A. A. ADDISON vs.
MARCIANA FELIX and BALBINO two parcels, which are those occupied mainly by the brothers
TIOCO (G.R. No. L-12342; August 3, 1918); FISHER, J.:
By a public instrument dated June 11, 1914, the plaintiff sold
to the defendant Marciana Felix, with the consent of her
husband, the defendant Balbino Tioco, four parcels of land,
described in the instrument. The defendant Felix paid, at the
time of the execution of the deed, the sum of P3,000 on
account of the purchase price, and bound herself to pay the
remainder in installments, the first of P2,000 on July 15, 1914,
and the second of P5,000 thirty days after the issuance to her
of a certificate of title under the Land Registration Act, and
further, within ten years from the date of such title P10, for
each coconut tree in bearing and P5 for each such tree not in
bearing, that might be growing on said four parcels of land on
the date of the issuance of title to her, with the condition that
the total price should not exceed P85,000. It was further
stipulated that the purchaser was to deliver to the vendor 25
per centum of the value of the products that she might obtain
from the four parcels "from the moment she takes possession
of them until the Torrens certificate of title be issued in her
favor."
It was also covenanted that "within one year from the date of
the certificate of title in favor of Marciana Felix, this latter may
rescind the present contract of purchase and sale, in which
case Marciana Felix shall be obliged to return to me, A. A.
Addison, the net value of all the products of the four parcels
sold, and I shall obliged to return to her, Marciana Felix, all
the sums that she may have paid me, together with interest at
the rate of 10 per cent per annum."
In January, 1915, the vendor, A. A. Addison, filed suit in Court
of First Instance of Manila to compel Marciana Felix to make
payment of the first installment of P2,000, demandable in
accordance with the terms of the contract of sale
aforementioned, on July 15, 1914, and of the interest in
arrears, at the stipulated rate of 8 per cent per annum. The
defendant, jointly with her husband, answered the complaint
and alleged by way of special defense that the plaintiff had
absolutely failed to deliver to the defendant the lands that
were the subject matter of the sale, notwithstanding the
demands made upon him for this purpose. She therefore
asked that she be absolved from the complaint, and that,
after a declaration of the rescission of the contract of the
purchase and sale of said lands, the kplaintiff be ordered to
refund the P3,000 that had been paid to him on account,
together with the interest agreed upon, and to pay an
indemnity for the losses and damages which the defendant
alleged she had suffered through the plaintiff's non-fulfillment
of the contract.
The evidence adduced shows that after the execution of the
deed of the sale the plaintiff, at the request of the purchaser,
went to Lucena, accompanied by a representative of the
latter, for the purpose of designating and delivering the lands
sold. He was able to designate only two of the four parcels,
and more than two-thirds of these two were found to be in the
possession of one Juan Villafuerte, who claimed to be the
owner of the parts so occupied by him. The plaintiff admitted
that the purchaser would have to bring suit to obtain
possession of the land (sten. notes, record, p. 5). In August,
1914, the surveyor Santamaria went to Lucena, at the
request of the plaintiff and accompanied by him, in order to
survey the land sold to the defendant; but he surveyed only
Leon and Julio Villafuerte. He did not survey the other
parcels, as they were not designated to him by the plaintiff. In
order to make this survey it was necessary to obtain from the
Land Court a writ of injunction against the occupants, and for
the purpose of the issuance of this writ the defendant, in
June, 1914, filed an application with the Land Court for the
registration in her name of four parcels of land described in
the deed of sale executed in her favor by the plaintiff. The
proceedings in the matter of this application were
subsequently dismissed, for failure to present the required
plans within the period of the time allowed for the purpose.
The trial court rendered judgment in behalf of the defendant,
holding the contract of sale to be rescinded and ordering the
return to the plaintiff the P3,000 paid on account of the price,
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10 per cent per
annum. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.
In decreeing the rescission of the contract, the trial judge
rested his conclusion solely on the indisputable fact that up to
that time the lands sold had not been registered in
accordance with the Torrens system, and on the terms of the
second paragraph of clause (h) of the contract, whereby it is
stipulated that ". . . within one year from the date of the
certificate of title in favor of Marciana Felix, this latter may
rescind the present contract of purchase and sale . . . ."
The appellant objects, and rightly, that the cross-complaint is
not founded on the hypothesis of the conventional rescission
relied upon by the court, but on the failure to deliver the land
sold. He argues that the right to rescind the contract by virtue
of the special agreement not only did not exist from the
moment of the execution of the contract up to one year after
the registration of the land, but does not accrue until the land
is registered. The wording of the clause, in fact, substantiates
the contention. The one year's deliberation granted to the
purchaser was to be counted "from the date of the certificate
of title ... ." Therefore the right to elect to rescind the contract
was subject to a condition, namely, the issuance of the title.
The record show that up to the present time that condition
has not been fulfilled; consequently the defendant cannot be
heard to invoke a right which depends on the existence of
that condition. If in the cross-complaint it had been alleged
that the fulfillment of the condition was impossible for reasons
imputable to the plaintiff, and if this allegation had been
proven, perhaps the condition would have been considered
as fulfilled (arts. 1117, 1118, and 1119, Civ. Code); but this
issue was not presented in the defendant's answer.
However, although we are not in agreement with the
reasoning found in the decision appealed from, we consider it
to be correct in its result. The record shows that the plaintiff
did not deliver the thing sold. With respect to two of the
parcels of land, he was not even able to show them to the
purchaser; and as regards the other two, more than two-thirds
of their area was in the hostile and adverse possession of a
third person.
The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver
the thing sold. The thing is considered to be delivered when it
is placed "in the hands and possession of the vendee." (Civ.
Code, art. 1462.) It is true that the same article declares that
the execution of a public instruments is equivalent to the
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in
order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of
tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such
control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its
material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to
confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of
possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control.
When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing
sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will
of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a
public instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the
execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of
it himself or through another in his name, because such
tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of
another will, then fiction yields to reality the delivery has
not been effected.
As Dalloz rightly says (Gen. Rep., vol. 43, p. 174) in his
commentaries on article 1604 of the French Civil code, "the
word "delivery" expresses a complex idea . . . the
abandonment of the thing by the person who makes the
delivery and the taking control of it by the person to whom the
delivery is made."
The execution of a public instrument is sufficient for the
purposes of the abandonment made by the vendor; but it is
not always sufficient to permit of the apprehension of the
thing by the purchaser.
The supreme court of Spain, interpreting article 1462 of the
Civil Code, held in its decision of November 10, 1903, (Civ.
