POLITICAL LAW LABOR LAW COMMERCIAL LAW CIVIL LAW CRIMINAL LAW TAXATION LAW REMEDIAL LAW TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 17 30 32POLITICAL LAW Elements of Presidential Communications Privilege 1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power." “ 2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President, 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. (VERE VS SENATE COMMITTEE, G.R. 180643; Sept. 4, 2008) Claim for Executive Privilege Properly Invoked Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter." A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a "pre reason" for preserving their confidentiality. (NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE, GR. 180643; Sept. 4, 2008) PreciseTime when Just Compensation Should Be Reckoned In Republic v. Castellvi, this Court held that there is a “taking” enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a more permanent nen the expropriator duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment theréof. Thus, in that case, we etoa rejected the State’s contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a determinate Page lof 71lime, as was the lease of Castellvi's land, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand, Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated. Where, as here, the owner was comperisated and not deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property by its being diverted to public use, there is no taking within the constitutional sense (PNOC vs. MAGLASANG, G.R. 155407; Nov. 11, 2008) Page 2of 71i LABOR LAW Labor-Only Contracting Vs. Permissible Job Contracting/ Subcontracting 2 2 Labor-only contracting, which is prohibited, is an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, stipplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service ©. fora principal. In labor-only contracting, the following elements are present: « (a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial ‘al or investment to actually perform the job, work or service under its own account and responsibility; and (b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal On the other hand, permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur: (a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the job, work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; (b) The contractor or subcontractor ha substantial capital or investment; and (c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits. (ILIGAN CEMENT CORP. vs IEWU-SPFL, G.R. 158956; April 24, 2009) Page 3of 74,Loss of Trust and Confidence as Reason for Termination from Employment Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised from the fact ~that-an employee-concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This situation holds where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property. But, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be “work-related” such as would show the-employee concemed to be unfit to continue working for the employer. As a general rule, employers are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial personnel or those who, while not of similar rank, perform functions which by their nature require the employer's full trast and confidence. This must be distinguished from the case of ordinary rank and file employees, whose termination on the basis of these same grounds requires a higher proof of involvement in the events in question; mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not suffice. (PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NERC, G.R. 123294; Oct. 20, 2010) Serious Misconduct as Ground for Termination of Employment Serious misconduct as a valid cause for the dismissal of an employee is defined simply a3 improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongfil intent and not mere error of judgment. To be serious within the meaning and intendment of the law, the misconduct must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. However serious such misconduct, it must, nevertheless, be in connection with the employee’s work to constitute just cause for his separation. The act complained of must be related to the performance of the employee's duties such as would show him to be unfit to continue working for the employer. On the other hand, moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contr: good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties to justice, modesty, or which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. (PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NLRC, G.R. 123294; Oct. 20, 2010) Page 4 of 71Unfair Labor Practice ~ In the past, we have ruled that “unfair labor practice refers to ‘acts that violate the workers’ tight to organize.’ The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization ‘and to the observance of a CBA.” We have likewise declared that “there should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers' right to self-organization.” Thus, an employer may only be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his employees to self-organize. (CULILI ys. EASTERN COMMUNICA TIONS PHILIPPINES INC., G.R. 165381; Feb. 9, 2011) Award for Reinstatement Is Immediately Executory The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award [by the Labor Arbiter] for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement ir ately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224 [including the issuance of a writ of execution] were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. (PFIZER, INC. vs. VELASCO, G.R. 177467; Mar. 9, 2011) Award of Disability Benefits of farers The application of the provisions of the Labor Code to the contracts of seafarers had long been settled by this Court. In Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, we emphatically declared that: Page 5 of 72The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to "secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith” and to "promote and protect the well-being’ of Filipino workers overseas." Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC itself = provides that "all rights and obligations of the parties to the Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, “sg:intemnational conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory.” © Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects." Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. x x x.38 ‘The Labor Code defines permanent total disability under Article 192(c)(1), which states: ART, 192. PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY. — x x x XXXX (c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent: (1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty d except as otherwise provided in the Rules. This concept of permanent total disability is further explained in Section 2(b), Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book IV of the Labor Code (Amended Rules on Employees Compensation) as follows: SEC. 2. Disability. — x x x (b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee 120 days, is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules. ‘The exception in Rule X of the Implementing Rules of Book IV (Amended Rules on “Employees “Compensatién) as mentioned above, on the other hand, pertains to an employee’s entitlement to temporary total disability benefits under Section 2 of the aforesaid Rule X, to wit: Page 6 of 71SEC. 2. Period of entitlement. — (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where injury or sickness still requires medical _ attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the Systefn. _ ~-In Vergara vy, Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., the Court discussed how the above- {.mentioned provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules should be read in Gonjunction with the first paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POBA SEC, which states: 3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of _ permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) dat Correlating the aforementioned provision of the POEA SEC with the pertinent labor laws and rules, Vergara teaches that: As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition. - poo As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so Page 7 of 72‘“2ndeclared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the “expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of = gither fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.(FAIR SHIPPING CORP, AND/OR KOHYU MARINE CO., LTD. vs. JOSELITO T. MEDEL; 6.8. 177907; Aug. 29,2012) ~ Assumption of Jurisdiction by the Secretary Of Labor Article 263(g) is both an extraordinary and a preemptive power to address an extraordinary situation - a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. Thi grant is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that 1 preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place. As the term "assume jurisdiction" connotes, the intent of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout; it includes and extehds to all questions and controversies‘arising from or related to the dispute, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. (TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM, GR. 170007; April 7, 2014) A-validly dismissed employee is not ordinarily entitled to separation pay: Exception In view of the finding that Santos was validly dismissed from employment, she would not ordinarily be entitled to separation pay. An exception to this rule is when the court finds justification in applying the principle of social justice according to the equities of the case. [international School Manila _vs._International_School_ Alliance _ef Educators (SAE), 715 SCRA 343 , February 05, 2014] Page 8 of 71Guidelines to consider Cognizant of the possibility of abuse in the utilization of fixed-term employment contracts, Wwe emphasized in Brent that where from the circumstiinces ‘it is apparent that the periods’ fave: been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee. they ~-Should be struck down as contrary to public policy or morals. We thus laid down indications or criteria under which “term employment” cannot be said to be in cumvention of the law on security of tenure, namely: 1) The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or 2) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former or the latter. (Citation omitted.) These indications, ~ which must be read together, make the Brent doctrine applicable only in a few special cases wherein the employer and employee are on more or less in equal footing in entering into the contract, The reason for this is evident: when a prospective employee, on account of special skills or market forces, is in a position to make demands upon the prospective employer, such prospective employee needs less protection than the ordinary worker. Lesser limitations on the parties’ freedom of contract are thus required for the protection of “ the employee. (GMA Network, Inc. vs. Pabriga, 710 SCRA.690 , November 27, 2013] Illegal Dismissals Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.- Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement “shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the emplo: merely reinstated in the payroll.” It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. The person reinstated assumes the position he had occupied prior to his dismissal. [Pfizer, Inc. vs. Velasco, 645 SCRA 135, March 09, 2011] Page 9 of 72,An order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages from the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a higher court without fear of refunding what he had received. : —In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessit: that it must be immediately self-executory without need for a writ of execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble Purpose, and any attempt on the part sx ‘Sof the employer to evade or delay its execution should not be allowed. Furthermore, we *=-S: likewise restate our ruling that an order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages from the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date When the same was reversed by a higher court without fear of refunding what he i received, (Pfizer, Inc. vs. Velasco, 645 SCRA 135, March 09, 2011] The “unfair labor practice” refers _to_acts that violate the workers’ right to organize; The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) An employer may only be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his employees to self-organize.