Exhibits: Bang-Er Shia v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Michelle K. Lee, Sarah Harris, William R. Covey, Et Al.

Case 1:16-cv-01051-AJT-MSN Document 1-5 Filed 08/17/16 Page 1 of 79 PageID# 501
EXHIBIT AO
r c
UNITED STATES PATENT ANDTRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
In the Matter of:

Proceeding No. D2014-31
Bang-er Shia,
April 22,2015
Respondent
Appearances:
Melinda M. DeAtley, Esq.

Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel, Esq.
Associate Solicitors
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Dr. Bang-er Shia

Pro se
Before: Alexander FERNAnDEZ, Administrative Law Judge

INITIAL DECISION AND ORDER
On July 22,2014, the Director ofEnrolhnent and Disciplme ("OED Director") for the
UnitedStates Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO" or "Office") filed m Amended Complaint
andNotice ofProceedings Under 35 U.S. C. 32("Complaint") inProceeding No. D2014-31
against Dr. Bang-er Shia ("Respondent").' The Complaint seeks the exclusion or suspension of
Respondent for committing violations ofthe USPTO practitioner disciplinary rules.
OnAugust 20,2014, Respondent filed anAnswer and Counterclaim toAmended
Complaint ("Answer") sxmmiarily denying the allegations inthe Complaint and raising a number
of affinnative defenses.
Thehearing in this matter was heldon October 6-10,2014 in Washington, District of

Columbia. The testimony of the following witnesses was received: TanyaAmos, TEAS
Administrator in theLegal Policy Office of theUSPTO; Catherine Cain, staffattorney in the
Office of Trademark Legal Policy and editorof the Trademark Manual ofExamining Procedure',
Jennifer Harchick, staff attorney in the Officeof Enrollment and Discipline; and Respondent.
' TheOED Director also filed a Complaint and Notice ofProceedings Under 35 U.S.C. 32 against Respondent in
Proceeding No.D2014-04, which was withdrawn at thehearing resulting inthedismissal of theD2014-04
proceeding. Theorigmal Complaint andNotice ofProceedings Under 35 U.S.C. 32 inProceeding No. D2014-31
was filed on June 27,2014.
r . r
The Court also accepted the deposition testimony ofMarjêll Gainer, records custodian of
Windstream Communications, Inc., in lieu of her live testimony.
Following the Court's receipt of the transcript on October 27,2014, the parties were ^
ordered to file post-hearing briefs and response briefs. After the thnely receipt of the parties'
briefs, the record was closed.
Applicable Law
The USPTO has the"exclusive authority to establish qualifications foradmitting persons

to practice before it, and to suspend or exclude them from practicing before it." Krollv.
Finnertv> 242 F.3d 1359,1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Director oftheUSPTO may suspend or
exclude aperson from practice before the Patent and Trademark Office ifthe person is "shown to
be incompetent ordisreputable, or guilty ofgross misconduct," or ifthe person violates
regulations established by theOffice. 35U.S.C. 32.
The USPTO hasduly promulgated regulations governing theconduct of persons

authorized to practice before the Office. The USPTO Rules ofProfessional Conduct (37 C.F.R.
11.100 etseq.) apply topersons who practice before the Office and became effective May 3,
2013. For alleged violations ofUSPTO disciplinary rules occurring prior to May 3,2013, the
USPTO Code of Professional Responsibility (37 C.F.R. 10.20 et seq.) applies.^
Burden of Proof. The OEDDirector has theburden of proving the alleged violations by
clear and convincing evidence. 37 C.F.R. 11.49. Thereafter, it isRespondent's burden to
prove any affirmative defense byclear and convincing evidence. Id
Theclearandconvincing standard is applied "to protect particularly important interests ..
where there is a clear liberty interest at stake." Thomas v. Nicholson, 423 F.3d 1279,1283
(Fed. Cir. 2005). This is an intermediate standard "between a preponderance ofthe evidence and
proof beyond areasonable doubt." Addineton v. Texas. 441 U.S. 418,424-425 (1979). The
standard requires evidence "ofsuch weight that itproduces inthe mind ofthe trier offact a firm
belief orconviction, without hîtancy, asto thetruth of theallegations sought to be
established." Jimenez v. DaimlerChrvsler Corp.. 269 F.3d439,450 (4thCir. 2001). "Evidence
is clear if it is certain, unambiguous, and plain to theunderstanding, andit is convincing if it is
reasonable and persuasive enough to cause the trier offacts tobelieve it." Foster v. Alliedsienal.
Inc.. 293 F.3d 1187,1194 (10th Chr. 2002) (citmg Ortega v. IBP.Inc.. 874 P.2d1188,1198
(1994), disapproved of by In re B.D.-Y.. 187 P.3d594 (2008)).
Findings of Fact
Background
1. OnSeptember 26,2005, theUSPTO registered Dr. Bang-er Shia("Respondent") as a

patent agent. Respondent's registration number is 57,568.
^ The Complaint alleges Respondent committeid various violations ofthe USPTO disciplinary rules both before and
after the effective date of the USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct
c
2. Respondent operates abusiness called the latemational Patent Office ofBang Shia.
3. Respondent is associated with the following e-mail addresses: bs@pat-bangshia.com;
bangershia@yahoo.com; and ryu204@yahoo.com. Respondent authorized her husband,
Yu LiangYu, to acc^s thesee-mailaddresses.
4. Respondent is associated with the following mailing addresses: 102 Lindencrest Court,
Sugar Land, Texas 77479 ("Lindencrest address"); 204 Canyon Creek, Victoria, Texas,
77901 ("Canyon Creek address"); and 3105 Summerfield Ridge Court, Sugar Land,
Texas, 77479 ("Summerfield Ridge address").
5: Respondent is authorized to practice before the USPTO as a patent agent in patent

matters only and is notauthorized to practice before theUSPTO in trademark matters.
6. Respondent isnot, and never has been, an attorney licensed inany state topractice law.
7. Since 2006, Respondent has acted as thedomestic representative for certain foreign
applicants based in Taiwan and China.
8. On January 23,2012, the Commissioner for Trademarks ("Commissioner") sent a show

cause letter to Respondent informing herthat the USPTO had determined that it appeared
Respondent may beengaging inthe unauthorized practice oftrademark law before the
Office.
9. By letter dated January 27,2012, Respondent answered the show cause letter denying
that she was engagedin the unauthorized practiceof trademark law.
10. OnFebruary 21,2013, after considering Respondent's answer to the show cause letter,
theCommissioner excluded Respondent from participating as correspondent or domestic
representative in anytrademark matters before theUSPTO. TheCommissioner's
Exclusion Order statedthat Respondent's exclusion was effective immediately.
11.After the issuance of the Exclusion Order, Respondent's foreign clients instructed her to
remove her name as their domestic representative.
12. However Respondent's clients also asked her to continue assisting with theirtrademark
applications.
13. On March 19,2013, Respondent's appeal of the Commissioner's ExclusionOrder

("Respondent's Petition to the Director") was filed with the USPTO.
14. On December 27,2013, theUSPTO Director^ issued a Memorandum and Order

affirmingthe Commissioner's Exclusion Order.
^TheMemorandum andOrd^ was signed byAriLeifman, Acting ChiefofStaff, OfRce of Policy and Internatibnal
Affairs, USITOon behalfof Margaret Focarino, Commissioner for Patents performing thefunctions andduties of
the Under Secretary ofCommerce for Intellectual Property and Director ofdie USPTO.
(
Trademark Application 85/585.031
15. On March 30,2012, Respondent filed U.S. Trademark Application, Principal Register
SerialNo. 85/585,031 ("the *031 application") with the USPTO.
16. The *031 application lists Dongshan Dongxing Aquatic Processing Co., Ltd
(**Dongshang") as the applicant and owner ofthe mark seeking registration.
17. Inthe Correspondence Information fields. Respondent's Ryu204 e-mail address was
identified as the designated correspondence e-mail address.
18. Tlie *031 application was prepared by an attorney in China with Shinwha Co. Ltd. and
forwarded to Respondent for filmg withthe USITO.
19. Prior to submitting the *031 application. Respondent electronically entered the signature
**/Chi-Ching Weng/" as the declaration signature for the *031 application.
20. Respondent also entered her name and Ryu204 e-mail address as designated recipient for
the filing confirmation.
21. On April 11,2012, Respondent filed aChange ofCorrespondence Address with the
USPTO.
22. The Change ofCorrespondence Address identified Respondent's Canyon Creek address
and bs@pat-bangshia.com e-mail address as the new correspondence addresses for the
*031 application.
23. Respondent electronically signed the name **Chi-ching Weng" to the Change of
Correspondelnce Address.
Tradetnark Application 85/712.340
24. On August 24,2012, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/712,340 (**the *340
application") was filed with the USPTO.
25. The *340 application listed Jet Crown International Co., Ltd. (**Jet Crown") as the owner
ofthemark. Jet Crown is a corporation inTaiwan with noknown U.S. subsidiaries.
26. Inthe field designated for the e-mail address ofJet Crown, as the owner ofthe mark,
Respondent's Ryu204 e-mail address was mput.
27. The *340 application identified Jet Crown as the correspondent for the application.
However, Respondent's Lindencrest address was used asthecorrespondent address and
Respondent's Ryu204 e-mail address was input as the correspondent e-mail address.
r r
28. Respondent submitted the *340 application to the USPTO. However, prior to doing so.
Respondent electronically signed "/Wang, Edmund/" as the declaration signature.
29. Respondent paid the filing fee for the *340 application using her own credit card and
designated her Ryu204 e-mail address for receipt ofthe filing confirmation.
30. On May 26,2013, Respondent filed a Statement ofUse related tothe *340 application.
31.The Statement of Use also changed thecorrespondence address forJet Crown to **c/o SW
TW SHEN" and identified Respondent*s Summerfield Ridge address and Ryu204 e-mail
address.
32. TheStatement of Usewas executed using theHSign-on method, wherein a .pdfbearing

thehandwritten signature of Edmund Wang was attached.
33.OnOctober 7,2012, Respondent submitted U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.

85/747,741 (**the *741 application") to the USPTO.
34. The *741 application identifies Min Hsiang Corporation (**Min Hsiang") as the applicant
and owner of the mark seeking registration.
35. Prior to submitting the *741 application tothe USPTO, Respondent entered the electronic
signature **yTim WuA* into thedeclaration signature field.
36. On February 7,2013, an Outgoing Office Action was issued in the *741 application. The
Outgoing Office Action inquired as towhether the wording **Mm Hsiang" inthe
trademark hadan English translation and requested other clarifications. TheOutgoing
Office Action provided a telephone number for an applicant tocall with questions and
noted that TEAS Plus applicants must submit documents electronically or submit a filing
fee.
37. OnMarch 24,2013,Respondent submitted a Response to Office Action to theUSPTO.
38. Before submitting theResponse toOffice Action, Respondent entered theelectronic

signature **/Tim Wu/" into thesignature field. However, Respondent also submitted a
.pdf tothe Miscellaneous Statement section for the *741 application. The .pdf included a
handwritten signatureby Tim Wu datedMarch6,2013.
39. Respondent's Ryu204 e-mail address was designated asthereply e-mail forthe Response
to Office Action.
40. OnAugust 17,2013, Respondent filed a Statement of Usefor the '741 application.
Before doing so, she electronically entered **/Tim Wu/" as the nameof the signatory.
Respondent also attached the handwritten signatureof Tim Wu.
r r
Trademark Application 85/595,869
41. On April 12,2012, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/595,869 ("the *869
application") wasfiled withthe USPTO.
42. Eng Ku Optical Industrial Co., Ltd. ('TEng Ku'*) is identified as the applicant and owner
of &e mark seeking registration.
43. Lan Loop Patent &Trademark ("Lan Loop*') and Respondent's Canyon Creek address
were identified in the"Correspondence Information" fields for the *869 application.
44. Lan Loop is the name ofa patent and trademark office inTaiwan that provided legal
services to Eng Ku.
45. The *869 application was completed using the HSign-on method by Terry Chou,
president of Eng Ku.
46.Respondent filed the *869 application with theUSPTO.
47. On April 30,2012, Respondent submitted a Change ofCorrespondence Address to the

USPTO for the *869 application.
48. The Change ofCorrespondence Address purported to change the original correspondence
address firom '*LAN LOOP PATENT & TRADEMARK VICTORIA Texas 77479 US" to
Respondent's Canyon Creek address. Respondent's Ryu204 e-mail address remained the
correspondence e-mail for *869 application.
49. Respondent affixed Mr. Terry Chou's electronic signature to the Change of
Correspondence Address and transmitted it to theUSPTO.
50. On January 22,2013, a Statement ofUse was submitted tothe USPTO for the *869
application.
51. Respondent entered Mr. Chou's electronic signature on the Statement ofUse prior to
submitting it to the USPTO.
52. Respondent also attached a .pdf tothe Statement ofUse. The .pdf included a copy ofthe
Statementof Use signed on January 17,2013, by Mr. Chou.
53. On July 30,2012, U.S. Trademark Application 85/689,678 (**the *678 application") was
filed with the USPTO.
r"
54. The *678 application identified KUNSHAN PEPWING TEXTILE CO., LTD
("Kunshan") as the applicant and owner ofthe mark seeking registration, but identified
Respondent's Ryu204 e-mail address for Kunshan.
55. The *678 application was completed by an attomey ofKingkraft inChina who then
transmitted it to Respondent for filing with the USPTO.
56. The *678 application identified the Office ofBang Shia and included Respondent's
Canyon Creek address inthe Correspondence Information fields.
57. Prior to filing the *678 application with the USPTO, Respondent electronically entered
the signature **/George YANG/" mthe declaration signature field.
58. The name ofRespondent's husband and Respondent's Ryu204 e-mail address were
identified to receive the filing receipt.
59. OnNovember 28,2012,the USPTO issued anOffice Action related to the *678
application. The Office Action stated aresponse was due within six months.
60. The Office Action was sent toRespondent's Ryu204 e-mail address. Respondent
forwarded the Office Action to Kunshan's attomeys in China.
61. An attomey with Kingkraft prepared aResponse to Office Action for the *678 application
andsent it to Respondent for filing withthe USPTO.
62. Prior to submitting the Response to Office Action for the *678 application. Respondent
entered the electronic signature **/George Yang/" to the document.
63. On March 5,2013, a Change ofCorrespondence Address was filed with the USPTO for
the *678 application.
64. The Change ofCorrespondence Address purported to change the correspondence address
from Respondent's Canyon Creek address to apost office box inTaiwan but
Respondent's e-mail addresses was notchanged.
65. Respondent prepared and completed the Change ofCorrespondence Address and entered
theelectronic signature **/George Yang/" in the signature field.
66. On September 3,2012, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/719,310 ('*the *310
application") was filed withthe USPTO.
67. Shuangfei Daily Chemicals USA Inc. (**Shuangfei") is identified as the applicant and
owner of the mark seekmg registration.
r r
68. Although Shuangfei is identified as a corporation incorporated inthe state of

Pennsylvania, the *310 application provided Respondent's Lindencrest address and
Ryu204 e-mail address inthe correspondence information fields.
69. The *310 application was transmitted to Respondent by Shuangfei's attorney inChina.
70. Respondent filed the *310 application with the USPTO. However, before doing so she
entered the electronic signature **/Zhenhui Li/** inthe declaration signature field.
71. The name ofRespondent's husband and Respondent's Ryu204 e-mail address were
identified for receiptof the filing receipt.
72. On March 5,2013, Respondent filed a Change ofCorrespondence Address related to the
*310 application with the USPTO.
73. The Change ofCorrespondence Address purported tochange the correspondence address
from Respondent's Lindencrest address to an address inTaiwan. However, Respondent's
Ryu204 e-mail address remained as the correspondence e-mail address.
74. Prior to submitting the Change ofCorrespondence Address tothe USPTO, Respondent
entered the electronic signature **/Zhenhui Li/" into the signature field.
Trademark Application 85/748,531
75. On October 8,2012, Respondent filed U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/748,531
(**the *531 application") with the USPTO.
76. This was a second trademark application for Min Hsiang. Although theapplication was
for thesame trademark, the *531 application identified a different class of goods than the
*741 application.
77. Prior tofiling the *531 application with the USPTO, Respondent entered the electronic
signature **/Tim Wu/" in thedeclaration signature field.
78. On March 24,2013, Respondent filed a Response to Office Action forthe *531
application.
79. Althou^ Respondent included a .pdf copy with Tim Wu'shandwritten signature.
Respondent also entored the electronic signature **/Tim Wu/" inthe signature field.
80. On August 17,2013, Respondent filed a Statement ofUse related to the *531 application
with the USPTO.
81. A .pdf document attached to the Statement ofUse included a copy Tim Wu's handwritten
signature.
r r
82. On October 17,2012, Respondent filed U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
85/756,529 C*the *529 application'*) withthe USPTO.
83. This was a third trademark application for Min Hsiang. Although this application was for
the same trademark, the *529 application identified a different class ofgoods than the
*531 or *729 applications.
84. Prior to filing the *529 application with the USPTO, Respondent electronically signed
**/Tim Wu/** in the declaration signature field of the application.
Trademark Application 77/836.647^

