Mangonon V CA
CHILDREN AT A MEASLEY P5,000.00 PER CHILD.
Facts: On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B.
Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children
Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy
and Support, with application for support pendente lite
with the RTC Makati. 3 In said petition, it was alleged
that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent
Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City
Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At
that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while
respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the
marriage was solemnized without the required consent
per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, 4 it was annulled
on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.
Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court, petitioner
brought the case to the Court of Appeals via Petition for
Certiorari. The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of
the trial court and disposed the petition.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied
through the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16
May 1996. Petitioner is now before this Court claiming
that the Decision of the Court of Appeals was tainted
with errors
Francisco, be judicially declared pursuant to Article 173
of the Family Code. As legitimate children and
grandchildren, Rica and Rina are entitled to general and
educational support under Articles 174 11 and 195(b) 12
in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2) 13 and 199(c) 14 of
the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that under these
provisions, in case of default on the part of the parents,
the obligation to provide support falls upon the
grandparents of the children; thus, respondent Federico,
or in his default, respondent Francisco should be ordered
to provide general and educational support for Rica and
Rina in the amount of US$50,000.00, more or less, per
year.
Petitioner also maintains that as respondent Francisco
has the financial resources to help defray the cost of Rica
and Rina's schooling, the Court of Appeals then erred in
sustaining the trial court's Order directing respondent
Federico to pay Rica and Rina the amount of award
P5,000.00 each as monthly support pendente lite
Issue:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID
NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
FIXING THE AMOUNT OF MONTHLY SUPPORT
PENDENTE LITE GRANTED TO PETITIONER'S
RESPONDENT COURT IGNORED EVIDENCE ON
RECORD OF THE FINANCIAL INCAPACITY OF
RICA AND RINA'S PARENTS IN DEFAULT OF
WHOM THEOBLIGATION TO GIVE SUPPORT
DEVOLVES ON THE GRANDFATHER.
IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE PERSON
OBLIGED TO GIVE SUPPORT
GRANDFATHER DON PACO IS
UNDOUBTEDLY CAPABLE OF GIVING THE
AMOUNT DEMANDED, RESPONDENT COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING AN AMOUNT
OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE THAT IS
OBVIOUSLY INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE
EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE
RECIPIENTS
Ruling: The petition is meritorious
As a preliminary matter, we deem it necessary to briefly
discuss the essence of support pendente lite. The
pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter
provides:
Rule 61 SUPPORT 'PENDENTE LITE
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant
support pendente lite( during litigation) prior to the
rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully
into the merits of the case before it can settle an
application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do
is determine the kind and amount of evidence which
may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application.
It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or
other documentary evidence appearing in the record.
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as
the evidence presented, we find that petitioner was able
to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her
twin daughters to private respondents and the twins'
entitlement to support pendente lite.
Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the trial
court's grant of support pendent lite in favor of Rica and
Rina, the next question is who should be made liable for
said award
The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this
subject states:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to
give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
An eminent author on the subject explains that the
obligation to give support rests principally on those more
closely related to the recipient. However, the more
remote relatives may be held to shoulder the
responsibility should the claimant prove that those who
are called upon to provide support do not have the means
to do so.
The trial court gave full credence to respondent
Federico's allegation in his Answer 36 and his testimony
37 as to the amount of his income. We have, however,
reviewed the records of this case and found them bereft
of evidence to support his assertions regarding his
employment and his earning. Notably, he was even
required by petitioner's counsel to present to the court
his income tax return and yet the records of this case do
not bear a copy of said document. This, to our mind,
severely undermines the truthfulness of respondent
Federico's assertion with respect to his financial status
and capacity to provide support to Rica and Rina.
Meanwhile, respondent Francisco asserts that petitioner
possessed the capacity to give support to her twin
daughters as she has gainful employment in the USA. He
even went as far as to state that petitioner's income
abroad, when converted to Philippine peso, was much
higher than that received by a trial court judge here in
the Philippines. In addition, he claims that as she
qualified for the federal parent loan program, she could
very well support the college studies of her daughters.
We are unconvinced. Respondent Francisco's assertion
that petitioner had the means to support her daughters'
education is belied by the fact that petitioner was even
forced by her financial status in the USA to secure the
loan from the federal government. If petitioner were
really making enough money abroad, she certainly
would not have felt the need to apply for said loan. The
fact that petitioner was compelled to take out a loan is
enough indication that she did not have enough money
to enable her to send her daughters to college by herself.