Rep., vol. 96, p. 560) that this article "merely declares that
when the sale is made through the means of a public
instrument, the execution of this latter is equivalent to the
delivery of the thing sold: which does not and cannot mean
that this fictitious tradition necessarily implies the real tradition
of the thing sold, for it is incontrovertible that, while its
ownership still pertains to the vendor (and with greater reason
if it does not), a third person may be in possession of the
same thing; wherefore, though, as a general rule, he who
purchases by means of a public instrument should be
deemed . . . to be the possessor in fact, yet this presumption
gives way before proof to the contrary."
It is evident, then, in the case at bar, that the mere execution
of the instrument was not a fulfillment of the vendors'
obligation to deliver the thing sold, and that from such non-
fulfillment arises the purchaser's right to demand, as she has
demanded, the rescission of the sale and the return of the
price. (Civ. Code, arts. 1506 and 1124.)
Of course if the sale had been made under the express
agreement of imposing upon the purchaser the obligation to
take the thing sold, and it were proven that she knew that the
thing was in the possession of a third person claiming to have
property rights therein, such agreement would be perfectly
valid. But there is nothing in the instrument which would
indicate, even implicitly, that such was the agreement. It is
true, as the appellant argues, that the obligation was
incumbent upon the defendant Marciana Felix to apply for
and obtain the registration of the land in the new registry of
property; but from this it cannot be concluded that she had to
await the final decision of the Court of Land Registration, in
order to be able to enjoy the property sold. On the contrary, it
was expressly stipulated in the contract that the purchaser
should deliver to the vendor one-fourth "of the products ... of
the aforesaid four parcels from the moment when she takes
possession of them until the Torrens certificate of title be
issued in her favor." This obviously shows that it was not
forseen that the purchaser might be deprived of her
possession during the course of the registration proceedings,
but that the transaction rested on the assumption that she
was to have, during said period, the material possession and
enjoyment of the four parcels of land.
Inasmuch as the rescission is made by virtue of the
provisions of law and not by contractual agreement, it is not
the conventional but the legal interest that is demandable.
It is therefore held that the contract of purchase and sale
entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendant
on June 11, 1914, is rescinded, and the plaintiff is ordered to
make restitution of the sum of P3,000 received by him on
account of the price of the sale, together with interest thereon
at the legal rate of 6 per annum from the date of the filing of
the complaint until payment, with the costs of both instances
against the appellant. So ordered.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO O. PLAZA; [G.R.
No. 108926. July 12, 1996]; TORRES, JR., J.:
Petitioner implores this Court to review and set aside the
decision[1] of February 8, 1993 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 34950 which affirmed the decision of June 14,
1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in LRC Case No.
M-99 confirming respondent Democrito O. Plazas title over
Rel. Plan 1059, which is the relocation plan of Psu-97886.
After the filing of private respondents Comment, this Court, in
its resolution of May 24, 1993, gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda. The petitioner filed its Memorandum on June 29,
1993 while private respondent filed his Memorandum on July
6, 1993.
The factual background is summarized in the Decision[2]of
the Court of Appeals as follows:
According to petitioner-appellee, the subject property situated
at Liwanag, Talon (formerly Pamplona), Las Pinas, Rizal, now
Metro Manila, having an area of 45,295 sq. m., was first
owned by Santos de la Cruz who declared the same in his
name under Tax Declaration Nos. 3932, for the year 1913;
3933 for 1917; and 6905, for 1921 (Exhs. 2-B, 2-C and 2-D,
Exh. K for petitioner-appellee, pp. 514-516, Record).
Subsequently, the subject property was successively bought
or acquired by Pedro Cristobal, Regino Gervacio, Diego
Calugdan and Gil Alhambra. To evidence their respective
acquisition of the property in question, Tax Declaration Nos.
7937, for the year 1923; 8463, for 1927; 9467, for 1934; and
2708 (year not available) were presented.[3] After Gil
Alhambra died, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned the subject
property and declared it in their names under Tax Declaration
Nos. 5595 and 5596 for the year 1960.[4] On 5 July 1966,
they executed a Deed of Sale With Mortgage deeding the
subject property to petitioner-appellee for P231,340.00
payable in three installments, the payment of which was
secured by a mortgage on the property. Upon receipt of the
full payment, they executed a Release of Mortgage on 1
August 1968. After the sale, petitioner-appellee took
possession of the subject property and paid the taxes due
thereon for the years 1966 up to 1986, and in 1985 declared
it in his name under Tax Declaration Nos. B-013-01392 and
B-013-01391. He appointed Mauricio Plaza and Jesus
Magcanlas as the administrator and caretaker thereof,
respectively. Due to losses, the property in question was
cultivated only for a while. Five (5) years according to
Mauricio Plaza, and from 1966 up to 1978 according to Jesus
Magcanlas.[7]
On 14 November 1986, petitioner-appellee filed a petition,
which was amended on 17 July 1987, for the registration and
confirmation of his title over the subject property alleging,
among others, that:
1. by virtue of the deed of sale, he is the owner thereof;
2. he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the property prior to, and since 12 June 1945;
3. other than himself, there is no other person occupying, or
having any interest over the property; and,
4. there are no tenants or agricultural lessees thereon.
On 24 February 1988, oppositor-appellant, the Republic of
the Philippines (Republic, for brevity), filed its opposition
maintaining, among others, that: (1) petitioner-appellee and
his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto; (2) the muniment of title and tax declarations as well
as tax payments relied upon do not constitute sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land by petitioner-
appellee and of his open, continuous possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owner since 12 June
1945, or prior thereto, and (3) the subject property pertains to
the public domain and is not subject to private
appropriation.[9]
On 9 March 1988, after the compliance of the jurisdiction
requirements was proved and, on motion, the lower court
issued its order of general default.[10]
Aside from the Republic, there were others who opposed the
petition and filed their opposition thereto prior to, or were
allowed to submit their opposition despite, and after, the
issuance of the order of general default. They are:
(a) Arsenio Medina who withdrew his opposition on 29 May
1989;[11]
(b) Emilio, Leopoldo and Abraham, all surnamed Borbon;
Heirs of Andres Reyes; Maximo Lopez; and, Marilou
Castanares who prayed that the lower court direct petitioner-
appellee to see to it that their respective property, which
adjoins the land in question, are not included in the
petition;[12]
(c) the Heirs of Santos de la Cruz and the Kadakilaan Estate.
Upon their respective motion, the order of default was set
aside as to them and they were allowed to file their
opposition.
The Heirs of Santos de la Cruz argue that: (1) their
predecessor-in-interest, Santos de la Cruz, is the primitive
owner of the subject lot; and, (2) he, his heirs, and upon their
tolerance, some other persons have been in open, peaceful,
notorious and continuous possession of the land in question
since time immemorial until the present.