85. On February 7,2013, Respondent completed, signed, and filed a Change of
Correspondence Address related to U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77/836,647
("the *647 application") with the USPTO.
86. The Change ofCorrespondence Address changed the correspondence address from
Respondent's Lindencrest address toan address inTaiwan belonging to the applicant.
Discussion^
The OED Director claims Respondent engaged in misconduct related to theei^t

trademark applications referenced, supra. The OED Director also claims that Respondent's
misconduct constitutes violations of the USPTO disciplinary rules. As such, theOED Director
requests an order excluding Respondent from practice before the USPTO inall matters.
I. Respondent's Actions Constitute Misconduct
The OED Director alleges Respondent improperly handled trademark matters onbehalf
ofher clients. Specifically, the OED Director claims Respondent (A) improperly signed
documents related to trademark applications filed onbehalf ofherclients; (B) filed trademark
documents with theUSPTO that were completed by foreign attorneys; (C) went beyond therole
ofa domestic representative and/or correspondent by actively practicmg before the Office in
trademark matters; and (D)contmued to actas a domestic representative and/or correspondent
despite being excluded by the Commissioner ofTrademarks. The alleged misconduct all relates
In the Order on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, dated September 5,2014, the Court held that acts rela^ to the
*647 application that occurred prior to the Commissioner's Show Cause Letter fell outside the statute oflimitations,
becausesuchacts were "made known" to the Commissioner no later than January 23,2012. The facts cited below
occurred after the Show Cause Letter and were not made known to the OED Director until January 9,2014, and are,
therefore, not time-barred by the statute of limitations.
^The Courthasconsidered all issues raisedandall documentary and testimonial evidence in therecordand
presented athearing. Those issues not discussed here are not addressed because the Court finds they lack materiality
or importance to the decision.
r c
to Respondent's submission oftrademark documents to the USPTO using the Trademark

Electronic ApplicationSystem (*TEAS").
As a means of simplifying thetrademark filing system and reducing errors, the USPTO
allows the public toelectronically file certain trademark-related forms onTEAS. Upon
completing aform, the user may upload the form to TEAS orsave a .pdf version ofitfor later
submission. Iftheuser opts to save a .pdf version oftheform, TEAS downloads a copy ofthe
completed form but deletes any signatures electronically entered directly onto the form. Deleting
the signature requires the user tore-sign the form just prior tosubmitting it, thereby ensuring that
the information contained in the form is verified. This is necessary as the signatory is often
required to attest to the truthfulness of facts contained in the form.^
There arethree acceptable signature methods for TEAS filings. One is the direct
signature method wherein the appropriate signatory personally enters his orher own electronic
signature between two forward slashes. Specifically, the signatory may select any combination
of letters, numbers, spaces and/or punctuation marks thathe or shehas designated as a signature.
See 37 C.F.R. 2.193(c)(1). Whatever combmation the signatory adopts as his or her signature
must be personally entered between two forward slash symbols in the signature block.^ M.
**ESign-on" is thesecond method, wherein a user can e-niail a text version of theform to the
appropriate signatory, who then returns the signed electronic copy to the user for submission.
Finally, "HSign-on" is a method wherein a user cansubmit a printed pen-and-ink signature
personally made by anappropriate signatory that isthen scanned as a .pdfor .jpeg and attached
to the form.
A. Respondent imprnperlv signed trademark documents filed with theUSPTO.
The OED Director claimsRespondent failedto complywith USPTOsignature

regulations byknowingly entering theelectronic signatures offoreign applicants on trademark
documents and submitting those documents to the Office. The OED Directoralso claims
Respondent inappropriately entered herown name and electronic signature onto a Change of
Correspondence Address relatedto the *647 application.
Documents filed in connection with a trademark application or registration must be

signed by a proper person. 37 C.F,R. 2.193(e). Trademark documents thatrequire a
verification of the facts must be sworn to in a declaration that is signed by the owner or the
owner's authorized representative. ^ at 2.193(e)(1). A personproperlyauthorized to sign a
declarationon behalf of an owner is either (i) a person with legal authority to bind the owner
^TEAS applications include a declaration wherein thesignatory attests to thetruthfulness of the facts contained in
theapplication. Thedeclaration contains thefollowing language, "Thesignatory being warned thatwillful false
statements an4the likeare punishableby fine or imprisonment, or both, under 18U.S.C.Section 1001, andthat such
willful false statements and the like mayjeopardizethe validity of the application or any registration resulting
therefrom, declares that all statements made of his/her own knowledge are true and all statements made on
information and behalf are believed to be true."
^37C.F.R. 2.193(c)(2) purports to authorize thesignatory to sign a verified statement using "some other form of
electronic signature specified bytheDirector.*' TheCourt mterprets this language to serve as a place holder forifor
when the Director authorizes another form or method of electronic signature. Thus, until another form or method of
electronic signature is authorized, an electronicsignatureis only acceptable if it meets the requirements of 37 CJF.R.
2.193(c)(1).
10
r r
(e.g,, a corporate officer orgeneral partner ofa partnership); (ii) a person with firsthand
knowledge ofthe facts and actual or implied authority to act onbehalf of the owner; or (iii) an
attorney with power of attorney from the owner. M. However, when the applicant is ajuristic
entity rather than an individual person, additional requirements apply. For instance, "[w]here a
document mustbe signed by someone withlegal authority to binda corporation, a corporate
officer must sign. An officer is a person who holds anoffice established inthe articles of
incorporation orcorporate bylaws." Trademark Manuel of Examining Procedure
CTMEP") 611.06(d).
Atthehearing, Respondent admitted that she entered theelectronic signature ofthe

applicants onto trademark documents and then filed the documents with the USPTO.
Respondent's testimony on the matter is as follows:
Theapplicant signs theirsignature, typed in theirsignature before.

Buttheirsiâtures, theirpersonal signatures, were taken away by
USPTO. Asane-filer,Ihadtoputitback. I cannotput in my
name because the their signatures on the forms is not my name.
Their handwritten pen-and-ink signature is not my name.
Respondent also acknowledged that she was not an officer ofany ofthe client
corporations on whose behalf the trademark applications were filed. Regardless, Respondent
claims she acted properly because she had legal authority to bind the applicants. In support of
her argument. Respondent filed several documents after the hearing, wWch she alleges bestowed
upon her the legal authority to sign the applicant's names to the trademark documents.^ The
documents include purported Powers ofAttorney for the *031, *869, *340, '741, *310, *531, and
*529 applications, and an ''authorization" for the *678 application.
After careful review of these documents, the Court finds that they do not authorize
Respondent to enter the electronic signature ofthe applicants onto the declarations verifying the
facts inthe trademark applications cited above. Most of thedocuments doappear to be powers
ofattorney. However, they are insufficient to authorize Respondent tosign onbehalf ofthe
applicants because she is not an attorney. See 37 C.F.R. 2.193(e)(1) (an attorney with power of
attorney isproperly authorized to sign a declaration on behalf ofanowner); see also Ross v.
Chakrabarti. 5 A.3d 135,139 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (finding a power of attorney didnot
give an agent the right toperform legal services, where the law does not permit the principal to
act throu^ an agent who is not licensed to perform such services).
Further, the Courtquestions whatauthority, if any, the purported powers of attorney
actually convey to Respondent. "The nature and extent of theauthority granted must be
Attheheating, Respondent asked when the'firsthand knowledge" language was included intheregulation,
because shebelieved '^firsthand knowledge" was nota requirement until afterheralleged misconduct occurred. The
Court takes judicial notice that thecurrent regulation, which includes the"firsthand knowledge" language, became
effective on December 28,2009. The Court also notes that 'firsthand knowledge" was already required for "verified
statements" supported bydeclarations in a prior version of theregulation effective October 30,1999. See64FR
48900-01,48908.
Respondent's post-hearmg submission of evidence was authorized bythe Orderfor Documents^ dated October 9,
2014.
11
c c
ascertained jfrom the instrument granting thepower of attorney." Hardy v. Robinson. 170 S.W.3d
777,780 (Tex. App. 2005); Dingle v. Prikhdina. 59So. 3d326,328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
(general rule isthat a power of attorney must bestrictly construed and the instrument will be
held to grant only those powers which are specified."); Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Co.
V. Rose. 239 S.W.3d 743,749 (Tenn. 2007) ("A powerof attorney is a written instrument that
evidences tothird parties the purpose ofthe agency and theextent ofthe agent's powers.");
yiinft Ry &Through Kline v. Utah Dep*t ofHealth. 776 P.2d 57,61 (Utah Ct App. 1989) CThe
scope ofthe authority so conferred may, by the terms ofthe instrument itself, be general or
limited, butthe instrument creating thisagency relationship is to be strictly construed.")
Each of these documents includes the heading "Power of Attomey," with some variation
of**with Legal Authority to Bind the Applicant" However, the body ofeach document is
nothing more than a cut-and-pasted declaration, signed bythe applicant, attesting tothe veracity
of thestatements made in a trademark application. Theonly reference to Respondent is under
the heading "Contact Information," wherein Respondent's name, address, and phone numbers
are listed. To conclude that the documents bestow uponRespondent the authority to bind the
applicant in matters before the USPTO would require a very liberal interpretation ofthe
applicants' intent for most, ifnot all, the purported Powers of Attomey submitted.'
One of the documents titled "Authorization from the Applicant beforethe USPTO" goes
as far as confirming that Respondent has "legal authority to act on behalf ofthe applicant" mthe
body ofthe document. However, this document was not signed by the applicant. Rather, itwas
executed by the applicant's attomey from KunShan Baike Trademark Agent Co., Ltd. This
signature is impermissible because USPTO regulation requires apower ofattomey to be signed
by a corporate officer ifthe applicant is acorporation. 37 C.F.R. 2.17(c)(l)-(2). Moreover, the
Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure ('Trademark Manual") explicitly states.
Simply stating thata person hasbeen granted authority to acton

behalf of the applicant or registrant is insufficient. Documents
purporting to authorize representation, even if signed byofficers,
will notbe accepted as establishing theauthority of a person who
is not the equivalent of an officer. The applicant or registr^t must
state that the signatory has the authority to legallybind the
applicant or registrant under itsbylaws or articles of incorporation.
TMEP 611.06(e). Still,had Respondent beenproperly bestowed withthe authority to act on

behalf ofthe applicant. Respondent could not sign swom declarations because she did not have
firsthand knowledge ofthe facts.''
TheCourt notes thatthepurported Power of Attomey forthe '340application goes further bystating "[t]his is to
authorize Dr.Banger Shia... to have thelegal authority tobind theapplicant before theUSPTO** above thecut-
and-pasted declaration. However, this still does not au&orize Respondent tosign documents, onbehalf ofthe
applicant, to be filed with the USPTO, because she is not an attomey.
" At thehearing, Respondent admitted thatshedidnothave firsthand knowledge of the facts contamed in the
applications cited above. Rather, Respondent testiHed thattheapplicants, whose electronic signature shewas
entering, had firsthand knowledge.
12
( C"
Furliier, the Court finds thateven ifRespondent was theproper signatory meaning
legal authority to bind the applicants in matters before the USPTO was properly conveyed to her
and she had firsthand knowl^ge of the facts Respondent should have identified herself as
signatory and personally entered her own electronic signature (i.e. Respondent's own name in
between two forward slashes) rather thanthesignature of another person. See37 C.F.R.
2.193(a) (For all trademark correspondence with the Office that requires a signature, the
signature must be either ahandwritten signature ofthe signatory, or an electronic signature that
ispersonally entered by theperson named as the signatory.)
Accordingly, the Court finds that Respondent isnot legally authorized tobind the
applicants in the aforementioned trademark applications in matters before the USPTO. Her
practice of entering the electronic signatures of the applicants onto trademark documents filed
withthe USPTO was inappropriate andconstitutes misconduct.
B. Respondent filed trademark documents prepared bv foreign attorneys.
Respondent consistently and emphatically testified that foreign attorneys would prepare
the trademark documents and forward themto Respondent for filing withthe USPTO. At the
hearing, Respondent's testimony onthematter is asfollows:
All the forms were prepared by either, attorneys in Taiwanor

attorneys in China andthey asked theirtheu* clients, the
applicant, to authorize meto represent themrepresent them to
submit those forms to USPTO. What I did were only to add
whatever is missed, the signature,from their document.
Everything [USPTO] received were prepared by attorneys in

Taiwan or attorneys in China, and they downloaded it into a E-fiOie
andthey sentthatfileto me. Myjob was to make surenothing is
missing from the^their file.
All [documents USPTO] received were prepared by the attorneys

in Taiwan and in China.
The evidence m therecord of this proceeding demonstrates thatforeign attorneys, who

are not recognized topractice before theOffice intrademark matters, prepared trademark
applications. Statements ofUse, and Responses toOffice Actions. The foreign attorneys then
paid Respondent toreview the trademark documents for accuracy and file them with the USPTO.
Accordingly, the Courtfinds that the trademark applications at issue, along with all Statements
of Use and Responses to Office Action cited above, were initially prepared by foreign attorneys
and transmittedto Respondent for filing with the USPTO.
13
( (
C. Respondent's actions went bevond the role of a domestic representative and

constituted practicebefore the Officein trademark matters.
The OED Director claims Respondent went beyond herrole as a domestic representative
orcorrespondent byactively practicing before the Office intrademark matters. Specifically, the
OED Director alleges Respondent "prepared electronic trademark applications, electronically
signed the applications, and filed the applications with the Office." Respondent also allegedly
"prepared, electronically signed, and submitted Responses to Office Actions and Statements of
Use with the Office."
Anowner of a mark may represent himself orherself in prosecuting an application. 37

C.F.R. 11.14(e); TMEP 601. Anowner of a mark may also berepresented by a practitioner
authorized under 37 C.F.R. 11.14. Section 11.14 identifies thefollowing individuals who may
practice before the Office intrademark matters: (a) attorneys; (b) non-lawyers who were
recognized to practice before the Office intrademark matters prior to January 1,1957; and (c)
foreign attorneys that have been specially recognized by the USPTO for the lunited purpose of
representing parties located intheir country. Only the rforementioned individuals are permitted
to practice before the Office in trademark matters.
Practice before the Office in trademark matters includes, but is not limited to, consulting
with orgiving advice toa client incontemplation offiling a trademark application orother
document with the Office; preparing and prosecuting anapplication for trademark registration;
preparing an amendment that may require written argument to establish the registrability ofthe
mark; and conducting an opposition, cancellation, orconcurrent use proceeding; orconducting
an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. 37 C.F.R. 11.5(b)(2). An individual who
isnot authorized to practice before the Office intrademark matters may notsign documents on
behalf ofapplicants. TMEP 608.01. Such anindividual may, however, act as a domestic
representative orcorrespondent. The Trademark Manual describes a domestic representative as
an individual whoserves andreceives correspondence and process on behalfof an overseas
client. TMEP 608.01.
Respondent testified that foreign attorneys would prepare trademark applications.

Responses to Office Action, and Statements ofUse, and send them to her for submission. Upon
receiving said documents. Respondent would review the documents for completeness and
accuracy. On several occasions. Respondent completed the trademark documents by entering the
applicant's electronic signature. Respondent would then submit the completed document tothe
USPTO for filing. Inaddition. Respondent also prepared Change of Correspondence Address
forms andentered eitherthe electronic signature of the applicant or her own electronic signature.
Such conduct went beyond merely forwarding correspondence between the applicants ^d the
USPTO and constitutes practice before the Office in trademai^c matters.
D.Respondent continued to act as domestic representative after being excluded firom

doing so bv the Commissioner.
TheOEDDirectorclaims Respondent ignored the Commissioner's Exclusion Order

excluding Respondent from acting as a dom^tic representative or correspondent in trademark
14
r c
matters before the USPTO. The OED Director alsoalleges Respondent attempted to conceal the
fact that she was continuing to serve as a domestic representative by changing the mailing
addresses and providing ane-mail address that the USPTO had not attributed toRespondent
The first sentence of the Exclusion Order states, **This letter is to notify you that,
effective immediately, the [USPTO] isexcluding you from participating as a correspondent or
domestic representative inany trademark matters before the USPTO." The Exclusion Order also
explained that domestic representatives are appointed for the purpose ofproviding acontact and
addressfor service of process for foreign applicants.
Respondent acknowledged that she read and understood the letter. She also testified that
she ceased serving as a correspondent for her clients after receiving the Exclusion Order.
I don't think it is a fair decision in the [Exclusion Order] dated
February 21,2013 firom theTrademark Director. However, after I
received this letter, withthe permission of the foreign applicants, I
stopped being -1 stopped acting asa U.S. domestic representative
or correspondence addressee in front of USPTO.
After receiving theTrademark Director's letterof February 21,

2013,... With permission from my clients, I took.off my name
and mycompany's name from allthe related USPTO website or
documents andchanged their correspondent address to their
attorneys in China and in Taiwan.
Although Respondent argues that she did not agree with the Exclusion Order and had
appealed it. Respondent testified that her clients also understood that she was excluded from
acting as a correspondent. Respondent's testunony on that matter is as follows:
The language inthe first paragraph [ofthe Exclusion Order] said I
was excluded, somyclients advised meto take offmyname and
not act as the correspondent or the domestic representative.
However, while Respondent's mailing address was removed asthe correspondence

address for the applications atissue. Respondent continued toreceive and submit trademark
documents on behalf of her clients. This is evidenced by the following testimonyfrom
Respondent:
It shouldbe stated like this: [Myclients] wantedto take off my

name as domestic representative; however, theystill authorized me
to help with the application.
Myclientsaid USPTO had excluded me fromtrademark business;

however, they knew that I was innocent. So they just borrow my
15
r:
address and email address just in case the letters and

communications got lost.
The evidencein the record of this proceeding demonstrates that Respondentcontinued to

file trademark documents with the USPTO even after receiving the Exclusion Order. Such
documents mclude Statements of Use, Responses to Office Actions, and Change of
Correspondence Address forms related to the *340, *741, *678, *310, and *531 applications. On
the Change of Correspondence forms forboththe *678 andthe *310 applications, the
correspondence addresses were changed from Respondent's mailing address to addresses in
Taiwan, butRespondent's Ryu204 e-mail address continued to be identified as the e-mail
address forreceiving correspondence. At this time, the Ryu204 e-mail address had not been
identified by the USPTO as belonging to Respondent.
Based uponthe foregoing, the Courtfinds that Respondent continued to act as the
domestic representative or correspondent for the applicants despite beingexcluded from doing so
by theCommissioner. TheCourt also finds that Respondent attempted to conceal this fact from
theUSPTO by filing Change of Correspondence forms thatincluded theRyu204 e-mail address
for receipt of correspondence.
II. Respondent's Misconduct Violates the USPTO Disciplinary Rules
The OEDDirectorclaimsRespondent's misconduct violated a litany of disciplinary rules

under the USPTO Code of Professional Responsibility and USPTO Rules of Professional
Conduct. The Court applies the Code of Professional Conduct to misconduct thatoccurred prior
to May 3,2013, and the Rules ofProfessional Responsibility to misconduct that occurred
thereafter. See 37 C.F.R. 11.901.
A. Respondentengaged in disreputable conduct.
The OED Director claims Respondent's conduct constitutes disreputable or gross

misconduct in violation of 37 C.F.R. 10.23(a).**With respect to attorneys or other agents,
disreputable conduct has generally included unprofessional conduct... to include anyconduct
violative of the ordinary standard of professional obligation andhonor." In re Lane. Proceeding
No. D2013-07 (USPTO Mar. 11,2014) (quotmgPoole v. United States. CIV. A. 84-0300,1984
WL 742 (D.D.C. June 29,1984)).
A respondent's misconduct is not outsidethe disciplinary reach of the Office simply

becausethe misconduct is not specifically enumerated withinthe USPTO's disciplinary rules.
See InreEdinston. Proceeding No. D08-12, at 6 (USPTO Jul. 9,2009) (finding the
Respondent's manslaughter conviction to be sufficient evidence that the respondent engaged in
disreputable or gross misconduct ui violation of the USPTO disciplinary rules); In re Reynolds.
Proceeding No. D1999-12, at 19 (USPTO Apr. 4,2001) (finding Respondent's convictions for
drivingwhile intoxicated represent conductadversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law in
violation of 37 C.F.R. 10.23(b)). The Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases (**Rules of
Practice") are set forth in Title 37, part 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations. *'The primary
function of the rules of practice is to advise the public of the regulations that have been
16
r r
established in accordance withthestatutes, which must be followed before theUSPTO." TMH*

Introduction. In addition, theTrademark Manual provides "trademark applicants, and
attorneys and representatives for trademark applicants with areference work on the practices and
procedures relative to prosecution of applications to register marks in the USPTO." As such, the
Rulesof Practice andthe Trademark Manual offerguidance as to the appropriate conduct
trademark applicants, attorneys, and representatives for trademark applicants should undertake
when registering amark with the USPTO. While aviolation ofthe Rules ofPractice is not aper
se violation oftheUSPTO disciplinary rules, the underlying conduct may, nevertheless,
constitute misconduct.
As noted, supra, byaffixmg her clients' electronic signatures totrademark documents.

