EN BANC

[G.R. No. 93867 : December 18, 1990.]

192 SCRA 358
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Petitioner, vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as
ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate
Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of
Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to
investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat attempt.
The qualifications of the respondent are conceded by the petitioner and are not in issue in this
case. What is the power of the President of the Philippines to make the challenged designation in
view of the status of the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the
specific provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution that "(I)n no case shall any
Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity."
The petitioner invokes the case of Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101, where President
Elpidio Quirino designated the Solicitor General as acting member of the Commission on
Elections and the Court revoked the designation as contrary to the Constitution. It is also alleged
that the respondent is not even the senior member of the Commission on Elections, being
outranked by Associate Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.:-cralaw
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of
the President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court,
where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief
Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that no such designation is necessary in the case
of the Supreme Court because the temporary succession cited is provided for in Section 12 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948. A similar rule is found in Section 5 of BP 129 for the Court of Appeals.
There is no such arrangement, however, in the case of the Commission on Elections. The
designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of
"administrative expediency," to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC.
Expediency is a dubious justification. It may also be an overstatement to suggest that the
operations of the Commission on Elections would have been disturbed or stalemated if the
President of the Philippines had not stepped in and designated an Acting Chairman. There did
not seem to be any such problem. In any event, even assuming that difficulty, we do not agree
that "only the President (could) act to fill the hiatus," as the Solicitor General maintains.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the
control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of
1
these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules
and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to
review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of
the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore
revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity,
the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be
withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit.
It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from
challenging its withdrawal.chanrobles virtual law library
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be removed at will from
her permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no less true, however, that she can be
replaced as Acting Chairman, with or without cause, and thus deprived of the powers and
perquisites of that temporary position.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of
the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent.
This is still a government of laws and not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected,
if it existed at all, did not call for presidential action. The situation could have been handled by
the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the
President, however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most
likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In
any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved only by
the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation. But while conceding her
goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the Constitution. Hence, even as
this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in
the case at bar.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on
Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not
available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of
the President of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent Haydee B. Yorac
as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the
respondent is hereby ordered to desist from serving as such. This is without prejudice to the
incumbent Associate Commissioners of the Commission on Elections restoring her to the same
position if they so desire, or choosing another member in her place, pending the appointment of
a permanent Chairman by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments.: rd
SO ORDERED.

2
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 108399. July 31, 1997]

RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), the BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS composed of Atty. RUBEN M.
RAMIREZ, Atty. RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, and Atty. ENRIQUE C. ROA, GUILLERMINA RUSTIA,
in her capacity as Director of the Barangay Bureau, City Treasurer Atty. ANTONIO ACEBEDO,
Budget Officer EUFEMIA DOMINGUEZ, all of the City Government of Manila, petitioners,
vs. ROBERT MIRASOL, NORMAN T. SANGUYA, ROBERT DE JOYA, ARNEL R. LORENZO, MARY
GRACE ARIAS, RAQUEL L. DOMINGUEZ, LOURDES ASENCIO, FERDINAND ROXAS, MA.
ALBERTINA RICAFORT,and BALAIS M. LOURICH, and the HONORABLE WILFREDO D.
REYES,Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Metro Manila, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 19, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila (Branch 36),[1] nullifying an order of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), which
in effect cancelled the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) slated on December 4, 1992 in
the City of Manila, on the ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 served the purpose of the
first elections for the SK under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160).
Section 423 of the Code provides for a SK in every barangay, to be composed of a chairman, seven (7)
members, a secretary, and a treasurer. Section 532(a) provides that the first elections for the SK shall be held
thirty (30) days after the next local elections. The Code took effect on January 1, 1992.
The first local elections under the Code were held on May 11, 1992. Accordingly, on August 27, 1992, the
Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 2499, providing guidelines for the holding of the general
elections for the SK on September 30, 1992. The guidelines placed the SK elections under the direct control
and supervision of the DILG, with the technical assistance of the COMELEC.[2] After two postponements, the
elections were finally scheduled on December 4, 1992.
Accordingly, registration in the six districts of Manila was conducted. A total of 152,363 youngsters, aged
15 to 21 years old, registered, 15,749 of them filing certificates of candidacies.The City Council passed the
necessary appropriations for the elections.
On September 18, 1992, however, the DILG, through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, issued a letter-
resolution exempting the City of Manila from holding elections for the SK on the ground that the elections
previously held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first under the newly-enacted Local Government
Code. The DILG acted on a letter of Joshue R. Santiago, acting president of the KB City Federation of Manila
and a member of City Council of Manila, which called attention to the fact that in the City of Manila elections for
the Kabataang Barangay (the precursor of the Sangguniang Kabataan) had previously been held on May 26,
1990. In its resolution, the DILG stated:

[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the legislature to exempt from the
forthcoming Sangguniang Kabataan elections those kabataang barangay chapters which may have conducted their
elections within the period of January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 under BP 337. Manifestly the term of office of those
elected KB officials have been correspondingly extended to coincide with the term of office of those who may be elected
under RA 7160.

3
 On November 27, 1992 private respondents, claiming to represent the 24,000 members of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC of Manila to set aside the resolution of the
DILG. They argued that petitioner Secretary of Interior and Local Government had no power to amend the
resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs and that the DILG resolution in question
denied them the equal protection of the laws.
On November 27, 1992, the trial court, through Executive Judge, now COMELEC Chairman, Bernardo P.
Pardo, issued an injunction, ordering petitioners to desist from implementing the order of the respondent
Secretary dated September 18, 1992, . . . until further orders of the Court. On the same day, he ordered
petitioners to perform the specified pre-election activities in order to implement Resolution No. 2499 dated
August 27, 1992 of the Commission on Elections providing for the holding of a general election of the
Sangguniang Kabataan on December 4, 1992 simultaneously in every barangay throughout the country.
The case was subsequently reraffled to Branch 36 of the same court. On January 19, 1993, the new
judge, Hon. Wilfredo D. Reyes, rendered a decision, holding that (1) the DILG had no power to exempt the City
of Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992 because under Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution
the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall is vested solely in the COMELEC; (2) the COMELEC had already in effect
determined that there had been no previous elections for KB by calling for general elections for SK officers in
every barangay without exception; and (3) the exemption of the City of Manila was violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because, according to the DILGs records, in 5,000 barangays KB
elections were held between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 but only in the City of Manila, where there
were 897 barangays, was there no elections held on December 4, 1992.
Petitioners sought this review on certiorari. They insist that the City of Manila, having already conducted
elections for the KB on May 26, 1990, was exempted from holding elections on December 4, 1992. In support
of their contention, they cite 532(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides that:

All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the different sanggunians shall be deemed vacant
until such time that the sangguniang kabataan chairmen shall have been elected and the respective pederasyon presidents
have been selected: Provided, That, elections for the kabataang barangay conducted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 at
any time between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 shall be considered as the first elections provided for in this
Code. The term of office of the kabataang barangay officials elected within the said period shall be extended
correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under this Code. (emphasis added)

They maintain that the Secretary of the DILG had authority to determine whether the City of Manila came
within the exception clause of 532(d) so as to be exempt from holding the elections on December 4, 1992.
The preliminary question is whether the holding of the second elections on May 13, 1996[3] rendered this
case moot and academic. There are two questions raised in this case. The first is whether the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government can exempt a local government unit from holding elections for SK officers on
December 4, 1992 and the second is whether the COMELEC can provide that the Department of Interior and
Local Government shall have direct control and supervision over the election of sangguniang kabataan with the
technical assistance by the Commission on Elections.
We hold that this case is not moot and that it is in fact necessary to decide the issues raised by the
parties. For one thing, doubt may be cast on the validity of the acts of those elected in the May 26, 1990 KB
elections in Manila because this Court enjoined the enforcement of the decision of the trial court and these
officers continued in office until May 13, 1996. For another, this case comes within the rule that courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. [4] For the
question whether the COMELEC can validly vest in the DILG the control and supervision of SK elections is
likely to arise in connection with every SK election and yet the question may not be decided before the date of
such elections.
In the Southern Pacific Terminal case, where the rule was first articulated, appellants were ordered by the
Interstate Commerce Commission to cease and desist from granting a shipper what the ICC perceived to be
preferences and advantages with respect to wharfage charges. The cease and desist order was for a period of
4
about two years, from September 1, 1908 (subsequently extended to November 15), but the U.S. Supreme
Court had not been able to hand down its decision by the time the cease and desist order expired. The case
was decided only on February 20, 1911, more than two years after the order had expired. Hence, it was
contended that the case had thereby become moot and the appeal should be dismissed. In rejecting this
contention, the Court held:

The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are usually continuing (as are
manifestly those in the case at bar), and these considerations ought not to be, as they might be, defeated, by short-
term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review, and at one time the government, and at another time the
carriers, have their rights determined by the Commission without a chance of redress.[5]

In Roe v. Wade,[6] petitioner, a pregnant woman, brought suit in 1970 challenging anti-abortion statutes of
Texas and Georgia on the ground that she had a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy at least within
the first trimester. The case was not decided until 1973 when she was no longer pregnant. But the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to dismiss the case as moot. It was explained: [W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a
significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will
come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot,
pregnancy litigation seldom will survive. Our laws should not be that rigid. Pregnancy provides a classic
justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.[7]
We thus reach the merits of the questions raised in this case. The first question is whether then DILG
Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III had authority to determine whether under 532(d) of the Local Government
Code, the City of Manila was required to hold its first elections for SK. As already stated, petitioners sustain the
affirmative side of the proposition. On the other hand, respondents argue that this is a power which Art.IX,C,
2(1) of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC. Respondents further argue that, by mandating that elections
for the SK be held on December 4, 1992 in every barangay, the COMELEC in effect determined that there had
been no elections for the KB previously held in the City of Manila.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
First. As already stated, by 4 of Resolution No. 2499, the COMELEC placed the SK elections under the
direct control and supervision of the DILG. Contrary to respondents contention, this did not contravene Art. IX,
C, 2(1) of the Constitution which provides that the COMELEC shall have the power to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall. Elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of the COMELEC in the same way that, as
we have recently held, contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. In Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors,[8] it was contended that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is null and void because: (a) it prescribes a separate set of rules for the
election of the SK Chairman different from and inconsistent with that set forth in the Omnibus Election Code,
thereby contravening Section 2, Article 1 of the said Code which explicitly provides that it shall govern all
elections of public officers; and, (b) it constitutes a total, absolute, and complete abdication by the COMELEC
of its constitutionally and statutorily mandated duty to enforce and administer all election laws as provided for
in Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution; Section 52, Article VIII of the Omnibus Election Code; and
Section 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title 1, Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code.[9]
Rejecting this contention, this Court, through Justice Davide, held:

Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution
on the COMELECs exclusive appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials refer to the elective
barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the
ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and the
elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay and the six sangguniang bayan members. They were to
be elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. They are also the same officers referred to by the provisions
of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on election of barangay officials. Metropolitan and municipal trial courts

5
had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to
the Regional Trial Courts.

....

In the light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK (formerly KB) officials do not fall
within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no
law in effect prior to the ratification of the Constitution had made the SK chairman an elective barangay official. His
being an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay does not make him one for the law specifically provides who are
its elective members, viz., the punong barangay and the seven regular sangguniang barangay members who are elected at
large by those who are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution and who are duly
registered voters of the barangay.[10]

The choice of the DILG for the task in question was appropriate and was in line with the legislative policy
evident in several statutes. Thus, P.D. No. 684 (April 15, 1975), in creating Kabataang Barangays in every
barangay throughout the country, provided in 6 that the Secretary of Local Government and Community
Development shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary to effectively
implement the provisions of this Decree. Again, in 1985 Proclamation No. 2421 of the President of the
Philippines, in calling for the general elections of the Kabataang Barangay on July 13-14, 1985, tasked the
then Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, and the Commission on
Elections to assist the Kabataang Barangay in the conduct of the elections. On the other hand, in a
Memorandum Circular dated March 7, 1988, President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Secretary of Local
Government to issue the necessary rules and regulations for effecting the representation of the Kabataang
Barangay, among other sectors, in the legislative bodies of the local government units.
The role of the COMELEC in the 1992 elections for SK officers was by no means inconsequential. DILG
supervision was to be exercised within the framework of detailed and comprehensive rules embodied in
Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC. What was left to the DILG to perform was the enforcement of the rules.
Second. It is contended that, in its resolution in question, the COMELEC did not name the barangays
which, because they had conducted kabataang barangay elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1,
1992, were not included in the SK elections to be held on December 4, 1992. That these barangays were
precisely to be determined by the DILG is, however, fairly inferable from the authority given to the DILG to
supervise the conduct of the elections. Since 532(d) provided for kabataang barangay officials whose term of
office was extended beyond 1992, the authority to supervise the conduct of elections in that year must
necessarily be deemed to include the authority to determine which kabataang barangay would not be included
in the 1992 elections.
The authority granted was nothing more than the ascertainment of a fact, namely, whether between
January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 elections had been held in a given kabataang barangay. If elections had
been conducted, then no new elections had to be held on December 4, 1992 since by virtue of 532(d) the term
of office of the kabataang barangay officials so elected was extended correspondingly to coincide with the term
of office of those elected under [the Local Government Code of 1991]. In doing this, the Secretary of Interior
and Local Government was to act merely as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare
the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.[11] There was no undue delegation of legislative
power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. That this is constitutionally permissible is the
teaching of our cases.[12]
Third. Respondents claim, however, that the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila were void because (a)
they were called at the instance of then Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez who did not have authority to do so and (b)
it was not held under COMELEC supervision.
The 1990 elections for the Kabataang Barangay were called by then Manila Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez,
Jr., who in his Executive Order No. 21 dated April 25, 1990 stated:

6
WHEREAS, the Kabataang Barangay as an organization provided for under Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, has been
practically dormant since the advent of the present national administration;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to involve the youth in the affairs and undertakings of the government to ensure the
participation of all sectors of our population in the task of nation building;

WHEREAS, the last elections for the Kabataang Barangay officers were held in November 1985 yet, which is over their
three years term of office;

WHEREAS, most of the present crop of KB officers are way past the age limit provided for under the law;

....