The Kadakilaan Estate contends that: (1) by reason of its
Titulo de Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree 01-4,
with approved plans registered under the Torrens System in
compliance with, and as a consequence of, P.D. 872, it is the
owner of the subject property; and, (2) petitioner-appellee or
his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or
earlier.[13]
(d) the Heirs of Hermogenes Rodriguez. They allege, among
others, that by reason of a Titulo de Propiedad de Terrenos of
1891; Royal Decree No. 01-4, Protocol of 1891; Decree No.
659, approved Plan of the Bureau of Lands No. 12298 dated
10 September 1963, their predecessor-in-interest is the
owner of the subject property. Despite (sic) that their motion
to lift order of default as to them and admit their opposition,
which motion was opposed by petitioner-appellee, does not
appear to have been acted upon by the lower court, they
were able to present one (1) witness;[14] and,
(e) Phase II Laong Plaza Settlers Association, Inc. It filed a
motion to intervene in the case but the motion does not
appear to have been acted upon by the lower court.[15]
On 13 March 1990, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office, West Sector (CENRO-WEST) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
requested the lower court to furnish it photocopies of the
records of the petition as the property in question was the
subject of a request for a Presidential Proclamation reserving
the land in question for Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Site (SIR) of the National Housing Authority.[16]
On 22 June 1990, upon order of the lower court, an ocular
inspection was conducted on the subject property by the
court-appointed commissioner who submitted his report on 2
July 1990.[17]
On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the
President of the Republic of the Philippines withdrawing the
subject property from sale or settlement and reserve (the
same) for slum improvement and sites and services program
under the administration and disposition of the National
Housing Authority in coordination with the National Capital
Region, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
subject to actual survey and private rights if any there be, ...
The National Housing Authority was authorized to develop,
administer and dispose of the area in accordance with LOI
555, as amended (by LOI Nos. 686 and 1283), and LOI
557.[18]
On 31 May 1991 petitioner-appellee filed his
memorandum.[19] The oppositors did not. Nevertheless,
among them, only the Republic and the Heirs of Santos de la
Cruz formally offered their evidence.[20]
On 14 June 1991 the lower court rendered the judgment
referred to earlier.
On 8 July 1991, from among the oppositors, only the Republic
filed a notice of appeal which was approved on 10 July
1991.[21] By reason of the approval thereof, the motion filed
on 23 July 1991 by the Heirs of Hermogenes Rodriguez for
the reconsideration of the judgment was denied on 1 August
1991.[22]
On February 8, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision affirming the trial courts judgment.
Hence, this petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines
alleging that:
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AND IS
CONTRARY TO LAW, THE EVIDENCE AND EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE.
Petitioner argues that the burden rests on the applicant to
show by convincing evidence that he has a registrable title
over the property sought to be titled, which the latter failed to
do.
According to petitioner, aside from mere tax declarations all of
which are of recent vintage, private respondent has not
established actual possession of the property in question in
the manner required by law (Section 14, P.D. 1529) and
settled jurisprudence on the matter. Thus, no evidence was
adduced that private respondent cultivated much less, fenced
the subject property if only to prove actual possession. The
actual fencing of the property was done only starting 1988
when the actual occupants were forcibly ejected and driven
out from their respective abodes and that its witnesses
namely: Elascio Domitita, Manuel Dolom, Bernadette
Aguinaldo and Virginia Franco, who were all actual residents
of the questioned area, categorically testified on this score,
summarized as follows:
1. In their long stay in the area, the longest staying occupant
being Domitita who had been in the premises for more than
thirty (30) years nobody ever claimed ownership over the
subject property;
2. It was only in 1988 that they learned that private
respondent had filed a petition to have the property titled in
his name;
3. Private respondent had not introduced any improvement
nor was there a caretaker assigned by him to look after the
property; and,
4. Aside from them, there were about 200 more families
residing in the area but through force, intimidation and illegal
demolitions, were driven out by private respondent from the
premises.
We are not persuaded. On this point, the respondent Court
correctly found that:
Proof that petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest
have acquired and have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject property for a period
of 30 years under a bona fide claim of ownership are the tax
declarations of petitioner-appellees predecessors-in-interest,
the deed of sale, tax payment receipts and petitioner-
appellees tax declarations. The evidence on record reveals
that: (1) the predecessors-in-interest of petitioner-appellee
have been declaring the property in question in their names in
the years 1923, 1927, 1934 and 1960; and, (2) in 1966,
petitioner-appellee purchased the same from the Heirs of Gil
Alhambra and since then paid the taxes due thereon and
declared the property in his name in 1985.
xxxxxxxxx
x x x Considering the dates of the tax declarations and the
realty tax payments, they can hardly be said to be of recent
vintage indicating petitioner-appellees pretended possession
of the property. On the contrary, they are strong evidence of
possession in the concept of owner by petitioner-appellee
and his predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, the realty tax
payment receipts show that petitioner-appellee has been very
religious in paying the taxes due on the property. This is
indicative of his honest belief that he is the owner of the
subject property. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
petitioner-appellee has proved that he and his predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property in the concept of
owner for a period of 30 years since 12 June 1945 and
earlier. By operation of law, the property in question has
become private property.[23]
Contrary to the representations of the Republic, petitioner-
appellee had introduced some improvements on the subject
property from the time he purchased it. His witnesses testified
that petitioner-appellee developed the subject property into a
ricefield and planted it with rice, but only for about five years
because the return on investment was not enough to sustain
the continued operation of the riceland. Though not in the
category of permanent structures, the preparation of the land
into a ricefield and planting it with rice are considered
improvements thereon.[24]
Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they
are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that
is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.[25]
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[26]
Neither do we find merit in the assertions of petitioners
witnesses Elascio Domitita, Manuel Dolom, Bernadette
Aguinaldo and Virginia Franco. As properly stated by the
public respondent,
xxx Their alleged possession is not based on any right.
Neither do they claim to have any title or interest over the
subject property. As a matter of fact, they did not bother to
oppose the petition. The most that can be said of their alleged
possession is that it was only with the tolerance of rightful
owners of the property - plaintiff-appellee and his
predecessors-in-interest, hence, is no bar to the granting of
the petition. We do not see why we should accept the bare
assertions of the alleged occupants at their face value as
against the claim of ownership of plaintiff-appellee backed up
by legal documents, tax declarations, and tax receipts.[27]
Well-settled and oft-repeated is the rule that findings of facts
of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive on the
Supreme Court except: 1.) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
2.) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; 3.) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4.) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; 5.) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6.) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; 7.) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; and
8.) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based.[28]
Concededly, none of the above exceptions obtains in the
case at bar.
