NEGOTIATION WITH TERRORISTS

Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy , United States of America president

Terrorism can be defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against

noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. Terrorist actions usually
involve bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, barricade and hostage situations,
(or) hijackings. Such actions have many aims including vengeance, publicizing grievances,
freeing imprisoned comrades, disrupting negotiations between moderates, changing government
policies, provoking a disproportionate backlash from the authorities, demonstrating the
possibility of resistance against the authorities, and showing that the authorities are too weak to
protect their constituents.1
To be easier to understand, the terrorism could also be defined by using three important
characteristics: (1) a violent means (2) aimed at triggering political change (3) by affecting a
larger audience than its immediate target.2
Combating terrorists
Most governments prefer combat over the other strategies because it requires no concessions,
grants no legitimacy, and is consistent with the norm of punishing illegal violence. Since
terrorists usually hide their identities and locations, successful combat requires the gathering of
intelligence through the use of electronic surveillance, the interrogation of prisoners, or bribing
of informants. When prisoners or informants talk to the authorities, it sows distrust among the
terrorists, and makes them more vulnerable. Other combative tactics include direct efforts to
block terrorist actions, through the use of curfews, identification cards, checkpoints, fences, and
the like, and efforts to deny the terrorists resources such as funds, arms, and training facilities. As
mentioned earlier, combat is often successful with terrorists who do not represent substantial

1
Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation with terrorists, 2006, p 1

Harmonie Toros, We Dont Negotiate with Terrorists!: Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist
2

Conflicts, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2008, p 3

constituencies. It is much less successful when terrorists are imbedded in large populations with
deeply felt grievances, as in the case of most ethno-nationalist terrorist groups, including al
Qaeda. Supporters within these populations can provide funds, housing and food; they can
replace them when they are killed, attack government forces who are trying to capture them, and
deny intelligence to the authorities. Furthermore, the ranks of terrorists and their supporters often
increase as a result of a vicious circle in which government efforts to fight terrorists actually
alienate members of the population in which these groups are embedded, which produces even
heavier terrorist activity. Thus, efforts to kill terrorists often injure innocent people and destroy
their property. Curfews, fences, and checkpoints tend to enrage the populations involved; the
harsh treatment of prisoners, while it may yield useful information, often alienates the
populations from which the prisoners are drawn. All of these tactics strengthen terrorist groups.
This vicious circle is such a predictable phenomenon that it is often welcomed and courted by
terrorists.3
Strategies for dealing with terrorists
Five often overlapping strategies are available for dealing with terrorists:
Capitulating -meeting the terrorists demands.
Combating- seeking to defeat the terrorists.
Isolating-making concessions to supporters or potential supporters ( including political reform)
in an effort to undercut the terrorists also known as marginalizing.
Mainstreaming-trying to lure the terrorists into normal politics.
Negotiating-seeking an agreement that will end the terrorists campaign.
Capitulating is uncommon except when terrorists have very moderate demands. One reason for
this is the fear that capitulation will encourage further terrorism, a fear that is supported by
research findings. Because this strategy is uncommon, no more will be said about it.4
Negotiation
Lets focus now on the last one and lets see in what conditions we do this (who?, when?, how?,
etc.). Maybe the term negotiation is hard to be understood in its fully meaning so thats why
many wrong interpretations could occure and many of us, political involved ones or simply
citizens, could see an intention to negotiations as a capitulation or as a proof that our government

3
Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation with terrorists, 2006, p 4
4
Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation with terrorists, 2006, pp 3-4
or democracy is a weak, unprepared an less informed. Gary Noesner retired as the Chief of the
FBI's Crisis Negotiation Unit following a 30 year career. He was heavily involved in numerous
prison riots, right-wing militia standoffs, religious zealot sieges, terrorist embassy takeovers,
airplane hijackings, and over 120 overseas kidnapping cases. In 2003 he became an international
kidnap risk consultant. It would be a wise action to read an approved opinion based not only on
readings and scientifical researches, but, more important, on the whole-life experience of of Mr.
Gary Noesner. That is his opinion regarding the negotiation term: The problem arises from the
misunderstanding of the term negotiate. Many embrace the false belief that negotiations are
synonymous with capitulation or acquiescence, and are therefore unacceptable. Correctly
understood, negotiation is simply a dialogue between parties attempting to resolve a
disagreement. While some may erroneously infer that negotiation means making substantive
concessions, it does not. All agree that our government should not make substantive concessions
which reward terrorists for their actions, including the release of prisoners. However, this tough
stance does not require repeated public declaration that we will not negotiate, nor should we let
this unequivocal phrase inhibit our willingness to open a channel of communications with
terrorists in an attempt to save lives.5
A wide range of variables can determine the efficacy of negotiations, including the nature of the
organization (with hierarchical groups having an advantage over groups that cannot control their
members actions), the nature of the leadership (groups with a strong leader having an advantage
over those that are decentralized), and the nature of public support for the cause (where groups
with constituencies who tire of violence are more likely to compromise).
Political Stalemate
Negotiations are best initiated when both sides sense that they have achieved a situation
where further violence is counterproductive. William Zartman coined the phrase hurting
stalemate to refer to the most promising circumstances for talks in internal conflicts. From the
perspective of a challenger group that mainly uses terrorism, this situation reflects a political
rather than a military status. Zartman also detailed four stages of insurgency articulation,
mobilization, insurgency, and warfare. It is because terrorist groups remain essentially in the
phase of mobilization that they are particularly difficult to negotiate with: the level of

