This document summarizes several petitions filed that challenge the constitutionality of the Philippine pork barrel system and related presidential discretionary funds. It discusses the facts of the case, which involve alleged misuse of public funds channeled through dummy NGOs. The Supreme Court holds that the pork barrel system violates separation of powers and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative authority. Specifically, the Court finds the PDAF article and other laws allowing post-enactment legislator involvement in implementation unconstitutional. Additionally, certain phrases related to the use of the Malampaya Funds and Presidential Social Fund are struck down for failing to establish clear guidelines on use of the funds.
This document summarizes several petitions filed that challenge the constitutionality of the Philippine pork barrel system and related presidential discretionary funds. It discusses the facts of the case, which involve alleged misuse of public funds channeled through dummy NGOs. The Supreme Court holds that the pork barrel system violates separation of powers and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative authority. Specifically, the Court finds the PDAF article and other laws allowing post-enactment legislator involvement in implementation unconstitutional. Additionally, certain phrases related to the use of the Malampaya Funds and Presidential Social Fund are struck down for failing to establish clear guidelines on use of the funds.
This document summarizes several petitions filed that challenge the constitutionality of the Philippine pork barrel system and related presidential discretionary funds. It discusses the facts of the case, which involve alleged misuse of public funds channeled through dummy NGOs. The Supreme Court holds that the pork barrel system violates separation of powers and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative authority. Specifically, the Court finds the PDAF article and other laws allowing post-enactment legislator involvement in implementation unconstitutional. Additionally, certain phrases related to the use of the Malampaya Funds and Presidential Social Fund are struck down for failing to establish clear guidelines on use of the funds.
G.R. No. 208493 SJS filed a Petition BELGICA vs. HONORABLE for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. Barrel System" be declared OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently G.R. No. 208566 November G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed 19, 2013 an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA Prohibition With Prayer For The JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. Immediate Issuance of Temporary GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and Restraining Order and/or Writ of QUINTIN PAREDES SAN Preliminary Injunction seeking that the DIEGO, Petitioners, annual "Pork Barrel System," presently vs. embodied in the provisions of the GAA of HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, and the Executives lump-sum, Respondents discretionary funds, such as the PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional NATURE: and null and void for being acts These are consolidated petitions taken constituting grave abuse of discretion. under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all Also, they pray that the Court issue a of which assail the constitutionality of TRO against respondents the Pork Barrel System.
UDK-14951 A Petition filed seeking FACTS:
that the PDAF be declared The NBI Investigation was spawned by unconstitutional, and a cease and desist sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle- order be issued restraining President blowers who declared that JLN Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had Aquino) and Secretary Abad from swindled billions of pesos from the public releasing such funds to Members of coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy Congress NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the ISSUES: Ombudsman, charging five (5) 1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) Article and all other Congressional Pork other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Barrel Laws similar thereto are Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft unconstitutional considering that they and Corrupt Practices Act. Also violate the principles of/constitutional recommended to be charged in the provisions on (a) separation of powers; complaints are some of the lawmakers (b) non-delegability of legislative power; chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the (c) checks and balances; (d) heads and other officials of three (3) accountability; (e) political dynasties; implementing agencies, and the several and (f) local autonomy. presidents of the NGOs set up by 2. Whether or not the phrases Napoles. (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to Whistle-blowers alleged that" at the Malampaya Funds, and under least P900 Million from royalties in the Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by operation of the Malampaya gas project PD 1993, relating to the Presidential off Palawan province intended for Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone as they constitute undue delegations of into a dummy NGO. Several petitions legislative power. were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be HELD: declared unconstitutional PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR 1. Yes, the PDAF article is RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE unconstitutional. The post-enactment FROM CALAMITIES. measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and (b) and to finance the restoration of fund realignment are not related to damaged or destroyed facilities due to functions of congressional oversight and, calamities, as may be directed and hence, allow legislators to intervene authorized by the Office of the President and/or assume duties that properly of the Philippines was declared belong to the sphere of budget unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE execution. This violates the principle of PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE separation of powers. Congressrole AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND must be confined to mere oversight that FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and MAY SO DETERMINE AS A PRIORITY. (2) investigation and monitoring of the VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A implementation of laws. Any action or DEFINITION OF PRIORITY step beyond that will undermine the INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT separation of powers guaranteed by the PROJECTS AND HENCE, LEAVES THE constitution. PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME. Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS wield any form of post-enactment BENIGNO AQUINO III authority in the implementation or GR No. 209287 enforcement of the budget, unrelated to July 1, 2014 congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and When President Benigno Aquino III took thus unconstitutional. office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy 2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase needed a stimulus plan. Budget and for such other purposes as may be Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then hereafter directed by the President came up with a program called the constitutes an undue delegation of Disbursement Acceleration Program legislative power insofar as it does not (DAP). lay down a sufficient standard to The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed adequately determine the limits of the up the funding of government projects. Presidents authority with respect to the DAP enables the Executive to realign purpose for which the Malampaya Funds funds from slow moving projects to may be used. It gives the President wide priority projects instead of waiting for latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for next years appropriation. So what any other purpose he may direct and, in happens under the DAP was that if a effect, allows him to unilaterally certain government project is being appropriate public funds beyond the undertaken slowly by a certain executive purview of the law. agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by withdrawn, these funds are declared as PD 1993- the phrases: savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure priority projects. The DAP program did development projects was declared work to stimulate the economy as constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE economic growth was in fact reported ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY and portion of such growth was OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE the Treasury except in pursuance of an attributed to the DAP (as noted by the appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Supreme Court). Art. VI, Constitution). Other sources of the DAP include the II. Whether or not the DAP realignments unprogrammed funds from the General can be considered as impoundments by Appropriations Act (GAA). the executive. Unprogrammed funds are standby III. Whether or not the DAP appropriations made by Congress in the realignments/transfers are GAA. constitutional. Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator IV. Whether or not the sourcing of Jinggoy Estrada made an expos unprogrammed funds to the DAP is claiming that he, and other Senators, constitutional. received Php50M from the President as V. Whether or not the Doctrine of an incentive for voting in favor of the Operative Fact is applicable. impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed HELD: that the money was taken from the DAP I. No, the DAP did not violate Section but was disbursed upon the request of 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP the Senators. was merely a program by the Executive This apparently opened a can of worms and is not a fund nor is it an as it turns out that the DAP does not appropriation. It is a program for only realign funds within the Executive. prioritizing government spending. As It turns out that some non-Executive such, it did not violate the Constitutional projects were also funded; to name a provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera of the Constitution. In DAP no additional Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for funds were withdrawn from the Treasury the MNLF (Moro National Liberation otherwise, an appropriation made by law Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, would have been required. Funds, which P50-P100M for certain Senators each, were already appropriated for by the P10B for Relocation Projects, etc. GAA, were merely being realigned via This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, the DAP. Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang II. No, there is no executive Makabayan, and several other concerned impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment citizens to file various petitions with the of funds refers to the Presidents power Supreme Court questioning the validity to refuse to spend appropriations or to of the DAP. Among their contentions retain or deduct appropriations for was: whatever reason. Impoundment is DAP is unconstitutional because it actually prohibited by the GAA unless violates the constitutional rule which there will be an unmanageable national provides that no money shall be paid government budget deficit (which did out of the Treasury except in pursuance not happen). Nevertheless, theres no of an appropriation made by law. impoundment in the case at bar because Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is whats involved in the DAP was the based on certain laws particularly the transfer of funds. GAA (savings and augmentation III. No, the transfers made through the provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that of the Constitution (power of the the President (and even the heads of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 other branches of the government) are of Executive Order 292 (power of the allowed by the Constitution to make President to suspend expenditures and realignment of funds, however, such authority to use savings, respectively). transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Issues: Thus, no cross-border I. Whether or not the DAP violates the transfers/augmentations may be principle no money shall be paid out of unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, allowed. But under the DAP, this was is applicable. The DAP has definitely violated because funds appropriated by helped stimulate the economy. It has