Petitioner also alleges that the land in question had been
withdrawn from the alienable portion of the public domain
pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 679 entitled
Reserving for Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR)
Sites and Services of the National Housing Authority, A
Certain Parcel of Land of the Public Domain Situated in the
Municipality of Las Pinas, Metro Manila, which was issued on
January 7, 1991 or almost 6 months prior to the issuance of
the trial courts decision.
The Court of Appeals opined that the issuance of the
proclamation did not have any effect on the subject property
as the proclamation only withdrew it from sale or settlement
and reserved the same for slum improvement and sites and
services program, but subject to actual survey and existing
private rights. The proclamation did not prohibit the
registration of title of one who claims, and proves, to be the
owner thereof. We agree. At any rate, registration does not
vest title. It is merely evidence of such title.[29] Our land
registration laws do not give the holder any better title than
what he actually has. When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The Torrens
system was not established as a means for the acquisition of
title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership.[30]
Of particular relevance is the finding of the respondent Court
of Appeals to the effect that -
We have found that petitioner-appellee has proven his claim
of ownership over the subject property. As provided in the
proclamation itself, his ownership of the subject property must
be respected and he cannot be barred from having the land
titled in his name. This does not contravene or negate the
intention of the proclamation. Besides, its implementing
Letters of Instruction recognize that there may be lands
declared included in the Slum Improvement Resettlement
(SIR) program that are privately owned. Paragraph 10 of LOI
No. 555 provides that if the land declared to be included in
the SIR program is privately owned, the concerned local
government, upon the approval by the National Housing
Authority of its project plan, shall acquire the property through
expropriation. In LOI No. 686 paragraph 3, it is mandated that
the NHA, upon request of the local government, expropriate
or otherwise acquire land for the SIR program. Proclamation
No. 679 is, therefore, not a valid justification to deny the
petition.
x x x At the time the Proclamation was issued, the
controversy over the subject property was sub-judice. The
conflicting rights over it had been presented to the court for
resolution. That jurisdiction could not be removed from it by
subsequent legislation. The President must have been aware
of this. Hence, the inclusion of the cautionary clause subject
to existing private rights.[31]
Over time, Courts have recognized with almost pedantic
adherence that what is inconvenient or contrary to reason is
not allowed in law - Quod est inconveniens, aut contra
rationem non permissum est in lege. Undoubtedly, reason
and law find respondent entitled to rights of ownership over
the disputed property.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision dated February 8,
1993 is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 149844. October 13, 2004]
MIGUEL CUENCO, Substituted by MARIETTA C.
CUYEGKENG vs. CONCEPCION CUENCO Vda. DE
MANGUERRA
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Inasmuch as the facts indubitably and eloquently show an
implied trust in favor of respondent, the Court of Appeals did
not err in affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
ordering petitioner to convey the subject property to her. That
Decision satisfied the demands of justice and prevented
unjust enrichment.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, challenging the August 22, 2001 Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 54852. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[3]
On the other hand, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision
affirmed by the CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, considering that this action is essentially one
for reconveyance or enforcement of a trust, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the substituted defendant Marietta
Cuenco Cuyegkeng to reconvey or transfer, in a duly
registrable public instrument, Lot No 903-A-6 under TCT No.
113781 of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City, of the Banilad
Estate with an area of 834 square meters, in favor of plaintiff
Concepcion Cuenco Vda. De Manguerra; or should the
substituted defendant, for one reason or another, fail to
execute the necessary instrument once the decision becomes
final, the Clerk of Court of this Court (RTC) is hereby
instructed, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prepare
and execute the appropriate and requisite conveyance and
instrument in favor of herein plaintiff which, in either case,
shall be registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Cebu City.
Without costs in this instance.[4]
The Facts
The facts were summarized by the appellate court as follows:
On September 19, 1970, the [respondent] filed the initiatory
complaint herein for specific performance against her uncle
[Petitioner] Miguel Cuenco which averred, inter alia that her
father, the late Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco (who became
Senator) and said [petitioner] formed the Cuenco and Cuenco
Law Offices; that on or around August 4, 1931, the Cuenco
and Cuenco Law Offices served as lawyers in two (2) cases
entitled Valeriano Solon versus Zoilo Solon (Civil Case 9037)
and Valeriano Solon versus Apolonia Solon (Civil Case 9040)
involving a dispute among relatives over ownership of lot 903
of the Banilad Estate which is near the Cebu Provincial
Capitol; that records of said cases indicate the name of the
[petitioner] alone as counsel of record, but in truth and in fact,
the real lawyer behind the success of said cases was the
influential Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco; that after winning said
cases, the awardees of Lot 903 subdivided said lot into three
(3) parts as follows:
Lot 903-A: 5,000 [square meters]: Mariano Cuencos attorneys
fees
Lot 903-B: 5,000 [square meters]: Miguel Cuencos attorneys
fees
Lot 903-C: 54,000 [square meters]: Solons retention
That at the time of distribution of said three (3) lots in Cebu,
Mariano Jesus Cuenco was actively practicing law in Manila,
and so he entrusted his share (Lot 903-A) to his brother law
partner (the [petitioner]); that on September 10, 1938, the
[petitioner] was able to obtain in his own name a title for Lot
903-A (Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] RT-6999 [T-21108]);
that he was under the obligation to hold the title in trust for his
brother Marianos children by first marriage; that sometime in
1947, the Cuenco family was anticipating Marianos second
marriage, and so on February 1, 1947, they partitioned Lot
903-A into six (6) sub-lots (Lots 903-A-1 to 903-A-6) to
correspond to the six (6) children of Marianos first marriage
(Teresita, Manuel, Lourdes, Carmen, Consuelo, and
Concepcion); that the [petitioner] did not object nor oppose
the partition plan; that on June 4, 1947, the [petitioner]
executed four (4) deeds of donation in favor of Marianos four
(4) children: Teresita, Manuel, Lourdes, and Carmen,
pursuant to the partition plan (per notary documents 183,
184, 185, 186, Book III, Series 1947 of Cebu City Notary
Public Candido Vasquez); that on June 24, 1947, the
[petitioner] executed the fifth deed of donation in favor of
Marianos fifth child Consuelo (per notary document 214, Book
III, Series 1947 of Cebu City Notary Public Candido Vasquez)
(Exhibits 2 to 5); that said five (5) deeds of donation left out
Marianos sixth child Concepcion who later became the
[respondent] in this case; that in 1949, [respondent] occupied
and fenced a portion of Lot 903-A-6 for taxation purposes
(Exhibit F, Exhibit 6); that she also paid the taxes thereon
(Exhibit G); that her father died on February 25, 1964 with a
Last Will and Testament; that the pertinent portion of her
fathers Last Will and Testament bequeaths the lot.near the
Cebu provincial capitol, which were my attorneys fees from
my clients, Victoria Rallos and Zoilo Solon, respectively have
already long been disposed of, and distributed by me,
through my brother, Miguel, to all my said children in the first
marriage;
That on June 3, 1966, the [petitioner] wrote a letter petitioning
the Register of Deeds of Cebu to transfer Lot 903-A-6 to his
name on the ground that Lot 903-A-6 is a portion of Lot 903-
A; that on April 6, 1967, the [respondent] requested the
Register of Deeds to annotate an affidavit of adverse claim
against the [petitioners] TCT RT-6999 (T-21108) which
covers Lot 903-A; that on June 3, 1967, the Register of
Deeds issued TCT 35275 covering Lot 903-A-6 in the name
of the [petitioner] but carrying the earlier annotation of
adverse claim; that in 1969, the [petitioner] tore down the wire
fence which the [respondent] constructed on Lot 903-A-6
which compelled the latter to institute the instant complaint
dated August 20, 1970 on September 19, 1970.