Respondent violated the Rules of Practice, which requires that signatories personally sign
trademark documents. In addition. Respondent's practice of filing trademark documents
prepared by unauthorized foreign attorneys is inconsistent with the standard set forth by the
Rules ofPractice, which allows only authorized persons to practice before theOffice in
trademark matters. Suchconduct is therefore considered disreputable because it does notcomply
with thepractices and procedures outlined by theUSPTO.
The Court also finds that Respondent engaged indisreputable conduct bycontinuing to
act as domestic correspondent after being excluded from doing so by the Conmiissioner.
Respondent knew she had been excluded, but attempted to conceal Ae fact that she was involved
with the prosecution ofthe trademark applications by changing the addresses on the Change of
Correspondence Address forms and continuing to use an e-mail address that had not yet been
discovered by the USPTO as belonging to Respondent. Respondents conduct deliberately defied
the Exclusion Order and is therefore disreputable. Accordingly, theCourt finds Respondent
engaged indisreputable conduct inviolation of37 C.F.R. 10.23(a).
B. Respondent's misconduct involved deceit and misrepresentations made to the USPTO.
The OED Director claims Respondent's misconduct involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation in violation of the USPTO Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules of
Professional Conduct
Practitioners shall notengage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation. 37 C.F.R. 10.23(b)(4); 37 C.F.R. 11.804(c) (2013). The forgery ofa
person's signature constitutes an act of deceit. Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinarv Bd. v.
Liles. 808 N.W.2d 203,206 (Iowa 2012) (finding an attorney's forgery of a witness's signature
on a will constitutes deceitful conduct); Disciplinarv Counsel v. Wilson. 2014-Ohio-5487, f 3
(finding an attorney who signed her daughter-in-law's name onto a sworn affidavit and presented
that affidavit to the courtengaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation even though the attorney believed she had her daughter-in-law's consent todo
so"^: seealso In re Lane. Proceeding No, D2013-07, at 14(deceit is dishonest behavior or
behavior that is meant to fool or trick someone.).
Amisrepresentation isthe actofmaking a false or misleading assertion about something,

usually with the intent to deceive, and includes notjustwritten orspoken words butalso any
otherconduct that amountsto a false assertion. Lane, at 14 (citingBlack's LawDictionary(9th
17
r- r
ed. 2009)). Therefore "[c]onceahnent or even non-disclosure may have the effect ofa
misrepresentation." Mt Falsely signing adocument and submitting itto the Office is afalse
representation even ifthe substance of the document is accurate, because the signature is
misleading. In reUchendu. 812 A.2d 933.939 (D.C. 2002). Givmg false or misleading
information totheOffice or any employee ofthe Office constitutes misconduct. 37 C.F.R.
10.23(c)(2)(ii).
InUchendu. an attorney admitted to signing hisclients' names onto probate documents

that required verification. The attorney claimed that he had his clients' permission to verify the
documents onhis clients' behalf, andthe attorney presented affidavits ofhis clients assertmg that
he had their permission to sign for them. The attorney also testified that he did not know his
conduct was improper. The court inUchendu noted that the attorney could not sign verifications
as an agent ofhis clients, because the verifications, by statute, had to be "personally made." In
the instances where the attorney signed clients' names without indicating that the clients were
not the actual signatories, the court found the attorney made false representations to the court.
Here, Respondent entered the signatures ofapplicants into several trademark applications
and other documents ancillary tothe trademark registration proceedmgs. Respondent did not
make any indication that the electronic signatures were entered by anyone other than the
purported signatories. And, even ifthe applicants had personally signed some version of these
documents atsome point intime, most ofthe documents actually filed were signed by
Respondent. By filmg these documents with the USPTO, Respondent was falsely representing
that they bore die applicants' actual signatures. Such conduct is deceitful and misled the
examinmg trademark attorneys into believing that the applicants personally entered their
signatures onto these documents.
Respondent also engaged mdeceitful conduct by preparing Change of Correspondence

Address forms that purported to remove Respondent as the domestic correspondent. Although
Respondent had changed the mailing address, she continued to provide an e-mail address that the
USPTO had not yet attributed to her. This was done with the intent to conceal the fact that
Respondent was continuing to act as adomestic correspondent despite being excluded from
doing so by the Commissioner.
Lastly, Respondent misrepresented to the USPTO that she was an authorized signatory on
the diange ofCorrespondence Address for the *647 application by indicating **YES" in the
section for "authorized signature." Such anassertion isfalse because a Change of
Correspondence Address must be signed by the applicant, someone with legal authority to bind
the applicant, ora practitioner qualified topractice before the Office intrademark matters.
Respondent was none ofthese. Accordingly, the Court finds Respondent's conduct involved
deceit and misrepresentations inviolation of37C.F.R. 10.23(b)(4) and 37C.F.R. 11.804(c).
Respondent's conduct also violates 37C.F.R. 10.23(c)(2)(ii) because these false
representations were knowingly made tothe Office orto an employee ofthe Office.
18
c r
C. Respondent failed to correct the misrepresentations she made to the Office.

The OED Director alleges Respondent's misrepresentations to the Office also constitute a
violation under 37C.F.R. 11.303(a)(1), because Respondent did not correct thefalse
representations previously made tothe Office.
Practitioners shall not knowingly make afalse statement offact or law to a tribunal or fail
tocorrect a false statement of material fact orlaw previously made tothe tribunal bythe
practitioner. 37 C.F.R. 11.303(a). The term *Taiowingly" means actual knowledge of the fact
in question, and aperson's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. 37 C.F.R.
11.1. The intent to deceive is not required, rnmm. on ProFl Ethics &Conduct ofthe Iowa State
RarAss'nv.WunscheL 461 N.W.2d 840,847 (Iowa 1990) ("Even absent an intent to dîve, an
attorney's failure to recognize and correct potentially misleading situations is unethical.")
As noted. Respondent made misrepresentations to the Office. The Commissioner's
Exclusion Order, dated February 21,2013, explained toRespondent that electronically signing
an applicant's name onto trademark documents is inappropriate. Respondent understood this, as
evidenced by the fact that Respondent later filed Statements of Use using Ae HSign-on method.
However, Respondent made no attempt to correct her prior misrepresentations related to the
trademark documents cited inthis matter. Respondent's failure to correct these false
representations to the Office violates 37 C.F.R. 11.303(a)(1). See ^ InreFuUer, 586 P.2d
1111, nil (Or. 1978) ("We hasten to add that the ethical difference between active
misr4)resentation and failure to correct afalse impression that one has given is oflittle import.
Eitheract on accused's part is deceitful.")
n. Respondent handled leâl matters she should have known she was not competent to
handle.
The OED Durector alleges that by engaging in unauthorized practice before the Office in
trademark matters, Respondent handled matters that she was not competent to handle, in
violation of37 C.F.R. 10.77(a). The Code ofProfessional Conduct prohibits practitioners from
handling alegal matter that the practitioner knows or should know the practitioner is not
competent to handle, without associating with another practitioner who is competent to handle it.
37 CJ^.R. 10.77(a). This requires, in part, that apractitioner know the rules relating to the
matter for which she isrepresenting her clients. And, by agreeing to represent these clients itis
the practitioner's duty to inform herself of the applicable rules ifshe does not aheady know
them. Pp-ihman V Senie. 302 A.D.2d 290,291 (N.Y. App. Div.2003); Attorney Grievance
rnrnm^n nf Maryland v. Zhang. 100 A.3d 1112,1129 (Md. 2014), reconsideration deni^ (Aug.
27,2014) (finding an attorney did not provide competent representation to aclient by failing to
conduct any legal research before advising her client on a matter inwhich the attorney was not
familiar).
Respondent agreed to act as domestic representative to file documents with the Office on
behalf offoreign applicants. In so doing. Respondent was required to educate herself on the
proper method for filmg electronically on TEAS. Namely, Respondent should have recognized
thedistinctions between thedifferent signature options andhow to file a trademark docmnent
19
r
with the appropriate signature. Such information could be found in the Rules ofPractice, the
Trademark Manual, orbysimply reviewing the *lielp" section on the form that explains the three
different signature approaches and how they are intended to be used. However, rather than
signatures sne oeiievea nau mauvcricuuy icmuvcu. o xouiuw w
herself onthe Rules ofPractice and thesignature requirements ofTEAS resulted in improperly
signed trademark applications and their related documents. Accordingly, the Court finds
Respondent handled legal matters that she was not competent tohandle.
R Respondent aided others inthe unauthorized practice oflaw.
The OED Director also claims thatbyengaging in theunauthorized practice before the
Office intrademark matters, and by aiding foreign attorneys indomg the same before the Office,
Respondent violated the USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct proscribing the unauthorized
practice of law.
Practitioners may not practice law inajurisdiction inviolation ofthe rules ofthe legal
profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.^^ 37 C.F.R. 11.505; See faje
Kenneth Paul Campbell. Proceeding No. D2014-11 (USPTO Apr. 29,2014) (excluding a
practitioner who engaged in the imauthorized practice of law by representing aclient in acivil
and criminal matterbefore the Colorado courts despitenot being a licensed attorney).
Determining whether conduct constitutes aiding another in the unauthorized practice of

law requires atwo-step analysis. Comm. on ProFl Ethics &Conduct ofthe Iowa State Bar
Ass*nv. Baker. 492 N.W.2d 695,701 (Iowa 1992). First, theCourt must determine whether
actions taken by the foreign attorneys constitute unauthorized practice intrademark matters
before theOffice. Id.; but see Wavne Ctv. BarAss'n. v. Naumoff, 660 N.E.2d 1177,1178 (Ohio
1996) (noting that this step does not require a separate adjudication). Second the Court must
determine whether Respondent aided inthose actions. Generally, the preparation oflegal
documents constitutes the practice oflaw. Geauea Ctv. Bar Ass*n. v. Haig. 955 N.E.2d 352
(Ohio 20in: but see Real Estate Bar Ass*n for Massachusetts. Inc. v. Nafl Real Estate Mo.
Servs.. 946 N.E.2d 665,678 (Mass. 2011) C*Whether [drafting orpreparing documents with
legal implications] constitute the practice oflaw depends to some degree on the type of
document, whether legal ri^ts and obligations are being established, whether thedocument
involves providing legal advice ora legal opinion, and whether the document istailored to
address a client's individual legal needs.")
Itis particularly concerning that Respondent did not verify that the applicants had actually signed the trademark
applications before they were transmitt^ to Respondent. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent ever
corresponded with the applicants. Rather, Respondent relied on secondhand assurances that the applicants had
signed theapplications priorto transmission.
TheUSPTO is considered ajurisdiction for thepurposes of this rule. Changes to Representation opOthers
Before The United States Patent AND Trademark OFFICE, 7 fr 201so-oi: see also in Re Discipline of
Peirce. 128 P.Sd 443,444(2006) ("We therefore conclude that "another jurisdiction'* includes theUSPTO. "ê
professional conduct rules are similar, sodiat what constitutes misconduct before the USPTO ismisconduct in
Nevada.")-
20
r-
(
Respondent filed Statements ofUse for the *340 application and the '531 application.
The documents were prepared by foreign attorneys and sent to Respondent for filing. As noted,
supra, the foreign attorneys who prepared these documents engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law before theOffice in trademark matters. Respondent knew or should have known thatsuch
attorneys were not authorized to do so pursuant to USPTO regulations. By accepting these
documents from the foreign attorneys and filing them with the USPTO, Respondent aided the
foreign attorneys inthe unauthorized practice oflaw before the Office, in violation of37 C.F.R.
11.505.
Althou^ the Court finds Respondent violated 37 C.F.R. 11.505 by aiding foreign
attorneys, the Court does not find Respondent's practice offilmg Statements ofUse, or
completing, signing, and filing Change ofCorrespondence forms constitute the unauthorized
practice oflaw. >ên filing the Statements of Use, Respondent attached a.pdfofthe
applicant's handwritten signature to each document Respondent's act ofmerely filing the
Statements of Use with the USPTO, withoutmore, is insufficient to constitute the unauthorized
practice oflaw, because the Rules ofPractice authorize non-attorneys to file and receive
correspondence between the USPTO and applicants. As to the Change ofCorrespondence
Address forms, theCourt reaches a similar conclusion because these forms donothave any legal
implications. Although itwas improper for Respondent to sign such forms, doing so does not
constitute the practice oflaw. See In re PeeL 725 F.3d 696,700 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that
merely signing and filing adocument does not require legal knowledge orskill and is therefore
not the unauthorized practice oflaw); Drew v. Unauthorized Practice ofLaw Comm.. 970
S.W.2d 152,156 (Tex. App. 1998) (Court noting that while a state's habeas corpus statute allows
a non-attomey tosign and present ahabeas petition, the state's restrictions against the
unauthorized practice oflaw still require an attorney todraft the documents and appear in court
onbehalf ofanother.) Accordingly, although the Court finds Respondent did not personally
engage in the unauthorized practice oflaw, Respondent still violated the USPTO Rules of
Professional Conduct by aiding foreign attorneys in the unauthorized practice of law.
F. Respondent's misconduct was oreiudicial tothe administration of justice.
The OED Director claims Respondent's misconduct is prejudicial to theadministration of
justice in violation ofthe USPTO disciplinary rules. S^ 37 C.F.R. 10.23(b)(5); 37 C.F.R.
11.804(d).
Generally, an attorney engages in such conduct "when his or herconduct impacts

negatively thepublic's perception or efficacy of the courts or legal profession." Attomev
GrievanceCommon v. Rand. 981 A.2d 1234,1242 (Md. 2009). Courts have found that the
unauthorized practice oflaw is a serious threat tothe effective administration ofjustice. United
StatesV. Tnhnsnn. 327 F.3d 554,560 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Am. Exp. Co. v. Monfort Food
Distrib. Co.. 545S.W.2d 49,52 (Tex. Civ.App. 1976) CThe purpose of the rule requiring legal
matters tobehandled by persons trained inthelaw and familiar with court procedure is to further
the efficient administration of justice."). In addition, filing documents with forged signatures
TheCourt draws a distinction between the Respondent's conduct occurring beforeand afterMay3,2013, because
the OED Director has only alleged anunauthoriz^ practice oflaw violation under the Rules ofProfessional
Conduct, which bâmeeffective onthat date.
21
c
rniirt Attorney Disciplinarv Bd. v. LUes. 808 N.W.2d 203,206 (Iowa 2012) (finding an
attorney's forgery of asignature on awill and submission ofthe will to the court constituted
conduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice because it hampered the efficient operation of
the court); TnreKroll. 33 A.D.3d 270,272 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (An attomey's act of signing
an applicant's name to apower of attorney constitutes conduct prejudicial to the admmistration
ofjustice under the USPTO Code ofProfessional Responsibility.).
As found above. Respondent aided foreign attorneys in the unauthorized practice oflaw
before the Office. Respondent also forged the signatures oftrademark applicants onto
documents submitted to theUSPTO. After being excluded from acting as a domestic
representative by the Commissioner, Respondent knowingly violated the Exclusion Order by
continuing to send and receive co.rrespondence on behalf of the applicants. Such conduct is
prejudicial to the administration ofjustice and violates the USPTO disciplinary rules.
G. Respondent did not make false or misleading communkiations about herself or her
services.
The OED Director also claims Respondent represented toforeign local services that she
was authorized to represent others in trademark matters before the Office and that she actually
undertook such representation. The USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit practitioners
from making false or misleading communications about themselves or their services. 37 C.F.R.
11.701.
The record ofthis proceeding does not support afinding that Respondent violated 37
C.F.R. 11.701 by Tnaking false ormisleading communications to foreign local services. No
evidence was proffered to demonstrate Respondent suggested to the foreign attorneys that she
was authorized to practice before the Office in trademark matters. At the very least, itis
reasonable to fmd that Respondent represented toforeign attorneys that she could act as a
domestic representative or correspondent. Furtiier, there is evidence that after Respondent was
excluded from acting as adomestic correspondent, the foreign attorneys were aware ofthat fact
but proceeded to pay Respondent for her services anyway. Accordingly, the Court finds the
OED Director failed to prove this violation with clear and convincing evidence.
H. Respondent did not engage in anv other activity that adversely reflects on her fitness
to practice beforethe Office.
The OED Director claims Respondent violated the Code ofProfessional Responsibility
by otherwise engaging in acts and omissions that do not constitute violations ofthe preceding
regulations. Apractitioner shall not "[e]ngage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the
practitioner's fitness to practice before the Office." (emphasis added) 37 C.F.R. 10.23(b)(6).
This subsection ofthe regulation isessentially a "catch all" provision regulating conduct that
does notfall under thesubsections immediately preceding it. Therefore, by thelanguage ofthe
subsection, if thealleged conduct is found to violate any provision of 10.23(b)(1) through
22
r r
(b)(5), it cannot also violate 10.23(b)(6). Inre Lane. No. D2013-07, at 16; InreKelber. No.
2006-13 at 59 (USPTO Sept. 23,2008).
TheOED Director has not specifically citedconduct that is applicable to thisviolation.