—In the past, we have ruled that “unfair labor practice refers to ‘acts that violate the workers’ right to organize.’ The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA.” We have likewise declared that “there should be no dispute that Si all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers’ right to self-organization.” Thus, an employer may only be held liable for unfair labor : practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his employees to self-organize. [Culili_vs. Eastern Telecommunications Philipnines. Ine., 642 SCRA 338 , February 09, 2011, Redundancy ‘A position becomes redundant when it is rendered superfluous by any number of factors a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.- There is redundancy when the service capability of the workforce is greater than what is such as over-hiring of workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping o Page 10 of 71= Teasonably required to meet the demands of the business enterprise. A position becomes ¢ _ tedundant when it is rendered superfluous by any number of factors such as over-hiring of workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. ‘[Culili vs. Eastern 2, Lelecommunications Philippines, Inc., 642 SCRA 338 , February 09. 2011) Page 11 of 71,cee COMMERCIAL LAW Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a sui generis corporation The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by - law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation - Contemplated: by the aforesaid constitutional ban. A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. (Liban ys. Gordon, 639 SCRA 709 , January 18, 2011 Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) cannot be classified as either a purely priva or government entity The PNRC cannot be classified as either a purely private or government entity. It is a hybrid organization that derives certain peculiarities from international humanitarian law. For this reason, its organizational character does not fit the parameters provided by either the Corporation Code or Administrative Code. It is a sui generis entity that draws its nature from the Geneva Conventions, the Statutes of the Movement and the law creating it. [Liban ys. Gordon, 639 SCRA 709 , January 18, 2011 Philippine National Red Cross ( PNRC) cannot be regarded as either a purely private or government entity ‘The PNRC cannot also be regarded as a government corporation or instrumentality. To begin with, it is not owned or controlled by the government or part of the government machinery. The conditions for its recognition as a National Society also militate against its classification as a government entity. (Liban vs. Gordon, 639 SCRA 709, January 18, 2011) Page 12 of 71CIVIL LAW Condition Imposed On the Perfection of the Contract Vs, Condition Imposed Merely On The Performance Of An Obligation “Article 1182 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides: . When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. If it depends upon chance or upon the will of a third person, the obligation shall take effect in conformity with the provisions of this * Code. In the past, this Court has distinguished between a condition imposed on the perfection of a contract’ anda condition imposed imerely on the perform @ of an obligation. While failure to comply with the first condition results in the failure of a * contract, failure to comply with the second merely gives the other party the option to either refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the condition. This principle is evident in Article 1545 of the Civil Code on sales, which provides in part: Art. 1545. Where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the condition x x x. Paragraph 1(b) of the Conditional Deed of Sale, stating that respondent shall pay the balance of the purchase price when he has successfully negotiated and secured a road right of way, is not a condition on the perfection of the contract nor on the validity of the entire contract or its compliance as contemplated in Article 1308. It is a condition imposed only on respondent’s obligation to pay the remainder of the purchase price. In our view and applying Article 1182, such a condition is not purely potestative as petitioners contend. It is not dependent on the sole will of the debtor but also on the will of third persons who own. the adjacent land and from whom the road right of way shall be negotiated. In a ma of speaking, such a condition is likewise dependent on chance as there is no guarantee that respondent and the third party-landowners would come to an agreement regarding the road right of way. This type of mixed condition is expressly allowed under Page 13 of 72Article 1182 of the Civil Code. (CATUNGAL vs. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. 146839; MAR. 23, ~ 2011) ‘S-Contracts Have the Force of Law between Contracting Parties and Should Be = Complied With In Good Faith = It cannot be gainsaid that “contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties nd should be complied with in good faith.” We have also previously ruled that “being the primary law between the parties, the contract governs the adjudication of their rights and “e-0bligations. A court has no alternative but to enforce the contractual stipulations in the ~£.'Sumanner they have been agreed upon and written.” We find no merit in petitioners’ -=-.=°Gontention that their parents were merely “duped” into accepting the questioned provisions in the Conditional Deed of Sale. We note that although the contract was between Agapita Catungal and Rodriguez, Jose Catungal nonetheless signed thereon to signify his marital consent to the same. We concur with the trial court’s finding that the spouses Catungals” claim of being misled into signing the contract was contrary to human experience ‘and conventional wisdom since it was Jose Catungal who was a practicing lawyer while Rodriquez was a non-lawyer. It can be reasonably presumed that Atty. Catungal and his ~ wife reviewed the provisions of the contract, understood and accepted its provisions before they affixed their signatures thereon. (CATUNGAL vs. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. 146839; MAR, 23, 2011) » Determining Liability In Payment Of Attorneys Fees And Cost Of Litigation ‘The award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule and the court must state explicitly the legal reason for such award.[32] As we held in ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals: The general rule is that attorey’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article.2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous Page 14 of 71,-HILIPPINES vs. TRAVERSE DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. 169293; Oct. 5, 2011) Pactum Commissorium the Pactum commissoriumis among the contractual stipulations that are deemed contrary to = = law. It is defined as "a stipulation empowering the creditor to appropriate the thing given ‘S588 guaranty for the fulfillment of the obligation in the event the obligor fails to live up to = = his undertakings, without further formality, such as foreclosure proceedings, and a public - sale."33 Itis explicitly prohibited under Article 2088 of the Civil Code which provides: hanes = ART. 2088. The creditor cannot appropriate’ the things given by way of pledge or “mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void. ‘There are two elements for pactum commissoriumto exist: (1) that there should be a pledge Or mortgage wherein a property is pledged or mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation; and (2) that there’ should be a stipulation for an automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing pledged or mortgaged in the event of nonpayment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period. (PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE vs. PHILNICO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, G.R. 199432; Aug. 27, 2014) © Estoppel The mortgagor is already estopped from challenging the validity of the foreclosure sale, after entering into « Contract of Lease with the buyer over one of the foreclosed properties- —the title of the landlord is a conclusive presumption gainst the tenant or » Finally, the Court agrees with the RTC that respondents are already estopped from challenging the validity of the foreclosure sale, after entering into a Contract of Lease with =~ petitioner over one of the foreclosed properties. The title of the landlord is a conclusive : © presumption as against the tenant or lessee. According to Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, “[tJhe tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.” The juridical relationship between petitioner as lessor and respondents as lessees carties with it a recognition of the lessor’s title. As lessees, then respondents are estopped to deny their Poge 15 of 71landlord’s title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in some third person while they remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and ‘lessee was created, and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by tiese who succeed to his title. (Century Savings Bank vs. Samonte, 634 SCRA 261 , October 20, 2010] Foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity and that the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of proving such fact. It is an elementary rule that the “burden of proof is the duty of @ party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claisn or defense by the Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 253 (2000), the Court explicitly ruled that foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity and that the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of proving such fact, (Century Savings Bank 634 SCRA 261 , October 20. 2010) required by law.” In Page 16 of 71CRIMINAL LAW shed Crime of murder what should be estab! According to jurisprudence, to be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was Killed; (2) the accused killed him; the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide. (People of the Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014) Presence of Treachery as qualifying circumstance in the crime of murder Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the qualifying circumstance of treachery did attend the killing of Jesus. We ch commits any of the or ve consistently held that treachery is present when the offender nes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. . (People of the Philippines ys. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014) Circumstance of abuse of super penalty under Article 63 of the RPC strength concurs with treachery : applicable However, in contrast to the pronouncements of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we cannot consider abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance in this case. As per jurisprudence, when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. Since there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, it being the lesser penal the two indivisible penalties for the felony of murder which is reclusion perpetua to death. (People of the Philippines vs. Joel 201092, January 15, 2014) between Page 17 of 72,Jurisprudence tells us that to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The appellate court correctly observed that the killing of Jesus cannot qualify the carnapping into a special complex crime because the carnapping was merely an afterthought when the victim's death was already fait accompli. Thus, appellant is guilty only of simple carnapping. . (People of the Philippines ys. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014) Physical resistance need not to_be established in_rape only the use of force or intimidation Thus, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs only to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim — which it did in the case at bar. (People of the Philippines vs. Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014) Exemplary Damages can be awarded even inthe absence _of_an_ aggravating circumstances provided the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender This Court notes, however, that both the RTC and Court of Appeals overlooked the award of exemplary damages. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages can be awarded even in the absence of an aggravating circumstance if the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. Thus, this Court deems it necessary to modify the civil liability of appellant Jastiva to include exemplary damages for the vindication of the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by AAA, a woman of advanced age, and to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to those who abuse the elderly, and to protect the latter from sexual-assaults. (People of the Philippines vs. Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No, 199268, February 12, 2014) Page 18 of 72Carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental deficiency considered rape It is settled in jurisprudence that, under the foregoing provision of law, carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental deficiency is considered rape because such a person is not capable of giving consent to 2 sexual act. In a recent case, we had declared that in cases of + Tape involving a victim suffering from mental retardation, proof of force or intimidation is hot necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish (1) the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and (2) the mental retardation of the victim.(People of the Philippines vs. MarcialBayrante Y Boaquina, G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012) Libel : Elements Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Consequently, the following elements constitute libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice. (SAGANI M. YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC, JOSE MA. D. NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T. ENGRACIA, JR. and VOLT CONTRERAS ys. Hon. ARTEMIO TUQUERO in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, and ESCOLASTICO U. CRUZ, JR., G.R. No. 169895, Mareh 23, 2011) ime committed under the compulsion of an ble fear A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invitofactus non est meus actus. ‘An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity he accused f escape or self-defense in equal combat. (People of the Philippines vs. NelidaDequina Y Page 19 of 71Dimapanan, JoselitoJundoc Y Japitana and Nora Jingabo Y Cruz, G.R. No. 177570, January 19,2011) Conspiracy how proved “ Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. = Although the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to 44049 “perpetrated. (People of the Ph support a finding of the presence of conspiracy, it need not be proven by direct evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and wh offense was ppines vs. NelidaDequina Y Dimapanan, JoselitoJundoe Y Japitana and Nora Jingabo Y Cruz, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011) nner i Violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act: Credence given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers on the presumption that they have performed their duti regular manner un) ther evidence to the contrary a It is equally settled that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Dela Cruz utterly failed to prove that in testifying against him, PO2 Ocampo was motivated by reasons other than the duty to curb the sale of prohibited dru; proof of any ill motive or odious intent on the part of the police authorities to impute falsely such a serious crime to Dela Cruz.(People of the Philippines vs. ReynaldDela Cruz Y Libantocia., G.R. No. 177324, March 30, 2011) gs. There is no Actual force or intimidation need not be employed in incestuous rape of a minor More importantly, even if we assume for the sake of argument that AAA did not put up a struggle against accused-appellant, we have consistently held that actual force or intimidation need not-be employed in incestuous rape of a minor. Thus, in the case at bar, we find that the moral and physical dominion of the place of actual force or intimidation. (People of the Philippines vs. Jose Galvez y Blanea., G.R. No. 181827, February 2, 2011) Page 20 of 72 endant is sufficient to-o-Force, Intimidation or physical evidence of injury is immateri: ial in statutory rape Undeniably, the instant case is one 6f sta = knowledge of a woman below 12 years ol tutory rape, the gravamen of which is the carnal id. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years is Heys rape. Thus, force, intimidation or physical evidence of injury is immaterial, (People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Bagos., G.R, No. 177152, January 6, 2010) ~ Rape: How committed Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Com: . - Rape is committed: 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following ~circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; ¢) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; : 4) When the offended party is under twelve (12) y ears of age or is demented, ~ even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present, (People of the Philippines vs. Roman Zafra y Serrano, G.R, No. 197363, June 26, 2013) Absence of external signs of physical injuries does not negate rape Tthas been ruled, ina long line of cases, that “absence of external signs of physical injuries does not negate rape." The doctrine is thus well entrenched in our jurisprudence, and the Court of Appeals correctly applied it:People of the Philippines vs. Roman Zafra y Serrano, G.R. No. 197363, June 26, 2013) "+ Conspiraey: how committed In People v. Nelmida, we elaborated on the principle of criminal conspiracy and its ramifications in this manner: Page 21 of 71There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the = commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue = it. Onee established, each and every one of the conspirators is miade ctiminally liable for "the crime actually committed by any one of In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the = commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of = one is the act of all. (Citation and emphasis omitted,). (People of the Philippines vs. ~ MarcelinoDadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddic Ma G.R. No, 201860, January 22, 2014) ogsi (deceased) and AlfemioMalogsi., qT shery Time and again, we have declared that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms: in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.Furthermore, we have also © held that the essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.In the case at bar, the manner by which PionioYacapin was Killed carried all the indubitable hallmarks of treachery. . (People of the Philippines ys. MarcelinoDadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and AlfemioMalogsi., G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014) th occurs due to Anent the award of damages, it is jurisprudentially settled that when death occurs due toa crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attomey’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. (People of the Philippines vs. MarcelinoDadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and AlfemioMialogsi., G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014) Page 22 of 71,Justifying Circumstanes; Essential elements We agree’that the death of Wilson at the hands of appellant was not occasioned by self- defense. For this Court to consider self-defense as a justifying circumstance, appellant has to prove the following essential elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity-of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. The Court has repeatedly stated that a person who invokes self-defense has the burden to prove all the aforesaid elements. The Court also considers unlawful aggression on the part of the victim as the most i nportant of these elements. Thus, unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete(People of the Philippines vs. MarcialMalicdem y Molina., G.R. No. 184601, November 12, 2012) » Two kinds of Unlawful Aggression As stated in People v. Fontanilla’ Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (2) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or fike aiming to throw a pot.(People of the Philippines vs. Marcial Malicdem y Molina., G.R. No. 184601, November 12, 2012) Self-defense under Article 11, Par. 1 of the RPC: Free from both eriminal and civil liability Page 23 of 71,SelFdefense under Article 11, paragraph | of the Revised Penal Code necessaril ly implies a deliberate and positive o vert act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression . of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is awate of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of ail human affairs, and of the law. From Recessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when = hocessity does, and ends where it ends. Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that. the accused is deemed ot to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities. (People of the Philippines vs. Marcial Maliedem y Molina., G.R. No. 184601, November 2, 2012) © Ageas an element in statutory rap. In People v. Teodoro,” the Court clearly explained the elements of statutory rape 2 committed under Article 266-A(1)(d): paneiee 3484) Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law Punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of Injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman * = and whether camal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and © cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child’s consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discem good from evil. (People of the Philippinesys. RoelVergara ¥ Clavero,G.R. No. 199226, January 15, 2014) «Medical certificate not necessary to prove rape. With regard to appellarit’s argument that the findings of the medico-legal report do not Support the allegation that the victim was indeed ray we cannot give any Claim in light of established jurisprudence holding that a medical certific hecessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.(People of the Philippines Vs. Roberto Velasco,G.R. No. 190318, November 27, 2013) Page 24 of 71,= =We, therefore, rule that the killing of Emesto was attended by treachery. However, even “I “TaSsuming for the sake of argument that treachery should not be appreciated, the-qualifying = circumstance of abuse of superior strength would nevertheless qualify the killing to murder. Despite being alleged in the Information, this circumstance was not considered in he trial court as the same is already absorbed in treachery. The act of the accused in ‘tabbing Emesto while two persons were holding him clearly shows the deliberate use of *xcessive force out of proportion to the defense available in to the person attacked. In ~ People v. Gemoya, we held: > = Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is ¢ notorious inequality of forces = < between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously > advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of in the commission of the crime (People vs. Bongadillo, 234 SCRA 233 [1994]). When four armed assailants, «=-two of whom are accused-appellants in this case, gang up on one unarmed victim, it can only be said that excessive force was purposely sought and employed. (People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero,G.R. No. 168169, February 24, ~ 2010) Treachery. Treachery is defined under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: “ There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, ly and employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend dir rising from the defense which the specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself offended party might make. *The Solicitor General argues that treachery was amply demonstrated by the restraint upon Emesto, which effectively rendered him defenseless and unable to effectively repel, much ~ less evade, the assault. We agree with the Solicitor General. Page 25 of 72head: a the cases cited by the appellants, the eyewitnesses were not able to observe any means, =miethod or form in the execution of the killing which rendered the victim defenseless. In Amamangpang, the first thing the witness saw was the victim already prostrate on the bamboo floor, blood oozing from his neck and about to be struck by the atcused. In Tealla, TEeiSie witnesses merely saw the accused fleeing from the scene of the crime with a knife in SEThis hand. In Sambulan, the witness saw the two accused hacking the victim with a bolo. ince; in these cases, there was no restraint upon the victims or any other circumstance ‘= Whicli would have rendered them defenseless, the Court ruled that it should look into the commencement of the attack in order to determine whether the same was done swiftly and Sunexpectedly. However, the swifiness and unexpectedness of an attack are not the only “means by which the defenselessness of the victim can be ensured. Thus, there is treachery where the victim was stabbed in a defenseless situation, as when ie was being held by the others while he was being stabbed, as the accomplishment of the accused's purpose was ensured without risk to him from any defense the victim may offer [People v. Condemena, G.R. No. L-22426, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 910; People v. Lunar, GR. No. L-15579, May 29, 1972,.45 SCRA 119. In the instant case, it has been established that the accused-appellant stabbed the victim on the chest while his Companions held both of the victim's arms.