On December 5, 1970, the answer with counterclaim dated
December 3, 1970 of [petitioner] Miguel Cuenco was filed
where he alleged that he was the absolute owner of Lot 903-
A-6; that this lot was a portion of Lot 903-A which in turn was
part of Lot 903 which was the subject matter of litigation; that
he was alone in defending the cases involving Lot 903
without the participation of his brother Mariano Cuenco; that
he donated five (5) of the six (6) portions of Lot 903-A to the
five (5) children of his brother Mariano out of gratitude for the
love and care they exhibited to him (Miguel) during the time of
his long sickness; that he did not give or donate any portion
of the lot to the [respondent] because she never visited him
nor took care of him during his long sickness; that he became
critically ill on February 11, 1946 and was confined at the
Singians Clinic in Manila and then transferred to Cebu where
he nearly died in 1946; that his wife Fara Remia Ledesma
Cuenco had an operation on January 1951 and was confined
at the University of Santo Tomas Hospital and John Hopkins
Hospital in the United States; that two of his children died at
the University of Santo Tomas Hospital in 1951 and 1952;
and that his wife was blind for many months due to malignant
hypertension but [respondent] never remembered her nor did
she commiserate with him and his wife in their long period of
sorrow.
[Petitioner] Miguel Cuenco took the witness stand as early as
September 13, 1974. His self-conducted direct examination
lasted until 1985, the last one on November 22, 1985.
Unfortunately, he died[5] before he was able to submit himself
for cross-examination and so his testimony had to be stricken
off the record. His only surviving daughter, Marietta
Cuyegkeng, stood as the substitute [petitioner] in this case.
She testified that she purchased Lot 903-A-6 (the property
subject matter of this case) from her late father sometime in
1990 and constructed a house thereon in the same year; that
she became aware of this case because her late father used
to commute to Cebu City to attend to this case; and that Lot
903-A-6 is in her name per Transfer Certificate of Title
#113781 of the Registry of Deeds for Cebu.[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA found respondents action not barred by res judicata,
because there was no identity of causes of action between
the Petition for cancellation of adverse claim in L.R.C.
Records 5988 and the Complaint for specific performance to
resolve the issue of ownership in Civil Case No. R-11891.
The appellate court further found no reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court that respondent has the legal right of
ownership over lot 903-A-6. The CA ruled that the subject
land is part of the attorneys fees of Don Mariano Cuenco,
predecessor-in-interest of [Respondent] Concepcion Cuenco
vda. de Manguerra and [petitioner] merely holds such
property in trust for [her], his title there[to] notwithstanding.
Finally, the CA held that the right of action of respondent has
not yet prescribed as she was in possession of the lot in
dispute and the prescriptive period to file the case
commences to run only from the time she acquired
knowledge of an adverse claim over [her] possession.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for
our consideration:
I.On question of law, the Court of Appeals failed to consider
facts of substance and significance which, if considered, will
show that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the
petitioner.
II.On question of law, the Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate the proposition that, contrary to the position taken
by the trial court, no constructive or implied trust exists
between the parties, and neither is the action one for
reconveyance based upon a constructive or implied trust.
III.On question of law, the Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that even where implied trust is admitted to exist the
respondents action for relief is barred by laches and
prescription.
IV.
On question of law, the trial court and the appellate court
erred in expunging from the records the testimony of Miguel
Cuenco.[8]
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue: Evaluation of Evidence
Petitioner asks us to appreciate and weigh the evidence
offered in support of the finding that Lot 903-A-6 constituted a
part of Mariano Cuencos share in the attorneys fees. In other
words, she seeks to involve us in a reevaluation of the
veracity and probative value of the evidence submitted to the
lower court. What she wants us to do is contrary to the
dictates of Rule 45 that only questions of law may be raised
and resolved in a petition for review. Absent any whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment, and unless the lack of any
basis for the conclusions made by the lower courts be amply
demonstrated, the Supreme Court will not disturb such factual
findings.[9]
As a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming
those of the trial court are binding and conclusive. Normally,
such factual findings are not disturbed by this Court, to which
only questions of law may be raised in an appeal by
certiorari.[10] This Court has consistently ruled that these
questions must involve no examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.[11]
Emphasizing the difference between the two types of
question, it has explained that there is a question of law in a
given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as the truth or the
falsity of alleged facts.[12]
Indeed, after going over the records of the present case, we
are not inclined to disturb the factual findings of the trial and
the appellate courts, just because of the insistent claim of
petitioner. His witnesses allegedly testified that Civil Case No.
9040 involving Lot 903 had not been handled by Mariano for
defendants therein -- Apolonia Solon, Zoilo Solon, et al. It has
sufficiently been proven, however, that these defendants
were represented by the Cuenco and Cuenco Law Office,
composed of Partners Mariano Cuenco and Miguel Cuenco.
Given as attorneys fees was one hectare of Lot 903, of which
two five-thousand square meter portions were identified as
Lot 903-A and Lot 903-B. That only Miguel handled Civil
Case No. 9040 does not mean that he alone is entitled to the
attorneys fees in the said cases. When a client employs the
services of a law firm, he does not employ the services of the
lawyer who is assigned to personally handle the case. Rather,
he employs the entire law firm.[13] Being a partner in the law
firm, Mariano -- like Miguel -- was likewise entitled[14] to a
share in the attorneys fees from the firms clients. Hence, the
lower courts finding that Lot 903-A was a part of Mariano
Cuencos attorneys fees has ample support.
Second Issue:
Implied Trust
Petitioner then contends that no constructive or implied trust
exists between the parties.