the GAA for the Executive were being funded numerous projects. If the transferred to the Legislative and other Executive is ordered to reverse all non-Executive agencies. actions under the DAP, then it may Further, transfers within their cause more harm than good. The DAP respective offices also contemplate effects can no longer be undone. The realignment of funds to an existing beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even to return what they received especially though some projects were within the so that they relied on the validity of the Executive, these projects are non- DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative existent insofar as the GAA is concerned Fact may not be applicable to the because no funds were appropriated to authors, implementers, and proponents them in the GAA. Although some of of the DAP if it is so found in the these projects may be legitimate, they appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or are still non-existent under the GAA administrative) that they have not acted because they were not provided for by in good faith. the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. without legal basis. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936 On the issue of what are savings These DAP transfers are not savings LAUREL, J.: contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, I. THE FACTS among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project Petitioner Jose Angara was once it is completed, finally proclaimed winner and took his oath discontinued, or finally abandoned. The of office as member of the National GAA does not refer to savings as funds Assembly of the Commonwealth withdrawn from a slow moving project. Government. On December 3, 1935, Thus, since the statutory definition of the National Assembly passed a savings was not complied with under the resolution confirming the election of DAP, there is no basis at all for the those who have not been subject of transfers. Further, savings should only an election protest prior to the be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already adoption of the said resolution. being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being On December 8, 1935, however, declared as savings by the Executive private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed particularly by the DBM. an election protest against the IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the petitioner before the Electoral GAA cannot be used as money source for Commission of the National the DAP because under the law, such Assembly. The following day, funds may only be used if there is a December 9, 1935, the Electoral certification from the National Treasurer Commission adopted its own to the effect that the revenue collections resolution providing that it will not have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was consider any election protest that secured before unprogrammed funds was not submitted on or before were used. December 9, 1935. V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as relating to the election, returns and Citing among others the earlier qualifications of members of the resolution of the National Assembly, National Assembly, is intended to be the petitioner sought the dismissal of as complete and unimpaired as if it respondents protest. The Electoral had remained originally in the Commission however denied his legislature. The express lodging of motion. that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the II. THE ISSUE National Assembly. xxx. Did the Electoral Commission act [T]he creation of the Electoral without or in excess of its jurisdiction Commission carried with it ex in taking cognizance of the protest necesitate rei the power regulative in filed against the election of the character to limit the time with which petitioner notwithstanding the protests intrusted to its cognizance previous confirmation of such should be filed. [W]here a general election by resolution of the National power is conferred or duty enjoined, Assembly? every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the III. THE RULING performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any [The Court DENIED the petition.] further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be NO, the Electoral Commission did not followed in filing protests before the act without or in excess of its Electoral Commission, therefore, the jurisdiction in taking cognizance of incidental power to promulgate such the protest filed against the election rules necessary for the proper of the petitioner notwithstanding the exercise of its exclusive power to previous confirmation of such judge all contests relating to the election by resolution of the National election, returns and qualifications of Assembly. members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary The Electoral Commission acted implication to have been lodged also within the legitimate exercise of its in the Electoral Commission. constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against Cocofed vs Republic members of the National Assembly, Case Digest GR 177857-58 Jan 24 nor prevent the filing of a protest 2012 within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might Facts: prescribe. In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to The grant of power to the Electoral administer the Coconut Investment Commission to judge all contests construed by any law as a special Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy and/or trust fund, the stated intention on the sale of copra. The copra seller being that actual ownership of the was, or ought to be, issued said fund shall pertain to coconut COCOFUND receipts. The fund was farmers in their private capacities. placed at the disposition of Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 COCOFED, the national association of however, PCA had already bought coconut producers having the largest from Peping Cojuangco 72.2% of the membership. outstanding capital stock of FUB / When martial law started in 1972, UCPB. In that contract, it was also several presidential decrees were stipulated that Danding Cojuanco issued to improve the coconut shall receive equity in FUB amounting industry through the collection and to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as use of the coconut levy fund: consideration