As theCourt finds Respondent's misconduct violates the disciplinary rules previously cited, the
Court concludesthat the OED Director has not demonstratedRespondent engaged in any other
conduct that adversely reflects on her fitness to practicebefore the Office.
in. Respondent's Affirmative Defenses
Respondent raises numerous defenses inresponse tothe allegations contained inthe

Amended Complaint, Specifically, Respondent clahns (A) herconstitutional rights have been
violated; (B) there is nojurisdiction for this disciplinary action; and (C) the OED Director failed
to follow procedural requirements in instituting this disciplinary proceeding.
In a disciplinary proceeding, Respondent has theburden of proving any affirmative
defense byclear and convincing evidence. 37 C.F.R. 11.49. Such defenses must bestated
affirmatively in theAnswer^ wherein Respondent must draw a nexus between thedefense and the
misconduct, and thereason it provides a defense or mitigation. 37C.F.R. 11.36(c). Although,
generally, a respondent may not rely ona defense that was not raised inthe respondent's answer,
the Courtmay,for good cause, allow a respondent to file the statement late.
A. Respondent's Constitutional Arguments
Respondent raises several claims that this proceeding should be dismissed on

constitutional grounds.
1. Due Process Clause
Respondent claims theAmended Complaint violates theFifth Amendment's Due Process

Clause because it seeks to deprive her of her"liberty to represent others in patent, trademark, and
othermatters" without notice. Respondent claims shehas engaged in the samealleged
misconduct since 2006 but was never told that she was doing anything wrong.
The Fifth Amendment statesthat "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process oflaw." U.S. CONST, amend. V. The "root requirement" ofthe
Due Process Clause is that an individualbe given an opportunityto be heard before she is
deprived of any significant property interest See Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67,82 (1972);
Boddie v. Connecticut. 401 U.S. 371,379 (1971); Armstrong v. Manzo. 380 U.S. 545,552
(1965) (the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningfiil manner").
AmendedComplaint included an extensive recitation of the alleged facts that the

OEDDirector believedsupported his decision to institutethe disciplinary proceeding at bar. The
Amended Complaintalso outlined the disciplinary rules that Respondent is alleged to have
violated. At the hearing. Respondent acknowledged that she understoodwhat the Amended
23
r r
Complaint was and the allegations contained therein. Although the Court suggested Respondent
obtain counsel to represent her atthe hearing. Respondent insisted on proceeding prose.
Respondent actively participated in the hearing and provided several exhibits in support ofher
position. Accordingly, Respondent has not demonstrated adeprivation ofdue process.
The Court also finds Respondent's claim that she was not notified ofher misconduct until
2012 isinsufficient todemonstrate a deprivation ofdue process. As noted, supra^ Respondent is
responsible for knowing and understanding the regulations governing signatures and the filing of
documents with theUSPTO if she is providing such services. Moreover, thefact that
Respondent forged the applicants' signatures onto the dociments, rather than mdicate that she
was signing on behalf ofthe applicants, directly contributed to the delay in the USPTO
discovering the misconduct. At the hearing. Respondent elicited the following testimony from
Ms. Amos:
Q. Ifyou accepted the document with a signature and we don't receive

any communication orcorrespondence from you telling us that the
signature isimproper, do youdoes itmean that the signatory, either
theelectronic signature or thehandwritten signature, is not doing
anything illegal?
A. If on its fact the electronic signature or the handwritten signature

appears proper xmder our rule, we would not question itany further so
that ifthe applicant's name appeared between the slashes onin an
electronic signature, we would have no reason toinquire any further.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds Respondent has not met her burden to prove
this affirmative defense.
2. Contract Clause
Respondent also claims that implementation ofthe USPTO rules violates her right to
contract with clients without government restriction, which Respondent claims isconstitutionally
protected byArticle I of theU.S. Constitution.
ArticleI of the U.S. Constitutionstates that "no state shall... pass any... Law
unpairing the Obligation ofContracts." U.S. Const, art. I, 10, cl. 1. In determining whether
theContract Clause affords a litigant protection from state legislation, a court considers (1)
whether a contractual relationship exists; (2) whether a change inlaw impairs that contractual
relationship; and (3) whether the impairment issubstantial. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503
U.S. 181,186(1992).
However, the Court need not xmdertake these inquiries herebecausethe Contract Clause
applies to state legislation and not to the federal government. Pueblo ofSanta Ana v. Kellv. 932
F. Supp. 1284,1297 (D.N.M. 1996) affd. 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1997) crart denied. 522 U.S.
807 (1997). Even assuming, arguendo, that the Contract Clause is implicated here. Respondent
has not produced any evidence ofthe contracts she and her clients entered into. This is material
24
r"
r
to the Court's determination as the contracts mustbe executed prior to the enactment of the
legislation that purportedly impairs it. See Fabri v. United Technologies Int'L Inc.. 387 F.3d
109,124 (2dCir.2004) (noting thatthe Contract Clause prohibits the knpairment by a state of
existing contracts). Without evidence ofthe contracts and then: terms, theCourt is also unable to
determine how, if at all, the contracts have been impaired by the USPTO's regulations.
Accordingly, theCourt finds Respondent has not met her burden to prove this affirmative
defense. .
3. Selective Enforcement
Respondent claims she isbeing denied equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
because she is being treated differently than similarly situated parties. In other words,
Respondent alleges that the OED Director has ignored the similar conduct ofother foreign
e-filers while "meticulously" reviewing Respondent's conduct.
. The federal government has the"broad discretion" to enforce thelaw. United States v.
Armstrong. 517 U.S.456,463-64 (1996). Thus,a **presumption of regularity supports their
prosecutorial decisions and, inthe absence ofclear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that
they have properly discharged their official duties." Id. (citing United States v. Chemical
Foundation. Inc.. 272 U.S. 1,14-15 (1923)). In order to prevail in a selective enforcement claim,
Respondent must demonstrate that (1) she has been singled out while other similarly situated
violators were left untouched; and(2) thattheOED Director elected to pursue thisdisciplinary
action against Respondent "invidious[ly] or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible
considerations as race, religion, orthe desire toprevent the exercise of [their] constitutional
rights." United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc.. 969 F. Supp. 975,985 (E.D. Va. 1997).
'Evidence of mere selectivity, without more, cannot sustain a claim ofselective prosecution."
UnitedStatesv. Hendrickson. 664 F. Supp.2d 793,798 (E.D.Mich. 2009).
Atthe hearing. Respondent identified certain individuals whom she alleges also e-signed
trademark documents on behalf of applicants despite notbeing attorneys or appropriately
authorizedsignatories.
JayeHuang is onlyan authorized correspondent, and... he E-

signed for Yimsheng Tianen; however, he didn'thave to provide
the evidence to show the authorization... While my authorization
is fromthe attorney in Taiwanand in Chma, so I don't know why I
did everything legal and I have to sit here and Jaye Huang doesn't
have to sit here.
Respondent also identified additional individuals and the documents they submitted to
theUSPTO that Respondent claims were inappropriately signed, butnevertheless accepted by
the USPTO, as Respondent's filings were.
However, that is the extent of Respondent's evidence. Respondent's submissions are,

therefore, insufficient to supporta selective enforcement claim. While Respondent purports to
identify several individuals whose conduct sunilarly violates theUSPTO disciplinary rules.
25
c
Respondent has not demonstrated that such individuals have avoided discipline oreven an
investigation. Simply because they were not parties tothe same disciplinary proceeding does not
mean thattheOED Director has not investigated or instituted disciplinary proceedings against
them. And, evenif suchindividuals were "leftuntouched," Respondent hasnot proven, by clear
and convincing evidence, thattheOED Director has pursued disciplinary action against
Respondent based upon an impermissible purpose. After all,
[t]here is no right underthe Constitution to have the law go
unenforced against you, even if you arethe first personagainst
whom it is enforced, and even if you think (or can prove) that you
are not as culpable as someothers who have gone unpunished.
The law does not need to be enforced everywhere to be
legitimately enforced somewhere; and prosecutors have broad
discretion in deciding whom to prosecute.
Futemick V- Snmpter Twp..78 F.3d 1051,1056 (6thCh:. 1996).
Accordingly, the Court finds Respondent's selective enforcement claim has not been
sufficientlyproven.
B. Lack of Jurisdiction
Respondent also claims that there is no jurisdiction for this disciplinary proceedmg
because Respondent's alleged misconduct does not constitute grounds for discipline under 37
C.F.R. 11.19(b).
All practitioners engaged inpractice before the Office are subject tothe disciplinary
jurisdiction ofthe Office. 37 C.F.R. 11.19(a^: see also Chambers v. NASCO. Inc.. 501 U.S.
32,43, (1991) (stating thatthepower to control admission to itsbarand to discipline attorneys
who appear before itis incidental to all courts). The violation ofany USPTO disciplinary rule
constitutes a ground for discipline. 37 C.F.R. 11.19(b)(l)(iv).
Respondent acknowledges she is a registered patent agent with the USPTO. She is
therefore subject tothe disciplmary jurisdiction ofthe Office. Moreover, the Court has found
that Respondent has violated a number ofUSPTO disciplinary rules. These violations constitute
grounds for discipline. Accordingly, the Court finds tiiat Respondent's lack ofjurisdiction claim
is without merit.
C.Respondent's claim regarding the OED Director's procedural violations.
Respondent also raises a number ofclaims related to the OED's investigation and the
OED Director's institution of this disciplinary proceeding. Specifically, Respondent claims the
OED's investigation of heralleged misconduct does notcomply with 37C.F.R. 11.22 and diat
the OED Directorviolated the procedures of 37 C.F.R. 11.32. In supportof her argument.
Respondent cites to statements by counsel for theOED Director suggesting thatOED didnot
request authorization documents fromRespondent untilthe hearing.
26
( (
The OEDDirectoris authorized to investigate possiblegrounds for disciplineagainst a

practitioner. 37 C.F.R. 11.22(a). The OED Director isrequired tonotify the practitioner in
writing ofthe initiation of aninvestigation into whether a practitioner has engaged inconduct
constituting possible grounds fordiscipline. Id at 11.22(e). TheOED Director may request
information and evidence regarding possible grounds for discipline from thepractitioner. W. at
11.22(f).
Atthehearing. Respondent consistendy testified that she had not previously provided the
Powers ofAttorney documents because the OED Director did not ask for the documents. There
is noregulatory requirement that the OED Director request specific documents from a'
practitioner alleged to have violated the disciplinary rules. Moreover, even ifthe OED Director
had requested such documentation, itisunclear whether Respondent would have produced it. At
the hearing, the following exchange took place between counsel for die OED Director and
Respondent:
Q. Did youprovide OED withany [documents proving

Respondent'srelationship with the applicant]?
A. I -1 didn't dare, because he said I [revealed] client's

information - confidential information.
. Respondent also testified that she "pleaded the Fifth Amendment" inresponse tothe
OED's request. Accordingly, the Court finds Respondent's argument tobe unpersuasive. The
OED Durector's investigation could nothave included documents theOED did notknow were in
existence, orthat Respondent refused to submit. Accordingly, the Court finds this argument to
be without merit.
Sanctions
The OED Director requests that the Court sanction Respondent by entering anorder that
excludes Respondent from practice before the Office. Before sanctioning a practitioner, the
Court must consider the following four factors:
(1) Whetherthe practitioner has violated a duty owed to a client, to

thepublic, to the legal system, or to theprofession;
(2) Whether the practitioner acted intentionally, knowingly, or
negligently;
(3) The amount of the actualor potential injury causedby the
practitioner's misconduct; and
(4) the existence of any aggravatingor mitigating factors.
37C.F.R. 11.54(b).
27
r r
1. Respondent violated her duties to the clients, the legal system, and the legal profession.
Respondent violated her duties to her clients and the legal profession.'^ Respondent was
obligated to serve her clients competently by leammg and understanding the requirements for
submitting trademark documents to the USPTO via TEAS. Respondent did not do so.
Respondent also failed to mflintain the integrity and competence ofthe legal profession by
engaging in disreputable conduct, engaging mdeceitful conduct, making false and misleadmg
representations to the Office, and by aiding others in the unauthorized practice oflaw.
Accordingly, this factor warrants amaximum sanction. United States v. Johnson, 327 F.3d 554,
560 {7th Cir. 2003) CThe unauthorized practice oflaw poses aserious threat to the integrity of
the legal profession."); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass*n v. Pacenza. 2006 OK 23, f 33
("Honesty and integrity are the cornerstones ofthe legal profession. Nothing reflects more
negatively upon theprofession than deceit.").
2.Respondent acted knowinglv and intentionally.
Respondent acted knowingly by submitting trademark documents that Respondent Imew

were not signed by the applicants. Respondent also knowmgly aided others ui the unauthorized
practice of law by filing trademark documents she knew were prepared by foreign attorneys who
were notrecognized to practice before theOffice.
TheCourt alsofinds thatRespondent acted intentionally by continuing to serve as

domestic representative despite being excluded by the Commissioner. Respondent understood
that shehad been excluded, butcontinued to actas a domestic representative andactively
concealed that fact from the USPTO. Suchconduct is especially egregious and demonstrates a
lack ofrespect for the Commissioner's authority to manage and direct all aspects ofthe USPTO
that affect theadministration oftrademark operations. Accordingly, theCourt finds this factor
warrants a maximum sanction. SeeInreCofield. 26 So. 3d729,733 (La. 2010), ("Disbarment is
generally appropriate when... alawyer engages many other intentional conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice.").
^ Thft pntftntial injury caused bvRespondent's misconduct is significant.
The OED Director has notproffered evidence of any actual injury caused by
Respondent's misconduct. However, evidence in the record suggests Respondent's misconduct
could cause significant injury to the applicants ofthe trademark applications cited above.
Trademark registrations that have not been appropriately verified may be subject to cancellation.
Here, Respondent inappropriately verified the facts ofthe trademark applications inquestion.
Accordingly, thefactor supports a moderate sanction.
The Court's reference tothe "legal profession" pertains tothe profession ofbeing a practitioner appearing before
the Office.
28
r r
4. Aggravatinp and mitigating factors exist in this case.
The Court often looks to the ABA's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA
Standards") when determining whether aggravating ormitigating factors exist. See In reChae,
Proceeding No. D2013-01, at4 (USPTO Oct. 21,2013). Areview ofthe record reveals that
aggravating factors, and one mitigating factor exist inthis case.
Respondent has not proffered evidence supporting any mitigating factors. However, the
OED Director stipulates that Respondent has been admitted to the patent bar for nine years and
has no prior disciplinary record. Accordingly, the Court finds Respondent's lack ofa
disciplinary record serves as a mitigating factor.
Respondent acted with a dishonest motive, which is an aggravating factor under the ABA
Standards. Specifically, Respondent intentionally concealed the fact that she continued to serve
as domestic representative by filing Change of Correspondence Address forms that purported to
change the mailing address, while maintaming an e-mail address belonging to Respondent.
Accordingly, the Court fini this aggravating factor to be present.
The Court also finds that Respondent engaged ina pattern ofmisconduct, which isalso
an aggravating factor under the ABA Standards. The Commissioner's Exclusion Order
references more than 230 trademark applications orregistrations with which Respondent has
been involved. During the hearing. Respondent offered testunony suggesting she had been
entering the electronic signatures of applicants onto trademark documents transmitted by foreign
attorneys since 2006. While itis unclear the extent ofRespondent's misconduct as to the
applications cited in the Commissioner's Exclusion Order, the Court is persuaded that
Respondent has been engaged in this pattern of misconduct for an extensive period of time.
Inaddition. Respondent has refused toacknowledge that her actions constitute
misconduct. Rather than take responsibility. Respondent has blamed foreign attorneys for
directing her to engage in said misconduct, and even blamed the OED for not investigating
others for engaging insimilar conduct and for not taking steps to correct her misconduct sooner.
Respondent also accuses the USPTO trademark examinmg attorneys ofaiding in the
unauthorized practice law despite the fact that itwas Respondent's own misleading actions that
caused the USPTO to accept her filings and tocontinue corresponding with the applicants
through Respondent. Respondent, as apractitioner before the Office, and having agreed to
provide services to foreign applicants, must understand the relevant rules and appropriate
practices.
Respondent's dishonest motive, extensive pattern ofmisconduct, and outrigjit refiasal to

acknowledge hermisconduct further supports the imposition ofthe maximum sanction.
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds Respondent electronically entered the
signature oftrademark applicants onto the applications cited above and on numerous documents
supporting said applications. She then filed these documents with the USPTO. Her practice of
29
r
signing the applicants' names, without identifying that someone other than the signatory had
signed the document, was misleading. Inaddition, Respondent concealed the fact that she was
continuing toserve as domestic representative despite being excluded bythe Commissioner.
Respondent's actions effectively aided foreign attomeys inthe unauthorized practice of
trademark lawbefore the Office. Accordingly, Respondent's actions constitute violations of the
USPTO disciplinary rulesas citedabove.
ORDER
The Court considers Respondent's numerous violations oftheUSPTO disciplinary ruleis

and the factors setfordi by37C.F.R. 11.54(b). Accordmgly, theCourt finds the record
supports an order excluding Respondent from practice before the Office in patent, trademark,
and other non-patent matters.
It istherefore ORDERED that Respondent is excluded from practice before theOffice in

patent, trademark, and other non-patent matters. Respondent is directed to 37 C.F.R. 11.58
regarding responsibilities incases ofsuspension or exclusion, and 37 C.F.R. 11.60 concerning
petitions for remstatement.
So ORDERED,
r\
w lexander Femdndez
A lexi
Administrative Law Judge
Notice ofAppeal Rights: Within thirty (30) days ofthis initial decision, either party may file an
appeal to the USPTO Director. 37C.F.R. 11.55(a).
30
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
April, 2015, in the manner indicated:
Docket Clerk
VIA E-MAIL:
Dr. Bang-er Shia

