Gomez vs.

CA, 168 SCRA 503 (1988)

168 SCRA 503 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Judgment Confirms Title Sec 30 &
32 PD 1529
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12 parcels of land belonged to one
Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Jose
Gomez et al her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property among them.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court
issued an order of general default. On August 5, 1981, the court rendered its decision
adjudicating the subject lots in Gomez et als favor. The decision became final and executory
hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office (GLRO) to issue
the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and petitioned for its setting aside. He
discovered that the 12 parcels of land were formerly part of a titled land which was already
granted by homestead patent in 1929. Under the law, land already granted by homestead
patent can no longer be the subject of another registration. The lower court granted Silverios
recommendation.
Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration Act) which provides
that after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order
to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and
certificate of title. That once the judgment becomes final and executory under Sec 30, the
decree of registration must issue as a matter of course.
ISSUE: Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial ruling on approving the
adjudication even after it had became final and executory.
HELD: Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land
registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the
expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. The Supreme
Court has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration
Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry
of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

LABURADA vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

[G.R. No. 101387, March 11, 1998]

FACTS:
Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which was approved by
the trial court. Upon motion of petitioners, the trial court issued an order requiring
the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused.
Hence, petitioners filed an action for mandamus.
The LRA revealed that based on records, Lot 3-A which sought to be registered
by Sps. Laburada is part of Lot No. 3, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been
issued. Upon the other hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 is covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, which was
issued as a transfer from TCT No. 6595. The LRA contended that to issue the
corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners, it would result in the
duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and
purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRA may be compelled by mandamus to issue a decree of
registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an
existing Torrens certificate of title?

HELD:
NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land
registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void, since
the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. Thus,
if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners
will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a decree of registration is part of
the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus. It is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a
decree of registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to
the court of origin in Pasig City. The LRA, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit
to the court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in
the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After
receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with
deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the
decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as herein discussed.

Baranda vs. Gustilo

GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988

FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara,
Iloilo covered by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute between
petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria
Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and possession over the said land.
However during the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was
fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was ordered to be put in the name of
petitioners. In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso
annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new
certificate of titles in the name of petitioners. However, by reason of a separate case pending in
the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title. This
prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new
certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of
the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration
invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.

ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of
lis pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?

HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deeds stand that
the notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court
of Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds,
encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did
not have any legal standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judges Order directing him
to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: It shall be the duty of the
register of deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real
or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.

If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and in form the
presentor or such denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of
his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree. On the other hand,
Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper
step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other
instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the
action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall
be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in
interest through the Register of Deeds.
CARMELITA FUDOT vs. CATTLEYA LAND, INC., VELASCO, JR. 533 SCRA 350

FACTS: Respondent asked someone to check, on its behalf, the titles of nine (9) lots, the subject
land included, which it intended to buy from the spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson. Finding
no defect on the titles, respondent and the Tecsons executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
same properties . The Register of Deeds, Atty. Narciso dela Serna, refused to actually annotate
the deed of sale on the titles because of the existing notice of attachment in connection with Civil
Case No. 3399 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The attachment was eventually
cancelled by virtue of a compromise agreement between the Tecsons and their attaching creditor
which was brokered by respondent. Titles to six (6) of the nine (9) lots were issued, but the
Register of Deeds refused to issue titles to the remaining three (3) lots , because the titles covering
the same were still unaccounted for. On 23 January 1995, petitioner presented for registration
before the Register of Deeds the owners copy of the title of the subject property, together with
the deed of sale purportedly executed by the Tecsons in favor of petitioner on 19 December 1986
On 5 May 1995, respondent filed its Complaint6 for Quieting of Title &/Or Recovery Of
Ownership, Cancellation Of Title With Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran
City. On 26 June 1995, Asuncion filed a complaint-in-intervention, claiming that she never signed
any deed of sale covering any part of their conjugal property in favor of petitioner. She averred
that her signature in petitioners deed of sale was forged thus, said deed should be declared null
and void. The trial court rendered its decision: (i) quieting the title or ownership of the subject
land in favor of respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale between petitioner and spouses Tecson
invalid; (iii) ordering the registration of the subject land in favor of respondent; (iv) dismissing
respondents claim for damages against the Register of Deeds for insufficiency of evidence; (v)
dismissing Asuncions claim for damages against petitioner for lack of factual basis; and (vi)
dismissing petitioners counterclaim for lack of the required preponderance of evidence.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied her motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

1. BETWEEN 2 BUYERS OF REGISTERED LAND, WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT-IS IT THE
FIRST BUYER WHO WAS GIVEN THE OWNERS DUPLICATE TCT TOGETHER WITH A
DEED OF SALE IN 1986, OR THE SECOND BUYER IN 1992 WITH ONLY A DEED OF SALE.

2. IS A BUYER OF REGISTERED LAND WHO DID NOT DEMAND OR REQUIRE THE

DELIVERY OF THE OWNERS DUPLICATE TCT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH.

