Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to
actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules
are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and
rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. This retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely
affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held
that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist
on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure." More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was
not able to pay the docket fees on time. Clearly, there were no substantive rights to
speak of when the RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal.
SM Land, Inc. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc.) and Watsons Personal Care Store, Phils.,
Inc. Vs. City of Manila, Liberty Toledo, in her official capacity as the City
Treasurer of Manila, et al. G.R. No. 197151. October 22, 2012
In fact, this Court has held that even if there was complete non-compliance with the rule
on certification against forum shopping, the Court may still proceed to decide the case
on the merits, pursuant to its inherent power to suspend its own rules on grounds,
as stated above, of substantial justice and apparent merit of the case.
Audi AG v. Mejia, G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007; De los Reyes v. People, G.R. No.
138297, January 27, 2006
Hierarchy of courts meant that while the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue original writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, such concurrence does not
accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of court to which filing thereof may be
directed. Petitions should be filed with the court of lower level unless the importance of
the issue involved deserves the action of a higher court.
Omictin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007
The court cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience and services in determining technical or intricate matters of fact.
Abad, et. al. v. RTC of Manila, et. al. G.R. No. L-65505, October 12, 1987
Jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be ousted by the happening of subsequent events
even of such character which should have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the
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first instance. The rule of adherence of jurisdiction (exists) until a cause is finally
resolved or adjudicated.
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion
to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon
the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.
Heirs of Telesforo Julao v. Spouses De Jesus, G.R. No. 176020, September 29,
2014
The assessed value must be alleged in the complaint to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint, which contains the concise statement of the ultimate facts
of a plaintiffs cause of action.
Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different
parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
of the claims in all causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions.
The causes of action in favor of two or more plaintiffs or against two or more defendants
should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a
common question of law or fact as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 3
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Civil Case No. 01-1567, being an action for Annulment of Sale and Titles resulting from
the extrajudicial foreclosure by Union Bank of the mortgaged real properties, is
classified as a real action. In Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a
case seeking to annul a foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is a real action, viz: An
action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to
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annul a private sale of real property. (Muoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950). While it is
true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the
property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are
closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is
considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioners primary objective.
The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real
property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of
the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.
Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. vs. Fil-Estate Land, Inc.,
G.R. No. 152272, March 5, 2012
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action
is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated differently, if the allegations in the
complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be asserted by the
defendant.
The allegation of petitioners that they are not the owners of the subject property, thus
making them unable to remove the installed surveillance cameras on the corporations
building, cannot be upheld especially when the corporation who is managed by the
family of petitioners. They are thus considered parties-in-interest in the present case.
Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. G.R. No. 193753.
September 26, 2012
The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make one an
indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the
court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit or proceeding, the judgment
of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
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subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present.
Theodore And Nancy Ang, Represented By Eldrige Marvin B. Ceron, Vs. Spouses
Alan And Em Ang, Respondents. G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in
the case below as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein.
He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited
purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such
appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners
and ought to be considered as a real party in interest.
In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words (e.g. only, solely, exclusively in this
court, in no other court save, particularly, nowhere else but/except) venue stipulation is
merely permissive and not exclusive which means that the stipulated venue is in
addition to the venue provided for in the rules
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BIGNAY EX-IM PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. NO.
171590, February 12, 2014
Non-payment of docket fees on ones counterclaim is a jurisdictional defect. Anent the
counterclaims interposed by defendant for the collection of certain sum of money
adverted earlier hereof, this Court could not exercise jurisdiction over the same as
defendant did not pay the docket fees therefor. Although the counterclaims were
denominated as compulsory in the answer, the matters therein alleged were not
connected with the plaintiffs complaint. The counterclaims could stand independently
from the plaintiffs complaint hence they are a sic permissive counterclaims.
Georgia T. Estel, vs. Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr., G.R. No.
174082, January 16, 2012
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Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who
has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment
Re: In The Matter of Clarification of Exemption From Payment of All Court And
Sheriff's Fees of Cooperatives Duly Registered in Accordance with Republic Act
No. 9520 Otherwise Known as the Philippine Cooperative Code Of 2008, Perpetual
Help Community Cooperative (Phcci), A.M. No. 12-2-03-0 , March 13, 2012
With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court (Supreme Court
En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, which denied the petition of the GSIS for
recognition of its exemption from payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, 11 February 2010; Baguio Market Vendors Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes, 26 February 2010), it is
evident that the exemption of cooperatives from payment of court and sheriffs fees no
longer stands. Cooperatives can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees.
to allow such amendment, since it is elementary that the court must first acquire
jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly therein.