A trust is a legal relationship between one having an
equitable ownership in a property and another having legal
title to it.[15]
Trust relations between parties may either be express or
implied.[16] Express trusts are created by the direct and
positive acts of the parties, indicated through some writing,
deed, will, or words evidencing an intention to create a
trust.[17] On the other hand, implied trusts are those that,
without being express, are deducible from the nature of the
transaction as matters of intent[;] or which are superinduced
on the transaction by operation of law as a matter of equity,
independently of the particular intention of the parties. Implied
trusts may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both
coming into being by operation of law.[18]
Resulting trusts are presumed to have been contemplated by
the parties and are based on the equitable doctrine that
valuable consideration, not legal title, determines the
equitable title or interest.[19] These trusts arise from the
nature of or the circumstances involved in a transaction,[20]
whereby legal title becomes vested in one person, who is
obligated in equity to hold that title for the benefit of another.
Constructive trusts are created by the construction of
equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent
unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against
one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or
holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity
and good conscience, to hold.[21]
A review of the records shows that indeed there is an implied
trust between the parties.
Although Lot 903-A was titled in Miguels name, the
circumstances surrounding the acquisition and the
subsequent partial dispositions of this property eloquently
speak of the intent that the equitable or beneficial ownership
of the property should belong to Mariano and his heirs.
First, Lot 903-A was one half of the one-hectare portion of Lot
903 given as attorneys fees by a client of the law firm of
Partners Miguel and Mariano Cuenco. It constituted the
latters share in the attorneys fees and thus equitably
belonged to him, as correctly found by the CA. That Lot 903-A
had been titled in the name of Miguel gave rise to an implied
trust between him and Mariano, specifically, the former holds
the property in trust for the latter. In the present case, it is of
no moment that the implied trust arose from the circumstance
-- a share in the attorneys fees -- that does not categorically
fall under Articles 1448 to 1456 of the Civil Code. The cases
of implied trust enumerated therein does not exclude others
established by the general law of trust.[22]
Second, from the time it was titled in his name in 1938,[23]
Lot 903-A remained undivided and untouched[24] by Miguel.
Only on February 3, 1947, did Lourdes Cuenco,[25] upon the
instruction of Mariano, have it surveyed and subdivided into
six almost equal portions -- 903-A-1 to 903-A-6. Each portion
was specifically allocated to each of the six children of
Mariano with his first wife.[26]
Third, Miguel readily surrendered his Certificate of Title[27]
and interposed no objection[28] to the subdivision and the
allocation of the property to Marianos six children, including
Concepcion.
Fourth, Marianos children, including Concepcion,[29] were
the ones who shouldered the expenses incurred for the
subdivision of the property.
Fifth, after the subdivision of the property, Marianos children -
- including Concepcion[30] -- took possession of their
respective portions thereof.
Sixth, the legal titles to five portions of the property were
transferred via a gratuitous deed of conveyance to Marianos
five children, following the allocations specified in the
subdivision plan prepared for Lourdes Cuenco.[31]
With respect to Lot 903-A-6 in particular, the existence of
Concepcions equitable ownership thereof is bolstered, not
just by the above circumstances, but also by the fact that
respondent fenced the portion allocated to her and planted
trees thereon.[32]
More significantly, she also paid real property taxes on Lot
903-A-6 yearly, from 1956 until 1969[33] -- the year when she
was dispossessed of the property. Although tax declarations
or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. Such realty tax
payments constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property.
Tellingly, Miguel started paying real property taxes on Lot
903-A-6 only on April 4, 1964,[35] after the death of
Mariano.[36] This fact shows that it was only in that year that
he was emboldened to claim the property as his own and to
stop recognizing Marianos, and subsequently Concepcions,
ownership rights over it. It was only by then that the one who
could have easily refuted his claim had already been silenced
by death. Such a situation cannot be permitted to arise, as
will be explained below.
Estoppel
From the time Lot 903-A was subdivided and Marianos six
children -- including Concepcion -- took possession as
owners of their respective portions, no whimper of protest
from petitioner was heard until 1963. By his acts as well as by
his omissions, Miguel led Mariano and the latters heirs,
including Concepcion, to believe that Petitioner Cuenco
respected the ownership rights of respondent over Lot 903-A-
6. That Mariano acted and relied on Miguels tacit recognition
of his ownership thereof is evident from his will, executed in
1963, which states:
I hereby make it known and declare that x x x all properties
which my first wife and I had brought to, or acquired during
our marriage, or which I had acquired during the years I was
a widower including jewelry, war damage compensation, and
two other lots also located at Cebu City, one near the South-
Western University and the other near the Cebu provincial
capitol, which were my attorneys fees from my clients,
Victoria Rallos and Zoilo Solon, respectively have already
long been disposed of, and distributed by me, through my
brother, Miguel, to all my said six children in the first
marriage.[37] (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, as early as 1947, long before Mariano made his will
in 1963, Lot 903-A -- situated along Juana Osmea Extension,
Kamputhaw, Cebu City,[38] near the Cebu Provincial Capitol -
- had been subdivided and distributed to his six children in his
first marriage. Having induced him and his heirs to believe
that Lot 903-A-6 had already been distributed to Concepcion
as her own, petitioner is estopped from asserting the contrary
and claiming ownership thereof.
The principle of estoppel in pais applies when -- by ones acts,
representations, admissions, or silence when there is a need
to speak out -- one, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist;
and the latter rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so as to
be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence
of those facts.[39]
Third Issue: Laches
Petitioner claims that respondents action is already barred by
laches.
We are not persuaded. Laches is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to it has either abandoned
or declined to assert it.[40] In the present case, respondent
has persistently asserted her right to Lot 903-A-6 against
petitioner.
Concepcion was in possession as owner of the property from
1949 to 1969.[41] When Miguel took steps to have it
separately titled in his name, despite the fact that she had the
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. RT-6999 -- the title
covering the entire Lot 903-A -- she had her adverse claim
annotated on the title in 1967. When petitioner ousted her
from her possession of the lot by tearing down her wire fence
in 1969,[42] she commenced the present action on
September 19, 1970,[43] to protect and assert her rights to
the property. We find that she cannot be held guilty of laches,
as she did not sleep on her rights.