Patent Officeof Bang Shia
l02UndencrestCourt
Sugar Land, TX 77479
m
MelindaDeAtley
Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel
Mail Stop 8
Office of the Solicitor
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
EXHIBIT AP
jfageioio
Print Report
Case Name: Shia

Docket #:14-JM-0021-OC-OOS
Report Date: Thursday lO"* July 2014 2:21 PM
Document Zmlex Report
Representative Date RIed
Document Template Document Riename
S No
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Complaint and Notice of Proceedings Ronald K. 3alck5, Esq. 11/08/2013
1 Complaint 11082013.pdf
14-3M-0021-OC-005 Notice of Hearing and Order Court 11/15/2013
2 Notice of Hearing and Order 11152013.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 PTO AttorneyAppearance Porms Mellnda DeAUey, Esq. 11/19/2013
3 Attorney Appearance lll92013.pdf
14-3M-0021-OC-005 Pet Attorney Appearance Form Bang-er Shia 11/25/2013
4 Appearance 11192013.pdf
14-3M-0021-OC-005 Respondents Motion for EOT w-Exhlblts Bang-erShIa 11/29/2013
5 Motion for Extension of Time 11292013.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-OOS Response to Motion for Extension ofTlme Eilzabetn U. Mendeil,
Responseto Motion for Extension 12/03/2013
6 12032013.pdf Esq.
OfTlme
14-3M-0021-OC-OOS Order Granting Extension ofTlme to Court 12/04/2013
7 OnJer: Granting Answer I2042013.pdf
Bang-er Shia 12/06/2013
Answer
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Answer12062013.pdf
8
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Motion to Dimlss with Memo and Exhibits Bang-er Shia 12706/2013
9 Motion to Dismiss 12062013.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Respondents Opposition to PTOs Motion Bang-er Shia 12/12/2013
10 Response to Motion for Leave for Leaveto Respond 12l22013.pdf
14-3M-0021-OC-005 MoHon for Leave to Rie Response to Mellnda DeAtley, Esq. 12/13/2013
11 Motion for Leave Responden%27t Motion to Dismiss 12l32013.pdf
14-3M-0021-OC-005 OrderGranting Leave to Respond Court 12/19/2013
12 Order: Granting 12192013.pdf
Other
14-3M-0021-OC-005 Respondents Opposition 01032014.pdf
13
14-3M-0021-OC-005 OED Director Memo Motion for Additional Mellnda DeAtley, Esq. 01/03/2014
Other
14 Timeto RIe Dispositive Motions 01032014.pdf
1
httD://hudsharepointhud.Rov/dtes/apps/OHA/SitePaReseportPriiitaspx?m=DocIhdex&repnjode=prmt^ 7/10/2014
rage z oio
Print Report
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Respondents Exhibits 01062014.pdf Bang-er Shia 01/06/2014
15 Exhibit Binder
14OM-0021-OC-005 Respondents Objections 1-6 Bang-er Shia 01/06/2014
16 Otjectlons to Exhibits/Witnesses 01062014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Order Granting Additional Timeto Rle Court 01/06/2014
17 Order: Granting Dispositive Motions01062014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 OED Directors Memorandum In Ellzabetn U. Mendeil,
01/10/2014
18 Response to Motion to Dismiss Opposition to RES Motion to Dismiss with Exhibits Esq.
01102014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Supplement to Response to Motion to Melinda DeAtley, Esq. 01/15/2014
19 Other
Dismiss 01152014.pdf
14-3M-C021-OC-OOS Supplemental Exhibits and Updated Bang-er Shia 01/15/2014
20 Other Exhibits list 01l52014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 RESSupplemental Motion to Dismiss Bang-er Shia 01/27/2014
21 Other
with Memo and Exhibits 0i2720l4.pdf
Court 01/28/2014
Order: Miscellaneous 14-JM-0021-OC-005 Notice of Transfer 01282014.pdf
22
Order: Referral to Settlement 14-JM-0021-OC-005 Referral to Settlement Judge Court 01/28/2014
23
Judge 012870l4.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Resp Response to Settlement Bang-er Shia 01/28/2014
24 Other
01282014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Respondents Motion to Transfer Bang-er Shia 01/29/2014
25 Other 01292014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Notice of Telephonic Hearing Court 01/30/2014
26 Order: Miscellaneous 01302014.pdf
14-JM-C021-OC-005 Res Refusal to Enter a Settlement Bang-er Shia 01/30/2014
27 Other Proceedings 01302014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Resp Response to Notice of Telephonic Bang-er Shia 01/30/2014
28 Reply Hearing 013020l4.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 RES Response to Counsels Response Bang-er Shia 01/30/2014
29 Administrative Record 01302014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Revised Notice of Telephonic Hearing Court 01/31/2014
30 Order: Requiring 01312014.pdf
http://hTidsharq)omthud.gov/sites/^ps/OHA/SitePages/RfiportPriiitaspx?m=DocIhdex&repmodeTJtint&DktID=340 7/10/2014
mitKeport rage j oio
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Corrected Notice of Telephonic Hearing

31 Orden Requiring Court 01/31/2014
01312014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Report of Settlement Judge

32 Settlement Judge: Report Court 02/03/2014
02032014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 PTO Motion tor Leave to Proceed for

Motion for Leave Ronald K. Jaicks, Esq. 0?/04/2014
33 Issuance of Subpoena and Memo 02042014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Motion for Discover/ and Memo In Bang-erShIa

34 Discovery Notice 02/04/2014
Support02052014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 OED Directors Memorandum in

35 Motion to Dismiss Oppostion to Respondents Supp Motion to Dismiss Mellnda DeAtley, Esq. 02/06/2014
02062014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Motion for Leave for Extension of Time to

Ellzabetn U. Mendeli,
36 Motion for Leave Exchange Additional Proposed Exhibits and Memo 02/11/2014
Esq.
02112014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 OED Directors OtêcOon to Respondents Elizabetn U. Mendell,

Other 02/12/2014
37 Esq.
Motion for Discover/ 02122014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Order on Motion to Transfer Case

38 Order: Denying Court 02/13/2014
02132U14.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 RES Opposition to Exhibit 7

Other Bang-er Shia 02/13/2014
39 02132014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 RES Response to Revised Order for

Other Bang-er Shia 02/18/2014
40
Teleconference 02172014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 RES Amended Supplemental Motion to

41 Motion to Dismiss Bang-er Shia 02/18/2014
Dismiss with Memo and Exhibits 02182014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-OOS Notice of Telephonic Hearing

Order: Requiring Court 02/18/2014
42
02162014.pdr
14-JM-0021-OC-005 RES Response to Notice of Telephonic 02/18/2014

43. Other Bang-er Shia
Hearing dated February 18th 2014 02182014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC'005 Order on Respondent%27s Response to 02/18/2014
Order: Requiring Court
44
Notice of Telephonic Hearing 02182014.pdf
Order: Vacating Court 02/18/2014

45 14-JM-0021-OC-005 Ruling and Order on Respondent%27s
ht^://hudshaiq)omthiid.gov/sites/ws/OHA/SitePages/ReporfPrintaspx?m=DocIndex&rq)inodeFprintI)kaD=340 7/10/2014
rage 4 010
Print Report
Motion to Dismiss 02182014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Revised Notice of Hearing and Order
Notice of Hearing and Order-OC Court 02/18/2014
46 02182014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC<005 OED Directors Response to RES Eilzabetn U. Mendell,
02/19/2014
47 Reply Response to Notice of Telephonic Hearing 02192014.pdf Esq.
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Report on Costs of Stenographer and 02/25/2014
Other
Mellnda DeAUey, Esq.
48 Interpreter 02252014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Amended Complaint and Notice of
Court 03/25/2014
49 Complaint
Proceedings 03252014^pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 OED Directors Motion for Change of
Mellnda DeAdey, Esq. 04/04/2014
50 Correspondence Location and Memo In Support 04042014.pdf
.14-JM-0021-OC-005 Motions For Right of Due Process Motions Bang-er Shia 04/07/2014
51 Motion for Sanctions
for Sanctions and Motion to Strike and Dismiss 04072014.pdf
Response to Statement for a 14-JM-0021-OC-005 RES Opposing Directors Motion for
52 Hearing Location Change 04072014.pdf
Preference for GeographlcLocatlon
14-JM-0021-OC-005 OED Directors Motion for Leave to File
Mellnda DeAtley, Esq. 04/09/2014
53 Motion for Leave Response to Respondents Motion to Dfsmlss04092014.pdf
14-JM-C021-OC-G05 Order Granting Leave to File Respnse to Court 04/09/2014
54 Order: Granting
Respondents Motion to Dismiss 040920l4.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 RES Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and
55 Motion to Dismiss
Memo in Support 04092014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 OED Directors Objection to Hiring an
Other
Mellnda DeAtiey, Esq. 04/09/2014
56 Interpreter Q4092014.pdf
140N-002X-OC-OOS RES Motion to Make Hearing be Open to 04/09/2014
Other
Bang-er Shia
57
the Public 040920l4.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Order for Status Conference
Order: Requiring court 04/10/2014
58 04i02014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Motion for Leave to file Response to Resp
Mellnda DeAtley, Esq. 04/10/2014
59 Motion for Leave Motion to Make Hearing Public 041020l4.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Directors Response to Motion to Make 04/10/2014
Other
Mellnda DeAtley, Esq.
60 Hearing Public 04102014.pdf
ht^://hudshare5)ointJiudgov/sites/apps/OHA/SitePages/Rqx)rtPiintaspx7m=DoclQdex&tepinode==print&Dk(iD=340
Case 1:16-cv-01051-AJT-MSN Document 1-5 Filed 08/17/16 Page 37 of 79 PageID# 537 7/10/2014
rage 3 010
Print Report
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Director Motion for Leave to File
Response to RES Supplemental Motion to Stiiice and Dismiss Meiinda DeAtley, Esq. 04/11/2014
61 Motion for Leave
04102014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 RES Motion to To exdude Directors
Objectionsand Motion for Sanction with Memo fn Support Bang-erShla 04/14/2014
62 Administrative Record
04142014.pdf
14-3M-0021-pC-005 Order Granting RES MoOon to Make
Hearing Public and OED Motion to Strike Dismiss Court 04/15/2014
63 Order: Granting
04152014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Order on OED Directors Objection to 04/15/2014
Court
64 Order: Denying Hiringan Interpreter 04152014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 OED Director%27s Opposition to Elizabetn U. Mendell,
04/15/2014
65 Other Respondent%27s Urgent Motions 04152014.pdf Bsq.
14-3M-0021-OC-005 RES Opposition to Drirector Hiring an 04/15/2014
Bang-er Shia
66 Other
Interpreter 04152014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 RES Reponse to Courts Order Dated Bang-er Shia 04/16/2014
67 Other AprillS, 2014 04162014:pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Withhold Judicial Misconduct Bang-er Shia 04/21/2014
68 Other
04212014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-OOS Order Granting Extension of Time to Court 04/22/2014
69 Order: Granting Answer and Sealing Portions of Record 04222014.pdf
14-3M-0021-OC-005 Order Granting OED Driectors Change of Court 04/23/2014
70 Order: Notice of Hearing Location Hearing I.ocation 04232014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 OED Directors Opposition to Motions to Ellzabebi U. Mendell,
04/29/2014
71 Response to Motion to Dismiss Dismiss Amended Complaint 04292014.pdf Esq.
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Amended Sup Motion tor Warrant Motion
to Sanction to Strike and Dismiss and Support Memo Bang-er Shia 04/30/2014
72 Motion fbr Sanctions
04302014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Order for Response to RESAmended SUP Court 04/30/2014
73 Order: Requiring Motion Warrant Sanction and Dismiss 043d2014.pdf
14-3M-0021-OC-005 Directors Motion for Leave to Proceed Mellnda DeAtiey, Esq. 04/30/2014
74 Motion for Leave
Under 35 USCSection 24 and Support Memo 04302014.pdf
^^p//^^<^har.înthllrtgf^v/s^tBs/apps/OHA/SitePages/ReportP^^ntaspx?^l=DocLldex&repmode^)rint&DlcaD=340
Case 1:16-cv-01051-AJT-MSN Document 1-5 Filed 08/17/16 Page 38 of 79 PageID# 538 7/10/2014
rogi? o UA u
Print Report
14-3M-0021-OC-005 PTO Memo In Opp to Res Suppl Motion Elizabetn U. Mendell,
05/05/2014
75 ppgponse to Motion for Sanctions and Exhibit 05052014.pdf Esq.
14-JM-0021-OC-005 PET AnswerCounterclaims 050720l4.pdf Bang-er Shla 05/07/2014
76 Reply
14-3M-0021-OC-005 RES Privacy ActWaiver05122014.pdf Bang-er Shla 05/12/2014
77 Other
14-3M-0021-OC-005 Order on Respondents Motion Court 05/15/2014
78 Order: Denying 05152014.pdf
14-JM-C021-OC-005 Order Granting OED Directors Motion Court 05/20/2014
79 Order: Granting Issuance of Witness Supoenas 05202014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Respondents Exhibit List05282014.pdf Bang-er Shla 05/28/2014
80 Exhibit Binder
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Notice to the Deposition and Subpoena Mellnda DeAtley, Esq. 06/18/2014
81 Subpoena: Service Notice 06182014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 RES Motion'for Deposition at Hearing In Bang-er Shla 06/24/2014
82 Other Lieu of Appearance 06242014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Amended Nodce to Take Deposition and Mellnda DeAHey, Esq. 06/25/2014
Other
83 Subpoena 06232014.pdf
14-jM-002i-OC-005 PTO Response to RES Motion Requesting Mellnda DeAtiey^ Esq. 06/27/2014
84 Response to MoOon to Reconsider Deposition 062720l4.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC;-00S PTO MoHon for Leave to File Response to Mellnda peAtiey, Esq. 06/27/2014
85 Motion for Leave RES Motion Regarding Personal Appearance 062720l4.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-G05 Order Denying Motion for Deposition at Court 07/01/2014
86 Order: Denying Hearing 07012014.pdf
Motion for Approval of Consent 14-JM-0021-OC-005 OED Directors Motion to Consolidate and Mellnda DeAtley, Esq. 07/02/2014
87
Order Memorandum in Support 07022014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Order Granting OEDDirectors Motion to Court 07/08/2014
88 Order: Granting Consolidate 07082014.pdf
14-AF-0100-OA-019 GOV Joint Exhibitsand Lists and Indices Elizabetn U. Mendell,
07/08/2014
89 Hearing Exhibits 07082014.pdf Esq.
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Noticeof Waiver and RES Amended Bang-er Shla 07/10/2014
90 Administrative Record Waiver 07102014.pdf
"r-in : 1--90 of 90 Items
?.i.... li
h
1
..il. {
; '-i
M ^
' 5 items per page
http://hudsharepomthu4gov/sites/apps/OHA/SitePagesfiporPriiiLaspx?m=DocIn& 7/10/2014
EXHIBrrAQ
P/int Report
Case 1:16-cv-01051-AJT-MSN Document 1-5 Filed 08/17/16 Page 41 of 79 PageID# 541 Page 1 oir4
Case Name: Shia (II)

Docket #;14-AF-O109-OG-O17
Document Index Report
Report Date: Tuesday 5*^ May 2015 11:26 AM
Document Filename Representative Date Filed

S.NO DocumentTemplate
14-AF-6i09-OC-017 Complaint and Notice of Proceed ngs Melinda DeAUey 06/27/2014
1 Complaint
06272014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Notice of Hearing and Order

Court 06/30/2014
Notice of Hearing and Order-OC 06302014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 OED Directors Notice of Appeara ice Hizabeth Ullmer Mendel 07/02/2014
Attorney Appearance 07022014.pdf
14-JM-0021-OC-005 Motion to Dismiss and Support Dr. Bang-er Shia 07/15/2014

Motion to Dismiss
Memorandum 71S2014.pdf
14OM-0021-OC-C05 Answer to Complaint Exiiibits an 1 Exhibit 07/15/2014

Dr. Bang-er Shia
Answer
Ust 07152014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Notice of New Hearing Dates anc Order 07/16/2014

Court
Notice of Hearing and Order-OC for OED Director Response 07162014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Directors Motion to File an Amenped Melinda DeAtley 07/22/2014
Otlier
Complaint and Amended Complaint 07222014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Order to Supplement OED Direct 3trs 07/22/2014
Court
Order: Requiring Motion to Rle Amended Complaint 072220i4.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 RES Opposition to PTOs Motion t bFile Dr. Bang-er Shia 07/22/2014
Petitioner's Response
Amended Complaint 072220l4.pdl-
14-JM-0021-OC-005 OED Directors Response to July t2 2014 Melinda M. DeAtiey 07/24/2014
10 Reply Orxler 07242014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 RES Supplemental Opposing OEI 07/25/2014

Administrative Record Melinda M. DeAtley
11 Directors Motion to File Amended Complaint 0725201J.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 OED Directors Memo in Opposition to

Melinda M. DeAtiey 07/25/2014
12 Response to Motion to Dismiss RES Motion to Dismiss 07252014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Order Granting Motion to File An ended Court 08/05/2014