5
Gary Noesner, Negotiating with terrorists, The Negotiator Magazine, April 2013, p 1
mobilization determines the incentives of the group. Thus, it is crucial to determine the degree of
popular support for a group and its cause. Generally, groups are more likely to compromise if
their popular support is waning. On the other hand, if a group perceives that the domestic
constituency of a state is shifting in directions that serve its interests or responds favorably (from
its perspective) to violence, it will wait to negotiate.
Negotiations with terrorist groups occur most easily in situations where the group perceives itself
to be losing ground in the conflict. This may occur for a number of reasons. There may be
competition for support with other groups, as was the case with the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and the rise of competitors in the intifada. Or there may be infiltration by
government agents, as was the case in the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) throughout
the 1990s. Or the group may perceive an undercutting of popular support, as did the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers) in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Quite often the
erosion of support is the result of the groups own miscalculations, leading to a backlash by
its own actual (or intended) constituency. Public opinion may be passionately repulsed by
targeting errorsas was the case with the Real IRA following the Omagh bombings, the Red
Brigades following the killing of Aldo Moro, and the Egyptian Islamist group al-Gamaa al-
Islamiyya following the killing of sixty-two Western tourists in Luxor. All of these things (and
others) may result in an erosion of political support and a sense that the group is losing ground.
Another impetus for talks is increases in civilian casualties among the groups constituency that
are directly caused by the group (not the government). It seems an obvious point, but if a group
is killing large numbers of its own people (i.e., not just targeted killings of rival factions), it will
lose political ground. Intelligent counterterrorism strategy aims to manipulate political
conditions, particularly by ensuring that a focus on military means does not work at odds with
the political realm. In determining whether negotiations are promising or unpromising, therefore,
a thorough understanding of the political context is more important than either the tactical facts
on the ground or the substance of the talks themselves. Related to this, governments should be
mindful that the military situation may not be improved by negotiations, especially in the short
term. Groups sometimes enter talks to relieve pressure on themselves and to rearm. The
PIRA continued to rearm following the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, buying guns in Florida
and importing AN-94 rifles from Russia. The Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) announced
a cease-fire in 1998 following a public backlash to its murder of a popular young councillor and
then renounced the cease-fire in 1999, claiming that it had wanted a reprieve from government
pressure in order to rearm. Because of the risky nature of negotiations for both sides, it is naive
to expect groups to halt their usual preparations for violence. This is why entering into
negotiations should be seen as another form of competitive interaction, to be decided upon
according to its merits and on local conditions, approached as a process, and accompanied by
low expectations for changes in behavior, especially in the short term. Keeping the population
patient, its expectations realistic, is probably the most important and difficult task any
negotiating government faces as talks unfold.
Suicide attacks
The presence of suicide attacks is an unpromising factor for successful negotiations, because
they reduce the ability and willingness of populations to live side-by-side. Those involved have
much greater incentive to be separated from one another physically, as intermingling among
different ethnic, sectarian, religious, or national groups carries with it the possibility that some of
those among them may prove to be human bombs. And the attention given to such attacks
enhances their psychological effect, heightening the intimidation of potential victims but also
enlarging the sense of a sacrifice investment on the part of the group. Suicide attacks force a
sociological and cultural shift in societies that experience them, causing changes that are difficult
to overcome. It is not a coincidence that the most intransigent and difficult negotiations of the
late 1990s were in Israel-Palestine and Sri Lanka. In such circumstances, it is uniquely difficult
to separate talks from the passions that surround them. The increasing prevalence of suicide
campaigns internationally is thus a discouraging development.
Strong leadership
Terrorism is a type of violence employed most often in situations where the population is not
sufficiently activated for a cause. Targeting noncombatants is a means of mobilization and
garnering support, in addition to intimidating a target and spreading fear. Talks are most
promising when there are strong leaders on both sides, able to mobilize support for alternatives
to violent behavior instead. The role of a leader who advocates terrorism is distinctive. Political
science professor Charles King has argued that a change of leadership can increase the likelihood
of successful negotiations in civil wars, but it is not at all clear that this dynamic operates in the
same way with campaigns characterized primarily by terrorist attacks. Leaders who have
negotiated, including such figures as Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness in Northern Ireland
and Pedro Antonio Marin of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, have frequently
been held personally responsible for the success or failure of the talks. And of course failure
damages the political prospects of government policymakers as well; but generally the state is
not damaged as much as is the group. Even when they falter, negotiations have a longterm
impact upon a terrorist leaders credibility, complicating his efforts to perpetuate the absolutist
perspective that is so necessary to justify this tactic. From a government perspective, the
importance of strong leadership is widely recognized, as well as the need for a strong bipartisan
consensus in favor of a peace process. Negotiations by democratic states are virtually impossible
without both. Likewise, a strong, charismatic terrorist leader who pursues talks and can at least
pretend to distance himself from the violence can be equally crucial to successfully easing a
campaign toward decline. Nudging such a leader toward compromise holds the potential of
bringing his constituency with him. On the other hand, when groups will not compromise, it is
vital to consider very carefully how their leaders are targeted by a state. Comparative historical
case studies indicate, for example, that if the goal is to end campaigns, arresting leaders has more
often been effective than assassinating them, as a way of undercutting a political movement over
time. Talks often become more difficult following a leadership change. If the group survives the
transition, a change of leadership may result in a more diffuse organization that is more difficult
to parley with, as its different parts chase different aims. Because it targets civilians, the size of a
terrorist group is not necessarily correlated with its ability to kill, so fractionation might make the
violence worse, especially in the short term.6
Sponsors
The role of third-party states neighboring or having interests in a conflict is crucial, as are
mediators, outside guarantors, and other external actors willing to push along or support
negotiations. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process could not have begun without the Israeli
governments realization that it could not circumvent the PLO by talking to Jordan, Syria, or
non-PLO Palestinians within the occupied territories. But the failure of key Arab states such as
Syria to demonstrate a commitment to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process also helped to
undermine it, even as the United States unsuccessfully tried to facilitate the talks. The signing of
the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Republic of Irelands subsequent efforts to influence and