Moreover, even Rica and Rina themselves were forced
by the circumstances they found themselves in to secure
loans under their names so as not to delay their entrance
to college.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner
and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and
Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily
charged to support their children's college education. In
view however of their incapacities, the obligation to
furnish said support should be borne by respondent
Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code,
respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of
Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents
Anent respondent Francisco and Federico's claim that
they have the option under the law as to how they could
perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina,
respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should
move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local
universities. After all, the quality of education here,
according to him, is at par with that offered in the USA
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall
have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who
has a right to receive support. The latter alternative
cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal
obstacle thereto.
Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the
choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give
support. Thus, he may give the determined amount of
support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay
in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be
availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or
moral, which should be considered
In this case, this Court believes that respondent
Francisco could not avail himself of the second option.
From the records, we gleaned that prior to the
commencement of this action, the relationship between
respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and
her twin daughters, on the other, was indeed quite
pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them
expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and
concern for one another's well-being. The photographs
presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a
seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of
these, however, are now things of the past. With the
filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one
another by the parties, the relationships among the
parties had certainly been affected.
Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact
that those who they had considered and claimed as
family denied having any familial relationship with
them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina
moving back here in the Philippines in the company of
those who have disowned them.
As to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our
bearings from the provision of the law mandating the
amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
42 Guided by this principle, we hold respondent
Francisco liable for half of the amount of school
expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente
lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco
has the financial resources to pay this amount given his
various business endeavors.
Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have
already been done with their education by the time of the
promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to
award support pendente lite in arrears 43 to be computed
from the time they entered college until they had
finished their respective studies.
The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil
Code on petitioner and her twin daughters raised by
respondent Francisco is best left for the resolution of the
trial court.
After all, in case it would be resolved that Rica and Rina
are not entitled to support pendente lite, the court shall
then order the return of the amounts already paid with
legal interest from the dates of actual payment
PSBA V CA
Facts: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which
caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the
second-floor premises of the Philippine School of
Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents
of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court
of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoez- Benitez, for
damages against the said PSBA and its corporate
officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled
in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not members of the
schools academic community but were elements from
outside the school.
Ruling: The petition is denied
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that
the motion to dismiss the complaint was correctly denied
and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do
not however agree with the premises of the appellate
court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This
Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of
Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in
Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. In all such cases,
It had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly
provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of the educational
institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its
pupils or students while in its custody. However, this
material situation does not exist in the present case for,
as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not
students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be
made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to
consider such material facts mean the exculpation of
the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily
follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are
bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes
to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools
and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On
the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or
"built-in" obligation of providing their students with an
atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its
primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly,
no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other
sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding
in the air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily,
the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises
and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a
contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern
QUASI-DELICTS; OBLIGATIONS ARISING
FROM QUASI-DELICTS OR TORTS ARISE
ONLY BETWEEN PARTIES NOT BOUND BY
CONTRACT. Because the circumstances of the
present case evince a contractual relation between the
PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do
not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known
as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between
parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express
or implied.
VIEW THAT LIABILITY FROM TORT MAY
EXIST EVEN IF THERE IS A CONTRACT. In
Air France vs. Carroscoso (124 Phil. 722), the private
respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted
expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner
airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the
petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not
one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air
France is authority for the view that liability from tort
may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America
S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached
thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of
Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not
be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence
becomes material only because of the contractual
relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a
contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot
exist independently on the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
SCHOOL MAY STILL AVOID LIABILITY BY
PROVING THAT THE BREACH OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO STUDENTS
WAS NOT DUE TO ITS NEGLIGENCE.
Conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be
an insurer of its students against all risks. It would not be
equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of
violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding
the security measures installed, the same may still fail
against an individual or group determined to carry out a
nefarious deed inside school premises and environs.
Should this be the case, the school may still avoid
liability by proving that the breach of its contractual
obligation to the students was not due to its negligence.
NEGLIGENCE; DEFINED. Negligence is
statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of
diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of
persons, time and place.
YHT Realty Corporation v CA
Facts:
Before this Court is a Rule 45 petition for review of the
Decision 1 dated 19 October 1995 of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the Decision 2 dated 16
December 1991 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 13, of Manila, finding YHT Realty Corporation,
Brunhilda Mata-Tan (Tan), Erlinda Lainez (Lainez) and
Anicia Payam (Payam) jointly and solidarily liable for
damages in an action filed by Maurice McLoughlin
(McLoughlin) for the loss of his American and
Australian dollars deposited in the safety deposit box of
Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel, owned and
operated by YHT Realty Corporation.