' 13 Order: Granting
Complaint 08052014.pdf
r I f I'ynn r
t ^ . /rt... J . I . . -
J //^TT A . . ./r . . o _ . . t . 3 ... o. J J._ * on tm ^jTTX 4 m/\
Page 2 of4
Print Report
14-Al=-O109-Oc-O17 OED Directors Motion to File Rec acted Mellnda M. DeAtiey 08/08/2014
14 Motion for Leave Exhibit Attachment and Memo in Support 08072014.J df
14-AF-0109-OC-017 RES Motion to Sanction M DeAtii y and E Dr. Bang-er Shia 08/08/2014
15 Motion for Sanctions Mendei Attachments and Memo in Support 08082014 pdf
14-Al=-0109-0C-017 Order for RES to Sanction Couns|s] for Court 08/08/2014
16 Onler: Granting OED DIR08082014.pdf
14-Al=-O109-Oc-O17 Order for RES to OED DIR MR. t^ RIe Court 08/08/2014
17 Order: Granting Redacted IP Chart 08082014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Motion to Quash with Support Dr. 3ang-er Shia 08/08/2014
18 Motion to Quash Memorandum 08082014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Order for Response to RES MTQ illicit Court 08/11/2014
19 Order: Requiring Witness Declaration 08112014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Witness and Exhibit Lists with E> hibits Dr. Bang-er Shia 08/13/2014.^
Hearing Exiiibits 08132014.pdf
JSL
14-AF-0109-OC-O17 RES Answer and Counterclaims Or. Bang-er Shia 08/20/2014
21 Answer 08202014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 RES Response to OED Directors ^ v e t o Dr. Bang-er Shia 08/25/2014
22 Response to Motion for Leave RIe a Redated Version of IP Address Chart 08252014. pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 OED Directors Opposition to RES Motion
Mellnda DeAtiey 08/25/2014
23 Motion to Quasii to Sanction and to Quash with Support Memoand Exi liblts
1 08252014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Order on RES Motion to Dismiss Court 09/05/2014
124 Order: Denying 09052014.pdf
i
14-AF-0109-OC-017 OED Directors Objections to Res)>ondents Mellnda M. DeAtiey 09/08/2014
25 Otdections to Exhibits/Witnesses Proposed Witness List and Exhibits 090820l4.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 RES Motion to Sanctions and Mejno in Dr. Bang-er Shia 09/11/2014
Motion for Sanctions Support 09112014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Order for Response to RES Moticjn to Court 09/12/2014
27 Order: Requiring Sanction OED Counsel 09122014,pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Notice of Rilng Deposition Transi 3lpt Mellnda M. DeAtiey 09/15/2014
28 Discovery Notice Mar/neil Gainer 091520l4.pdf
lA r /r/OA1 e
' inTXAiou-n m o J :
Page 3 of4
Print Report
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Notice of Rling and Deposition Mellnda M. DeAtiey 09/15/2014
29 RHng of Transcript Transcript-Marynell Gainer 09152014.pdf
14-Af=-O109-Oc-O17 RES Motion to Strike GOV Motior Dr. Bang-er Shla 09/16/2014
30 Response to Motion to Strike 09l62014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Directors Memo in Opposition to RES 2nd
Mellnda DeAtiey 09/16/2014
31 Response tx> Motion for Sanctions Motion to Sanction and Exhibits 09162014.pdf
M-Al'-Olog-OC-Ol? OED Directors Motion to Strike Mellnda M. DeAtiey 09/16/2014
32 Motion to Strike Counterclaim 091620l4.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Order on Motion Related to the Court 09/19/2014
33 Order: Denying Deposition of the Records Custodian 09l92014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 RES Response to OED Directors Dr. Bang-er Shia 09/23/2014
34 Response to Objections to Exhibits Objections to Witness List09232014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 OED Directors Supplemental Exhibit Melinda M. DeAtiey 09/24/2014
35 Exhibit Binder Binder and Usting 09242014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 OED Directors Objections to Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel 09/26/2014
36 Other Respondent%27s Exhibits 09262014.pdf
l4-Ah-Oi09-OC-Oi7 RES Pre Hearing statement Dr. Bang-er Shla 09/30/2014
37 Prehearing Statement 09302014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 GOV Prehearing Statement Melinda DeAtiey 09/30/2014
38 Prehearing Statement 09302014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 RES Objections to GOV Objectioijs to RES Dr. Bang-er Shla 09/30/2014
39 Objectionsto Exhibits/Witnesses Exhibits 09302014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 GOV Motion to Voluntarily DismI Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel 10/01/2014
40 Motion to Dismiss
Charges in D2014-04 10012014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Order Denying RCS Motion to Sa action Court 10/02/2014
41 Order: Denying Counsel for the OED Director 10022014.pdf
X4-AF-0109-OC-017 Order for Documents 10092014. )df Court 10/09/2014
42 Order: Documentary Evidence
14-AF-0l09-bc-0l7 Order for Closlrtg Statement Court 10/14/2014
43 Order: Supplementary Briefing 10142014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 RES Documents of App Auth and Support Dr. Bang-er Shla 10/20/2014
44 Documentary Evidence Docs 10202014.pdf
Case 1:16-cv-01051-AJT-MSN Document 1-5 Filed 08/17/16 Page 43 of 79 PageID# 543 4 Af\ c t e /OA 1 e
. //U* J . A o r\t-jo-J * :
Case 1:16-cv-01051-AJT-MSN Document 1-5 Filed 08/17/16 Page 44 of 79 PageID# 544 Page 4 of4
.Print Report
14-AF-0109-OC-017 RES Oosing Statements 102120 L4.pdf Dr. Bang-er Shla 10/21/2014
45 Other
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Post-Hearing Order I0292014.p^f Court 10/29/2014

46 Order: Requiring
PTO 02014-04 D2014-31 OED Directors Objection to and 10/31/2014
Elizabeth Uilmer Mendel
Motion to Strike pdf
47 Motion to Strike RES Post-Hearing Exhibits 10312014
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Order for Response to OED DIrei ttors Court 10/31/2014
48 Order: Requiring Objections to and Motion to Strike 10312014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 RES Objection to GOVObjection and
Dr. Bang-er Shia 11/10/2014
49 Reply Attachments lll02014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 RES Obj to MTS on GOV with Dr. Bang-er Shla 11/17/2014
50 Other Attachments 11172014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Order Denying OED MTS RES PH Ex. RES

Court 11/20/2014
51 Order: Denying MTS 11202014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 OED Directors Post Hearing Brie Elizabeth Uilmer Mendel 12/01/2014
52 Post Hearing Brief 120l2014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 RES Post Hearing Brief l20120lH.pdf Dr. Bang-er Shla 12/01/2014
53 Post Hearing Brief
14-AF-0109-OC-017 GOV Post-Hearing Response Bri4f Mellnda DeAtley 12/15/2014
54 Post Hearing Brief 12l52014.pdf
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Initial Decision and Order 04222|0 IS.pdf Court 04/22/2015

55 Order: Decision and Order
14.AF-0109-OC-017 RES Email Correspondence 043C 2015.pdf Dr. Bano-er Shla 04/30/2015
56 Correspondence
14-AF-0109-OC-017 Courts Response to RES Email court 05/01/2015
57 Correspondence
Correspondence 043020l5.pdf
1- 57 of 57 Items
.5 items per page
. /t 4
EXfflBIT AR
4. The ALJ's Determination that Respondent Violated the

USPTO Disciplinary Rules by Continuing to Act as a
Domestic Representative after Trademarks Excluded
her was Correct 24
5. The ALJ Rightly Concluded that Respondent Aided in

Unauthorized Practice ui Trademark Matters 24
VI. CONCLUSION 29
u
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Atty. Grievance Comm'nofMd. v. Zhangy

100 A.3d 1112 (Md. 2014) 20
Edington, In re, . '

Proceeding No. DOS-12 at 6 (USPTO Jul. 9,2009) 15
Laczko,
Proceeding No. 02013-08 (USPTO Dec. 1,2014) ..19
Reibman v. Senie,
302 A.D.2d 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) 20
Uchendu, In re,
812 A.2d 933 (D.C. 2002) 19
Statutes
15U.S.C.1051 7
35U.S.C.2 ; 13,14
35U.S.C.3 ; 16
35 U.S.C. 32... 1,14
35 U.S.C. Title 15, Chapter 2 22
37 C.F.R. 10.20.. 3
37C.F.R. 10.23 passim
37C.F.R.10.77; 3,12,20
37C.F.R.11.1 : 10,11,25
37C.F.R. 11.101 3,13
iii
37 C.F.R. 11.14 17,25,26,28
37C.F.R. 11.19 13,14
37 C.FJR.. 11.303 4, 12
37 C.F.R, 11.39 1
37 C.F.R. 11.49 26
37C.F.R. 11.5 17,26
37C.F.R. 11.505 4,12,29
37 C.F.R. 11.804 4,12,19,23,24
37 C.F.R. 11.901 ....3,13
37 C.F.R. 2.17 13,23,29
37 C.F.R. 2.193 passim
37 C.F.R. 2.20 7
37 C.F.R. 2.33 7
37 C.F.R.2.62 8
37 C.F.R. 11.101 through 11.901 3,13
37 C.F.R. Chapter 1, Part 2 22
Other Authorities
American Inventor's Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,113 Stat.

1501A (Appendix I) (enacted November29,1999)) '. 16
In reLackzo, Proceeding No. D2013t08 (USPTO Dec. 1,2014); ht^://e-

foia.uspto.gov/Foia/RetrievePdf?system=OED&flNm=0564_DIS_2009-07-0912
iv
In re Proceeding No. D08-12 (USPTO Jul. 9,2009); http://e-

foia.uspto.gov/Foia/RetrievePdf?system=OED&flNm=0788JDIS_2014-12-0118
Regulations
Rules of Professional Conduct ..3
TMEP 1901 28
TMEP 1902.02... 28
TMEP 601 ; 17
TMEP 602 25
TMEP 602.03 .25
TMEP 609 v5
TMEP 610 5
TMEP 611.01... ....:...10,22
TMEP 611.02 23,25
TMEP 611.03 : 10
TMEP 611.06 10
TMEP 712 : .8
TMEP Introduction 23
USPTO Code of Professional Responsibility 3,13

L STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
On April 22,2015, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") issued an Initial
Decision("Decision") finding that Dr. Bang-er Shia ("Respondent) violated eight
ethics rules governing the conduct ofpatent practitioners practicing before the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO" or "Office") and excluded
her from practice before the USPTO. The issue on appeal is whether the ALJ's
Initial Decision should be affirmed, where the evidence of record establishes that
Respondent, a non-attorney patent agent, improperly practiced in trademark
matters before the Office; electronically forged the signatures oftrademark
applicants in eight trademark applications and filings Iherein; continued to serve as
domestic representative after she was the subject of an Exclusion Order enteredby
the Commisisioner for Trademarks ("Commissioner"); and aided foreign attorneys
in the unauthorized practice oftrademark law before the USPTO.
n. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 8, 2013, the Director ofthe Office of Enrollment and
Discipline ("OED Director") filed a Complaint and Notice ofProceedings under
35 U.S.C. 32 against Respondent, Proceeding No. D2014-04. (A.R. D2014-04,
1).^ On March 25,2014, the OED Director filed an Amended Complaint in D2014-
^The Complaint was filed with an ALJ firom the Department ofHousing and Urban
Development pursxiantto an agreement between the USPTO and HUD. See 37 C.F.R. 11.39.
The AU's administrative record ofthe proceeding has been filed with the USPTO Dir^tor. The
1
04. (A.R. D2014-04,49). On June 27,2014, the OED Director jfiled a second
Complaint against Respondent, Proceeding No, D2014-31. (A.R. D2014-31,1). At

the OED Director's request, the two cases were consolidated. (A.R. 88,1). On July
22,2014, the OED Director filed anAmended Complaint in D2014-31, andthe
matter was scheduled for ahearing. (A.R. D2014-31,7).
On October 1,2014, the OED Directorfiled a Motion to Dismiss D2014-04,
electing to proceed totrial only on the allegations asserted inD2014-31. (A.R.
D2014-31,40). The Motion to Dismiss D2014-04 was granted bythe ALJ onthe
first day ofthe hearing. (T. 46,3-4).^ The hearing proceeded based solely upon the
Amended Complaint filed July 22,2014 in D2014-31.
The Amended Complaint alleged thatRespondent, a registered patent agent,
who isnotand never has been an attorney, went beyond acting as a domestic
representative for foreign applicants and engaged in unauthorized practice in
trademark matters before the Office. The Amended Complaint further alleged she
forged liie electronic signatures of applicants to trademark documents and filed
those documents with the USPTO, ineight trademark applications.^ Furthermore,
pleadings which are part oftheadministrative record were tabbed bythe ALJ and are cited in
this briefby their tab number and proceeding number as "A.R. D2014- ,
2 ru-i|
The Transcript ofEvidence from the hearing, conducted October 6 -10,2014, iscited inthis
brief as "T. (page), (line)"
' Trademark ^plication Nos. 85/585,031 (the '031 application); 85/689,678 (the '678
application); 85/712,340 (the '340 application); 85/747,741 (the '741 application); 85/719,310
Respondent was alleged to have continued to act as the domestic representative in
certain trademark applications after being excluded from doing so by the
Conmiissioner and concealing her misconduct by using an email or mailing
address that hadnot yet been detected by the USPTO as being associated withher.
Respondent was also alleged to have actively assisted foreign attorneys in the
unauthorized practice of trademark law.
Afterthe hearing, the ALJ found that Respondent violated the following
provisions ofthe USPTO Code of Responsibility and the Rules ofProfessional
Conduct:"^ 37 C.F.R. 10.23(a) (engaging in disreputable or gross misconduct);

10,23(b)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation); 10.23(b)(5) (engagingin conduct prejudicial to the
administration ofjustice); 10.23(a)via 10.23(c)(2)(ii) (knowingly giving, or
knowingly participatingin a material way in giving, false or misleading
information to the Office or any employee ofthe Office); 10.77(a) (handling a
legal matter which the practitioner knows or should knowthat the practitioner is
not competent to handle without associating with anotherpractitionerwho is
(the *310 application); 85/748,531 (the *531 application); 85/756,529 (the *529 application); and
77/836,647 (the *647 application).
Êffective May 3,2013, the USPTO Rules ofProfessional Conduct apply to persons who
practice before theOffice. See 37 C.F.R. 11.101 through 11.901. Those Rules areapplicable
to misconduct thatoccurred after May 2,2013. The USPTO Code ofProfessional Responsibility
applies to misconduct thatoccurred before May 3,2013. See 37C.F.R. 10.20 etseq.
competent to handle it); 11.303(a)(1) (making a false statement of material fact or
law to a tribunal or failing to correct a false statement of material fact or law
previouslymade to the tribunal by the practitioner); 11.505 (practicing law in a
jurisdiction in violation ofthe regulationof the legal profession in that jurisdiction,
or assisting another in doing so); 11.804(c) (engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 11.804(d) (engaging in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice). Based on these
findings, the ALJ excluded Respondent from practice before the Office. (Decision
16-21).^
Respondent's appeal followed.
m. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Respondent's status
Respondent is not and has never been an attorney licensed in any state to
practice law. (T. 297,2-3). She was admittedto the USPTO as a patent agent in
2005. (T. 295,22- T. 296,6). Respondent began serving as a domeistic
representative and correspondence address for foreign trademark applicants in
2005 or 2006. (T. 222, 5-11). A domestic representative is an individual appointed
by a foreign trademark applicant to serve as a resource in the United States oh
whom notices or process in proceedings affecting the markmay be served. (T. 56,
^The ALJ's Initial Decision and Order, issued April 22,2015, is found at A.R. D2014-31,55.
18-T. 57, 5; Trademark Manual ofExamining Procedure ("TMEP") 610). A
domestic representative is not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO
in trademark matters. A domestic representative ..is not authorized to prosecute
an application or represent a party in a proceeding before the USPTO, unless the
domestic representative is a qualified practitioner who has been recognized by the
USPTO as the representative ofthe applicant or registrant." (TMEP 609.04;
T. 58,11-18).
Respondent also acted as the correspondence address for foreign applicants.
(T. 466,16-21). A trademark applicant may designate a correspondence address in
writing and if the applicant does so correspondence from the USPTO will be
transmitted to that address. (TMEP 609; T. 58,22- 59,2).
In 2012, the Commissionerfor Trademarks began investigatingRespondent
to determine if she was acting beyond the scope of a domestic representative or
correspondent. Ultimately, after an investigation and affording Respondentthe
opportunity to present her case, the Commissioner found that Respondent had
engaged in unauthorized practice in trademark matters before the USPTO and
excluded her in an Order dated February 23,2012. (JNT. 4, G865). The Order
specifically forbade Respondent from serving as a domestic representative or a
correspondence address. {Id.). The Exclusion Order was effective immediately.
(Id.). Respondent had the right to appeal the decision to the USPTO Director, and
did so. On December 27,2013, the USPTO Director affirmed the Commissioner's
decision. (GOV. 13, G973)/
B. Signing Docmnents in Electronic Trademark Applications
There are three types of signatures available to an applicant using the
Trademark Electronic Application System ("TEAS") to file a trademark document.
A "Direct" signature is one in which the signatory of an electronic trademark
documentpersonally enters his or her name between two forward slashes. (T. 72,
1-4; T. 97,6-8). An "E-SIGN" signature is one where the person completing and
filing the electronic document is not the personwho will be attesting to the
Declaration or verification and signing the document, but who instead will send it
to the appropriate person for siâture.^ (T. 72,5-13). The "H-SIGN" signature is
one in which the person with authority to sign the document signs his or her
original handwritten signature to a hard copy signature page containing the
requisite Declaration and the document is then attached to the electronic trademark
document in the form of a PDF, JPEG, or other electronic file before submitting
În this brief, pleadings are identified by the document number and page number inthe
Administrative Record and exhibitsare identified as eitherJoint ("JNT") exhibits (which were
designated by the parties before the hearing asjoint exhibits), Government ("GOV") exhibits, or
Respondent ("RES") exhibits. Each ofthe Government and Joint Exhibits is labeled with a
number.
The TEAS systemallows a document preparer to complete the document and send it to the
person who vim electronically sign it, and, ifdone correctly, the electronic signature will be
embedded in the signature blockwhenthe document is filed withthe Office. (T. 104-115; GOV.
469,470,471,474,476,478,479,480,481,482, and.484).
6
the electronic document to the Office. (T. 72,14 -73,1; T. 128,4-8; GOV, 489,
490,494).
Respondent states in her appellate brief that Responses to Office Actiondo
not have a place to attach a handwritten signature. (Respondent's Brief, hereinafter
"R. Br." 7-8,10-11). To attacha handwritten signature page, one must select the
H-SIGN signature method when choosing the Response to Office action response
form. (T. 140, 5-10; T. 128,4 -133,6). If attaching a handwritten signature isnot
an option for the Response to Office Action, the handwritten signature option was
A
not selected. Similarly, Respondent states in her briefthat a handwritten signature
option is not available for a Statement of Use. R. Br. 8. A handwritten signature
option is available for a SOU, however, one must selectthe handwritten signature
method whenbegiiming to complete the SOUelectronic form. (GOV. 392- 408).
Anytrademark application mustbe signed by the properpersonwith a
verified statement such as an Oath or Declaration attesting to the veracity ofall
statements made in the document in themanner set forth in the signature rules.
{See 15 U.S.C. 1051; 37 C.F.R. 2.20,2.33,2.193(c), (e)(l)-(e)(2)), A
Statement ofUse must be signed with a verification. (37 C.F.R. 2.193(e)(1)).
Similarly, a Response to Office Action must be signed consistent withthe
procedures set forth in 2.193(e)(2). (37 C.F.R. 2,62(b), TMBP 712).

