Special Proceeding
Christine Joymarie Perias
Sat. 3:00 5:00
Comparative Analysis No. 3
ISIDRO SANTOS,vs.LEANDRA MANARANG
G.R. No. L-8235
Facts:
Don Lucas de Ocampo died, possessed of certain real
and personal property which, by his last will and
testament he left to his three children. He also mentioned
debts in is will, among in the list referred to are two in
favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one due on April 14,
1907, for P5,000, and various other described as falling
due at different dates (the dates are not given)
amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly
probated and a committee was regularly appointed to
hear and determine such claims against the estate as
might be presented. This committee submitted its report
to court, the plaintiff, Isidro Santos, presented a petition
to the court asking that the committee be required to
reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate
which were recognized in the will of testator.
RTC: This petition was denied by the court, the plaintiff
instituted the present proceedings against the
administratrix of the estate to recover the sums
mentioned in the will as due him.
MR: Relief was denied in the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in refusing to reconvene
the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's
claim
Ruling:
No, plaintiff states that his failure to present the said
claims to the committee was due to his belief that it was
unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the
testator, in his will, expressly recognized them and
directed that they should be paid. The inference is that
had plaintiff's claims not been mentioned in the will he
would have presented to the committee as a matter of
course; that plaintiff was held to believe by this express
mention of his claims in the will that it would be
unnecessary to present them to the committee; and that
he did not become aware of the necessity of presenting
them to the committee until after the committee had
made its final report.
The testator, in so many words, left the total net assets of
his estate, without reservation of any kind, to his children
per capita. There is no indication that he desired to leave
anything by way of legacy to any other person. These
considerations clearly refute the suggestion that the
testator intended to leave plaintiff any thing by way of
legacy. His claim against the estate having been a
simple debt, the present action was improperly instituted
against the administratrix. But it is said that the plaintiff's
claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of
a legacy and disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect
then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after all
debts had been paid and the heirs by force of law had
received their shares. From any point of view the
inevitable result is that there must be a hearing sometime
before some tribunal to determine the correctness of the
debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This
hearing, in the first instance, can not be had before the
court because the law does not authorize it. Such
debtors must present their claims to the committee,
otherwise their claims will be forever barred.
Comparative analysis:
The claim was not presented at all to the committee on
claims which had to pass upon it according to the old
law, and this court held that the admission of the debt in
the testators will was not a sufficient reason for the court
to allow the creditors claim which had not been
presented to said committee.
FRANCISCO QUISUMBINGv. MARIANO GUISON
G.R. No.49022
Facts:
The deceased, Consuelo Syyap, during her life time
executed a promissory note dated November 9, 1940 for
P3,000 in favor of Leonardo Guison payable sixty (60)
days from the date thereof, with interest at the rate of 12
per cent per annum.
The debtor Consuelo Syyap died on November 30, 1940.
On December 5 of the same year, intestate proceedings
were instituted and notice given to creditors to file their
claim within six (6) months.
In the inventory filed by the administrator of the estate of
the deceased, the said obligation of P3,000 was
acknowledged as one of the liabilities of the decedent.
The creditor Leonardo Guison died on December 31,
1941, and his son Mariano Guison, who was appointed
as administrator of the intestate estate of his deceased
father, filed the claim of P3,000 against the estate.
The attorney for the claimant, in his reply to the answer
of the attorney for the administrator of the estate of
Consuelo Syyap, stated that the claimant believed in
good faith that he was relieved of the obligation to file a
claim with the court, because said administrator had
assured him that he should not worry about it, since the
debt was admitted in the inventory and he would pay it
as soon as he was authorized by the court to do so, and
that the same administrator had been paying the interest
due on the note.
RTC: allowed the appellees claim and ordered the
appellant to pay the claimant the sum of P3,000 with
interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred or abused its
discretion in allowing the appellees claim under section
2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court 18 after the expiration of
the time previously limited for the filing of claims, and
without a previous application for extension of time
having been filed by the claimant.
Ruling:
No, It was held that the claim filed by the appellee may
be considered as implying an application for time within
which to file said claim, and the order of the lower court
allowing such claim impliedly granted said appellee an
extension of time within which to file said claim. It would
have been a waste of time on the part of the court and
the parties in this case, if the court had dismissed the
claim and required the appellee to file, first, an
application for a period not exceeding one month within
which to file his claim, and then to file his claim within the
time granted by the court, when the latter would allow the
claim after all. Strict compliance with the said
requirement of section 2 of Rule 87 would be necessary
if a claim had to be presented to and passed upon by the
committee on claims according to the old law; but now as
it is to be filed with and passed upon by the court itself,
no harm would be caused to the adverse party by such a
procedure as was followed in the present case.