Thereafter the trial court rule in favor of the
McLoughlinUnperturbed, YHT Realty Corporation,
Lainez and Payam went to this Court in this appeal by
certiorari.
Petitioners submit for resolution by this Court the
following issues:
(a) whether the appellate court's conclusion on the
alleged prior existence and subsequent loss of the subject
money and jewelry is supported by the evidence on
record;
(b) whether the finding of gross negligence on the part of
petitioners in the performance of their duties as
innkeepers is supported by the evidence on record;
(c) whether the "Undertaking For The Use of Safety
Deposit Box" admittedly executed by private respondent
is null and void; and
(d) whether the damages awarded to private respondent,
as well as the amounts thereof, are proper under the
circumstances
Issue: It is whether a hotel may evade liability for the
loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by
having these guests execute written waivers holding the
establishment or its employees free from blame for such
loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which
voids such waivers?
Ruling: The petition is denied
*Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who,
in the performance of their obligations, are guilty of
negligence, are liable for damages. As to who shall bear
the burden of paying damages, Article 2180, paragraph
(4) of the same Code provides that the owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions. Also,
this Court has ruled that if an employee is found
negligent, it is presumed that the employer was negligent
in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the
victim to prove the negligence of such employer. Thus,
given the fact that the loss of McLoughlin's money was
consummated through the negligence of Tropicana's
employees in allowing Tan to open the safety deposit
box without the guest's consent, both the assisting
employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner
and operator of Tropicana, should be held solidarily
liable pursuant to Article 2193
*The issue of whether the "Undertaking For The Use of
Safety Deposit Box" executed by McLoughlin is tainted
with nullity presents a legal question appropriate for
resolution in this petition. Notably, both the trial court
and the appellate court found the same to be null and
void. We find no reason to reverse their common
conclusion. Article 2003 is controlling, thus:
Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from
responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is
not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any
stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest
whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in
Articles 1998 to 2001 37 is suppressed or diminished
shall be void.
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as
an expression of public policy precisely to apply to
situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel
business like the common carrier's business is imbued
with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers
are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests
and security to their persons and belongings. The twin
duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in
turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated
or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called
"undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms
imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the "undertaking" manifestly
contravene Article 2003 of the New Civil Code for they
allow Tropicana to be released from liability arising
from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety
deposit box for any cause whatsoever. 40 Evidently, the
undertaking was intended to bar any claim against
Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety
deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by
Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is
explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall
extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of
the guests even if caused by servants or employees of the
keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except
as it may proceed from any force majeure. 41 It is the
loss through force majeure that may spare the hotel-
keeper from liability. In the case at bar, there is no
showing that the act of the thief or robber was done with
the use of arms or through an irresistible force to qualify
the same as force majeure.
Petitioners likewise anchor their defense on Article 2002
43 which exempts the hotelkeeper from liability if the
loss is due to the acts of his guest, his family, or visitors.
Even a cursory reading of the provision would lead us to
reject petitioners' contention. The justification they raise
would render nugatory the public interest sought to be
protected by the provision. What if the negligence of the
employer or its employees facilitated the consummation
of a crime committed by the registered guest's relatives
or visitor? Should the law exculpate the hotel from
liability since the loss was due to the act of the visitor of
the registered guest of the hotel? Hence, this provision
presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not guilty of
concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any
degree to the occurrence of the loss. A depositary is
not responsible for the loss of goods by theft, unless
his actionable negligence contributes to the loss.
In the case at bar, the responsibility of securing the
safety deposit box was shared not only by the guest
himself but also by the management since two keys are
necessary to open the safety deposit box. Without the
assistance of hotel employees, the loss would not have
occurred. Thus, Tropicana was guilty of concurrent
negligence in allowing Tan, who was not the registered
guest, to open the safety deposit box of McLoughlin,
even assuming that the latter was also guilty of
negligence in allowing another person to use his key. To
rule otherwise would result in undermining the safety of
the safety deposit boxes in hotels for the management
will be given imprimatur to allow any person, under the
pretense of being a family member or a visitor of the
guest, to have access to the safety deposit box without
fear of any liability that will attach thereafter in case
such person turns out to be a complete stranger. This
will allow the hotel to evade responsibility for any
liability incurred by its employees in conspiracy with the
guest's relatives and visitors
Petitioners contend that McLoughlin's case was mounted
on the theory of contract, but the trial court and the
appellate court upheld the grant of the claims of the
latter on the basis of tort. 45 There is nothing anomalous
in how the lower courts decided the controversy for this
Court has pronounced a jurisprudential rule that tort
liability can exist even if there are already contractual
relations. The act that breaks the contract may also be
tort.
