FOUNDERS QUOTES ON THE COMPACT THEORY

Constitutional Convention:

Edmund Randolph, in his remarks on his proposed Virginia Plan in the opening
days of the Constitutional Convention stated: “1. that a union of the States merely
federal [in international law, a “federate alliance” was a multinational confederation] will
not accomplish the objects proposed by the articles of Confederation, namely common
defense, security of liberty, & gen welfare. 2. that no treaty or treaties among he whole
or part of the States, as individual Sovereignties, would be sufficient.” Madison’s Notes
of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787. (May 30, 1787.)

On June 6th, George Mason, in arguing against states having representation in the
House by noting that under “the existing Confederacy, Congs. represent the States4 not
the people of the States: their acts operate on the States, not on the individuals.5 The case
will be changed in the new plan of Govt. The people will be represented; they ought
therefore to choose the Representatives.”

During debates on June 19th, Madison acknowledged that the proposed new
government did not simply strengthen the existing compact theory government under the
Articles, but that it created an entirely new type of government. As evidence of this, he
noted that a compact government exercised power “not on the people individually, but on
the people collectively, on the States,” while the opposite would be true under the new
government. He also pointed out that a compact government “derived its appointments
not immediately from the people, but from the States which they respectively composed,”
unlike the various proposals for the new government put forth by the convention.

On June 5, 1787, the Constitutional Convention discussed the proposal for the
Constitution to be ratified by the people in special state ratifying conventions. During the
debate, James Madison argued in favor of the proposal, noting that “the new constitution
ought to have the highest source of authority, at least paramount to the powers of the
respective constitutions of the States.”

He contrasted it with “the mischiefs that have arisen in the old confederation,
which depends upon no higher authority than the confirmation of an ordinary act of a
legislature.” James Wilson also favored the proposal, noting that “the people by a
convention are the only power that can ratify the proposed system of the new
government.”

This debate over the mode of ratification came up again on July 23, 1787, at
which time George Mason argued:

[That he] considered a reference of the plan to the authority of the

people as one of the most important and essential of the
Resolutions. The Legislatures have no power to ratify it. They are
the mere creatures of the State Constitutions, and can not be
 greater than their creators. And he knew of no power in any of the
Constitutions, he knew there was no power in some of them, that
could be competent to this object. Whither then must we resort? To
the people with whom all power remains that has not been given
up in the Constitutions derived from them. It was of great moment
he observed that this doctrine should be cherished as the basis of
free Government. Another strong reason was that admitting the
Legislatures to have a competent authority, it would be wrong to
refer the plan to them, because succeeding Legislatures having
equal authority could undo the acts of their predecessors; and the
National Govt. would stand in each State on the weak and tottering
foundation of an Act of Assembly. There was a remaining
consideration of some weight. In some of the States the Govts.
were not derived from the clear & undisputed authority of the
people. This was the case in Virginia Some of the best & wisest
citizens considered the Constitution as established by an assumed
authority. A National Constitution derived from such a source
would be exposed to the severest criticisms. Notes of the Debates
in the Federal Convention of 1787.

Edmund Randolph concurred, arguing:

One idea has pervaded all our proceedings, to wit, that opposition
as well from the States as from individuals, will be made to the
System to be proposed. Will it not then be highly imprudent, to
furnish any unnecessary pretext by the mode of ratifying it. Added
to other objections agst. a ratification by Legislative authority only,
it may be remarked that there have been instances in which the
authority of the Common law has been set up in particular States
agst. that of the Confederation which has had no higher sanction
than Legislative ratification. Whose opposition will be most likely
to be excited agst. the System? That of the local demagogues who
will be degraded by it from the importance they now hold. These
will spare no efforts to impede that progress in the popular mind
which will be necessary to the adoption of the plan, and which
every member will find to have taken place in his own, if he will
compare his present opinions with those brought with him into the
Convention. It is of great importance therefore that the
consideration of this subject should be transferred from the
Legislatures where this class of men, have their full influence to a
field in which their efforts can be less mischeivous. It is moreover
worthy of consideration that some of the States are averse to any
change in their Constitution, and will not take the requisite steps,
unless expressly called upon to refer the question to the people.
Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787.
 Gouvernear Morris argued that the existing Articles can be altered by “an appeal
to the people of the U.S., the supreme authority.” A majority of them may change the
form of government, “in like manner as the Constitution of a particular state may be
altered by a majority of the people in the State.” In responding to Mr. Elseworth’s
argument that the state legislatures should ratify the Constitution, Morris states that
Elseworth “erroneously supposes that we are proceeding on the basis of the
Confederation. This Convention is unknown to the Confederation.”