Under section 2 of Rule 87, there is no limitation as to
the time within which a creditor who has failed to file his
claim within the time previously limited, may file an
application for extension of time within which to file his
claim, and the court may for cause shown grant such
application fixing a period not exceeding one month for
that purpose, provided that the application is presented
before an order of distribution has been entered.

THE FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK
vs.SILVIO CHENG TAN
G.R. No. L-14234
Facts:
Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment
which was an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage
ordering the defendants therein, Silvio Cheng Tan
alias Silvio Cheng Pan amongst them to pay, jointly
and severally, The First National City Bank of New York
the sum of P142,000.56, with the stipulated interest on
the sum of P129,361.13, plus costs, and providing that in
case of default of payment within the period of time
therein given, the properties mortgaged by said
defendants be sold at Public auction to satisfy the
judgment. After the sale of the mortgaged properties a
deficiency judgment was. After the issuance of the
corresponding writ of execution and the sale of two
parcels of land located in San Miguel, Bulacan, there
remained unsatisfied the sum of P38,090.06, with the 7%
stipulated interest thereon until paid.
As the other defendants in the case had died or could
nowhere be found, and the five-year period for the
enforcement of the deficiency judgment by mere motion
had elapsed without the same having been satisfied. The
First National City Bank of New York instituted the
present action against Silvio Cheng Tan in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to revive the judgment aforesaid.
During the pendency of the case Cheng Tan died and
was substituted by his legal representative, Serafin
Cheng, who filed a motion to dismiss the action on the
ground that under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 5, Rule
87 of the Rules of Court, plaintiff should file its claim in
the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of said deceased pending in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, an administrator having been
appointed by said court.
RTC: granted defendant's motion to dismiss
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not present action having ceased to be
executory, demandable and operative, the same had
been reduced to a mere right of action not one for the
recovery of money but for reason that it is a contingent
claim
Ruling:
Deficiency judgment is a contingent claim and must be
filed with the probate court where the settlement of the
estate of the deceased mortgagor is pending, within the
period of time fixed for the filing of claims. On the other
hand, Section, 5 Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides
that, among others, judgments for money against the
decedent whose estate is in the process of judicial
settlement must be filed with the private court within the
time limited in the notice given for that purpose,
otherwise they will be deemed barred forever, except
that they may be set forth as counterclaim in any action
that the executor or administrator may bring against the
judgment creditor. The claim should be submitted as a
claim to the probate court where the settlement of the
estate of the deceased debtor is pending.
The admission of the existence of the debt in the
inventory filed by the administrator was considered by
the court, not as sufficient cause for not filing the
appellees claim at all, but as one of the reasonable
causes or reasons for his failure to file it within the time
previously limited.
Comparative analysis:
The last sentence of section 2, Rule 87, provides that the
court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are
equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not
exceeding one month. As it does not state what cause
shall be considered sufficient for the purpose, it is clear
that it is left to the discretion of the court to determine the
sufficiency thereof; and when the court allows a claim to
be filed for cause or causes which it considers as
sufficient, on appeal this court can not reverse or set
aside the action of the court below unless the latter has
abused its discretion.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ALLAN M. CHUA
G.R. No. 121597
Facts:
The spouses Antonio M. Chua and Asuncion M. Chua
were the owners of a parcel of land registered in their
names. Upon Antonios death, the probate court
appointed his son, private respondent Allan M. Chua,
special administrator of Antonios intestate estate. The
court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan
accommodation of five hundred fifty thousand
(P550,000.00) pesos from petitioner Philippine National
Bank to be secured by a real estate mortgage over the
above-mentioned parcel of land.
On June 29, 1989, Allan obtained a loan of P450,000.00
from petitioner PNB evidenced by a promissory note,
payable on June 29, 1990, with interest at 18.8 percent
per annum. To secure the loan, Allan executed a deed of
real estate mortgage on the aforesaid parcel of land.