The elections were actually held on May 26, 1990 in the 897 barangays of Manila. Later, on June 30,
1990, KB City Federation elections were conducted.
It was precisely to foreclose any question regarding the validity of KB elections held in the aftermath of the
EDSA revolution and upon the effectivity of the new Local Government Code that the exception clause of
532(d) was inserted. The proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee which drafted the Code show
the following:[13]
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Isa-cite na lang ko ano iyong title o chapter o section, ha!
HON. LINA: . . .
Page 436, lines 13 to 14 delete within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and in lieu
thereof, insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of the Code. The rationale. . . .
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: How should it be read?
HON. LINA: It will read as follows: Provided however, that the Local Government Units which have
conducted elections for the Kabataang Barangay as provided for, in Batas Pambansa Bilang
337, up to the effectivity. . . .
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: So, any deletion from the word within, ha, up to. . . .
HON. LINA: Remove the words, the phrase, within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and
insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: From?
HON. LINA: From 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code. Kasi meron nang mga election, eh, na
ginawa, eh. There are five thousand barangays, based on the record of the DILG, out of forty
thousand, imagine that, na nag-conduct na ng election nila based on the KB Constitution and By-
Laws, and theyre sitting already, now if we do not recognize that, mag[ka]karoon sila ng question.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Accepted, Mr. Chairman.
Section 532(d) may thus be deemed to be a curative law. Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective in effect, are enacted to validate acts done which otherwise would be invalid under existing laws,
by considering them as having complied with the existing laws. Such laws are recognized in this jurisdiction.[14]
Fourth. It is finally contended that the exemption of the barangays of the City of Manila from the
requirement to hold elections for SK officers on December 4, 1992 would deny the youth voters in those
barangays of the equal protection of laws. Respondents claim that only in the barangays in the City of Manila,
which then numbered 897, were elections for SK not held in 1992 on the ground that between January 1, 1988
and January 1, 1992 there had already been SK elections held, when, according to petitioners own evidence,
during that period, SK elections had actually been conducted in 5,000 barangays.

7
 Whether this claim is true cannot be ascertained from the records of this case. Merely showing that there
were 5,000 barangays which similarly held KB elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 does
not prove that despite that fact these same barangays were permitted to hold elections on December 4,
1992. For one thing, according to the Manila Bulletin issue of November 18, 1992 (p. 9), 568 barangays in the
Province of Bulacan did not have SK elections on December 4, 1992 either, because they already had
elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992. For another, even assuming that only barangays in
Manila were not permitted to hold SK elections on December 4, 1992 while the rest of the 5,000 barangays
were allowed even if KB elections had already been held there before, this fact does not give the youth voters
in the 897 Manila barangays ground for complaint because what the other barangays did was contrary to
law. There is no discrimination here.
In People v. Vera[15] this Court struck down the Probation Law because it permitted unequal application of
its benefits by making its applicability depend on the decision of provincial governments to appropriate or not to
appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers, with the result that those not disposed to allow the
benefits of probations to be enjoyed by their inhabitants could simply omit to provide for the salaries of
probation officers. The difference between that case and the one at bar lies in the fact that what youth voters in
the other barangays might have been allowed was not a right which was denied to youth voters in Manila. If
those barangays were not entitled to have SK elections on December 4, 1992 but nevertheless were allowed
to have such elections, that fact did not mean those in Manila should similarly have been allowed to conduct
elections on December 4, 1992 because the fact was that they already had their own, just two years before on
May 26, 1990. Respondents equal protection argument violates the dictum that one wrong does not make
another wrong right.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is REVERSED and the case
filed against petitioner by private respondents is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima,
Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., and Torres, Jr., J., on leave.

8
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 160465. April 28, 2004]

ROMEO M. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. COMMISSIONER RALPH

C. LANTION and ROLANDO F. SALVADOR, respondents.

RESOLUTION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 seeking to set aside and nullify the November 5,
2003 Status Quo Ante Order[1] issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in EAC No. A-
10-2002, Romeo F. Estrella v. Rolando F. Salvador.
Romeo M. Estrella (petitioner) and Rolando F. Salvador (respondent) were mayoralty candidates in
Baliuag, Bulacan during the May 14, 2001 Elections.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent as winner. Petitioner thereafter filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan an election protest, docketed as EPC No. 10-M-2001, which was raffled
to Branch 10 thereof.[2]
By Decision of April 10, 2002, the RTC annulled respondents proclamation and declared petitioner as the
duly elected mayor of Baliuag.[3]
Respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC where it was docketed as EAC No. A-10-
2002, and raffled to the second Division thereof, while petitioner filed before the RTC a motion for execution of
the decision pending appeal.[4]
The RTC, by Order of April 16, 2002, granted petitioners motion for execution pending appeal and
accordingly issued a writ of execution.[5]
Respondent thus assailed the April 16, 2002 Order of the RTC via petition for certiorari filed on April 24,
2002 before the COMELEC where it was docketed as SPR No. 21-2002, and raffled also to the Second
Division thereof.[6]
Petitioner later moved for the inhibition[7] of Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, a member of the COMELEC
Second Division.
On May 30, 2002, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Status Quo Ante Order,[8]
By Order of July 9, 2002, the motion for inhibition of Commissioner Lantion was denied by the COMELEC
Second Division.
On July 11, 2002, petitioner filed before this Court a petition for certiorari questioning the COMELEC
Second Division May 20, 2002 Status Quo Ante Order, which petition was supplemented on July 30, 2002. The
petition was docketed by this Court as G.R. No. 154041.
As no temporary restraining order was issued by this Court, the May 30, 2002 Status Quo Ante Order of
the COMELEC Second Division was implemented on or about July 17, 2003, resulting in the ouster of
petitioner from the mayoral post.
In the meantime, during the July 23, 2002 hearing of SPR No. 21-2002, COMELEC Commissioner Lantion
inhibited himself.[9] Commissioner Ressureccion Z. Borra was, by Order of August 25, 2002,[10] thus designated
in place of Commissioner Lantion.

9
 During the pendency of G.R. No. 154041 before this Court, the COMELEC Second Division, by Order of
January 16, 2003, nullified in SPR No. 21-2002 the writ of execution[11] issued by the RTC. Respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order which motion was duly certified to the COMELEC En Banc.
On September 16, 2003, this Court, by Resolution on even date, dismissed G.R. No. 154041 on the
grounds that 1) the case had become moot and academic because of the COMELEC Second Divisions
resolution on the merits of SPR No. 21-2002, and (2) this Court has no jurisdiction over Division orders or
rulings of the COMELEC.
On October 15, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division, issued in EAC No. A-10-2002 an
Order[12] adopting the order of substitution in SPR No. 21-2002 dated August 25, 2002designating
Commissioner Borra as substitute member thereof.
On October 20, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division issued in EAC No. A-10-2002 a
Resolution[13] affirming with modifications the RTC decision and declaring petitioner as the duly elected
mayor. On even date, respondent moved to reconsider[14] the said October 20, 2003 Order.
Petitioner, in the meantime, filed on October 22, 2003 a motion for immediate execution [15] of the
COMELEC Second Division October 20, 2003 Resolution, which was set for hearing on October 28, 2003 but
reset to November 4, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, respondent filed before the COMELEC Second Division a very urgent motion to
consider the instant case certified to the Commission en banc.[16]
Respondent later filed on November 3, 2003 a very urgent manifestation and motion to suspend
proceedings.[17]
Hearing of the incidents in EAC No. A-10-2002 was conducted on November 4, 2003. The following day
or on November 5, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order[18]denying respondents plea for
suspension of proceedings and granting petitioners motion for execution pending appeal and accordingly
directing the issuance of a writ of execution. On even date, the COMELEC En Banc issued the
questioned November 5, 2003 Status Quo Ante Order. Five (5) members including
Commissioner Lantion participated in this November 5, 2003 Order wherein Commissioner Lantion stated that
his previous voluntary inhibition is only in the SPR cases and not in the EAC and as further agreed in the
Second Division, [he] will not participate in the Division deliberations but will vote when the case is elevated [to
the] en banc. Of the five Commissioners, Commissioner Borra dissented.
Hence, the present petition, alleging as follows:
I. THE NOV. 5 STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF THE COMELEC TO ISSUE SUCH AND
ORDER.
II. THE COMELEC EN BANC PALPABLY ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND IN FLAGRANT
BREACH OF INTER-COLLEGIAL COMITY WHEN IT ISSUED THE NOV. 5 ORDER
CONSIDERING THAT EAC NO. A-10-2002 IS STILL UNDER THE PRIMARY AND CONTINUING
JURISDICTION OF THE SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION WHICH HAS YET TO FULLY DISPOSE
OF ESTRELLAS TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE EXECUTION.
III. DUE TO HIS PREVIOUS VOLUNTARY INHIBITION IN A RELATED CASE, SPR NO. 21-2002
AND AT THE DIVISION LEVEL IN THE SAME CASE, EAC NO. A-10-2002, COMMISSIONER
LANTIONS VOTE IN THE ASSAILED ORDER SHOULD BE DISREGARDED AND CANCELLED.
THE EN BANCS NOV. 5 ORDER IS THUS INVALID FOR FURTHER REASON THAT IT IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE REQUIRED MAJORITY VOTE.
IV. THE COMELEC EN BANC ALSO ACTED ARBITRARILY AND IN MANIFEST GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
PREVENTED THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DIVISIONS ORDER OF EXECUTION THE
ISSUANCE OF WHICH IS LEGALLY JUSTIFIED UNDER THE APPLICABLE CASE

10
 PRECEDENTS AND WARRANTED UNDER THE SPECIFIC FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THE CASE.
V. THE COMELEC EN BANC GROSSLY VIOLATED ESTRELLAS RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAWS AND EQUAL OR FAIR TREATMENT WHEN IT IGNORED ITS OWN CASE
PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICE. IN STARK CONTRAST TO WHAT IT DID IN THIS CASE, THE
EN BANC HAD PREVIOUSLY ALLOWED THE FIRST DIVISION, IN AT LEAST TWO RECENT
CASES (EPC NO. 2001-19 AND EAC NO. A-4-20030 TO RESOLVE TIMELY FILED MOTION
FOR EXECUTION PENDING RECONSIDERATION AND GAVE SAID DIVISION A FREE HAND
AT FULLY DISPOSING OF SAID INCIDENTS.
Petitioner argues that Commissioner Lantions vote in the assailed order should be disregarded because of
his previous inhibition in a similar case and in the same case in the Division level, thus making said assailed
order null and void as it was not concurred by the required majority.
Petitioners argument is meritorious.
Commissioner Lantions voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the
COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to
participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any
satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus
leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of
the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision or order, as required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides:

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a
quorum for the purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the
Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5,
2003 issued by the COMELEC En Banc is hereby NULLIFIED. This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

11
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 114795. July 17, 1996]

LUCITA Q. GARCES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

SALVADOR EMPEYNADO and CLAUDIO CONCEPCION, respondents.

RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:

Questioned in this petition for review is the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] (CA), as well as
its resolution, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court [3] (RTC) of Zamboanga del Norte
in dismissing a petition for mandamus against a Provincial Election Supervisor and an incumbent
Election Registrar.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on
July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn,
was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.[4] Correspondingly approved by the Civil Service
Commission,[5] both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion,
however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. [6] Garces, on the other hand, was
directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. [7] But she was
not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor
Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office in Gutalac as the same is not vacant. [8]
On February 24, 1987, Garces was directed by the same Office of Assistant Director to defer her
assumption of the Gutalac post. On April 15, 1987, she received a letter from the Acting Manager,
Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of
polling booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte which
Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order.[9] Meanwhile, since respondent
Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his
appointment to Liloy.[10]
On February 26, 1988, Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado [11] and Concepcion, among
others. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated June 3, 1988, resolved to
recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac, [12] and ordered that the
appointments of Garces to Gutalac and of Concepcion to Liloy be cancelled. [13] In view thereof,
respondent Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was
rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only
by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. The RTC, thereafter, dismissed the
petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy,[14] and (2)
that the cases or matters referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of
elections. On appeal, respondent CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition.
The issues raised are purely legal. First, is petitioners action for mandamus proper? And, second,
is this case cognizable by the RTC or by the Supreme Court?
12
 On the first issue, Garces claims that she has a clear legal right to the Gutalac post which was
deemed vacated at the time of her appointment and qualification. Garces insists that the vacancy was
created by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution.[15] On the contrary, Concepcion posits
that he did not vacate his Gutalac post as he did not accept the transfer to Liloy.
Article III Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution provides:

All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from
February 25, 1986. (Italics supplied)

The above organic provision did not require any cause for removal of an appointive official under the
1973 Constitution.[16] The transition period from the old to the new Constitution envisioned an
automatic vacancy;[17] hence the government is not hard put to prove anything plainly and simply
because the Constitution allows it.[18] Mere appointment and qualification of the successor removes
an incumbent from his post. Nevertheless, the government in an act of auto-limitation and to prevent
indiscriminate dismissal of government personnel issued on May 28, 1986, Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 17. This executive order, which applies in this case as it was passed prior to the issuance of
Concepcions transfer order, enumerates five grounds for separation or replacement of elective and
appointive officials authorized under Article III, Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution, to wit:

1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;

2. Existence of the probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as
determined by the Ministry Head concerned;

3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;

4. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;

5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.

Not one of these grounds was alleged to exist, much less proven by petitioner when respondent
Concepcion was transferred from Gutalac to Liloy. More, Concepcion was transferred without his
consent. A transfer requires a prior appointment.[19] If the transfer was made without the consent of
the official concerned, it is tantamount to removal without valid cause [20]contrary to the fundamental
guarantee on non-removal except for cause.[21] Concepcions transfer thus becomes legally infirm and
without effect for he was not validly terminated. His appointment to the Liloy post, in fact, was
incomplete because he did not accept it. Acceptance, it must be emphasized, is indispensable to
complete an appointment.[22] Corollarily, Concepcions post in Gutalac never became vacant. It is a
basic precept in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for
a certain position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. [23] There can be no appointment
to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment validly
terminated before one could be validly installed to succeed him. Further, Garces appointment was
ordered to be deferred by the COMELEC. The deferment order, we note, was not unequivocably
lifted. Worse, her appointment to Gutalac was even cancelled by the COMELEC en banc.

13
 These factors negate Garces claim for a well-defined, clear, certain legal right to the Gutalac
post. On the contrary, her right to the said office is manifestly doubtful and highly questionable. As
correctly ruled by respondent court, mandamus, which petitioner filed below, will not lie as this
remedy applies only where petitioners right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. [24] It
will not issue to give him something to which he is not clearly and conclusively entitled.[25] Considering
that Concepcion continuously occupies the disputed position and exercises the corresponding
functions therefore, the proper remedy should have been quo warranto and not mandamus.[26] Quo
warranto tests the title to ones office claimed by another and has as its object the ouster of the holder
from its enjoyment, while mandamus avails to enforce clear legal duties and not to try disputed
titles.[27]
Garces heavy reliance with the 1964 Tulawie[28] case is misplaced for material and different
factual considerations. Unlike in this case, the disputed office of Assistant Provincial Agriculturist in
the case of Tulawie is clearly vacant and petitioner Tulawies appointment was confirmed by the
higher authorities making his claim to the disputed position clear and certain.Tulawies petition for
mandamus, moreover, was against the Provincial Agriculturist who never claimed title to the
contested office. In this case, there was no vacancy in the Gutalac post and petitioners appointment
to which she could base her claim was revoked making her claim uncertain.
Coming now to the second issue.
The jurisdiction of the RTC was challenged by respondent Empeynado[29] contending that this is a
case or matter cognizable by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. The
COMELEC resolution cancelling the appointment of Garces as Election Registrar of Gutalac, he
argues, should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else
the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
The contention is without merit. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:

Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the
contrary, it was the COMELECs resolution that triggered this Controversy. The case or matter
referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must
pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the
COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers[30] involving elective regional,
provincial and city officials.[31] In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an
appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up
of an agency.[32] The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this
matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would surely burden
the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which
the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[33]

14
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby DENIED without prejudice
to the filing of the proper action with the appropriate body.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

ROSALINDA A. PENERA, G. R. No. 181613

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated:

and EDGAR T. ANDANAR,
Respondents. September 11, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

15
This Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order [1] under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court, seeks the nullification of the Resolution[2] dated 30 January 2008 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc. Said Resolution denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
earlier Resolution[3] dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 07-224,
ordering the disqualification of herein petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate
for the position of mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte (Sta. Monica) in
the 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.