(People of the Philippines vs. Alberto °SFabarnero and Gary Tabarnero,G.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010) Requisites of self-defens The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable _ means to prevent and repel aggression. The Court of Appeals noted that the only evidence presented by the defense to prove the alleged unlawful aggression was Gary’s own testimony. Citing Casitas v. People, the Court of Appeals held that the nine stab wounds inflicted upon Ernesto indicate Gary’s intent to kill, and not merely an intent to defend himself. The number of wounds also negates the claim that the meang used by Gary to defend himself was reasonable.(People “of the Philippines vs. Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero,G.R. No. 168169, ~ February 24, 2010) abbiie Page 26 of 71non, without which there can be no self- spp heres incomplete self-defense when the elementof unlawful aggression by the victim is eset, and any of the other two essential requisites for self-defense. Having failed to Sesteprove: the indispensable element of unlawful aggression, Gary is not entitled to the Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is imporiant and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her consent, and Such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. [Peopte vs Paras, GR. 192912, (2014)] Art. 335. When and how rape is committed, > Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2, When the woman is deprived of reason 6r-otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by Page 28 of 71/o or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In this case, both the SESSSRIC nd the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-appellant guilty of rape by having Heszegral knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The courts a SeuiZquo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused- ~ Sc!Sappellant as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. After thoroughly r ing the records of SS this case, the Court finds that AAA was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony it the accused-appellant was the one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had ° “Sexual intercourse with her. [People vs Paras, GR_ 192912, (2014)] ts of Lasciviousness Elements of.-The crime of acts of lasciviousness, as punished under Article 336 of =the Revised Penal Code, is defined as follows: ART. 336. Acts of lasciviousness —Any “person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prisién “f2correccional. The elements of this crime are: (1) the offender commits any act of sciviousness or lewdness; (2) it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by ing:force or intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) the ~ offended party is another person of either sex [People vs Renato Dela Cruz, 724 SCRA = 691, June 04, 2014] Page 29 of 71ijesiies Vigferibaes ads i sade TAXATION LAW ChcpBanks and Banking tition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Rural Bank of Bokod (Benguet), ‘sliic., Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 511 SCRA 123 (2006), ruled that Section 52(C) of the Tax Code of 1997 is not applicable to banks ‘detéd placed under liquidation by the Monetary Board, and a tax clearance is not a =prerequisite to the approval of the project of distribution of the assc’ Sliquidation by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation.—This Court has already Sresolved the issue of whether Section 52(C) of the Tax Code of 1997 applies to banks ordered placed under liquidation by the Monetary Board, that is, whether a bank placed Sunder liquidation has to secure a tax clearance from the BIR before the project of [distribution of the assets of the bank can be approved by the liquidation court. In Re: =Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Rural Bank of Bokod (Benguet), Inc., =Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 511 SCRA 123 006), ruled that Section 52(C) of the Tax Code of 1997 is not applicable to banks ‘Totdered placed under liquidation by the Monetary Board, and a tax clearance is not a Fs pjerecusite to the approval of the project of distribution of the assets of a bank under iquidation by the PDIC. [Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation ys. Bureau of =: -¢ Internal Revenue, 698 SCRA 311(2013)] inder = Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) Section 181 of the Tax Code is levied on the hange purporting to be drawn in a foreign country z The Documentary Stamp Tax und “acceptance or payment of “a bill of e *- but payable in the Philippines.”- ‘he Court agrees with the CTA that the DST under Section 181 of the Tax Code is = levied on the acceptance or payment of “a bill of exchange purporting to be drawn in a foreign country but payable in the Philippines” and: that “a-bill of exchange is an = unconditional order in writing addressed by one person to another, signed t person 2 giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or erminable future time a sum certain in money to order or to bearer.” A bill of exchange Page 30 of 71SL. [Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited-Philippine Branches vs. =Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 724 SCRA 499 June. OA 2014] I is Worthy to note that in the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues submitted by the parties, it was explicitly stated that both Bank of Commerce and Traders Royal Bank continued to exist as separate corporations with distinct corporate personalities, despite the ffectivity of the Purchase and Sale Agreement. It is worthy to note that in the Joint Eas ulation of Facts and Issues submitted by the parties, it was explicitly stated that both =eTROC and TRB continued to exist as separate corporations with dist corporate SE cSpersoialities, despite the effectivity of the Purchase and Sale Agreement. Considering the foregoing, this Court finds no reason to reverse the CTA En Banc’s Amended Decision. In = reconsidering its June 27, 2007 Decision, the CTA En Bane not only took into account the CTA st Division’s ruling in Traders Royal Bank, which, save for the facts that BOC was “not made a party to the case, and the deficiency DST assessed were for taxable years 1996 and 1997, is almost identical to the case herein; but more importantly, the CIR’s very own riling on the issue of merger between BOC and TRB, in BIR Ruling No. 10-2006, was dated well after the case at bar had been filed with the CTA in 2004. [Commissioner of = Internal Revenue vs. Bank of Commerce, 709 SCRA 390 , November 13, 2013] Page 31 of 71ceEEEER ES 5 REMEDIAL LAW Testimony given in_a candid and straightforward manner, there is_no room for doubt that the witness is telling the truth 7 Jurisprudence also tells us that when a testimony is given in a candid and straightforward manner, there is no room for doubt that the witness is telling the truth. A pe: al of the testimony of Jefferson indicates that he testified in a manner that satisfies the aforementioned test of credibility. More importantly, during his time at the witness stand, Jefferson positively and categorically identified appellant as one of the individuals who stabbed his father. (People of the Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014) Defense of Alibi We have held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. ‘These requirements of time and place must be strictly met. A review of the evidence presented by appellant reveals that it falls short of the standard set by jurisprudence. Appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan when Ji dered. His own testimony revealed that the distance between the locus delicti and Dasmarifias City, Cavite is only a four to five hour regular commute. Thus, it would not be physically impossible for him to make the round trip between those two points from dusk till dawn of September 5-6, 2002 and still have more than enough time to participate in the events surrounding the murder of Jesus. (People of the Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014) s Wa Page 32 of 71=-Eurthermore, the only person that could corroborate appellant’s alibi is his friend and Yoimer co-worker, Paul Maglaque. However, we have consistently assighed less probiative ‘weight to a defense of alibi when it is corroborated by friends and relatives since we have stablished in jurisprudence that, in order for corroboration to be credible, the same must 'be offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. Clearly, due to his friendship with Appellant, Maglaque cannot be considered as a disinterested witness. (People of the Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014) saegaqggiil Positive identification prevails over alibi = Nevertheless, it is jurisprudentially settled that positive identification prevails over alibi 3 Since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable. (People of the ‘* Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014) ~ Indication that witness was actuated _by improper motive must_be alleged _and = proved. it is likewise settled that where there is nothing to indicate that a witness for the = prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. In the case at bar, no allegation was made nor proven to show that Jefferson had any ill motive to falsely testify > ~ against appellant. (People of the Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, -~ G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014) = Testimony of rape victim which is accurate and credible, conviction may the sole basis of the victim’s testimony ~ In a long line of cases, this Court has held that if the testimony of the rape victim is At the outset, we agree with accused-appellant that the details concerning the manner of the commission of the rape, which was merely narrated by AAA at the barangay outpost, s hearsay and cannot be considered by this Court. A witness can testify only on the facts “nenu that she knows of his own personal knowledge, or more precisely, those which are derived “e"<%'ftom her own perception. A witness may not testify on what she merely leamed, read or ‘Heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received = as proof of the truth of what she has learned, read or learned. (People of the Philippines ~ vs. Leonardo Cataytay Y Silvano, G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014) Defense of denial and alibi inherently weak against a positive and credible testimony We have pronounced time and again that both denial and alibi are