On December 27, 1990, for failure to pay the loan in full,
the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage, through the Ex-Officio Sheriff, who conducted
a public auction of the mortgaged property pursuant to
the authority provided for in the deed of real estate
mortgage. During the auction, PNB was the highest
bidder Since PNBs total claim as of the date of the
auction sale was P679,185.63, the loan had a payable
balance of P372,825.63. To claim this deficiency, PNB
instituted an action with the RTC against both Mrs.
Asuncion M. Chua and Allan Chua in his capacity as
special administrator of his fathers intestate estate.
Despite summons duly served, private respondents did
not answer the complaint. The trial court declared them
in default and received evidence ex parte.
RTC: endered its decision, ordering the dismissal of
PNBs complaint.
CA: affirmed the RTC decision by dismissing PNBs
appeal for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not it was error for the Court of Appeals to
rule that petitioner may no longer pursue by civil action
the recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having
foreclosed the property securing the same.
Ruling:
The case at bar involves a foreclosure of mortgage
arising out of a settlement of estate, wherein the
administrator mortgaged a property belonging to the
estate of the decedent, pursuant to an authority given by
the probate court. As the Court of Appeals correctly
stated, the Rules of Court on Special Proceedings comes
into play decisively.
It is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once
the deed of real estate mortgage is recorded in the
proper Registry of Deeds, together with the
corresponding court order authorizing the administrator
to mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid as if it
has been executed by the deceased himself. Section 7

Comparative analysis:
A judgment rendered in a civil action remaining
unsatisfied after 5 years from its date of entry, is reduced
to the condition of a mere right of action but it does not
argue against the proposition that it should be filed with
the probate court for corresponding action. To the
contrary, reduced, as it has been, to the condition of a
mere right of action. Therefore it should be submitted as
a claim to the probate court where the settlement of the
estate of the deceased debtor is pending.
Buan and Paras v. Laya
102 Phil. 682
Facts:
Petitioners herein filed a contingent claim for more than
P500,000 against the intestate estate of the deceased
spouses Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina Paras Buan. The
contingent claim was based on the fact that a Philippine
Rabbit Bus, owned and operated by the deceased
spouses Buan, collided with a car in which Juan C. Laya,
Rodolfo Escosa, Jose S. Palma, and Juan de Leon, were
riding; that the collision was caused by the fact that the
driver of the bus managed and drove the vehicle in a
negligent manner; that as a consequence of the collision
Juan C. Laya was killed and his companions suffered
physical injuries. The driver of the bus was Ernesto
Triguero, and he was charged with homicide and serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence and was
sentenced therefor. The heirs of Juan C. Laya, petitioners
herein, reserved the civil action for damages, they filed an
independent civil action against the administrator of the
deceased spouses Buan. The petition for the admission of
a contingent claim was accompanied with a copy of the
complaint filed in the civil case and a sentence in the
criminal case filed against Ernesto Triguero, driver of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus.
When the administrators learned of the filing of the
provides in part:
Sec. 7. Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate The court
having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may
authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal
estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real
estate, in cases provided by these rules when it appears
necessary or beneficial under the following regulations:
(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the
province in which the real estate thus sold, mortgaged, or
otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the
order of the court, together with the deed of the executor
or administrator for such real estate, which shall be valid
as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his
lifetime.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the conditions
under the aforecited rule have been complied with. It
follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86,
appropriately applicable to the controversy at hand.
Case law now holds that this rule grants to the
mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually
exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by
the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in
case the mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from
the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any
deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the
same at any time before it is barred by prescription
without right to file a claim for any deficiency.
Clearly, in our view, petitioner herein has chosen the
mortgage-creditors option of extrajudicially foreclosing
the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now
bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate
of the deceased, Antonio M. Chua. Petitioner may no
longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the
balance of indebtedness against said estate, after
petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage
in its favor. It follows that in this case no further liability
remains on the part of respondents and the late Antonio
M. Chuas estate.
Comparative analysis:
The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure
is that the creditor waives his right to recover any
deficiency from the estate. The result of extrajudicial
foreclosure is that the creditor waives any further
deficiency claim. Thus: When account is further taken of
the fact that a creditor who elects to foreclose by
extrajudicial sale waives all right to recover against the
estate of the deceased debtor for any deficiency
remaining unpaid after the sale it will be readily seen that
the decision in this case will impose a burden upon the
estates of deceased persons who have mortgaged real
property for the security of debts, without any
compensatory advantage.