Surigao Mine Exploration Co. v. Harris, G.R. No. L-45543, May 17, 1939
The cause of action must exist at the time the action was begun, and the plaintiff will not
be allowed by an amendment to introduce a cause of action which had no existence
when the action was commenced.
SPOUSES BENEDICT and SANDRA MANUE vs. RAMON ONG G.R. No. 205249,
October 15, 2014
Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where
summons is served. A defendants address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the
summons to the defendant. What is determinative of the validity of personal service is,
therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
Planters Development Bank, Vs. Julie Chandumal, G.R. No. 19561905 September
2012
In this case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons due to his failure to
serve it personally. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the requisites for
a valid substituted service of summons, summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of
prompt personal service the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must
show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
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service; (2) specific details in the return the sheriff must describe in the Return of
Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service; (3)
a person of suitable age and discretion the sheriff must determine if the person found
in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipients
relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons, which matters
must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons; and (4) a
competent person in charge, who must have sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects
arising from inaction on the summons.
Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-
fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son
Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis
and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014
Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. The time frame
indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition
precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9
stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this
Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res
judicata; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest
efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions.
VIRGINIA S. DIO and H.S. EQUITIES, LTD vs. SUBIC BAY MARINE
EXPLORATORIUM, INC., represented by its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
TIMOTHY DESMOND G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014
Petitioners filed counterclaim against respondents. However, the latter alleged
that the dismissal of the main action results to the dismissal of the counterclaims. The
Court ruled that as the rule now stands, the nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding,
the dismissal of the complaint does not ipso jure result in the dismissal of the
counterclaim, and the latter may remain for independent adjudication of the court,
provided that such counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor
under any infirmity that may warrant its outright dismissal. Stated differently, the
jurisdiction of the court over the counterclaim that appears to be valid on its face,
including the grant of any relief thereunder, is not abated by the dismissal of the main
action. The courts authority to proceed with the disposition of the counterclaim
independent of the main action is premised on the fact that the counterclaim, on its own,
raises a novel question which may be aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own
merits and evidentiary support.
Natividad Lim vs. National Power Corporation, Sps. Roberto Ll. Arcinue and
Arabela Arcinue, G.R. No. 178789. November 14, 2012
Lim points out that an answer-in-intervention cannot give rise to default since the filing
of such an answer is only permissive. But Section 4, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires the original parties to file an answer to the complaint-in-intervention
within 15 days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different period is
fixed by the court. This changes the procedure under the former rule where such an
answer was regarded as optional. Thus, Lims failure to file the required answer can
give rise to default.
B. STA. RITA & CO., INC. AND ARLENE STA. RITA KANAPI v. ANGELINE M.
GUECO. G.R. No.193078, August 28, 2013
Persons who are not parties to a case, either as petitioners, defendants or intervenors,
they cannot participate in the proceedings of the same. Consequently, they also cannot
be adversely affected by the outcome of such proceeding. A complaint-in-intervention
cannot be treated as an independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and a
supplement of the principal action. The complaint-in-intervention essentially latches on
the complaint for its legal efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads
to its concomitant dismissal.
Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. And Trebel International, Inc., Vs. Banco De Oro
Universal Bank And Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr., In His Capacity As Ex-Officio
Sheriff Of The Rtc Of Makati City, G.R. No. 192716, June 13, 2012
While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for
pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to do so within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the
plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently. This case had been at the pre-
trial stage for more than two years and petitioners have not shown special
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Nenita Gonzales, Et. Al. Vs. Mariano Bugaay And Lucy Bugaay, G.R. No. 173008,
February 22, 2012
In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the
judgment. Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must
clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment. Accordingly, the CA committed
reversible error in granting the demurrer and dismissing the Amended Complaint a quo
for insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an
available remedy to respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC had
correctly done.
