EN BANC the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose
of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as
G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., accused,
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-6026 May 30, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BAYANI ESPIRITU, ET AL., accused,
BAYANI ESPIRITU and TEOPISTA VALERIO, defendants-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et
al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026)
the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies; the appellants are Amado V. Hernandez,
Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano
Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have
withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders,
arsons and kidnappings; the accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed
but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal.
The information filed against defendants Hernandez and others in Criminal Case No. 15481 alleged:
I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had
chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one
(31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082, 14270, 14315 and 14344 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and
identities are still unknown, the said accused and their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking
officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines
(P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines
thru act theretofore committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the
Philippines, and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly
known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against
in fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or "Hukbalahaps" have risen publicly and taken
arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks
against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then
and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of
private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as. follows, to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen attacks on
government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946, August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947,
August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950,
September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950.)
II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated the said
accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with several others as aforesaid,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or maintained the Congress of
Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organizations (CLO), with
central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other "mass
organizations" in different places in the Philippines, as an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of
the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully
cooperate in, and synchronize its activities as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or
maintained by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and
synchronized its activities with the activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) and
other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to
thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of the above-mentioned
armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
The information filed against the defendants in Criminal Case No. 15479, Bayani Espiritu Andres Baisa, Jr. and
Teopista Valerio, alleges:
That on or about the 6th day of May, 1946, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto and
continuously up to the present time, in the City of Manila, the seat of the government of the Republic
of the Philippines, which the herein accused have intended to overthrow, and the place chosen for that
purpose as the nerve center of all their rebellious atrocities in the different parts of the country, the
said accused being then high ranking officials and/or members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.) and/or of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly
known as the "Hukbalahaps" (HUKS), the latter being the armed forces of said Communist Party of the
Philippines; having come to an agreement with the 29 of the 31 accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 14071,
14082, 14270, 14315, 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and decided to commit the crime
of rebellion, and therefore, conspiring and confederating with all of the 29 accused in said criminal
cases, acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance thereof, together with many
others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown up to the filing of this information, and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously promote maintain, cause,
direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan", (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) to
rise publicly and take Arms against the Government or otherwise participate therein for the purpose of
overthrowing the same, as in fact, the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or Hukbalahap (HUKS)
have risen publicly and taken arms against the Government, by then and there making armed raids,
sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachment, and as a necessary
 means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, by then
and there committing wanton acts of murder, spoilage, looting, arson, kidnappings, planned
destruction of private and public buildings, to create and spread terrorism in order to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen attacks on
Government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946. August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947,
August 19, 1947, June 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950,
September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950).
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the present appeals.
APPEAL OF AMADO V. HERNANDEZ
After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the following: (1) that he
is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely, Victor or Soliman; (2)
that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as other publications of the Party; (3)
that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor Organizations; (4) that he had close connections
with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous communications with its leaders and its
members; (5) that he furnished a mimeographing machine used by the Communist Party, as well as clothes and
supplies for the military operations of the Huks; (6) that he had contacted well-known Communists coming to
the Philippines and had gone abroad to the WFTU conference Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the CLO, etc.
Evidence was also received by the court that Hernandez made various speeches encouraging the people to join
in the Huk movement in the provinces.
The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the Congress of Labor
Organizations, of which Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress was organized by Hernandez in
conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos, Guillermo Capadocia, etc.
We will now consider the nature and character of both the testimonial as well as the documentary evidence,
independently of each other, to find out if the said evidence supports the findings of the court.
Testimonial Evidence
Amado V. Hernandez took the oath as member of the Communist Party in the month of October, 1947, at the
offices of the Congress of Labor Organizations at 2070 Azcarraga in the presence of Guillermo Capadocia, Ramon
Espiritu, Pedro Castro, Andres Balsa, etc. As a Communist he was given the pseudonyms of Victor and Soliman,
and received copies of the Communist paper "Titis". He made various speeches on the following dates and
occasions:
(1) On August 29, 1948 before the Democratic Peace Rally of the CLO at Plaza Miranda, in which he
announced that the people will soon meet their dear comrade in the person of Comrade Luis Taruc.
(2) On September 4, 1948 he conferred with Hindu Khomal Goufar at the Escolta, at which occasion
Balgos told Goufar that the PKM, CLO and the Huks are in one effort that the PKM are the peasants in
the field and the Huks are the armed forces of the Communist Party; and the CLO falls under the TUD
of the Communist Party. 1wph1.t
(3) On October 2, 1948 he went abroad to attend the Second Annual Convention of the World
Federation of Trade Unions and after arrival from abroad a dinner was given to him by the people of
Gagalangin, at which Hernandez delivered a speech and he said that he preferred to go with the Huks
because he felt safer with them than with the authorities of the Government.
(4) In April, 1949, he made a speech before a group of tenants in Malabon attacking the frauds in the
1947 elections, graft and corruption in the elections and that if improvement cannot be made by the
ballots, they could be made by bullets; and enjoined the people to go to the hills and join Luis Taruc
the head of the dissidents in the Philippines.
(5) On October 2, 1949 he delivered a speech on the occasion of the commemoration of the World
Peace at the CLO headquarters at 330 P. Campa. He attacked the city mayor and incited the people to
go to Balintawak and see Bonifacio there and thereafter join four comrades under the leadership of
Luis Taruc.
(6) On October 16, 1949 he delivered a speech before a convention of the unemployed at 330 P.
Campa. He asked the unemployed to approve a resolution urging the Government to give them jobs. In
conclusion he said that if the Government fails to give them jobs the only way out was to join the
revolutionary forces fighting in the hills. He further said that Mao Tse Tung, leader of the People's
Army in China, drove Chiang Kai Shek from his country, and that Luis Taruc was also being chased by
Government forces run by puppets like Quirino, etc.
(7) On January 13, 1950 there was another meeting at 330 P. Campa. In his talk Hernandez expressed
regret that two foremost leaders of the CLO, Balgos and Capadocia, had gone to the field to join the
liberation army of the HMB, justifying their going out and becoming heroes by fighting in the fields
against Government forces until the ultimate goal is achieved.
The above evidence was testified to by Florentino Diolata who was the official photographer of the CLO since
August, 1948.
On the tie-up between the Communist Party and the CLO Guillermo Calayag, a Communist and a Huk from 1942
to 1950, explained:
(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the president government by force of
aims and violence; thru armed revolution and replace it with the so-called dictatorship of the
proletariat the Communist Party carries its program of armed overthrow of the present government by
organizing the HMB and other forms of organization's such as the CLO, PKM, union organizations, and
the professional and intellectual group; the CLO was organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the
Communist Party.
(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the CLO
were also top ranking officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by the TUD - the vital
undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the organizational bureau of the
Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO especially the Executive Committee. And it is a fact
that since a good majority of the members of the Executive Committee are party members, there is no
time, there is no single time that those directives and decisions of the organizational department, thru
 the TUD are being objected to by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These directives refer to how
the CLO will conduct its functions. The executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused
Amado V. Hernandez.
(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of armed overthrow of the present
government and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of propaganda - by
propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other forms
of material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very constitution of the CLO itself which
expounded the theory of classless society and the eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2,
page 18 of the CLO Constitution contained in the Fourth Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the
CLO Exh. "V-1579"). Thru propaganda, the CLO promoted the aims of Communist Party and
disseminated Communist ideas by:
(a) The conspicuous display of the portrait or, pictures of Crisanto Evangelista (Exh. V-1662),
founder of Communism in the Philippines, in the session hall of the CLO headquarters at
2070 Azcarraga and then at 330 P. Campa;
(b) The distribution of foreign communist reading materials such as the World Federation of
Trade Union Magazine, International Union of Students magazine, Voice magazine of the
marine cooks of the CLO, World Committee of the Defenders of the Peace magazine, Free
Bulgaria magazine, Soviet Russia Today magazine and World Federation of Democratic Youth
magazine (Exhs. V-911, V-907, V-910, V-899, V-912, V-853, W-996 and V-967);
(c) The publication and distribution of some local subversive publications such as the "Titis",
"Bisig", Kidlat", which are Communist Party organs; "The Philippine Labor Demands Justice"
and "Hands Off Korea" authored by accused Amado V. Hernandez;
(d) Principles of Communism were also propagated thru lectures, meetings, and by means of
organization of committees in the educational department as well as researches in the
Worker's Institute of the CLO.
(4) The CLO also helped carry out the program of the Communist Party thru infiltration of party
members and selected leaders of the HMB within the trade unions under the control of the CLO. The
Communist Party thru the CLO assigned Communist Party leaders and organizers to different factories
in order to organize unions. After the organization of the union, it will affiliate itself with the CLO thru
the Communist leaders and the CLO in turn, will register said union with the Department of Labor; and
the orientation and indoctrination of the workers is continued in the line of class struggle. After this
orientation and infiltration of the Communist Party members and selected leaders of the HMB with the
trade unions under the control of the CLO is already achieved and the group made strong enough to
carry out its aims, they will begin the sporadic strikes and the liquidation of anti-labor elements and
anti-Communist elements and will create a so-called revolutionary crisis. That revolutionary crisis will
be done for the party to give directives to the HMB who are fighting in the countrysides and made
them come to the city gates. The entry of the HMB is being paved by the simultaneous and sporadic
strikes, by ultimate general strikes thru the management of the CLO.
Important Documents Submitted at Trial
1. Documents which proved that Amado V. Hernandez used the aliases "Victor", or was referred to as
"Victor" or "Soliman".
(a) Letter dated April 23, 1950 (signed) by Victor addressed to Julie telling the latter of his
sympathies for other communists, describing his experiences with Communists abroad,
telling Julie to dispose of materials that may be sent by Victor. (Exh. D-2001-2004)
(b) "Paano Maisasagawa, etc." mentions different groups of labor unions of which Victor
heads one group, consisting of the MRRCO, PTLD, PGWU, EMWU and IRWU (Exh. C-2001-
2008) Cadres assigned to different industries. (Exh. V-40-41)
(c) Handwritten certificate of Honofre Mangila states that he knew Amado Hernandez as
Victor from co-party members Hugo and Ely. (Exh. LL)
(d) Letter of Elias to Ka Eto requesting the latter to deliver attached letter to Victor. (Exh.
1103)
(e) Saulo's letter about his escape, asks Victor why his press statement was not published in
the newspapers. (Exh. C-362) Letter was however published by Hernandez in the Daily
Mirror.
(f) Letter of Taruc to Maclang directing the latter to give copy of Huk Story to Victor. (Exh. D-
463-64)
(g) Notes of Salome Cruz, Huk courier, stating that she went to Soliman at Pampanga St. to
bring to the latter communications from the Communist Party. (Exh. D-1203) That Soliman
was given copies of "Titis". (Exh. D-1209)
(h) SEC directions to Politburo members, Soliman not to be involved with Nacionalista Rebels.
(Exh. F-92-93. SEC)
(i) Letter of SEC to Politburo reporting that Saulo be sent out and Soliman has "tendencies of
careerism and tendency to want to deal with leaders of the party"; that he should be asked
to choose to go underground or fight legally. (Exh. F-562)
(j) Explanation given by Hernandez why he did not join Saulo in going underground. (Exh. V-
87) (1) His election as councilor until December, 1951. (Exhs. V-42, W-9) (2) His election as
President of CLO until August of following year. (Exhs. V-42, W-9)
2. Letters and Messages of Hernandez.
(a) To Lyden Henry and Harry Reich, tells Huks still fighting. (Exh. V-80)
(b) To SOBSI Jakarta that Filipinos are joining other communist countries of the East. (Exh.
V-82)
 (c) Press release on Saulo's disappearance published by Amado Hernandez. (Exh. W-116-120)
(d) To Hugh and Eddie, July 8, 1949 Extends greetings to National Union of Marine Cooks
and Stewards, states that labor has one common struggle "the liberation of all the peoples
from the chains of tyranny, fascism and imperialism". (Exh. V-259)
(e) To Kas. Pablo and Estrada - talks of the fight - fight of labor. (Exh. V-85-89)
(f) Appeal to the Women and Asia. (Exh. V-5-10)
(g) Letter to Julie (Exh. V-2001-2004)
(h) Letter to Chan Lieu - states that leaders during the war are being persecuted, like Taruc.
Tells of reward of P100,000.00 on Taruc's head. (Exh. X-85-88)
(i) Letter to John Gates of the Daily Worker condemns Wall Street maneuvers; corruption
and graft in Quirino administration, etc. (Exh. V-83)
(j) Cablegram: CLO join ILWU commends Harry Bridges, US Communist. (Exh. V-79)
(k) Communication of Hernandez to CLO at MRRCO Praises Balgos and Capadocia for
joining the Huks. (Exhs. V-12-22, V-289)
(l) "Philippine labor Demands Justice" Attacks czars of Wall Street and U.S. Army and
Government. (Exh. V-94) .
(m) Letter to Taruc June 28, 1948.-States solidarity among the CLO Huks and PKM. Attacks
North Atlantic Pact. Praises Mao Tse Tung (contained in Exh. V-94)
(n) "Philippines Is Not A Paradise" States of a delegation to Roxas attacking
unemployment. (Exh. V-90-93)
(o) Article "Progressive Philippines" (Exh. V-287)
(p) Article "Hands Off Korea" (Exhs. V-488-494, 495-501, 509-515, W-25-26)
(q) "Limang Buwang Balak Sa Pagpapalakas Ng Organisasyon". (Exh. X-35-38)
(r) Press statement of Hernandez opposes acceptance of decorations from Greece by
Romulo. (Exh. V-72)
3. Other Activities of Hernandez.
(a) Hernandez received clothes from Pres. Lines thru P. Campa, which clothes he sent to the
field. Letters show of sending of supplies to Huks. (Exh. S-383)
(b) Hernandez was asked to furnish portable typewriter, which he did furnish to Huks. (Exh.
C-364)
(c) Hernandez brought Taruc's letter about facts and incidents about Huks to Bulosan for
inclusion in Bulosan's book. (Exh. FF-1)