E. GASKELL & CO., INC vs. TAN SIT
G.R. No. 18405
Facts:
Dy Poco was declared bankrupt in a proceeding
instituted by some of his creditors in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, and short he died. Nevertheless,
the insolvency proceedings continued their course and
in the end an order was made discharging the debtor
or his estate from all liability upon provable
claims, as contemplated in section 69 of the Insolvency
Law. Meanwhile, Tan Sit, the widow of Dy Poco, had
qualified as his administratrix, for the purpose chiefly,
of realizing upon a policy of insurance of P25,000 in
force upon the life of Dy Poco at the time of his death.
In this she was successful.
Prior to the institution of the bankruptcy proceeding
above alluded to, Gaskell & Co., the plaintiff herein, as
customs broker for Dy Poco, joined wit the latter in a
written application to the Philippine Guaranty Co.,
requesting said company to become surety on a bond
which the Insular Collector of Customs had required Dy
Poco to give inorder to secure the delivery of certain
merchandise arriving from abroad for which Dy Poco
was at that time unable to produce the proper bill of
lading. Pursuant to said application the Philippine
Guaranty Company executed a bond. Dy Poco
contingent claim in the Court of First Instance, they filed an
opposition thereto on the ground that the same was not
filed before the death of the spouses Florencio Buan and
Rizalina Paras Buan and that it was also not filed within
the period prescribed by Rule 89, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court.
RTC: admitted the claim in an order, but denied the prayer
that a portion of the estate be set aside to respond for the
amount of the contingent.
MR: set aside its previous order of December 16, 1953,
admitting the contingent claim of petitioners. The reason
for the admission of the claim, according to the court, had
ceased to exist and even the plaintiffs had filed the
amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the same has not yet been acted upon by the said
court.
Issue:
Whether or not the court was erroneous in their conception
of a contingent claim
Ruling:
The order of the court dismissing the claim and declaring
that the same may again be entertained if another valid
complaint by the petitioners herein is filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, is inconsistent with the nature and
character of a contingent claim. A contingent claim does
not follow the temporary orders of dismissal of an action
upon which it is based; it awaits the final outcome thereof
and only said final result can cause its termination. The
rules provide that a contingent claim is to be presented in
the administration proceedings in the same manner as any
ordinary claim, and that when the contingency arises which
converts the contingent claim into a valid claim, the court
should then be informed that the claim had already
matured. (Secs. 5. 9, Rule 87.) The order of the court
subject of the appeal should, therefore, be set aside.
Comparative analysis:
A 'contingent claim' against an estate within the statute
providing for the settlement hereof, as one where the
absolute liability depends on some future event which may
never happen, and which therefore renders such liability
uncertain and indeterminable. It is where the liability
depends on some future event after the debtor's death
which may or may not happen.
The validity of the contingent claim is apparent; as the
driver of the bus belonging to the deceased spouses,
Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, was found guilty
of negligence, as a result of which Juan C. Laya died, the
said deceased spousesthe employers of the drivercan
be made responsible, as masters of a servant, for
damages for the death of the petitioner's father. A portion
of the estate should therefore, be set aside to respond for
such damages as petitioners herein may subsequently
recover in the action they have brought in the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
SUILIONG & CO., as liquidators of The Yek Tong Lim
Fire vs. SILVINA CHIO-TAYSAN
G.R. No. L-4777
Facts:
Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a
certain tract of land, which was duly inscribed in her
name in the land registry of the city of Manila. She
borrowed from Francisca Jose, the intervener and
appellant in this action, 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency,
and turned over her title deeds to this tract of land to the
lender as security for the loan, but no entry touching the
transaction was noted in the land registry.
defaulted in his undertaking to produce the bill of lading
corresponding to the merchandise which had been
delivered to him, and said document was afterwards
produced by the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation, an innocent holder thereof for value; and
demand was made by this bank upon the Insular
Collector of Customs for the delivery of the same
merchandise that had previously been delivered to Dy
Poco. Upon the preceding statement it is evident that
the Philippine Guaranty Company, having paid out a
sum of money in the character of surety for Dy Poco,
had a right to be exonerated by the latter; and
accordingly said company duly proved this claim in the
insolvency proceeding that had been instituted against
Dy Poco.