Madison voiced his agreement, noting:

[That he] thought it clear that the Legislatures were incompetent to

the proposed changes. These changes would make essential
inroads on the State Constitutions, and it would be a novel &
dangerous doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution
under which it held its existence. There might indeed be some
Constitutions within the Union, which had given, a power to the
Legislature to concur in alterations of the federal Compact. But
there were certainly some which had not; and in the case of these, a
ratification must of necessity be obtained from the people. He
considered the difference between a system founded on the
Legislatures only, and one founded on the people, to be the true
difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution. The
former in point of moral obligation might be as inviolable as the
latter. In point of political operation, there were two important
distinctions in favor of the latter. 1. A law violating a treaty ratified
by a preexisting law, might be respected by the Judges as a law,
though an unwise or perfidious one. A law violating a constitution
established by the people themselves, would be considered by the
Judges as null & void. 2. The doctrine laid down by the law of
Nations in the case of treaties is that a breach of any one article by
any of the parties, frees the other parties from their engagements.
In the case of a union of people under one Constitution, the nature
of the pact has always been understood to exclude such an
interpretation. Comparing the two modes in point of expediency he
thought all the considerations which recommended this
Convention in preference to Congress for proposing the reform
were in favor of State Conventions in preference to the
Legislatures for examining and adopting it. Farrand’s The Records
of the Federal Convention of 1787 Volume II

Contrary to the contention by Thomas Woods, no draft of the Constitution

contained the words “We the States.” To the contrary, preliminary drafts (for instance,
the one on August 6, 1787, began with the words “We the People of the States of…”
followed by a list of the original thirteen states. Woods is correct that the list of states
was dropped due to uncertainty over how many would initially ratify the document.
Newspaper Debates & Other Sources:

James Madison, in Federalist No. 46, writes that the “Foederal and State
Governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with
different powers, and designated for different purposes…[T]he ultimate authority,
wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone..”

He echoes these thoughts in Federalist No. 49, in which he states that, as “the
people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the
constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold their power,
is derived; it seems strictly consonant to the republican theory, to recur to the same
original authority, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-
model the powers of government; but also whenever any one of the departments may
commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others.”

Madison further elaborates these thoughts in Federalist No. 39: “[I[t appears on
one hand that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people
of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but on the other, that this
assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one
entire nation; but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they
respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived
from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves.”

In other words, by ratifying the Constitution, the people as ultimate sovereigns

took some of the sovereign power away from their individual states and gave that power
to the new federal government. In discussing the method of amending the Constitution,
Madison noted that, if it were simply a compact between the states, “the concurrence of
each State in the Union would be essential [as it was under the Articles] to every
alteration that would be binding on all.”

In Federalist No. 45, Madison replies to the argument that the new government
should be opposed because it will take away the sovereignty of the states. He responds:
“if the Union, as has been shewn, be essential…to the happiness of the people of
America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an objection to a government without which
the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a Government may derogate from
the importance of the Governments of the individual States?

“Was then the American revolution effected, was the American confederacy
formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard earned substance of
millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty and safety;
but that the Governments of the individual States, that particular municipal
establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain
dignities and attributes of sovereignty?

“We have heard of the impious doctrine in the old world that the people were
made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the new, in
another shape, that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of
political institutions of a different form?”

Writing in Federalist No. 15, Alexander Hamilton notes that “if we are unwilling
to be placed in this perilous situation [under a confederacy]; if we will still adhere to the
design of a national government, or which is the same thing of a superintending power
under the direction of a common Council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan
those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference
between a league and a government; we must extend the authority of the union to the
persons of the citizens,--the only proper objects of government.”