TEOFILO B. ADOLFO vs. FE T. ADOLFO G.R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015
Judgment on the pleadings is proper where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading. An answer
would fail to tender an issue if it does not deny the material allegations in the
complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings by
confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if an
answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the complaint and/or
asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while admitting the
material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent
or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would naturally be
improper.
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Spouses Ramon Villuga And Mercedita Villuga, Vs. Kelly Hardware And
Construction Supply Inc., Represented By Ernesto V. Yu, Executive Vice-
President And General Manager, G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the
affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such
issues are not genuine.
were based on different grounds. The grounds were separate and distinct from each
other and entailed different sets of facts.
SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. AND OSCAR
VIOLAGO, PETITIONERS, vs. MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG G.R. No. 194702, April
20, 2015
It is settled that the fresh period rule in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not
to administrative appeals. The fresh period rule shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from
the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from
the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Fortune Life Insurance Co., Inc. v. COA, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the
aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the
assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or
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reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved
party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five
days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial. We ruled in Pates v. Commission
on Elections that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the
belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the
petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh
period rule under Neypes applied.
Priscilla Alma Jose, Vs. Ramon C. Javellana, Et Al., G.R. No. 158239
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari
under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
The present rule is that a government party is a "party adversely affected" for
purposes of appeal provided that the government party that has a right to appeal must
be the office or agency prosecuting the case. The grant of the right to appeal in
administrative cases is not new. In Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service Law of
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1959, appeals "by the respondent" were allowed on "the decision of the Commissioner
of Civil Service rendered in an administrative case involving discipline of subordinate
officers and employees." Thus, LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the
Civil Service Commission of its decision.
Dare Adventure Farm Corporation Vs. Spouses Felix and Nenita Ng, Spouses
Martin and Azucena Ng and Agripina R. Goc-ong, et al. G.R. No. 161122.
September 24, 2012
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that
it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment,
final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking
jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is
not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final
judgments, orders or resolutions.
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Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law. A judgment, if
left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. While it
appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the execution of
a confirmed arbitral award, it is the Court's considered view that the Rules' procedural
mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but necessarily extend to a
confirmed award's execution in light of the doctrine of necessary implication which
states that every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege.
designated by the court, and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by
the party himself.
SPOUSES VERSOLA VS. CA, G.R. NO. 164740,31 JULY 2006
It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property
is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set and proved to the sheriff. Failure
to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
HELEN CABLING assisted by her husband ARIEL CABLING vs. JOSELIN TAN
LUMAPAS as represented by NORY ABELLANES, G.R. No. 196950, June 18, 2014
Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is made applicable to
extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages, the possession of the property shall
be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding
the property in a capacity adverse to the judgment obligor. It contemplates a situation in
which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-
owner, tenant or usufructuary, who possesses the property in his own right, and is not
merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the
owner of the property.
the principal action. If an action, by its nature, does not require such protection or
preservation, said remedies can not be applied for and granted.
Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen, G.R. No. 157494, December 10, 2004
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte.
Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order
with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the
twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary
restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated.
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK,
INC. G.R. No. 182963, June 3, 2013.
Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there
is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make
a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could
be filed.
conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation,
be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to
one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability.
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal
authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. It is directed
against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or
by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. On the
strength of the constitutional provisions under Article VIII, it can be fairly interpreted that
the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in
issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Sarmiento v. Manalite Home Owners Association, G.R. No. 182953, October 11,
2010
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In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior
physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the
defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an
allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued, that
is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or
building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of
any contract, express or implied.
CHARLIE LIM vs. SPOUSES DANILO LIGON and GENEROSA VITUG-LIGON G.R.
No. 183589, June 25, 2014
As a result of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case, Spouses Ligon
were evicted from the subject property. They filed a complaint against defendant Lim for
Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession to restore them to their possession of the
subject property. The legal limitation, despite the finality of the ruling in the ejectment
case, is that the concept of possession or prior possession which was established in
favor of defendants predecessors-in-interest in the ejectment case pertained merely to
possession de facto, and not possession de jure. The favorable judgment in favor of
defendants predecessors-in-interest cannot therefore bar an action between the same
parties with respect to who has title to the land in question.