(d) Had conference with Kumar Goshal a Hindu, about the Huks and their armed forces.
(Photographs, Exhs. X-6 RR-54-55A)
(e) Supervised taking of pictures of sons of Capadocia and Joven. (Photographs, Exhs. T-1, RR-
136-138A)
(f) Had knowledge of the going underground of Capadocia and Balgos and issued press
release about their going underground. (Exh. F-91)
(g) Victor mentioned to continue as contact for Chino. (Exh. C-362)
(h) Taruc's letter to Maclang shows that Soliman had sent 7 lessons to Taruc. (Exh. D-451-
451-A)
(i) Associated with fellow ranking Communist leaders.
The Court upon consideration of the evidence submitted, found (1) that the Communist Party was fully organized
as a party and in order to carry out its aims and policies a established a National Congress, a Central Committee
(CC), Politburo PB, Secretariat (SEC), Organization Bureau (OB), and National Courier or Communication Division
(NCD), each body performing functions indicated in their respective names; (2) that in a meeting held on August
11, 1950 the SEC discussed the creation of a Military Committee of the Party and a new GHQ, under which on
September 29, 1950 the SEC organized a special warfare division, with a technological division; (3) that on May 5,
1950 a body known as the National Intelligence Division was created, to gather essential military intelligence
and, in general, all information useful for the conduct of the armed struggle (4) that a National Finance
Committee was also organized as a part of the Politburo and answerable to it; (5) that the country was divided
into 10 Recos, the 10th Reco comprising the Manila and suburbs command; (6) that since November, 1949 the
CPP had declared the existence of a revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone underground and
the CPP is leading the armed struggle for national liberation, and called on the people to organize guerrillas and
coordinate with the HMB on the decisive struggle and final overthrow of the imperialist government; (7) that in
accordance with such plan the CPP prepared plans for expansion and development not only of the Party but also
of the HMB; the expansion of the cadres from 3,600 in July 1950 to 56,000 in September 1951, the HMB from
10,800 in July 1950 to 172,000 in September 1951, et seq.
Around the month of January, 1950 it was decided by the CPP to intensify HMB military operations for political
purposes. The Politburo sanctioned the attacks made by the Huks on the anniversary of the HMB on March 25,
1950. The HMB attacks that were reported to the PB were those made in May, 1946; June, 1946; April 10, 1947;
May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950; October 15 and 17, 1950; May 6, 1946; August
6, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; April 29, 1949; August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950;
September 12, 1950; March 26, 1950; March 29, 1950.
The theory of the prosecution, as stated in the lower court's decision, is as follows:
The evidence does not show that the defendants in these cases now before this Court had taken a
direct part in those raids and in the commission of the crimes that had been committed. It is not,
however, the theory of the prosecution that they in fact had direct participation in the commission of
the same but rather that the defendants in these cases have cooperated, conspired and confederated
with the Communist Party in the prosecution and successful accomplishment of the aims and purposes
of the said Party thru the organization called the CLO (Congress of Labor Organizations).
The Court found that the CLO is independent and separate from the CPP, organized under the same pattern as
the CPP, having its own National Congress, a Central Committee (which acts in the absence of and in
representation of the National Congress), an Executive Committee (which acts when the National Congress and
the Executive Committee are not in session), and seven permanent Committees, namely, of Organization,
Unemployment and Public Relations, Different Strikes and Pickets, Finance, Auditing, Legislation and Political
Action. Members of the Communist Party dominate the committees of the CLO. The supposed tie-up between
CPP and the CLO of which Hernandez was the President, is described by the court below in finding, thus:
Just how the CLO coordinates its functions with the Communist Party organ under which it operates was
explained by witness Guillermo S. Calayag, one-time ranking member of the Communist Party and the CLO who
typewrites the "Patnubay sa Education" from a handwritten draft of Capadocia, which is one of the texts used in
the Worker's institute of the CLO. According to him, the CLO plays its role by means of propaganda, giving
monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other material forms of help to the HMB, which constitutes the armed
forces of the Communist Party. Propaganda is done by lectures, meetings, and the organization of committees of
the educational department as well as researches at the CLO Worker's Institute.
Another way of helping the Communist Party of the Philippines is by allowing the Communist Party
leaders to act as organizers in the different factories in forming a union. These Party Members help
workers in the factories to agitate for the eradication of social classes and ultimately effect the total
emancipation of the working classes thru the establishment of the so-called dictatorship of the
proletariat. It is the duty of these Communist Party members to indoctrinate uninitiated workers in the
union to become proselytes of the Communist Party ideology. After the right number is secured and a
union is formed under a communist leader, this union is affiliated with the CLO and this in turn
registers the same with the Department of Labor. The orientation and indoctrination of the masses is
continued with the help of the CLO. The primary objective of the CLO is to create what is called a
revolutionary crisis. It seeks to attain this objective by first making demands from the employers for
concessions which become more and more unreasonable until the employers would find it difficult to
grant the same. Then a strike is declared. But the strikes are only preparation for the ultimate
attainment of the Communist goal of armed overthrow of the government. After the workers in the
factories have already struck in general at the behest of the Communist Party thru the CLO a critical
point is reached when a signal is given for the armed forces of the Communist Party, the HMB, to
intervene and carry the revolution now being conducted outside to within the city.
On the basis of the above findings, the court below found Hernandez guilty as principal of the crime charged
against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories provided by law,
and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
Our study of the testimonial and documentary evidence, especially those cited by the Court in its decision and by
the Solicitor General in his brief, discloses that defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, as a Communist, was
an active advocate of the principles of Communism, frequently exhorting his hearers to follow the footsteps of
Taruc and join the uprising of the laboring classes against capitalism and more specifically against America and
the Quirino administration, which he dubbed as a regime of puppets of American imperialism. But beyond the
open advocacy of Communistic Theory there appears no evidence that he actually participated in the actual
conspiracy to overthrow by force the constituted authority.
Hernandez is the founder and head of the CLO. As such, what was his relation to the rebellion? If, as testified to
by Guillermo S. Calayag, the CLO plays merely the role of propagation by lectures, meetings and organization of
committees of education by Communists; if, as stated, the CLO merely allowed Communist Party leaders to act
as organizers in the different factories, to indoctrinate the CLO members into the Communist Party and
proselytize them to the Communist ideology; if, as also indicated by Calayag, the CLO purports to attain the
ultimate overthrow of the Government first by making demands from employers for concessions until the
employers find it difficult to grant the same, at which time a strike is declared; if it is only after the various strikes
have been carried out and a crisis is thereby developed among the laboring class, that the Communist forces
would intervene and carry the revolution it is apparent that the CLO was merely a stepping stone in the
preparation of the laborers for the Communist' ultimate revolution. In other words, the CLO had no function but
that of indoctrination and preparation of the members for the uprising that would come. It was only a
preparatory organization prior to revolution, not the revolution itself. The leader of the CLO therefore, namely
Hernandez, cannot be considered as a leader in actual rebellion or of the actual uprising subject of the
accusation. Hernandez, as President of the CLO therefore, by his presidency and leadership of the CLO cannot be
considered as having actually risen up in arms in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines, or taken
part in the conspiracy to commit the rebellion as charged against him in the present case; he was merely a
propagandist and indoctrinator of Communism, he was not a Communist conspiring to commit the actual
rebellion by the mere fact of his presidency of the CLO.
The court below declares that since November 1949 the Communist Party of the Philippines had declared the
existence of the revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone underground, with the CPP leading
the struggle for national integration and that in the month of January 1950, it was decided by the said Party to
intensify the HMB military operations for political purposes. The court implicates the appellant Hernandez as a
co-conspirator in this resolution or acts of the Communist Party by his mere membership thereto. We find this
conclusion unwarranted. The seditious speeches of Hernandez took place before November, 1949 when the CPP
went underground. The court below has not been able to point out, nor have We been able to find among all
acts attributed to Hernandez, any single fact or act of his from which it may be inferred that he took part in the
deliberations declaring the existence of a revolutionary situation, or that he had gone underground. As a matter
of fact the prosecution's evidence is to the effect that Hernandez refused to go underground preferring to
engage in what they consider the legal battle for the cause.
We have also looked into the different documents which have been presented at the time of the trial and which
were confiscated from the office of the Politburo of the Communist Party. The speeches of Hernandez were
delivered before the declaration by the Communist Party of a state of revolutionary situation in 1949. Neither
was it shown that Hernandez was a member of the Executive Committee, or of the SEC, or of the Politburo of the
Communist Party; so NO presumption can arise that he had taken part in the accord or conspiracy declaring a
revolution. In short, there has been no evidence, direct or indirect, to relate or connect the appellant Hernandez
with the uprising or the resolution to continue or maintain said uprising, his participation in the deliberations
leading to the uprising being inferred only from the fact that he was a communist.
The practice among the top Communists, as declared by the trial court appears to have been for important
members, if they intend actually to join the rebellion, to go underground, which meant leaving the city,
disappearing from sight and/or secretly joining the forces in the field.
The document, Exhibit F-562, which is quoted in the decision, contains the directive of the SEC of September 1,
1950, to Saulo and Hernandez, which reads:
11. In view of the new developments in the city, send out Elias who prefers to work outside. Present
problem of fighting legally to Com. Soliman. If Soliman is prepared for martyrdom, retain him to fight
legally. If not, send him out with Elias. Same goes with Com. Mino and other relatively exposed mass
leaders.
And the lower court itself found that whereas Saulo went underground and joined the underground forces
outside the City, Hernandez remained in the City, engaged in the work of propaganda, making speeches and
causing the publication of such matters as the Communist Party leaders directed him to publish.
That Hernandez refused to go underground is a fact which is further corroborated by the following reasons
(excuses) given by him for not going underground, namely (1) that his term of councilor of the City of Manila was
to extend to December, 1951; and (2) that he was elected President of the CLO for a term which was to end the
year 1951.
As a matter of fact the SEC gave instructions to Hernandez not to be involved with Nacionalista Rebels, and
reported to the Politburo that Hernandez "has tendencies of careerism, and tending to want to deal with leaders
of the Nacionalista Party instead of following CPP organizational procedures."
The court below further found that Hernandez had been furnishing supplies for the Huks in the field. But the
very document dated December 3, 1949, Exhibit D-420422, cited in the decision (printed, p. 49), is to the effect
that clothes and shoes that Hernandez was supposed to have sent have not been received. It is true that some
clothes had been sent thru him to the field, but these clothes had come from a crew member of a ship of the
American President Lines. He also, upon request, sent a portable typewriter to the SEC or Politburo.
Furthermore, a certain Niagara Duplicating machine received by Hernandez from one Rolland Scott Bullard a
crew member of the SS President Cleveland, appease later to have been forwarded by him to the officers of the
SEC or the Politburo.
Lastly, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant Hernandez, who in
turn issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts in this respect belong to the
category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions as a Communist.
The acts of the appellant as thus explained and analyzed fall under the category of acts of propaganda, but do
not prove that he actually and in fact conspired with the leaders of the Communist Party in the uprising or in the
actual rebellion, for which acts he is charged in the information. And his refusal to go underground because of
his political commitments occasioned by his term of election as president of the CLO and the impressions caused
by his acts on the Communist leaders, to the effect that he was in direct communication or understanding with
the Nacionalista Party to which he was affiliated, creates in Us the reasonable doubt that it was not his
Communistic leanings but his political ambitions, that motivated his speeches sympathizing with the Huks. For
which reason We hold that the evidence submitted fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he has conspired
in the instigation of the rebellion for which he is held to account in this criminal case.
The question that next comes up for resolution is: Does his or anyone's membership in the Communist Party per
se render Hernandez or any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion under the provisions of Article
136 of the Revised Penal Code? The pertinent provision reads:
ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. The conspiracy and proposal
to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished, respectively, by prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos, and by prision correccional in its
medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of
conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere
advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive,
the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an
uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless
action is actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding
belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of
Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field
subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does
he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. Borrowing the language of the Supreme Court of the United
States:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or on
conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other
concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship must be sufficiently
substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an organization engaged in illegal
advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized by this Court to be such a relationship. ... .
What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when accompanied by the elements
of knowledge and specific intent, affords an insufficient quantum of participation in the organization's
alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and encouragement to permit
the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be recognized that a person who
merely becomes a member of an illegal organization, by that "act" alone need be doing nothing more
than signifying his assent to its purposes and activities on one hand, and providing, on the other, only
the sort of moral encouragement which comes from the knowledge that others believe in what the
organization is doing. It may indeed be argued that such assent and encouragement do fall short of the
concrete, practical impetus given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment
on the part of the conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as distinguished from
a conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal enterprise by the very fact of his membership
without thereby necessarily committing himself to further it by any act or course of conduct whatever.
(Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)
The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears to be the propagation of improvement of conditions or foster the cause of the rebellion. We are constrained, in view of these circumstances, to absolve, as We
of labor through his organization, the CLO. While the CLO of which he is the founder and active president, has hereby absolve, the appellant Amado V. Hernandez from the crime charged, with a proportionate share of the
communistic tendencies, its activity refers to the strengthening of the unity and cooperation between labor costs de oficio.
elements and preparing them for struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated in the need of an actual war with or
against Capitalism. The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and it is not unreasonable to suspect that his APPEAL OF OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
labor activities especially in connection with the CLO and other trade unions, were impelled and fostered by the
desire to secure the labor vote to support his political ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the
All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the information
labor union of which he was the head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not
and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, with the accessories
merely to advance his political aspirations.
provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.

Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist are concerned, We have not found, nor has any
Legal Considerations. Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is believed useful
particular act on his part been pointed to Us, which would indicate that he had advocated action or the use of
if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of their criminal responsibility
force in securing the ends of Communism. True it is, he had friends among the leaders of the Communist Party,
or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have exhaustively discussed in relation to the appeal of
and especially the heads of the rebellion, but this notwithstanding, evidence is wanting to show that he ever
Hernandez, we do not believe that mere membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member
attended their meetings, or collaborated and conspired with said leaders in planning and encouraging the acts of
liable, either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more
rebellion, or advancing the cause thereof. Insofar as the furnishing of the mimeograph machine and clothes is
merely implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such
concerned, it appears that he acted merely as an intermediary, who passed said machine and clothes on to
advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or
others. It does not appear that he himself furnished funds or material help of his own to the members of the
conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same.
rebellion or to the forces of the rebellion in the field.

On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising or rebellion
But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go underground, in spite of the apparent desire of the chief of
to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from thraldom. By membership
the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-participation in the conspiracy to engage in or to foster the rebellion or the
in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force, and by such membership he agrees or
uprising.
conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such membership, therefore, even if there is
nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by law.
We next consider the question as to whether the fact that Hernandez delivered speeches of propaganda in favor
of Communism and in favor of rebellion can be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy to commit rebellion as
And when a Huk member, not content with his membership, does anything to promote the ends of the rebellion
defined in the law. In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and rendering speeches favoring Communism
like soliciting contributions, or acting as courier, he thereby becomes guilty of conspiracy, unless he takes to the
would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the hearers of his speeches of
field and joins in the rebellion or uprising, in which latter case he commits rebellion.
propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the
democratic government as envisaged by the principles of Communism. To this effect is the following comment of
Viada: In U.S. v. Vergara, infra, the defendants organized a secret society commonly known as the "Katipunan", the
purpose of which was to overthrow the government by force. Each of the defendants on various times solicited
funds from the people of Mexico, Pampanga. The Court held that the defendants were guilty of conspiracy and
CUESTION 10. El que hace propaganda entre sus convecinos, induciendoles a que el dia que se
proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection and not of rebellion or insurrection itself. Thus, the Court ruled
anunciara la subasta de consumes se echaran a la calle para conseguir aunque fuera preciso acudir a la
that:
fuerza el reparto entre los vecinos ricos solamente, sera responsable de un delito de conspiracion para
la sedicion? El Tribunal Supreme ha resuelto la negative al casar cierta sentencia de la Audiencia de
Valencia, que entendio lo contrario: "Considerando que, con areglo a lo que dispone el art. 4. del From the evidence adduced in this case we are of the opinion that the said defendants are guilty, not
Codigo Penal, hay conspiracion cuando dos o mas personas se conciertan para la execution de un of inciting, setting or foot, or assisting or engaging in rebellion, but rather of the crime of conspiring to
delito y resuelven cmeterlo; y no constando que existiera ese concierto en cuanto a los hechos que se overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the United States in the Philippine
refieren en la tercera pregunta del veredicto, pues en ella solo se habla de los actos de induccion que Islands, and therefore we find that said defendants, and each of them, did, together with others, in the
el procesado realizo, sin expresar el efecto que la mismo produjo en el animo de las personas a quienes months of February and March, 1903, in the Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, conspire to
se dirigian, ni si estas aceptaron o no lo que se las propuso, resulta evidence que faltan los clementos overthrow, put down, and to destroy by force the Government of the United States in the Philippine
integrantes de la conspiracion, etc." (Se. de 5 de Julio de 1907, Gaceta de 7 de Enero de 1909.) (Viada, Islands. (U.S. v. Vergara, et al., 3 Phil. 432, 434.)
Tomo I, Codigo Penal, p. 152)
JUAN J. CRUZ
In view of all the above circumstances We find that there is no concrete evidence proving beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellant (Hernandez) actually participated in the rebellion or in any act of conspiracy to commit
The court found him to be a Communist with various aliases, a member of the Central Committee of the CLO
member of the Central Committee of the CPP and as such committed to the establishment of the dictatorship of
the proletariat To the same effect is the testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
There is no evidence to connect him with the rebellion or to the conspiracy to commit rebellion. He should
therefore be absolved of the charges contained in the information.
AMADO RACANDAY
The trial court found him guilty as a Communist, a Secretary and Executive Committee member of the CLO a
communications center of the Communist Party, having been found in possession of letters from Federico
Maclang to Salome Cruz, and solicitor of contributions for the Huks.
Racanday admits being a member of the Executive Committee of the CLO Editor of the Kidlat of the Government
Workers Union, receiving copies of the Titis. Calayag testified that he was a member of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party entrusted with the duty of receiving directives of the Regional Committee of the
Communist Party.
The letters found in his possession are dated February 14, 1950, before the Communist Party went underground.
We have been unable to find the evidence upon which the court bases its conclusion that he received
contributions for the Huks. With these circumstances in mind, We are not convinced beyond reasonable doubt
that as a Communist he took part in the conspiracy among the officials of the Communist Party to take part and
support the rebellion of the Huks.
We are, therefore, constrained to absolve him of the charges filed against him.
GENARO DE LA CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist since 1945, an officer of an organized Communist branch in Pasay City, a
member of the Central Committee and Treasurer of the CLO. He admitted his membership and his position as
member of the executive committee and treasurer of the CLO these facts being corroborated by the witness
Guillermo Calayag.
His membership in the Communist Party dates as far back as the year 1945. As a communist, Genaro de la Cruz
received quotas and monetary contributions coming from the areas under his jurisdiction, and one time he made
a receipt from a member from Caloocan at the CLO headquarters at Azcarraga signing the receipt as "Gonzalo"
which is one of his aliases. He also distributed copies of the "Titis" magazine. `
While his membership in the Communist Party plus his having received contributions for the party indicate that
he is an active member, it was not shown that the contributions that he received from Communist Party
members were received around the year 1950 when the Central Committee of the Communist Party had already
agreed to conspire and go underground and support the Huk rebellion. Under these circumstances We cannot
find him guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion because of the lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
JULIAN LUMANOG
The court found him to be an organizer of HMB among the mill workers, solicited contributions for the HMB and
Central Committee member of the CLO as per Testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
He admitted that he joined the Communist Party because he was made to believe that the Party is for the
welfare of the laborers. He also admitted being a member of the Central Committee of the CLO Calayag testified
that Lumanog organized the HMB units of the Communist Party in the Lumber Unions and attended a
Communist meeting held by Maclang.
Domingo Clarin testified that he (Julian Lumanog) used to give the money collected by him to one Nicasio
Pamintuan, one of the members of the HMB Special Unit Trigger Squad) in Manila for the use of the said unit.
Considering that the HMB was engaged in a rebellion to overthrow the government, it is evident that by giving
his contributions he actually participated in the conspiracy to overthrow the government and should, therefore,
be held liable for such conspiracy, and should be sentenced accordingly.
FERMIN RODILLAS
The trial court found that Fermin Rodillas was a member of the CPP and the CLO that his activities consisted in
soliciting contributions, in cash and in kind, from city residents for the use of the HMB, turning over said
collections to the Party; that he has given asylum to a wanted Hukbalahap at his house at Juan Luna St.,
Gagalangin, which house was used as Military post. The above findings of the court are fully supported by the
testimony of Domingo Clarin.
Considering that while he has not actually taken part in the rebellion, he has shown sympathy with the cause by
soliciting contributions for it and had given shelter to the Huks. We feel that the court was fully justified in
finding him guilty, but We hold that he should be declared liable merely as a co-conspirator in the crime of
conspiracy to commit rebellion, and should be sentenced accordingly.
BAYANI ESPIRITU
This appellant was found by the court to be a Communist, he having admitted membership in the Communist
Party since 1945; that his duties as a Communist was to help in the office of the National Finance Committee,
assorting papers and written documents; that sometimes he accompanied the purchaser of medicines, shoes,
papers, foodstuffs and clothing to be given to the Huks; that he is a member of the Communication Division of
the CPP in Manila, in charge of distribution of letters or communications; that he admits having written to
Salome Cruz, courier of the Communist Party, when he asked for his necessities, such as money and shoes, etc.
The facts found by the court are sufficiently supported by the communications and evidence submitted by the
prosecution. The exhibits show that he was in constant communication with the communists; serving them as
courier. His oath as a member of the Communist Party was submitted in court and in it he admits obedience to
all orders of the Party and to propagate the stability of the PKP.
Considering that the PKP was engaged in an actual uprising against the constituted Government and that Bayani
Espiritu was in constant communication with the Communist Party and served it as courier, We believe that the
court was fully justified in finding him guilty. However, We believe that not having actually taken up arms in the
uprising he may only be declared guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
TEOPISTA VALERIO
The court below found that this appellant joined the Communists in 1938 in San Luis, Pampanga, under Casto
Alejandrino, who later became her common-law husband; that her aliases are "Estrella" and "Star"; that she was
found in possession of various documents written to top Communists like Alejandrino, Lava and Romy, as well as
a letter from Taruc congratulating her for the delivers, of a son.
Jose Taguiang testified that she was a member of the Provincial Committee of the CPP in Nueva Ecija, later
Chairman of the Finance Department, and then promoted to Finance Officer of the Central Luzon Committee.
Alicia Vergara, a Huk courier, testified that she delivered letter from the mountains to Teopista Valerie, who was
in turn also a courier.
their proportionate share of the costs de oficio. The defendants-appellants Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas
in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) and the defendants-appellants Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio
in Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) are hereby found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit
rebellion, as defined and punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their
proportional share of the costs. So ordered.

Without considering the close relationship that she had with top Communist Casto Alejandrino, We are satisfied
that she herself was, aside from being a Huk courier, also a Huk, a member of the HMB from 1942 to 1951. As
she was a Communist and at the same time a member of the HMB, and considering that the HMB was engaged
in an uprising to uproot the legitimate government, there cannot be any question that she was in conspiracy
with the other members of her Party against the constituted government. We hold, therefore, that the evidence
proves beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.

DEFENDANTS NOT INCLUDED IN DECISION

In Crim. Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) the charge against Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P. Balgos, Alfredo B.
Saulo and Jacobo Espino was dismissed because they have not been apprehended at the time of the trial.

PEOPLE VS. EVANGELISTA, 57 PHIL. 354 AND

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700, DISTINGUISHED

In the case at bar the prosecution is for actual rebellion which consists in rising publicly and taking aims against
the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of
the Philippines, or any part thereof, etc., a crime defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas
Evangelista was charged and convicted for inciting to rebellion under Art. 138, Revised Penal Code (formerly Sec.
2, Act No. 292). As the specific charge against appellants is that of rising up in arms in actual rebellion against the
Government, they cannot be held guilty of inciting the people to arms under Article 138, which is a different
offense.

On the other hand, Rep. Act 1700, known as the Anti-subversion Act, which penalizes membership in any
organization or association committed to subvert the Government, cannot be applied to the appellants because
said Act was approved on June 20, 1957 and was not in force at the time of the commission of the acts charged
against appellants (committed 1945-1950) ; the Anti-Subversion Act punishes participation or membership in an
organization committed to overthrow the duly constituted Government, a crime district from that of actual
rebellion with which appellants are charged.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) defendants-appellants Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J.
Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges contained in the information, with
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG.
GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS
WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C.
MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes
center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the
limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with
the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and circumstance had more
effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none,
certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same
question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce
Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day
filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant.
The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was
given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
corpusherein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary
investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6,
1990. 5On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case and
in G.R. No. 921647 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-
accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the
petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandezruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the
information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.charged murder and frustrated murder
committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would
distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for
committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the
subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with
which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its
Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned
upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and
P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more
extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not
passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to
Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No.
92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said
case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the
Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the
commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common"
crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether
or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members
felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its
substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here
persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the
incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among
others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or
neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that
"(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which
includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are
committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the
offender."' 11In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine
with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited
in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling
should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on
the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents'
arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what
appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following
excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in
the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately
(assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending
upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime
of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of
the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him
to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished
separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de
1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p.
2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the
counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas
delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite
que represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez
Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition
of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of
the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our
Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes
two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of
said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the
aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article
48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less
perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each
crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on
the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of
an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less
adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point
for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to
the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge
an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant
Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense
of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion,
not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty
imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that,
in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment,
said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while
technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context
of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the
Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation
conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned
information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an
indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence
developed during the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the
complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled,
however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient
that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty
minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to
personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent
had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no
reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to
overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandezas applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information
against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before
conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from
which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right
to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to
bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy
was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-
existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would not
excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have
been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition,
whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on
the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were
originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there instead of
directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or
competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our
trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify
every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing established
judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this
is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that
the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it
erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge
here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's
recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to
set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom
no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength
or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar
situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse
in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the
petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to
wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone
through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly
the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that should have
started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in
a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas
like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly
within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and
decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner
Enrile in factualmilieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have
uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in
Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March
1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-
they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic
quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels
are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to
whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so
underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted
mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military,
but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital
City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at
national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the
penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that
it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The
Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and
what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the
initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio
must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction,
as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the
proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail
bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M.
CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE
TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City
Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion
complexed with murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another
information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
The second information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmarias Village, Makati, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect
that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously,
willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of
arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge
the information from the record.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin,
denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the
accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on
the grounds that:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and
(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as
alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the
prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for alleged lack
of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following
grounds, to wit:
I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989
is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as
alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;
III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the component acts
of rebellion;
IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;
V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829. The
preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due
process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No.
1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed
against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the
Revised Penal Code or a general law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the
rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge
Salazar,(G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the
long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate
prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which
thatHernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity
that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion
for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where
one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:
SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos
or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the
following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to
believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest,
prosecution and conviction.
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by
giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from
justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such
failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three
(3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and
some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the
evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1
December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby
concluded that:
In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in the
presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators
in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the very
incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the
Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with
murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for
harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component
elements is readily apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily,
being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose
but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single
intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as
may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of
intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance
of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People
v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659
[1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly
a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore
be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very
nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed
or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision.
Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with the latter crime and can
not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as
article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a
dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in
conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a
special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will
not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All
crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and
charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and
hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These
common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the
Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the
theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under
special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too
intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two
separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with
Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed
by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that
common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common"
offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues
the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541) raised by the petitioner.