He continues, in discussing the current condition of the league confederacy under

the Articles, that in “our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is
requisite under the confederation to the complete execution of every important measure,
that proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The
measures of the Union have not been executed; and the delinquencies of the States have
step by step matured themselves to an extreme; which has at length arrested all the
wheels of the national government, and brought them to an awful stand.”

Madison, writing to Thomas Jefferson on October 24, 1787, states that: “It
appeared to be the sincere and unanimous wish of the Convention to cherish and preserve
the Union of the States. No proposition was made, no suggestion was thrown out, in favor
of a partition of the Empire into two or more Confederacies.

“It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union could not be secured by any
system founded on the principle of a confederation of sovereign States. A voluntary
observance of the federal law by all the members, could never be hoped for. A
compulsive one could evidently never be reduced to practice, and if it could, involved
equal calamities to the innocent & the guilty, the necessity of a military force both
obnoxious & dangerous, and in general, a scene resembling much more a civil war, than
the administration of a regular Government.

“Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government which instead of

operating, on the States, should operate without their intervention on the individuals
composing them; and hence the change in the principle and proportion of representation.”

It should be noted here that Madison’s rejection of the use of force against the
states, which he also expressed at the Constitutional Convention, only concerned the
nature of the federal government and its administration (i.e., acting on individuals), and
was not a rejection of its use in the case of nullification, insurrection, or secession by the
states.

Alexander Hamilton elaborates on this subject in Federalist No. 16, writing:

The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be

clearly this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a Foederal
 Government capable of regulating the common concerns and
preserving the general tranquility, it must be founded, as to the
objects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the principle
contended for by the opponents of the proposed constitution. It
must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in
need of no intermediate legislations; but must itself be empowered
to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own
resolutions. The majesty of the national authority must be
manifested through the medium of the Courts of Justice. The
government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able to
address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals;
and to attract to its support, those passions, which have the
strongest influence upon the human heart. It must in short, possess
all the means and have a right to resort to all the methods of
executing the powers, with which it is entrusted, that are possessed
and exercised by the governments of the particular States.

To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any State

should be disaffected to the authority of the Union, it could at any
time obstruct the execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the
same issue of force, with the necessity of which the opposite
scheme is reproached…

But if the execution of the laws of the national government, should

not require the intervention of the State Legislatures; if they were
to pass into immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the
particular governments could not interrupt their progress without
an open and violent exertion of an unconstitutional power. No
omissions, nor evasions would answer the end. They would be
obliged to act, and in such a manner, as would leave no doubt that
they had encroached on the national rights…

And as to those mortal feuds, which in certain conjunctures spread

a conflagration through a whole nation, or through a very large
proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes of
discontent given by the government, or from the contagion of some
violent popular paroxism, they do not fall within any ordinary rules
of calculation. When they happen, they commonly amount to
revolutions and dismemberments of empire. No form of
government can always either avoid or controul them. It is in vain
to hope to guard against events too mighty for human foresight or
precaution, and it would be idle to object to a government because
it could not perform impossibilities.

In his October 8, 1887 letter published in the New York Journal, the Federalist
Farmer noted that: “The present moment discovers a new face in our affairs. Our object
has been all along, to reform our federal system, and to strengthen our governments--to
establish peace, order and justice in the community--but a new object now presents. The
plan of government now proposed is evidently calculated totally to change, in time, our
condition as a people. Instead of being thirteen republics, under a federal head, it is
clearly designed to make us one consolidated government.”

Throughout his October 8th letter, the Federalist Farmer referred to the new form
of government as “passing the Rubicon” and “that the old ship [a confederacy] was to be
destroyed” and a “new ship presented…” He concludes: “Before we do away the state
governments, or adopt measures that will tend to abolish them, and to consolidate the
states into one entire government, several principles should be considered and facts
ascertained...”