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts
resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the
premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does
not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer
case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the
issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same
in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is,
however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the property.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Montaer vc CA, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009
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Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have
participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that
then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement
was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
Torbela vs. Rosario, G.R. No. 140528 G.R. No. 140553, December 7, 2011
It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot acquire by
prescription a property entrusted to him unless he repudiates the trust. Acquisitive
prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust
for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the
evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.
Repubic vs. CA & Solano, G.R. No. 143483, January 31, 2002
The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any
claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to
be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
judgment.
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abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that
they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and
properly counselled.
Feria vs. CA, G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000
Consequently, the writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of where, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction
to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess.
Lee Yick Hon vs. Insular Collector Of Customs, G.R. No. L-16799, March 30, 1991
RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO
RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO,* G.R. Nos. 184379-80,
April 24, 2012
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the
rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the
quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in
response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal
sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of
amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure Amparo reliefs and
protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to
proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary
procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is
not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is seriously misplaced.
evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
xxx
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, petitioner vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGALARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA,
LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G.
TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer
named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name
"HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT
CALLAGAN, G.R. No. 191805
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the
petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or even administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence. The totality of evidence as a standard for the grant of the writ was correctly
applied by this Court. x x x
In the matter of the petition for the writ of Amparo and the writ of Habeas Data in
favor of Francis Saez, petitioner vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22Nn MICO, CAPT.
LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT.
JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL.
ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST
SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL.
JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY GOMEZ,
respondents, G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012
Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his
claims, the reliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to
amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a claimant is dispensed with the
onus of proving his case. Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence
demands some adequate evidence.
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGA G.R. No. 203254, October 08,
2014
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A Habeas Data Petition is dismissible if it fails to adequately show that there exists a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or
security on the other. Moreover, it is equally dismissible if it is not supported by
substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There
was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by
operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners
were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Mary Rose A. Boto vs. Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Villena, A.C. No. 9684,
September 18, 2013
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed
simultaneous or separately with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where
the libellous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
Bureau of Customs v. Peter Sherman, et al, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011.
nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused
of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused.
DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX
APPEALS G.R. No. 179962, June 11, 2014
Dr. Joel Mendez was charged with tax evasion. However, the prosecutor filed amended
complaint which changed the date of the commission of the offense. The court ruled
that amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the
original one; or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise
to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered
merely as formal amendments.
People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Feliciano Jr., et. al, G.R. No. 196735, May 5,
2014
In case of variance between the complaint filed by the offended party and the
information in crimes against chastity, the complaint controls
A variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he
fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner
than what was alleged. While the information clearly states that the crime was
committed by appellant's insertion of his penis inside AAA's vagina, the latter solemnly
testified on the witness stand that appellant merely put his penis in her mouth.
Nevertheless, appellant failed to register any objection that the Information alleged a
different mode of the commission of the crime of rape. Thus, appellant's conviction for
rape by sexual assault must be sustained, the variance notwithstanding.
Honesto General vs. Hon. Graduacion Reyes Claravall, et al., 195 SCRA 623
In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interest of clarity and
certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when the civil
action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court because the offended party has not waived the civil
action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to
the criminal action the rule is as follows: (1) when the amount of the damages, other
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than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information filed in court, then the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof in court
for trial; and (2) in any other case, however i.e., when the amount of damages is not
so alleged in the complaint or information filed in court the corresponding filing fees
need not be paid and shall simply constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an
award for actual damages.
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 161075.
JULY 15, 2013
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not
raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of
the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the
independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL. G.R. No.
166836, September 4, 2013
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer
of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots
is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of
Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The
administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal
charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.
Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161075, July 15,
2013
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may
be independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not
operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. This
was precisely the Court's thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus: Moreover, neither is there a
prejudicial question of the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, iun the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action. xxx In the instant case, Civil Case
No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.
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P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R. No. 190569, April
25, 2012
There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or
requires the prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accuseds counter-
affidavit. To illustrate the non-mandatory nature of filing a Reply in preliminary
investigations, Section 3 (d) of Rule 112 gives the prosecutor, in certain instances, the
right to resolve the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit, viz: (d) If the respondent
cannot be subpoenaed, of if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the
ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the
evidence presented by the complainant. On the other hand, petitioner was entitled to
receive a copy of the Counter- affidavit filed by Aguillon.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENGR. RODOLFO YECYEC ET AL. G.R. No.