The antecedents of the case, both factual and procedural, are set forth hereunder:

Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar (Andanar) were mayoralty candidates in Sta.
Monica during the 14 May 2007 elections.

On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED),
Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification[4] against Penera, as well as the
candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party,[5] for
unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the
commencement of the campaign period. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-224.

Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 a day before the start of the authorized campaign
period on 30 March 2007 Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in
Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the
day of the elections. Attached to the Petition were the Affidavits of individuals[6] who witnessed
the said incident.

Penera alone filed an Answer[7] to the Petition on 19 April 2007, averring that the charge
of premature campaigning was not true. Although Penera admitted that a motorcade did take
place, she explained that it was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and
provinces, where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade,
which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. In fact, Penera claimed, in the
motorcade held by her political party, no person made any speech, not even any of the
candidates. Instead, there was only marching music in the background and a grand standing for
the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates in the motorcade. Finally, Penera
cited Barroso v. Ampig[8] in her defense, wherein the Court supposedly ruled that a motorcade
held by candidates during the filing of their COCs was not a form of political campaigning.

16
 Also on 19 April 2007, Andanar and Penera appeared with their counsels before the
ORED-Region XIII, where they agreed to submit their position papers and other evidence in
support of their allegations.[9]

After the parties filed their respective Position Papers, the records of the case were
transmitted to the COMELEC main office in Manila for adjudication. It was subsequently
raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.

While SPA No. 07-224 was pending before the COMELEC Second Division, the 14 May
2007 elections took place and, as a result thereof, Penera was proclaimed the duly elected
Mayor of Sta. Monica. Penera soon assumed office on 2 July 2002.
On 24 July 2007, the COMELEC Second Division issued its Resolution in SPA No. 07-
224, penned by Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer (Ferrer), which disqualified Penera from
continuing as a mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, for engaging in premature campaigning, in
violation of Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

The COMELEC Second Division found that:

On the afternoon of 29 March 2007, the 1st [sic] day to file the certificates of candidacy
for local elective positions and a day before the start of the campaign period for the May 14,
2007 elections [some of the members of the political party Partido Padajon Surigao], headed by
their mayoralty candidate Datty Penera, filed their respective Certificates of Candidacy before
the Municipal Election Officer of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.

Accompanied by a bevy of supporters, [Penera and her partymates] came to the

municipal COMELEC office on board a convoy of two (2) trucks and an undetermined number
of motorcycles, laden with balloons ad [sic] posters/banners containing names and pictures and
the municipal positions for which they were seeking election. Installed with [sic] one of the
trucks was a public speaker sound subsystem which broadcast [sic] the intent the [sic] run in the
coming elections. The truck had the posters of Penera attached to it proclaiming his [sic]
candidacy for mayor. The streamer of [Mar Longos, a candidate for the position of Board
Member,] was proudly seen at the vehicles side. The group proceeded to motorcade until the
barangays of Bailan, Libertad and as afar [sic] as Mabini almost nine (9) kilometers from Sta.
Monica. [Penera and her partymates] were seen aboard the vehicles and throwing candies to the
residents and onlookers.

Various affidavits and pictures were submitted elucidating the above-mentioned

facts. The above facts were also admitted in the Answer, the Position Paper and during the
hearings conducted for this case, the only defense propounded by [Penera] is that such acts
allegedly do not constitute campaigning and is therefore not proscribed by the pertinent election
laws.

xxxx

17
 What we however find disturbing is [Peneras] reference to the Ampig Case as the
justification for the acts committed by [her]. There is really no reference to the acts or similar
acts committed by [Penera] as having been considered as not constituting political campaign or
partisan political activity. The issue in that case is whether or not the defect of the lack of a
certification against non-forum [sic] shopping should result to the immediate dismissal of the
election cases filed in that case. There is nothing in said case justifying a motorcade during the
filing of certificates of candidacy. [Peneras] reliance thereon is therefore misplaced and of no
potency at all.

xxxx

However, the photos submitted by [Andanar] only identified [Penera] and did not have
any notation identifying or indicating any of the other [candidates from Peneras party]. It cannot
be conclusively proven that the other [candidates from Peneras party] were indeed with Penera
during the Motorcade. More importantly, the Answer and the Position Paper contain admissions
referring only to [Penera]. There is therefore no justification for a whole sale [sic]
disqualification of all the [candidates from Peneras party], as even the petition failed to mention
particularly the participation of the other individual [party members].[10]

The afore-quoted findings of fact led the COMELEC Second Division to decree:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Commission resolves to disqualify [Penera] but absolves the
other [candidates from Peneras party] from violation of section 80 and 68 of the Omnibus
Elections [sic] Code.[11]

Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. (Tuason) wrote a Separate Opinion [12] on the 24 July
2007 Resolution. Although Commissioner Tuason concurred with the ponente, he stressed that,
indeed, Penera should be made accountable for her actions after the filing of her COC on 29
March 2007. Prior thereto, there was no candidate yet whose candidacy would have been
enhanced by the premature campaigning.

It was the third member of the COMELEC Second Division, Commissioner Rene V.
Sarmiento (Sarmiento) who put forth a Dissenting Opinion[13] on the 24 July
2007Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento believed that the pieces of evidence submitted by
Andanar did not sufficiently establish probable cause that Penera engaged in premature
campaigning, in violation of Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The two
photocopied pictures, purporting to be those of Penera, did not clearly reveal what was actually
happening in the truck or who were the passengers thereof. Likewise, the Affidavits seemed to
have been prepared and executed by one and the same person because they had similar sentence
construction and form, and they were sworn to before the same attesting officer.

18
 Penera filed before the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration[14] of the 24
July 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, maintaining that she did not make
any admission on the factual matters stated in the appealed resolution. Penera also contended
that the pictures and Affidavits submitted by Andanar should not have been given any
credence. The pictures were mere photocopies of the originals and lacked the proper
authentication, while the Affidavits were taken ex parte, which would almost always make
them incomplete and inaccurate. Subsequently, Penera filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration,[15] explaining that supporters spontaneously accompanied Penera and her
fellow candidates in filing their COCs, and the motorcade that took place after the filing was
actually part of the dispersal of said supporters and their transportation back to their
respective barangays.

In the Resolution dated 30 January 2008, the COMELEC en banc denied Peneras Motion
for Reconsideration, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, this Commission RESOLVES to DENY the instant Motion for

Reconsideration filed by [Penera] for UTTER LACK OF MERIT.[16]

The COMELEC en banc ruled that Penera could no longer advance the arguments set
forth in her Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, given
that she failed to first express and elucidate on the same in her Answer and Position
Paper. Penera did not specifically deny the material averments that the motorcade went as far as
Barangay Mabini, announcing their candidacy and requesting the people to vote for them on
Election Day, despite the fact that the same were clearly propounded by Andanar in his Petition
for Disqualification and Position Paper. Therefore, these material averments should be
considered admitted. Although the COMELEC en banc agreed that no undue importance should
be given to sworn statements or affidavits submitted as evidence, this did not mean that such
affidavits should not be given any evidentiary weight at all. Since Penera neither refuted the
material averments in Andanars Petition and the Affidavits attached thereto nor submitted
countervailing evidence, then said Affidavits, even if taken ex parte, deserve some degree of
importance. The COMELEC en banc likewise conceded that the pictures submitted by Andanar
as evidence would have been unreliable, but only if they were presented by their
lonesome. However, said pictures, together with Peneras admissions and the Affidavits of
Andanars witnesses, constituted sufficient evidence to establish Peneras violation of the rule
against premature campaigning. Lastly, the COMELEC en banc accused Penera of deliberately
trying to mislead the Commission by citing Barroso, given that the said case was not even
remotely applicable to the case at bar.

19
 Consistent with his previous stand, Commissioner Sarmiento again dissented [17] from
the 30 January 2008 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc. He still believed that Andanar was
not able to adduce substantial evidence that would support the claim of violation of election
laws. Particularly, Commissioner Sarmiento accepted Peneras explanation that the motorcade
conducted after the filing by Penera and the other candidates of their COCs was merely part of
the dispersal of the spontaneous gathering of their supporters. The incident was only in accord
with normal human social experience.

Still undeterred, Penera filed the instant Petition before us, praying that the Resolutions
dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and en banc,
respectively, be declared null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In a Resolution[18] dated 4 March 2008, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),

enjoining the COMELEC from implementing the assailed Resolutions, on the condition that
Penera post a bond in the amount of P5,000.00. We also directed COMELEC and Andanar to
comment on the instant Petition.

After the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Andanar
filed their respective Comments[19] on the Petition at bar, we required Penera, in a
Resolution[20] dated 17 June 2008, to file a Reply. However, as no Reply was filed in due time,
we dismissed Peneras Petition in a Resolution[21] dated 14 October 2008, in accordance with
Rule 56, Section 5(e) of the Rules of Court.[22] Penera subsequently filed an Ex Parte Motion to
Admit Reply,[23] which we treated as a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 14
October 2008. On 11 November 2008, we issued another Resolution reinstating Peneras
Petition.[24]

Penera presents the following issues for our consideration:

I.

Whether or not [Penera] has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity
outside the campaign period.

II.

Whether the contents of the complaint are deemed admitted for failure of [Penera] to specifically
deny the same.

III.

20
 Whether or not [Andanar] has presented competent and substantial evidence to justify a
conclusion that [Penera] violated Section 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

IV.

Whether or not [the COMELEC] committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction in finding that the act of [Penera] in conducting a motorcade before the
filing of her certificate of candidacy constitutes premature campaigning.

V.

Whether or not [the COMELEC] committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction when it resolves [sic] to disqualify [Penera] despite the failure of
[Andanar] to present competent, admissible and substantial evidence to prove [the] violation of
Section 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Penera claims that the COMELEC exercised its discretion despotically, arbitrarily and
whimsically in disqualifying her as a mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica on the ground that she
engaged in premature campaigning. She asserts that the evidence adduced by Andanar was
grossly insufficient to warrant the ruling of the COMELEC.

Penera insists that the COMELEC Second Division erred in its findings of fact, basically
adopting Andanars allegations which, contrary to the belief of the COMELEC Second Division,
Penera never admitted. Penera maintains that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned,
and the supporters merely joined Penera and the other candidates from her party along the way
to, as well as within the premises of, the office of the COMELEC Municipal Election
Officer. Andanars averments that after Penera and the other candidates from her party filed their
COCs, they held a motorcade in the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to
the public and threw candies to the onlookers were not supported by competent substantial
evidence. Echoing Commissioner Sarmientos dissent from the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions, Penera argues that too much weight and credence were given to the pictures and
Affidavits submitted by Andanar. The declaration by the COMELEC that it was Penera in the
pictures is tenuous and erroneous, as the COMELEC has no personal knowledge of Peneras
identity, and the said pictures do not clearly reveal the faces of the individuals and the contents
of the posters therein. In the same vein, the Affidavits of Andanars known supporters, executed
almost a month after Andanar filed his Petition for Disqualification before the ORED-Region
XIII, were obviously prepared and executed by one and the same person, because they have a
similar sentence construction, and computer font and form, and were even sworn to before the
same attesting officer on the same date.

We find no merit in the instant Petition.

21
The questions of fact
Crystal clear from the above arguments is that Penera is raising only questions of fact in
her Petition presently before us. We do not find any reason to pass upon the same, as this Court
is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of the Court to review, examine and evaluate or
weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. A question of fact would arise in such an
event.

The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or

grave abuse of discretion, and it does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the
evidence.[25] Because of its fact-finding facilities and its knowledge derived from actual
experience, the COMELEC is in a peculiarly advantageous position to evaluate, appreciate and
decide on factual questions before it. Factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own
assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive on this Court, more so in the
absence of a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law in the questioned
resolutions. Unless any of these causes are clearly substantiated, the Court will not interfere
with the findings of fact of the COMELEC.[26]

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave, as
when it is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility. The
abuse must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[27]

We find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of the COMELEC Second Division in disqualifying Penera as a mayoralty candidate in Sta.
Monica in the Resolution dated 24 July 2007; and also on the part of the COMELEC en banc in
denying Peneras Motion for Reconsideration on the Resolution dated 30 January 2008. Said
Resolutions are sufficiently supported by substantial evidence, meaning, such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[28]

The prohibited act of premature campaigning is defined under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code, to wit:

SECTION 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall
be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity
except during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold political
conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within thirty

22
 days before the commencement of the campaign period and forty-five days for Presidential and
Vice-Presidential election. (Emphasis ours.)

If the commission of the prohibited act of premature campaigning is duly proven, the
consequence of the violation is clearly spelled out in Section 68 of the said Code, which reads:

SECTION. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a

party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having xxx (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to
a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphases ours.)

In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not just by Andanars evidence, but
also those of Penera herself, that Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs on 29
March 2007, participated in a motorcade which passed through the different barangays of Sta.
Monica, waived their hands to the public, and threw candies to the onlookers.

Indeed, Penera expressly admitted in her Position Paper that:

Respondents actually had a motorcade of only two (2) jeppneys [sic] and ten (10)
motorcycles after filing their Certificate of Candidacy at 3:00 P.M., March 29, 2007 without
any speeches made and only one streamer of a board member Candidate and multi-colored
balloons attached to the jeppneys [sic] and motorcycles.[29] (Emphasis ours.)

Additionally, the Joint Affidavit of Marcial Dolar, Allan Llatona, and Renante Platil,
attached to Peneras Position Paper, gave an even more straightforward account of the events,
thus:

1. That on March 29, 2007 at 3:00 P.M. at Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, Mayoralty
Candidates Rosalinda CA. Penera [sic] and her parties of four (4) kagawads filed their
certificate of candidacy at the COMELEC Office;

2. That their [sic] was a motorcade consisting of two jeppneys [sic] and 10 motorcycles after
actual registration with the COMELEC with jeeps decorated with balloons and a streamer
of Margarito Longos, Board Member Candidate;

3. That the motorcade proceeded to three (3) barangays out of the 11 barangays while
supporters were throwing sweet candies to the crowd;

23
 4. That there was merriment and marching music without mention of any name of the
candidates more particularly lead-candidate Rosalinda CA. Penera [sic];

5. That we were in the motorcade on that afternoon only riding in one of the
jeepneys.[30] (Emphases ours.)

In view of the foregoing admissions by Penera and her witnesses, Penera cannot now be
allowed to adopt a conflicting position.