Again, in a letter published on October 12, 1787, he warns that: “It is to be

observed that when the people shall adopt the proposed constitution it will be their last
and supreme act; it will be adopted not by the people of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
&c., but by the people of the United States…”

On January 22, 1788, the Federal Farmer argues that the new government is not a
continuation of the compact theory under the Articles because. “the laws of the union, in
most important concerns, as in levying and collecting taxes, raising troops, &c. operate
immediately upon the persons and property of individuals, and not on states, extend to
organizing the militia, &c. the government, as to its administration, as to making and
executing laws, is not federal, but consolidated.

“To illustrate my idea--the union makes a requisition, and assigns to each state its
quota of men or monies wanted; each state, by its own laws and officers, in its own way,
furnishes its quota: here the state governments stand between the union and individuals;
the laws of the union operate only on states, as such, and federally: Here nothing can be
done without the meetings of the state legislatures--but in the other case the union,
though the state legislatures should not meet for years together, proceeds immediately, by
its own laws and officers, to levy and collect monies of individuals, to inlist men, form
armies, &c. [H]ere the laws of the union operate immediately on the body of the people,
on persons and property; in the same manner the laws of one entire consolidated
government operate.—

“These two modes are very distinct, and in their operation and consequences have
directly opposite tendencies: The first makes the existence of the state governments
indispensable, and throws all the detail business of levying and collecting the taxes, &c.
into the hands of those governments, and into the hands, of course, of many thousand
officers solely created by, and dependent on the state. The last entirely excludes the
agency of the respective states, and throws the whole business of levying and collecting
taxes, &c. into the hands of many thousand officers solely created by, and dependent
upon the union, and makes the existence of the state government of no consequence in
the case.”
 Interestingly, the Federal Farmer provides for two checks to guard “against undue
combinations and influences in a federal system. The first is, in levying taxes, raising
and keeping up armies, in building navies, in forming plans for the militia, and in
appropriating monies for the support of the military, to require the attendance of a large
proportion of the federal representatives, as two-thirds or three-fourths of them; and in
passing laws, in these important cases, to require the consent of two-thirds or three-
fourths of the members present.

“The second is, by requiring that certain important laws of the federal head, as a
requisition or a law for raising monies by excise shall be laid before the state legislatures,
and if disapproved of by a given number of them, say by as many of them as represent a
majority of the people, the law shall have no effect.” Noticeably, he never once mentions
the check of nullification and secession.

Brutus, writing in Anti-Federalist No. 12, notes that “it be further considered, that
this constitution, if it is ratified, will not be a compact entered into by states, in their
corporate capacities, but an agreement of the people of the United States, as one great
body politic…”

Samuel Adams (of Massachusetts), in a letter dated December 3, 1787 to Richard

Henry Lee (of Virginia), writes “I confess, as I enter the Building I stumble at the
Threshold. I meet with a National Government, instead of a Federal Union of Sovereign
States. I am not able to conceive why the Wisdom of the Convention led them to give the
Preference to the former before the latter.”

Luther Martin, writing in 1788, described how advocates of a compact theory of

government wanted the federal government to be constituted:

Whereas it was urged, that the principles on which a federal

government over States ought to be constructed and ratified are the
reverse; that instead of the legislature consisting of two branches,
one branch was sufficient, whether examined by the dictates of
reason, or the experience of ages--That the representation instead
of being drawn from the people at large as individuals, ought to be
drawn from the States as States in their sovereign capacity--That in
a federal government, the parties to the compact are not the people
as individuals, but the States as States, and that it is by the States as
States in their sovereign capacity, that the system of government
ought to be ratified, and not by the people as individuals.

It was further said, that in a federal government over States equally

free, sovereign, and independent, every State ought to have an
equal share in making the federal laws or regulations; in deciding
upon them, and in carrying them into execution, neither of which
was the case in this system, but the reverse, the States not having
an equal voice in the legislature, nor in the appointment of the
 executive, the judges, and the other officers of government: it was
insisted, that in the whole system there was but one federal feature,
the appointment of the senators by the States in their sovereign
capacity, that is by their legislatures, and the equality of suffrage in
that branch; but it was said that this feature was only federal in
appearance. The Founder’s Constitution. Volume 1, Chapter 8,
Document 32.

The Impartial Examiner, writing on March 5, 1788 in the Virginia Independent

Chronicle, expressed his fear that the new government went too far and waxed eloquent
on the alleged virtues of a confederacy:

For what can be more truly great in any country than a number of
different states in the full enjoyment of liberty--exercising distinct
powers of government; yet associated by one general head, and
under the influence of a mild, just and well-organized
confederation duly held in equilibrio;--whilst all derive those
external advantages, which are the great purposes of the union?
This separate independency existing in each--this harmony
pervading the whole--this due degree of energy in the foederal
department, all together, will form a beautiful species of national
grandeur. Storing 5.14.13

On May 28, 1788, the Impartial Examiner notes that the “advocates for a new
code wi[s]h all sovereignty to be lodged in the hands of Congress. This is not to connect
thirteen independent states--but to form one extended empire by compounding the whole,
and thus destroying the sovereignty of each.” On the other hand, Anti-Federalists “desire
a continuance of each distinct sovereignty.” Storing 5.14.25--26

In The Fallacies of the Freeman Detected by a [Pennsylvania] Farmer published

on April 23, 1788, the author notes that under the new government, the “absolute
sovereignty in all the foregoing instances, as well as several others not here enumerated,
are vested in the general government, without being subject to any constitutional check or
controul from the state governments.”

He goes on to note that states do not retain their sovereignty simply because they
elect their senators.

The exercise of sovereignty does not consist in chusing masters,

such as the senators would be, who, when chosen, would be
beyond controul, but in the power of dismissing, impeaching, or
the like, those to whom authority is delegated. The power of
instructing or superceding of delegates to Congress under the
existing confederation, hath never been complained of,
 As well may the electors who are to vote for the president under
the new constitution, be said to be vested with the sovereignty, as
the state legislatures in the act of chusing senators. The senators
are not even dependent on the states for their wages, but in
conjunction with the federal representatives establish their own
wages. The senators do not vote by states, but as individuals. The
representatives also vote as individuals, representing people in a
consolidated or national government; they judge upon their own
elections, and, with the senate, have the power of regulating
elections in time, place and manner, which is in other words to say,
that they have the power of elections absolutely vested in them.
Storing 3.14.6--21

The author of The Fallacies concludes that, though “the state governments have
certain ministerial and convenient powers continued to them is not denied,” they can only
“support, but cannot controul the general government, nor protect their own citizens from
the exertions of civil or military tyranny.” He also argued, as did many other Anti-
Federalists, that “this ministerial power will continue with the states as long as two-thirds
of Congress shall think their agency necessary [i.e., removed by constitutional
amendment].”

Ratifying Conventions:

The Articles of Confederation described the relationship between the sovereign,

independent states as a “confederacy,” a “confederation,” and a “firm league of
friendship with each other” in which “each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence.” The lack of this language in the Constitution, and its replacement by the
words We the People, did not go unnoticed by the public as they debated the document’s
ratification.

For instance, Samuel Nasson, in discussing the words “We the People at the
beginning of the Constitution, argued that the new government would be a “perfect
consolidation of the whole Union,” a departure from the Articles of Confederation which
“confederated us under one head, as sovereign and independent States.” (Speech at
Massachusetts’s ratifying convention on February 1, 1788).

John Smilie, speaking to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention on November 28,

1787, stated “I think however, Mr. President, it has been clearly argued, that the proposed
system does not directly abolish, the governments of the several States, because its
organization, and, for some time, perhaps, its operations, naturally pre-suppose their
existence. But, Sir, it is not said, nor is thought, that the words of this instrument
expressly announce that the sovereignty of the several States, their independency,
jurisdiction, and power, are at once absorbed and annihilated by the general
government…

“Hence, Sir, we may trace that passage which has been pronounced by the
honorable delegate to the late convention with exultation and applause; but when it is
declared that ‘We the people of the United States do ordain and establish this
constitution,’ is not the very foundation a proof of a consolidated government, by the
manifest subversion of the principle that constitutes a union of States, which are
sovereign and independent, except in the specific objects of confederation? These words
have a plain and positive meaning, which could not be misunderstood by those who
employed them; and therefore, Sir, it is fair and reasonable to infer, that it was in
contemplation of the framers of this system, to absorb and abolish the efficient
sovereignty and independent powers of the several States, in order to invigorate and
aggrandize the general government. The plan before us, then, explicitly proposes the
formation of a new constitution upon the original authority of the people, and not an
association of States upon the authority of their respective governments.”

