Sps. Cirelos v. Sps.

Hernandez

FACTS: On March 10, 1993, spouses Aniceto and Thelma Cirelos filed a complaint for
Breach of Contract, Annulment of Sale and Damages before the RTC, against spouses
William G. Hernandez and Rosemarie Zafe alleging that: they are the registered owners
of a house and lot located at No. 10 Kennedy Drive, Tandang Sora, Quezon City,
consisting of 302 square meters and covered by TCT No. 244566; on March 5, 1991,
petitioner Thelma Cirelos obtained a loan from respondent William Hernandez, a money
lender, in the amount of P450,000.00 and as security therefor, executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of Hernandez covering the said property; in order to effect the
immediate release of the loan, Hernandez asked Cirelos to sign a blank bond paper
containing nothing but her name which Hernandez said will be converted into
promissory note; on February 15, 1993, petitioners received a letter from respondents
asking them to vacate the property because respondents already own the same; Cirelos
went to the Register of Deeds and learned that there was already a Deed of Sale in
favor of respondents annotated at the back of the title as Entry No. PE-2060/T-244566,
PR-24978, and a Release of Real Estate Mortgage annotated as Entry No. PE-
2059/TCT-244566, PR-23978; Cirelos also discovered that the blank paper she signed,
which Hernandez said will only be used as promissory note, was converted into a Deed
of Absolute Sale; moreover, the Deed did not have the consent of Aniceto, husband of
Cirelos, and the Release of Real Estate Mortgage is fictitious as petitioners have not yet
paid their loan.

Respondents in their Answer countered that: Thelma did not sign any blank paper
neither did they require her to do so; the execution of the Release of Real Estate
Mortgage and Deed of Absolute Sale was out of the free will and volition of petitioners
who could no longer pay the loan plus interest; in the execution of the promissory note,
Real Estate Mortgage and Deed of Absolute Sale, Thelma was authorized by her
husband, Aniceto, through a power of attorney executed way back on January 27,
1990 and it is not true that petitioners learned of the sale only after receiving a letter
from respondents lawyer dated February 15, 1993 and thereafter verifying with the
Register of Deeds, because as early as September 5, 1991, respondents counsel had
been writing petitioners asking them to vacate the property.

Trial ensued and on May 8, 1996, the RTC dismissed petitioners complaint. The RTC
finds that the Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject property is not fabricated by
the defendants. First of all, plaintiff Thelma Cirelos alleges that defendant made her sign
a blank paper from which the latter later on made on Deed of Absolute Sale. However,
plaintiff admitted during trial that it was not her habit of signing blank papers although in
this particular case, she claimed she signed a blank paper to effect the immediate
release of the loan. Furthermore, the paper used, the type of their contents, the
signature of the parties, their subscribing witnesses and of the notary public, as well as
the spacing and the wordings thereof, the entry number in the notarial register, all these
are incontestable evidence that the document is what it purports to be. Second, Atty.
Campos testified under oath in Court that both plaintiff and defendant appeared and
signed the deed of sale before him. In this case, the presumption of regularity applies.
Also, Atty. Campos is a disinterested third party who will not risk his name as well as his
professional license for the benefit of his retaining client. Third, plaintiff admitted that
defendant never made a demand on her to pay nor did she ever offered to pay the debt.
This may be premised on the fact that plaintiff already knew that she had executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale over the lot in question in favor of defendant Hernandez due to
her inability to pay the debt. Another is the fact that plaintiffs never made any effort of
reconstituting the original TCT which was burned during the fire that occurred in the
Quezon City Hall where it was kept. Such omission only shows that plaintiffs are no
longer interested in the land. Finally, the letter of plaintiffs asking for an extension of
time to vacate the premises is an admission and recognition of the right of the
defendants over the subject property.

Petitioners appealed to the CA which denied their appeal. Cireloss testimony that she
was made to sign a blank paper which will be converted into a promissory note is not
worthy of belief as there was already a promissory note at the time the Real Estate
Mortgage was executed; petitioners failed to impeach the credibility of Atty. Danilo
Campos, the notary public before whom the Deed of Absolute Sale was acknowledged
and they were not able to overthrow the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed; respondents were able to present the questioned deed of sale
which appeared to be genuine and untampered and petitioners were not able to present
proof to the contrary other than Cireloss testimony; the RTC correctly noted the failure
of Cirelos to pay their debt despite the lapse of reasonable length of time and her failure
to take steps towards the reconstitution of the burned title; gross inadequacy of the price
does not affect a contract of sale and there was no sufficient evidence to show defect in
consent or show an intent other than a contract of

Petitioners now come before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were able to comply with the requirements of
Rule 132, Section 31

HELD: Yes. Under Rule 132, Section 31 of the Rules of Court, the party producing a
document as genuine which has been altered, in a part material to the question in
dispute must account for the alteration. Said provision reads:

Sec. 31. Alterations in document, how to explain. --- The party producing a document as
genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in
a part material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show
that the alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the
consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or
that the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails
to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence.