More importantly, the conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan

political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election
Code, on [h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda
for or against a candidate[.] A motorcade is a procession or parade of automobiles or other
motor vehicles.[31] The conduct thereof during election periods by the candidates and their
supporters is a fact that need not be belabored due to its widespread and pervasive practice. The
obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the candidates and the positions,
to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visible so as to
facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds of the voters come
election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose than to promote
the election of a particular candidate or candidates.

In the instant Petition, Penera never denied that she took part in the conduct of the
motorcade after she filed her COC on the day before the start of the campaign period.She
merely claimed that the same was not undertaken for campaign purposes. Penera proffered the
excuse that the motorcade was already part of the dispersal of the supporters who spontaneously
accompanied Penera and her partymates in filing their COCs. The said supporters were already
being transported back to their respective barangays after the COC filing. Penera stressed that
no speech was made by any person, and there was only background marching music and a
grand standing for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates in the motorcade.

We are not convinced.

As we previously noted, Penera and her witnesses admitted that the vehicles, consisting
of two jeepneys and ten motorcycles, were festooned with multi-colored balloons; the
motorcade went around three barangays in Sta. Monica; and Penera and her partymates waved
their hands and threw sweet candies to the crowd. With vehicles, balloons, and even candies on
hand, Penera can hardly persuade us that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned.

24
 For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period, Penera must be disqualified from
holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica.

The questions of law

The dissenting opinion, however, raises the legal issue that Section 15 of Republic Act No.
8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, provides a new definition of the term candidate,
as a result of which, premature campaigning may no longer be committed.

Under Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate is any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through
an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties.

Republic Act No. 8436,[32] enacted on 22 December 1997, authorized the COMELEC to
use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. The statute also
mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines, computer equipment,
devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. In particular,
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 provided for the specifications of the official ballots to be
used in the automated election system and the guidelines for the printing thereof, the relevant
portions of which state:
SECTION 11. Official ballot. - The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official
ballot which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be
voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of
candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same
type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix
his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.

Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.

For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred
twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national
or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for president and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of
the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided,
further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon
the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May
11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of
President, Vice President, Senators and candidates under the Party-List System as well as
petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the Party-List System shall be on

25
 February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions
shall be on March 27, 1998. (Emphases ours.)

On 10 February 2007, Republic Act No. 9369[33] took effect. Section 13 of Republic Act No.
9369 amended Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 and renumbered the same as the new
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436. The pertinent portions of Section 15 of Republic Act No.
8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, now read:
SECTION.15. Official Ballot. - The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic
display and/or the size and form of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the
position to be filled and/or the proposition to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or
plebiscite. Where practicable, electronic displays must be constructed to present the names of all
candidates for the same position in the same page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays
must be constructed to present the entire ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to
ensure that the voter sees all of the ballot options on all pages before completing his or her vote
and to allow the voter to review and change all ballot choices prior to completing and casting his
or her ballot. Under each position to be filled, the names of candidates shall be arranged
alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using the same type size. The maiden or
married name shall be listed in the official ballot, as preferred by the female candidate. Under
each proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be uniformly indicated using the same font
and size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspector shall affix her/her signature
to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who
files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate
at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect
only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and
officers, and employees in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso factor resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the
day of the filing of his/her certification of candidacy. (Emphases ours.)
In view of the third paragraph of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the
Dissenting Opinion argues that Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code can not be applied to
the present case since, as the Court held in Lanot v. Commission on Elections,[34] the election
campaign or partisan activity, which constitute the prohibited premature campaigning, should
be designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates. Under present election laws, while a person may have filed his/her COC within the
prescribed period for doing so, said person shall not be considered a candidate until the start of
the campaign period. Thus, prior to the start of the campaign period, there can be no election
campaign or partisan political activity designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate to public office because there is no candidate to speak of.

26
 According to the Dissenting Opinion, even if Peneras acts before the start of the
campaign period constitute election campaigning or partisan political activities, these are not
punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code given that she was not yet a
candidate at that time. On the other hand, Peneras acts, if committed within the campaign
period, when she was already a candidate, are likewise not covered by Section 80 as this
provision punishes only acts outside the campaign period.

The Dissenting Opinion ultimately concludes that because of Section 15 of Republic Act No.
8436, as amended, the prohibited act of premature campaigning in Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is practically impossible to commit at any time.

We disagree. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.
A close reading of the entire Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436,
would readily reveal that that it did not contain an express repeal of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code. An express repeal is one wherein a statute declares, usually in its repealing
clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is
repealed.[35] Absent this specific requirement, an express repeal may not be presumed.

Although the title of Republic Act No. 9369 particularly mentioned the amendment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled "An Act Authorizing the Commission on
Elections to Use an Automated Election System x x x, Amending for the Purpose Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, As Amended x x x. (Emphasis ours.),

said title explicitly mentions, not the repeal, but the amendment of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881. Such fact is indeed very material. Repeal of a law means its complete abrogation by the
enactment of a subsequent statute, whereas the amendment of a statute means an alteration in
the law already existing, leaving some part of the original still standing.[36]Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code is not even one of the specific provisions of the said code that were
expressly amended by Republic Act No. 9369.

Additionally, Section 46,[37] the repealing clause of Republic Act No. 9369, states that:

Sec. 46. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations
or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

27
Section 46 of Republic Act No. 9369 is a general repealing clause. It is a clause which
predicates the intended repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent
was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist
in the terms of the new and old laws. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied
repeal.[38]

Well-settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are disfavored. In order to
effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and
repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The
clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for
inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing
in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable
with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not
suffice.[39]

Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor
to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the
other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize them if
this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature, and
so give effect to both while at the same time also according due respect to a coordinate
department of the government.[40]
To our mind, there is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile
these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both.
The following points are explanatory:

First, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature campaigning, explicitly provides
that [i]t shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate,or for any
party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political
activity, except during the campaign period. Very simply, premature campaigning may be
committed even by a person who is not a candidate.

For this reason, the plain declaration in Lanot that [w]hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code prohibits is an election campaign or partisan political activity by a candidate outside of
the campaign period,[41] is clearly erroneous.

28
Second, Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines election campaign or partisan
political activity in the following manner:

SECTION 79. Definitions. - As used in this Code:

xxxx

(b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public
office which shall include:

(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for
the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda
for or against a candidate;

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or

against the election of any candidate for public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or

oppose the election of any candidate; or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of
the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered
a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly
declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming elections. The commission by
such a person of any of the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election
Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and
reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.

When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her
intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her
COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate,
hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. Also,
conversely, if said person, for any reason, withdraws his/her COC before the campaign period,
then there is no point to view his/her acts prior to said period as acts for the promotion of
his/her election as a candidate. In the latter case, there can be no premature campaigning as
there is no candidate, whose disqualification may be sought, to begin with.[42]

29
Third, in connection with the preceding discussion, the line in Section 15 of Republic Act No.
8436, as amended, which provides that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate
shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period, does not mean that the acts
constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the offender may be
disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the
dissent, nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the
campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a
candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts
described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan
political activity. However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the
beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning
under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a
candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts
constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign
period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous
advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to
his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election
campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys
an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, harmony in the provisions of Sections 80
and 79 of the Omnibus Election Code, as well as Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, is not only very possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the
legislative intent and policy of the law.

The laudable and exemplary intention behind the prohibition against premature campaigning, as
declared in Chavez v. Commission on Elections,[43] is to level the playing field for candidates of
public office, to equalize the situation between the popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and
lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue
advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The intention
for prohibiting premature campaigning, as explained in Chavez, could not have been
significantly altered or affected by Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, the avowed purpose of which is to carry-on the automation of the election
system. Whether the election would be held under the manual or the automated system,
the need for prohibiting premature campaigning to level the playing field between the
popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and the lesser-known or poorer candidates, on
the other, by allowing them to campaign only within the same limited period remains.
30
We cannot stress strongly enough that premature campaigning is a pernicious act that is
continuously threatening to undermine the conduct of fair and credible elections in our country,
no matter how great or small the acts constituting the same are. The choice as to who among the
candidates will the voting public bestow the privilege of holding public office should not be
swayed by the shrewd conduct, verging on bad faith, of some individuals who are able to spend
resources to promote their candidacies in advance of the period slated for campaign activities.

Verily, the consequences provided for in Section 68[44] of the Omnibus Election Code for the
commission of the prohibited act of premature campaigning are severe: the candidate who is
declared guilty of committing the offense shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate,
or, if he/she has been elected, from holding office. Not to mention that said candidate also faces
criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section 262 of the same Code.

The Dissenting Opinion, therefore, should not be too quick to pronounce the
ineffectiveness or repeal of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code just because of a
change in the meaning of candidate by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,
primarily, for administrative purposes. An interpretation should be avoided under which a
statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or
nugatory.[45] Indeed, not only will the prohibited act of premature campaigning be officially
decriminalized, the value and significance of having a campaign period before the conduct of
elections would also be utterly negated. Any unscrupulous individual with the deepest of
campaign war chests could then afford to spend his/her resources to promote his/her candidacy
well ahead of everyone else. Such is the very evil that the law seeks to prevent. Our lawmakers
could not have intended to cause such an absurd situation.

The Dissenting Opinion attempts to brush aside our preceding arguments by contending that
there is no room for statutory construction in the present case since Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8436,[46] as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,[47] is crystal clear in its
meaning. We disagree. There would only be no need for statutory construction if there is a
provision in Republic Act No. 8436 or Republic Act No. 9369 that explicitly states that there
shall be no more premature campaigning. But absent the same, our position herein, as well as
that of the Dissenting Opinion, necessarily rest on our respective construction of the legal
provisions involved in this case.

31
 Notably, while faulting us for resorting to statutory construction to resolve the instant
case, the Dissenting Opinion itself cites a rule of statutory construction, particularly, that penal
laws should be liberally construed in favor of the offender. The Dissenting Opinion asserts that
because of the third paragraph in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the election
offense described in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code is practically impossible to
commit at any time and that this flaw in the law, which defines a criminal act, must be
construed in favor of Penera, the offender in the instant case.

The application of the above rule is uncalled for. It was acknowledged in Lanot that a
disqualification case has two aspects: one, electoral;[48] the other, criminal.[49] The instant case
concerns only the electoral aspect of the disqualification case. Any discussion herein on the
matter of Peneras criminal liability for premature campaigning would be nothing more
than obiter dictum. More importantly, as heretofore already elaborated upon, Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, did not expressly or even impliedly repeal Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code, and these two provisions, based on legislative intent and policy,
can be harmoniously interpreted and given effect. Thus, there is no flaw created in the law,
arising from Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which needed to be construed
in Peneras favor.

The Dissenting Opinion further expresses the fear that pursuant to our theory, all the politicians
with infomercials prior to the filing of their COCs would be subject to disqualification, and this
would involve practically all the prospective presidential candidates who are now leading in the
surveys.

This fear is utterly unfounded. It is the filing by the person of his/her COC through
which he/she explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming
elections. It is such declaration which would color the subsequent acts of said person to be
election campaigning or partisan political activities as described under Section 79(b) of the
Omnibus Election Code. It bears to point out that, at this point, no politician has yet
submitted his/her COC. Also, the plain solution to this rather misplaced apprehension is for
the politicians themselves to adhere to the letter and intent of the law and keep within the
bounds of fair play in the pursuit of their candidacies. This would mean that after filing their
COCs, the prudent and proper course for them to take is to wait for the designated start of the
campaign period before they commence their election campaign or partisan political
activities. Indeed, such is the only way for them to avoid disqualification on the ground of
premature campaigning. It is not for us to carve out exceptions to the law, much more to decree
away the repeal thereof, in order to accommodate any class of individuals, where no such
exception or repeal is warranted.
32
Lastly, as we have observed at the beginning, Peneras Petition is essentially grounded on
questions of fact. Peneras defense against her disqualification, before the COMELEC and this
Court, rests on the arguments that she and her partymates did not actually hold a motorcade;
that their supporters spontaneously accompanied Penera and the other candidates from her
political party when they filed their certificates of candidacy; that the alleged motorcade was
actually the dispersal of the supporters of Penera and the other candidates from her party as said
supporters were dropped off at their respective barangays; and that Andanar was not able to
present competent, admissible, and substantial evidence to prove that Penera committed
premature campaigning. Penera herself never raised the argument that she can no longer be
disqualified for premature campaigning under Section 80, in relation to Section 68, of the
Omnibus Election Code, since the said provisions have already been, in the words of the
Dissenting Opinion, rendered inapplicable, repealed, and done away with by Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. This legal argument was wholly raised by the Dissenting
Opinion.

As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and
decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change theory on appeal. Points of law,
theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first
time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule.[50] If we do not
allow and consider the change in theory of a case by a party on appeal, should we not also
refrain from motu proprio adopting a theory which none of the parties even raised before us?
Nonetheless, the questions of fact raised by Penera and questions of law raised by the
Dissenting Opinion must all be resolved against Penera. Penera should be disqualified from
holding office as Mayor of Sta. Monica for having committed premature campaigning when,
right after she filed her COC, but still a day before the start of the campaign period, she took
part in a motorcade, which consisted of two jeepneys and ten motorcycles laden with multi-
colored balloons that went around several barangays of Sta. Monica, and gave away candies to
the crowd.

Succession

Despite the disqualification of Penera, we cannot grant Andanars prayer to be allowed to

assume the position of Mayor of Sta. Monica. The well-established principle is that the
ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected.[51]

33
In this case, the rules on succession under the Local Government Code shall apply, to wit:

SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and
Vice-Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the xxx mayor, the x x x vice-
mayor concerned shall become the x x x mayor.

xxxx

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office. (Emphases ours.)

Considering Peneras disqualification from holding office as Mayor of Sta. Monica, the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as Mayor.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is

hereby DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the
COMELEC Second Division and en banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224 are
hereby AFFIRMED. In view of the disqualification of petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera from
running for the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, and the resulting permanent
vacancy therein, it is hereby DECLARED that the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is the rightful
successor to said office. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 4 March 2008 is
hereby ORDERED lifted. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

34
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-
general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR
JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under
"Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG
YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP;
and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people
who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate
directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now
dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this
lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.

The Case

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1issued
by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and
capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as]
35
heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of
these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two
(2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These
numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the
Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December
22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were
denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-
list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations,
but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:

"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation
scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization
to directly participate in this electoral window.

"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.

"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep
the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who
substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or
evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of
[some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said
certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents
not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna
and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 5

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within
three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3,
2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. 8

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9before
this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a
non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also
challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective
Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It
added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but
barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.

36
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral
Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their
respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15

Issues:

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:

"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?

"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.

"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785." 16

The Court's Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus
Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.