8
For example, inthe *869 application, Respondent selected the direct sign method, electronically
forged the signature ofthe applicant, and then attached a copy ofthe handwritten signature page
inthe"miscellaneous" box. (GOV, 508, G17958 - G17964,17969. T. 493,17-494, 8).
7
C. Use of the Direct Signature Method
The electronic signature rule governing the form of a signature is set forth at
37 C.F.R. 2.193(c)(1). Currently the rules do not provide for any other form of
electronic signature, such as is referenced in 2.193(c)(2). (T. 385, 19-386,9).
An applicant's signature, or that of an authorized signatory, mustcomply with
2.193(c)(1).
When completing gin electronic trademark application or related document
applicants havethe option to save the document to their personal computers prior
to submitting the document to the Office. (T. 211,16-212,13). But when usingthe
Direct Signature approach, the applicantwho has saved a documentmust upload
the form again to the TEAS system and re-enter his or her electronic signature
before the document may be electronically filed. (T. 211,16-212,13; T. 212,19-
213,4). The requirement that the document be signed immediately before filing is
by design in the TEAS system, because the USPTO requires that all ofthe
information in a trademark application be verified (including any changes made to
apreviouslysaved, but not filed, document). (T. 212,14-213,4; .T. 211,16-
T. 212,13; T. 212,14-T. 213,4). Once a document has been electronically signed
and filed, it remains unchanged. (T. 142,11-15). Signatures on alreadv filed
electronic trademark applications and related documents are not removed once
submitted to the USPTO. (T. 142,16-19).
8
In her brief, Respondent states that after the foreign applicant electronically
signed the application or other document and submitted it to the USPTO that the
electronic signature was "removed" by the TEAS system, thus "forcing"
Respondent to forge the electronic signature of the applicant or signatory. (R. Br. 7
- 11).Respondenttestified that the foreign applicantor the foreign attorney for the
applicant completed the trademark document (whether an application. Statement of
Use, or Response to Office Action), saved the electronic document to his or her
personal computer, and then transmitted it to Respondent for filing. (T. 474,17-
475,2; T. 507,1-7). Respondent received the document and then when she
uploaded it to the USPTO TEAS system from her office in Texas, a new electronic
signature was required. Respondent personally entered the electronic signature of
the applicant or authorized signatory (not her own signature) and then filed the
document with the USPTO. (T. 574, 9-22).
The rules governing signatures for trademark documents filed with the
USPTO are set forth at 37 C.F.R. 2.193. Respondent knowingly entered the
electronic signatures of other persons, specifically, foreign applicants or other
authorized signatories, on electronic trademark applications and other trademark
documents and filed those documents with the USPTO. (37 C.F.R. 2.193(c)(1),
T. 574, 9-22).
D. Legal Authority to Bind Applicants
Respondent testified at the hearing that applicants gave her permission to
sign for them and she had "legal authority to bind the applicants." (T. 201, 8-12; T.
234,19-22). However, under the regulations, no applicant can give permission to
another person, such as Respondent, to sign his or her name to trademark
documents filed with the Office. (S&e TMEP 611.01(c); T. 64, 5-14).
In order to sign a trademark document oh behalf ofjuristic entities,^ one

must be a corporate officer, have firsthand knowledge ofthe facts (for some
documents), or be an attorney as defined in 11.1. (TMEP 611.06(d) and
611.03(a)). Respondent testified that she is not an officer or employee ofthe
corporate applicants on whose behalf she filed trademark docxmients. (T. 467,4-
13; T. 484,10-13; T. 500,10-17; T. 516,6-12; T. 561,15-18). Respondent testified
that she had no ownership interest in the applicant companies. (T. 484,1-9; T. 467,
4-13; T. 483,18-T. 484, 5; T. 500,4-14; T. 516,1-5; T. 561,12-14). Respondent
also testified that she did not have firsthand knowledge ofthe facts for the
documents she filed. (T. 518,17-20; T. 561,21-T. 562,4). Respondent is not an
attorney and thus she may not he given a power of attorney to act on behalf of
All ofthe trademark applicants in D2014-31 are juristic entities, not individuals.
10
trademark applicants before the USPTO. (37 C.F.R. 11.1; 37 C.F.R. 2.17(c);
Decision at 3 and 12; T. 246,12 -18).
Respondent submitted, post hearing, documents which purported to give her
power of attorney and/or legal authority to bind the applicants in the trademark
applications at issue.The ALJ found that the documents for each application
merely contained a cut-and-pasted declaration, signed by the applicant, attesting to
the veracity ofthe statements made in the trademark application. (Decision at 12).
The ALJ determined that even ifthey were legitimate documents, the documents
did not bestow on Respondent the legal authority to bind the coiporate applicants.^^
(Decision at 11-13).
IV. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's factual findings and legal
conclusions and the Initial Decision should be affirmed. Respondent engaged in
unauthorized practice before the USPTO in trademark matters; forged the
electronic signatures oftrademark applicants to applications and other trademark
documents filed with the USPTO and did not have "legal authority to bind" the
Respondent's post-hearing submissions were labeled "Respondent's Exhibits" for the

trademark applications: '031; *678; '340; *741; '310; '531; '529; and *869. See Respondent's
Documents for Authorization.
" In Respondent's final paragraphof her appeal she states that Catherine Cain testifiedthat *'If
Dr. Shia established that she had legal authority to bind her clients, the PTO case fall apart...." R.
Br. 30. Respondent does not cite to Ms. Cain's testimony, she cites to the ALJ's question and
answerwith the witness Tanya Amos. (T. 192,17-19 -193,1-5). In fact, Ms. Cain never made
this statement.
11
foreign applicants; acted as a domestic representative after being excluded by the
Commissioner and concealed that fact; and aided foreign attorneys in the
unauthorized practice oftrademark law before the USPTO. Based on the record,
the ALJproperly found thatRespondent violated 37 C.F.R. 10.23(a),
10.23(b)(4), 10.23(c)(2)(ii), 10.77(a), 10.23(b)(5), 11.804(c), 11.303(a)(i), 11.505,
11.804(d) and appropriately held the correctsanction for Respondent's misconduct
was exclusion from practice before the Office.
V. ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review
TheUSPTO Director reviews the factual record de novo and may affirm,
reverse, or modify the initial decision, or remand to the hearing officer. In re
Laczko, Proceeding No. D2013-08 (USPTO Dec. 1,2014) at 8.^^ The evidence
comprising the record made before the hearing officer contains the pleadings, the
exhibits, and the hearing transcript.
B. The USPTO Director has Jurisdiction to Discipline Respondent
Respondent makes several jurisdictional challenges on appeal. She claims
that the USPTO Director has no authority over her. (R Br.16-17). Respondent also
argues that her violations ofthe Trademark rules do not constitute violations ofthe
USPTO Disciplinary rules. (R. Br. 15-17). Finally, Respondent asserts thatthe
"http://e-foia.uspto:gov/Foia/RetrievePdf?system=OED&flNm=0788_DIS_2014-12-01.
12
Commissioner of Trademarks had no jurisdiction to enter its 2012 order excluding
her from practice in trademark matters. (R. Br. 25-28). All of these arguments fail.
1. The USPTO's Statute and Regulations Provide the USPTO

Director with Authority to Discipline Patent Agents
The USPTO Director has authority over Respondent as a patent agent
registered to practice before the USPTO. (Decision at 3; 35 U.S.C. 2(b)(2)(D)).
The ALJ has repeatedlyruled that the USPTO Director has authority over
Respondent as a patent agent. (Decision at 2 and A.R. 2014-04,78 at 3-4; A.R.
D2014-31,24at2).
Congress vested the USPTO with plenary, statutory authority to promulgate
regulations "govem[ing] the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before the Office." (35 U.S.C.
2(b)(2)(D)). Accordingly, the USPTO Director has authority to regulate practice
before the Office in both patent and trademark matters. {Id), This authority
includes the authority to regulate the unauthorizedpractice of law before the
Office. (Id.), Indeed, upon enacting its most recent regulations the Office took the
opportunity to clarify its broad jurisdiction over those engaging in UPL before the
USPTO. {See 37 C.F.R. 11.19(a)).
Pursuant to its authority to regulate the conduct ofpractitioners, the USPTO
enacted its Code of Professional Responsibility, 37 C.F.R. 10.20 etseq., and the
Rules ofProfessional Conduct, 37 C.F.R. 11.101 through 11.901, which include

13
a number of mandatory "Disciplinary Rules" setting forth the minimxmi level of
conduct below whi^ch no registered patent practitioner can fall without being
subjected to disciplinary action. (See 37 C.F.R. 10.20(b)). If a registered patent
practitioner fails to comply with his or her professional obligations, the USPTO
has the authority to suspend or excludethe practitioner jSrom further practice before
the Office. (See 35 U.S.C. 32; 37 C.F.R. 11.19).
2. Respondent's Violations of the Trademark Rules of Practice

also Violate the USPTO Disciplinary Rules
To support her argument that violations ofthe Trademark Rules ofPractice
do not constituteviolations ofthe USPTO Disciplinary Rules, Respondent engages
in a nonsensical discourse that the USPTO may only promulgate rules that are
procedural and not substantive. (R. Br. 15-16). Respondent incorrectiy and
selectively cites to case law that pertains to patent regulations rather than the
USPTO disciplinary rules. Although not entirely clear, it seems that Respondent
believes that her violation of the trademark rules cannot be a violation of the
USPTO disciplinaryrules, otherwise the USPTO is making new law. (Id). But the
USPTO Director has authority, bestowed by Congress, to promulgate substantive .
rules governing the conduct ofthose who practice before the Office. (35 U.S.C.
2(b)(2)(D)).
The OED Director charged Respondent withviolating the disciplinary rules

I
by transgressing not only the trademark rules but also engaging in other
14
misconduct. Respondent admitted at the hearing that she had repeatedly violated
the trademark signature rules by entering the electronic signatures of applicants to
trademark applications and related documents and filing them with the USPTO.
(T. 574,9-22). Based on substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ properly found
that Respondent had violated the disciplinary rules, in particular 37 C.F.R.
10.23(a). (Decision at 16-17 and 29-30).
With respect to Respondent's argument that these violations do not
constitute disciplinary offenses, the ALJ found that"... [w]hile a violation ofthe
[Trademark] Rules ofPractice is not aper se violation of the USPTO disciplinary
rules, the vinderlying conduct may, nevertheless, constitute misconduct." (Decision
at 17). The ALJ explained that "[a].. .respondent's misconduct is not outside the
disciplinary reach ofthe Office simply becausethe misconduct is not specifically
enumerated within the USPTO's disciplinary rules." (Decision at 16, citing In re
Edington, Proceeding No. D08-12 at6 (USPTO Jul. 9,2009)^^ (manslaughter

conviction supported findhig ofviolation of USPTO disciplinary rule prohibiting
disreputable or gross misconduct)). Here, Respondent's blatant violations ofthe
trademark rules also constitute violations ofthe disciplinary rules.
"http://e-fpia.uspto.gov/Foia/RetrievePdf?system=OED&flNm=0564_DIS_2009-07-09.
15
3. ^ The Commissioner's Exclusion Order was Valid
Respondent attacks the Commissioner's Exclusion Order by questioning the
Commissioner's authority to issue the Order and the timeliness of the
Commissioner's investigation, (R. Br. 25-28). She argues that ifthe Exclusion
Order was invalid, then the ALJ's finding that she engaged in misconduct by
violating the Exclusion Order*"* when continuing to act as the domestic
representative after the effective date of the Order is also invalid. (R. Br. 26-27).
Specifically, Respondent claims that the authority of the Commissioner for
Trademarks to exclude practitioners was removed in 1999 via P.L. 106-113 and
became vested in the USPTO Director. (R. Br. 26-27).

\
Respondent misreads the law, which throughout changed the title of the
"Commissioner for Patents and Trademarks" to "Under Secretary of Commerce for
IntellectualProperty and Director ofthe United States Patent and Trademark
Office." (See, American Inventor's Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
113 Stat. 1501A (Appendix I) (enacted November29,1999)). This legislation did
not strip the Commissioner of Trademarks of her authority to order Respondent
excluded. Under 35 U.S.C. 3(b)(2)(A), the Commissioner has statutory authority
to manage and direct "all aspects ofthe activities ofthe Office relating to ...
Decision at 14-16.
16
trademarks,... [and] all aspects ofthe activities of the Office that affect the
administration of...trademark operations...."
More important, Respondent does not explain in her briefwhy she should be
allowed to collaterally attack, in this disciplinary proceeding, the Commissioner's
order, which was affirmed by the USPTO Director.
C. The Initial Decision Should be Affirmed
1. The ALJ Correctly Determined that Respondent Engaged in

Unauthorized Practice before the Office
The ALJ correctly determined, based on the evidence in the record, that
Respondent engaged in unauthorized practice in trademark matters before the
USPTO in violation of 37 C.F.R. 10.23(a). (Decision at 14 and 17). The ALJ
noted that owners of a trademark may represent themselves or berepresented bya
qualified practitioner in prosecuting trademark appUcations before the USPTO.
{Id.\37 C,F.R. 2.17(a); 11.5(b)(2); 11.14(a), 11.14(e); TMEP 601). The ALJ
explained that practice before the Office intrademark matters includes "consulting
with or giving advice to a client in contemplation offiling a trademark application

orother document with the Office; [and] preparing and prosecuting an application
for trademark registration." (Decision at 14, see also 37 C.F.R. 11.5(b)(2)).

Respondent claims that she merely acted as a domestic representative for the
foreign applicants. (R. Br. 3; see, for example, T. 473,7-9; T. 484,3-5; T. 500,13-
14). However, the ALJ correctly found that Respondent acted beyond her role as
17
domesticrepresentative and engagedin practice before tlie USPTO in trademark
matters:
Respondent testified that foreign attorneys wouldprepare trademark

applications, Responses to Office Action, and Statements of Use, and
send them to her for submission. Upon receiving said documents,
Respondentwould review the documents for completeness and
accuracy. On several occasions. Respondent completedthe trademark
documents by entering the applicant's electronic signature.
Respondent would then submit the completed document to the
USPTO for filing. In addition. Respondent also prepared Change of
Correspondence Address forms and entered either ê electronic
signature ofthe applicant or her own electronic signature. Such
conduct went beyond merely forwarding correspondence between the
applicants and the USPTO and constitutes practice before the Office
in trademark matters.
(Decision at 14). The ALJ correctlyfound that by engaging in this behavior
Respondentviolated 37 C.F.R. 10.23(a). (Decision at 17).
2. The ALJ Properly Found that Respondent Forged Electronic