Fourth Issue:
Expunging of Testimony
Petitioner Cuyegkeng questions the expunging of the direct
testimony of Miguel Cuenco. Respondent points out that this
issue was not raised before the CA. Neither had petitioner
asked the trial court to reconsider its Order expunging the
testimony. Hence, this issue cannot for the first time be raised
at this point of the appeal. Issues, arguments and errors not
adequately and seriously brought below cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.[44] Basic considerations of due
process impel this rule.[45]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73465 September 7, 1989
LEONIDA CUREG, ROMEO, PEPITO, HERNANDO,
MANUEL, ANTONIO AND ELPIDIO (ALL SURNAMED
CARNIYAN)
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (4TH CIVIL
CASES DIVISION), DOMINGO APOSTOL, SOLEDAD
GERARDO, ROSA GERARDO, NIEVES GERARDO,
FLORDELIZA GERARDO, AND LILIA MAQUINAD,
respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks the
reversal of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) dated October 15,1985 in AC-G.R.
CV No. 03852 entitled "Domingo Apostol, et al., Plaintiffs-
Appellees, v. Leonida Cureg, et al., Defendants-Appellants",
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Isabela, Branch XXII declaring private respondent Domingo
Apostol the absolute owner of a parcel of land, situated in
Barangay Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more
particularly described as follows:
... containing an area of 5.5000 hectares, and bounded, on
the north, by Cagayan River; on the east, by Domingo
Guingab; on the south, by Antonio Carniyan; and on the west,
by Sabina Mola, with an assessed value of P3,520. (par. 9 of
complaint, p. 4, Record; Emphasis supplied)
On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo Apostol,
Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza
Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad, filed a complaint for quieting of
title and damages with preliminary injunction against herein
petitioners Leonida, Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel,
Antonio and Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan with the Regional
Trial Court of Isabela and docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 111-
373. A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial
court on November 12, 1982.
The complaint alleged that private respondents, except
Domingo Apostol, are the legal and/or the forced heirs of the
late Domingo Gerardo, who died in February 1944, the latter
being the only issue of the late Francisco Gerardo, who died
before the outbreak of the second world war; that since time
immemorial and/or before July 26, 1894, the late Francisco
Gerardo, together with his predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession,
under a bona fide claim of ownership and adverse to all other
claimants, of a parcel of land (referred to as their
"motherland"), situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela,
more particularly described as follows:
... containing an area of 2.5000 hectares, more or less, and
bounded on the North, by Cagayan River; on the East, by
Domingo Guingab (formerly Rosa Cureg); on the south by
Antonio Carniyan; and on the West by Sabina Mola, ... (p. 2,
Record)
that said land was declared for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 08-3023 in the name of Francisco Gerardo,
which cancels Tax Declaration No. C-9669, also in the name
of Francisco Gerardo; that upon the death of Francisco
Gerardo, the ownership and possession of the "motherland"
was succeeded by his only issue, Domingo Gerardo who,
together with three (3) legal or forced heirs, namely Soledad
Gerardo, one of private respondents herein, Primo Gerardo
and Salud Gerardo, both deceased, have also been in actual,
open, peaceful and continuous possession of the same; that
Primo Gerardo is survived by herein respondents, Rosa,
Nieves and Flordeliza, all surnamed Gerardo and Salud
Gerardo is survived by respondent Lilia Maquinad; that in
1979, respondents Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves
Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad verbally sold
the "motherland" to co-respondent Domingo Apostol; that on
September 10, 1982, the verbal sale and conveyance was
reduced into writing by the vendors who executed an "Extra-
Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance (Exhibit "Q",
p. 206, Rollo); that about the time of the execution of the
Extra-Judicial Partition, their "motherland" already
showed/manifested signs of accretion of about three (3)
hectares on the north caused by the northward movement of
the Cagayan River; that Domingo Apostol declared the
motherland and its accretion for tax purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 08-13281 on September 15, 1982.
The complaint also stated that sometime about the last week
of September and/or the first week of October 1982, when
private respondents were about to cultivate their "motherland"
together with its accretion, they were prevented and
threatened by defendants (petitioners herein) from continuing
to do so. Named defendants in said case are herein
petitioners Leonida Cureg and Romeo, Pepito, Hernando,
Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan,
surviving spouse and children, respectively, of Antonio
Carniyan. Further, the complaint stated that Antonio Carniyan
was the owner of a piece of land situated in Casibarag-Cajel,
Cabagan, Isabela and more particularly described as follows:
... containing an area of 2,790 sq. m., more or less bounded
on the north by Domingo Gerardo; on the East, by Domingo
Guingab; on the south, by Pelagio Camayo; and on the west
by Marcos Cureg, declared for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 13131, with an assessed value of P70.00. (P.
5, Record)
that deceased Antonio Carniyan revised on November 28,
1968 his Tax Declaration No. 13131 dated July 24, 1961 to
conform with the correct area and boundaries of his Original
Certificate of Title No. P-19093 issued on November 25,
1968; that the area under the new Tax Declaration No.15663
was increased from 2,790 square meters to 4,584 square
meters and the boundary on the north became Cagayan
River, purposely eliminating completely the original boundary
on the north which is Domingo Gerardo.
Petitioners' answer alleged that the "motherland" claimed by
private respondents is non-existent; that Antonio Carniyan,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a piece
of land bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by
the land of Francisco Gerardo as claimed by private
respondents; that the "subject land" is an accretion to their
registered land and that petitioners have been in possession
and cultivation of the "accretion" for many years now.
The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction was denied on July 28,1983 (pp. 244-250, Rollo)
on the ground that the defendants were in actual possession
of the land in litigation prior to September 1982. In a decision
rendered on July 6, 1984, the trial court held that respondent
Domingo Apostol, thru his predecessors-in-interest had
already acquired an imperfect title to the subject land and
accordingly, rendered judgment: 1. declaring Domingo
Apostol its absolute owner; 2. ordering the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction against herein petitioners; 3. ordering
that the writ be made permanent; and 4. ordering herein
petitioners to pay private respondents a reasonable attorney's
fee of P5,000.00, litigation expenses of P1,500.00 and costs
(pp. 143-145, Rollo).
On July 17, 1984, petitioners appealed to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of
the trial court on October 15, 1985. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on January 8, 1986. Hence, this
petition for review on the following assigned errors:
A. It erred in ruling that the subject land or "accretion" (which
is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River) belongs to the
private respondents and not to the petitioners when the
petitioners "Original Certificate of " Title No. 19093 states
clearly that the petitioners' land is bounded on its north by the
Cagayan River.
B. It erred in construing the tax declarations against the
interest of the herein petitioners who are only the heirs of the
late Antonio Carniyan since the late Francisco (supposed
predecessor of the respondents) could not have executed the
recently acquired tax declarations (Exhibits "A" to "A-2") as he
died long before World War II and since the late Antonio
Carniyan could no longer stand up to explain his side.
C. Contrary to the evidence and the finding of the Regional
Trial Court, it wrongly ruled that petitioners have never been
in possession of the land (p. 7 of Annex "A", ibid.).