First Issue:

Recourse Under Rule 65

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain,
speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that
petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of
registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9,
2000. 19

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001.
Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a
verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no
motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure. 21

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that
Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there
was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to
this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality
because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.

In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of
other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of

37
urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must
urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules." 25

Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves
the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26

Second Issue:

Participation of Political Parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list
system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects
to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the
impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the
party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations." 29

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the
party-list system.

"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the
participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between
Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33

"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP,
Liberal at Nacionalista?

MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."

Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in
order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat
in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that
there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000
votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But
this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in
legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."

38
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political
party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government
and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office."

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list
system. We quote the pertinent provision below:

"x x x

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation
in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.

x x x"

Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.

Third Issue:

Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or
any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must
be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:

"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission
declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence,
when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully,
usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature."35

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in
accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
39
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-
style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole.

The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack ofwell-
defined constituencies."

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-
list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group.
Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration
in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the
persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who
have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this
intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in
Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its
constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban

40
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear
intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38

The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941
"does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may
participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the
super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41

The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that
the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion
of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the
party-list system.

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by
the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's
position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna
Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters
could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more
awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of
one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only
genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns
of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its
noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily,
it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even
those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and
participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and
desecrating this social justice vehicle.

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections
normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled
80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the
OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the
party-list elections.

As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the chance
of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest
scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within

41
it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to
do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged
sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.

The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory
"open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the
benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special
privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through
regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of
Congress.

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system
would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the
intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could
not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.

This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.

Refutation of the Separate Opinions

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are
anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.

The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still
prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous
aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in
order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention
'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of
the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions
ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.

But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x
x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not
even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual
opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.

42
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence,
they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.

Fourth Issue:

Grave Abuse of Discretion

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the
law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed
above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and
overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution
or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49Indeed, the
function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-
guess it. 50

In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political
parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No.
4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001
elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns,
Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to
the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which
parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.

What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents
herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate
in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.

Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is
a government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51It is
not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they
qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in
and be elected under the party-list system.

Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections
comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following
guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the
interest of such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in
the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words,
while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that
43
they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and
other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:

"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52

Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is
allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be
represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following
discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

"MR. OPLE. x x x

In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and
supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties
I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that
also not fall within this prohibition?

MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec
can pierce through the legal fiction."54

The following discussion is also pertinent:

"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course,
prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent
their group.

REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the
Protestant Church et cetera."55

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered."56 The
prohibition was explained by a member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any
religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a
candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party."58

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the
grounds for disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

44
 (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%)
of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered."59

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with
election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system
seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does
not comply with this policy must be disqualified.

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by,
the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens,
organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the
government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but
also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9
of RA 7941 reads as follows:

"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors;
so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who
belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth
cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist.
To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be
able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or
regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x."61

Epilogue

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives."

Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should
have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the
great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced,

45
and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo
and seize the opportunity.

Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the
party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances
of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list
system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further
weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.

In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are
nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of
people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the
makers of RA 7941.

WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have
garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further
DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof. 1w phi 1.nt

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any winner"
during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported
its compliance with the foregoing disposition.

This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003.
Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had
parties or movements to back up his candidacy.

On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same
46
under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and
thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by
a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner
Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.

In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in
violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987

Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly
amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to
choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all
the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other
countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate
of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable
guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and his
program of government.

First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.

Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public
office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to
seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles
and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,2 and there is no
plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.4

An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory.
The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public
office and prohibit public dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought
forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of
the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise:

I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be
equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would
be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also
possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should
not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to
what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the
word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as
many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the
framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition
of a clear State burden.

47
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It
is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are
not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of
the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights
may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some
valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining
the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by
any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and has
to be accorded due weight.

Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
misplaced.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have
not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that
its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the
practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for
the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated
electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships,
whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency,
but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:

[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum
of support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot the interest,
if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].11

The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17
January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in the
COMELECs Comment:

There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions
because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national
campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates,
Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For
the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more
or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000.00).

xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent
campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.12

48
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in
the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in
every polling place,13 watchers in the board of canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral
contributions.15Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the
number of candidates in a given election.

Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is
not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body
would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance
candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."

The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to
ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract
and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of
elections16 and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion of
free, orderly and honest elections.17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public
office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.18 The determination of bona fide candidates is
governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.

Now, the needed factual premises.

However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the
petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions
of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that petitioner was a
nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the
matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.

Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials
as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the
reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to
their respective Comments.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual
determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.

A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioners aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It
deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process.

As to petitioners attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form
strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a
certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to show that the candidate possesses
the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as established by the Constitution and other election laws.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC
for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with
deliberate dispatch.
49
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.

J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.

Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and
assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter,
League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he
was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated
May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His
naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution
by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed,
being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in
accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper party
because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections
decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for
reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition
for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the
merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.

In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen
and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not
qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was
not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent
Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his
alienage. Even if their petition were to be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten
days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of his
naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only
for the League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone.

50
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of
the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was
disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of
Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also
joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable
because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of
Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of
Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American
citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L.
396 (1955)] where a German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been
obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections
because the Special Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet been
organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of
repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American
citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his
prayer for the rejection of the move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to resolve it directly
instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a, long
delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and the vital principles of public
office to be here applied.

It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial
and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through
its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was
taken by him after consultation with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision
of the COMELEC itself that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of Court and the
Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as having been filed in accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of
the Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC.

The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of
his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are
merely secondary to this basic question.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of
the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines
and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen
of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he
was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District
Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

September 23, 1988

51
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915, was naturalized
in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization No. 11690178.

Petition No. 280225.

Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER

Clerk

by:

(Sgd.)

ARACELI V. BAREN

Deputy Clerk

This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer.
Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the
persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States.

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing
American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free
and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of
them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been
coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to
the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely
renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty
of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of
the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who,
unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to
the Marcos regime.

The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective
nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of
the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows:

Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated
as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of
personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities
which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the

52
 nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the
nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact
most closely connected.

Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and
acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many
members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had
declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that
he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against
Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with
which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.

That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the
nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar;
in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question
presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws,
regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own
territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to
determine under its law who are its nationals."

It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the
present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the
petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the
laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him
and the United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his
naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of
automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what
might have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a
stateless individual.

Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special
Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that
body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious Such a conclusion
would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to
claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their adoptedstate and reaffirming
their allegiance to the Philippines.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing
his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship.
But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously
disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what
that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by
legislative or judicial proceedings.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for
tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
53
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say,
a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his
nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may
no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even
denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his
proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while
owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty
to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of
great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored.
This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother.
Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The
returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and
love.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared
not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the
duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. The
temporary restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., took no part.

Cortes J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher interests of the
State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural infinities which may affect a
petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person who
by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of any
province.

It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest
whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional. 1
54
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation
should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election results. 2 The purpose of the
law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite
time within which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide summary
proceedings for the settlement of such disputes. 3 The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the
Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who performs an act which works a
forfeiture of his office. 4 However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that there are no good
reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, 5 the Court should allow a person like respondent
Estuye or his league to bring the action.

I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an
elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. 6Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for
ineligibility, 7 I believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.

The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for the
final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the total lack of any serious
grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to
concur in the procedure pro hac vice.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher interests of the
State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural infinities which may affect a
petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person who
by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of any
province.

It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest
whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional. 1

As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation
should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election results. 2 The purpose of the
law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite
time within which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide summary
proceedings for the settlement of such disputes. 3 The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the
Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who performs an act which works a
forfeiture of his office. 4 However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that there are no good
reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, 5 the Court should allow a person like respondent
Estuye or his league to bring the action.

I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an
elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. 6Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for
ineligibility, 7 I believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.

The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for the
final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the total lack of any serious
grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to
concur in the procedure pro hac vice.

55
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989

RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents

Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.

Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the question of his
citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is
not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this
matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.

It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition itself but of the payment of
the filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of
P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown
that the petition was indeed filed beyond the reglementary period, there is no question that this petition must be
granted and the challenge abated.

The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The petition
for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date.
This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself
alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid. This was done
beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:

SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of a Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission
within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the election.

The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of
the COMELEC providing that

Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment of a filing fee in
the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee as required by law.

and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing fee is essential to the
timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this effect, specifically Manchester
v. Court of Appeals. 1

For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he says, it was
flied ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate
Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a
56
pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it
was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo
warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid
the filing fee on that date.

The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-
proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed suspended
under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure cited by the petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after publication of the said
Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January 26,1988,
when he filed his petition with the COMELEC.

In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it, the payment of filing
fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC,
promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private respondent counters
that the latter resolution was intended for the local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988
local elections, which were supposed to be governed by the first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996
took effect only on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its publication as required by RA No.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on January 5, 1988. Its
Section 30 provides in part:

Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. The rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in the
Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on
time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency
of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the
payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the
payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was
even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in
the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.

The petitioner forgets Ta;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the resolutions became effective "immediately upon
approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that case that publication was still necessary under the
due process clause despite such effectivity clause.

In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may have been is not
imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, we required the timely
payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however this Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that case, declared:

This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the payment of the said fee within
a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be dismissed.

The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20,
1988, thus:

Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. If the fees above prescribed are not paid,
the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or
the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for
failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as
"a futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public
57
office can be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the
reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.

This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo
warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and considering the
necessity for an early resolution of that more important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we
shall directly address it now in this same action.

The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:

From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would appear that our sole
function in this proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for new trial of the GSIS in question should indeed be
deemed pro forma. But going over the extended pleadings of both parties, the Court is immediately
impressed that substantial justice may not be timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon
such a technical ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the
parties, very ably and comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually
competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve the interests of justice by broadening the scope
of our inquiry, for as the record before us stands, we see that there is enough basis for us to end the
basic controversy between the parties here and now, dispensing, however, with procedural steps
which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of their respective claims. 6

xxx

While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and thereby allowing the period
for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case to
the proper court which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the
length of time that this case has been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v.
Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:

... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of
future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial
court only to have its decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court and
from there to this Court. (p. 43)

Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141,
January 29, 1988), we stated that:

... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts dictate the rendition of a
verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore no point in referring the case back to the Court of
Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions involved will not change, nor should the ultimate
judgment. Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that the
controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil.
57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA
575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162). Sound lwph1.t

practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to
the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v.
Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of
justice so demand ... the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21
SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case,
the dictates of justice do demand that this Court act, and act with finality. 7

xxx

58
 Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the
court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the
Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the
merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends
of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an
early disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the
parties. 8

This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that
a foreigner is holding a public office.

We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:

In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as "its own"
private respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has
not respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by reason of prejudgment, from resolving
the petition for quo warranto filed by private respondent still pending before it? 9

This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of this case.

Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's
citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be
a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on
11
September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines.

The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate
Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the petition
"without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." Commissioner
Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have
been made with the Australian Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an
Australian.

The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano
and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is important to observe that in the proceeding
before the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen
of Australia. This conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married
an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this
country in 1980.

On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the Australian Government
dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of
that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:

I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a certificate of appointment signed and
sealed by the Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter
of Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby
provide the following statement in response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the
Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the
statement is true and correct.

STATEMENT

A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married in the Philippines
to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not required to meet normal

59
 requirements for the grant of citizenship and was granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28
July 1976.

B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship must take an oath of
allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I ...,
renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This need not necessarily have any effect on his former
nationality as this would depend on the citizenship laws of his former country.

C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June 1980 on
the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.

D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.

E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of Section 50 of Australian
Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of false or misleading information of a material
nature in respect of an application for Australian citizenship. If such a prosecution was successful,
he could be deprived of Australian citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.

F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australian citizenship:

(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship under Section 18 of the
Australian Citizenship Act, or

(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntary act other than
marriage, then he would automatically lose as Australian citizenship under Section 17 of the Act.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN
EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.

(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul

This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private respondent by the
Department of Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13

Sir:

With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry made with the
Australian Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra has elicited the following
information:

1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.

2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either swear an oath of
allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a renunciation of "all other allegiance.

Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant
Secretary

The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian reading as follows:

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors
60
 according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an
Australian citizen. 14

and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:

AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and declare that I will be
faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs
and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia and fulfill my
duties as an Australian citizen. 15

The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained
Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before
the immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-
323985. 16 He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was
granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia
in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court
on the ground that he was a foreigner. 18

The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that did not divest the
petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members joined in this finding. We reject this ruling
as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences of his acts,
let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel when he performed these acts.

The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and stresses Labo's political affiliation
with the party in power then, but we need not go into that now.

There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this
too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several
cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's comment. Besides, one
of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.

The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of
Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because
of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and
positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above.
Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the
Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."

The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not
divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA
No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1)
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is
also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found
that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his
Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between
him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine
citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may

61
have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically
reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization
as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with
PD No. 725, providing that:

... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by
Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their
certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)

That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien
certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his present claim for recognition as a citizen of
the Philippines.

The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the
Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He was
therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in
material part as follows:

Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay,
municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one
year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English,
Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.

The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of
the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not
as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that
locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia,
or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as
mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.

The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified
only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held
by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the
office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently
lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from
running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can
replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest
number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections 22 decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That
decision was supported by eight members of the Court then 23 with three dissenting 24 and another two reserving their
vote. 25 One was on official leave. 26

62
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case
of Geronimo v. Ramos, 27 Which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the
doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes 28 was supported by ten members of the Court 29 without any
dissent, although one reserved his vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two others were on leave. 32 There the Court held:

... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared
through their ballots that they do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental Idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried
unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris
2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote
the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.

It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless
gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he
must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him material and other
attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he
sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to
be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an
undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be
restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he
solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be
accomplished by election to public office.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and
surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and executory. The
temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri;o-
Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

63
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 202202 March 19, 2013

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO, Petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the March 22, 2012
Decision1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) which
declared the validity of private respondent Lucy Marie Torres-Gomezs substitution as the Liberal Partys
replacement candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in lieu of Richard
Gomez.

The Facts

On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy2 (CoC) with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte
under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates,
Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition,3 alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of
College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910
Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should
be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richards CoC be denied
due course and/or cancelled.5

On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution6 granting Juntillas petition without any
qualification. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVE, to GRANT the Petition
to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O. JUNTILLA against RICHARD I.
GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth
District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc through a
Resolution dated May 4, 2010.7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted the said resolution
with finality "in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution."8

On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC9 together with a Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the partys official substitute candidate vice
her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to various letter-requests submitted to the
COMELECs Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative
functions, issued Resolution No. 889011 on May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the said
department to allow the substitution of private respondent. The recommendation reads:

64
 STUDY AND OBSERVATION

On the same date, this Department received an Opposition from Mr. Buenaventura O. Juntilla, thru his counsel,
opposing the candidacy of Ms. Lucy Marie Torres Gomez, as a substitute candidate for Mr. Richard I. Gomez.