183551, November 12, 2014
It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor
exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be
filed in court, and the courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the
information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest
error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. In this case,
there is no question that the Information filed against the respondents was sufficient to
hold them liable for the crime of Theft because it was compliant with Section 6, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, a review of the resolutions of the MCTC, the
Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA shows that there is substantial basis to
support finding of probable cause against the respondents. Hence, as the Information
was valid on its face and there was no manifest error or arbitrariness on the part of the
MCTC and the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC and the CA erred when they overturned
the finding of probable cause against the respondents.
Iris Kristine Balois Alberto vs. CA, GR No. 182130, June 19, 2013
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Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts
are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean actual and positive
cause nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is based merely on opinion and
reasonable belief. Accordingly, probable cause does not require an inquiry whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that
the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
The Ombudsmans primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct
preliminary investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its
commission in relation to office, had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II vs. The Panel
of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, and affirmed in subsequent cases: The
Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate offenses committed by public officers and employees. The authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent
with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state
prosecutors, however, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
People vs. Mabuyo, 63 SCRA 532; People vs. Lazo; 198 SCRA 274
The accused who is denied the mandatory preliminary investigation may refuse to enter
a plea upon arraignment and to object to the continuation of further proceedings based
on lack of preliminary investigation. If he pleads without objection, he cannot raise the
issue on appeal.
Imelda S. Enriquez vs. Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011, August 7,
2006
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Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon, Rosabella M. Tormis, AM No. MTJ-12-
1817, March 12, 2013
Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that
the court shall not order the arrest of the accused unless he fails to appear whenever
required. In this case, Judge Tormis claimed that the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against the accused in the Librando case was justified because of the accuseds failure
to appear during her arraignment despite notice. However, as clearly found by the OCA,
Judge Tormis order requiring the accused to appear and submit her counter-affidavit
and those of her witnesses within ten days from receipt of the order was not yet served
upon the accused when she issued the warrant. In doing so, Judge Tormis issued the
warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure that the accused
should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his
counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence.
People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et al, G.R. No. 180452. January 10, 2010.
An arrest made during the commission of a crime does not require a warrant. Such
warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, section 5(a) of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the instant case, contrary to accused-
appellants contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto.
Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-
appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an
ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to
Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the
goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six
accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white
L-300 van. Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that
accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan,
upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to
Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused- appellants who were caught in
flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu,
a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amended is valid.
People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Velasco, G.R. No. 190318, November 27,
2013
Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his
arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against
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him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest
or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
Nevertheless, even if appellants warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid,
such a scenario would still not provide salvation to appellants cause because
jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial
free from error.
LEVISTE v. CA
A finding that none of the bail negating circumstances is present will not automatically
result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach. However, if the appellate court determines the
existence of any of the bail negating circumstances, it has no other option except to
deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail
pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed
Speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining whether
the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view
of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration
of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d)
prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial
proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must
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be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. While the Court
recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy
administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to
fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.
Anna Lerima Patula vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains
why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding
hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the
original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.
If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court.
It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party's witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, is
essential to the administration of justice.
Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration
before the DOJ. However, the lapse of almost 1 year and 7 months warranted the
application of the limitation of the period for suspending arraignment. While the
pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days
reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that
after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to
deny the motion to defer arraignment.
The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses
legal significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving
the commission of the crime by the accused.
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at
any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Marino B. Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No. 185960, January 25, 2012
Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when his counsel failed to
assist him during the promulgation of the judgment. He faults the Sandiganbayan for
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proceeding with the promulgation despite the petitioner not then being assisted by his
counsel, and being a layman he is not familiar with court processes and procedure.
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any
judge of the court in which it was rendered.However, if the conviction is for a light
offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for
the promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served
on accused and his counsel, the latters absence during the promulgation of judgment
would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the
accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the
sentence was pronounced.
People of the Philippines vs. Val Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 130714 & 139634, October
16, 2012
At the outset, the Court notes that these cases were elevated to Us on automatic review
in view of the RTC's imposition of the death penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997
Decision. However, with the Court's pronouncement in the 2004 case of People vs.