D. It erred in awarding the accretion of 3.5 hectares to the
private respondents who incredibly claimed that the accretion
occurred only in 1982 and is a "gift from the Lord. (pp. 24-25,
Rollo)
This petition is impressed with merit.
The object of the controversy in this case is the alleged
"motherland" of private respondents together with the
accretion of about 3.5 hectares, the totality of which is
referred to in this decision as the "subject land."
In this case, petitioners claimed to be riparian owners who are
entitled to the "subject land" which is an accretion to the
registered land while private respondents claimed to be
entitled to the 3.5 hectares accretion attached to their
"motherland."
It should be noted that the herein private respondents' claim
of ownership of their alleged two and a half (2 & ) hectare
"motherland" is anchored mainly on four (4) tax declarations
(Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2" and "B", pp. 191, 192, 193, 194,
Rollo). This Court has repeatedly held that the declaration of
ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the
tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. (Evangelista
v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12
Phil. 384; cited in Camo v. Riosa Bayco, 29 Phil. 437, 444).
For their part, petitioners relied on the indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility of their Original Certificate of Title No. P-
19093, dated November 25, 1968 (Exhibit "3", p. 189, Rollo)
issued in the name of Antonio Carniyan (petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest) pursuant to Free Patent No. 399431
dated May 21, 1968, clearly showing that the boundary of
petitioners' land on the north is Cagayan River and not the
"motherland" claimed by respondents. The said registered
land was bought by the late Antonio Carniyan from his father-
in-law, Marcos Cureg, on October 5, 1956, as evidenced by
an Absolute Deed of Sale (Exhibit "8", p. 195, Rollo) which
states that the land is bounded on the north by Cagayan
River.
In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393,401-402, We ruled that
as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations
and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of
ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original
certificate of title indicates true and legal ownership by the
registered owners over the disputed premises. Petitioners'
OCT No.P-19093 should be accorded greater weight as
against the tax declarations (Exhibit "A', dated 1979; Exhibit
"A-1 " undated and Exhibit "A2" dated 1967, pp. 191, 192,
193, Rollo) offered by private respondents in support of their
claim, which declarations are all in the name of private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo, and
appear to have been subscribed by him after the last war,
when it was established during the trial that Francisco
Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war.
Anent Tax Declaration No. 13131, in the name of Antonio
Carniyan (Exhibit "C", p. 203, Rollo), which the appellate
court considered as an admission by him that his land is
bounded on the north by the land of Domingo Gerardo and
that he (Carniyan) is now estopped from claiming otherwise,
We hold that said tax declaration, being of an earlier date
cannot defeat an original certificate of title which is of a later
date. Since petitioner's original certificate of title clearly stated in-interest appeared as one of those found occupying and
that subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan cultivating said accretion.
River, private respondents" claim over their "motherland,"
allegedly existing between petitioners" land and the Cagayan On the other hand, the allegation of private respondents that
River, is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of the they were in possession of the "motherland" through their
original certificate of title. predecessors- in-interest had not been proved by substantial
evidence. The assailed decision of the respondent court,
It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all which affirmed the decision of the trial court, stated that since
claims and rights which arose or may have existed prior to the the "motherland" exists, it is also presumed that private
decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, supra., p. 404). By respondents were in possession of the "subject land" through
the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto their predecessors- in-interest since prior to July 26, 1894.
quieted, subject only to exceptions stated in Section 39, Act The trial court relied on the testimony of Soledad Gerardo,
496 (now Sec. 44 of PD No. 1529). Moreover, the tax one of the private respondents in this case, an interested and
declarations of the late Antonio Camiyan subsequent to the biased witness, regarding their possession of the
issuance of OCT P-19093 (Exhibit "D", p. 204, Rollo) already "motherland." From her testimony on pedigree, the trial court
states that its northern boundary is Cagayan River. In effect, presumed that the source of the property, the late Francisco
he has repudiated any previous acknowledgment by him, Gerardo, was in possession of the same since prior to July
granting that he caused the accomplishment of the tax 26, 1894 (pp. 137-140, Rollo).
declarations in his name before the issuance of OCT No. P-
19093, of the existence of Francisco Gerardo's land. The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the
alleged "motherland" claimed by private respondents is
Finally, the trial court concluded that petitioners have never nonexistent. The "subject land" is an alluvial deposit left by
been in possession of the "subject land" but the evidence on the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant
record proves otherwise. First, the trial court on page 11 of its to Article 457 of the New Civil Code:
Decision (p. 121, Rollo), stated the reason for denying private
respondents' petition for the issuance of a preliminary To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the
injunction, that is, "... the defendants (petitioners herein) were accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to current of the waters.
September, 1982" (p. 121, Rollo). Second, witness for private
However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT
respondents, Esteban Guingab, boundary owner on the east
No. P-19093 is only four thousand five hundred eighty four
of the land in question and whose own land is bounded on
(4,584) square meters. The accretion attached to said land is
the north of Cagayan River, on cross-examination, revealed
approximately five and a half (5.5) hectares. The increase in
that when his property was only more than one (1) hectare in
the area of petitioners'land, being an accretion left by the
1958, (now more than 4 hectares) his boundary on the west is
change of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan
the land of Antonio Carniyan (T.S.N., 5 May 1983, pp. 19-20).
River does not automatically become registered land just
Third, witness Rogelio C. Albano, a geodetic engineer, on
because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a
direct examination stated that in 1974, the late Antonio
Torrens title. (See Grande v. Court of Appeals, L-17652, June
Carniyan requested him to survey the land covered by his title
30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed under the
and the accretion attached to it, but he did not pursue the
operation of the Torrens System. ACCORDINGLY, the
same because he learned from the Office of the Director of
petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is
the Bureau of Lands that the same accretion is the subject of
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby
an application for homestead patent of one Democrata
rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. Br. III-373 for quieting
Aguila, (T.S.N., May 18, 1984, pp. 12-13) contrary to the
of title and damages. Costs against private respondents.
statement of the trial court and the appellate court that Albano
"made three attempts to survey the land but he did not SO ORDERED.
continue to survey because persons other than defendants
were in possession of the land," which statement appears
only to be a conclusion (p. 7, Rollo). Fourth, We note Exhibit
"20" (p. 273, Rollo) for petitioners which is an order by the
Director of Lands dated August 14,1980 in connection with
the Homestead Application of Democrata Aguila of an
accretion situated in Catabayungan, Cabagan, Isabela.
Aguila's application was disapproved because in an
investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands of the area
applied for which is an accretion, the same was found to be
occupied and cultivated by, among others, Antonio Carniyan,
who claimed it as an accretion to his land. It is worthy to note
that none of the private respondents nor their predecessors-