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the
crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:
An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is charged in the
present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary
element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a
separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of
preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional
Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further
proceedings therein is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case is already
absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page
663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had the
occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of
subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his
arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The
Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez,
Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no
separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must make up its mind
whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with
murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation
of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not
prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged
with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former
associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social
motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion
instead of being punished separately.
EN BANC On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army
at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass grave contained skeletal remains of
G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014 individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner, (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
vs.
HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct invocation of this Courts jurisdiction, we
Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. take cognizance of these petitions considering that petitioners have chosen to take recourse directly before us
VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the and that the cases are of significant national interest.
Department of Justice, Respondents.
Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to require consideration. Accordingly, in the
x-----------------------x exercise of sound judicial discretion and economy, this Court will pass primarily upon the following:

G.R. No. 185587 1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.
RANDALL B. ECHANIS, Petitioner,
vs. 2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed under the political offense doctrine.
HON. THELMA BUNYl-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, ANTECEDENT FACTS
Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U.
VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition2 seeking the annulment of the orders and resolutions of public
Department of Justice, Respondents. respondents with regard to the indictment and issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners for the crime of
multiple murder.
x-----------------------x
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (P C/Insp. Almaden) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional
G.R. No. 185636 Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the
Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial
RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, Petitioner, Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).3 The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12
vs. complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the Communist Party of the
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder,
32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, including petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members.
Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U.
VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army
Department of Justice, Respondents. discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan,
Leyte.4 Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of
x-----------------------x Operation VD.5

G.R. No. 190005 The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in Regional Office 8 was immediately dispatched to
the mass grave site to conduct crime investigation, and to collect, preserve and analyze the skeletal
VICENTE P. LADLAD, Petitioner, remains.6Also, from 11-17 September 2006, an investigation team composed of intelligence officers, and
vs. medico-legal and DNA experts, conducted forensic crime analysis and collected from alleged relatives of the
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch victims DNA samples for matching.7
32, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006 issued by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame,
DECISION Quezon City, was inconclusive with regard to the identities of the skeletal remains and even the length of time
that they had been buried. The report recommended the conduct of further tests to confirm the identities of the
SERENO, CJ.: remains and the time window of death.9
However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006, the Case Secretariat of the Regional and National Inter-
Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) came up with the names of ten (10) possible victims after comparison and
examination based on testimonies of relatives and witnesses.11
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD. All of them swore that
their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen again.
They also expressed belief that their relatives remains were among those discovered at the mass grave site.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,12 Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid,
Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former members of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP.13 According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central
Committee.14 Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),15 Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),16 Rafael G.
Baylosis (Baylosis),17 and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)18 were then members of the Central Committee.
According to these former members, four sub-groups were formed to implement Operation VD, namely, (1) the
Intel Group responsible for gathering information on suspected military spies and civilians who would not
support the movement; (2) the Arresting Group charged with their arrests; (3) the Investigation Group which
would subject those arrested to questioning; and (4) the Execution Group or the "cleaners" of those confirmed
to be military spies and civilians who would not support the movement.19
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and executed by members of the
CPP/NPA/NDF20 pursuant to Operation VD.21
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring, among
others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses.22 Petitioner Ocampo
submitted his counter-affidavit.23 Petitioners Echanis24 and Baylosis25 did not file counter-affidavits because they
were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of
petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary
investigation.26 However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not served a
subpoena.27
In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15
counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein, for
the death of the following: 1) Juanita Aviola, 2) Concepcion Aragon, 3) Gregorio Eras, 4) Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5)
Restituto Ejoc, 6) Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8) Crispin Dalmacio, 9) Zacarias Casil, 10) Pablo Daniel, 11)
Romeo Tayabas, 12) Domingo Napoles, 13) Ciriaco Daniel, 14) Crispin Prado, and 15) Ereberto Prado. 29
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio
Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital to the success
of the prosecution.30 The Resolution was silent with regard to Veronica Tabara.
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte)
presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando) on 28 February 2007, and docketed as Criminal Case No. H-
1581.31 Petitioner Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Hearing dated 5 March 2007
prior to receiving a copy of the Resolution recommending the filing of the Information.32
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission by all mentioned
accused of the crime charged."33 He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no
recommended bail for their temporary liberty.34
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R. No. 176830 seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order
of Judge Abando and the 16 February 2007 Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.35 The petition prayed for the
unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the
petition.36
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including petitioners Echanis and
Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch
150 (RTC Makati).39 Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common
crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a
necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.40
We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition and the prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction, and set42 the case for oral arguments
on 30 March 2007. The OSG filed its Comment on 27 March 2007.43
The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during the oral arguments:
1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy of petitioner Ocampo;
2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due process during preliminary investigation and in
the issuance of the warrant of arrest;
3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the rebellion charge against him in the RTC. 44
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within 10 days.45 On 3 April 2007, the Court
ordered the provisional release of petitioner Ocampo under a P100,000 cash bond.46
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the single Information filed before the RTC
Hilongos, Leyte was defective for charging 15 counts of murder, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Information and New Informations on 11 April 2007.47 In an Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge Abando
held in abeyance the resolution thereof and effectively suspended the proceedings during the pendency of G.R.
No. 176830 before this Court.48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested on 28 January 2008 by virtue of the
warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on 6 March 2007.49 On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and
Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the
Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.50
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.51 Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a
Motion for Reconsideration52 dated 30 May 2008, but before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an
Order dated 12 June 2008 transmitting the records of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC Manila.53 The Order was issued in compliance with the Resolution dated 23 April 2008 of this Court
granting the request of then Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales to transfer the venue of the case.
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided by Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina (Judge
Medina) and re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-262163.54 Petitioner Echanis was transferred to the PNP
Custodial Center in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 12 August 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their
Supplemental Arguments to Motion for Reconsideration.55
In anOrder56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the proceedings of the case pending the
resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss.57
On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27
October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.58 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185587, prayed for the unconditional
and immediate release of petitioner Echanis, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain his further incarceration.59
On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also seeking the annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27
October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.60 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185636, prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation of the warrant of
arrest against petitioner Baylosis.61
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January 2009.62
On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of these two cases with G.R. No. 176830.63 We
required64 the OSG to comment on the prayer for petitioner Echaniss immediate release, to which the OSG did
not interpose any objection on these conditions: that the temporary release shall only be for the purpose of his
attendance and participation in the formal peace negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August 2009; and that his temporary release shall not
exceed six (6) months.65 The latter condition was later modified, such that his temporary liberty shall continue
for the duration of his actual participation in the peace negotiations.66
On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Echanis under a P100,000 cash bond,
for the purpose of his participation in the formal peace negotiations.67
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition68 to petitioner Ladlads motion to quash before
the RTC Manila. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on 13 February 2009.69
On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70 denying the motion to quash. The motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Ladlad was also denied on 27 August 2009.71
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 May 2009 and 27 August 2009 Orders of Judge Medina.72 The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 190005.
On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005 with G.R. Nos. 176830, 185587 and
185636.73 We also required the OSG to file its comment thereon. The OSG submitted its Comment 74 on 7 May
2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in G.R. Nos. 185636 and 185587.75 These
Comments were filed by the OSG on 13 December 201076 and on 21 January 2011,77 respectively. Petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis filed their Consolidated Reply78 on 7 June 2011.
On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail.79 On 21 July 2011, petitioner Baylosis filed A
Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail.80 The OSG interposed no objection to the grant of a P100,000 cash bail to
them considering that they were consultants of the NDFP negotiating team, which was then holding negotiations
with the GRP peace panel for the signing of a peace accord.81
On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the amount
of P100,000, subject to the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual
participation in the peace negotiations.82
Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment on 18 January 2013.
OUR RULING
Petitioners were accorded due
process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.
A. Preliminary Investigation
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair."84 It is conducted to protect the innocent from the
embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial.85 While the right to have a preliminary investigation before
trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.86
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be
heard.87 It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondents side with regard to the
accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a
reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it.
Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's
defense."88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard.89 Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to
present ones own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.90
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence.91 Petitioner Ladlad claims that he was not served a subpoena due to the false address
indicated in the 12 undated letters of P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor
Vivero.92Furthermore, even though his counsels filed their formal entry of appearance before the Office of the
Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a subpoena through his counsels addresses.93 Thus, they were
deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits.
Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu,
surreptitiously inserted the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records of the case without
furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy.94 The original affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 14 September 2006 stated
that a meeting presided by petitioner Ocampo was held in 1984, when the launching of Operation VD was
agreed upon.95 Petitioner Ocampo refuted this claim in his Counter-affidavit dated 22 December 2006 stating
that he was in military custody from October 1976 until his escape in May 1985.96 Thereafter, the Supplemental
Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 12 January 2007 admitted that he made a mistake in his original affidavit, and
that the meeting actually took place in June 1985.97 Petitioner Ocampo argues that he was denied the
opportunity to reply to the Supplemental Affidavit by not being furnished a copy thereof.
Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero, because the latter deliberately delayed the service of the Resolution by 19 days,
effectively denying petitioner Ocampo his right to due process.98
As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the pertinent portion of Prosecutor Viveros
Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[,] the respondents
were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their counter-affidavits
and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be found in
their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim,
Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin
Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their respective
counsels.99
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the
evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were
made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation
remains valid.100 The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the
prosecution of offenses.101
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents
at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no
longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the
attached documents or evidence.
Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent address "53 Sct. Rallos St., QC,"102 which
had never been his address at any time.103 In connection with this claim, we take note of the fact that the
subpoena to Fides Lim, petitioner Ladlads wife,104 was sent to the same address, and that she was among those
mentioned in the Resolution as having timely submitted their counter-affidavits.
Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlads counsel filed a formal entry of appearance
on 8 December 2006.105 Prosecutor Vivero had a reason to believe that petitioner Ladlad had received the
subpoena and accordingly instructed his counsel to prepare his defense.
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his
counsels formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation.
Instead, he refused to participate.
We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is
sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case."106 Having opted to remain passive during the preliminary
investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of due process, since their failure to
file a counter-affidavit was of their own doing.
Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampos allegation of collusion to surreptitiously insert the
Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records. There was nothing surreptitious about the
Supplemental Affidavit since it clearly alludes to an earlier affidavit and admits the mistake committed regarding
the date of the alleged meeting. The date of the execution of the Supplemental Affidavit was also clearly stated.
Thus, it was clear that it was executed after petitioner Ocampo had submitted his counter-affidavit. Should the
case go to trial, that will provide petitioner Ocampo with the opportunity to question the execution of Zacarias
Piedads Supplemental Affidavit.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampos contention that he was denied the right to be heard. For him to
claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias
Piedad would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has
asserted that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other
witnesses107attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which
had ordered the launch of Operation VD.
As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of
Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period
for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of
receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of the
2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution, or of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero on 12 March 2007, 108 the former
had until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a motion for reconsideration before the latter or an appeal
before the Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant petition for certiorari directly
before this Court on 16 March 2007.
B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution in
finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.109
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested."110 Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the
judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled
that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.111 In fact, the judges personal examination of the
complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a
warrant of arrest.112
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and supporting documents showing the
existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the
basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the
submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. 113
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly examined the records submitted by
Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against them.114 Additionally, petitioner
Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in the record that were used as bases
for his finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.115
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed to
the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge. 116 Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial
judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan117 as follows:
x x x. The trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule, be interfered with in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure errors in the trial court's appreciation
of the evidence of the parties, the conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings, as well as the
conclusions of law. x x x.
Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of
fact based on the allegations in the Informations, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other
documents and/or evidence appended to the Information.
Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits of the complainants and
witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no probable cause for petitioners indictment for multiple
murder or for the issuance of warrants for their arrest. As stated above, the trial judges appreciation of the
evidence and conclusion of facts based thereon are not interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion. Again, "he sufficiently complies with the requirement of personal determination if he reviews the
[I]nformation and the documents attached thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is
probably guilty of the crime with which he is being charged."118
Judge Abandos review of the Information and the supporting documents is shown by the following portion of
the judges 6 March 2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and filed by the Provincial Prosecution of
Leyte Province supported by the following documents: Affidavits of Complainants, Sworn Statements of
Witnesses and other pertinent documents issued by the Regional Crime Laboratory Office, PNP, Region VIII and
Camp Crame, Quezon City, pictures of the grave site and skeletal remains, this court has the findings [sic] of
probable cause in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged.119
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance of a warrant of arrest,
as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact that are normally not within the purview of a
petition for certiorari,120 such as the petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is not a
ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination
by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense,
or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." 121
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion.122 Thus, when a killing is
committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the
political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents with simple
rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that
the institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of
the public prosecutor.123
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court
to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of
the act to be conclusively demonstrated.124
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in furtherance of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged murders can be clearly seen from
the charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the defense,
since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows.125 The proof showing political motivation is
adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It
is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA,126 if during trial,
petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion,
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the
trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any
accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its
order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court
may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial court
shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners
would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila, Branch 32, is hereby
ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner Saturnino C.
Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until the termination of the
proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad shall
remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until their actual participation as CPP-NDF
consultants in the peace negotiations with the government are concluded or terminated, or until the termination
of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner.
SO ORDERED.