Signatures
The ALJ properly found that Respondent repeatedly violatedthe trademark
electronic signature rule set forth at 37 C.F.R. 2.193(c)(1). (Decision at 10-13).
Respondent did so by electronically entering the electronic signatureof the
applicant, or authorized signatory, in trademark applications. Responses to Office
Actions, Statements of Use, and Change of Correspondence Address forms.
(Decision 10-13; 17-^22). Respondent admitted at the hearing that shehad forged
the electronic signature of applicants to all ofthe documents at issue in the D2014-
31 proceeding. (T. 574, 9-22). The ALJ concluded these forgeries violated
18
37 C,F.R. 10.23(a); 10.23(b)(4); and 11.804(c), as forgery constitutes
disreputable and gross misconduct, dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
Pecision 17-19] as well as 37 C.F.R. 10.23(b)(5) and 11.804(d), because
forging signatures constituted misconduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice. (Decision at 21-22).
The ALJ cited In re Uchendu for the proposition that"... [Qalsely signing a
document and submitting it to the Office is a false representation even ifthe
substance ofthe document is accurate, because the signature is misleading." In re
Uchendu, 812 A.2d 933,939 (D.C. 2002). He continuedby explaining that:
In Uchendui an attorney admitted to signing his clients' names onto

probate documents that required verification. The attorney claimed
that he had his clients' permission to verify the documents on his
clients' behalf, and the attorney presented affidavits ofhis clients
asserting that he had their permission to sign for them. The attorney
testified that he did not know his conductwas improper. The court in
Uchendu noted that the attorney could not sign verifications as an
agent of his clients, because the verification, by statute, had to be
personally made. In the instances where the attorney signed the
clients' names without indicating that the clients were not the actual
signatories, the court found the attorney made false representations to
the court.
(Decision at 18). Similarly, here, the trademark rules require that the electronic
signature must be personally entered.
Respondent's only defense to violating the signature rule is to blame the
USPTO in one way or another. For example, she has argued that she was "forced"
to violate the signature rules by the operation of the USPTO'sTEAS system. (R.
19
Br. 24-25). Respondent also claims that the USPTO had an obligation to alert her
that forging the electronic signatures of applicants was wrong. (R. Br. 22).
The ALJ found that Respondent was required to educate herself on the
proper methods for filing electronically on TEAS. (Decision at 19). See also
Reibman v. Senie^ 302 A.D.2d 290, 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Atty. Grievance
Common ofMd, v. Zhang, 100 A.3d 1112,1129 (Md. 2014). In particular,
Respondent should have recognized the different signature options and determined
the appropriate signatures for filing electronic trademark documents. (Decision at
20). The ALJ noted that: "... Respondent's failure to educate herself on the Rules
of Practice and the signature requirements ofTEAS resulted in improperlysigned
trademark applications and their related documents." (Decisionat 20). As a result,
the ALJ properly found that Respondent violated 37 C.F.R. 10.77(a) for handling
legal matters that she was not competent to handle. (M).
Moreover, Respondent seems to argue that she and the applicants deserved
special notice regarding the fact that when an electronic document is saved to a
personal computer and uploaded again, the TEAS system will remove the signature
in order to ensure that the document, including any changes, is properly verified
before filing with the USPTO.(R. Br. 22). She cites no legal support for this
remarkable proposition and none exists. It was the duty ofRespondent to learn and
The purpose for requiring the user to re-signthe documentis to ensure that the signatoryis
legallyverifyingthat all information in the document including changesis correct. (T. 212,14-
213,4; T. 211,16-212,13; T. 212,14-213,4).
20
understand how the TEAS system worked if she planned to make use of it
(particularly since her clients were paying her for her supposed expertise in
trademark matters, including the proper filing oftheir trademark applications and
related documents). Respondent's argument that she and the foreign applicants
deserve special tutoring on the methods for signing and filing electronic trademark
documents before the USPTO simply serves to demonstrate Respondent's lack of
competence and fitness to practice before the USPTO.
Respondent argues further that she did not violate the signature rules
because some ofthe documents she submitted (and signed other people's names
to) also contained PDF attachments with handwritten signatures. (R. Br. 20). She
suggests that the fact that she forged the electronic signatures on the documents is
unimportant since a handwritten signature was attached. But Respondent is wrong.
The fact that a valid handwritten signature was provided does not negate her
forgery ofthe applicant's electronic signature in violation of 2.193(c)(1).
In support ofthis argument, Respondentrelies on the testimony of Catherine
Cam, a USPTO trademarks employee. (R. Br. 20). Ms. Cain did testify that two
signatures for any given submission were imnecessary and that only one signature
is requured for an electronic document. (T. 395, 8-16). However, Ms. Cain did not
testify that ifRespondent forged the electronic signature of an applicant to m
electronic trademark docimient the forgery was excused if she also attached a
21
handwritten signature. The forgeries, in violation of the trademarkregulations, do
not becomenullified simply because Respondent attached an additional, correct,
signature. Additionally, Ms. Cain affirmatively testified that Respondent was not
permitted to electronically sign the name ofthat applicant simply becauseshe
possessed a document with the handwritten signature.^^ (T. 394,4-17).

3. Notice to Respondent of Violation of the Signature Rules
Respondent claims that she was not "provided notice" ofher violation of the
electronic signature rule eventhough she began signing the names of others to
electronic trademark documents starting in 2006. (R. Br. 5). The public, including
Respondent and foreign applicants, are put on notice ofthe electronic signature
rules, under 37 C.F.R. 2.193, in the regulation itself, the TMEP, and the Help
menu found on the electronic document(such as the application). (37 C.F.R.
2.193(c)(1); TMEP 611.01(c); T. 64,9-14; T. 76,4-11). The trademark
regulations provide the public with rules for practicing in trademark matters before
the USPTO. (35 U.S.C. Title 15, Chapter 2, codified at 37 C,F.R. Chapter 1, Part
2). Citing to the TMEP, the ALJ explained that "[t]heprimaryfunction ofthe rules
of practice is to advise the public ofthe regulations that have been established in
"Respondent also asserts forging signatures ona Change ofCorrespondence Address form
cannot form the basis for discipline since signing and filing these forms does not constitute the
unauthorized practice of law. R. Br. 20-21. Butforging a signature is a violation of the
disciplinary rules no matter what type of documentis involved.
22
accordance with the statutes, which must be followed before the USPTO."
(Decision at 17 (citing TMEP Introduction)).
If a document is submitted to the Office and appears to be electronically
signed by the correct person, it is accepted as valid. (T. 363,2-8; T 397,12-17;
TMEP 611.02). The USPTO does not have a policy of investigating all electronic
signatures to determine whether they are forged. (T. 363,2 - 364,1; T. 397,12-
17). Once the Office became aware that Respondent was violatingthe signature
rules and suspectedshe was otherwise exceeding the scope ofher authority as a
domestic representative or correspondent, it conducted an investigation and
contacted Respondent. (JNT. 4).
As set forth above, the ALJ found that where Respondent electronically
signed the signatures of others she violated the signature rule ..whichrequires
that signatories personally sign documents...." (Decision at 17). The ALJ also
concludedthese forgeries violated 37 C.F.R. 10.23(a); 10.23(b)(4) and
11.804(c), as they disreputable and gross misconduct, dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation [Decision 17-19] and 37 C.F.R. 10.23(b)(5) and 11.804(d), as
the signatures constituted misconduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice.
(Decision at 21-22).
23
4. The ALJ's Determination that Respondent Violated the

USPTO Disciplinary Rules by Continuing to Act as a Domestic
Representative after Trademarks Excluded her was Correct
The ALJ correctly found that Respondent ignored the Commissioner's
Exclusion Order and continued to act as domestic representative for foreign
applicants after she was excluded. (Decision at 15-16). The ALJ noted that
Respondent acknowledged at the hearing that she had read and understood the
Exclusion Order and understood she was excluded. (Decision at 15; T.442,22 -
443,6). Yet, as the ALJ found, Respondent continued to act as a domestic
representative afterthe Exclusion Order was entered and concealed the continued
practice by using an email address (R)m204) that was unknownto the USPTO.
(Decision at 16 and 18). This conduct violated 37 C.F.R. 10.23(a), 10.23(b)(4),
11.804(c), 10.23(c)(2)(ii), 10.23(b)(5), and 11.804(d). The ALJ's fmdings
pertaining to Respondent's violation of the Exclusion Order are supported by the
record and should be affirmed.
5. The ALJ Rightly Concluded that Respondent Aided in

Unauthorized Practice in Trademark Matters
The ALJ rightly concluded that Respondent aided foreign attorneys in the
unauthorized practice in trademark matters before the USPTO. (Decision at 20).
The ALJ set forth a two-step process for determining whether Respondent aided
foreign attorneys in the unauthorizedpractice of law. "First, the Court must
determine whether actions taken by thes foreign attorneys constitute unauthorized

24
practice in trademark matters before the Office." {Id, (citations omitted)).
"Second, the Court must determine whether Respondent aided in those actions."
(Id.), The ALJ determined that "[g]enerally,the preparation of legal documents
constitutes the practice of law." {Id,).
Foreign attorneys are not permittedto practice before the Office in
trademark matters. (T. 63,13-21; 37 C.F.R. 11.14(c); TMEP 602.03,
602.03(b), 602.03(c)). Any individual who is an attorney (as defined in the
regulations) may represent othersbefore the Office in trademark and other non-
patentmatters. (37 C.F.R. 11.14(a)). Under37 C.F.R. 11.1, "attorney" is
defined to mean "an individual who is in goodstanding of the highest court of any
State...." The only foreign attorneys who are currently authorized to practice in
trademark matters before the Office are Canadian lawyers (under limited
circumstances). (T. 63,13-21; TMEP. 602,602.03(a)).
Respondent testified at the hearing thatforeign attorneys in Taiwan and
Chinarepresented the foreign applicants in the trademark applications at issueby
preparing allthe documents, such ias trademark applications, Statements ofUse,
and Responses to Office Actions, then sending themto Respondent for filing. (T.
474,17 - 475,2; T. 507,1-7). Based on that testimony, the ALJ found as a factual
matter:
The evidence in the record of this proceeding demonstrates that the

foreign attorneys, who are not recognized to practice before the Office
25
in trademark matters, prepared trademark applications, Statements of

Use, and Responses to Office Actions, The foreign attorneys then paid
Respondent to review the trademark documents for accuracy and file
them with the USPTO. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
trademark applications at issue, along with all Statements of Use and
Responses to Office Action... were initially prepared by foreign
attorneys and transmitted to Respondent for filing with ê USPTO.
(Decision at 13). Based on these factual findings, the ALJ found that the foreign
attorneys' practice ofpreparing trademark documents was practice in trademark
matters beforethe USPTO. (Decision at 17,see also 37 C.F.R. 2.17(a),
11.5(b)(2), and 11.14),
On appeal, Respondent statesthat tiie foreign law firms were merely hired
by the foreign trademark applicants to perform translation services. (R. Br. 6, 8 -
9). However, her citations to the record do not support this factual assertion.
Instead the record clearly establishes that the foreign attorneys provided trademark
legalservices to foreign applicants. (A.R. D2014-31, 52 at 8. (citing transcript)).
Respondent asserts on appeal, also for the first time, that the foreign
attorneys who providedthe documents to her may be licensed to practice in the
United States. (R Br. 28 - 29). The record is devoid of evidence that the foreign
attorneys were licensed to practice in any U.S. state, and Respondent cites to none.
Respondent has the burden of proving any affirmative defenses by clear and
convincing evidence. (37 C.F.R. 11.49).
26
The ALJ's factual findings were based on Respondent's own testimony that
foreign attorneys prepared the trademark documents and sent themto her for filing
with the USPTO. (See A.R. D2014-31,52 at 8. (citing transcript)). For example,
the ALJ found that a foreign attorney completed the Statement ofUse in the '340
application and the '531 application. (Decision at 21). For the '340 application,
Respondent testifiedthat the foreign attorney was in Taiwan with the corporate
headquarters ofthe company m China. (T. 532,17 - 20; T. 516,16-17; T. 518,17
-519,2; T. 566,13-571,5). Similarly, Respondent testifiedthat the owner of the
company who signed certain documents in the '531 application, Tim Wu, was
located in Taiwan'^ and was represented by an attorney there. (T. 567,19-21; T.

568, 13-17). Therefore, the ALJ logically concluded thatthese foreign attorneys in
Taiwan and Chinawere not licensed to practice in a U.S. state.
Respondent states thatone foreign attorney, Xiamen Shinhwa, was given a
USPTO client identifier (client ID) which she claims allows himto practice before
the USPTO. (R. Br. 6,29). Respondent cites to her own testimony regarding a
"privileged client ID" and her Exhibit Q1-Q4. (R. Br. 6.)
Neither Respondent's testimony norRespondent's Exhibit Q1-Q4 establish
that limited practice rights were bestowed upon Xiamen Shinhwa to allow him to
Tim Wu signed numerous documents inseveral applications. (GOV. 512, G18267; GOV. 513,
G18345; GOV. 514, G18428). Respondent testified Tim Wu isthe President ofHsiang
Corporation in Taiwan. (T. 561,12-13; T. 562,3-4).
27
practice beforethe USPTO in trademarks. The client identifier in Exhibit Q1-Q4 is
found in Trademark Application No. 79/101128 which was filed through the
International Bureau ("IB") under the Madrid Protocol and received the Intl.
Registration No. 1086969. The clientID, 767136, originated firom the IB. (See
generally^ TMEP 1901). TheUSPTO does not use this numberfor any purpose.
{See generally, TMEP 1901 and 1902.02). Additionally, the USPTO does not
grant or recognize so-called temporary practice rights in trademarks; the
Trademark Rules ofPracticeprovide that only an individual qualified under 37
C.F.R. 11.14 is authorized to practice intrademark cases.^^ (37 C.F.R. 2.17).
Accordingly, Respondent's practice of filmgtrademark documents prepared
by these foreign attorneys constituted aiding the foreign attorneys in unauthorized
practice before the USPTO. (Decision at 17). Specifically, the ALJ found that
Respondent's practice of filing such documents prior to May 3,2013 violated
37 C.F.R. 10.23(a). {Id), The ALJ found that inthe '340 application^^ and '531
application^ Respondent filed after May 3,2013, a Statement ofUse in each
1o
The OED Director hasthe authority to grant limited recognition to practice only in patent
matters beforethe USPTO. (37 C.F.R. 11.9).
On May 26,2013, Respondent filed a Statement of Use in the *340 application. (Decision at 5,
GOV.510,G18131-G18133).
OnAugust 17,2013 Respondent filed a Statement ofUse inthe *531 application. (Decision at
8, GOV. 513, G18365 - 18367).
28
application that had been prepared by a foreign attorney, which violated 37 C.F.R.
11.505. (Decision at 21).
VI. CONCLUSION
The ALJ's factual findings of Respondent's misconduct are supported by
ample evidence in the record. Likewise, his legal analysis explaining how this
misconduct resulted in the violation of multiple USPTO disciplinary rules is
correct. Accordingly, the April 22,2015 Initial Decision and Order excluding
Respondent from practice before the USPTO should be affirmed.
29
Rcspcctful y submitted.
June 22,2015 . 1
Meiindaivi. DeAtley
Rli/abeth I f Imcr Mendel
Mendel dinjct dial: (57!) ^"
Solicitor's '.office main: (57
Fax numbe* (571) ^ =
niv . . I ir**-' '
Counsel foi:
Director of the Onict of Km Dllm^nt and Discipline
United Statos Patent and Tra Jemari< Office
30

Exhibits: Bang-Er Shia v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Michelle K. Lee, Sarah Harris, William R. Covey, Et Al.

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Exhibits: Bang-Er Shia v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Michelle K. Lee, Sarah Harris, William R. Covey, Et Al.

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case 1:16-cv-01051-AJT-MSN Document 1-5 Filed 08/17/16 Page 1 of 79 PageID# 501

UNITED STATES PATENT ANDTRADEMARK OFFICE

In the Matter of:

Melinda M. DeAtley, Esq.

Dr. Bang-er Shia

Before: Alexander FERNAnDEZ, Administrative Law Judge

Thehearing in this matter was heldon October 6-10,2014 in Washington, District of

The USPTO has the"exclusive authority to establish qualifications foradmitting persons

The USPTO hasduly promulgated regulations governing theconduct of persons

1. OnSeptember 26,2005, theUSPTO registered Dr. Bang-er Shia("Respondent") as a

5: Respondent is authorized to practice before the USPTO as a patent agent in patent

8. On January 23,2012, the Commissioner for Trademarks ("Commissioner") sent a show

13. On March 19,2013, Respondent's appeal of the Commissioner's ExclusionOrder

14. On December 27,2013, theUSPTO Director^ issued a Memorandum and Order

Trademark Application 85/585.031

Tradetnark Application 85/712.340

32. TheStatement of Usewas executed using theHSign-on method, wherein a .pdfbearing

Trademark Application 85/747.741

33.OnOctober 7,2012, Respondent submitted U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.

37. OnMarch 24,2013,Respondent submitted a Response to Office Action to theUSPTO.

38. Before submitting theResponse toOffice Action, Respondent entered theelectronic

Trademark Application 85/595,869

46.Respondent filed the *869 application with theUSPTO.

47. On April 30,2012, Respondent submitted a Change ofCorrespondence Address to the

Trademark Application 85/689.678

Trademark Application 85/719.310

68. Although Shuangfei is identified as a corporation incorporated inthe state of

Trademark Application 85/748,531

Trademark Application 85/756.529

Trademark Application 77/836.647^

The OED Director claims Respondent engaged in misconduct related to theei^t

to Respondent's submission oftrademark documents to the USPTO using the Trademark

A. Respondent imprnperlv signed trademark documents filed with theUSPTO.

The OED Director claimsRespondent failedto complywith USPTOsignature

Documents filed in connection with a trademark application or registration must be

Atthehearing, Respondent admitted that she entered theelectronic signature ofthe

Theapplicant signs theirsignature, typed in theirsignature before.

Simply stating thata person hasbeen granted authority to acton

TMEP 611.06(e). Still,had Respondent beenproperly bestowed withthe authority to act on

B. Respondent filed trademark documents prepared bv foreign attorneys.

All the forms were prepared by either, attorneys in Taiwanor

Everything [USPTO] received were prepared by attorneys in

All [documents USPTO] received were prepared by the attorneys

The evidence m therecord of this proceeding demonstrates thatforeign attorneys, who

C. Respondent's actions went bevond the role of a domestic representative and

Anowner of a mark may represent himself orherself in prosecuting an application. 37

Respondent testified that foreign attorneys would prepare trademark applications.

D.Respondent continued to act as domestic representative after being excluded firom

TheOEDDirectorclaims Respondent ignored the Commissioner's Exclusion Order

After receiving theTrademark Director's letterof February 21,

However, while Respondent's mailing address was removed asthe correspondence

It shouldbe stated like this: [Myclients] wantedto take off my

Myclientsaid USPTO had excluded me fromtrademark business;

address and email address just in case the letters and

The evidencein the record of this proceeding demonstrates that Respondentcontinued to

II. Respondent's Misconduct Violates the USPTO Disciplinary Rules

The OEDDirectorclaimsRespondent's misconduct violated a litany of disciplinary rules

A. Respondentengaged in disreputable conduct.

The OED Director claims Respondent's conduct constitutes disreputable or gross

A respondent's misconduct is not outsidethe disciplinary reach of the Office simply

established in accordance withthestatutes, which must be followed before theUSPTO." TMH*

As noted, supra, byaffixmg her clients' electronic signatures totrademark documents.

Practitioners shall notengage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or