William Findley, in a speech to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention no

December 1, 1787, argued that the proposed constitution would establish a general
government of the people of the whole rather than sovereign states. He listed several
reasons for this conclusion, including: “1st. In the preamble, it is said, We the People,
and not We the States, which therefore is a compact between individuals entering into
society, and not between separate states enjoying independent power, and delegating a
portion of that power for their common benefit. 2d. That in the legislature each member
has a vote, whereas in a confederation, as we have hitherto practised it, and from the very
nature of the thing, a state can only have one voice, and therefore all the delegates of any
state can only give one vote.”

The minority who unsuccessfully opposed ratification of the Constitution at

Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention wrote a letter to their constituents in which they
stated: “For the moderate exercise of this power, there is no controul left in the state
governments, whose intervention is destroyed. No relief, or redress of grievances can be
extended, as heretofore by them. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of
the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents. 18 Dec. 1787 Storing 3.11.48—
50.

George Mason, in a debate at the Virginia ratifying convention on June 4, 1788,

noted that the new government is “a National Government, and no longer a
confederation. I mean that clause which gives the first hint of the General Government
laying direct taxes. The assumption of this power of laying direct taxes, does of itself,
entirely change the confederation of the States into one consolidated Government.”

Patrick Henry argued during the Virginia ratifying convention that: “The fate…of
America may depend on this…Have they made a proposal of a compact between the
states? If they had, this would be a confederation. It is otherwise most clearly a
consolidated government. The question turns, sire on that poor little thing—the
expression, We, the people, instead of the states, of America.” “Suppose the people of
Virginia should wish to alter their government; can a majority of them do it? No;
because they are connected with other men, or, in other words, consolidated with other
states…This government is not a Virginian, but an American government.” This
departure from the multinational treaty alliance under the Articles of Confederation was
“a resolution as radical as that which separated us from Great Britain.” “States are the
characteristics, and the soul of a confederation. If the States be not the agents of this
compact, it must be one great consolidated National Government of the people of all the
States.” (4--12 June 1788 Storing 5.16.1--2, 22--23, 27)

What is important to note is that those who supported ratification did not dispute
but rather confirmed the claims of their opponents. For instance, on July 29, 1899, North
Carolina’s Governor Samuel Johnston argued at his state’s ratification convention that
“the Constitution must be the supreme law of the land; otherwise, it would be in the
power of any one state to counteract the other states, and withdraw itself from the
Union.” Elliot's Debates, Vol IV, pp. 187-188.

George Wythe, speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention, stated that “the truth
is, that the supreme, absolute and uncontrollable authority, remains with the people. I
mentioned also, that the practical recognition of this truth was reserved for the honor of
this country…

“His position is, that the supreme power resides in the States, as governments; and
mine is, that it resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government; that the people have
not--that the people mean not--and that the people ought not, to part with it to any
government whatsoever. In their hands it remains secure. They can delegate it in such
proportions, to such bodies, on such terms, and under such limitations, as they think
proper…

“Unless the people are considered in these two views, we shall never be able to
understand the principle on which this system was constructed. I view the States as made
for the people as well as by them, and not the people as made for the States. The people,
therefore, have a right, whilst enjoying the undeniable powers of society, to form either a
general government, or state governments, in what manner they please; or to
accommodate them to one another, and by this means preserve them all. This, I say, is the
inherent and unalienable right of the people…” 4 Dec. 1787 McMaster 315-17