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.127

A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for which the
accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.128

To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and penalized under Article 134
in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the
RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.129

However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944.1awp++i1 Even before the indictment for
rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a petition
before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the
members of the prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and independence. 130 When the indictment was
filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal
Case No. 06-944.131 We eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy
never had a chance to attach.

Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the P100,000 cash bond posted before the Office of
the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on provisional liberty until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC
Manila.1wphi1

The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad in view of
the ongoing peace negotiations. Their provisional release from detention under the cash bond of P100,000 each
shall continue under the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual
participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the government or until the termination of
the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner. It shall be the duty of the government to inform
this Court the moment that peace negotiations are concluded.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market
when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the
policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom
shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his
companions boarded a tricycle and fled. 1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from
Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta
identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant's father was his
first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and
other parts of the body. 2 On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic
shock.3
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an
Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, at Burgos Street,
Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim. Case No. 5931 before
RTC, Branch I, and three (3) others whose true identities are at present unknown and remain at large, conniving,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to
kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire and
shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot
wounds causing his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The
dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime
of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to pay the heirs of the
deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said widow the sum of Eighteen
Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part of the said accused.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial court decision finding him
guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that
he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a
police informer, identified him as a member of the New People's Army. Additionally, he contends that because
the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends," 4 (said killing) should have been
deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming
that he did not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he
should have been charged merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2
of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty of prison
mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder, the Solicitor General avers
that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively
proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive
ends." 5 Moreover, the Solicitor General contends that even if appellant were to be convicted of rebellion, and
even if the trial court had found appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a rebellion, the proper
imposable penalty is not prision mayor as appellant contends, but reclusion temporal, because Executive Order
No. 187 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal as the penalty imposable for individuals found
guilty as participants in a rebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and not rebellion.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the
following manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to
said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of
land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially, of any of
their powers or prerogatives. 6
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. 7 By its very nature,
rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined
a priori within predetermined bounds. 8 One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts
committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political character.
This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People v. Hernandez, 9 thus:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as
may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually
regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the
Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof," then it becomes stripped of its
"common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the
political character of the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different color by
being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if
the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not
the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively
demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind
which the accused, better than any individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes, 10 this court stressed that:
Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's) knowledge and since moreover this is an affirmative
defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to state, which they could easily do personally or through
witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven.
Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the
crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would be separately
punishable as a common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion. 11
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime alleging
rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty could benefit from the law's relatively benign
attitude towards political crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v.
Amin, 12 where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829, 13 for
allegedly harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the senator's knowledge that
Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against the prosecution's contention, that rebellion and
violation of P.D 1829 could be tried separately 14 (on the principle that rebellion is based on the Revised Penal
Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the senator was being charged, though punishable
under a special law, was absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related to the acts for which
he was charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor
of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a
separate prosecution for rebellion had already been filed and in fact decided, the Court said:
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in
rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are
perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense. 15
Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court in Enrile vs. Amin further underscored that:
[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or
concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is
completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of
rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the
common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v. Ompad, Jr., 16 to the instant case is striking. Two
witnesses, both former NPA recruits identified the accused Ompad, alias "Commander Brando," a known hitman
of the NPA, as having led three other members of the NPA in the liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan, a military
informer, also in a rebel infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was merely charged
with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because political motive was neither alleged nor proved.
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political motive lies on the
accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information. 17 It must be established by clear and satisfactory
evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we held:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or defense that the accused has
the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that his superiors
told him of Dayrit being an informer, and his suspicion that he was one such, is neither sufficient or adequate to
establish that the motivation for the killing was political, considering appellant's obvious interest in testifying to
that effect. 18
Similarly, in People v. Buco, 19 the Court stressed that accused in that case failed to establish that the reason for
the killing of their victim was to further or carry out rebellion. The evidence adduced by the defense therein
simply showed that appellant Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas Calma, alias "Commander Sol" to kill
municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise showed that Calma was induced by an
acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing on account of private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of
land. The court attributed no political motive for the killing, though committed by known members of the
Hukbalahap movement. 20
People v. Dasig 21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case. There, the Court held that "the act of
killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion." In Dasig the Court however noted that the
accused, who was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership with the NPA but also executed an
extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of an NPA "sparrow unit," a fact to which even the
Solicitor General, in his brief therein was in agreement. The Solicitor General's brief in Dasig which this Court
favorably quoted, noted that:
[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly
constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed
as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.22
By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in the case at bench. He states that
accused-appellant's belated claims to membership in the NPA were not only insubstantial but also self
serving 23an averment to which, given a thorough review of the circumstances of the case, we fully agree. He
states:
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA, clearly overcame the burden of proving
motive or intent. It was shown that the political motivation for the killing of the victim was the fact that Ragaul
was suspected as an informer for the PC. The perpetrators even left a letter card, a drawing on the body of
Ragaul as a warning to others not to follow his example. It is entirely different in the case at bar where the
evidence for the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and denials not substantial enough as
an indicia of political motivation in the killing of victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo. 24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial confession to having
participated in the killing of Lucilo as follows:
Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?
A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male person a
certainalias ALWIN, ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one unknown to me, fetched me and told me to go with them,
so I asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he stopped/call a passenger jeepney and told me
board on said jeepney. (sic)
Q Please continue.
A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we alighted on said jeep, so we walk towards
Daraga Bakery we stopped walking due to it is raining, when the rain stopped we continue walking by using the
road near the bakery. (sic)
Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7 you used the road near the bakery where did you
proceed?
A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue walking, at more less 4:30 P.M. July 27,
1992 one of my companion told us as to quote in Bicol dialect, to wit: "AMO NA YADI AN TINAMPO PALUWAS"
(This is the place towards the poblacion), so, I placed myself just ahead of a small store, my three (3) companions
continue walking towards poblacion, later on a policeman sporting white T-shirt and a khaki pant was walking
towards me, while the said policeman is nearly approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman in front of the
small store, when the said policeman fell on the asphalted road, ALWIN took the service firearm of the said
policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2) companions commanded a tricycle then we
fled until we reached a hill wherein there is a small bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the handgun that was
handed to me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)
Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?
A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO. (sic)
Q What is your participation in the group?
A Look-out sir.
Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)
A No more sir. 25
It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did appellant ever mention that he was a
member of the New People's Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which would suggest that
the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover, the information filed
against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any mention or allusion as to the involvement of
the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo. 26 Even prosecution eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in
his sworn statement of October 19, 1992. 27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as
an afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up and followed through upon prosecution
eyewitness Armenta's testimony on cross-examination that he knew appellant to be a member of the NPA.
Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as
an NPA member. 28 The logical result, of course, was that the trial court did not give any weight and credence to
said testimony. The trial court, after all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness' testimony while
upholding the rest of it. 29 While disbelieving the portion of Armenta's testimony on appellant's alleged
membership in the NPA, the trial court correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the crime
was committed. 30 Such narration is even corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of the
gun wielder, by the testimony of the appellant himself.
In any case, appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime being a matter
of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified that, upon the prodding
of aliasAlwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the organization's
goals. 31 He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because he "had offended our organization," 32 without,
however, specifying what the "offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had been a member of the NPA for five
months before the shooting incident. 33
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's contentions are couched in terms so general and non-
specific 34 that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made towards the
achievement of the NPA's subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was never alleged to be an
informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended the NPA. Against appellant's attempts to shade
his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence on record leaves the impression that appellant's
bare allegations of membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon
him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the
furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of mitigating the imposable
penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis
v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly observed:
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits, or irresponsible or deranged
individuals, is a reality that cannot be ignored or belittled. Their activities, the killings and acts of destruction and
terrorism that they perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated despite the best efforts that the Government
authorities are exerting, although it may be true that the insurrectionist groups of the right or the left no longer
pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The need for more stringent laws and more rigorous law-
enforcement, cannot be gainsaid. 35
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo,
we are satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder. 36 It is of no moment
that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is settled that the testimony of one witness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. 37 Against appellant's claims that he acted merely as a look-out, the
testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free from any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to
convict the accused. 38Moreover, neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or
absence of motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who
fully and satisfactorily identified appellant as the perpetrator of the felony. 39 In the case at bench, the strength
of the prosecution's case was furthermore bolstered by accused-appellant's admission in open court that he and
the eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against each other.40

Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and
without warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the
trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all the accessories provided by
law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the
accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17748 March 4, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Vicente Sotto for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee
MALCOLM, J.:
As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain members of the Philippine Constabulary to inflict revenge
upon the police of the city of Manila, charges of sedition were filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila against the participants in the public disturbance. Convicted in the trial court of a violation of Act No. 292
of the Philippine Commission, and sentenced either to the maximum penalty or a near approach to the
maximum penalty provided by the punitive provisions of that law, all of the defendants have perfected an appeal
to this court. A statement of the case and of the facts, an opinion on the pertinent issues, and a judgement, if no
reversible error be found, regarding the appropriate penalty, will be taken up in the order named.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS
On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested a woman who was a member of the household
of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia Barracks in this city. The arrest of the woman was
considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage committed by the policemen, and it instantly
gave rise to friction between members of Manila police department and member of the Philippine Constabulary.
The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policemen named Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle Real, in the
District of Intramuros, city of Manila, had an encounter with various Constabulary soldiers which resulted in the
shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary. Private Macasinag was seriously, and as afterwards
appeared, mortally wounded.
The encounter between policemen Mojica and other companions of the Manila force and private Macasinag and
other companions of the Constabulary, with its grave consequences for a Constabulary soldier endangered a
deep feeling of resentment on the part of the soldiers at Santa Lucia Barracks. This resentment was soon
converted into a desire for revenge against the police force of the city of Manila. The officers of the Constabulary
appear to have been aware of the state of excitement among the soldiers the shooting of private Macasinag,
Captain Page, the commanding officer of the Barracks, increased the number of guards, and confined all the
soldiers in the Barracks.
During the afternoon of the next day, December 15, 1920, a rumor spread among the soldiers in Santa Lucia
Barracks to the effect that policeman Mojica was allowed to continue on duty on the streets of Intramuros and
that private Macasinag had died as a consequence of the shot he received the night before. This rumor
contributed in no small degree in precipitating a movement for reprisal by the Constabulary soldiers against the
policemen.
At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day, December 15, 1920, corporal Ingles of the Fourth Company
approached private Nicolas Torio who was then the man in charge of quarters, and asked him to let the soldiers
out through the window of the quarters of the Fourth Company. Private Torio was easily persuaded to permit
private Francisco Garcia of the Second Company to saw out the window bars of the quarters, in his charge, and
to allow soldiers to escape through the window with rifles and ammunition under the command of their
sergeants and corporals. When outside of the quarters, these soldiers divided into groups for attack upon the
city police force.
One platoon of Constabulary soldiers apparently numbering about ten or twelve, on Calle Real, Intramuros, fired
in the direction of the intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo where an American policeman named Driskill was
stationed, and was taking with a friend named Jacumin, a field clerk in the United States Army. These two men
were shot and died soon afterwards. To the credit of policeman Driskill be it said, that although in a dying
condition and in the face of overwhelming odds, her valiantly returned the fire with his revolver. Jacumin was
killed notwithstanding that in response to the command of Constabulary, "Hands up!," he elevated both arms.
A street car happened to stop at this time at the corner of Calles Real and Cabildo. Without considering that the
passengers in the car were innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad fired a volley into the car, killing instantly
the passenger named Victor de Torres and gravely wounding three other civilian passengers, Gregorio Cailes,
Vicente Antonio, and Mariano Cortes. Father Jose Tahon, a priest of the Cathedral of Manila, proved himself a
hero on this occasion for, against the command of the Constabulary, he persisted in persuading them to cease
firing and advanced in order that he might administer spiritual aid to those who had been wounded.
The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time. Some minutes later, Captain William E. Wichman, assistant chief
of police of the city of Manila, riding in a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, arrived at the corner of Calles
Real and Magallanes in Intramuros, and a volley of shorts by Constabulary soldiers resulted in the instantaneous
death of Captain Wichman and the death shortly afterwards of patrolman Saplala.
About the same time, a police patrol came from the Meisic police station. When it was on Calle Real near
Cabildo, in Intramuros, it was fired upon by Constabulary soldiers who had stationed themselves in the courtyard
of the San Agustin Church. This attack resulted in the death of patrolmen Trogue and Sison.
Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty and forty in number, had in the meantime, arranged
themselves in a firing line on the Sunken Gradens on the east side of Calle General Luna opposite the Aquarium.
From this advantageous position the Constabulary fired upon the motorcycle occupied by Sergeant Armada and
driven by policeman Policarpio who with companions were passing along Calle General Luna in front of the
Aquarium going in the direction, of Calle Real, Intramuros. As a result of the shooting, the driver of the
motorcycle, policeman Policarpio, was mortally wounded. This same platoon of Constabulary soldiers fired
several volleys indiscriminately into the Luneta police station, and the office of the secret service of the city of
Manila across Calles General Luna and Padre Burgos, but fortunately no one was injured.
General Rafael Crame, Chief of the Constabulary, and Captain Page, commanding officer of the Santa Lucia
Barracks, and other soldiers in the streets of Manila, and other soldiers one after another returned to the
Barracks where they were disarmed. No list of the names of these soldiers was, however, made.
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1920, Colonel, Lucien R. Sweet of the Constabulary officers, and
later by the fiscals of the city of Manila, commenced an investigation of the events of the night before. He first
ordered that all the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks at that time, numbering some one hundred and eighty, be
assembled on the parade ground and when this was done, the soldiers were separated into their respective
companies. Then Colonel Sweet, speaking in English with the assistance of Captain Silvino Gallardo, who
interpreted his remarks into Tagalog, made to all of the soldiers two statements.
What occurred on the occasion above described can best be told in the exact language of Colonel Sweet: "I
assembled all four companies in Santa Lucia Barracks and asked them to tell me which ones had been out the
night before and which ones had participated in the shooting, which they did, and to tell me the names of those
who were with them and who were not then present, which they did. I think there were seventy-two (seventy-
three) present and they named five (four) others." Again the witness said: "At first I asked all those who went out
on the previous night for any purpose whatever to signify the fact by stepping forward and gave them five
minutes to think it over before doing so. To those who stepped forward that had gone out for any purpose
whatever I asked those who took part in the shooting the night before that in justice to themselves and to the
other men who had not taken part in it, and for the good of all concerned, that they step forward and they did."
The names of the four who took part (not five as stated by Colonel Sweet), but ho were taken to present, were
noted by Captain Gallardo.
The statements of the seventy-seven soldiers were taken in writing during the afternoon of the same day,
December 16. The questionnaire prepared by the fiscal of the city of Manila was in English or Spanish. The
questions and answers were, however, when requested by the soldiers, translated not their dialects. Each
statement was signed by the soldier making it in the presence of either two or three witnesses.
Although the answers to the questions contained these statements vary in phraseology, in substance they are
the same. One of them, the first in numerical order, that of Sergeant Graciano L. Cabrera, taken in Spanish and
interpreted into Tagalog, may be selected into Tagalog, may be selected as typical of the rest, and is here literally
transcribed:
1. Give your name, age, status, occupation, and residence. Graciano I. Cabrera, 254 years of age, single,
sergeant of the first company of the General Service of the Constabulary, residing in Santa Lucia Barracks.
2. To what company of the Philippine Constabulary do you belong? First Company, General Service of the
Constabulary.]
3. Where were you garrisoned yesterday afternoon December 15,
1920? In the Santa Lucia Barracks.
4. Did you leave the barracks at about 7 o'clock yesterday evening? Yes, sir.
5. For what reason, and where did you go? We went in search of the policemen and secret service men of
Manila. It has been sometime now since we have been having standing grudge against now since we have been
having a standing grudge against the police of Manila. The wife of one of our comrades was first arrested by the
policemen and then abused by the same; and not content with having abused her, they gave this woman to an
American; after this incident, they arrested two soldiers of the Constabulary, falsely accusing them of keeping
women of bad reputation; after this incident, came the shooting of Macasinag, a shooting not justified, because
we have come to know that Macasinag did nothing and the policemen could have arrested him if they desired.
Moreover, the rumor spread among us that the police department of Manila had given orders to the policemen
to fire upon any Constabulary soldier they found in the streets, and we believe that the rumor was not without
foundation since we noticed that after the Macasinag affair, the policemen of Manila, Contrary to the usual
practice, were armed with carbines or shotguns. For this reason we believe that if we did not put an end to these
abuses of the policemen and secret service men, they would continue abusing the constabulary. And as an act of
vengeance we did what we had done last night.
6. How did you come to join your companions who rioted last night? I saw that almost all the soldiers were
jumping through the window and I was to be left alone in the barracks and so I followed.
7. Who asked you to join it? Nobody.
8. Do you know private Crispin Macasinag, the one who was shot by the Manila police the night before last on
Calle Real? Yes, Sir, I know him because he was our comrade.
9. Were you offended at the aggression made on the person of said soldier? Indeed, yes, not only was I
offended, but my companions also were.
10. State how many shots you fired, if nay, during the riot last night. I cannot tell precisely the number of
shots I fired because I was somewhat obfuscated; all I can assure you is that I fired more than once.
11. Do you know if you hit any policeman or any other person?-If so state whether the victim was a policeman or
a civilian. I cannot tell whether I hit any policeman or any civilian.
12. State the streets of the city where you fired shots. I cannot given an exact account of the streets where I
fired my gun. I had full possession of my faculties until I reached Calle Victoria; afterwards, I became aware that I
was bathed with perspiration only upon reaching the barracks.
13. What arms were you carrying and how much ammunition or how many cartidge did you use? I Carried a
carbine; I cannot tell precisely the number of cartridges I used; however, I placed in my pocket the twenty
cartridges belonging to me and I must have lost.
14. How did you manage to leave the barracks? By the window of the quarter of the Fourth Company, through
the grating which I found cut off.
15. Are the above statements made by you, voluntarily, freely, and spontaneously given? Yes, sir.
16. Do you swear to said statements although no promise of immunity is made to you? Yes, sir; I confirm
them, being true.
(Sgd.) G. L. CABRERA.
Witnesses:
S. GALLARDO.
LAURO C. MARQUEZ.
The defendants were charged in one information filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the
crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the same, court, with the crimes of murder and serious
physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before different judges of first instance.
All of the accused, with the exception of eight, namely, Francisco Ingles, Juan Noromor, P. E. Vallado., Dionisio
Verdadero, and Paciano Caa, first pleased guilty to the charge of sedition, but later, after the first witness for
the prosecution had testified, the accused who had pleaded guilty were permitted, with the consent of the
court, to substitute therefor the plea of not guilty. the prosecution, in making out it case, presented the seventy-
seven confession of the defendants, introduced in evidence as Exhibits C to C-76, conclusive, and with the
exception of those made by Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Gamus, and Venancio Mira, all were identified by the
respective Constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who intervened in taking them. The prosecution
further relied on oral testimony, including eyewitness to the uprising.
The attorneys for the accused presented two defenses. The first defense was in favor of all the defendants and
was based on the contention that the written statements Exhibits C to C-76 were not freely and voluntarily made
by them. The second defense was in favor of the defendants Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Roberto
Palabay, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Roque Ebol, Francisco Garcia, Benigno Tagavilla, Paciano Caa,
Juan Abarques, Genaro Elayda, Hilario Hibabar, P. E. Vallado, Patricio Bello, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio,
Nemesio Decea, Venancio Mira, Baldomero Rodriguez, Juan Noromor, Maximo Perlas, and Victor Atuel, and
was to the effect these men did not take part in the riot.
The court overruled the special defenses and found that the guilt of the accused had been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. All of the defendants were sentenced to serve the maximum imprisonment of ten years
provided by section 6 of Act No. 292. The court, however, distinguished fines from that of a defendants Francisco
Garcia, a private and the eight corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarques,
Pedro V. Matero, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, upon each of whom a fine of P5,000 was
imposed, and of the three sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, upon each of
whom a fine of P10,000 was imposed. The costs were divided proportionately among the defendants.
For the statement of the cases and the facts which has just been made, we are indebted in large measure to the
conspicuously fair and thoughtful decisions of the Honorable George R. Harvey who presided in the sedition case
and of the Honorable Carlos Imperial who presided in the murder case. As stipulated by the Attorney-General
and counsel for the defendants, the proof is substantially the same in both cases.
In all material respects we agree with the findings of fact as made by the trial court in this case. The rule is again
applied that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgement of the trial court in passing upon the
credibility of the opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstances of weight
and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. (U. S. vs.
Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil., 295; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918], 37 Phil., 599.) In the record of the case at
bar, no such fact or circumstance appears.
OPINION
An assignment of five errors is made by counsel for the defendants and appellants. Two the assignment of error
merit little or no consideration. Assignment of error No. 2 (finding its counterpart in assignments of error 5 and 6
in the murder case), in which it is attempted to establish that Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Paciano Caa,
Juan Abarquez, Mariano Garcia, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero Rodriguez, Roberto
Palabay, Juan Noromor, Roque Ebol, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Cipriano Lizardo, Francisco Garcia, Genaro Elayda,
Hilario Hibalar, P. M. Vallado, Maximo Perlas, and Benigno Tagavilla, did not leave the Santa Lucia Barracks in the
night of the tragedy, is predicated on the special defense raised in the lower court for these defendants and
three other and which was found untenable by the trial court. Any further discussion of this question falls more
appropriately under consideration of assignment of error No. 4, relating to the conspiracy between the accused.
Assignment of error No. 3, relating to the finding of the trial court that it had not been shown that the policemen
were not aware of the armed attack of the Constabulary, However, we find that the evidence supports this
conclusion of the trial court.
The three pertinent issues in this case relate to: (1) the Admission of Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution
(assignment of error No. 2, murder case); (2) the conspiracy between the accused (assignment of error No. 4,
sedition case; assignment of error No. 3, murder case); and (3) the conviction of the accused of a violation of the
Treason and Sedition Law (assignment of error No. 5, sedition case).
1. The admission of exhibits C to C-76
Appellants claim that fraud and deceit marked the preparation of the seventy seven confessions. It is alleged that
some of the defendants signed the confessions under the impression that those who had taken part in the affray
would be transferred to Mindanao, and that although they did not in fact so participate, affirmed that they
because of a desire to leave Manila; that other stepped forward "for the good of the service" in response to
appeals from Colonel Sweet and other officers; while still others simply didn't understand what they were doing,
for the remarks of Colonel Sweet were made in English and only translated into Tagalog, and their declarations
were sometime taken in al language which was unintelligible to them. Counsel for the accused entered timely
objection to the admission in evidence of Exhibits C to C-76, and the Attorney-General is worn in stating
otherwise.
Section 4 of Act No. 619, entitle "An Act to promote good order and discipline in the Philippines Constabulary,"
and reading: "No confession of any person charged with crime shall be received as evidence against him by any
court of justice unless be first shown to the satisfaction of the court that it was freely and voluntarily made and
not the result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace or of promises or offers of reward or leniency," was
repealed by the first Administrative Code. But the same rule of jurisprudence continues without the law. As he
been repeatedly announced by this and other courts, "the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made
freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort". If the confession is freely and voluntarily
made, it constitutes one of the most effectual proofs in the law against the party making it. (Wilson vs. U.
S.[1896], 162 U. S. 613.)The burden of proof that he confession was not voluntarily made or was obtained by
undue pressure is on the accused. (U. S. vs Zara [1912, 42 Phil., 308.)
What actually occurred when the confessions were prepared is clearly explained in the records. The source of
the rumor that the defendant would be transferred to Mindanao if they signed the confession is not established.
One the contrary it is established that before the declaration were taken, Lieutenant Gatuslao in response to a
query had shown the improbability of such a transfer. With military orders given in English and living in the city
of Manila where the dialect is tagalog, all of the defendants must have understood the substantial part of
Colonel Sweet's remarks. What is more important, there could be no misunderstanding as to the contents of the
confessions as written down. In open court, sixty-nine of the defendants reiterated their guilt. The officers who
assisted in the investigation were of the same service as the defendants in their own men.
It must also be remembered that each and everyone of the defendants was a member of the Insular Police force.
Because of the very nature of their duties and because of their practical experience, these Constabulary soldiers
must have been aware of the penalties meted out for criminal offenses. Every man on such a momentous
occasion would be more careful of his actions than ordinarily and whatever of credulity there is in him, would for
the moment be laid aside. Over and above all desire for a more exciting life, over and above the so called esprit
de corps, is the instinct of self preservation which could not but be fully aroused by such stirring incidents too
recent to be forgotten as had occurred in this case, and which would counsel prudence rather than rashness;
secretiveness rather than garrulity.
These confessions contain the statements that they were made freely and voluntarily without any promise of
immunity. That such was the case was corroborated by the attesting witnesses whose credibility has not been
successfully impeached.
We rule that the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution.
2. The conspiracy between the accused
The contention of the appellants is that evidence is lacking of any supposed connivance between the accused.
Counsel emphasizes that in answer to the question in the confession, "who asked you to join the riot," each of
the accused answered, "Nobody." The argument is then advanced that the appellants cannot be held criminally
responsible because of the so called psychology of crowds theory. In other words, it is claimed that at the time of
the commission of the crime the accused were mere automatons obeying the insistent call of their companions
and of their uniform. From both the negative failure of evidence and the positive evidence, counsel could deduce
the absence of conspiracy between the accused.
The attorney-General answers the argument of counsel by saying that conspiracy under section 5 of Act No. 292
is not an essential element of the crime of sedition. In this law officer for the people may be on solid ground.
However, this may be, there is a broader conception of the case which reaches the same result.
It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to perform a criminal act, each is responsible for all the
acts of the other done in furtherance of the common design; and " the result is the same if the act is divided into
parts and each person proceed with his part unaided." (U. S. vs Maza [1905], 5 Phils., 346; U. S. vs. Remegio
[1918] 37 Phil., 599; decision of supreme court of Spain of September 29, 1883; People vs. Mather [1830], 4
Wendell, 229.)
Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances which vary
according to the purposes to be accomplished. It be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same
object, one performing one part and another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the
attainment of that same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to
effect that object. (5 R. C. L., 1088.) Applied to the facts before us, it is incontestable that all of the defendants
were imbued with the same purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the police force of the city of Manila.
A common feeling of resentment animated all. A common plan evolved from their military training was followed.
The effort to lead the court into the realm of psychology and metaphysics is unavailing in the face of actualities.
The existence of a joint assent may be reasonably inferred from the facts proved. Not along are the men who
fired the fatal shots responsible, not along are the men who admit firing their carbines responsible, but all,
having united to further a common design of hate and vengeance, are responsible for the legal consequences
therefor.
We rule that the trail court did not err in declaring that there a c conspiracy between the accused.
3. The conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sediton Law
Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The Philippine law
on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to
obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or
revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or
Municipal Government. The trial court found that the crime of sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had
been committed, and we believe that such finding is correct.
Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292 it is and
necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functionary, and that
what really happened in this instance was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, is
absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of section 5 of the Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction
between the persons to which it applies. In one scene there was a fights between two armed bodies of the
Philippine Government, but it was an unequal fight brought on by the actions of the accused.
We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused of the violation of section 5, paragraph 3, of Act
No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
JUDGEMENT
The Treason and Sedition Law provides as a penalty for any person guilty of sedition as defined in section 5 of
the law, punishment by fine of not exceeding P10,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both. In
this connection, it will be recalled that the court sentenced each of the private soldiers Salvador Gregorio, Juan
Noromor, Patricio Bello, Nemesio Decea, Baldomero Rodriguez, P. E. Vallado, Pedro Layola, Felix Liron (Cenon),
Dionisio Verdadero, Lorenzo Tumboc, Casiano Guinto, Victor Atuel, Venancio Mira, Benigno Tagavilla, Masaway,
Quintin Desierto, Teofilo Llana, Timoteo Opermaria, Maximo Perlas, Cornelio Elizaga, Roberto Palabay, Roque
Ebol, Benito Garcia, Honorio Bautista, Crisanto Salgo, Francisco Lusano, Marcelino Silos, Nicanor Perlas, Patricio
Rubio, Mariano Aragon, Silvino Ayngco, Guillermo Inis, Julian Andaya, Crispin Mesalucha, Prudencio Tasis, Silvino
Bacani, Petronilo Antonio, Domingo Peroche, Florentino Jacob, Paciano Caa, Domingo Canapi, Arcadio San
Pedro, Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Camas, Luis Borja, Severino Elefane, Vicente Tabien, Marcos Marquez, Victorino
Merto, Bernabe Sison, Eusebio Cerrudo, Julian Acantilado, Ignacio Lechoncito, Pascual Dionio, Marcial Pelicia,
Rafael Nafrada, Zacarias Bayle, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Juan Miranda, Graciano Zapata, Felisardo
Favinal, Gaspar Andrade, Felix Lamsing, and Vicente Casimiro, to suffer imprisonment for ten years, and to pay
one seventy-seventh part of the costs; the private Francisco Garcia, who sawed the bars of the window through
which the defendants passed from Santa Lucia Barracks and each of the corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles,
Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarquez, Pedro V. Mateo, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, to suffer
imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P5,000 and one seventy-seventy of the costs; and each of the
sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and
to pay a fine of P10,000 and one seventy-seventy of the costs. The trial judge appears to have made a reasonable
exercise of the discretion which the law reposes in him.
We cannot bring to a close this disagreeable duty without making our own the pertinent observations found in
the decision of the trial court in this case. Therein, along toward the closed of his learned opinion, Judge Harvey
said:
Rarely in the history of criminality in this country has there been registered a crime so villainous as that
committed by these defendants. The court is only concerned in this case with crime of sedition. The maximum
penalty prescribed by Act No. 292, imprisonment for ten year and a fine P10,000, is not really commensurate
with the enormity of the offense. Impelled by hatred, employing their knowledge of military sciences which is
worthy of a better cause, and in disregard of the consequences to themselves and their innocent loved ones, and
using the means furnished to them by the Government for the protection of life and property, they sought by
force and violence and outside of legal methods to avenge a fancied wrong by an armed and tumultuous attack
upon officials and agents of the government of the city of Manila.