Mateo, providing for and making mandatory the intermediate review by the CA of cases
involving the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course
of action would be to remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an
intermediate review.
DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA. G.R. NO 166995, JANUARY 13,
2014
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However,
in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, acted without
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. No
grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged
misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on said
evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or
mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
CHAN v. HONDA MOTORS
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it
must issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant
and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge himself in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them.
Luz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012
It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all
that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the
morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily
against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines., G.R. No. 190889, January 10,
2011
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a
right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.
EVIDENCE
El Greco Ship Maning and Management Corporation vs. Commissioner of
Customs, G.R. No. 177188, December 4, 2008
It does not apply to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings as administrative bodies
are not bound by the technical niceties of the rules obtaining in the court of law.
Calamba Steel Center, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
151857, April 28, 2005
Court of Appeals ignored the existence of the tax return extant on the record. As a
general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records
in other cases tried or pending in the same court, even when those cases were heard or
are actually pending before the same judge. However, an exception is when reference
to such records is sufficiently made without objection from the opposing parties.
People vs. Tundag, G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense
counsels admission. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such
as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact.
NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM AND THE EAST ASIATIC CO., LTD. vs.
GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES, LTD. G.R. No. 156330, November 19, 2014
It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. To prove a foreign law, the
party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under the rules of private international law, a
foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading
and proof, the laws of the foreign country or state will be presumed to be the same as
our local or domestic law. This is known as processual presumption. While the foreign
law was properly pleaded in the case at bar, it was, however, proven not in the manner
provided by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. While a photocopy of
the foreign statute relied upon by the court a quo to relieve the common carrier from
liability, was presented as evidence during the trial, the same however was not
accompanied by the required attestation and certification.
respect and have even conclusive effect. Such factual findings and conclusions assume
even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA. In the case at bench, the RTC
gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
compared to those of the accused appellants. After a judicious review of the evidence
on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the
RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses.
People v. Larrahaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, July 21, 2005
An object evidence, when offered in accordance with the requisites for its admissibility,
becomes evidence of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than witnesses put
together. The presence of the victims ravished body in a deep ravine with handcuffs on
her wrist is a physical evidence that bolsters the testimony of the witness.
Only a photocopy of the Employee Clearance was presented in evidence. The Court
held that the photocopy is admissible as evidence since an exception to the best
evidence rule is when the document sought to be presented is in the possession of the
person against whom it is to be offered and such party fails to present it even after
reasonable notice.
National Power Corporation vs. Codilla, G.R. No. 170491. April 3, 2007
The evidence offered by NAPOCOR were photocopies. The Court held that the
photocopies were not equivalent to the original documents based on the Rules on
Electronic Evidence. The information contained in the photocopies submitted by
NAPOCOR will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the
persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced
electronically.
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633.
October 17, 2007
The Court held that the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are not
electronic evidence. Thus, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as
the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Cruz vs. CA, 192 SCRA 209
The parol evidence rule is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the
terms of an agreement. A receipt is not such a document as it merely attests to the
receipt of money and it is not and could have not been intended by the parties to be the
sole memorial of their agreement.
Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988)
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Respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official
having legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy
presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation
must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in
Dubai. The transmittal letter, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for
Philippines' does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under
Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25.
On the other hand, Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provided that
a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules. Anicetas testimony is mainly hearsay, especially on the purported fight between
Wilfredo and Jesus that ended in Wilfredos death. Anicetas testimony as such carries
no probative weight. At best, Anicetas testimony is an independent relevant statement:
offered only as to the fact of its declaration and the substance of what had been relayed
to Aniceta by Marilou, not as to the truth thereof.
Under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record
is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by
the other, and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing
or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.
FEDERICO SABAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 192150, October
01, 2014
Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot
consider any evidence that has not been formally offered. This rule, however, admits of
an exception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed the formal-offer rule and
allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted. Jurisprudence enumerated the
requirements so that evidence, not previously offered, can be admitted, namely: first,
the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second,
the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of the case. In the present
case, we find that the requisites for the relaxation of the formal-offer rule are present. As
it is correctly observed, Godofredo identified the Certification to File an Action during his
cross-examination. Although the Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it
was marked as Exhibit 1 and attached to the records of the case.