3. IN SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION OF REGISTERED LANDS, AS BY SALE, WHICH LAW

SHALL GOVERN, ARTICLE 1455 OF CIVIL CODE OR P.D. 1529 OR TORRENS SYSTEM.

HELD:

1. First issue : The Civil Law provision on double sale is not applicable where there is only one
valid sale, the previous sale having been found to be fraudulent. The Court held that despite the
fact that one deed of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not
apply where said deed is found to be a forgery, the result of this being that the right of the other
vendee should prevail. Thus, under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.
The act of registration does not validate petitioners otherwise void contract. Registration is a
mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the
records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title
covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or instrument.

2. On the second issue: Art. 1544. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong
to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. The Court
declared that the governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in
right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers
rights, except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first as
provided by the afore quoted provision of the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does
not bar him from availing of his rights under the law, among them to register first his purchase
as against the second buyer. However, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale
defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his
prior registration with bad faith. That respondent was a buyer in good faith, in its desire to finally
have the title to the properties transferred in its name, it persuaded the parties in the said case to
settle the same so that the notice of attachment could be cancelled.

3. Third issue: The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration
under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as the
operative act that binds the land. On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires
such rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or
encumbrance not noted therein. Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. L-360 November 15, 1947

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appelant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA,

respondent and appellee.

FACTS:

Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was
interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of
deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to
the Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?

2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of private
ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?

RULING:

1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. This means to say that, under the provisions of the
Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the
Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which
granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the
pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential
or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means
provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in
effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber,
dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely
by way of reciprocity.
Ong Cung Po vs CA 239 SCRA 341

DOCTRINE: The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or
hold landa of the public domain. The 1935 constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition,
exploitation, development and utiization of all lands of the public domain and other natural resoutces
of the Philippines for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was
owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals, corporatioon, have been disqualified from acquiring
public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.

FACTS

On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to private respondent Soledad Parian, wife of Ong Yee.
Ong Yee is the brother of petitioner Ong Ching Po.The sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale and
subsequently registered with the register of Deeds of Manila of which transfer of certificate of Title was
issued to the private respondent. According to the private respondent, she entrusted the administration
of the lot and building to petitioner Ong Ching Po when she and her husband settled in Iloilo. When her
husband died, she demanded the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, Ong Ching
Po refuses to vacate the land.

On March 19, 1981, the private respondent filed a case for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila.The inferior court dismissed the case. The dismissal was both affirmed by the
Regional trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners ,on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1949, Ong Ching Po bought the parcel of Land
from Ong Joi Jong evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale conveying therewith the he is acceding to
the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po to sign another document in favor of Soledad Parian forthe purpose of
facilitating the issuance of the new title by the Register of Deeds and for the reason that he is not yet a
Filipino.

On December 12, 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po and his children filed an action for re conveyance and
damages against private respondent in the RTC of Manila.

On July 26, 1986, private respondent filed an action for quieting of title against Ong Ching Po. Upon the
motion, the case was consolidated and on May 30, 1990, the TC rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent. On appeal by the petitioners to the CA, the court affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence the
petition to the SC.

ISSUE

1) Whether or not Ong Ching Po as a Chinese citizen can validly acquire the land executed under the
Deed of Sale.

2) Whether or not the private respondent took possession of the property.

HELD/RATIO

1) No. An Alien is disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines. The Supreme Court did not go
along with the claim of the petitioner that Ong Ching Po merely used the private respondent as a dummy
to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an alien he was disqualified
to own real property in the Philippines. To sustain such contention is a violation of the nationalization
laws. Assuming that the Deed of sale is in existence and was duly executed, still the petitioner cannot
claim ownership of the land by virtue of Section 5 Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that
save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except
to individuals, corporations or associations qualifies to acquire or hold lands of the public domain the
Philippines, this was further reiterated in the Section 14 Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution and adopted
in the 1987 Constitution, Section 7, Article XII which further states that save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain of the Philippines.

The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of
public domain. Private land maybe transferred or conveyed to individuals or entities qualified to acquire
lands of the public domain.The 1935 constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization of all lands of the public domain and other natural resources
of the Philippines for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was
owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals, corporation, have been disqualified from acquiring public
lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. Petitioner Ong Ching Po was
a Chinese citizen; therefore he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property. Assuming that
the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of sale has been established, the same is null and void, it
being contrary to law.

2) Yes. The private respondent took possession of the land. Under the law, possession is transferred
to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. Under Art 1498 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent
to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot
clearly be inferred. If what the petitioners meant was that the private respondent never lived in the
building constructed on said land, it was because her family had settled in Iloilo. It is markworthy that all
the tax receipts were in the name of private respondent and her husband. The rental receipts were also
in the name of her husband.