Although in view of the sentence which is being handed down in the murder case, affecting these same
defendants and appellants, it would seem to be a useless formality to impose penalties in this case, yet it is
obviously our duty to render judgement appealed from, with one seventy-seventh of the costs of this instance
against each appellant. So ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5803 November 29, 1954
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NARCISO UMALI, ET AL., defendants.
NARCISO UMALI, EPIFANIO PASUMBAL and ISIDRO CAPINO, defendants-appellants.
Jose P. Laurel, Cipriano Primicias, Alejo Mabanag, Manuel Concordia, P.M. Stuart Del Rosario, Tomas R. Umali,
Eufemio E. De Mesa and Edmundo T. Zepeda for appellants.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Narciso Umali, Epifanio Pasumbal, and Isidro Capino are appealing directly to this Tribunal from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon province finding them guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, and sentencing each of them to "life imprisonment, other
accessories of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally Marcial Punsalan in the amount of P24,023; Valentin
Robles in the amount of P10,000; Yao Cabon in the amount of P700; Claro Robles in the amount of P12,800;
Pocho Guan in the amount of P600; the heirs of Domingo Pisigan in the amount of P6,000; the heirs of Locadio
Untalan in the amount of P6,000; Patrolman Pedro Lacorte in the amount of P500; Lazaro Ortega in the amount
of P300; Hilarion Aselo in the amount of P300; Calixto Rivano in the amount P50; Melecio Garcia in the amount
of P60; and Juanito Lector in the amount of P90, each to pay one fifteenth of the costs, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency due to the nature of the principal penalty that is imposed upon them."
The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty was said to have been committed during the raid
staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed
men. It is not denied that such a raid took place resulting in the burning down and complete destruction of the
house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at
P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano
and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians; that during and after the
burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stories; and
that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the
town led by Captain Alzate.
To understand the reason for and object of the raid we have to go into the political situation in Tiaong not only
shortly before that raid but one year or two years before it. Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old time
friends and belonged to the same political faction. In the general elections of 1947 Umali campaigned for
Punzalan who later was elected Mayor of Tiaong. In the elections of 1949 Punzalan in his turn campaigned and
worked for Narciso Umali resulting in the latter's election as Congressman. However, these friendly relations
between the two did not endure. In the words of Punzalan, Narciso Umali who as Congressman regarded himself
as the political head and leader in that region including Tiaong, became jealous because of his (Punzalan's) fast
growing popularity among the people of Tiaong who looked to him instead of Umali for political guidance,
leadership, and favors. In time the strain in their relations became such that they ceased to have any dealings
with each other and they even filed mutual accusations. According to Punzalan, in May 1950, Umali induced
about twenty-six special policemen of his (Punzalan's) to flee to the mountains with their arms and join the Huks,
this is in order to discredit Punzalan's administration; that he was later able to contact two of his twenty-six
policemen and tried to persuade them to return to the town and to the service, but they told him that they and
their companions would not surrender except and with through the intervention of Congressman Umali, and so
Punzalan had to seek Umali's intervention which resulted in the surrender of the 26 men with their firearms; that
thereafter Umali wanted to have their firearms, claiming that they all belonged to him from his guerrilla days
when he was a colonel, and that after liberation he had merely loaned them to the municipal authorities of
Tiaong to help keep peace and order; and that the refusal of Punzalan to grant Umali's request further strained
their relations, and thereafter Umali would not speak to him even when they happened to meet at parties.
On September 19, 1951, the Chief of Police of Punzalan disarmed four of Umali's men, including his bodyguard
Isidro Capino who were then charged with illegal possession of firearms. Umali interceded for his men and Col.
Gelveson, Provincial Commander, sent a telegram stating that the firearms taken away from the men were
licensed. As a result the complaint was dismissed. This incident was naturally resented by Umali and spurred him
to have a showdown with Punzalan.
Then the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached and Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose him, and to
clip his political wings and definitely blast his ambition for continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali
picked Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader.
The pre-election campaign and fight waged by both factions Punzalan and Pasumbal, was intense and bitter,
even ruthless. The election was to be a test of political strength and would determine who was who in Tiaong,
Umali or Punzalan. Umali spoke at political meetings, extolling the virtues of Pasumbal and the benefits and
advantages that would accrue to the town if he was elected, at the same time bitterly attacking Punzalan,
accusing him of dishonesty, corruption in office, abuse of power, etc. At one of those meetings he told the
audience not to vote for Punzalan because he would not be elected and that even if he won the election, he
would not sit for blood will flow, and that he (Umali) had already prepared a golden coffin for him (Punzalan).
After denying the charges, in retort, Punzalan would say that Umali as a Congressman was useless, and that he
did not even attend the sessions and that his chair in Congress had gathered dust, even cobwebs.
To help in the Umali-Pasumbal campaign, Amado Mendoza who later was to play the role of star witness for the
prosecution, was drafted. He was a compadre of Pasumbal and had some experience in political campaigns, and
although he was not exactly a model citizen, being sometimes given to drunkenness, still, he had the gift of
speech and persuasion. In various political meetings he delivered speeches for Pasumbal. He was ever at the
back and call of Umali and Pasumbal, and naturally he frequented the latter's houses or headquarters. The result
of the elections plainly showed that Punzalan was the political master and leader in Tiaong. He beat Pasumbal by
an overwhelming majority of 2,221 votes. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were keenly disappointed, and
according to the evidence, adopted measures calculated to frustrate Punzalan's victory, even as prophesied by
Umali himself in one of his pre-election speeches about blood flowing and gold coffin.
Going back to the raid staged in Tiaong on November 14, 1951, it is well to make a short narration of the
happenings shortly before it, established by the evidence, so as to ascertain and be informed of the reason or
purpose of said raid, the persons, behind it, and those who took part in it. According to the testimony of Amado
Mendoza, in the morning of November 12th, that is, on the eve of the election, at the house of Pasumbal's
father, then being used as his electoral headquarters, he heard Umali instruct Pasumbal to contact the Huks
through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be killed, Pasumbal complying with the order of his Chief
(Umali) went to the mountains which were quite near the town and held a conference with Commander Abeng.
It would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was going to win in the elections the next
day, and that his death was the surest way to eliminate him from the electoral fight.
The conference between Pasumbal and Commander Abeng on November 12th was witnessed and testified to by
Nazario Anonuevo, a Huk who was under Commander Abeng, and who later took an active part in the raid. In the
evening of the same day, Mendoza heard Pasumbal report to Umali about his conference with Commander
Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to the proposition and had even outlined the manner of attack, that
the Huks would enter the town (Tiaong) under Commander Lucio and Aladin, the latter to lead the sector
towards the East; but that Commander Abeng had suggested that the raid be postponed because Pasumbal may
yet win the election the following day, thereby rendering unnecessary the raid and the killing of Punzalan.
Continuing with the testimony of Amado Mendoza, he told the court that as per instructions of Umali he went to
the house of the latter, in the evening of November 14th, the day following the election, with the result of the
election already known, namely, the decisive victory of Punzalan over Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come
with him, and Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep with Pasumbal at the wheel. They drove toward the
Tiaong Elementary School and once there he (Mendoza) was left at the school premises with instructions by
Umali to wait for Commander Abeng and the Huks and point to them the house of Punzalan. After waiting for
sometime, Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands and carbines, arrived and after
explaining his identity and his mission to Abeng, he had led the dissidents or part of the contingent in the
direction of Punzalan's house and on arriving in front of the bodega of Robles, he pointed out Punzalan's house
and then walked toward his home, leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat in a canal. Before reaching his
house, he already heard shots, so, he evacuated his family to their dugout in his yard. While doing so he and his
wife Catalina Tinapunan saw armed men in the lanzones grove just across the street from their house, belonging
to the father of Umali, and among those men they saw Congressman Umali holding a revolver, in the company of
Huk Commander Torio and about 20 armed men. Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions leave in the
direction of Taguan, by way of the railroad tracks.
It would appear from the evidence that the raid was well-planned. As a diversionary measure, part of the
attacking force was deployed toward the camp or station of the Army (part of 8th B.C.T.) in the suburbs and the
camp was fired upon, not exactly to destroy or drive out that Army unit but to keep it from going to the rescue
and aid of the main objective of the raid. The rest of the raiding party went toward Punzalan's house and
attacked it with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and even with bottles filled with gasoline (popularly known
as Molotov's cocktail). It was evident that the purpose of the attack on Punzalan's house was to kill him.
Fortunately, however, and apparently unknown to the attackers and those who designed the raid, at six o'clock
that morning of November 14th Punzalan and his Chief of Police had left Tiaong to go to Lucena, the capital, to
report the results of the election to the Governor.
The attack on the house of Punzalan was witnessed and described by several persons, including policemen who
happened to be near the house. Policeman Tomas Maguare who was in front of the house saw Epifanio
Pasumbal, Isidro Umali (brother of Congressman Umali) and Moises Escueta enter the gate of Punzalan's house
and take part in the firing. Policeman Pedro Lacorte who was stationed as guard at the gate of Mayor Punzalan's
house recognized defendant Isidro Capino as one of those firing at the house. Lacorte said that he was guarding
the house of Punzalan when he suddenly heard shots coming from the sides of the house and going over to the
place to investigate, he saw armed men in fatigue and shouting "burn the house of Mayor Punzalan"; that he
was hit on the left check and later Isidro Capino threw at him a hand grenade and he was hit in the right forearm
and in the right eye and became permanently blind in said eye. Mateo Galit, laundryman who was sitting inside a
jeep parked in front of the house of Punzalan recognized defendant Pasumbal as one of the attackers who, once
in the yard said ina loud voice as though addressing somebody in the house "Pare, come down." Mrs. Punzalan
who was then inside the house related to the court that at about eight in the evening while she was resting she
heard shots and rapid firing. As a precaution she took her children to the bathroom. Then she noticed that her
house was being fired at because the glass window panes were being shattered and she heard the explosion of a
hand grenade inside the house, followed by flares in the sala and burning of blankets and mosquito nets in the
bedrooms and she noticed the smell of smoke of gasoline. Realizing the great danger, she and the children ran
out of the house and went to hide in the house of a neighbor.
Nazario Aonuevo declared in court that he was a farmer and was picked up and seized by Huk Commander
Tommy sometime in August 1951, and was taken to Mt. Banahaw in Laguna and mustered in the ranks of the
Huks; that just before the elections of November 13, 1951, he saw Pasumbal come to the mountains near Tiaong
and talk to Commander Abeng; that on November 14th by order of Commander Abeng he with other Huks left
Mt. Banahaw for Tiaong; that when they crossed the Osiw River already near Tiaong, they were met by Pasumbal
and Capino; that when they were at the outskirts of the town, he and the party were told by Commander
Tommy to attack the 8th BCT camp in Tiaong to prevent the sending of army help to the town proper; that he
took part in firing on the camp which returned the fire in the course of which he was wounded; and that because
of his wound he could not escape with his companions to the mountains when the Army soldiers dispersed and
drove them out of the town and so he was finally captured by said soldiers.
As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their participation in and responsibility for the raid was duly established
not only by the going of Pasumbal on November 12th to the mountains following instructions of Umali, and
conferring with Commander Abeng asking him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan, but also by the fact that
Pasumbal and Capino in the afternoon or evening of November 14th met the Huks at the Osiw River as the
dissidents were on their way to Tiaong and later Pasumbal and Capino were seen in the yard of Punzalan firing at
the house with automatic weapons and hand grenades.
What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also established, tho indirectly. We have the testimony of
Amado Mendoza who heard him instructing Pasumbal to contact Commander Abeng and ask him to raid Tiaong
and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is more or less circumstantial, but nonetheless strong and convincing.
No one saw him take part in the firing and attack on the house of Punzalan; nor was he seen near or around said
house. Because of his important position as Congressman, perchance he did not wish to figure too prominently
in the actual raid. Besides, he would seem to have already given out all the instructions necessary and he could
well stay in the background. However, during the raid, not very far from Punzalan's house he was seen in the
lanzonesan of his father, holding a revolver and in the company of about 20 armed men with Huk Commander
Torio, evidently observing and waiting for developments. Then he and his companions left in the direction of
Taguan.
Umali and Pasumbal, however, claim that during the raid, they were in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, about
seven kilometers away from Tiaong where a consolation party was being held. There is ample evidence however
to the effect that they arrived in Pasumbal's home only around midnight. An Army soldier named Cabalona who
happened to be in Pasumbal's home arriving there earlier in the evening and who was invited to take some
refreshments said that he did not see the two men until they arrived about midnight when the Army
reinforcements from Lucena passed by on their way to Tiaong. Thus, we have this chain of circumstances that
does not speak in favor of Umali, or Pasumbal for that matter. But this is not all. There is the rather strange and
unexplained, at least not satisfactorily, behaviour of Umali and Pasumbal that evening of November 14th.
Assuming for a moment as they claim, that the two were not in Tiaong at the commencement of the raid
between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., and during the whole time the raid lasted, and that they were all that time in the
home of Pasumbal in Taguan, still, according to their own evidence, they were informed by persons coming or
fleeing from Tiaong that there was a raid going on there, and that some houses were burning. As a matter of
fact, considering the promixity of Taguan to Tiaong, a distance of about seven kilometers and the stillness and
darkness of the night, the fire and the glow produced by the burning of three houses and the noise produced by
the firing of automatic weapons and the explosion of the hand grenades and bottles of gasoline, could and must
have been seen and heard from Taguan. The natural and logical reaction on the part of Umali and Pasumbal
would have been to rush to Tiaong, see what had really happened and then render help and give succor to the
stricken residents, including their own relatives. It will be remembered that the houses of the fathers of Umali
and Pasumbal were in Tiaong and their parents and relatives were residing there. And yet, instead of following a
natural impulse and urge to go to Tiaong, they fled in the opposite direction towards Candelaria. And Umali
instead of taking the road, purposely avoided the same and preferred to hike through coconut groves so that
upon arriving in Candelaria, he was wet, and spattered and very tired. Had they wanted to render any help to
Tiaong they could have asked the police authorities of Candelaria to send a rescue party to that town. Or better
still, when the army reinforcements from Lucena sent at the instance of Punzalan, who at about eight or nine
that evening was returning to Tiaong from Lucena, found at the barrio or sitio of Lusakan near Tiaong that there
was fighting in the town, he immediately returned to Lucena to get army reinforcements to relieve his town, was
passing by Taguan, where they were, Umali and Pasumbal could have joined said reinforcements and gone to
Tiaong. Instead the two continued on their way to the capital (Lucena) where before dawn, they went and
contacted Provincial Fiscal Mayo, a first cousin of Umali, and Assistant Fiscal Reyes and later had these two
officials accompany them to the Army camp to see Col. Gelveson, not for the purpose of asking for the sending
of aid or reinforcement to Tiaong but presumably to show to the prosecution officials, specially the Army
Commander that they (Umali and Pasumbal) had nothing to do whatsoever with the raid. Umali said he was
trying to avoid and keep clear of Tiaong because he might be suspected of having had some connection with the
raid and might be the object of reprisal. As a matter of fact, according to Umali himself, while still in Taguan that
evening and before he went to Candelaria, somebody had informed him that Col. Legaspi of the Army was
looking for him. Instead of seeking Col. Legaspi and find out what was wanted of him, he left in the opposite
direction and fled to Candelaria and later to Lucena, and the next day he took the train for Manila. This strange
act and behaviour of the two men, particularly Umali, all contrary to impulse and natural reaction, and what
other people would ordinarily have done under the circumstances, prompted the trial court in its decision to
repeat the old saying "The guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent stands bold as a lion." We
might just as well reproduce that portion of the decision of the trial court, to wit:
. . . Considering the fact that Taguan is very near Tiaong so that even taking it for granted as true, for the sake of
argument, that the said accused were really at the party of Pasumbal on the night in question, that would not
prevent them from being in Tiaong between 8 and 9. Besides, why was it that night the hasaglamp was replaced
with candles when the reinforcements passed through Taguan about midnight of November 14, 1951. Why did
Congressman Umali and company instead of going to Tiaong which was the scene of the attack hurried towards
Candelaria, after the reinforcement has passed and went to the house of Felix Ona walking through a muddy
path under the coconut groves? Why was Umali afraid to pass through the provincial road and preferred a
muddy road instead? Was he trying to conceal himself? Why did Pasumbal and company also go to the house of
Ona? Why did they go to the house of Felix Ona instead of going to the house of Manalo who could have given
them better protection? And again why did Congressman Umali and the other co-accused repaired and sought
the company of Fiscal Reyes in going at such an early hour to the Army authorities, did they fear any reprisal?
From whom? Why did Umali go to Manila from Lucena on November 16, 1951? "The guilty man flees even if no
one pursues, but the innocent stands bold as a lion."
At first blush it would appear rather unbelievable that Umali and Pasumbal, particularly the former should seek
the aids of the Huks in order to put down and eliminate their political enemy Punzalan. It would seem rather
strange and anomalous that a member of Congress should have friendly relations with this dissidents whom the
Government had been fighting all these years. But if we study the evidence, it will be found that the reason and
the explanation are there. As already stated, during the Japanese occupation, to further the resistance
movement, guerillas were organized in different parts of the Philippines. One of these was the guerilla unit
known as President Quezon's Own Guerillas (PQOG) operating in the provinces of Tayabas (now Quezon) and
Laguna. Umali, Pasumbal, Commander Abeng and even Punzalan himself were officers in this guerilla unit, Umali
attaining the rank of colonel, and Pasumbal and Punzalan that of Lieutenant-colonel, Pasumbal then being
known as "Panzer". After Liberation, Abeng joined the dissidents, and became a Huk Commander. It was not
unnatural that Umali and Pasumbal should continue their friendship and association with Commander Abeng
and seek his aid when convenient and necessary. Umali admitted that he knew Huk Commander Kasilag.
Graciano Ramos, one of the witnesses of the prosecution told the court that way back in May 1950, in a barrio of
San Pablo City he saw Umali confer with Commander Kasilag, which Commander after the conference told his
soldiers including Ramos that Umali wanted the Huks to raid Tiaong, burn the presidencia and kidnap Punzalan.
Of course, the last part of the testimony may be regarded as hearsay, but the fact is that Umali conferred with a
Huk commander as early as 1950. Then we have the fact that on November 18 of the same year Punzalan wrote
to President Quirino denouncing the congressman Umali for fraternizing with the Huks and conducting a
campaign among them in preparation for the elections the following year. And we may also consider the fact
that the town of Tiaong stands at the foothills of Mt. Banahaw where the dissidents under Commander Abeng,
Tommy, Lucio, Aladin, and others had their hideout, so that it was not difficult for residents of Tiaong like Umali
and Pasumbal to communicate and even associate with dissidents in that region.
After carefully considering all the evidence in the case, we are constrained to agree with the trial court that the
three appellants are guilty. Besides, the determination of this case, in great measure, hinges on the credibility of
witnesses. The learned trial court which had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of witnesses on the
stand and gauging their sincerity and evaluating their testimony, decided the Government witnesses, including
Amado Mendoza, to be more credible and reliable. And we find nothing in the record to warrant correction or
reversal of the stand and finding of the trial court on the matter. We have not overlooked the rather belated
retraction of Amado Mendoza made on October 31, 1952, about a year and 9 months after he testified in court.
Considering the circumstances surrounding the making of this affidavit or retraction, the late date at which it was
made, the reasons given by him for making it and the fact that when he testified in court under the observation
and scrutiny of the trial court bearing in mind that he was the star witness for the prosecution and his testimony
naturally extremely important, and the trial court after the opportunity given to it of observing his demeanor
while on the witness stand had regarded him as a witness, sincere, and his testimony truthful, and considering
further the case with which affidavits of retraction of this nature are obtained, we confess that we are not
impressed with such retraction of Mendoza.
The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense of offenses committed. Appellants were charged
with and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and
robbery. Is there such a complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, etc? While the Solicitor General in his
brief claims that appellants are guilty of said complex crime and in support of his stand "asks for leave to
incorporate by reference" his previous arguments in opposing Umali's petition for bail, counsel for appellants
considered it unnecessary to discuss the existence or non-existence of such complex crime, saying that the
nature of the crime committed "is of no moment to herein appellants because they had absolutely no part in it
whatsoever". For that present, and with respect to this particular case, we deem it unnecessary to decide this
important and controversial question, its consideration and determination to another case or occasion more
opportune, when it is more directly and squarely raised and both parties given an opportunity to discuss and
argue the question more adequately and exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for the moment that there is
no such complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., and that consequently appellants could not have been
legally charged with, much less convicted of said complex crime, and the information should therefore, be
regarded as having charged more than one offense, contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113, section 2 (e),
of the Rules of Court, but that appellants having interposed no objection thereto, they were properly tried for
and lawfully convicted if guilty of the several, separate crimes charged therein, we have decided and we rule that
the appellants may properly be convicted of said several and separate crimes, as hereinafter specified. We feel
particularly supported and justified in this stand that we take, by the result of the case, namely, that the prison
sentence we impose does not exceed, except perhaps in actual duration, that meted out by the Court below,
which is life imprisonment.