Manliclic et.al. V Calaunan
Facts:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine
Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478, owned
by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio
Manliclic;
(2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned
by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo
Mendoza.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be
held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who
should be liable while the latter is resolute in saying it
was the former who caused the smash up. The versions
of the parties are summarized by the trial court.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of
respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic
and PRBLI.
Issue:
*THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN
EVIDENCE OF THE TSN's AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE.
*THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE
RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT
SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
*THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN
PETITIONER PRBL's DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF
DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND
SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
*THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEY'S FEE.
Ruling: Petition is denied
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that
the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how the accident
occurred is more credible than respondent's version.
They anchor their contention on the fact that petitioner
Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the
charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Physical Injuries. To be resolved by the
Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic's acquittal in
the civil case
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case
for damages was one arising from, or based on, quasi-
delict. 30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his
negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the
collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure
to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection
and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner
Manliclic
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be
found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the
Court of Appeals that there was an absence of
negligence on his part?
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals,
it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on
reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the
author of the act complained of which is based on
Section 2 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be
held liable for the mishap. The aforequoted section
applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex
delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now
Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all
its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual. The same negligence causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled
that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding
that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on
reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising
from the crime may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.
However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he
was not the author of the act or omission complained of
(or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said
acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the
crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being
no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based
thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil
action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than
the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or
that accused was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising
from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in
the civil case 37 based on quasi- delict or culpa aquiliana
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of
how the collision occurred and to disregard that of
respondent's. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus
was in the process of overtaking respondent's jeep, the
latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left
(fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it,
thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in
a petition for review. The factual findings of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court,
are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. 38
Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a
review thereof unless
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find
any of the exceptions that would warrant our departure
from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of
the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving
the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic's
negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the
juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent,
rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence
of a good father of a family. 41 Under Article 2180 42 of
the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part
of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both. The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employee.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had
shown that it exercised the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees, particularly
petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed
the screening process that petitioner Manliclic
underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the
exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its
employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators
(Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it
exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of
its employees
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection but not in the supervision of its
employees.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the
occurrence of the accident is not enough to exempt
petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the
negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not
comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases
abovementioned.
The presence of the investigators after the accident is not
enough supervision.
Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any
accident, should have been shown and established. This,
petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can
further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of
manual containing the rules and regulations for all the
drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of
petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of
the rules and regulations when only one manual is being
lent to all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held
solidarily responsible for the damages caused by
petitioner Manliclic's negligence.
Barredo v Garcia
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages
for death pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of
Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto
Barredo
- May 3, 1936 in road between Malabon and Navotas,
head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing
overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of
Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers
- Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and
separate civil action is reserved
- Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole
proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla
- CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanillas
negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side
of the road and at a high speed
> no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the
family as Barredo is careless in employing (selection and
supervision) Fontanilla who had been caught several
times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding
> CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil
liability arising from crime bec this is under obligations
arising from wrongful act or negligent acts or omissions
punishable by law
- Barredos defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF
liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against
Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held responsible
ISSUE
WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action
against Barredo making him primarily liable and directly
responsible under A1903CC as employer of Fontanilla
HELD:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case,
either separately or with the street car company. This is
precisely what happens in the present case: the driver,
Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either
alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave
criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain
said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the
conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the
present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal
negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil
responsibility arising from the crime, he would have
been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo
would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same.
But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his
primary responsibility because of his own presumed
negligence which he did not overcome under
article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo:
First, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of
the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal
negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as
an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free
to choose which course to take, and they preferred the
second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within
their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the
plaintiffs chose the more expeditious and effective
method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison,
or had just been released, and besides, he was probably
without property which might be seized in enforcing any
judgment against him for damages.
Yes. There are two actions available for parents of
Garcia. One is under the A100RPC wherein the
employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages
arising from the crime thereby first exhausting the
properties of Fontanilla. The other action is under
A1903CC (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as
the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held
primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising
diligence of a good father of the family.
The parents simply took the action under the Civil Code
as it is more practical to get damages from the employer
bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla who is
yet to serve his sentence.