REPUBLIC VS CA AND LAPINA

CASE NO: 235 SCRA 567

CHAPTER: JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE, P 100

PONENTE:

FACTS:
 Respondent spouses bought lots, they were then natural born Filipino Citizens: Eventually they
filed application for registration but they were no longer Filipino citizens and had opted to embrace
Canadian Citizenship. Opposition was filed by the republic on the ground of Foreign Nationality

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent can register there land which they bought when tehy were Filipino
citizen even if at the rgistration they are altready of another citizenship?

RULING:

They can register it

Private respondents were undoubtedly natural born citizens at the time of the acquisition of the
property and by virtue thereof acquired vested rights thereon tacking in the process, the possession in the
concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessor in interest under Public
Land Act

A natural born citizen who has lost his Philippine Citizenship may be a tranferee of private lands
upto a maximum of 5000 sq m urban and 1 hectare -rural

It is not significant that whetehr private respondents are no longer filipino citizens at the time they
registered the land what is important is that they were former natural-born citizens of the Philippines

Public Land Act requires that applicant must prove that:

1) The land is alienable public Land and

2) his possesion in the concept above stated must be either since time immemorial or for
period prescribed by Public Land Act

Thus, when the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of land by operation of law
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
As such the land ceases to be a part of public domain and goes beyond the Dir. of Lands to dispose

Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She 21 SCRA 52 Galicia, Monico

King A.
FACTS:
Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property in Manila, as her sister died. Then already well
advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other
relative to live with. She lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in
the restaurant. Wong had been a longtime lessee of a portion of the property. Wong himself was the
trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping, including rentals from her property.

In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to her, Justina Santos executed a
contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the entire property, including the portion on which the house
of Justina Santos stood.

She then executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises. The option was
conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it
was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. In 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children
on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was
discovered and the proceedings were abandoned.

Later on, she executed two other contracts, one extending the term of the lease to 99 years, and another
fixing the term of the option of 50 years.

In two wills executed on, she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong,
but in a codicil of a later date she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts
were made by her because of machinations and inducements practised by him, she now directed her
executor to secure the annulment of the contracts. Action was filed, and the court was asked to direct the
Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of the contracts

Both parties died during the pendency of the action. Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui She, while
Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation.

ISSUE:

Whether an alien may validly acquire lease right and an option to buy a real property.

HELD/RATIO:

No.

A lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real
property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As this Court said in Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds:

[A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential
purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary they may be granted temporary
rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to
remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible
to acquire.

But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the
Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes
clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages
not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of
the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi)rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It is just as if
today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until
ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is just
exactly what the parties in this case did within the space of one year, with the result that Justina Santos
ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow concept.

As this Court said in Krivenko:

It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing
the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction
is to preclude where they may build aliens admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites
their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to
compromise it even in the name of amity or equity, xxx

For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without
costs.

Borromeo vs Descallar

G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009

CAMILLO F. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O DESCALLAR, respondent.

FACTS:

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love and live
together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names.
However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it was refused on the ground
that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, his
name was erased but his signature remained and the property was issued on the name of the
Respondent alone. However their relationship did not last long and they found new love.

Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum of
money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of
assignment it found out that said land was registered in the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent for recovery of real property.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not transfer and assign
any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?

2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make his the owner
thereof.

RULINGS:

1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who possesses
the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the
properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct
the house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but his name was deleted in the Deed
of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale
where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and
participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore,
the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation does not help the
respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other
does not apply. At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to another when she and
Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the
parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition
of property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.

2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of
confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere possession of a title does not make
one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.
II. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY AND REGISTER OF DEEDS

1. Functions
2. Duty is ministerial
a. Gomez vs. CA, 168 SCRA 503 (1988)
b. Laburada vs. LRA, 287 SCRA 333 (1998)
c. Baranda vs. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 (1988)
d. Fudot vs. Cattleya Land, 533 SCRA 350 (2007)

III. ORIGINAL REGISTRATION

1. Who may apply

a. Co-owners shall file application jointly
b. Vendee a retro may file application in his name
c. Trustee may apply for registration on behalf of his principal
2. Citizenship requirement
1.1. Natural persons
a. Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947)
b. Ong Ching Po vs. CA, 239 SCRA 341 (1994)
c. Secs.1, 7, 8, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
d. Republic vs. Lapina, 235 SCRA 567 (1994)
e. Cabauatan vs. Uy Hoo, 88 Phil. 103 (1951)
f. Philippine Banking Corp. vs. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52 (1967)
g. Borromeo vs. Descallar, 580 SCRA 175 (2009)
h. Ting Ho vs. Teng Gui, 558 SCRA 421 (2008)
i. Muller vs. Muller, 500 SCRA 65 (2006)
j. Frenzel vs. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
k. Cheesman vs. IAC, 193 SCRA 93 (1991)
1.2. Artificial Persons
a. Director of Lands vs. IAC and Acme Plywood & Veneer, 146 SCRA 509 (1986)
b. Republic vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 591 SCRA 438 (2009)
c. Republic vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lucena, 168 SCRA 165 (1988)
Requisites