitude was adopted towards the one form of

disarmament which might actually affect the man in the street in the country.a

proposal to prohibit the dropping of bombs by one State on the territory or shipping of

another sovereign state, neatly circumvented the question of retaining the right to drop

bombs on Iraq and the North-West Frontier.39

Article 34 of the MacDonald Plan, a British proposal at the 1933 Geneva Disarmament

Conference, went so far as to agree in principle to a limitation on aerial bombardment "with the

exception of police actions in certain distant locations." Primary sources from military officials,

as opposed to the Geneval Conferences civilian representatives, also seem to support the

prevailing assumption that international law could be circumvented when bombing colonial

subjects. In the previously cited 1924 Directive on policing in the North-West Frontier,

Trenchard states that: Hesitation or delay in dealing with uncivilized enemies are invariably

interpreted as signs of weaknessIn warfare against savage tribes who do not conform to codes

of civilized warfare, aerial bombardment is not necessarily limited in its methods or objectives

by rules agreed upon in international law.40 The official depiction of these colonial subjects as

uncivilized and savage adds to the argument that widespread and commonly held prejudices

painted the perceptions of military theorists during the interwar period. Such an explanation

seems to convincingly explain the lack of abundant primary source comparison between the two

connected theories of air control and strategic bombing. It is important to note however, the

39
Kitching, Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference, 62-63.
40
Trenchard, Employment of Aircraft on the North-West Frontier of India, 42.
 26

nuances of this explanation. While many military and political advocates of bombing at this time

were indeed prejudiced in their conceptions of race and ethnicity, this did not translate into a

total lack of humanity. As noted earlier in this paper, advocates of air control, like strategic

bombing advocates, had no desire to conduct indiscriminate bombing that would pose an obvious

and unnecessary danger to non-combatants. Priya Satia even states that many airpower theorists

based their faith in the bomber on the notion that people were the same everywhere and would

respond in the same manner to its power.41 The prejudice that I identify here did not open the

floodgates for indiscriminate civilian bombing in colonial territories; rather, it simply gave more

flexibility and greater room for error to colonial air control that would not be granted to more

heavily regulated strategic bombing schemes. This statement is better understood if we cite once

more, the statement made by Satia in describing the militarization policing in Iraq: What was

permissible only in wartime in advanced countries turned out to be always permissible in Iraq.42

We see as such that bombing advocates were willing to use the lessons of air control to

strengthen theories of strategic bombing, but clearly regarded the two as distinct and saw

comparisons of the two as improper.

The end of World War I brought a host of problems upon the various British colonial

administrations. Nationalistic uprisings and border conflicts coupled with budgetary and

logistical issues forced the administrators of the Empire to develop more efficient solutions for

maintaining order. The use of air forces had been touted since its inception as a clean and cost

effective method of waging war and policing restive populations. As such, colonial

administrators were quick to initiate schemes of air control in colonies ranging from Iraq and

Yemen to the Northwest Frontier of British India. Air controls impact on colonial policing is

41
Satia, Spies in Arabia, 248.
42
Satia, Spies in Arabia, 248.
 27

therefore fairly clear: the practice and its effectiveness led to an unprecedented and rapid degree

of militarization in colonial policing strategy. An analysis of the impact of air control on strategic

bombing in a European context however requires a much finer reading of available primary

sources. Early air strategists believed that air warfare could be conducted in such a way that

minimized suffering in a conflict. The theory of air control exhibited many aspects of this

ideology especially with assertions of air controls civilizing and clean methods. The goal of

minimizing suffering carried over into ideas of strategic bombing as advocates characterized it as

a precise and surgical method of disabling an opponents capacity to wage war. However,

this belief was to be ultimately overshadowed by an increased fixation on the potentially

devastating effects of bombing and the disintegration of morale that would result from such

effects. Interestingly enough, air control advocates seem to have been equally if not more fixated

on these effects as well. Indeed, the focal point of air controls success was its ability to

discourage further rebellion through a combination of fear and deterrence. Thus, there exists a

strong degree of continuity between the more tactically based theory of air control and later,

more strategically situated ideas of strategic bombing. Despite this clear continuity, we know

that very few interwar discussion of strategic bombing referenced or even mentioned the

experiences of air control. As one can see throughout this paper, conclusions on this continuity

are based heavily on parallels between the two separate dialogues as well as the fact that both

theories were often espoused by the same individuals. This absence reveals much about how air

power advocates of the time thought with regard to issues of race and nationality. While the

practical lessons of colonial air bombardment could certainly be applied to the subject of

bombing in Europe, the outright comparison between the two was evidently unthinkable. This

prejudiced mindset can be seen in other aspects of air control as well including the clear attempts
 28

to remove the bounds of international law from air control and the language of air control

advocates in their descriptions of colonial subjects. The rapid adoption and formalization of air

control schemes by as early as 1917 also contrasts strongly with the great trepidation that

characterized discussions of European strategic bombing. The continued existence of colonially

inspired racism is informative with regard to the mindset of British military and civilian officials.

Even after the First World War, the administrators of Britains empire continued to view their

role in the same way that their predecessors of the 19th century had. They saw the imperial

project as a battle between the civilized and uncivilized, and for them, they were continuing the

legacy and burden of bringing civilized order to these regions. In the process, their perceptions of

race and nationality that were inherent in their project also affected the methods they used and

the ways they were implemented. Indeed, the bombing of another nation state required much

more thought and regulation then the civilizing of a few tribes.

 29

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