During the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson agreed with

opponents of the Constitution that “the boasted state sovereignties will, under this system,
be disrobed of part of their power. Before I go into the examination of this point, let me
ask one important question: Upon what principle is it contended that the sovereign power
resides in the state governments?...[M]y position is, that the sovereignty resides in the
people. They have not parted with it; they have only dispensed such portions of power as
were conceived necessary for the public welfare. This constitution stands upon this broad
principle. I know very well, Sir, that the people have hitherto been shut out of the federal
government, but it is not meant that they should any longer be dispossessed of their
rights. In order to recognize this leading principle, the proposed system sets out with a
declaration that its existence depends upon the supreme authority of the people alone…

“When the principle is once settled that the people are the source of authority, the
consequence is that they may take from the subordinate governments powers with which
they have hitherto trusted them, and place those powers in the general government, if it is
thought that there they will be productive of more good. They can distribute one portion
of power to the more contracted circle called State governments: they can also furnish
another proportion to the government of the United States. Who will undertake to say as
a state officer that the people may not give to the general government what powers and
for what purposes they please? how comes it, Sir, that these State governments dictate to
their superiors?--to the majesty of the people? When I say the majesty of the people, I
mean the thing, and not a mere compliment to them. The honorable gentleman went a
step further and said that the State governments were kept out of this government
altogether. The truth is, and it is a leading principle in this system, that not the States only
but the people also shall be here represented. And if this is a crime, I confess the general
government is chargeable with it; but I have no idea that a safe system of power in the
government, sufficient to manage the general interest of the United States, could be
drawn from any other source or rested in any other authority than that of the people at
large, and I consider this authority as the rock on which this structure will stand. If this
principle is unfounded, the system must fall…

“When we examine history, we shall find an important fact, and almost the only
fact, which will apply to all confederacies. They have all fallen to pieces, and have not
absorbed the subordinate governments. In order to keep republics together they must
have a strong binding force, which must be either external or internal. The situation of
this country shows, that no foreign force can press us together; the bonds of our union
ought therefore to be indissolubly strong. 1--11 Dec. 1787 McMaster 301--3, 322--25,
389--91

Additionally, no state ratifying convention conditioned its approval of the

Constitution, either on a particular interpretation or on the later inclusion of specific
amendments. Thomas Woods and Kevin Gutzman have argued vigorously that Virginia
continued its ratification of the Constitution on the ability to nullify, per the compact
theory, federal laws. However, the Virginia ratifying instrument, which follows,
maintains that the convention ratified it on behalf of the people (not the State) of
Virginia, and that the people (not the states) may “resume” their sovereignty if it is
abused by the federal government.

WE the Delegates of the people of Virginia, duly elected in

pursuance of a recommendation from the General Assembly, and
now met in Convention, having fully and freely investigated and
discussed the proceedings of the Federal Convention, and being
prepared as well as the most mature deliberation hath enabled us,
to decide thereon, DO in the name and in behalf of the people of
Virginia, declare and make known that the powers granted under
the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United
States may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be
perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not
granted thereby remains with them and at their will: that therefore
 no right of any denomination, can be cancelled, abridged,
restrained or modified, by the Congress, by the Senate or House of
Representatives acting in any capacity, by the President or any
department or officer of the United States, except in those
instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those
purposes: and that among other essential rights, the liberty of
conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged,
restrained or modified by any authority of the United States.

With these impressions, with a solemn appeal to the searcher of

hearts for the purity of our intentions, and under the conviction,
that, whatsoever imperfections may exist in the Constitution, ought
rather to be examined in the mode prescribed therein, than to bring
the Union into danger by a delay, with a hope of obtaining
amendments previous to the ratification:

We the said Delegates, in the name and in behalf of the people of

Virginia, do by these presents assent to, and ratify the Constitution
recommended on the seventeenth day of September, one thousand
seven hundred and eighty seven, by the Foederal Convention for
the Government of the United States; hereby announcing to all
those whom it may concern, that the said Constitution is binding
upon the said People, according to an authentic copy hereto
annexed, in the words following:

Most states did include with their ratification of the Constitution a list of
recommended amendments to be added to the Constitution. In fact, the New York
convention defeated a proposal from Anti-Federalist John Lansing that “there should be
reserved to the State of new York a right to withdraw herself from the Union after a
certain number of years, unless the amendments proposed” were ratified.