inherently weak = = defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosect a witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between categorical = = which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former 7 generally held to prevail. (People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cataytay Y \& Silvano, G.R, No, 196315, October 22, 2014) imony Lo Page 34 of 71<¢ Defense of Alibi must be sufficiently convincing as to preclude any doubt on the “= physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the time of the incident Baaaaid ‘=-Eor the defensé of alibi to prosper, it must bé sufficiently convincinig a8 fo preclude any =doubi on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident. In the case at bar, accused-appellant and E:his brother, second defense witness Jose, claim that the former was" taking care of his =aughter in his house at around 7:00pm of September 7, 2003. He then went out and SEeszeproveeded to a videoke bar, which was merely 20 meters away from his house. Accused- chi eedppéllant and his brother admitted that their house was merely 50 meters away, or around Se-"one-minute walk, from the house of AAA, where the alleged incident occurred, Accuse4- ‘appellant was therefore clearly in the immediate vicinity of the locus criminis at the time = of the commission of the crime, and thus accused-appellant’s defense of alibi must fail. = (People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cataytay Y Silvano, G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014) Determination by the trial court if the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the = appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect =k is furthermore a fundamental rule that “the determination by the trial court of the = credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and = credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect.” The trial court, which had the ‘= 6pportunity to observe the demeanor of PO3 Lowaton and MADAC Castillo, on one hand, > and accused-appellant, on the other, was in a better position than this Court to determine Which of them is telling the truth. . (People of the Philippines vs. Marcos Sabadlab y ‘= Nareisoa.k.a “Bong Pango”, G.R. No. 186392, January 18, 2012) = = Allegation of denial and frame-up must be prove by strong and convincing evi In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to prove his allegation of denial and fra He, in fact, presented no evidence to prove the sa by strong and convincing evidence. and instead relied on the alleged irregularity in the buy-bust operation brought about by the inexact name mentioned in the Pre-operation Report from the Makati Police Station and the Certificate of Coordination from the PDEA. On.this matter, the accused-appellant that the buy-bust oper: as illegal as it was n = = with PDEA. (People of the Philippines vs. Marcos Sabadlab y Narcisoa.k.a “Bong Pango”, G.R. No, 186392, January 18, 2012) le without Page 35 of 72Suave Ut is @ well-settled rule that the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of Sr Witnesses will generally not be disturbed on appeal. The rationale for this doctrine is that a Sie trial court is in a better position to decide the issue, as it heard the witnesses themselves d ‘observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The only ‘exceptions to this rule are the following: (1) When patent inconsistencies in the statements =of witnesses are ignored by the trial court; or (2) When the conclusions arrived at are ied by the evidence. (People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Asilan y SS Selearly unsupp: “==-'Fabornal, G.R. No. 18832, April 11, 2012) efense of denial inherently weak = Denial, which is the usual refuge of offenders, is an inherently weak defense, and must be “-buttréssed by other persuasive evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. The defense of denial fails even more when the assailant, as in this case, was positively identified by credible witnesses, against whom no ulterior motive could be ascribed. “3. © (People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Asilan y Tabornal, G.R. No. 18832, April 11, 2012) = Question of sufficiency of information must be raised in the earliest possible time In this case, Asilan not only failed to question the sufficiency of the Information at any = ime during the pendency of his case before the RTC, he also allowed the prosecution to = present evidence, proving the elements of treachery in the commission of the offen “"Asilan is thus deemed to have waived any objections against the sufficiency of the Information. (People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Asilan y Tabornal, G.R. No. 18832. April 11, 2012) Page 36 of 72“Rule\_65 proper remedy _against_ resolution of Secretary of Justice on the term n_of probable cause Seas Series oh Semeur Seep: the Secretary of Justice reverses the Resoltition of the Investigating Prosecutor who SEszhaind no probable cause to hold the respondent for trial, and orders such prosecutor to file =~ = the Information despite the absence of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice acts [ZZ contrary to law, without authority and/or in excess of authority. Such resolution may ikeWise be nullified in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil perstis “© Procedure(ISAGANI M. YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC, JOSE MA. D. : “E.NOLASco, ARTEMIO T. ENGRACIA, JR. and VOLT CONTRERAS ys. Hon. ERO in his capacity as Se: 'y of Justice, and ESCOLASTICO =U, CRUZ, JR., G.R. No. 169895, March 23, 2011) 48:The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were bags “=:RO3 Appeals, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch 1, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, And Spouses Gualberto& Rene ‘abahug-Superales,G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011) Page 44 of 71= fermen seen = SESg writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave ‘= abuse Of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for = Eay other Purpose, as its function i is | limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds st a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) SoSEsEshch tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave SEs abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal ES" G any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Swe Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished fas: ee See Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which “shall be explained below. ‘= As to the Purpose, Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of = jimisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light: SoS" When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not Spereedepiive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every ccieror: committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous SessS judgment would be a void judgment, This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice ccsc=cwould not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may =F ommit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not comect{ajble through the original civil TET action of certiorari.” Se ©The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be SSi“S"exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower nase Court — on the basis Gu ot the i or ne a of the ok or of the wisdom or legal 2 E Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error w of law or fact ~ a mistake of 2. Judgment — appeal is the remedy. EEENEIAS to the Manner of Filing, Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and SESpower of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in Sst Page 45 of 72dance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. EEcrhn appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an tele weereoriginal and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the Be eos of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original ScRcreparties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved Haity"(who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi sual i ttle =s to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the iotice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the - Time to move for objection to evidence SS Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires scmstethe Court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without Such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.(People of the Philippines vs. ReynaldDela Cruz ¥ Libantocia,G.R. No. 177324, March 30, 2011) = General principles in issuing writ of preliminary injunction ‘s+ This Court has recently reiterated the general principles in injunction in Palm Tree Estates, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank: wuing a writ of preliminary preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of prior to judgment of crfinal order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or sz acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or Page 49 of 74,Ess Sntetests pending the final Judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ SS -Slics upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be SESE Voided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the patty Seseepplying for the wtit is concerned.(Solid Builders, Inc. and Medina Foods Industries, Spey 04: China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 179665, April 3, 2013) = Doctrine of Strong Arm of Equity ~ SSeS At lines referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled that there is [ESSN power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection hainsthe issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury masse where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; "in Sieessnbased of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative SE" “nconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a SE.“ Gontinuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory inj is rather to reestablish “and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily ciespsinterrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."(Solid Builders, Inc. and Sm ieeMedina Foods Industries, Inc., vs. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 179665, April equisites for issuance of writ of pri ry. netion Senmeg pe ee , ae Tiegz4 weit of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in somvsmthe face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance Srccgf a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites ‘= Tiecegsary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. In this connection, ‘=. writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the =4pplicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be =e: E protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that SSse Hight“ It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an cox mureparable injury.(Solid Builders, Inc. and Medina Foods Industries, Inc., vs. China 35 'S-Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 179665, April 3, 2013) Page 50 of 71ahiahs Fereeeeied Remedy of injunction in foreclosure sale cannot be granted to a party who constantly: Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of nonpayment of mortgage indebtednesé. As this Court held in Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. OJ-Mark Trading, Inc.: Where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts and promissoiy) notes that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged properties in case of. default by the mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear right to foreclosure in case of defaull making the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction improper. x xx. (Citation omitted.) In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies = them from availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. In particular, SBI and= MFI have stated in their Complaint that they have made various requests to CBC for restructuring of the loan. The trial court’s Order dated December 14, 2000 also found that SBI wrote several letters to CBC "requesting, among others, for a reduction of interests == and penalties and restructuring of the loan.” A debtor's various and constant requests for deferment of payment and restructuring of loan, without actually paying the amount due, -. — are clear indications that said debtor was unable to settle his obligation. SBI’s default“or == failure to settle its obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its hands = - and disqualified it from availing of the equitable remedy of preliminary injunction, arene As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFIL. The = accessory follows the principal. The accessory obligation of MFII as accommodation - mortgagor and surety is tied to SBI’s principal obligation to CBC and arises only in the event of SBI’s default (Solid Builders, Inc. and Medina Foods Industries, Inc., vs. Chitia Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 179665, April 3, 2013) While Ernesto was not able to testify in court, hi: s statement is considered admissible undet = Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, : , which provides Page 51 of 71aiereakageatt: See. 37.Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made iinder’the=> consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is-the= = subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death = In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, we held as follows: : saa rae "It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the decBdentis that his demise or at Jeast, its imminence -- not so much the rapid eventuation of death =igs-> at hand. This may be preven by the statement of the deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedent’s wounds, or other relevant circumstances." In the case at bar, Emmesto had nine stab wounds which caused his death within the next4g hours. At the time he uttered his statement accusing Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his: body was already very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his inability to speak and write towards the end of the questioning. (People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Tabarnero aind Gary Tabarnero,G.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010) = irregularity of arrest must be objected to before plea: otherwise the objecti deemed waived Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection invol ving a warrant of arrést-or’ the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 2 a= Nevertheless, even if appellant’s warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, “such ™ a scenario would still not provide salvation to appellant's cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting, aside Mesa valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. ftere Page 52 of 71Solicitor General is the representative of the People in criminal proceedirigsbéforesc; the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court; it is the People’s appellate counsel See Shoe Jurisprudence has been consistent on.this point. In the recent case of Carifio-v. De Castro it was held:In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the’ Suprétie== Count, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under= = Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG wa8.toz “represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal= proceedings." This provision has been carried over to the Revised Administrative CGde: particularly in Book IV, Title Il, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is thet: appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina, the Court made the following= pronouncement: Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions comniencéd=by= complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal; The fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses beforé:thens trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit ‘trial: courts and the regional trial courts. However, when such criminal actions are broughé the Court of Appeals or this Court, it is the Solicitor General who must represent the: People of the Philippines not the fiscal. And in Labaro v. Panay, the Court held: Government or the People of the Philippines before us and before the Court of Appeals in- al eriminal proceedings, or before any cout tribune body, or commission in any niatter, the people as the ends of justice may require. Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded-as-t the: appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have been givéatt he opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The records show that the CA failed to= require the Solicitér General to file his Comiment on Duica’s petition’ A copy 6f the CAT Resolution dated May 26, 2004 which required the filing of Comment was served-upom Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for Duca), Atty. VillamorTolete (counsel for private Page 53 of 71complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it shown that ie Solicitor General had ever been furnished a copy of the said Resolution. The failure of thes CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment deprived the prosecution © of a-fair— opporttinity to prosecute and prove’ its case. (People of the Philippines vs. A tur F Duca,G.R. No. 171175, October 30, 2009) Dismissal of the petition for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rt Court on service upon the OSG in appealed criminal cases The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it mustbex, given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrin consistently adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due prockSIe= void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lacie of: due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard. The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor: General the chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State. of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the CAs The: said decision is, therefore, a nullity. Respondent appealed to the CA from the decisiott of the RTC via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court; ‘The=! respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of. his petition for review upon the adverse party, in this case, the People of the Philippines: through the OSG. Respondent failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City. The service: of ¢ copy: of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor."would: bé: inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor General is the sole zepresentative of=thé People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court0The: through the OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided itt Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition (People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F. Duca,G.R. No.. 171175, October 30, 2009) - Page 54 of 71econ However, in Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held:that=— circumstances of the case. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a condition’siéa=: qua non when the issue raised is purely one of law, or where the error is patent of thes: disputed order is void, or the questions raised on certiorari are the same as thosé alrSa@yis-a squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court.(People of the Philippines: Arturo F. Duca,G.R. No. 171175, October 30, 2009) a Effect of death of the accused while case is on appeal -Given Paniterce’s death, we are now faced with the question of the effect of such death on the present appeal. tepeeBrees Bebbe iit Paniterce’s death on August 22, 2009, during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished only his criminal liabilities for the rape and acts of lasciviousness committed against his daughters, but also his civil liabilities solely arising from or based on said crimes. Zawplit ere According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability i§ tofally = extinguished: st? Stecccaeed 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalfi Hability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment, zs ' i Applying the foregoing provision, we laid down the following guidelines in People Bayotas'? es ae 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes: his == criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. AS opir by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior'to ff Judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liabilit Page 55 of 72arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i, civil iabilityae == delicto in sensostrictiore." SSS 2, Corollarily, the claim for civil Hability survives notwithstanding the'deathS— of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligatis other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these Stier sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the = same act or omission: c) Quasi-contracts X XXX e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above -8ine—- action-for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filipersit separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Ruléson == Criminal Procedure as amended. This seperate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the ‘acctiséd, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based “as =": explained above. =: See 4, Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right‘to "== file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during: theta prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the priyate- === offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such‘casé, the = statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during ‘the == pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions 6f. Amtigle=—= 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension prrazzt possible privation of right by prescription.’ : il Clearly, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on Paniterce’s appeal. Whether or not-he =~ was guilty of the crimes charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89(1)-6f. Page 56 of 71the Revised Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming PanitercesBadast incurred criminal liabilities, they were totally extinguished by his death. Moreqveny---=: because Paniterce’s appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been =: rendered against him when he died, his civil liabilities arising from the érimes, being awl > abilities ex delicto, were likewise extinguished by his death.(People of the Philippires. vs, Domingo Paniterce,G.R. No. 186382, April 5, 2010) Seconeet Judgment in forcible entry a: and generally not stayed by appeal anlawful detainer cases are immediately execrtor tings The ATO claims that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amoual to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and the subsequent writ of preliminarys: injunction through the Order dated March 29, 2006 and the Resolution dated May'3 50,2006 respectively. Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the key to that question: Sec. 21 Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. — The judgmentrof>, the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, withOutt prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. (Emphasis supplied.) > This reflects Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure: Sec. 21.Appeal. - The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate=~ Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas: PambansaBlg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases gove: this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately éxecOtOrys: without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom, Section 10 of Rulez70s shall be deemed repealed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) acl peaetoe The above provisions are supplemented and reinforced by Section 4, Rule 39 and Section= &(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court which respectively provide: Page 57 of 71hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their>-> rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered sm by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion may 1hak@-Sitmr= order suspending, “modifying, ‘restoring’*or- granting the injunction, reveiverghipscs accounting, or award of support. Tl Siedpecaseaat considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of the adverse party. XXXX Seo, 8.Perfection of appeal; effect thercof— (a) Upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the corresponiding~ docket and other lawful fees, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner. filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the petition, the Regional ‘Tifals: Court may issue orders for the protection and preservation: of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, pétthit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2= of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. fat (b) Except in civil cases decided under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the appeal’ stay the judgment or final order unless the Court of Appeals, the law, or these Ru esis Je otherwise. (Emphases supplied.) (1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefré and = Page 58 of 71,and suspended or modified.