In this case, since it is the respondents who presented the SPA, the burden is on them
to account for the alterations.
On this score, Atty. Campos, testifying for the respondents stated that while the Deed of
Absolute Sale which he notarized involved a property registered in the names of the
spouses, and the deed was signed only by Cirelos, he allowed the same, as an SPA
(Exhibit "7") was shown to him with the words "sell", "absolute sale", and "sale" with the
initials ABC; and that said SPA was already annotated at the back of the title as Entry
No. 9115 and marked as Exhibits "1-B" and "1-B-1."

Entry No. 9115 reads:

Entry No. 9115/ T244566 x x x POWER OF ATTORNEY

In favor of THELMA M. CIRELOS______________________
With power to SELL, MORTGAGE____________________
in behalf of ANECETO CIRELOS_______________________
Other conditions set forth in Doc. No. 131________________
Page No. 38________Book No. 3_________of the Not. Public
of QUIRINO D. CARPIO_____________________________

Date of Instrument _____1/27/90_______

Date of Inscription ______7/10/90______
(Emphasis supplied)

As respondents were able to show that there was already an annotation on the title
anent the SPA dated January 27, 1990 executed by Aniceto in favor of Cirelos, with
power to sell as well as mortgage, which was inscribed on July 10, 1990 or before
Cirelos started transacting with Hernandez, we find that respondents were able to
comply with the requirements of Rule 132, Section 31 and were able to show, by
convincing evidence that the insertions in the SPA were already existing when it was
given to them by Cirelos.
People v. Tomaquin

FACTS: At around 11:00 in the evening of December 14, 1996, appellant Elizar
Tomaquin @ Hapon, together with Rico and Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain
Cardo, were drinking Red Horse beer in Itom Yuta, Lorega, Cebu City. Appellant left the
group at around 1:00 in the morning, saying he has a headache. At the behest of Rico
Magdasal, the group transferred to Lorega proper. A few minutes later, they heard
Rustica Isogan shouting for help as the latter heard Jaquelyn Tatoy, her goddaughter,
asking for help. Isogan got two flashlights and they proceeded upstairs to Jaquelyns
house. The first to go up was a certain Moises, followed by the brothers Rico and Romy
Magdasal, while Noel and Cardo remained downstairs. Rico noticed that the hinge and
the walling of the main door were damaged, as if it were kicked open, and only the light
in the kitchen was turned on. Rico also saw a black shoe on the stairs and another in
the sala, which he claims belong to appellant. When they went into the kitchen, they
saw Jaquelyn bloodied and sprawled face-up on the floor, with her head inside a plastic
container. Jaquelyn was brought to the hospital, where she expired. A neighbor later
found a tres cantos with blood on it by the stairs, which Rico also identified to be
appellants. A certain Rey got the black pair of shoes and tres cantos for safekeeping
which were later turned over to Policeman Tariao of the Homicide Section, Ramos
Police Station. The person who turned over the objects to Policeman Tariao was not
identified.

At around 12:00 in the afternoon of December 15, 1996, barangay tanods Julius
Yosores and Armando Zabate of Lorega, Cebu City, searched for appellant because of
the information given by Rico Magdasal that the shoes and tres cantos found in the
scene of the crime belonged to appellant. Together with Rico, they went to the house of
Wilson Magdasal where appellant was temporarily staying, and found him
sleeping. Appellant was wearing a bloodstained maong shorts. The tanods told
appellant that he is a suspect in the killing of Jaquelyn, and brought him to the house
of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan. There, appellant was asked about the
shirt he was wearing and he told them that it was in Wilson Magdasals house. It was
Edgar Magdasal who found his shirt, wet and bloodstained, among the soiled
clothes. Atty. Parawan then told his tanods to take appellant to the police station.