The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no substitution because there is no
candidate to substitute for.

It must be stressed that the resolution of the First Division, this Commission, in SPA No. 09-059 speaks for
disqualification of candidate Richard I. Gomez and not of cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petition to
Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed x x x against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I.
GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of
residency requirement.

The said resolution was affirmed by the Commission En Banc on May 04, 2010.

The disqualification of a candidate does not automatically cancel ones certificate of candidacy, especially when it is
nominated by a political party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the candidate whose candidacy
was declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege given to a political party to exercise and not
dependent totally to a candidate.

Nonetheless, in case of doubt, the same must always be resolved to the qualification of a candidate to run in the
public office.

The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of Comelec
Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the following:

xxxx

2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD
GOMEZ: (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration12 (May 9, 2010
Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution

Pending resolution of Juntillas May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were conducted as scheduled
on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richards, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101, 250 votes
while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493
votes, respectively.13 In view of the aforementioned substitution, Richards votes were credited in favor of private
respondent and as a result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

On May 11, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending May 9, 2010 Motion relative to
Resolution No. 8890.14 The said motion, however, remained unacted.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition15 for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust private respondent
from her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with the one (1) year residency requirement

65
under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution considering that the transfer of her voter registration from San Rafael
Bulacan16 to the Fourth District of Leyte was only applied for on July 23, 2009; (2) she did not validly substitute
Richard as his CoC was void ab initio; and (3) private respondents CoC was void due to her non-compliance with
the prescribed notarial requirements i.e., she failed to present valid and competent proof of her identity before the
notarizing officer.17

In her Verified Answer,18 private respondent denied petitioners allegations and claimed that she validly substituted
her husband in the electoral process. She also averred that she personally known to the notary public who notarized
her CoC, one Atty. Edgardo Cordeno, and thus, she was not required to have presented any competent proof of
identity during the notarization of the said document. Lastly, she asserted that despite her marriage to Richard and
exercise of profession in Metro Manila, she continued to maintain her residency in Ormoc City which was the place
where she was born and raised.

During the preliminary conference, and as shown in the Preliminary Conference Order dated September 2, 2010,
the parties agreed on the following issues for resolution:

1. Whether or not the instant petition for quo warranto is meritorious;

2. Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid;
3. Whether or not a petition for quo warranto can be used as a substitute for failure to file the necessary
petition for disqualification with the COMELEC;
4. Whether or not respondents COC was duly subscribed; and
5. Whether or not respondent is ineligible for the position of Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte for
lack of residency requirement.19

Ruling of the HRET

After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision20 which dismissed the quo warranto
petition and declared that private respondent was a qualified candidate for the position of Leyte Representative
(Fourth Legislative District). It observed that the resolution denying Richards candidacy i.e., the COMELEC First
Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution, spoke of disqualification and not of CoC cancellation. Hence, it held that
the substitution of private respondent in lieu of Richard was legal and valid.21 Also, it upheld the validity of private
respondents CoC due to petitioners failure to controvert her claim that she was personally known to the notary
public who notarized her CoC.22 Finally, the HRET ruled that while it had been admitted that private respondent
resides in Colgate Street, San Juan City and lived in San Rafael, Bulacan, the fact was she continued to retain her
domicile in Ormoc City given that her absence therefrom was only temporary.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues Before the Court

The crux of the present controversy is whatever or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that Richard
was validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in
view of the formers failure to meet the one (1) year residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of
the Constitution.

It is petitioners submission that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the validity of private
respondents substitution despite contrary jurisprudence holding that substitution is impermissible where the
substituted candidates CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled, as in the case of Richard. On the other
hand, respondents maintain that Richards CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled by the COMELEC
as he was only "disqualified" and therefore, was properly substituted by private respondent.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

66
A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a certificate of
candidacy

The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidates bid for public office.
Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section 68;
and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions
between the two are well-perceived.

Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidates possession of a
permanent resident status in a foreign country;24 or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification.
Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations
of other penal laws.25 In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance ones
candidacy; (3) spending in ones election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting,
receiving or making any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating
Sections 80,26 83,27 85,28 8629 and 261, paragraphs d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33and cc, sub-paragraph 634 of the OEC.
Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or
she is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have
committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public office, or
disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected.35

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a
candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however,
deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidates compliance with the eligibility requirements
as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to
discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election
offenses.

On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the
OEC36 is premised on a persons misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective
office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a
false representation of the same in the CoC.37 The nature of a Section 78 petition was discussed in the case of
Fermin v. COMELEC,38 where the Court illumined:

Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidates states in his/her CoC
that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently
states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny
due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a
quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a
petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less ones intent to
defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the persons declaration of a material
qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person
committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether ones CoC
should be deemed cancelled or not.39 What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due
course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of ones ineligibility and that the same be granted without any
qualification.40

Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all
intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled
under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is
67
considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes.41 In Talaga
v. COMELEC42 (Talaga), the Court ruled that:

x x x x While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person
who certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she
never filed a CoC.

The foregoing variance gains utmost importance to the present case considering its implications on candidate
substitution.

B. Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution

Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a
CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. It states that:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate
of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution proceeds. Thus,
whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said section
unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted.43

As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party,
aggroupment, or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be
considered a candidate. The requirement of having a CoC obtains even greater importance if one considers its
nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes not only a persons public declaration to run for office but evidences as well
his or her statutory eligibility to be elected for the said post. In Sinaca v. Mula,44 the Court has illumined:

A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidates political
creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he
announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and the be is eligible for the office, the name of the political party
to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

In this regard, the CoC is the document which formally accords upon a person the status of a candidate. In other
words, absent a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal contemplation. As held in Talaga:45

x x x a persons declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility
for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that
render the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as the
precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that if a
persons CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the
electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to
be validly substituted.46

C. Divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC cases vis--vis
candidate substitution

68
Proceeding, from the foregoing discourse, it is evident that there lies a clear-cut distinction between a
disqualification case under Section 68 and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC case under Section
78 vis--vis their respective effects on candidate substitution under Section 77.1wphi 1

As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya47 (Miranda), a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be
validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose
CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not
considered a candidate.48 Stated differently, since there would be no candidate to speak of under a denial of due
course to and/or cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be no candidate to be substituted; the same does not
obtain, however, in a disqualification case since there remains to be a candidate to be substituted, although his or
her candidacy is discontinued.

On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where substitution is
permissible, that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause." Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not included in the said section and
therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.

D. Application to the case at bar

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure to
comply with the one year residency requirement.49 The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word
"disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the
COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in
denying the quo warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified and not that his CoC
was denied due course to and/or cancelled would mean that he could have been validly substitute by private
respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.

Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree the denial of
due course to and/or cancellation of Richards CoC should not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from
declaring the invalidity of private respondents substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal
basis for Richards "disqualification" is his failure to comply with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article
VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78
of the OEC, misrepresentation contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting ones
qualifications for elective office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino
status.51 There is therefore no legal basis to support a finding of disqualification within the ambit of election laws.
Accordingly, given Richards non-compliance with the one year residency requirement, it cannot be mistaken that
the COMELEC First Divisions unqualified grant of Juntillas "Verified Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of
Qualification"52 which prayed that the COMELEC declare Richard "DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE from seeking
the office of Member of the House of Representatives" and "x x x that his Certificate of Candidacy x x x be DENIED
DUE COURSE and/or CANCELLED"53 carried with it the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richards
CoC pursuant to Section 78.

Case law dictates that if a petition prays for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC and the same is
granted by the COMELEC without any qualification, the cancellation of the candidates CoC in in order. This is
precisely the crux of the Miranda ruling wherein the Court, in upholding the COMELEC En Bancs nullification of the
substitution in that case, decreed that the COMELEC Divisions unqualified grant of the petition necessarily included
the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of the candidates CoC, notwithstanding the use of the term
"disqualified" in the COMELEC Divisions resolution, as the foregoing was prayed for in the said petition:

The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joiel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the COMELEC
in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondents petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

69
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of
Mayor for the City of Snatiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the COMELEC ruled favorably
in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent
JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the COMELEC resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is
sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no
qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the
specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy.

xxxx

There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due
course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda. There is likewise no question that the
said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the
COMELEC granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the
said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and
cancelled. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same rule was later discussed in the case of Talaga, viz:

3. Granting without any qualification or petition in SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELECs intention to declare
Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC

xxxx

In Miranda v. Abaya, the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due course and/or
cancelled". The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced in apparent contradiction
that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any
qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Mirandas CoC.

xxxx

The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of cancelling or
denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any qualification. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First Divisions
February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Departments finding that Richard was only "disqualified"
and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval of private
respondents substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Divisions ruling encompassed the
cancellation of Richards CoC and in consequence, disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was
therefore grave and serious error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondents
substitution.

70
Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Bancs error as above-discussed, the HRET committed a grave
abuse of discretion, warranting the grant of the instant petition.

Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.54 While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been empowered by
the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check "whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.55 In other words, when the
HRET utterly disregards the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of
discretion.

Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional candidate for the Fourth District of
Leyte due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement; (2) Juntillas petition prayed for the
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of his CoC; and (3) the COMELEC First Division granted the foregoing
petition without any qualification. By these undisputed and essential facts alone, the HRET should not have adopted
the COMELEC En Bancs erroneous finding that the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution
"speaks only of "disqualification and not of cancellation of Richards CoC"36 and thereby, sanctioned the substitution
of private respondent.

Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to the
qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge57 of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by COMELEC resolutions, else its
constitutional mandate58 be circumvented and rendered nugatory. Instructive on this point is the Courts disquisition
in Fernandez v. HRET,59 to wit:

Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET, when
reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is concerned, is "co-equal", to the
COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The
truth is the other way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or contest at
issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo
warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping
even if another body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the
Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only where two cases
involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature
and character. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notably, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. More particularly, the term "qualifications" refers to matters that
could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the pro-claimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility, or
the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.60 As used in Section 74 of the OEC, the word "eligible" means having
the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for
the public office.61 In this relation, private respondents own qualification to run for public office which was
inextricably linked to her husbands own qualifications due to her substitution was the proper subject of quo
warranto proceedings falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET and independent from any previous
proceedings before the COMELEC, lest the jurisdiction divide between the two be blurred.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRETs independence is not without limitation. As earlier mentioned,
the Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over the HRET if only to check whether or not it has gravely abused its
discretion. In this regard, the Court does not endeavor to denigrate nor undermine the HRETs independence;
rather, it merely fulfills its duty to ensure that the Constitution and the laws are upheld through the exercise of its
power of judicial review.

In fine, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by deliberately adopting the COMELEC En
Bancs flawed findings regarding private respondents eligibility to run for public office which essentially stemmed
from her substitution. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET gravely abused its discretion.

71
Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate for
the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could
not have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other
issues respecting private respondents own qualification to office.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision rendered by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 147909. April 16, 2002]

MAUYAG B. PAPANDAYAN, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and FAHIDA P. BALT, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution, dated May 8, 2001, of the Second Division[1] of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr. as a candidate for
municipal mayor of the Municipality of Tubaran, Province of Lanao del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections, and
the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, dated May 12, 2001, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In the May 14, 2001 elections, three candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur,
namely: petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr., respondent Fahida P. Balt, who was the incumbent mayor
seeking reelection, and Maiko Hassan Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner in SPC
Case No. 01-114 of the COMELEC, alleging that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran,
Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
In support of her allegation, respondent submitted the joint affidavit,[2] dated February 14, 2001, of
Barangay Chairman Hadji Bashir Ayonga and two members of the Sangguniang Barangay of Tangcal, Tubaran,
Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, stating that petitioner never resided in Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran as
they personally knew all the registered voters of the said barangay; that petitioner omitted to own nor lease any
house in Barangay Tangcal; and that petitioners father, the late Mauyag Papandayan, Sr., who was a school
superintendent, and his family were permanent residents of Bayang, Lanao del Sur. Respondent also submitted
a similar affidavit,[3] dated February 17, 2001, of Samoranao Sarip, a member of the Sangguniang Barangay of
Tangcal. She averred that petitioner did not state in his Voter Registration Record,[4] accomplished on May 8,
1999, the number of years and months (Annex D-1) he had been a resident of the Municipality of Tubaran.

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 In his answer,[5] petitioner claimed that he was a resident of No. 13 Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran; that he
was the son of the late Mauyag Capal Papandayan, Sr., a former school superintendent, and Hadja Khalida
Magangcong Balt; that both the Capal and Papandayan clans were natives of Tangcal, Tubaran, and the
Magangcong clan were from Boribid, Tubaran while most of the Balt clan were residents of Bayang; that in
1990, he transferred his domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there with his wife Raina Guina
Dimaporo, whose family and relatives were residents and natives of Tangcal, Tubaran; that he managed an
agricultural land in Tubaran which he co-owned with his family; and that he filed in 1998 his certificate of
candidacy for the position of municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later withdrew.
To support his allegations, petitioner presented the following:
1. Affidavit,[6] dated March 8, 2001, of Taha C. Ali, Municipal Election Officer of the Office of the
Assistant Regional Election Director of the COMELEC, Region XII, Iligan City, stating that, based on the
continuous verification of household members in Tubaran, petitioner and his wife lived at No. 13 Barangay
Tangcal, Tubaran.
2. Affidavit of Witness,[7] dated March 8, 2001, of Delgado Caontongan, stating that he was an elementary
school teacher of Tubaran and that he was appointed Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of
Precinct No. 28-A in Tangcal, Tubaran in the May 8, 1999 registration of voters; that he personally received the
Voter Registration Record of petitioner whom he knew to be a resident of Tubaran; and that he knew petitioner
to be a qualified voter and, for that reason, he approved petitioners Voter Registration Record and included his
name in the master list of voters in Precinct No. 28-A.
3. Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor[8] of petitioner, filed on January 11, 2001, with the COMELEC
stating, among other things, that he was born on October 14, 1964; that his place of birth was Marawi City; that
he was employed as a municipal employee of a local government unit in Bayang; that he was a resident of
Tangcal, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur; that he was a registered voter of Precinct No. 28-A in Barangay Tangcal,
Tubaran, Lanao del Sur; and that his length of residency in the Philippines was 36 years and 10 months (Annex
3-A).
4. Affidavit of Witness,[9] dated March 8, 2001, of Rafael Guina Dimaporo (brother of petitioners wife),
stating that his family and the family of petitioner were residents of Tangcal, Tubaran; that his relatives on the
maternal side (the Andag and the Guina clans) were natives of Barangays Tangcal and Datumanong, both in the
Municipality of Tubaran; and that during the May 11, 1992 national and local elections, he was one of the
mayoralty candidates who garnered the second highest number of votes.
5. Affidavit of Witness,[10] dated March 8, 2001, of Sobair Tagtal, stating that he was a farmer and one of
the share tenants of an agricultural land located in Tubaran, co-owned by petitioner and the latters siblings; that
petitioner had been managing the land and residing in Tangcal, Tubaran since 1990; and that he knew petitioner
filed his certificate of candidacy in the 1998 mayoralty election in Tubaran.
6. Certification,[11] dated March 7, 2001, by Salem Buzar, Election Officer in Bayang, Lanao del Sur,
certifying that petitioner was not registered as a voter of Bayang in the May 11, 1998 and May 14, 2001
elections.
7. Affidavit of Desistance,[12] dated March 8, 2001, of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, stating that he was
withdrawing the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, which he had earlier executed, together with Hadji
Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, as he did not understand the consequences of signing the said affidavit and its
contents had not been explained to him; that he did not know that the affidavit would be used in a
disqualification case against petitioner who was a first cousin of his grandchildren; that he knew petitioner to be
a registered voter and a candidate for municipal mayor in Tubaran; and that petitioner is a native of Tubaran
because he is a descendant of Datu Sa Tatarikun Tangcal (Sumowa) on the paternal side and a legitimate
member of the Sultanate of Boribid in Tubaran on the maternal side.