for PCAs buy-out of PD 276 established the Coconut what Danding Conjuanco claim as his Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) exclusive and personal option to buy and declared the proceeds of the the FUB shares. CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized The PCA appropriated, out of its own to subsidize the sale of coconut- fund, an amount for the purchase of based products, thus stabilizing the the said 72.2% equity. It later price of edible oil. reimbursed itself from the coconut PD 582 created the Coconut Industry levy fund. Development Fund (CIDF) to finance While the 64.98% (72.2 % 7.22%) the operation of a hybrid coconut portion of the option shares seed farm. ostensibly pertained to the farmers, In 1973, PD 232 created the the corresponding stock certificates Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to supposedly representing the farmers accelerate the growth and equity were in the name of and development of the coconut and palm delivered to PCA. There were, oil industry. however, shares forming part of the Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, 64.98% portion, which ended up in providing under its Section 1 the the hands of non-farmers. The policy to provide readily available remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital credit facilities to the coconut stock were not covered by any of the farmers at preferential rates. Towards agreements. achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755 Through the years, a part of the authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF coconut levy funds went directly or and the CIDF collections to acquire a indirectly to various projects and/or commercial bank and deposit the was converted into different assets CCSF levy collections in said bank, or investments. Of particular interest free, the deposit relevance to this was their use to withdrawable only when the bank has acquire the FUB / UCPB, and the attained a certain level of sufficiency acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF in its equity capital. It also decreed and holding companies, of a large that all levies PCA is authorized to block of San Miguel Corporation collect shall not be considered as (SMC) shares. special and/or fiduciary funds or form Issue 1: W/N the mandate provided part of the general funds of the under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that the government. CCSF shall not be construed by any Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be It is unconstitutional because first, it law as a special and/or trust fund is have unduly delegated legislative valid power to the PCA, and second, it No. The coconut levy funds can only allowed the use of the CCSF to be used for the special purpose and benefit directly private interest by the balance thereof should revert the outright and unconditional grant back to the general fund. of absolute ownership of the Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA Constitution provides that all money entirely with the CCSF to the collected on any tax levied for a undefined coconut farmers, which special purpose shall be treated as a negated or circumvented the national special fund and paid out for such policy or public purpose declared by purpose only, and if the purpose for P.D. No. 755. which a special fund was created has Hence, the so-called Farmers shares been fulfilled or abandoned, the do not belong to the coconut farmers balance, if any, shall be transferred to in their private capacities, but to the the general funds of the Government. Government. The coconut levy funds Here, the CCSF were sourced from are special public funds and any forced exactions with the end-goal of property purchased by means of the developing the entire coconut coconut levy funds should likewise be industry. Therefore, the subsequent treated as public funds or public reclassification of the CCSF as a property, subject to burdens and private fund to be owned by private restrictions attached by law to such individuals in their private capacities property. ## under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 is unconstitutional. Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose or policy for which the coco levy fund Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative was created. Issue 2: vs. La Trinidad Water District [GR W/N the coco levy fund may be owned No. 166471, March 22, 2011] by the coconut farmers in their private capacities No. The coconut levy funds are in the FACTS: Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose nature of taxes and can only be used Cooperative is a cooperative organized for public purpose. They cannot be to provide domestic water services in used to purchase shares of stocks to Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet be given for free to private while respondent La Trinidad Water individuals. Even if the money is District is a local water utility created allocated for a special purpose and under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, raised by special means, it is still as amended. La Trinidad Water District public in character. is authorized to supply water for Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA domestic, industrial and commercial to distribute, for free, the shares of purposes within the municipality of La stock of the bank it acquired to the Trinidad, Benguet. Tawang Multi-Purpose coconut farmers under such rules and Cooperative filed with the National Water regulations the PCA may promulgate Resources Board an application for a is unconstitutional. certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. La Trinidad Water District opposed Tawang Multi- Purpoe Cooperative's application and claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.
ISSUE: Whether or not a public utility
franchise may be exclusive in character
RULING: No. The 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitution expressly and clearly prohibit thecreation of franchise that are exclusive in character. The President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration to create franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the Board of Directors of La Trinidad Water District and Local Water Utilities Administration to create franchises that are xclusive in character. Clearly, Section 47 is patently unconstitutional.