In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1996, appellant was investigated by
SPO2 Mario Monilar of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station in Cebu City.After
being apprised of his constitutional rights, appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was
willing to confess and asked for Atty. Parawan, the barangay captain, to assist him.
SPO2 Monilar called Atty. Parawan but the latter told him that he will be available in the
afternoon. When Atty. Parawan arrived at 2:00 in the afternoon, he conferred with
appellant for around fifteen minutes. Atty. Parawan then called SPO2 Monilar and told
him that appellant was ready to give his statement. Appellants extrajudicial confession,
which was taken down completely in the Cebuano dialect was made.
On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had a drinking spree with Rico
Magdasal and three other persons. His version of the incident is that it was Rico who
committed the crime and not him. Appellant testified that Rico asked his help in stealing
the television set from the Tatoys residence. When Jacquelyn saw them, she ran
towards the kitchen but she did not reach it as Rico had stabbed her on the back with
the tres cantos. Appellant claims that it was Rico who owns the tres cantos, as well as
the pair of shoes, left inside Tatoys house. Afraid of what happened, appellant went
home to Wilson Magdasals house and slept there. He was awakened the next morning
by barangay tanod Julius Yosores who kicked him. Yosores also boxed and poked a
gun at him. Appellant claims that Rico and Edgar Magdasal maltreated him in the
presence of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan when he was brought to the
latters house. He was made to admit committing the crime because Rico has a family
while he is single.

Appellant also repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty. Parawan merely
asked him to sign a blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to
assist and help him with his expenses.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 18) rendered its decision on
October 24, 1997, convicting appellant of the crime of Murder.

Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession was appropriately considered by the
trial court as evidence for the prosecution

HELD: Yes. Appellants extrajudicial confession was taken and transcribed entirely in the
Cebuano dialect. Rule 132, Section 33 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language.-- Documents written in an

unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their
attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial.

The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language
other than the official language (Filipino or English), if there is an appeal, that exhibit
should be translated by the official interpreter of the court, or a translation should be
agreed upon by the parties, and both original and translation sent to this court. In this
case, there is no official translation of appellants extrajudicial confession in the Filipino
or English language. If the Court were to strictly follow the rule, then appellants
extrajudicial confession should not have been admitted by the trial court as evidence for
the prosecution.

Nevertheless, considering that appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, and the
parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with
or knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written, such extrajudicial
confession was appropriately considered by the trial court as evidence for the
prosecution.

Pisuena v. Unating

FACTS: The lot in dispute, known as Lot 1201, Cadastral 228 of the Cadastral of Ivisan,
Capiz, located at Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of Ivisan, Province of Capiz, is a
registered land in the name of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar. Petra Unating
died on October 1, 1948 while Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953. The spouses
had two [legitimate] children, namely Felix Villar and Catalina Villar. Felix Villar died on
October 24, 1962, while Catalina Villar died on February 21, 1967.

For the purpose of this case, Felix Villar is represented by Dolores Villar Bautista, the
eldest of his four children while Catalina Villar is represented by Salvador Villar Upod,
the eldest of her three (3) children, all as plaintiffs [herein respondents].

Defendant [herein petitioner], Jessie Pisuea, is the son-in-law of Agustin Navarra who
was once a [m]unicipal [m]ayor of the Municipality of Ivisan. Agustin Navarra died on
October 30, 1958.

The land in question was a subject of court litigations between Dolores Bautista and
Salvador Upod on one hand, and defendant Jessie Pisuea on the other. Thus, when
Salvador Upod filed a petition for reconstitution of its title in Reconstitution Case No.
1408 before Branch I, then Court of First Instance of Capiz, defendant Jessie Pisuea
filed his opposition. Nevertheless, the title was reconstituted in the name of the
registered owners pursuant to the resolution of the court dated August 6, 1980 and it
now has a reconstituted title under OCT No. RO-6316 (18422) in the name of the
original registered owners.

Defendant Jessie Pisuea filed a petition for the surrender of withheld owners duplicate
certificate of title under Special Case No. 4610 against Salvador Upod, et. al. for
[Quieting] of Title and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction before
this court then presided by Hon. Odon C. Yrad, Jr. who dismissed said complaint on
August 27, 1984.

Plaintiffs evidence further show[s] that Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista filed a
complaint for ejectment with damages against defendant Jessie Pisuea and Norberto
Tugna before the Municipal Court of Ivisan docketed as Civil Case No. 94.