RTC: Claim was disallowed
Issue:
Whether or not the the appellants claim against Dy
Poco is a contingent claim,
Ruling:
There can be no question that the claim of Gaskell &
Co against Dy Poco is properly designated as a
contingent claim, which may be defined as a claim in
which liability depends on some future event that may
or may not happen, and which makes it uncertain
whether there will ever be any liability. The expression
is used in contradistinction to the absolute claim, which
is subject to no contingency and may be proved an
allowed as a debt by the committee or claims. The
absolute claim is such a claim as, if contested between
living persons, would be proper subject of immediate
legal action and would supply a basis of a judgment for
a sum certain. It will be noted that the term "contingent"
has reference to the uncertainty of the liability and not
to the uncertainty in which the realization or collection
of the claim may be involved.
It necessarily follows that, the claim in question having
been discharged in bankruptcy, it cannot serve as the
basis of recovery against the estate of Dy Poco in
administration. When it happens, as here, that both
bankruptcy proceedings and administration
proceedings are simultaneously conducted over the
estate of a deceased bankrupt, no claim can be proved
against the administrator which is provable in
bankruptcy; and it was partly with a view for making this
point clear that we were at pains to say at the
conclusion of our opinion in Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada vs. Ingersoll and Tan Sit, supra, that the
proceeds of the policy of insurance there awarded to
the administratrix were not liable for any of the debts
provable against Dy Poco in the bankruptcy
proceedings then pending.
Comparative analysis:
The most common example of the contingent claim is
that which arises when a person is bound as surety or
guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead.
Under the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety
has no claim whatever against his principal until he
himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the
obligation which is secured. When he does this, there
instantly arises in favor of the surety the right to compel
the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the
surety has contributed something to the payment of the
debt, or has performed the secured obligation in whole
or in part, he has no right of action against anybody
no claim that could be reduced to judgment.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF PASCUAL
VILLANUEVA. MAURICIA G. DE VILLANUEVA,
vs.PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. L-18403
Facts:
For the administration of the estate of her deceased
husband, Pascual Villanueva, the widow Mauricia G.
Villanueva, petitioned the Court of First Instance of
Agusan, for letters of Administration The petition was set
for hearing and Notice thereof was published on
February 25, March 4, and 11, 1950, in the Manila Daily
Bulletin. At the hearing, other heirs while agreeing to the
placing of estate under administration, opposed the
appointment the widow. The name of Atty. Teodulo R.
Avelina Caballero died and thereafter Silvina Chio-
Taysan, the defendant in this action, instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Manila an action, known, under
the system of civil procedure in existence prior to the
adoption of the present code, as an "action for the
declaration of heirship" the following order declaring her
to be the only and exclusive heir of Avelina Caballero
Silvina Chio-Taysan borrowed the sum of P2,500 from
the Fire and Marine Insurance and Loan Co., of which
the plaintiff is the lawfully appointed liquidator, and
mortgaged the land in question as security for the
repayment of the loan.
Thereafter the husband of Silvina Chio-Taysan instituted
special proceedings under the provisions of the present
Code of Civil Procedure, for the administration of the
estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased, he was, in
accordance with his petition, appointed administrator;
and thereupon, submitted as such administrator, an
inventory of the property of the estate, in which was
included the land in question.
Francisca Jose, the intervener in this action, submitted
her claim to the commissioner appointed in these
proceedings, for the sum of 1,000 pesos, Mexican
currency, loaned the deceased, as above set out which
claim was duly approved. The plaintiff in this action filed
its complaint against the defendant, Silvina Chio-Taysan,
praying for judgment for the amount loaned her as above
set out, and the foreclosure of its mortgage upon the
land.
Francisca Jose was permitted to intervene and file her
separate "complaint in intervention" wherein she set out
the facts touching the loan made by her to Avelina
Caballero, deceased, and prayed that the court declare
the mortgage executed by Silvina Chio-Taysan rescinded
and of no effect; and further that it annul the inscription in
the land registry of the title of Silvina Chio-Taysan to the
land in question; and declare this land subject to her
claim against the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased.
RTC: entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against both the defendant and the intervener.
Hence this review.