6
Audrey Kurth Cronin, When we should talk with terrorists ? , United States Institute of
Peace, 2010, pp 5-7
support Northern Ireland republicans provided an international framework and safety net and
was arguably a key turning point in the early moves toward peace. Early facilitators for talks
have been especially important in negotiations with groups that use terrorism, both because these
groups are typically clandestine, and because the domestic political cost to a government that
reaches out to a terrorist group is potentially high. Using figures that are considered by both sides
to have a degree of legitimacy is crucial, not least because they provide political cover. Early
contacts may be made by religious leaders or other private citizens (as in the PIRA), or other
nongovernmental organizations (as in South Africa and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, among
other cases). Governments may also use third-party government intermediaries: for example, the
Reagan administration used Swedish foreign minister Sten Andersson to pass messages to Yassir
Arafat. States also regularly use intelligence officers. All of these interim measures help insulate
weak governments from domestic political fallout. Early contacts may evolve from confidential
interactions among private citizens to public dialogues involving organized lectures, panels,
discussions, etc., and on to more formal prenegotiations, such as seminars between influential
people in closed, neutral environments and even secret meetings between low- or mid-level
representatives aimed at hammering out agreements. Good negotiated agreements in conflicts
that are as complicated as terrorist campaigns often have an element of ambiguity that actors can
interpret in ways that suit their constituents. Indeed, clarity in the negotiations is not necessarily
a desirable goal, as it can actually undermine long-term prospects for peace if carefully
orchestrated, precisely worded agreements spark additional conflict. Ensuring continued
interaction of the parties, providing a potential avenue out of terrorism, and offering the elusive
hope of a peace dividend may be the best that can be expected for a while.
Context
A last crucial element in determining whether negotiations hold promise to end terrorist attacks
is whether terrorist groups and governments are aware of the broader historical context within
which they are operating and whether they each adapt to it effectively not least because
terrorist movements tend to come in waves. Of particular concern is the relationship between
terrorist groups who share sources of inspiration globally. Looking broadly at campaigns that
have actually ended in a negotiated agreement, they have all involved groups whose cause was
no longer in the ascendancy on the international stage. The most successful negotiations occurred
with groups that were a part of the wave of decolonization that occurred in the mid- to late
twentieth century and faced colonial powers that were on the defensive for other reasons,
including the Greek Cypriot Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, the Algerian Front de
Libration Nationale, and the Kenyan Mau Mau, for example. This global influence can be seen
in a very practical way in Northern Ireland, where the angry moral overtones of the Northern
Irish peace process were replaced by a kind of pragmatism, especially on the part of the British.
And although negotiations with the Basque ETA have so far been unsuccessful, the Good Friday
Agreement in Northern Ireland was an important factor driving ETA to talk. A changing
international context may be essential to successful negotiations. Popular ideas about the state
and human aspirations do matter in the resolution of local conflicts that employ symbolic
violence aimed at broader audiences, and those ideas in turn are influenced by the fate of local
actors, especially in the context of increasingly globalized communications that project the
narratives of terrorist campaigns far beyond their usual constituencies. Talks with groups whose
global cause is perceived to be on the ascendancy in terms of broad-based political support are
unpromising.7
Conclusion
As a final conclusion of those written above, I think that it is not wise to totally reject the idea of
negotiation but to be continuously informed about the situation of the factors which influence the
negotiation (leadership, sponsors, etc.) and to speculate on the moment when these factors are at
a favorable moment for the start of the negotiations.

7
Audrey Kurth Cronin, When we should talk with terrorists ? , United States Institute of
Peace, 2010, p 9-10