Obiter
Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict
1) crimes public interest; quasi-delict only private
interest
2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil
Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the
damage
3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are
only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts
include any kind of fault or negligence intervenes
NOTE: Not all violations of penal law produce civil
responsibility
e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game
laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is
hurt
4) crime guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil mere
preponderance of evidence
- Presumptions:
1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there
instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or
employer in selection, in supervision or both
2) presumption is juris tantum 7) not juris et de jure (It is
a presumption of law that cannot be rebutted by evidence
and should be taken to be the case no matter any
evidence to the contrary.) TF may be rebutted by
proving exercise of diligence of a good father of the
family
- basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior but
the relationship of pater familias
- motor accidents need of stressing and accentuating
the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles
MENDOZA V. ARRIETA
MELENCIOHERRERA, J. / 1979
NATURE: Petition for Certiorari
FACTS:
A 3-way vehicular accident happened along
Mac-Arthur Highway, Bulacan involving a
Mercedes Benz (Mendozas ), a private jeep
(Salazars), and a truck (driven by Montoya,
owned by Timbol). Two separate Informations
for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to
Property were filed against (1) Rodolfo Salazar
by Mendoza and (2) Freddie Montoya by
Salazar.
The 1st case was against the jeep for colliding
with the Mercedes Benz. The 2nd was against the
truck that hit the rear part of the jeep.
Mendoza testified, and adopted by truck-driver
Montoya, that jeep-owner Salazar overtook the
truck driven by Montoya, swerved left going
towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car
which was bound for Manila. Petitioner
(Mendoza) further testified that before the
impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and
that he was not aware that Salazars jeep was
bumped from behind by the Montoyas truck.
Salazar, on the other hand, stated that, after
overtaking the truck, he flashed a signal
indicating his intention to turn left towards the
poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the
intersection by a policeman who was directing
traffic; that while he was at a stop position, his
jeep was bumped at the rear by Montoyas truck
causing him to be thrown out, which then
swerved to the left and hit petitioners car, which
was coming from the opposite direction.
CFI acquitted Salazar from the criminal offense
charged whereas truck-driver Montoya was
found guilty and civilly liable, ordered to
 indemnify Salazar. However, no indemnification
was awarded to Mendoza since he was not a
complainant against the truck-driver but only
against Salazar.
Later, Mendoza filed a civil case against Salazar
and, this time, Timbol, the owner of the truck.
Both Salazar and Timbol were joined as
defendants, either in the alternative or in
solidum, allegedly for the reason that petitioner
was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to
relief against both or only one of them.
Timbol motioned to dismiss the case on the
ground that the Complaint is barred by a prior
judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to
state a cause of action. Respondent judge
dismissed the case as well as its review stating
that while it is true that an independent civil
action for liability under Article 2177 CC could
be prosecuted independently of the criminal
action for the offense from which it arose, the
New RoC requires an express reservaqtion of the
civil action to be made in the criminal action,
otherwise, the same would be barred.
The case was then raised to this Court.
ISSUES:
(1) WoN truck-owner Timbols civil case is barred by
the fact that Mendoza failed to reserve, in the criminal
action, his right to file an individual civil action based on
quasi-delict.
(2) WoN jeep-owner-driver Salazar is civilly liable for
the offense even when he was already acquitted.
HELD:
(1) No.
(2) No.
RATIO:
(1) Against Timbol
The rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a
subsequent case is when the following requisites concur:
(a) final judgment; (b) must be rendered by a Court
having jurisdiction over the matter and the parties; (c)
must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) in the 1st and
2nd actions, there must be identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of cause of action. Only the 1st three
requisites are met. But as to the last, it is quite different.
For one thing, petitioner wasnt even a complainant
against Timbol. For the other, the cause of action for the
criminal cases was the enforcement of the civil liability
arising from criminal negligence whereas this present
civil case is based on quasi-delict. Therefore, such
petition is not barred.
Also, as to the ground that petitioner did not present a
cause of action, the two factors consisting of a cause of
action, that of (1) plaintiffs summary right being the
owner of the Mercedes Benz and (2) the defendants
wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiffs
primary right (negligence in driving of either defendant),
were alleged in the Complaint.
(2) Against Salazar
As in the above ratio, petitioner can opt to go for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal or
just an action of recovery based on culpa aquiliana.
Based on petitioners previous criminal case (initial case
against Salazar), he based his action on culpa criminal
also as evidenced by his active participation and
intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit
against said Salazar. Since Salazars civil liability
continued throughout the criminal case, there was no
need for petitioner to file a separate civil action, it being
deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal case. Under
the facts, the Trial Courts pronouncement was that
Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages. Hence, no
civil liability attaches to Salazar.
DECISION: Dismissal of civil case against Timbol is
set aside and ordered to continue whereas that of
dismissing the civil case against Salazar is upheld.