We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not necessarily the most serious, crime committed here was
not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and
taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and for the purpose of doing the things defined in Article
134 of the Revised Penal code under rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local
Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an
act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of
Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to constitute sedition. As regards the crime of
robbery with which appellants were charged and of which they were convicted, we are also of the opinion that it
was not one of the purposes of the raid, which was mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his house. The
robberies were actually committed by only some of the raiders, presumably dissidents, as an afterthought,
because of the opportunity offered by the confusion and disorder resulting from the shooting and the burning of
the three houses, the articles being intended presumably to replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the
mountains. For these robberies, only those who actually took part therein are responsible, and not the three
appellants herein. With respect to the crime of multiple frustrated murder, while the assault upon policeman
Pedro Lacorte with a hand grenade causing him injuries resulting in his blindness in one eye, may be regarded as
frustrated murder; the wounding of Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector should be considered as mere
physical injuries. The crimes committed are, therefore, those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated
murder and physical injuries. The murders may not be qualified by evident premeditation because the
premedition was for the killing of Punzalan. The result was the killing of three others intended by the raiders
(People vs. Guillen, 47 Off). The killing may, however, be qualified by treachery, the raiders using firearms against
which the victims were defenseless, with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The three
murders may be punished with the penalty of death. However, because of lack of the necessary votes, the
penalty should be life imprisonment.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised by the appellants in their brief.

In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical
injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay
a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to
indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum
penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting
fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more
persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay
the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to
the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In
view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, we find it unnecessary to fix and impose
the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the
victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these
modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Espuelas vs People
G.R. No. L-2990
December 17, 1951
Facts:
On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza
had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended
form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of
his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general
circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad,
for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious
suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating
his dismay and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and
directing his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the
Philippines the government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.
Issue:
Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the Government of the
Philippines?
Held:
Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the
penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.
44 SCRA 22 Political Law The Legislative Department Immunity from Arrest under the 1935 Constitution
Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional Convention. Both
were facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification of a public document before the sala of
Judge Jesus Morfe. While Bautista was charged for violation of the Revised Election Code. The two were later
arrested, this is while the Constitutional Convention was still in session. They now assail the validity of their
arrest. They contend that under the 1935 Constitution, they are immune from arrest because the charges upon
which they were arrested are within the immunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD: No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise
delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They are accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and
representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to and returning
from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace. In the case at bar, the crimes for
which Martinez and Bautista were arrested fall under the category 0f breach of peace. Breach of the peace
covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. Therefore, Martinez and
Bautista cannot invoke the privilege from arrest provision of the Constitution.
NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution:
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in any committee thereof.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe accused, cannot fail to
impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a
sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with
is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating
disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the
protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and
his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against
any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least
to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis
were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people
against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may seek to silence the writer.
Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of
illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the
Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds.