NOTES AND CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(With Constitutional Provisions & Doctrinal Rulings)

May 2015 Edition

Prepared by

ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN

Professor of Law
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
COLLEGE OF LAW
Baguio City
(P OLITICAL L AW R EVIEW , C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW I, C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW II )

BAR REVIEWER
(Political Law & Constitutional Law)

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FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

(Police Power)
Police power

JUSTICE EMILIO GANCAYCO VS. CITY GOVERNMENT OF

QUEZON CITY & METRO MANILA COMMISSION, G.R. No.
177933, October 11, 2011

Zoning ordinances are valid exercise of police power. Requiring building owners
along the street to construct an arcade of their structures which protrudes to the sidewalk
is valid. An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting
over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain
or sun. It is a valid exercise of police power to promote the welfare and health of the
passers-by.

a. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL VS. MAYOR OF MANILA, July 31, 1967 (Requiring

customers of motels to show IDs, name of companion, the receiving place
shall be facing a public street, etc. is a valid exercise of police power to
promote public morals, i.e., prevent or minimize prostitution as well as
illicit relationships)

b. WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA, January 20, 2009

(Prohibiting short time (any time less than 12 hours) in hotels and motels
is unconstitutional and not a valid exercise of police power. Not all those
going to hotels and motels for less than 12 hours are doing it for illicit
purposes. Further, couples with illicit relationships could still use the
hotels and motels by the simple expedience of paying the rate for 12 hours)

c. CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUIO, 455 SCRA 308 (Requiring motel
owners to convert their motels to flower shops, restaurants, antique shops,
souvenir shops, handicrafts display centers; art galleries; records and
music shops, coffee shops, etc., within 3 months or transfer the motels to
other parts of the City of Manila is not a valid exercise of police power. This
is so because if it is immoral to operate said motels in the Ermita-Malate
area, the same will likewise be immoral to operate in any other part of the
City of Manila)

d. DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569 (Nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan

were ordered closed and prohibited by a Municipal Ordinance. The SC held
that nightclubs are not illegal per se and therefore, they could not be
prohibited but merely to be regulated)

Requisites of a valid ordinance:

1. must not contravene the Constitution or any law;

2. must not be unfair or oppressive;

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3. must not be partial or discriminatory;

4. must not prohibit but regulate trade;
5. must be general and consistent with public policy; and
6. must not be unreasonable.

e. ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ, 101 Phil. 1155 (Retail Trade Nationalization Act
prohibiting foreigners from engaging in retail trade is a valid exercise of
police power tyo promote the economic stability of the Filipino people)

f. AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195 [Early warning device promotes public
safety to the motoring public and requiring every motor vehicle owner to
have one is a valid exercise of police power]

g. TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. BOT, 119 SCRA 597 (Phasing out of taxicabs
over 6 years old in Metro Manila is a valid exercise of police power to
promote public safety on the part of the riding public. However, even
taxicabs more than 6 years are still allowed outside MM because they are
not as dilapidated as those operating in Metro manila which are being used
24 hours daily)

h. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN

REFORM, 175 SCRA 343 (CARP Law is a valid exercise of police power and
power of eminent domain. It promotes general welfare on the part of the
people.)

i. VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA, September 21, 1987 (Permit earlier issued

by the Municipal Mayor for the vendors to have a Talipapa along the
National Highway of San Fernando City, Pampanga, with the approval of the
Municipal Council, may be validly revoked by the new mayor and could be
justified under the police power to promote public health. Selling fish and
meat along the national highway is dangerous to the health of the people,
the same being exposed to dust and smoke from vehicles)

j. PRC vs. De Guzman, et al., June 21, 2004 (Fatima College of Medicine
graduates had unusually and exceptionally high grades in the 2 most
difficult subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and
Gynecology during the Medical Board Examination. The NBI investigation
revealed that they had early access to test questions. They cant compel
the PRC to give them their licenses. Valid exercise of police power by PRC
in not giving said licenses to practice medicine to safeguard the heath and
general welfare of the people)

5-a. Not a valid exercise of police power

a. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA, 122 SCRA 759

(Requiring private cemeteries to set aside 6% of their land area to be given free
as burial places for paupers. It does not promote general welfare since only
paupers will benefit from it and not the entire citizenry. Further, it is the
obligation of local government units under the Local Government Code to have
cemeteries for the constituents and not to pass on to private cemeteries)

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b. YNOT VS. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (Prohibition of Inter-provincial transport of

carabaos and carabeefs without permits from health authorities is a valid
exercise of police power to promote public health. However, the Letter of
Instruction which gives the Director of Animal Industry or the Chairman of the
National Meat Commission to dispose of the confiscated animals in any manner
he deems fit is unconstitutional because in order that such measure is valid, it
must meet two (2) requisites: [1] valid subject---which is to promote public health
in this case; and [2] the means employed is valid. Here, the means employed is
not valid since the Director can use his discretion on what to do to the
confiscated animals)

c. DELA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569 (Prohibition on the operation of
nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan)

CHAPTER II
Section 1
DUE PROCESS

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of

life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

The right to Due Process of Maliksi was violated

when he was not notified of the dates when the
COMELEC conducted decryption and printing of
the ballot images

MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI VS. COMELEC and

HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302, April 13, 2013

Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be notified of every incident of the
proceedings and to be present at every stage thereof; (b) that he was deprived of such
rights when he was not informed of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot
images by the First Division; (c) that the March 28, 2012 and April 17, 2012 orders of the
First Division did not sufficiently give him notice inasmuch as the orders did not state the
date, time, and venue of the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (d) that he
was thus completely deprived of the opportunity to participate in the decryption
proceedings.

The Court grants Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and
reverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division
of the COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the
decryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount
proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot
images.

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It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the
assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to
which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The
recount proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of
their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective regional (the
autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.

The Court, by this resolution, does not intend to validate the victory of any of the
parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court simply
does not want to countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, a
cornerstone of our legal system.

A. BANCO ESPANOL VS. PALANCA, 37 Phil. 92 (Four (4) Requisites of

judicial due process)

B. IMELDA MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, October 6, 1998 (The

Sandiganbayan violated Imeldas right to due process of law when
Presiding Justice Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan asked 179 cross-
examination questions to the witness of Ms. Marcos. It is no longer a case
of asking clarificatory questions but cross-examination. Obviously, he has
allied himself to the cause of the prosecution. There is no more cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.

C. PEOPLE VS. OPIDA, June 13, 1986 (When the judge took over the cross-
examination before the Prosecutor could start asking questions, asks
immaterial questions, order the accused to remove his shirt and describe
the tattoos in his body for the record and after asking insulting questions
tells the accused Do you want me to dictate the decision now? clearly
shows his bias against the accused. No more impartial trial. He has clearly
prejudged the case.

D. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENANCIO MORTERA, G.R. No.

188104, April 23, 2010 [There is no violation of the right to due process
and impartial trial as a result of the comment of the Judge that if you are
not telling the truth to your own lawyer, how would I know that you
are telling the truth now as a result of his change of defense from a
negative defense to self-defense in a murder case.

E. DELGADO VS. CA, November 10, 1986 (The accused was represented
by a non-lawyer during the trial of her case for estafa. She was not
aware that Atty. Ico is not a member of the bar. She is entitled to a new
trial since her right to due process was violated. Even if a real lawyer
appeared for her on appeal, such defect was not cured since on
appeal, the evidence presented by the non-lawyer will still be the
basis in deciding said appeal)

F. Consulta vs. People, February 12, 2009 (He was represented during the
presentation of prosecutions evidence by one Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes who

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turned out to be a non-lawyer. He was represented by a PAO Lawyer

during the presentation of his evidence. No violation of his right to due
process since he was represented by a real lawyer during the presentation
of his evidence. And therefore, all the 4 requsites of judicial due process
are present)

G. DAVID VS. AQUILIZAN, 94 SCRA 707 (The CFI, now RTC, deciding the
case immediately after the filing of the answer, without presentation
of evidence violates the right to due process. NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT
SUCH PROCEDURE IS NOW ALLOWED IN CASES COVERED BY THE
RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE SINCE THE PLEADINGS ARE
UNDER OATH AND THE AFFIDAVITS OF WITNESSES ARE ALREADY
ATTACHED TO THE PLEADINGS)

H. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING VS. CA, 94 SCRA 261 (THE

SECRETARY OF THE DENR SECRETARY may not review his own
decision when he was still the Director of Mines without violating the
parties right to due process of law

I.ANZALDO VS. CLAVE, 119 SCRA 353 (The Deputy Executive Secretary
may not validly review his very own decision as the Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission. There will be violation of the right to due
process of law)

1. Procedural due process before administrative bodies/labor tribunals:

a. PLDT VS. TIAMZON, 474 SCRA 761. A party like the PLDT could not present
an evidence to justify its act of dismissing the private respondent for the first time
on appeal without violating the right of the employee to due process of law. This
is so because the employee waqs dismissed based on a different ground which
he was able to prove to be false and unsubstantiated.

b. ATTY. ROMEO ERECE VS. MACALINGAY, ET AL., G.R. No. 166809, April 22,
2008 (No right to cross-examine the complainant and witnesses in an
administrative case nor a formal hearing required as long as the parties were
already given the opportunity to present evidence, i.e., counter-affidavit and
affidavit of witnesses)

c. DATUFAX MANGUDADATU VS. HRET, December 18, 2008 (Summons by

registered mail is not valid since it is not one of the modes of service of summons
under the Rules of the HRET or the Rules of Court. Violation of the right to due
process)

d. DEP ED VS. CUANAN, December 16, 2008 (Not furnished a copy of the Motion
for Reconsideration of DepED before the Civil Service Commission even though
the private complainants did not question the Decision of the CSC anymore. The
right to due process of Cuanan was violated when the CSC reversed its decision
based on the Motion for Reconsideration where no notice was given to Cuanan)

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4. Procedural due process in disciplinary actions against students

A. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, DECEMBER 19,

2007 (A STUDENT HAS NO RIGHT TO DEMAND FOR CROSS-
EXAMINATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM. IT IS SUFFICIENT
THAT HE WAS GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO FILE HIS ANSWER AND
OTHER EVIDENCE. Due process is deemed complied with)

B. GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706 (5 REQUISITES OF DUE PROCESS

INVOLVING STUDENTS. PLEASE SEE THE PREWEEK REVIEWER)

In administrative proceedings, does due process require that a party be assisted by

counsel?

LUMIQUED VS. EXENEA, 282 SCRA 125 (The fact that the petitioner who was
under administrative investigation was not represented by a lawyer during the hearings of
his case could not claim violation of his right to due process. Nowhere from the Civil Service
Law nor the Administrative Code of 1987 could we find a provision requiring the presence of
a lawyer for government officials under investigation during hearings. Further, petitioner was
given several opportunities to engage the services of a lawyer but he failed to do so.

JOSE ATIENZA ET AL VS. COMELEC and MANUEL ROXAS II, FRANKLIN

DRILON AND NEREUS ACOSTA, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010

There is no violation of the right to due process when the group of Drilon expelled
Atienza and company without notice and hearing because administrative due process in
accordance with Ang Tibay could be invoked only in bodies created by the State
through which governmental acts or functions are performed. In this case, it was
purely private matter among members of the Liberal Party.

CHAPTER III
Section 1
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Section 1. nor shall any person be

denied the equal protection of the laws.

ELEAZAR QUINTO VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010,
reversing the Decision dated December 1, 2009, Per CJ Puno. There is no
violation of the right to equal protection if appointed government employees
arfe deemed automatically resigned from their work if they file their certificates
of candidacy while elected officials may continue discharging their duties even
if they have filed their certificates of candidacy. This is so because there is real
and substantial distinction. That is, their term of office is mandated by the
Constitution to be 3 or 6 years ending up to noon of June 30 following their
assumption of office. This cannot be amended or repealed by mere legislation
(Mancuso vs. Taft was abandoned and reversed in US Civil Service

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Commission vs. National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO and

Broadrick vs. State of Oklahoma)

VICTORIA GUTTIERREZ VS. DBM, G.R. No.153266, March 18, 2010. [Inclusion of
allowances and other fringe benefits for government workers in the national
government, state universities and colleges, including those in the local government
under the Compensation and Position classification Act of 1989 while those in the
AFP and PNP did not, does not violate the equal protection clause because there is
real and substantial distinction. Being charged of the actual defense of the country,
uniformed personnel of the government are expected to be stationed virtually
anywhere in the country. They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate
and high cost areas. Since their basic pay does not vary on location, the continued
grant of COLA is intended to help them offset the effects of living in higher cost
areas.

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH

COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent., G.R. No. 192935 : December 7, 2010
(Executive Order No. 1 of President Benigno Aquino III creating the Truth
Commission of 2010 to investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale
and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the
people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; Is unconstitutional because it singled out the administration of
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo while not investigating the previous
administrations as violative of the equal protection of the law. HAD THE EXECUTIVE
ORDER DIRECTS THE INVESTIGATION OF OFFICIALS UNDER THE PREVIOUS
ADMINISTRATIONS, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN CONTITUTIONAL, NOT SINGLING
OUT JUST THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT GLORIA
ARROYO.
HIMAGAN VS. PEOPLE, October 7, 1994 (Policemen charged of crimes shall be
preventively suspended up to the time their cases are completed resulting in
acquittal before they could be reinstated---regardless of the length of said trial while
other government officials could be preventively suspended only for 90 days under
the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. No violation of the equal protection clause
because there is real and substantial distinction, that is, policemen have guns and if
they immediately return to their work, there might be injustice committed because
witness might be afraid to testify against them.

PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO, November 11, 1993 [Franking

privileges for the courts removed while Congress and legislature were not. It is a
clear violation of the equal protection clause. There is a clear violation of equal
protection because there is no real and substantial distinction why it allows the
executive and legislative free use of the mails while the judiciary is not.]

Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (Later decision of the SC stating
that there is no such thing as rebellion complexed with murder and therefore, the
convicts shall serve only 6 years shall also apply to those earlier convicted of
rebellion complexed with murder. Otherwise, there will be violation of the equal
protection clause.
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Taxicab Operators vs. BOT, September 30,l982 [Theres a valid distinction when
taxicabs in Baguio City may be allowed to be used even after 6 years while Manila
taxicabs should be phased out after 6 years. The real and substantial distinction
being that the latter are used 24 hours daily while the former are used only for few
hours and as such, after 6 years, their taxicabs are already dilapidated and
dangerous to the riding public]

CHAPTER IV
Section 2
THE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE PROVISION

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

NOTE: In Southern Hemisphere vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, October 5, 2010, the

Supreme Court DISMSISED the petitions questioning the constitutionality of the Anti-
Terrorism Law or Human Security Act which allows the members of the Anti-Terrorism
Council to issue WARRANT OF DETENTION since only a JUDGE is allowed to issue a
warrant of arrest under Section 2 on the ground that the requisites of Judicial Review are
not present, there being no actual case or controversy nor the petitioners have the
personality to sue, they not having been the subject of a warrant of detention.

DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, February 18, 2014. The provision of the
Online Libel Law which provides that the DOJ has the power to restrict or to block
access to a computer data by an individual is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being
violative of the search and seizure provision as well as the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the Constitution. This in effect allows the DOJ to seize and places
under its control and disposition a computer data without a search warrant. The DOJ
Order could not supplant a judicial search warrant. It would make the DOJ the
complainant, prosecutor and judge rolled into one.

LEVISTE VS. JUDGE ALAMEDA, RTC MAKATI, G,.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010 &
ALFREDO MENDOZA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, April 21, 2014

THERE ARE TWO (2) KINDS OF PROBABLE CAUSE

1. The executive determination of probable cause on whether a crime was allegedly

committed and file a criminal case in court; and

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2. Judicial determination of probable cause is to be determined by the judge on

whether or not he shall issue warrant for the accused and bind him for trial or
whether the case shall be dismissed.

The place to be searched AS INDICATED in the warrant is controlling

PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400 The search warrant says the [4-door apartment
at the rear of Abigail Variety Store in QC, not Abigail Variety store]

As a general rule: warrantless searches and seizures as a result of an informers tip

is not valid for lack of personal knowledge on the part of the searching party,
complainant or witnesses.

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626 [On December 13, 1988, Olongapo Police
received a tip8.5 kilos of marijuana being transported from Baguio City to
Olongapo. Olongapo police just accosted the accused upon arrival in Olongapo City.
Warrantless search is not valid because the police have no personal knowledge that
accused was committing a crime]

PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA, 284 SCRA 703 [Dasmarinas, Cavite Police received a tip
on June 19, 1994The marijuana courier will alight at the waiting shed of Barangay
Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavitewith 28 kilos of marijuana. They searched him without
warrant but first, they allegedly asked for his consent---which he allegedly gave.
Warrantless search is valid because of the consent given by the accused]

P VS. CLAUDIO, 160 SCRA 646 [There is probable cause in the Warrantless search
of a bag (behind him in a bus) by a NARCOM agent when he allegedly smelled
marijuana therein. By reason of his training, he could smell marijuana and therefore,
he has personal knowledge and therefore, probable cause was present making the
search and arrest legal]

NOTE: In TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE, July 14, 1995 and People vs. CA, 216 SCRA 101,
the Supreme Court described a search warrant for estafa, robbery, theft and qualified theft
as SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT

2. Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [The clerk of court received the evidence of the
applicant for a search warrant while the judge was hearing a case. The fact that the judge
later on asked the complainant and his witnesses whether their testimony is true and they
said yes did not validate the issuance of the search warrant]

2-a. Pendon vs. CA, Nov. 16, 1990 [When the questions asked by the judge to the
applicant are pre-typed, the search warrant is not valid since there could have been no
searching questions]

1-b. Quintero vs. NBI, 162 SCRA 467 [Searching parties searched different rooms
simultaneously thereby resulting in no witnesses in the other rooms when searched
because the witnesses are in another room. Clearly, the search is not valid for lack of one
requisite]

1-d. SOLIVEN & BELTRAN VS. MAKASIAR, NOVEMBER 18, 1988 (There is no
need for the complainant and her witnesses to be personally examined by a judge before he
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issues a warrant of arrest provided he has their affidavits infront of him and upon reading it,
he is convinced of the presence of probable cause)

2-a. P. vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 (The judge may validly refuse to issue
warrants of arrest if he believes that there is no probable cause for their issuance
despite the findings of probable cause by the filing Prosecutor since that was for
purposes of filing only. The two (2) probable causes are different from one another
(Please see Leviste vs. People, supra))

7.JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR, ET AL., G.R.NO. 92163,
June 5, 1990 [Warrant of arrest issued against Senator Enrile after 1 hour and 20 minutes
from receipt of the records of the case consisting of several thousands of pages is valid.
There is no need to read all the affidavits or evidence in the record of a criminal case before
the Judge could issue a warrant of arrest. It is sufficient that he is convinced of the
existence of probable cause upon reading several affidavits]

d. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid or not. Is "Operation Kapkap" valid?

Warrantless search of alleged obscene magazines.

Read:

PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No. 87059, June, 1992 [Arrest or search
without warrant because of a bulging tummy which looks like a gun tucked therein is not
valid. There was no personal knowledge nor probable cause on the part of the police]

PEOPLE VS. GO, 354 SCRA 338 [Search of a gun which could be seen
tucked in the waist of the accused in a nightclub is valid based on the plain view
doctrine. Likewise, the sachets of shabu seen by a policeman who arrested the
accused on the front seat of his car when he opened it is admissible under the plain
view doctrine]

MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997 [The policemen saw several suspicious-
looking men at dawn and when they approached said persons, they ran but were caught.
The unlicensed firearm confiscated after the policemen searched them is admissible]

PITA VS. CA, 178 SCRA 362 [Requisites before the Mayor could confiscate
magazines which are allegedly obscene]

1. He must apply for a search warrant with the court;

2. Convince the court that the magazine is indeed obscene.
3. He can make seizures only after a search warrant is issued.

Note: The Mayor could not justify warrantless search based on police power. This is so
because he will be the complainant, prosecutor and judge rolled into one if that is allowed.
Also, only a judge could declare that the publication is obscene, not the mayor or any
other public official.

Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person is valid.

PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA, 301 SCRA 66

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL VS. SOLUTA, 482 SCRA 660

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE MARTI, G.R. NO. 81561, January 18,
1991

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

1. Search made incidental to a valid arrest

a. NOLASCO VS. PANO, 139 SCRA 541 (Note that the search shall be
made only on the body of the person arrested. She could not be
brought to her apartment and make searches therein when hshe was
arrested on board a passenger jeepney)
b. P vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [ The warrantless search and arrest of the
accused while plowing his field, and was not therefore committing a crime
then, is illegal.

c. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 588 (If accused was arrested in the street
in front of his house selling prohibited drugs, the arresting officers
may not search his house without warrant based on search
incidental to a valid arrest rule.

2. Search of moving vehicles

PEOPLE VS. BELEN MARIACOS, G.R. No. 18861, June 16, 2010 (Tip that
the accused has with her marijuana on her red bag at the topload of a
passenger jeepney justifies the police authorities to conduct a valid
Warrantless search since they have no more time to secure a search warrant)

a. MUSTANG LUMBER VS. CA, 257 SCRA 430

b. PEOPLE vs. AMINNUDIN Y AHNI, JULY 6,1988 (WARRANTLESS

Search and seizure on the bag of a ship passenger traveling from
Zamboanga City to Iloilo City basaed on an informers tip is not
valid,

a. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857

b. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16
c. HIZON VS. CA, 265 SCRA 517
d. PEOPLE VS. QUE, 265 SCRA 721

Seize of evidence in plain view

a. PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA 25 (If the policemen seized

the marijuana plants without warrant because there is a tip that
the house of the accused was surrounded by fully-grown
marijuana plants THAT IS WHY THEY WENT THERE, the same
could not be justified by the plain view doctrine because they
went to his place expecting to see or to look for marijuana. THE
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE APPLIES ONLY IF THE OFFICER IS
NOT SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE AGAINS THE ACCUSED,
BUT INADVERTENTLY COMES ACROSS AN INCRIMINATING
OBJECT.

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b. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547 (The police saw the
M14 Rifle on top of a table inside he rented apartment of the
accused AFTER THE OWNER OF SAID APARTMENT OPENED
IT WITH HER OWN KEY. Seizure of the gun cannot be
justified under the plain view doctrine because they were
looking for evidence at that time and something was done
before they saw it. It was not inadvertently found.

When there is waiver of right or gives his consent;

a. VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210 SCRA 97 (The consent given by the owner of the
house to the soldiers to look for rebel soldiers does not justify them to
search for unlicensed firearm inside the house by opening cabinets therein)

b. Lopez vs. Commissioner, 65 SCRA 336 (Note: In this case, the Supreme
Court during martial law, held that the consent given by the woman (inside
the hotel room of the suspect and who turned out to be his manicurist) to
the authorities to conduct warrantless search inside the hotel room of the
suspect, was held as valid consent justifying the admission of the seized
items.

c. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547 (Consent given by the owner of the
apartment for the police to search the room being rented to Basilio Damaso
is not valid. THE CONSENT MUST COME FROM THE ACCUSED OR THE
SUSPECT WHO WILL GO TO JAIL IF ILLEGAL ITEMS ARE FOUND, NOT BY
ANY OTHER PERSON)

STOP & FRISK or search in checkpoints

1. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN RENATO DE VILLA, GR No. 83988,

September 29, 1989 (Random searches on checkpoints are valid provided it
must only be VISUAL SEARCH, NOT BODILY SEARCH)

2. SUSAN ESQUILLO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010 Stop
and Friskvalid exception to a Warrantless search and seizure

Search of Hot Logs under the Forestry Code may be seized without warrant

MUSTANG LUMBER VS. CA, 257 SCRA 430

If the judge finds that there's probable cause, must he issue a warrant of arrest as a
matter of course?

1. Samulde vs. Salvani, September 26, 1988 (Not necessarily if it involves a

minor offense provided he is sure that the accused will appear in court
whenever his case is scheduled for trial)
2. GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265 (Yes, he must because the case is for
Murder and as such, the accused must be in jail for a non-bailable offense

Searching questions

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a. DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO

M. DAYRIT, RTC 33, Manila & People of the Philippines, GR No. 82870,
December 14, 1989 (When the applicant testifies that his knowledge that the
petitioner has guns and explosives in his office came from a very reliable
informant, there is no probable cause since he has no personal knowledge of
said fact.)

b. Pendon vs. CA, Nov. 16, 1990 [Pre-typed questions as a basis of probable
cause not valid. No searching questions]

1. Century Fox vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655 (The master tape must be presented if one
alleges that the tapes to be seized are illegal and pirated]; otherwise, the search
warrant is not valid)
2. COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. CA, 261 SCRA 144

CHAPTER IV-A
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and

correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the

preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

There are two (2) CATEGORIES of the Right to Privacy

as held by the Supreme Court in DISINI VS. SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, February 18, 2014. These are:

1. Decisional Privacy which is the right to

independence in making certain important
decisions; and
2. Informational Privacy which the interest
in avoiding disclosures on personal matters.

Further, Informational Privacy has two (2)

aspects, namely:

a. The right not to have personal

information about a particular be
disclosed; and
b. The right to live freely without surveillance
and intrusion.

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1. OPLE VS. TORRES, July 23, 1998 [National ID System (Admin. Order No. 308,
December 12, 1996 of President Ramos) through biometrics technology where
the people will have to furnish the government with their fingerprints, retinal
scan, hand geometry, facial features and others to be stored in a super
computer. Held: Since there is no safeguard that these informations will not be
used illegally, the EO is unconstitutional. It falls short of assuring that personal
information gathered from the people will be used for the specified purposes
without violating the citizens right to privacy.
2. ZULUETA VS. CA, February 10, 1996 [The intimacies of husband and wife
does not justify the latter from breaking cabinets in the clinic of the
physician-husband and take the diaries, checks, greeting cards, pictures of his
alleged paramours]
3. KMU VS. ERMITA, & BAYAN MUNA VS. ERMITA, April 19, 2006 & June 20,
2006 [Proclamation No. 420 of GMA requiring mandatory ID system is valid
because it applies only to national government employees and within her power
of control under Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution]
4. SABIO VS. GORDON, October 17, 2006 [Limited right to privacy of government
officials]

CHAPTER V
FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
PRESS, EXPRESSION, etc.

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the

freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.

DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014

The online Libel provision of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as well as the
Libel provision of the Revised Penal Code are constitutional and do not violate the freedom
of speech, press or expression of the individual since these rights are not absolute and the
State has the right to protect its citizens from defamation.

Unsolicited commercial communication or spam is constitutional though

transmitting spam amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending out the
spam enters the recipients domain without permission. But these spam do not reduce
the efficiency of computers. They can be read or deleted outright by the recipient.
UNSOLICITED ADVERTISMENTS ARE LEGITIMATE FORM OF EXPRESSIONS AND DO
NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTED FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.

The provision which punishes one who is aiding or abetting in the commission of a
cybercrime is constitutional BUT BECOMES UNCONSTITUTIONAL IF APPLIED TO
PEOPLE WHO like, share or makes Comment to a post. This is so because they are
not the author of the said libelous post.

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Baguio Midland Courier vs. CA & Ramon Labo, Jr., 444 SCRA 28 (A private
individual running for public office may be the subject of criticism like a public official
in order for the electorates to see his merits and demerits under the public figure
doctrine.

PABLITO V. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 90878, January 29, 1990 [The
State could not dictate the time and place for a citizen to exercise his freedom of
speech, expression or of the press UNLESS there is clear and present danger]

De la Cruz vs. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (The mayor could validly transfer the place where
members of the Jehovah witnesses will conduct their prayer-rally if there is clear
and present danger as a result of the previous violence that took place before
involving said religious sect and the members of the Roman Catholic Church.)

Tests of obscenity in the case of MILLER VS. CALIFORNIA:

a. Whether the average person applying to contemporary

community standards would find the work appeals to prurient
interest;

b. Whether the work depicts or describes a patently offensive

sexual conduct;

c. Whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic,

political or scientific value.

e. Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362 [City Mayor Bagatsing could not just order the
confiscation of copies of Pinoy Playboy because he considers the same as obscene
magazine even without a search warrant. That will make him the complainant, prosecutor
and judge rolled into one. He must:

i. Secure a copy of the alleged obscene publication;

ii. Apply for a search warrant;
iii. Convince the court that it is obscene; and
iv. If the court issues a search warrant, that is the only time
that he could go to the sidewalks and confiscate the said
magazine.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAYOR ATIENZA, G,R. No.

175241, February 24, 2010

The act of the mayor in denying the application for a rally permit by the IBP at the
foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 230 pm to 530 pm and instead allow them to
hold said rally at the Plaza Miranda is unconstitutional. It violates the right to freedom of
expression and public assembly. This is so because under Section 6 [e] of BP 880 or the
Public Assembly Act of 1985 which provides that if the Mayor is of the view that there is
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the
permit, HE SHALL IMMEDIATELY INFORM THE APPLICANT WHO MUST BE HEARD
ON THE MATTER. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the
applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

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1-a. Gesite vs. CA, 444 SCRA 28 [Concerted mass actions by government officials,
teachers in this case, like walkouts, mass leaves, and other work stoppage or absence
from work are prohibited because it is tantamount to strike which is prohibited to
government employees.

1-b. Bayan vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (Calibrated Pre-emptive Response is not
allowed. Instead, the police should observe the Maximum Tolerance Rule. As long as
there is no violence taking place during the rally, the Police may not validly disperse
the rallyists just because the police believes that their utterances are libelous or
seditious)

1-c. Randy David vs. Ermita, 489 SCRA 160

Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553; see guidelines for rallies but note the
same was amended by the Public Assembly Act and IBP vs. Atienza

Freedom from prior restraint

Read:

1. Newsounds Broadcasting Network vs. Hon. Ceasar Dy, April 2, 2009 [Closure of
the Bombo AM and FM stations allegedly because their building is on an agricultural land
and therefore, the Mayor did not issue a Business Permit and even ordered its closure is
tantamount to prior restrain. City of Cauayan shall pay the radio stations P10M in damages
and P1M in attorneys fees.

1-a. Bro. Eliseo Soriano vs. MTRCB, April 29, 2009 (Read also the dissenting opinion
of Justice Antonio Carpio) [Suspension for 3 months of the program Ang Dating Daan and 3
months suspension of the host Bro. Eli Soriano is not prior restraint but subsequent
punishment. The questioned utterances of Bro. Eli Soriano is quoted as follows:

August 10, 2004 at 10 p.m.

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo, sinungaling.

Gago ka talaga Michael (referring to the host of the INCs program ang
Tamang Daan) , masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba? Yung putang babae
and gumagana lang duon ay ang ibaba. Kay Michael, ang gumagana ang itaas,
o di ba? Masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito.

The balancing-of-interest test

AYER PRODUCTION VS. JUDGE CAPULONG, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, ET AL.,

160 SCRA 861 [The Dangerous Life: the 1986 EDSA Peoples Power Revolution
Senator Enrile could not validly stop the filming of the EDSA Revolution showing
him as a participant because such does not violate his right to privacy. To exclude
him in the movie as a participant of the revolution would distort history.As between
the right to privacy of Enrile and the freedom of expression on the part of the movie
producer, the latters right prevails.

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Lagunzad vs. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (The mother of the late Moises Padilla may
validly object to a film showing the alleged many girlfriends of her late son who was
murdered to protect the privacy or memory of her late son. The right to privacy
prevailed over the freedom of expression in this case. The producer is only after
profits while the mother is after the good reputation of her son from the eyes of the
people.)

CHAPTER VI
THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT
OF RELIGION CLAUSE

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

JAMES IMBONG ET AL VS. HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, G.R.

No. 204819, April 8, 2014

The provision of the Reproductive Health Law requiring a conscientious objector of

the said law to refer to another physician a patient for the performance of a procedure which
he does not want to perform as unconstitutional. It violates the freedom of religion as well as
free speech.

Likewise, the provision of the Implementing Rules and Regulations which provides
that provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, who by
virtue of their offices are specifically charged with the duty of implementing the provisions
of this act cannot be considered as conscientious objectors IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. This is so because if a
medical practitioner who is a conscientious objector is allowed not to perform an RH
Procedure because it is against his religious belief, there is no real and substantial
distinction why provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses
should not be allowed to refrain from performing the same if it is against their religious
beliefs.

However, even a conscientious objector may be forced to perform a

reproductive health procedure even if it is against his religious belief in life-
threatening cases. THE RIGHT TO LIFE ON THE PART OF THE MOTHER SHALL BE
GIVEN PREFERENCE CONSIDERING THAT REFERRAL TO ANOTHER MEDICAL
PRACTITIONER WOULD AMOUNT TO DENIAL OF MEDICAL SERVICE WHICH WOULD
UNNECESSARILY PLACE THE LIFE OF THE MOTHER IN GRAVE DANGER.

Estrada vs. Escritur, 408 SCRA 1 and 492 SCRA 1

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Requisites before a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses may validly excuse himself
from criminal or administrative liability for living with another person who is not his wife or
husband:

a. Must be a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower

Society;
b. The conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious
beliefs;
c. The conjugal arrangement was with the conformity of the
congregation;
d. Execute Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.

PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN & ZOSA, 38 O.G. 1676, refusal to join the armed forces
on religious grounds is not tenable because of the mandatory requirement of
Section 4, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.

INK vs. Gironella, 106 SCRA 1 [The judge described the act of members of
Iglesia ni Cristo from always present in his court during the trial of a rape
case where the complainant is an INC member as Gimmick. The
Supreme Court held that the said comment hurts the sensibilities of the
INC members and violates their freedom of religion]
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 398
Pamil vs. Teleron, November 20, 1978
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope, 59 SCRA 54 [Religious belief not to join unions is
superior over the collective bargaining agreement]
German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 (The exercise of freedom of religion
must be done in good faith)
Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 11 [1959]
EBRALINAG VS. SUPT. OF CEBU, March 1, 1993 (Members of the Jehovahs
witnesses may not be forced to sing the national anthem, salute the flag
and recite the patriotic pledge during flag ceremonies if it is against their
religion. Said constitutional right prevails over the Flag Salute Law.
ANG LADLAD [LGBT---LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL and TRANSGENDER]
PARTY VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 (The fact that their
belief---same sex marriage---is allegedly not sanctioned by the Bible or the
Koran is not a valid ground to disqualify Ang Ladlad from participating in
the party-list elections.

CHAPTER VII
THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the

same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in

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the interest of national security, public safety, or

public health, as may be provided by law.

1-a. FERDINAND MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL., G.R. NO.
88211, September 15, 1989 and the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated
October 27, 1989 [Arts. 12 and 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights]

The 1987 Constitution deals with the right to travel, not right to return which is a
different right under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As such, former President
Marcos could not invoke his right to travel to justify his request in asking for travel papers
from the government. This is so because what he wants deals with the right to return.

Manotoc vs. CA, 142 SCRA 149

An accused facing a BAILABLE criminal case in court [RTC or SB] may be

allowed travel abroad if he can:

a. prove [to the court] the urgency of the travel;

b. duration of the travel; and
c. consent of the surety.

Note: Even if a person is facing several criminal cases before the Municipal Trial
Court, he could travel abroad because MTCs are not empowered to issue HOLD
DEPARTURE ORDERS.

CHAPTER VIII
THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Section 7. The right of the people to information on

matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.

Read:

RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF

ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND
PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND

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EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June

13, 2012

RE: REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR

INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM [PCIJ] FOR THE 2008
STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH
[SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEETS OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS JUSTICES, A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA, June 13,
2012

It is within the right to information on matters of public concern or access to official

records, etc., to request for copies of SALN of justices and judges---subject to the
guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP (MOA-AD Case. There is violation of the
right to information when suddenly, and without any consultation to the people of Mindanao,
the government will sign already a Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
granting the MILF broad powers over many provinces in Mandanao to form part of the
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity )

AKBAYAN VS. THOMAS AQUINO, July 16, 2008 (The JEPEPA Case) There is no
violation of the right to information on matters of public concern if the President did not
furnish the petitioner a copy of the JPEPA for its comment and suggestions before the
President signs the same to become a treaty because the said petitioner could still voice out
its comments and suggestions before the Senate which shall still conduct hearings before
ratifying or rejecting it.

HAZEL ANTOLIN VS. ATTY. ABELARDO DOMONDON, ET AL., G.R. No. 165036, July 5,
2010 ( Petitioner may validly demand for a copy of the test questions, her answers or test
booklets, and copies of the answers by the examiners of the Accountancy Board
Examination in accordance with her right to information. The fact that she has passed the
exam on her second try does not make her request moot and academic.

3. Bantay Republika vs. COMELEC, 523 SCRA 1 (The provision of the Party-List
Law prohibiting the COMELEC from divulging to the public the nominees of the
party-list groups is unconstitutional. It violates the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.

CHAPTER X
THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for

public use without just compensation.

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1. Barangay Matictic vs. Elbinias, 148 SCRA 83 (Even barangays may expropriate upon
[1] approval of such resolution by the Barangay Council and [2] by the President of the
Philippines.

Procedure for the exercise of said power and when may a writ of possession be
issued in favor of the government

BIGLANG-AWA VS. JUDGE BACALLA, 354 SCRA 562 (The requisites in order
to be entitled to a writ of possession in ordinary expropriation are: [1] Filing of
a petition for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; and [2]
Deposit 100% of the assessed value of the property based on the latest tax
declaration.

CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE LEGASPI, 444 SCRA 269 (The requisites in order
to have a writ of possession in expropriation cases involving a local
government unit: [1} Filing of a petition for expropriation sufficient in form
and in substance; and [2] Deposit 15% of the market value of the property
based on the latest tax declaration.

REPUBLIC VS. JUDGE GINGOYON, 478 SCRA 474 [RA NO. 8974 APPLIES TO
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PROJECTS, NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECTS, AND BUILD OPERATE TRANSFER PROJECTS OF THE
GOVERNMEN ONLY] REQUISITES IN ORDER TO BE ENTITLED TO A WRIT OF
POSSESSION IN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PROJECTS, ETC.

[1} Filing of a petition for expropriation sufficient in form and in

substance; and [2] Deposit 100% of the market value of the property
based on the latest tax declaration or its zonal value.

However, if the expropriated land will not be used for the purpose for which it was
intended, the landowner may ask for its reversion.

Read:

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. LOZADA, JR., ET

AL., G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010

Taking of private property through expropriation is always subject to the

condition that the property be devoted to the specific purpose for which it was taken.
Corollarily, if the particular purpose or intent was abandoned, then the former owners
if they desire, may seek the reversion of their property by:

[1] returning the amount of just compensation received

[2] plus legal interest
[3] plus necessary expenses incurred in maintaining the lot as well as the
[4] pecuniary value of their services in managing it to the extent that the landowner
will be benefited thereby.

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When the Lahug Airport in Cebu City was no longer in operation, said lands
intended for its expansion can no longer be used for the purpose for which it was
intended. As such, reversion is justified.

BERKENKOTTER VS. CA, December 14, 1992 (In this case, the Supreme Court
declared that the just compensation to be paid by the government was not what the
trial court and the commissioners had found it to be but an amount much much
lower because it was found out that the landowner, in a deed of sale in favor of a
private corporation, sold an adjacent portion of the lot at a very low price. The SC
held that with more reason that the government should only pay the same lower
amount since it will be for public purposeeven if it believes that petitioner
undervalued its sale to the private corporation in order to cheat the government of
capital and documentary stamps tax. In closing, the Supreme Court held that this
should serve as a warning to taxpayers not to undervalue their property in the deed
of sale),

Manotok vs. CA, May 21,1987 (Just compensation is not what the government want
to pay the landowner, nor what the landowner wants the government to pay his
property, but it is the amount determined by the court as the just value of the
property by taking into account several factors to determine just compensation)

Requisite of "taking" in eminent domain cases

1. Rep. vs. Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336

Requisites of taking:

1. The expropriator must enter the property;

2. The entrance must not be just for a momentary period;
3. the entry must be under a warrant or color of title;
4. the property must be devoted for public use; and
5. the owner must be ousted from the beneficial use of his land.

CHAPTER XII
RIGHTS DURING
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the

commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation,

or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,

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incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention

are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation

of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions
for violations of this section as well as compensation
to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices, and their families.

PEOPLE VS. MAHINAY, February 1, 1999 [11 rights of the suspect under custodial
investigation which expanded the Miranda Doctrine. It is now called the Expanded
Miranda Doctrine or the Mahinay Docxtrine.

LUMANOG VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 182555, September 7, 2010 (ROLANDO ABDILLA
CASE)

Even if the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence if there are other

evidence sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, still, the
accused may be convicted.

1-a. Requisites of a valid extrajudicial confession:

PEOPLE VS. TUNIACO, G.R. No. 185710, January 10, 2010

Though the lawyer who assisted them at the Police Station is a PAO Lawyer and
who was already inside the Police Station when the accused was brought in, and
since ATTY. BESINGA, the PAO Lawyer who assisted them, IS NOT
BEHOLDEN TO THE POLICE, the confession is admissible.

The requisites of a valid confession are:

1. The confession must be voluntary;

2. The confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel;
3. The confession must be express; and
4. The confession must be in writing and signed by the suspectand the counsel.

PEOPLE VS. FELIXMINIA, March 20, 2002 (Even though the

extrajudicial confession was inadmissible for it was in violation of Section
12, Art. III of the Constitution, the accused could be convicted because of
circumstantial evidence which is enough to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

P. VS. GALIT, 135 SCRA 465 [SINCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL

CONFESSION (obtained through force and violence) IS INADMISSIBLE
AS EVIDENCE AND IT is the only evidence TO PROVE THE GUILT OF

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THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, HE IS ENTITLED TO

ACQUITTAL---even if said confession speaks of gospel truth]

PEOPLE VS. SAMOLDE, 336 SCRA 32 and PEOPLE VS. CABILES,

284 SCRA 199; PEOPLE VS. TAN, 286 SCRA 207 [A suspects
confession, whether verbal or in writing, when taken without the
assistance of counsel, without a valid waiver of such assistance,
regardless of the absence of coercion, or the fact that it was voluntarily
given, IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, EVEN IF THE APPELLANT;S
CONFESSION WERE GOSPEL TRUTH.

PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO LAUGA, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010

Confession made to the BANTAY BAYAN members without being informed of

his rights nor with the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. This is so
because Bantay Bayan is a police auxiliary and as such, they are extension of the police
who are bound to tell him his rights.

The Expanded Miranda Doctrine is not applicable in the following instances.

When there is no need to inform the accused/suspect of his rights nor is there
a need for the assistance of counsel, that is, if there is voluntary and
spontaneous confession or admission of the person even before he could be
informed of his rights

1. PEOPLE VS. TAMPUS, MARCH 28, 1980 [A convict in New

Bilibib confessed to the jail guards spontaneously of having
killed a member of the other gang therein]
2. P VS. TAYLARAN, 108 SCRA 373 [The accused went to
the police and said: I killed my mother-in-law since she
is a barang. The confession is admissible because he
uttered it to the police when he voluntarily surrendered. It
was voluntary and spontaneous]

Also in the following, the confession is admissible even if there is no

compliance with the Miranda doctrine, as amended.

1. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE RUBEN C. AYSON, RTC 6, BAGUIO CITY, 175

SCRA 216 (Investigator is a private person like the lawyer or security
officer of the Philippine Airlines who did not inform the accused of
his rights nor was he assisted by a lawyer when he investigated the
accused resulting in his confession. The same is admissible as
evidence because Section 12 Art. III, does not apply to administrative
investigations conducted by private persons)
2. PEOPLE VS. MAQUEDA, 242 SCRA 565 (Admission to a private
individual, DEAN RAY SALVOSA, then UC President, without
informing him of his rights is admissible in evidence)cvbn
3. KIMPO VS. CA, 232 SCRA 53 [Confession given upon investigation
made by a private individual]
4. PEOPLE VS. ORDONO, 334 SCRA 673 [Confession made to a Radio
announcer]

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5. PEOPLE VS. ZUELA, 323 SCRA 589; PEOPLE VS. ANDAM

[Confession made to the Municipal Mayor]
6. PEOPLE VS. ENDINO, 353 SCRA 307 [Confession in a Videotaped
interview with newsmen]
7. PEOPLE VS. JOSE TING LAN UY, JR., 475 SCRA 248. [The sworn
statement or extrajudicial admission used in convicting him was
given to a personnel of the National Power Corporation who
investigated him without informing him of his rights, is admissible]

PEOPLE VS. BARIQUIT, 341 SCRA 600 [Custodial investigation begins when a
person is taken into custody for the commission of a crime. THE PLACE OF
INTERROGATION IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THE EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BUT THE TONE AND MANNER OF QUESTIONING BY
THE POLICE AUTHORITIES. So even while the policemen and the suspect are just
walking in the highway towards the police station, there is already custodial
investigation in this case as a result of the questions asked of the suspect pointing
to him as a suspect. They should have informed him of his rights even while walking
in the street.

1-a. People vs. Marcos Jimenez, Dec. 10, 1991 (The suspect shall be assisted by
counsel from the moment the custodial investigation commences)

When shall the constitutional rights of the accused as mentioned above

demandable? How about during police line-up?

A. No because the suspect is not under custodial

investigation during police line-up. He is not
required to answer questions which might
incriminate him. Though in one case, the Supreme
Court held that he should be assisted by a lawyer
during the police line-up to prevent the investigator
from making improper suggestions to the
witnesses.

1. P vs. Usman Hassan, 157 SCRA 261

2. Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, 162 SCRA 642
1 3. DE LA TORRE VS. CA, 294 SCRA 196
4. PEOPLE VS. HATTON

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 57 SCRA 481

1. PEOPLE VS. PATUNGAN, 354 SCRA 413 [The suspect was under coercive and
uncounselled investigation by the police without a lawyer for 2 and a half days. Then
he was brought to the IBP for the signing of his extrajudicial confession. The same
is inadmissible in evidence.

2. PEOPLE VS. OBRERO, 332 SCRA 190 . The police investigator of Western Police
District provided the accused a counsel to assist him during the custodial
investigation in the person of Atty. De Los Reyes, the Station Commander of the
WPD, where he belongs. The confession is inadmissible because Atty. De Los

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Reyes is not a competent and independent counsel of his own choice. The position
of said lawyer is adverse to the suspect]

3. PEOPLE VS. JEREZ, 285 SCRA 393 [However, a lawyer provided by the
investigators to the suspect during custodial investigation is deemed engaged by the
accused WHERE HE NEVER RAISED ANY OBJECTION AGAINST THE
FORMERS APPOINTMENT DURING THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION
AND THE ACCUSED THEREAFTER SUBSCRIBES TO THE VERACITY OF HIS
STATEMENT BEFORE THE FISCAL.

4. PEOPLE VS. REYES, G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009 [PAOCTF of Col. Cesar
Mancao] [Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao were strangled to death after they
were kidnapped though the parents agreed to the P5M ransom. When arrested, the
suspects were provided by the PAOCTF Investigator, COL. CESAR MANCAO,
ATTY. UMINGA and ATTY. ROUS to assist them. Both lawyers are lawyers of
PAOCTF or friends of the PAOCTF officials. They informed them of their rights and
assisted them during the entire time of the investigation. The SC said the
confessions are admissible. This is so because a confession is admissible
when:

a. where the accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion or

duress or violence on their persons;
b. where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the
oaths;
c. where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment;
d. where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and
e. where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician
to buttress their claim. (People vs. PIA, 229 Phil. 577 [1986]

The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying

anything which might incriminate him; but rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something else. THE COUNSEL
SHOULD NEVER PREVENT AN ACCUSED FROM FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY
TELLING THE TRUTH. (PEOPLE VS. BASE, 385 Phil. 803 [2000]

5. PEOPLE VS. MARCOS JIMENEZ, G.R. No. 82604, December 10, 1991 [The
lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial investigation should be the latters
choice and not merely foisted on him by the police. ALSO, THE LAWYER SHALL BE
PRESENT TO ASSIST HIM FROM THE FIRST QUESTION ASKED OF HIM]

6. PEOPLE VS. JUANERIO, 267 SCRA 608 The suspect was Assisted by a lawyer
applying at the NBI, and who was accepted as NBI Investigator several days later.
Not valid confession. There is violation of the right to counsel because said lawyer
could not be considered competent and independent counsel of his own choice]

7. Could the Fiscal also represent the accused, who is his kumpare, during
custodial investigation to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution that the accused
must be assisted by counsel? In P. vs. Matos-Viduaya, September 11, 1990, the
Supreme Court held No. The Fiscal is representing the complainant or the

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People of the Philippines so as if the accusede had no lawyer during the

custodial investigation)

CHAPTER XIII
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with

offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.

Is bail available in extradition cases?

1. US GOVERNMENT VS. JUDGE PURGANAN & MARK JIMENEZ, 389 SCRA

623 [No right to bail in an extradition case since it is not criminal and nature
where the constitutional right applies]
2. RODRIGUEZ VS. PRESIDING JUDGE, 483 SCRA 290
3. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG VS. JUDGE OLALIA, JR., 521 SCRA 470 [A
prospective extraditee may be allowed on bail if [1] he can prove by CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE that he is not a flight risk and [2] that he is ready
and willing to comply with the processes of the extradition court. A clear and
convincing evidence is an evidence greater than mere preponderance of
evidence but below proof beyond reasonable doubt]

But the Question is: Is it possible for a prospective extraditee to convince the court
that he is not a flight risk and be allowed to post bail?