Plaintiffs [respondents herein] contend that during the lifetime of the registered owners,
Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, they enjoyed the absolute ownership and possession
of Lot No. 1201. However, sometime in 1950 (after the death of Petra Unating on
October 1, 1948) Aquilino Villar entered into an oral partnership agreement for ten (10)
years with Agustin Navarra involving the swampy portion of the lot in question consisting
of around four (4) hectares. It was agreed that the area of around three (3) hectares
shall further be developed into a fishpond while about one (1) hectare shall be
converted into a fishpond with the investment capital of Agustin Navarra. Whatever
excess there was in the capital so invested shall be used to make the fishpond
productive. Parties agreed that the net income after deducting expenses shall be
divided equally between Aquilino Villar and his co-heirs on one hand and Agustin
Navarra on the other. The upland portion of the land was not included in the transaction,
hence it remained in the possession of the plaintiffs.While alive, Agustin Navarra, who
managed the partnership, religiously gave Aquilino Villar and his co-heirs their
share. This arrangement continued until Aquilino Villar died on January 14,
1953. Thereafter, his share in the income of the partnership was delivered by Agustin
Navarra to Felix Villar and Catalina Villar.

Since Agustin Navarra died in 1958, Felix and Catalina Villar repossessed the land in
question. They maintained their possession up to the time Felix and Catalina Villar
died. Thereafter, the children of Felix and Catalina Villar continued the possession of
their predecessor-in-interest until the defendant disturbed their possession sometime in
1974. However, in 1975, they regained physical possession of the disputed area. From
1975, there were intermittent disturbances and intrusions of their physical possession of
the land in dispute by the defendant particularly the fishpond portion consisting of about
four (4) hectares more or less which resulted [in] the filing of cases against one and the
other as earlier stated.

Sometime in 1982, the defendant, in the company of several men including policemen,
wrested physical possession from the plaintiffs which possession of the defendant
continued up to the present. Hence, this complaint for its recovery particularly the
fishpond portion.

On the other hand, defendant counters that the whole land in dispute was sold by Felix
Villar and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra on February 2, 1949. The contract in
Spanish captioned ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA to evidence such sale was duly
notarized by Jose Villagracia, Notary Public, and was entered in his Notarial Register as
Document No. 517; Page 7; Book IV; Series of 1949.

On December 31, 1968, which [was] more than ten (10) years after the death of Agustin
Navarra on October 30, 1958, his heirs executed a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition and
Deed of Sale of the land in question in favor of the Spouses Jessie Pisuea and Rosalie
Navarra. The document was notarized by Jose P. Brotarly, Notary Public, and docketed
in his notarial register as Document No. 409; Page 83; Book No. VI; Series of
1968. From the time of the sale up to the present, the fishpond portion was in the
possession of the spouses Jessie Pisuea and Rosalie Navarra.However, the upland
portion is in the possession of Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista by mere tolerance
of the defendant. The latter denies any partnership agreement o[n] the fishpond portion
by Agustin Navarra, their predecessor-in-interest, and the plaintiffs.

On June 24, 1992, the trial court ruled that since the disputed lot was the conjugal
property of Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, its purported sale by Felix and
Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra could be considered valid. The court, however, ruled
that its validity pertained only to the share of the late Petra Unating, considering that at
the time of the sale, Aquilino Villar was still alive. It likewise held that the respondents,
as heirs of Aquilino Villar, were entitled to his one-half share in the disputed lot.

Before the Court of Appeals, Dolores Bautista and Salvador Upod assailed the trial
courts ruling upholding the validity of the Escritura de Venta Absoluta. Jessie Pisuea, on
the other hand, questioned the courts conclusion that the subject lot was conjugal. He
claimed that it was paraphernal, and that the Deed of Sale transferred the whole lot to
Agustin Navarra, his predecessor-in-interest.

The appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling in toto, holding that the disputed lot
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in admitting the Escritura de Venta Absoluta

HELD: No. Petitioner Jessie Pisuea traces his claim over the disputed lot to his father-
in-law, Agustin Navarra, who in turn acquired it on February 4, 1949 from Felix and
Catalina Villar, Petra Unatings children. His claim is evidenced by a notarized Deed of
Sale written in Spanish, captioned Escritura de Venta Absoluta. Private Respondent
Salvador Upod, on the other hand, asserts that both the trial and the appellate courts
erred in admitting the Deed, citing Section 33, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless

accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of the
proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared
before trial.

We do not agree. Instead, we uphold the Court of Appeals disquisition, which we quote:

The assertion is without merit. The aforementioned rule is not always taken literally so
long as there was no prejudice caused to the opposing party (People v. Salison, G.R.
No. 115690, February 20, 1996). The records show that there was no prejudice caused
to the plaintiffs who appear to be familiar with the contents or the nature of Exhibit '1'. As
proof thereof, they even questioned the defendant on the subject
document. Importantly, when required by the court to comment on the English
translation of Exhibit '1' (p. 316, records) plaintiffs did not bother to comment giving rise
to the presumption that the translation submitted was correct (p. 340, records).Hence,
the court a quo did not err in admitting the Escritura de Venta Absoluta.[13]