There would have been no need, however, for Lansing to have made his proposal
if it was understood that states had the right to secede. But the fact that the states had no
right to withdraw from the union was made clear in a July 20, 1788, letter from James
Madison to Alexander Hamilton, which the later read out loud during the debate over
Lansing’s proposal. In his letter, Madison states:

My opinion is that a reservation of a right to withdraw if

amendments be not decided on under the form of the Constitution
within a certain time, is a conditional ratification, that it does not
make N. York a member of the New Union, and consequently that
she could not be received on that plan. Compacts must be
reciprocal, this principle would not in such a case be preserved.
The Constitution requires an adoption in toto, and for ever. It has
been so adopted by the other States. An adoption for a limited time
 would be as defective as an adoption of some of the articles only.
In short any condition whatever must viciate the ratification…

This idea of reserving right to withdraw was started at Richmd. &

considered as a conditional ratification which was itself considered
as worse than a rejection.

Rather, the New York ratifying convention simply stated their confidence that the
proposed amendments would be ratified. Again, Kevin Gutzman has claimed that the
New York convention included in their ratifying instrument the condition that the states
could reclaim the power they are granting the federal government. But the instrument,
which follows, talks only in terms of the “people” and makes it clear that it understands
the Constitution to embody this principle:

We, the delegates of the people of the state of New York, duly
elected and met in Convention, having maturely considered the
Constitution for the United States of America, agreed to on the
17th day of September, in the year 1787, by the Convention then
assembled at Philadelphia, in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
(a copy whereof precedes these presents,) and having also
seriously and deliberately considered the present situation of the
United States, — Do declare and make known, —

That all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived

from, the people, and that government is instituted by them for
their common interest, protection, and security.

That the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, are
essential rights, which every government ought to respect and
preserve.

That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people

whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that
every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said
Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States,
or the departments of the government thereof, remains to the
people of the several states, or to their respective state
governments, to whom they may have granted the same; and that
those clauses in the said Constitution, which declare that Congress
shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply that
Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said
Constitution; but such clauses are to be construed either as
exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for
greater caution…
 Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid
cannot be abridged or violated, and that the explanations aforesaid
are consistent with the said Constitution, and in confidence that the
amendments which shall have been proposed to the said
Constitution will receive an early and mature consideration, —
We, the said delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the people
of the state of New York, do, by these presents, assent to and ratify
the said Constitution.

Once again, Kevin Gutzman argues that Rhode Island ratification was conditional
on the compact theory but, as the ratifying instrument below makes clear, it simply
followed New York’s lead:

We, the delegates of the people of the state of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations, duly elected and met in Convention,
having maturely considered the Constitution for the United States
of America, agreed to on the seventeenth day of September, in the
year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, by the
Convention then assembled at Philadelphia, in the commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, (a copy whereof precedes these presents,) and
having also seriously and deliberately considered the present
situation of this state, do declare and make known,—

I. That there are certain natural rights of which men, when they
form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity,—
among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means
of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety.

II. That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived
from, the people; that magistrates, therefore, are their trustees and
agents, and at all times amenable to them.

III. That the powers of government may be reassumed by the

people whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness.
That the rights of the states respectively to nominate and appoint
all state officers, and every other power, jurisdiction, and right,
which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the
Congress of the United States, or to the departments of government
thereof, remain to the people of the several states, or their
respective state governments, to whom they may have granted the
same; and that those clauses in the Constitution which declare that
Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply
that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said
Constitution; but such clauses are to be construed as exceptions to
certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution…

Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid

cannot be abridged or violated, and that the explanations aforesaid
are consistent with the said Constitution, and in confidence that the
amendments hereafter mentioned will receive an early and mature
consideration, and, conformably to the fifth article of said
Constitution, speedily become a part thereof,—We, the said
delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the people of the state
of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, do, by these presents,
assent to and ratify the said Constitution.