Issue:
Whether or not the intervenor is entitled for her claim
Ruling:
The judgment of the trial court should, therefore, be
modified in accordance with the foregoing principles, and
the record will be returned to the trial court where
judgment will be entered modifying the judgment, by
providing that the proceeds of the sale of the land under
the foreclosure proceedings will be deposited with the
clerk of the court, where it will be retained until the
amount of the debt due the intervener and unpaid in the
course of the administration of the estate of Avelina
Caballero shall have been ascertained, whereupon the
said funds shall be applied: first, to extinguish the unpaid
residue, if any, of the claim of the intervener; second, to
pay the debt due the plaintiff in this action; and finally,
the residue, if any, to be paid to the estate of the
deceased; the intervener to have her costs in this action
in both instances.
Comparative analysis:
The judgment of the trial court can be sustained in so far
as it wholly denies relief to the intervener, Francisca
Jose. The trial judge denied the relief prayed for by the
intervener, on the ground that her intervention in this
action was for the purpose of the written title deeds on
the land, and that, since she admitted that she had
admitted her claim against the estate of Avelina
Caballero, deceased, to the committee appointed in the
administration proceedings, she must be taken to have
abandoned, whatever lien she may have held as security
therefor, in accordance with the provisions of section 708
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The prayer of her complaint in intervention, however, is
merely for the rescission and annulment of the mortgage
contract between the loan company and the defendant
Ricaforte, suggested and all the parties agreed. After the
taking the required oath, Atty. Ricaforte entered upon the
performance of his duties. The Clerk of the Agusan CFI,
issued the Notice to Creditors.
Defendant-appellant Philippine National Bank filed in the
administration proceedings, Creditor's Claim for P1,347.
The administrator, opposed alleging that he had no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations therein. As special defenses,
he interposed
That the same indebtedness, if it existed, has already
been paid;
That the caused action for the recovery of the aforesaid
amount is barred by the statute of limitations, for more
than 10 Years have elapsed since the cause of action
accrued up to present time.
The appellant PNB, more than 4 Years after the
opposition of the claim presented by the administrator,
filed a pleading captioned "Petition for an Extension of
time within which to File the Claim of Philippine National
Bank", alleging, among others, that Sec. 2, Rule 87 of
the Rules, allows the filing of claims even if the period
stated in the notice to creditors elapsed, upon cause
shown and on such terms as equitable.
RTC: The claim of the Philippine National Bank against
the estate of the deceased Pascual Villanueva already
barred by the statute of limitations because the claim
was due and demandable since December 20, 1940, but
filed on July 20, 1953
Appellant Bank moved to reconsider the above Order,
arguing that the statute of limitations had been
suspended by the Moratorium Law
MR: denied for lack of merits.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim is already barred
Ruling:
Admittedly, the claim was filed outside of the period
provided for in the Order of the lower court, within which
to present claims against the estate. The period fixed in
the notice lapsed on November 16, 1951 and the claim
was filed on July 20, 1953 or about 1 year and 8 months
late. This notwithstanding, appellant contends that it did
not know of such administration proceedings, not even
its employees in the Branch Office. It is to be noted that
the petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to
Creditors were duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin
and in the Morning Times, respectively, which was a full
compliance with the requirements of the Rules.
Moreover, the supposed lack of knowledge of the
proceedings on the part of appellant and its employees
had been belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence,
consisting of a deposit of an amount of money by the
administrator Of the estate in said Bank. The deposit was
made on December 1, 1951, inspite of which the
appellant Bank only filed its claim on July 20, 1953. The
lower did not find any justifiable reason to give the
extension and for one thing, there was no period to
extend, the same had elapsed.
Comparative Analysis:
It is quite true that the Courts can extend the period
within Which to present claims against the estate, even
after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension
should be granted under special circumstances.
and of the inscription in the land registry of the title of the
defendant, and a declaration that as a creditor of the
estate she has a superior right to that of the plaintiff
company in the proceeds of any sale of the land in
question. She does not seek to enforce her claim and
recover her debt in this proceeding, but merely to prevent
the plaintiff from securing a judgment in this action which
would take out of the estate property which she believes
to be subject to her claim set up in the administration
proceedings. If her contentions are well founded, and if
the estate of the deceased is subject to the payment of
the debts of the deceased in such form that the heirs of
the deceased could not alienate this land free of the
claims of the creditors of the deceased against the land,
for the payment of their claims against the deceased, the
intervener is clearly entitled to at least so much of the
relief she seeks in this action as will have the effect of
preventing the sale of this land under the plaintiff's
foreclosure proceedings, free of the claims of creditors of
the deceased, because, if the plaintiffs in this action were
permitted to foreclosure their mortgage and to recover
their debt from the sale of the land in question, it might
well be that there would not be sufficient property in the
estate to pay the amount of the claim of the intervener
against the estate.