73
 8. Affidavit of Desistance,[13] dated March 8, 2001, of Samoranao Sarip, stating that he was withdrawing the
affidavit, dated February 17, 2001, which he had earlier executed, as he did not understand the consequences of
signing the said affidavit and its contents had not been explained to him; that he did not know that the affidavit
would be used in a disqualification case against petitioner; that he knew petitioner to be a registered voter and a
candidate for municipal mayor of Tubaran; and that petitioner is a native of Tubaran because he is a descendant
of Datu Sa Tatarikun Tangcal (Sumowa) on the paternal side and a legitimate member of the Sultanate of
Boribid in Tubaran on the maternal side.
In its resolution, dated May 8, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-114 declared
petitioner to be disqualified and ordered his name to be stricken off the list of candidates and all votes cast in his
favor not to be counted but considered as stray votes. Citing the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, of
Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe, and Saadori Buat and the affidavit of Samoranao Sarip stating that
petitioner had not at any time been a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran, the COMELEC ruled that it was the fact of
petitioners residence, not the statement in his certificate of candidacy, which determined whether or not he had
satisfied the residency requirement of one (1) year preceding the May 14, 2001 elections. In finding that
petitioner never intended to relinquish his former domicile in Bayang, the COMELEC took note of the
testimony of petitioner in the exclusion proceedings against him before the municipal trial court (Election Case
Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T), in which petitioner stated that he was living in Marawi City where he was the
private secretary of Mayor Abdillah Ampatua.
On May 14, 2001, elections were held in Tubaran. Petitioner was among those voted by the electorate for
the position of municipal mayor. On May 15, 2001, he received a telegram[14] from the COMELEC notifying
him of the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc which denied his motion for
reconsideration.
On May 17, 2001, he filed the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, on May 19, 2001, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC (First Division) in SPC No.
01-039 seeking the issuance of an order directing the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of Tubaran to count
and tally the ballots cast in his favor during the May 14, 2001 elections pursuant to COMELEC Resolution N.
4116. The said resolution provides that if the disqualification case has not become final and executory on the
day of the election, the BEI shall tally and count the votes of the candidate declared disqualified.
On the other hand, respondent filed a pre-proclamation case (SPC No. 01-259) in the COMELEC.
On May 29, 2001, the First Division of the COMELEC (in SPC No. 01-039) issued an order suspending the
proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Tubaran pending the resolution of this present
petition. However, despite the said order (in SPC No. 01-039), the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tubaran
proceeded with the proclamation of petitioner on June 3, 2001. Upon motion of respondent, therefore, the
COMELEC (First Division), in an order, dated June 25, 2001, set aside the proclamation of petitioner, without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate charges against the members of the Board responsible for the
proclamation.[15] Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution, dated January 30, 2002, sustaining the
annulment of the proclamation of petitioner and dismissing SPC No. 01-039 for being moot and academic. It
appears that, as a consequence thereof, the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Tubaran assumed the position of mayor
pursuant to the COMELEC en banc resolution dated January 30, 2002.
On May 22, 2001, this Court required the COMELEC and respondent Fahida Balt to comment on the
petition and, upon the posting of a bond by petitioner in the amount of P10,000.00, issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from implementing its resolutions of May 8 and May 12, 2001.
In a manifestation,[16] dated May 28, 2001, petitioner submitted the certificates of votes (Annexes A to A-
30), duly signed by the BEI Chairman and his two members, showing that in the 31 precincts of Tubaran, he
obtained 1,744 votes [should be 1,730] votes, while respondent Balt and Bantuas obtained 1,528 votes [should
74
be 1,540 votes] and 974 votes [should be 967 votes], respectively. Respondent countered that, despite these
results, petitioner could not be proclaimed mayor as she had appealed from the ruling of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Tubaran, wherein she sought the exclusion and the annulment of the election returns from certain
precincts in Tubaran because of massive fraud, terrorism, and substitution of registered voters.
After canvass of the election returns, the Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a Municipal Certificate of
Canvass[17] showing the following results:

Petitioner Papandayan 1,744 votes

Respondent Balt 1,540 votes
Maiko Hassan Bantuas 968 votes

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion in lieu of a comment, recommending that this Court grant
the present petition. It contends that the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, of Barangay Chairman Hadji
Bashir Ayonga and Sangguniang Barangay members Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, stating that
petitioner had not at any time been a resident of Tubaran, constituted hearsay evidence as the three affiants were
never presented during the proceedings of the case. In fact, one of the affiants, Hadji Bashir Ayonga, later
executed an Affidavit of Desistance, dated March 8, 2001, retracting his earlier statements. As for the
statements made by petitioner in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T, pending before the municipal
trial court, that he was then not residing in Bayang but in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur although living in Marawi
City, the Solicitor General says that the same does not necessarily mean that petitioner was not a resident of
Tubaran as such answer merely means that he was previously living in Marawi City.
In her comment, respondent insists that petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran but of Bayang. She
contends that petitioner made misrepresentations in claiming that he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor
of Tubaran in the May 11, 1998 elections and that he was a registered voter in the May 11, 1998 elections; that
when petitioner registered as a voter in Precinct No. 28-A in Tangcal, Tubaran on May 8, 1999, he refused to
fill out the space corresponding to the period of his residency in Tubaran; that it was unusual for the BEI
Chairman to execute an affidavit, stating therein that he allowed the registration of the petitioner because he had
known the latter to be a legitimate resident of [Tubaran] even prior to the May 8, 1999 registration; that it was
doubtful if the election officer of Tubaran really conducted a continuous verification of household members of
Tubaran; and that the certification of the election officer of Bayang that petitioner was not a registered voter in
Bayang during the May 11, 1998 and May 14, 2001 elections does not prove that he was a registered voter in
Tubaran. Respondent argues that the COMELEC did not commit any error of jurisdiction to justify the grant of
this petition for certiorari but, if at all, only an error of judgment, which is correctible by ordinary appeal.
In his reply to respondents comment, petitioner points out that respondent did not appear at the March 9,
2001 hearing of the disqualification case before the COMELEC; that of the six witnesses whom respondent said
she was presenting, only two Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat appeared, and both merely affirmed their
joint affidavit; that, although the cross-examination of the two was reset on March 12, 2001, they nevertheless
failed to appear and thus deprived petitioners counsel of the opportunity to cross-examine them; that
respondents four other witnesses Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Sultan Sarip Bilao, Osio Balbal, and Puno Balbal did
not appear either; that instead Sultan Sarip Bilao later executed an affidavit[18] denying his earlier statement that
the petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran; and that the Second Division of the COMELEC and the
COMELEC en banc did not conduct any hearing in the disqualification case and merely relied on the
recommendations submitted by the hearing officer. According to petitioner, while he filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Tubaran in the May 11, 1998 elections, the same was later withdrawn on his behalf by
Casim A. Guro, his brother-in-law. This fact was corroborated by Macawaris P. Masanang, a sultan in Tubaran,
who stated that he had been an Election Assistant of the COMELEC since 1978 and that, as such, he received
petitioners certificate of candidacy, which was later withdrawn by Casim A. Guro on behalf of petitioner.

75
 After reviewing the records, we find the foregoing allegations of petitioner to be correct. Hence, his petition
should be granted.
First. Petitioner contends that the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc was not yet
final and executory when the elections were held on May 14, 2001. Consequently, the Board of Election
Inspectors of Tubaran, in the exercise of its ministerial duty, had to count the votes cast in his
favor. Respondent, on the other hand, avers that the assailed resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the
COMELEC en banc had attained finality five (5) days thereafter, on May 17, 2001, as its enforcement had not
been restrained by this Court within the said period. The temporary restraining order should thus be set aside,
the same having been issued by this Court only on May 22, 2001.
At the time the elections were held in May 14, 2001, the assailed resolution, dated May 12, 2001, had not
become final and executory. Hence, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) was duty bound to tally and count
the votes cast in favor of petitioner. As R.A. No. 6646, 6 provides:

Effect of disqualification. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

On the other hand, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, promulgated on May 7, 2001, in pertinent parts reads:

RESOLUTION NO. 4116

This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division,
particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification cases).

Sec. 13, Rule 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions or Resolutions
provides:

Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies, and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall
become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.

(b) In Special Actions and Special cases, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall
become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court.

(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a Division
shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special Actions and Special
cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation.

Special Actions cases refer to the following:

a) Petition to deny due course to certificate of candidacy;

76
 b) Petition to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate;
c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.

....

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or
resolutions on Special Actions cases (disqualification cases); the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVED, as follows:

1. the decision or resolution of the en banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall
become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court;

2. the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed;

3. where the ground for the disqualification case is by reason of non-residence, citizenship,
violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the election the resolution
has not become final and executory, the BEI shall tally and count the votes of such disqualified
candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent, therefore, is in error in assuming that the issuance of a temporary restraining order by this
Court within five (5) days after the date of the promulgation of the assailed resolution on May 12, 2001, of the
COMELEC en banc is the operative act that prevents it from attaining finality. The purpose of temporary
restraining order was to enjoin the May 12, 2001 resolution of the COMELEC from being enforced despite the
fact that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, par. 3, as above quoted, the said resolution had not
attained finality.
Second. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him disqualified
on the ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran. On the other hand, respondent argues that whether or not
petitioner is a resident of Tubaran is a factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and determined by
the Second Division of the COMELEC and later by the COMELEC en banc.Respondent echoes the ruling of
the COMELEC in its resolution of May 12, 2001, which said that, as an administrative body and a specialized
constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, it has more than enough expertise in its
field, and its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality.
With due regard for the expertise of the COMELEC, we find the evidence to be insufficient to sustain its
resolution. We agree with the Solicitor General, to the contrary, that petitioner has duly proven that, although he
was formerly a resident of the Municipality of Bayang, he later transferred residence to Tangcal in the
Municipality of Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14,
2001 elections.
Section 39 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides:

Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the

Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
77
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other language or
dialect.

Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the issue of whether or not a candidate
has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions. The principle of animus revertendi has been
used to determine whether a candidate has an intention to return to the place where he seeks to be
elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an abandonment of his former residence
which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,[19] this Court set aside the
appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as
Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondents immigration to the United States in
1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder,
which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any
waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be
disqualified under 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[20] respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was proclaimed the
duly elected representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against claims that he was not a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v.
Quirino,[21] applied the concept of animus revertendi or intent to return, stating that his absence from his
residence in order to pursue studies or practice his profession as a certified public accountant in Manila or his
registration as a voter other than in the place where he was elected did not constitute loss of residence. The fact
that respondent made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoang revealed that he always had animus
revertendi.
In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on Elections,[22] it was explained that
the determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon the intention that may be
inferred from his acts, activities, and utterances. In that case, petitioner Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained
the highest number of votes in the local elections of February 1, 1988 and who had thus been proclaimed as the
duly elected governor, was disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence and registration qualifications,
not being a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. The COMELEC ruled that the attempt of
petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence one year before the election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to
qualify her to run for the position of governor of the province of Leyte was proof that she considered herself a
resident of Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the ruling of the COMELEC and held that petitioner Larrazabal
had established her residence in Ormoc City, not in Kananga, Leyte, from 1975 up to the time that she ran for
the position of Provincial Governor of Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no evidence to show that she and
her husband maintained separate residences, i.e., she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City. The
fact that she occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte through the years did not signify an intention to continue her
residence after leaving that place.
In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,[23] the Court held that domicile and residence are
synonymous. The term residence, as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G. Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980s in
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the sudden departure from the country of petitioner, because
of the EDSA Peoples Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United States until favorable
conditions had been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an abandonment of residence. The Court
explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence
in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There
78
must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at
the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The record shows that when petitioner and his wife Raida Guina Dimaporo got married in 1990, they
resided in Tangcal, Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest intention on the part of petitioner to reside in
Tubaran, which he deemed to be the place of his conjugal abode with his wife. The fact that he and his wife
transferred residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows that petitioner was relinquishing his former place of
residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran to be his place of domicile. Although petitioner worked as a
private secretary of the mayor of Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday after work. This is proof
of animus manendi.
Further, the evidence shows that in the May 11, 1998 election, petitioner was registered as a voter in
Tubaran and that in fact he filed his certificate of candidacy although he later withdrew the same. In the May 8,
1999 registration of voters, he was again registered as a voter in Precinct No. 28-A of Barangay Tangcal in
Tubaran.
In addition, the following bolster petitioners claim that since 1990 he has been a resident of Tubaran: (a)
the continuous verification of household members in Tubaran conducted by the election officer showed that
petitioner and his wife were members of household No. 13 in Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran; (b) petitioner co-
owned an agricultural land in Tubaran; and (c) Hadji Bashir Ayonga and Samoranao Sarip retracted their
previous affidavits which they had earlier executed and said that they did not understand the contents thereof
and did not know that the affidavits would be used in a disqualification case against petitioner.
Indeed, it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the Constitutions residency qualification requirement. In holding petitioner not to be a resident of
Tubaran, the COMELEC said:

Three (3) disinterested senior citizens, Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat,
all from Tangcal, Tubaran executed a joint affidavit (Exhibits A to A-1) stating that the respondent
has not at any time resided or lived in said barangay. Moreover, in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T
to 2001-244-T, the respondent admitted that he was living in Marawi City and was private secretary
to Mayor Abdillah Ampatua (T.S.N., Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T). As opined by
Hearing Officer Atty. Cristeto J. Limbaco, these statements made by the respondent in open court
are considered judicial admissions which do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless
proved to have been made through palpable mistake, citing Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat (L-23-23, August
31, 1968). On May 3, 2001, respondent through counsel submitted a Motion to Admit
Supplemental Memorandum alleging that respondent could be a domicile of Tubaran even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places citing the case of Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248
SCRA 300, 302. The fact remains though that respondent in open court admitted that he was living
in Marawi City. (T.S.N. of Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T).[24]

A candidate running for an elective office should at least have resided in the place where he seeks
election for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. Herein respondent
is wanting in this respect.