No! The reason why extradition is being requested is because said prospective
extradite COMMITTED FLIGHT WHEN HE WAS ABOUT TO BE PROSECUTED BY THE
REQUESTING COUNTRY.

Is bail by recognizance allowed after conviction by final judgment?

1. ATTY. ADALIM-WHITE VS. JUDGE BAGTAS, 475 SCRA 175 (No. The judge
committed gross ignorance of the law when he granted recognizance to an
accused who was convicted with finality of frustrated murder by no less than
the Supreme Court. Bail is allowed only during the trial of a criminal case when
he is still presumed innocent, but never after conviction by final judgment)

2. Ignacio vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 [Purely cash bond as demanded by the judge
for the accused who is facing numerous criminal cases in his court in order
that he be released from detention, is not allowed. Otherwise, that is
tantamount to removing the three (3) other modes of posting bail like [2]
property bond; [3] surety bond; and [4] recognizance.

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3. Marcos vs. Cruz, 67 and 70 Phil. Bail is a matter of discretion when the
accused Ferdinand Marcos was charged of murder and the evidence of guilt is
strong which normally, is not bailable. Yet, he was allowed bail considering
that the probability of flight is nil. He just graduated from the UP College of
Law with honors and will be reviewing and taking the Bar Examinations.

4. Villasenor vs. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 [Please memorize the 10 Factors to consider
in granting bailwhich later on became Section 9, Rule 114 of the December 1,
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure]

a. financial ability of the accused to give bail;

b. nature and circumstances of the offense;
c. penalty of the offense charged;
d. character and reputation of the accused;
e. age and health of the accused;
f. the weight of the evidence against the accused;
g. probability of the accused appearing in trial;
h. forfeiture of other bonds;
i. the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
j. the pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.

5. P vs. IAC, January 10,1987, 147 SCRA 219

6. Manotoc vs. CA, May 30,1986 (Note again: The 3 Factors to consider in
allowing/disallowing an accused to travel abroad)
7. Garcia vs. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143
8. P vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 [Bail application should be decided only after the
prosecution has presented all its intended witnesses in a bail hearing as part of its right to
due process of law. Granting bail to the accused even while the prosecution has still one or
2 witnesses to present in the bail hearings is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
court)

9. PEOPLE VS. BUCALON, G. R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009

The accused who charged of Murder filed a Demurrer to Evidence after the
prosecution rested its case. The court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and held that
though Murder was not duly proven, the evidence shows that the accused could be held
liable for Homicide. He then asked for bail which was granted by the court.

Issue:

Could the court validly grant bail even though there was no petition for bail?

Held:

The trial court is correct. The Demurrer to Evidence is equivalent to a petition for bail
and since the court held that he could be convicted of Homicide only, which is bailable, then
the trial court could validly allow him to be out on bail.

CHAPTER XIV
DUE PROCESS

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IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

1. P vs. Terrobias, 103 SCRA 321 [One week trial and conviction does not violate the
right to due process because all the requisites of due process in judicial proceedings as
enumerated in Banco Espanol vs. Palanca are all present.]

PEOPLE VS. MALBOG, October 12, 2000 , 342 SCRA 620. When the
alleged rape victim was left in the motel for 45 minutes by the accused
for him to buy her a new dress, her nursing uniform being crumpled and
stained with semen and when she did not leave nor seek help from hotel
authorities because she is ashamed of her outfit, the Supreme Court
held that such act is unbelievable and contrary to common human
experience. She gave more importance to her looks than the possibility
that the accused will rape her again when he returns. The Supreme
Court held that in consonance with the presumption of innocence on
the part of the accused, Mas vale que queden castigar diez
presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente. [It is better to acquit ten (10)
accused who are possibly guilty of the crime they are charged of than to
convict one who is innocent]

MALILLIN VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008 (Search of shabu
inside the room was conducted with a warrant. Several policemen with
witnesses participated. When the witnesses have left the room since no
shabu was found, one policeman who was left suddenly said he found a
shabu. Presumption of innocence applicable to support acquittal. It is
unbelievable)

PEOPLE VS. SATURNO, 355 SCRA 578 (IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE

COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, THE WIFE OF ONE OF THE 4 VICTIMS
TOLD THE INVESTIGATORS SHE did not see the assailant. After about a
week, she said it is the accused. Presumption of innocence dictates that he
should be acquitted)

Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 [Presumption of innocence makes a law

prohibiting all those who are charged of the crimes of rebellion and other
political crimes from running for public office, UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

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3. Presumption of innocence in the order of trial

Read:

1. Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 [Reverse Order of trial not allowed]
2. Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, July 10, l986 [Reverse order of trial is valid if the
accused consents thereto]
3.Sec. 3(3), Rule 119 , 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure , as amended.

3-a. Presumption of innocence in drugs cases/Obligations of arresting officers/Chain of

Evidence Rule under Section 21 of RA No. 9165

Read:

PEOPLE VS. PAJARIN, G.R. NO. 190460, January 12, 2011

If the alleged shabu was not marked by the arresting officers after the buy-bust
operation at the place where the arrest and seizure were made but marked by
the investigator when it was turned over in the police station, there is violation
of Section 21 and the accused shall be acquitted based on his presumption of
innocence. The integrity of the shabu is now doubtful.

PEOPLE VS. LORENZO, GR NO. 184760. April 23, 2010 (Non-compliance by the
arresting officers of Section 21) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act entitles
the accused to acquittal based on his presumption of innocence)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAPIA ANDONGAN, G.R. No. 184595, June
29, 2010

The presumption of regularity in the performance of

official duties could not prevail over the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused.

For, among other things, it is incredible for an allegedly

known drug-peddler to be standing at a corner of a street at
7:50 in the evening instead of plying her trade secretly, and with
only a 0.146-gram sachet worth P500.00 of prohibited drugs in
her possession the value of which happens to be what a
poseur-buyer wants to buy.

PEOPLE VS. RONALDO DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010

BONDAD VS. PEOPLE, December 10, 2008 (No pictures)

JULIUS CACAO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 180870, January 22, 2020. Conflict of
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on who delivered the seized
evidence to the evidence custodian entitles the accused to acquittal based on
his constitutional presumption of innocence.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.TOKOHISA KIMURA and AKIRA

KIZAKI, G.R. No. 130805, April 27, 2004, the Supreme Court held that said
failure of the arresting officers to mark the seized illegal drugs at the place of
apprehension is fatal. It was held that:
In People vs. Laxa, the policemen composing the buy-bust team failed to
mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the alleged
apprehension of the accused-appellant. One policeman admitted that he
marked the seized items only after seeing them for the first time in the
police headquarters.
PEOPLE VS. OBMIRANIS, December 16, 2008
MALLILLIN VS. PEOPLE, April 30, 2008
PEOPLE VS. MONALYN CERVANTES, March 17, 2009
PEOPLE VS. MARIAN CORECHE, August 14, 2009
PEOPLE VS. PARTOZA, May 8, 2009

3-b. Effect of inconsistent testimonies of arresting/searching officers

LEJANO VS. PEOPLE, DECEMBER 14, 2010 (The Hubert Webb Case)

Inconsistent testimony of the prime witness, Jessica Alfaro, on material points results
in acquittal.

AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE, April 30, 2008 (One witness said, 5 of them entered the
room and searched for a gun. He said SPO4 Jara searched the room but when the
latter testified, he said, he was outside guarding the premises. The accused is
entitled to acquittal)

PEOPLE VS. ANGUS, August 3, 2010

The mere fact that there is evidence showing that the accused and his wife were
quarreling the night before her body was found is not enough circumstantial evidence to
prove his guilt for parricide. Presumption of innocence justifies his acquittal.

The equipoise rule

Read:

PEOPLE VS. DE LOS SANTOS, 355 SCRA 415

PEOPLE VS. SATURNO, 355 SCRA 578

The right to counsel in criminal proceedings:

PEOPLE VS. JOHN HILARIO, G.R. No. 161070, April 14, 2008

Even if the decision of conviction is already final and executory, the case may be re-
opened IF THERE IS GROSS NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY COUNSEL THEREBY

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VIOLATING THE RIGHT OF THE SAID ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW . Two
counts of murder with conviction, he directed his PAO Lawyer to file appeal but he failed.
His Petition for Relief is granted)

Requisites:

1. Matter involves life, liberty or property;

2. existence of special or compelling circumstances;
3. merit of the case;
4. not entirely the fault of the party;
5. not dilatory or frivolous;
6. other party not prejudiced.

1. HILARIO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 167756, April 8, 2008

1-a P vs. Holgado,85 Phil. 752
1-b. Delgado vs. CA, 145 SCRA 357 (Please see due process)
1-c. CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE, FEBRUARY 12, 2009 (Discussed in due process)
1. P vs. Cuison, 193 Phil. 296
2. PEOPLE VS. YAMBOT, 343 SCRA 20
3. PEOPLE VS. NADERA, 324 SCRA 490 (Oleby and Maricris Nadera testified with
no cross-examination from the accuseds lawyer, a PAO Lawyer. Worse,
accused did not even testify. The Supreme Court remanded the case for
another trial as the accuseds right to counsel was violated)
4. PEOPLE VS. BERMAS, April 21, 1999

6. The right to be present during trial

1. Aquino vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546 (The accused must be present
during:

a. Arraignment;
b. when he is to be identified by the prosecution witnesses; and
c. during the promulgation of decision.

The accused may validly waive his right to be present if:

a. he will manifest to the court, verbally or in writing that he is waiving his right to be
present; AND
b. THAT WHENEVER A PROSECUTION WITNESS MENTIONS HIS NAME, HE
ADMITS THAT HE OR SHE IS REFERRING TO HIM.

2. P vs. Judge, 125 SCRA 269

7. The right to Speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases.

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition
of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.

JAIME BERNAT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, May 20, 2004. [His case was submitted for
decision as of August 23, 1994 but it was only about 8 years later that there was a Notice of

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Promulgation of the Decision. He claimed there is a gross violation of his right to speedy
trial

Held:

THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL WAS

VIOLATED CANNOT BE BASED ON MERE MATHEMATICAL RECKONING OF TIME.
PARTICULAR REGARD TO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL ALSO BE
CONSIDERED]

The delay must be VEXATIOUS, CAPRICIOUS AND OPPRESSIVE TO VALIDLY

INVOKE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL and this is so if the following
requisites are satisfied:

a. Length of the delay;

b. Reasons for the delay;
c. Assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
d. Prejudiced caused by the delay.