Union Bank of the Philippines vs Santibanez
G.R. No. 149926
Facts:
First Countryside Credit Corporation and Efraim M.
Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of
P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of
the purchase price of 1 unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor. Efraim and his son, Edmund,
executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the
principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of
P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31 st
thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,
this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to
pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of
Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with
accessories, Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed
a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the
FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed
a Continuing Guaranty.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a
holographic will. Subsequently testate proceedings
commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund, as one
of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of
the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the
testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his
sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors;
that is, 2 tractors for Edmund and 1 tractor for Florence.
Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late
father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively
taken by them.
A Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was
executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor,
among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent
by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines to Edmund, but
the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay.
Thus, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money
against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and
Florence,Rule 89, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
RTC: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
CA: Found that the appeal was not meritorious and held
that the petitioner should have filed its claim with the
probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made
in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition
may be had until after the will has been probated.
According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the
holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in
generic terms when the deceased referred to them as all
ERLINDA PILAPIL vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R.
BRIONES
G.R. No. 150175
Facts:
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-
Briones (Donata), consisting of her surviving sister,
Rizalina Ortiz- Aguila; Rizalinas
daughter, Erlinda Pilapil; and the other nephews and
nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other
sisters who hadalso passed away.
Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the
late Maximino Briones composed of his nephews and
nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in
representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino.
On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a
nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for
Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of
Maximino, which was initially granted
by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, allowing
Silverio to collect rentals from Maximinos properties.
But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set
Aside the Order, claiming that the said properties were
already under his andhis wifes administration as part
of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverios Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was
subsequently set aside by the RTC.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a
Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of
Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession of real property.
They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the
estate of Maximino, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the
knowledge of the other heirs,
succeeded in registering in her name the real
properties belonging to the intestate estate
of Maximino.
RTC: rendered its Decision in favor of the heirs
of Maximo, declared that the heirs of Maximino were
entitled to of the real properties
covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21543, 21544, 21545,
21546, and 58684. It also ordered Erlinda
to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said properties
and to render an accounting of the fruits thereof.
CA: in its Decision, promulgated affirmed the RTC
Decision
In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found
the Petition meritorious and, reversing
the Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the
Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession of real property filed by the heirs
of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794. This Court
summed up its findings
Issue:
other properties. Moreover, the active participation of
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount
to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision
Issue:
Whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the
obligation of the deceased.
Ruling:
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the
petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the
successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.
The petitioner in its complaint alleged that by virtue of the
Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by
and between First Countryside Credit Corporation and
Union Bank of the Philippines However, the
documentary evidence clearly reflects that the parties in
the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were
the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank,
with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc.
Nowhere can the petitioners participation therein as a
party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or
testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show
that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact,
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines.
Comparative analysis:
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate
in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for
the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees,
or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation
and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate
in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
Whether or not petitioners contention of fraud for
failing to declare that there are other
heirs is meritorious.
Ruling:
Court ruled in the negative, since there was insufficient
evidence to establish that Donata committed fraud. It
should be remembered that Donata was able to secure
certificates of title to the disputed properties which
declared her as Maximinos sole heir.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, the Court
accorded the presumptions of regularity and validity
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that
Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court
was not able to order that these siblings be given
personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should
be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether
testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem and that the
publication in the newspapers of the filing of the
application and of the date set for the hearing of the
same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to
the whole world of the existence of the proceedings
and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the
publication.
This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order
was the result of the intestate proceedings
instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this Court
pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which
the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the
presumption of regularity, and encompassed in such
presumption is the order of publication of the notice of
the intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails
to show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI
also failed to order the publication in newspapers of the
notice of the intestate proceedings and to require proof
from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can this
Court find any reason or explanation as to why
Maximinos siblings could have missed the published
notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.
Moreover, even if Donatas allegation that she was
Maximinos sole heir does constitute fraud, it
is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order.
Comparative Analysis:
Considering the nature of intestate proceedings as
being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the
regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise
of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the
questioned order. The publication requirement of the
notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of
informing all interested parties in the estate of the
deceased of the existence of the settlement
proceedings, most especially those who were not
named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless
of whether such omission was voluntarily or
involuntarily made.