(Air Transportation Office (ATO) vs. Hon. Coutrtof z= Appeals (Nineteenth Division) and Bernie G. Miaque, G.R. No.. 1736%6,5—~ June 25, 2014) Hence, duty of RTC in issuing writ of execution becomes a mii ‘The RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution under Section 21 of Rule 70 is ministeriakand=~ may be compelled by mandamus. Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes that the defenddtitin=: a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the RTC’s judgment and>: appeals to a higher court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of éxectitibn — without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course.The rationale of immediate exechtions-+ of judgment in an ejectment case is to avoid injustice to a lawful possessor. Neveithstéssjn = it should be stressed that the appellate court may stay the writ of execution slould=* circumstances so require.(Air Transportation Office (ATO) vs. Hon. Court of Appeal als (Nineteenth Division) and Bernie G. Miaque, G.R. No. 173616, June 25, 2014) - Judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer eases are not covered by-the== general rule in Section 2, Rule 39 (judgment stayed by appeal) but constitufe“ait't exception thereto. Discretionary execution is authorized while the trial court, -whichs rendered the judgment sought to be executed, still has jurisdiction over the case aS: Hes period to appeal has not yet lapsed and is in possession of either the original record or the== record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of the motion for execution =: 1c part ofthe trial courts residual powers, or those powers which it retains after losing: the RTC’s judgment under Section 21, Rule 70 is not discretionary ae hits ministerial duty of the RTC. Tt is not govemed by Section 2, Rule 39 of the’ Rulesiof Page 59 of 71Hon. Court of Appeals (Nineteenth Division) and Bernie G. Miaque, G.R. Ne June 25, 2014) executory judgments of RTC under Rule 70 In connection with the second characteristié of. the RTC judgment in an ejectment eases appealed to it, the consequence of the above distinctions between discretionary éxeciitign and the execution of the RTC’s judgment in an ejectment case on appeal to the ‘Coutpf= Appeals is that the former may be availed of in the RTC only before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the appeal while the latter may be availed of in the RTC at any stagecofs—= the appeal to the Court of Appeals. But then again, in the latter case, the Court of Appeals == may stay the writ of execution issued by the RTC should circumstances so require. City-of=- Naga v. Hon. Asuncion™ explains:This is not to say that the losing defendant. ina ejectment case is without recourse to avoid immediate execution of the RTC decisione'‘Thes== defendant may x xx appeal said judgment to the Court of Appeals and therein aply saris writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, as held in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, eventif== RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, pré! limitaty = injunction may still be granted. (Air Transportation Office (ATO) Vs. Hon. Court-0j Appeals (Nineteenth Division) and Bernie G. Miaque, G.R. No. 173616, June 25, 2014) =: Contempt may be validly imposed by COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial: function, The main thrust of petitioner’s argument is that the COMELEC exceededsits* ve and not its quasi-judicial functions as the National Board of Canvasseis-for—- ion of senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC may only, pansies contemptuous acts while exercising its quasi-judicial functions. = alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to Meee whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an :électfon&= offense had possibly been committed — could by no means’ be classified as:a_purely=- ministerial or administrative function Page 60 of 71,argue and support their respective positions, The effectiveness of the quasi-judicial power vested by law on a government ited a hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses atthe = hearings or proceetiings. (LintangBedolvs. Commission on Elections,G.R. No.°179830, December 3, 2009) Duties of Board of Canvassers not purely ministerial: hence contempt may be validly-== imposed by the board SSS Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassefs at-iffat > time it required petitioner to appear beforé it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the = powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial, The board exercisés quasi judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether: the ‘papers = fransmitied to them are uine aeaoen returns a by thes propel Indirect contempt proceeding may be instituted via verified petition or by the Board = motuproprio.The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC-Rulesat == peor re is i own enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings b rthe es initiated motuproprio by the COMELEC, viz: SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt initiated motuproprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by, or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should Adtbeon punished for contempt. Page 61 of 71In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petitions with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers invdlvédse therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings fora Civil actions in the court concerhed. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related thas principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fack bite said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court ints discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action forjomnt=—= hearing and decision. ——s Hence, the COMELEC properly assumed jurisdiction over the indirect “contetnpis= proceedings which were initiated by its Task Force Maguindanao, through a Contgrnptz= Charge and Show Cause Order, notwithstanding the absence of any complaint filed-by: = private party.(LintangBedolys. Commission on Elections,G.R. No. 179830, December=3, 2009) nt statement as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule. evidence to corroborate them. However, in Estrada v. Desierto, et al., the Court:held that. not all hearsay evidence is inadmissible and how over time, exceptions to the hearsap-rtles= have emerged. Hearsay evidence may be admitted by the courts on grounds of "felevancen— trustworthiness and necessity." When certain facts are within judicial notice of the CoBrts=: newspaper accounts "only buttressed these facts as facts." — Another exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of independently relevant statermen where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth“or falSity=:: thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the statementszaret admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondaiebiitc: relevant as to the existence of such a fact. aper clippings were introduced'to prove that petitioner deliberately defied== or challenged the authority of the COMELEC. As tatiocinated by the COMELEC fncie-= Here, the ne Page 62 of 71was in issue, but petitioner’s conduct when he allowed himself to be interviewed ides manner and circumstances, adverted to in the COMELEC Resolution, on. ending «~~ controversy which was still brewing in the COMELEC.(LintangBedolvs. Commissioh BH Elections,G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009) Fresh-period Jurisprudence hes settled the "fresh period rule," according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of. Gourt shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either fr pt of the original judgment dite trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denyingwthew= motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Taking our bearings from NeypéSaiita=. Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a notice of appeal whiclewras=-= purportedly filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within Which to file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the therein petitioner's: motion for reconsideration.(Ermélinda C. Manaloto, Aurora J. Cifra, FlordelizasJ2-2 Arcilla, Lourdes J. Catalan, Ethelinda J, Holt, Bienvenido R. Jongco, Artemio=ha-2 Jongeo, Jr. And Joel JongeoYs, Ismael Veloso Iti,G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010) tna Fresh-period rule has retroactive application. pending and undetermined upon its effectivity: The retroactivity of the Neypes rien: cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of Nevpests and sence at the time of their passage, ‘here being no vested rights in tte rules procedure. Amendments to procedural rules ae procedural or remedial in characte confirmation of rights already existing. Page 63 of 71,The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above article, departs from the:¢ asia theory that "he who uses a right injures no one." The modern tendency is,to depart from=- the classical and traditional theory, and to grant indemnity for damages in cases Whee: there is an abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit. Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal 'reiiiétiy=: for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provic = specifically in statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him Dable><: for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith makes= him liable, The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an hOrfest=: intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even throughs the forms or technicalities of the law, together with an absence of all informatioif or belie of fact which would render the transaction unconscientious. In business relations; it meat good faith as understood by men of affairs. User While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle, the."cardinale= law on human conduct” expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g7-that=- where a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duities-- in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to: or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring: another. ee srr ‘The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil laws The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality mast b€ exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. ‘he touchstone of every system of law, of thé ciltareia. civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficlentiy== protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality TSaH6bs exalted - then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights‘of petsbrig are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person's: dignitys= personality, privacy and peace of mind. ae beet It is petitioner’s position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any :of-thosé— enumerated in Arts. 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The violations hrentioned: Page 64 of 71in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for action: person's dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive Tabietagessrs Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, méral damages’ which include physical suffefings< mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, otal shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computat may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful at omission.