1. Tatad vs. SB, 159 SCRA 70

2. DUTERTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 289 SCRA 721 (On February 18, 1992, the
case was submitted for Resolution by OMB and the Information was filed only
on February 22, 1996. Violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases is
very obvious)
3. ANGCHANGCO VS. OMBUDSMAN, 269 SCRA 301 (October 22, 1999 when the
complaint was filed against him before the Ombudsman up to May 26, 2004, no
case filed whether administrative or criminal against a government employee
who long retired. There is violation of speedy disposition of cases)
4. CAPT. WILFREDO ROQUERO VS. THE CHANCELLOR OF UP MANILA, G.R. No.
181851, March 9, 2010

No formal offer of evidence by the complainant against him for 5 years is a clear
violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases. The administrative case shall be
dismissed.

The right to an impartial trial

1. ATTY. LAURO D. GACAYAN VS. JUDGE FERNANDO PAMINTUAN, RTC 3,

BAGUIO CITY, 314 SCRA, September 17, 1999 (If the judge orders the arrest of the
witnesses presented before a previous judge and examines them without notice to
the prosecutor and to the defense counsel, it is obvious that the right to impartial
trial was violated)

1-a. PEOPLE VS. OPIDA, June 13, 1986 (The judge conducted cross-examination on
the accused and his sole witness. He was so cruel on the accused. He even asked him to
remove his shirt and described the tattoos on his body for the record. After he was true
cross-examining the accused, he said Do you want me to dictate the decision now? There
was violation of the accuseds right to impartial trial and to due process of law. There was no
longer cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

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1-b. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENANCIO MORTERA, G.R. No.

188104, April 23, 2010 [There is no violation of the right to due process and
impartial trial as a result of the comment of the Judge that if you are not telling
the truth to your own lawyer, how would I know that you are telling the truth
now as a result of his change of defense from a negative defense to self-defense in
a murder case.

2. Olaguer vs. Chief of Staff, May 22, 1987 (The military commission appointed by
then President Marcos to try the petition when Marcos himself is the complainant and
was the one who created the Military Commission and appointed its members, is not
an impartial tribunal.

3. Ignacio vs. Villaluz,May 5, 1979 (When the judge stated in his Decision in the
Arson case against the accused that he burned the capitol in order to remove the
evidence against him in the malversation case, it is obvious that he has prejudged
the cause of the accused in the malversation case. His right to impartial trial was
violated. He is now lacking the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
4. P vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120
5. Dimacuha vs. Concepcion, 117 SCRA 630

Right to a public trial

1. Garcia vs. Domingo, July 25,1973 (Hearing held inside the chambers of the
Judge on Saturdays, without objection on the part of the parties do not violate the
accuseds right to public trial as long as there is no showing that people who wanted
to watch the proceedings were prevented from doing so)

1. P vs. Tampus, March 28,1980 (Trial inside New Bilibid Prison for a convict
therein instead of thetrial to be held in the premises of the CFI or RTC of
Muntinlupa did not violate the right to public trial on the part of the
accused.

The right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation

PEOPLE VS. JERRY NAZARENO, G.R. No. 167756, April 8, 2008

The information reads that sometime from January, 1990 up to December 6,

1998, in Barangay Codon, Municipality of San Andres, province of
Catanduanes.by force, intimidationhad sexual intercourse with the
complainant without her consent (Note: The information for rape covers a
period of almost 9 years)

No violation of the right to be informed since the date and time is not an
integral part or element of the crime of rape.

Further, the accused waived said right when he never questioned the
information before he entered his plea. He should have asked for a Bill of Particulars
or Moved to quash the Information. He did not. Clearly, he slumbered on his rights
and awakened too late.

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1-a. P vs. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653 (A deaf-mute accused is entitled to a sign
language interpreter from arraignment up to promulgation. Absence of said
interpreter violates his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him and that his conviction shall be set aside in favor of a new trial.

1-c. P vs. Resavaga, 159 SCRA 426 (While the caption of the criminal case shows
that he is being charged of Homicide, he can be convicted of Murder if the
evidence so warrant. There is no violation of the right to be informed of the cause
and accusation against him because the information read to him alleges treachery
and evident premeditation. He was therefore informed of the murder charge against
him. The material allegations prevail over the caption.

2. Ko Bu Lin vs. CA, 118 SCRA 573

The right to meet witnesses face to face or the right of confrontation

DELACRUZ VS. PAPA, December 8, 2010

The witness failed to return for cross-examination because he was sickly and never
did so up to the time of his death. His testimony shall be expunged from the record.

Read:

1. P vs. Valero, 112 SCRA 661 [Poisoned bread. Case vs. a deaf-
mute. The testimony of a prosecution witness who testified
that he was informed by a neighbor that he saw the accused
gave the poisoned bread to the victims is inadmissible being
hearsay and it violates the accuseds right to confrontation
or the right to meet witnesses face to face.]

2. P vs. Bundalian, 117 SCRA 718 [Libel complainant already

dead. There is no violation of the right to confrontation even
if the complainant could no longer be cross-examined. The
guilt or innocence of the accused is based on the written
article, not the testimony of the complainant]

3. P vs. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92 (But if there is partial cross-

examination, the testimony could not be fully expunged.
Only the parts where no cross-examination was conducted)

4. Ortigas, JR. vs. Lufthansa, 64 SCRA 610 (Failure of the

witness to return for cross-examination makes his testimony
hearsay and shall be expunged from the records of the case.
It violates the right of the other party to confront witnesses
face to face.

Trial in absentia

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Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 420

P vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (An accused who jumped bail after he was
arraigned may be convicted for murder if the evidence so warrants. It was
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to declare in its Decision
that he shall be tried after his arrest. There is a valid trial in absentia.

13. Right to secure witnesses and production of evidence.

1. Cavili vs. Hon. Florendo, 154 SCRA 610

2. Fajardo vs. Garcia, 98 SCRA 514

Note: The fact that the physician who examined the accused when brought to the hospital
could no longer testify since he is already working abroad does not violate the right of the
accused to secure witnesses or production of evidence since his medical records is still in
that hospital and could be testified on by other physicians.

CHAPTER XVI
THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a

witness against himself.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. PDEA, November 3, 2008 random drug testing to
students in HS & College valid because it is not intended for criminal prosecution but to help
the youth through early detection of drug use. RANDOMNESS AND SUSPICIONLESS. No
violation of their right against self-incrimination.

ATTY. MANUEL LASERNA, J. VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD, G.R. No.

158633, November 3, 2008 [Mandatory drug testing for persons charged of an offense
punishable by 6 yrs. And 1 day up IS VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION

1. Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663 (An accused may not be presented as a witness for
the prosecution. This is absolute. It will violate his right against self-incrimination)
2. Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294, read including the concurring and
dissenting opinions (There are 2 kinds of immunity statutes: Transactional immunity and use
immunity. In transactional immunity, the witness is immune from criminal prosecution only in
the case where he shall testify. In use immunity, the witness is immune from prosecution not
only in the case where he is testifying but also in other criminal acts he might mention in his
testimony.)

3. Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (There is no violation of the right against self-
incrimination if a woman charged of adultery will be ordered to undergo examination to
determine whether she is pregnant or not. It does not involve testimonial compulsion.
(There is violation of the right against self-incrimination if an accused of falsification is
made to give a sample of his handwriting. This is so because writing is not a mechanical act
but one which involves the use of ones intelligence.
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4. Beltran vs. Samson, 50 Phil. 570

5. Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 94 SCRA 906
6. US vs. Tang Teng, 23 Phil. 145
7. Cabal vs. Kapunan, Jr. December 29, 1962

CHAPTER XVII
THE RIGHT AGAINST
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by

reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.

(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist

except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted.

1. Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 (Forcing a resigned court stenographer to

transcribed her notes taken during her stint in court does not violate her right against
involuntary servitude. Note that she took the same when still in court and was paid her
salaries during said period. Otherwise, the court may not be able to decide the case without
said transcript of stenographic notes)

2. Caunca vs. Salazar, supra (Forcing a housemaid to still work for the employer
because she has been paid her salaries up to the end of the year, even though she wants to
leave already, violates her right against involuntary servitude)

CHAPTER XVIII
RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed,

nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed,
unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any
death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or

degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate
penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be
dealt with by law.

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Is death as a penalty, cruel or unusual punishment? No death through lethal

injection is the most humane way of implementing the death penalty (Leo Echegaray vs.
Secretary of Justice)

1. P vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 [It is cruel and unusual if the penalty is
disproportionate to the crime committed and shocking to the
conscience of the community]
2. People vs. Villanueva, 128 SCRA 488;
3. VENIEGAS VS. PEOPLE, 115 SCRA 79;
4. PEOPLE VS. CAMANO, 115 SCRA 688

CHAPTER XX
THE RIGHT
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy

of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.

DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, February 18, 2014.

If the same libelous article is published in a newspaper and at the same time
posted in the internet, the author could not be charged separately under the Libel
provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the online libel provision of the
Cybercrime Law. That would amount to double jeopardy. He can be the subject of
only one criminal information for his act.

Dismissal of a criminal case based on a

Demurrer to Evidence results in double
jeopardy and that no appeal nor petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 may be entertained,
as a general rule. Private complainant may
not, without the participation of the Solicitor
General, question said dismissal before the
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.

LITO BAUTISTA vs. SHARON CUNETA-PANGILINAN,

SHARON G. CUNETA -PANGILINAN, G. R. No. 189754,
October 24, 2012

The petitioners who are editor and assistant editor of the tabloid Bandera were
charged of two (2) counts of Libel before the RTC of Mandaluyong City based on the
complaint of actress Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan.

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4872, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:

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That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001, in the City

of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with x x x with deliberate intent to bring
SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor,
shame and contempt, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to publish in
Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which
among others have the following insulting and slanderous
remarks, to wit:

MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON!

Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress, Id

like to believe, is really brain-dead. Mukhang totoo
yata yung sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na
ganyan siya.

Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito

totoo. xxx Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are
those purportedly biting commentaries about her
katabaan and kaplastikan but she has simply refused to
acknowledge the good reviews weve done on her.

xxx

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4875, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:

That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001, in the

City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown
directors/officers of Bandera Publishing x x x with deliberate
intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public
dishonor, shame and contempt did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause
to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila,
which, among others, have the following insulting and
slanderous remarks, to wit:

She doesnt want kasi her husband to win as a senator

because when that happens, mawawalan siya ng hold
sa kanya, our caller opines. Pettizou is really sad that
Sharon is treating her husband like a wimp.

In public, our source goes on tartly, pa kiss-kiss siya.

Pa embrace-embrace pero kung silang dalawa [na] lang
parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya si Kiko.
My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. Hes really

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intelligent as compared to Sharon who appears to be

brain dead most of the time.

Upon arraignment, petitioners each entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, a joint
pre-trial and trial of the cases ensued.

On November 14, 2006, after the prosecution rested its case, petitioners filed a
Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence. In their Demurrer to
Evidence, which was appended to the said Motion, Bautista and Alcantara alleged that the
prosecution's evidence failed to establish their participation as Editor and Associate Editor,
respectively, of the publication Bandera; that that the subject articles written by Ampoloquio
were not libelous due to absence of malice.

On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 granting petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence and dismissed the above criminal cases. On August 19, 2008, respondent
Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside
the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008 which granted petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and
ordered the dismissal of the cases against them.

In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby
reversing and setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008 and ordered that the case
be remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence. Aggrieved, petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2009 which, however, was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated September 28, 2009.

Hence, petitioners filed this petition claiming that the petition for Certiorari filed by
Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan violated their right against double jeopardy.

Held:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008, granting the
Demurrer to Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can no
longer interpose an appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners
contend that respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA should not have prospered,
because the allegations therein, in effect, assailed the trial court's judgment, not its
jurisdiction. In other words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in the nature of an error
of judgment rendered, which was not correctible by a petition for certiorari with the CA.

At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and the
view she is advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in appeals of
criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific
powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court
and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The

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OSG is the law office of the Government.

To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the
State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or
dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended
party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court
or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever
legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general. As a rule, only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party
or complainant may not undertake such appeal.

In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially
questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case.
Consequently, the petition should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since the
petition for certiorari filed in the CA was not at the instance of the OSG, the same should
have been outrightly dismissed by the CA.

Finally, although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse and set
aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners constitutionally-
enshrined right against double jeopardy. Had it not been for this procedural defect, the
Court could have seriously considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in
seeking the reversal of the Order of the RTC.

The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with caution,

taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the private
offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the
accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In
such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke
his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and
circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of the Bench, always bearing in
mind that their decisions affect the lives of the accused and the individuals who come to the
courts to seek redress of grievances, which decision could be possibly used by the
aggrieved party as basis for the filing of the appropriate actions against them.

Requisites for a valid invocation of double

jeopardy:

1. There must be a valid complaint or information;

2. It must be filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction;
3. The accused must have been validly arraigned;
and
4. The accused was:
a. acquitted; or
b. convicted; or
c. case dismissed without his expressed
consent.

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Note:

Dismissal of a criminal case based on :

1. speedy trial; or
2. Demurrer to Evidence

-is equivalent to acquittal and as such, all the requisites are present to invoke
double jeopardy.

Indeed, the dismissal was with his consent and it seems, the 4 th requisite is
not present because there was consent to the dismissal since he himself was
the one who moved for it. Such an interpretation is not correct because the
applicable one is : The accused was : a. acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,

IMELDA MARCOS, JOSE CONRADO BENITEZ and
GILBERT DULAY, G.R. No. 153304-05, February 7, 2012

As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to
an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy, PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 559 SCRA 449.
Notably, the proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on errors of
judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double
jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 491
SCRA 185, June 16, 2000; and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a partys due process
rights, PEOPLE VS. VELASCO, 340 SCRA 207, SEPTEMBER 13, 2000.

A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due
process implies an invalid or otherwise void judgment. If either or both grounds are
established, the judgment of acquittal is considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally
inexistent and does not have the effect of an acquittal. Thus, the defense of double jeopardy
will not lie in such a case.

The petitioner claims that the special prosecutor failed in her duty to give effective
legal representation to enable the State to fully present its case against the respondents,
citing Merciales v. Court of Appeals where we considered the following factual
circumstances - (1) the public prosecutor rested the case knowing fully well that the
evidence adduced was insufficient; (2) the refusal of the public prosecutor to present other
witnesses available to take the stand; (3) the knowledge of the trial court of the
insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence when the demurrer to evidence was filed before
it; and (4) the trial courts failure to require the presentation of additional evidence before it
acted on the demurrer to evidence. All these circumstances effectively resulted in the
denial of the States right to due process, attributable to the inaction of the public
prosecutor and/or the trial court.

Merciales was followed by Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, 473 SCRA 279, where we

recognized the violation of the States right to due process in criminal proceedings

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because of sufficient showing that the special prosecutor haphazardly handled the
prosecution. In upholding the prosecutions right to present additional evidence under the
circumstances, Valencia took into account the fact that the former special prosecutor
rested his case solely on the basis of a Joint Stipulation of Facts that was not even signed
by the accused.

Speedy trial; double jeopardy when not

applicable in petition under Rule 65 to
increase the penalty as a result of grave
abuse of discretion

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012 AND people of the
Philippines vs. THE HOMORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et
al., G.R. No. 154954, February 1, 2012

[THE LENNY VILLA HAZING CASE]

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either
through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by
certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts
acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following
recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where
there is a finding of mistrial, People vs. COURT OF APPEALS & GALICIA, 516 SCRA
383 or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.

IVLER VS. JUDGE PEDRO, Presiding Judge, METC 71 OF PASIG CITY, G.R. No.
172716, November 17, 2010

After the petitioner pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical
injuries and was sentenced to censure, he could not be tried anymore of the 2 nd case of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and damage to property which arose from the
same act. Double jeopardy has set in. A reckless imprudence case could not be the subject
of two informations even though they are not grave or less grave felonies. They can still be
complexed as an exception to Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

LEJANO VS. PEOPLE, January 18, 2011 and PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ET AL.

After the acquittal of the accused by the SC on December 14, 2010, double jeopardy
has set in and no motion for reconsideration may be entertained.

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292

(Given several times already in the bar exams)

When the accused were earlier charged of theft of electricity based on a City
Ordinance and the case was dismissed due to prescription, charging them again for theft of
electricity under the Revised Penal Code violates the right of the accused against double

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jeopardy. When an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, acquittal or conviction in

either shall bar prosecution in the other.

DAYAP BS. SENDIONG, JANUARY 29, 2009 [Acquittal through demurrer to

evidence is final and could not be appealed. Double jeopardy has set in but civil aspect may
still proceed if there is no express finding that accused has not committed the crime]

PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009 [If an accused of Murder was
convicted of Homicide only in the RTC but appeals the same to the higher court, he could
not complain of double jeopardy if the appellate court sentences him of Murder since that is
the evidence found during the review of the case on Appeal]

1. CUDIA VS. CA, 284 SCRA 173 [Petitioner was arrested of illegal possession of
firearm in Mabalacat, Pampanga but it was the City Prosecutor of Angeles City who
signed the information. The dismissal of the case by the RTC of Pampanga, despite
objection of the accused does not result in double jeopardy because one requisite is
missing: there was no valid complaint or information..]

PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN, 17 SCRA 1119

[This case was the subject of several Bar Examination question already]

[The accused entered a plea of guilty to a charge of homicide but prayed for him to present
his evidence for incomplete self-defense. It was granted by the Court. After hearing his
evidence, he was acquitted instead because the evidence he presented satisfied all the
requisites of complete self-defense. No double jeopardy since there was no valid plea. One
requisite for the valid invocation of double jeopardy is absent]

PEOPLE VS. GALANO, 75 SCRA 193 [Charged of estafa in Batangas. During trial,
it was shown that the elements of the crime actually took place in Manila. No double
jeopardy if a new information will be filed in Manila because one of the requisites for the
valid invocation of double jeopardy is absent: filed in a court of competent jurisdiction]

8. P vs. Judge Hernando, 108 SCRA 121 (Even the RTC made an erroneous
appreciation of the evidence during the trial resulting in its acquittal of the accused,
the fact that the SC believes that the evidence guilt is strong to convict, the same
cannot be done. Double Jeopardy has set in from the time the decision of acquittal
was promulgated. Appeal is not allowed without violating the right of the accused
against double jeopardy.

9. Esmena vs. Judge Pogoy, 102 SCRA 861

10. Mazo vs. Mun. Court, 113 SCRA 217 [Dismissal of a criminal case based on
Demurrer to Evidence is equivalent to acquittal. Double jeopardy has set in and no motion
for reconsideration or appeal is allowed.]
11. Andres vs. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 217
14. P vs. Fuentebella, 100 SCRA 672 (Double jeopardy may not be invoked if the case
was dismissed based on the accuseds invocation of speedy trial if the same is not done
in good faith. The state is also entitled to due process in criminal prosecution.

CHAPTER XXI

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RIGHT AGAINST EX-POST FACTO LAW,

BILL OF ATTAINER, ETC.

Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder

shall be enacted.

Ex post facto law applies only to penal laws. Its requisites are:

3. It is a penal law;
4. it is given retroactive effect; and
5. it is prejudicial to the accused.

LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20, 1999

Specific instances when there is ex post facto law:

a. which makes an act criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action;

b. which aggravates the crime or makes it greater when it was committed;

c. when it changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
penalty when the crime was committed;

d. which alters the legal rules of evidence and now receives less or different
testimony to convict the accused;

e. a law that alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage, in relation to

an offense;

f. which assumes or regulates civil rights and remedies but in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; and

g. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he

has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or proclamation of amnesty.

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