AMADORA V. CA
CRUZ, J. / APRIL 15, 1988
PARTIES: Jose S. Amadora, et. al ,Petitioners Vs.Honorable Court
Of Appeals, Colegio De San Jose-Recoletos, Victor Lluch Sergio P.
Dlmaso Jr., Celestino Dicon, Aniano Abellana, Pablito Daffon thru his
parents and natural guardians, Mr. And Mrs. Nicanor Gumban, And
Rolando Valencia, thru his guardian, A. Francisco Alonso,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Pablito Damon, fired a gun that killed the 17yo Alfredo
Amadora while the latter was in the auditorium of their
school Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos to deliver his
physics project.
it was already sembreak ; the teacher-in-charge wasnt in
school
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence
 alfredos parents filed a civil action for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the school and its
officials like the rector, the high school principal, the dean
of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon.
Art 2180 Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their
custody.
The CFI of Cebu held the defendants civilly liable.
On appeal, CA absolved the defendants of the liability
because:
o Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and
trades but an academic institution of learning.
o the students were not in the custody of the
school at the time of the incident as the semester
had already ended
o fatal gun not clearly identified
o respondents exercised due diligence
ISSUES:
1. School should not be held liable because it is an academic
institution NO DIFF. BETWEEN ACADEMIC SCHOOL
AND SCHOOL OF ARTS AND TRADE
2. School still responsible even though end of school term?
YES
3. Teacher in charge has been negligent/ no proof of this
4. ho should be liable for the tort? School? Dean of boys?
Principal? Rector? The dean of boys of boys has been
negligent but none of those mentioned above is liable
REASON:
1. no difference between the academic and the non-academic
schools. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher
over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching.
2. It doesnt matter whether Alfredo was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to
submit his physics report-what is important is that he was
there for a legitimate purpose. even the mere savoring of
the company of his friends in the premises of the school is
a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in
the custody of the school authorities.
the teacher-in-charge must answer for his students' torts
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge,
no proof that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline
upon Daffon. He was not required to report to school on
that day
4.
a.) The rector, the high school principal and the dean of
boys= cannot be held liable because:
They are not the teacher-in-charge as previously defined.
Theyre only exercising general authority over the student
body, not direct control and influence
b.) dean of boys= since there is no teacher-in-charge, it is
probably the dean of boys who should be held liable bec.
He was negligent in not taking disciplinary action over the
boy who owns the unlicensed gun which he had earlier
confiscated; he returned it to the boy afterwards. He didnt
even report it to the authorities
But it does not link him to the shooting because there is no proof
that the confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed
Alfredo
c.) the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos = is not directly liable
under the article because the rector, the high school
principal and the dean of boys didnt have custody of the
offending student during the shooting or remiss in the
discharge of their duties. school cant be made to answer
for them
Decision: the petition is DENIED.
AMADORA V CA
CRUZ; April 15, 1988
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- A few days before high school graduation, while in the auditorium of
his school (Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos), a classmate, Pablito
Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit and killed Alfredo Amadora.
- The victims parents filed a civil action for damages under Article
2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos,
its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics
teacher (the victim was in school to finish his physics experiment a
prerequisite to graduation), together with Daffon and two other
students, through their respective parents.
- The pertinent provision reads:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
ISSUE
WON respondents are liable under Art. 2180
HELD
Ratio Those liable under the related provision of Art. 2180 shall be
taken to mean as teacher(s)-in-charge for academic institutions and
heads for schools of arts and trades.

Reasoning The difference between academic and arts and trades

institutions lie in history. Back in the times of artisan guilds, heads of
academic institutions were already focused on administrative work
and it is only the teachers who interact closely with students. Heads
of schools of arts and trades, on the other hand, because of the
technical nature of their craft, interact directly with the appentices.

Although the same may not be said for schools of arts and trades at
present, it is what is written. And only a re-writing of the law can
abolish the intended difference.

In the case at bar, none of the respondents were liable. The school is
not liable under Art. 2180; the rector, the principal and the dean of
boys only exercised general authority; the mere fact that Amadora
was in school to finish his physics experiment did not make the
physics teacher in-charge; and even if he were in-charge, there was
no showing that it was his negligence in disciplining Daffon that made
Daffon shoot Amadora; and the other respondents didnt have
custody of the offender.

Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any

pronouncements as to costs.

Voting Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento,

Cortes and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, C.J., did not participate in deliberations.

Fernan and Padilla, JJ., no part, formerly counsel for Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur but please see additional statement.

Herrera, J., with separate concurring and dissenting opinion.