(Ermelinda C. Manaloto, Aurora J. Cifra, Flordeliza J. Arcilla, Lourdes=J.= Catalan, Ethelinda J. Holt, Bienvenido R. Jongco, Artemio R. Jongco, Jr. And Ioel JongcoVs. Ismael Veloso IiisG.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010) Exception To The Rule That Jurisdiction May Be Raised At Anytime. While it is a rule that jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, this, however;= admits of an exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened. The Courthas; and again, frowned upon the undesitable practice of a party submitting his: casef decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, and attacking it for 1abkCo' jurisdiction when adverse.(SIMEON VALDEZ vs. GSIS, G.R. 146175; June 30;; 2008) Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. > It is an elementary principle that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be ued if. the proper remedy is appeal. Being an extraordinary remedy, a party can onlysavaile~ himself of certiorari, if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy fH3he ordinary course of law.Here, appeal is the correct mode but was not seasonably utilizeebys= the petitioner. Resort to this p for certiorari is, therefore, improper becausé cerfforari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal. Petitions for certiorari -ere= limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will arid résdlvé: questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. For, it istbasi¢ th certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in charactei’s a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of reyi principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal withif its jurisdiction, It can Be- invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issed by-the= court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or With wravé= Page 65 of 71abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. It is not Bess used for any other purpose, such as to cure errors in proceedings or to correct erronegus=— conclusions of law or fact, as what petitioner would like the Court to venture Sates (SIMEON VALDEZ vs. GSIS, G.R. 146175; June 30, 2008) Notice of Sale of Property upon Execution. SEC. 15. Notice of sale of property on execution. Before the sale of propel 1 a5 follows: : execution, notice thereof must be gi (a) In case of perishable property, by posting written notice of thé-ti place of the sale in three (3) public places, preferably in conspicuous area municipal or city hall, post office and public market in the municipality or city whet sale is to take place, for such time as may be reasonable, considering the characte “and condition of the property; (b) Incase of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in thegtitees= (3) public places above-mentioned for not less than five (5) days; = (©) In case of real property, by posting for twenty (20) days in thé thrS3Yr public places above-mentioned a similar notice particularly describing the wepergss stating where the property is to be sold, and if the assessed value of the property! exteBassc fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, by publaking a copy of the notice once aweek for byo eneral circulation in the ne or city; © In all cases, written notice of the sale shall be given tothe judgment odo: pleadings and other papers as eer by Section 6 of Rule 13. Section 15(d) of Rule 39, cited by petitioners must be read in relation te Section “65. Page 66 of 71 road13, which in turn provides: Sec. 6. Personal service. Service of tlie papers may be made by delivering personales copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk Of WIS person having charge thereof. Ifo person is found in his office, or his office is not knowns or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the mofiig=: and six in the evening, at the party's or counsel's residence, if known, with a personzofs~: sufficient age and discretion then residing therein. Verily, following Section 6, Rule 13, the written notice of sale to the tee obligor need not be personally served on the judgment obligor himself. It may be seryeds:: on his counsel, or by leaving the notice in his office with his clerk or a person haviig— charge thereof. If there is no one found at the judgment obligor’s or his counsel’S office gi> if such office is not known/inexistent, it may be served at the residence of the judgment: obligor or his counsel and may be received by any person of sufficient age and-discretfons—= residing therein. Thus, petitioners’ theory (that:only written notice of sale. Servedisotes petitioners’ themselves would be valid) is utterly bereft of merit. (TAGLE vs As Gr Raa 162738; July 8,2009) ‘tonnes Res Judicata in the Concept of Conclusiveness of Judgment. there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdic conchisively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that netion= and persons in privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any futhre Action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of. ponquient= jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action; while the judgmeni tunreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The only identities thus required. fostht= operation of the judgment as an estoppel x x x are identity of parties and identitysof issuesasa It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive: a8f6.3- particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential: that the issues be identi Page 67 of 71and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or questigng@s-= former judgment between the same parties [or their privies] will be final and conclusigecin> the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first Sait (TABANGAO” SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. PILIPH: ASo— SHELL PETROLEUM, G.R. 170007; Apr 7, 2014) Searches and Seizure Incidental to Lawful Arrest. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rutes of Criminal Procedure, to Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may: be:seargheds= for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof inte commission of an offense without a search warrant. The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful artést #8. protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who mig armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence withine- reach."13 It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (Bfaw= enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they havé lavifilly== arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure thet" safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the controf and within the reach of the arrestee. In People v, Valeroso, this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible reach off a valid warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz: When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist ¢ effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and“the Brfestin, itself frustrated. In addition, it is.entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to Searchfor= and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealméitor=: destruction. oes Moreover, in lawful arzes , it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehendmes= officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, butals@tifis= the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allovis-the Page 68 of 71seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arjestetipies within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediat control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon Samm destructible evidence. A gun on‘a table or iri a drawef in front of one who is arresterbean Ss be as dangerous to the arresting officer as concealed in the clothing of thie’ peRsones arrested, (PEOPLE vs. CALANTIAO, G.R. 203984; June 18, 2014) DSSS aes The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of sevi ences obtained in warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s persomand =; premises under his immediate control. This is so because "objects in the ‘plain view’ OEAn=- officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and=- may be presented as evidence.” "The doctrine is usually applied where a police:offi not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across: an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification - Wwhethérits= be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or somespther== legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the actised — and permits the warrantless seizure. (PEOPLE vs. CALANTIAO, G.R. 203984; June 2014) Plain View Doctrine. Inventory and Chain of Custody of Evidence. snerpen Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the marijuanais= still inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the apprehending 6fficéi&:td-: comply with the rules on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the police si stations = The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows: Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Siu fendered: Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Eséential= Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEAPshall= take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sourees of dangerbls rie controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphemnalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper dispositiat if the following manner: Page 69 of 71,(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs sith immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same = in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated == and/ot seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the medi angwmea Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be requil the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state: SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered =: = Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Esséntial Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Lat vatory Equipment. — The PDEA Shali== take charge and.have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs; controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia aifdorge laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper dispositinsins== the following manner: * (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,== immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph:the Sartie=— in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confisgateds= and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media’ antitHes= Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required igsige= the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that thé: physitals—~ inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant iss served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending? officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,.further,2~ that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as. lofigzaSothe=; integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by=th how apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and.custédysit over said items. 2 hiss This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article Tom Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not autéimattetily== impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost importance: the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as thse: WatIeS= Poge 70 of 71evidence seized tipon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventor photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at-the= place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the " the seized items — to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the ch: eventually the ones offered in evidence — should be done (1) in the presence Sfathig& apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. (PEOPLE vs. CAEANTIAQ;= G.R. 203984; June 18, 2014) Page 71 of 71,