In citing the joint affidavit of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, the COMELEC
overlooked the fact that Hadji Bashir Ayonga subsequently repudiated his affidavit on the ground that the same
had not been explained to him and he did not know that it would be used to disqualify petitioner. Hadji Bashir
Ayonga affirmed that petitioner was a resident of Tubaran. Indeed, in its findings of fact, the COMELEC stated:
79
On March 8, 2001, witness for petitioner Hadji Bashir Ayonga executed an Affidavit of Desistance
thereby withdrawing his affidavit and stated that he did not know the consequences of signing the
affidavit he executed on February 14, 2001 as the same was not explained to him and would be
used in a disqualification case against the respondent. A similar affidavit was also filed by
Samoranao Sarip withdrawing his prior affidavit and stating that he did not know the consequences
of his signing said affidavit of February 17, 2001.[25]

Apparently, the COMELEC (Second Division) forgot its own findings.

Respondent claims that in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T for exclusion of petitioner as a
voter of Tubaran, petitioner admitted that he was not a resident of that municipality but of Marawi
City. Petitioners testimony is as follows:
Atty. P. Dimaampao: MAUYAG PAPANDAYAN, Jr., what is your job now?
WITNESS: Im the private Secretary of Mayor Abdillah Ampatua.
Atty. P. Dimaampao: For how long?
WITNESS: Since he was elected Mayor of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
Atty. P. Dimaampao: Are you residing in Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
WITNESS: No, Im in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur. And I was living in Marawi City.[26]
Petitioners statement that [he] was living in Marawi City cannot be read as saying he was a resident of
Marawi City, because, when asked whether he was residing in Bayang, Lanao del Sur, he replied: No, Im in
Tubaran, Lanao del Sur. What he seems to be saying is that although he worked as a private secretary of the
Mayor of Bayang, he was not a resident of Bayang, because he was living in Tubaran.
When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is
weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the
victors right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected.[27] For the purpose of election laws is to
give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters.[28] To successfully challenge petitioners
disqualification, respondent must clearly demonstrate that petitioners ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will
of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions
that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.[29] Respondent failed to substantiate her claim
that petitioner is ineligible to be mayor of Tubaran.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolution of the COMELEC (Second
Division), dated May 8, 2001, disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr. as a candidate for municipal
mayor in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, and the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining
order heretofore issued is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-
Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, on official leave.
Corona, J., took no part in deliberation of this case.

80
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA. RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013 and the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.

We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has already ended
on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can no
longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnados
election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Courts Decision dated April
16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated
that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant
question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this Court.

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of
expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus
claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an
American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation
repudiates this claim.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1 which must be presented as public documents2 of a foreign
country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof."3 Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading
does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States "providing that a person who
is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by
using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."4

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code calls for
application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not
only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of
any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to run for any local elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act."5 This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)6 requires those
who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign
citizenship.

81
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code7 which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position,
indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To
allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport which indicates
the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign
citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship
from running for local elective positions.

There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country
which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named
therein as its national.

It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American
citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.

If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American citizenship when
he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal.
The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one
making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign
passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of
taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.

The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country". On the contrary, this Court
1wphi1

has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino
citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not
supported by substantial evidence.8 They are accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon
this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence
before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.9

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at
least six times after he renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which
found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed with Arnados claim that he only used
his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc
argued that Arnado was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12
January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.

None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using his
U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is USA-American. Adding these two
travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also presented his U.S.
passport four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July
2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.

The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine
passport was not yet issued to him for his use."10 This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado

82
claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that he continued to use his U.S.
passport even after he already received his Philippine passport. Arnados travel records show that he presented his
U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted
by Arnado.

Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the use of the U.S.
passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S.
passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.

It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos are
qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign
citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual
citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby
DENIED with finality.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 136587. August 30, 1999]

ERNESTO BIBOT A. DOMINGO, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and BENJAMIN BENHUR D. ABALOS, JR., respondents.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari are the En Banc Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), dated December 1, 1998,[1] and the Resolution of the COMELEC FirstDivision, dated
July 2, 1998,[2] in SPA No. 98-361, which dismissed, for lack of merit, the petition for disqualification filed
against herein private respondent, the incumbent mayor of Mandaluyong City.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Ernesto Domingo, Jr. and private respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr.
were both mayoralty candidates of Mandaluyong City. After private respondents proclamation on May 17,
1998, petitioner filed the instant petition for disqualification, on the ground that, during the campaign period,
private respondent prodded his father, then incumbent Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr., to give
substantial allowances to public school teachers appointed as chairpersons and members of the Boards of
Election Inspectors (BEIs) for Mandaluyong City.
Petitioners allegations obtain from an incident on April 14, 1998, wherein, in a Pasyal-Aral outing for
Mandaluyong City public school teachers in Sariaya, Quezon, then Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. announced that
the teachers appointed to the BEIs will each be given a hazard pay of P1,000.00 and food allowance of P500.00,
in addition to the allowance of P1,500.00.[3] In the petition for disqualification filed before the COMELEC First
Division, petitioner charged that private respondents influence over his father on this matter was evident from
the following declaration of father Abalos, Sr.:

83
Your President [referring to Mr. Alfredo de Vera, President of the Federation of Mandaluyong
Public School Teachers], together with Benhur, walang tigil yan kakapunta sa akin at not because
he is my son siya ang nakikipag-usap sa kanila and came up with a beautiful compromise. xxx[4]

As alleged by petitioner, the foregoing statement was revealing of how private respondent prodded his
father, then Mayor Abalos, Sr., to award substantial allowances to the public school teachers who will assume
seats in the BEIs in the May 11, 1998 elections, as to influence them into voting for him and ensuring his
victory.
Mayor Abalos, Sr.s speech, as well, as other activities in the aforesaid Pasyal-Aral outing, were recorded on
videotape per instructions of Mr. Perfecto Doroja, an associate of petitioner.[5] In addition to the videotape,
petitioner also submitted photographs of a streamer, hung at the entrance of the Tayabas Bay Beach Resort,
Sariaya, Quezon, declaring Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. as co-sponsor of the Pasyal-Aral,[6] as well as
affidavits of three public school teachers who participated in the said activity.[7]
Petitioner alleges that private respondents act of prodding his father, then incumbent mayor Benjamin S.
Abalos, Sr., to give substantial allowances to the Mandaluyong City public school teachers constitutes a
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the pertinent provisions of which read:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; xxx shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or
if he has been elected, from holding the office. xxx

In dismissing the petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit, the
COMELEC First Division admonished petitioner and his counsel for attempting to mislead the COMELEC by
making false and untruthful statements[8] in his petition. On reconsideration, the COMELEC, En Banc, affirmed
the findings and conclusions of its First Division.
Before us, petitioner assails the Resolutions of public respondent COMELEC for being violative of his
right to due process, and thus, issued with grave abuse of discretion. It is petitioners argument that the dismissal
of his petition for disqualification on the ground of insufficiency of evidence was unfounded, considering that
no hearing on the merits was conducted by public respondent on the matter.
Petitioner next contends that grave abuse of discretion was likewise attendant in public respondents act of
dismissing the petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence, despite the overwhelming pieces of
evidence of petitioner, consisting of the video cassette, pictures and affidavits, which were not denied by private
respondent.[9] Petitioner further decries the fact that private respondent presented no evidence to substantiate his
defense, while all the pieces of evidence that he submitted in his petition for disqualification were strong
enough to prove violation by private respondent of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.[10]
Before touching on the merits, we shall first resolve the procedural matters raised by private respondent;
namely, forum-shopping and failure to file this petition on time.
It is not disputed that, in addition to the petition for disqualification, petitioner also filed a criminal
complaint[11] and an election protest ex abundante cautelam[12] with public respondent COMELEC.Private
respondent contends that, inasmuch as the petition for disqualification and the complaint for election offense
involve the same issues and charges, i.e., vote-buying, exerting undue influence on BEI members, petitioner
should be held liable for forum-shopping.

84
 We rule to the contrary. Forum-shopping exists when the petitioner files multiple petitions or complaints
involving the same issues in two or more tribunals or agencies.[13] The issues in the two cases are different. The
complaint for election offense is a criminal case which involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of
the accused candidate and, like any other criminal case, requires a conviction on proof beyond reasonable
doubt.[14] A petition for disqualification, meanwhile, requires merely the determination of whether the
respondent committed acts as to merit his disqualification from office, and is done through an administrative
proceeding which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence.[15]
Next, petitioner admits receiving a copy of the assailed COMELEC First Division Resolution on July 13,
1998. He also admits filing a motion for reconsideration of the said COMELEC First Division Resolution on
July 20, 1998. A copy of the assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated December 1, 1998 was received by
petitioner on December 4, 1998. Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitions
for certiorari from orders or rulings of the COMELEC

shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought
to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of the said judgment or final
order or resolution xxx shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved
party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5)
days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.

Section 4 of Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure likewise provides:

Effect of motion for reconsideration on period to appeal. A motion to reconsider a decision,

resolution, order or ruling when not pro-forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the
matter to the Supreme Court.

Inasmuch as the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the 30-day period within which to file a
petition for certiorari with this Court, petitioner has effectively consumed seven days of the abovestated 30-day
period when he filed his motion for reconsideration. Thus, as correctly pointed out by private respondent, when
petitioner received a copy of the assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution, he only had 23 days from December
4, 1998, the date when he received the COMELEC En Banc Resolution, or until December 27, 1998[16], to file
the instant petition for certiorari. This petition was filed on January 4, 1999.
In any event, whether the petition was filed on time or not, an examination of the records leaves us satisfied
that public respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for
disqualification.
First, on the issue of due process, we find no violation thereof when public respondent COMELEC decided
to dismiss the petition for disqualification without hearing. Well-established is the rule that the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard.[17] In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan[18], cited in the recent case
of Bautista vs. COMELEC[19], we held that the right to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal
arguments in court. A party may also be heard through his pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard is
accorded, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process.
Furthermore, the filing by petitioner of a motion for reconsideration accorded him ample opportunity to
dispute the findings of the COMELEC First Division, so that he was as fully heard as he might have been had
oral arguments actually taken place. Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
was given the chance to be heard in his motion for reconsideration.[20]

85
 Next, petitioner re-asserts before us the sufficiency of his evidence to prove that private respondent
influenced the Mandaluyong City public school teachers, through his father, Abalos, Sr., in the performance of
their functions as members of the BEIs.
Petitioners evidence fails to persuade. First, the affidavits of the three teachers who participated in the
controversial Pasyal-Aral do not contain anything but the following bare declarations: (1) that they heard
Abalos, Sr. promise that he will give hazard pay of P1,000.00 and food allowance of P500.00, in addition to the
regular living allowance of P1,500.00, and (2) that, before the May 11, 1998 elections they each received
P1,500.00, or half of the total allowances promised by Abalos, Sr. in his speech. Nothing in these affidavits
suggests, let alone sets out, knowledge on any degree of participation of private respondent in the grant of these
allowances. The name of private respondent was not even mentioned or alluded to by any of the three affiants.
Petitioner also submitted photographs taken of the streamer at the entrance of the Tayabas Bay Beach
Resort, welcoming the participants to the Pasyal-Aral and declaring the Mandaluyong City School Board and
then mayor Abalos, Sr. as co-sponsors of the affair. Since by law, the mayor is a co-chairman of the City School
Board[21], we find nothing unusual in his having co-sponsored the said event. We fail to see the connection
between these pictures and the alleged influence wielded by private respondent on the public school teachers of
Mandaluyong City.
Yet it is upon the videotape recordings that petitioner lays much reliance on, in proving his case for
disqualification. The recordings are supposed to document how former mayor Abalos, Sr. announced that his
son, private respondent herein, prodded his father to release substantial allowances to teachers who will act as
members of the BEIs. As found by the COMELEC First Division, the name uttered in the announcement was
not Benhur, private respondents nickname and what petitioner alleged was uttered, but Lito Motivo, a name
which truly sounded unlike Benhur.[22] Also, when the COMELEC, through its First Division, viewed the
videotape submitted by petitioner, the speech of Mayor Abalos, Sr. was cut and so (they) also did not see and
hear that part of Mayor Abalos, Sr.s speech allegedly uttered by him.[23]
In the Petition, petitioners counsel admitted that the assailed quotation in the petition for disqualification
was based on an erroneous transcript of the speech which was prepared by somebody else, and which he in turn
failed to verify for errors. However, he denies having intended to mislead the COMELEC with the inclusion of
this statement, but instead submits that the word Benhur was derived from the succeeding pronouncement of
Abalos, Sr., not because he is my son, which may in turn be inferred to refer to private respondent, who was a
mayoralty candidate at the time.[24]
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELECs finding that Abalos, Sr.s controversial statement,
effectively reduced to this:

Your President, together with Lito Motivo, walang tigil yan kakapunta sa akin at not because he is
my son siya ang nakikipag-usap sa kanila and came up with a beautiful compromise. xxx

was seriously insufficient and vague to prove violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The burden
of proving that private respondent indirectly influenced the public school teachers of Mandaluyong City,
through his father, Abalos, Sr., was a burden that petitioner failed to meet.
Neither is this burden overcome by the argument that private respondent, for himself, had no evidence to
rebut petitioners allegations, since the burden of proving factual claims rests on the party raising
them.[25] Besides, it is not true that private respondent gave only denials and did not present any evidence to his
defense, or to offer an explanation for his fathers actions, which were assailed as having been influenced by
him. Private respondent presented in evidence a certified true copy of Joint Circular No. 1, series of
1998,[26] issued by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Department of Budget and Management
and Department of Interior and Local Government, which authorized the payment of allowances of public

86
school teachers chargeable to local government funds.[27] The Joint Circular provided the basis for private
respondents argument that the disbursement of funds by then mayor Abalos, Sr. was valid as having been made
pursuant to administrative circular, and was not an unlawful attempt made in conspiracy with private respondent
to secure the latters victory in the elections.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELECs decision to dismiss the petition for
disqualification. The conclusion that petitioners evidence is insufficient to support the charge of violation of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code was arrived at only after a careful scrutiny of the evidence at hand,
especially of the videotapes of petitioner. This is clearly evident from the discussion of the COMELEC First
Division, in the Resolution dated July 2, 1998, which quoted extensively from the pleadings and evidence of
petitioners, and provided adequate explanation for why it considered petitioners evidence insufficient and
unconvincing.
Clearly, where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the
questioned Resolutions, the Court may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own
findings on the sufficiency of evidence.[28]
Finally, the foregoing conclusion is without prejudice to the election protest and election offense cases
involving the same parties pending with public respondent COMELEC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed COMELEC Resolutions dated July 2, 1998 and
December 1, 1998, dismissing the petition for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit, and affirming the
proclamation of private respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr. as duly elected mayor of Mandaluyong City, are
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J. concurs in the result.

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